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THE AMERICAN CASEBOOK SERIES
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THE ﬁrst of the American Casebook Series, Mikell’s Cases on Crim
inal Law, issued in December, 1908, contained in its preface an able
argument by Mr. ]ames Brown Scott, the General Editor of the Se
ries, in favor of the case method of law teaching.
Until 1915 this
preface appeared in each of the volumes published in the series.
I
But the teachers of law have moved onward, and the argument
0
That such
in 1908 has now become needless.
5) that was necessary
is the case becomes strikingly manifest to one examining three im
"9
portant documents that ﬁttingly mark the progress of legal education
I
in America.
In 1893 the United States Bureau of Education pub
(‘I
lished a report on Legal Education prepared by the American Bar As
sociation’s Committee on Legal Education, and manifestly the work
‘of that Committee's accomplished chairman, William G. Hammond,
by
E in which the three methods of teaching law then in vogue—that
lectures, by text—book, and by selected cases-—were described and com
mented upon, but without indication of preference.
The. next report
of the Bureau of Education dealing with legal education, published
l‘l‘in 1914, contains these unequivocal statements:
"“ “To-day the case method forms the principal,
not the exclusive,
method of teaching in nearly all of the stronger law schools of the
Lectures on special subjects are of course still delivered in
country.
all law schools, and this doubtless always will be the case.
But for
staple instruction in the important branches of common law the case
has proved itself as the best available material for use practically ev
"‘
The case method
to-day the principal method
erywhere.
of instruction in the great majority of the schools of this country.”
But the most striking evidence of the present stage of development
to be found in the
of legal instruction in American Law Schools
special report, made by Professor Redlich to the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching, on “The Case Method in American
Professor Redlich, of the Faculty of Law in the Uni
Law Schools.”
Vienna,
was brought to this country to make
of
special study
versity
of methods of legal instruction in the United States from the stand
point of one free from those prejudices necessarily engendered in
American teachers through their relation to the struggle for supremacy
so long, and at one" time so vehemently, waged among the rival sys
From this masterly report, so replete with brilliant analysis
tems.
and discriminating comment, the following brief extracts are taken.
Speaking of the text-book method Professor Redlich says:
“The principles are laid down in the text-book and in the profes
sor’s lectures, ready made and neatly rounded, the predigested essence

';""

iv

'

PREFACE

of many judicial decisions. The pupil has simply to accept them and
to inscribe them so far as possible in his memory.
In this way the
scientiﬁc element of instruction is apparently excluded from the very
ﬁrst. Even t/hough the representatives of this instruction certainly do
regard law as a science—that is to say, as a system of thought, a group
ing of concepts to be satisfactorily explained by historical research and
logical deduction—they are not willing to teach this science, but only
its results.
The inevitable danger which appears to accompany this
method of teaching is that of ‘developing a mechanical, superﬁcial in
struction in abstract maxims, instead of ae genuine intellectual probing
of the subject-matter of the law, fulﬁlling the requirements of a
science."
to the case method Professor Redlich comments as follows:
emphasizes the scientiﬁc character of legal thought; it goes now
a step further, however, and demands that law, just because it is a
science,. must also be taught scientiﬁcally. e From this point of view it
very properly rejects the elementary school type of existinglegal edu
cation as inadequate to develop the speciﬁc legal mode of thinking, as
inadequate to make the basis, the logical foundation, of the separate
legal principles really intelligible to the students. Consequently, as the
method was developed, it laid the main emphasis upon precisely that
aspect of the training which the older text-book school entirely neg
lected—the training of the student in intellectual independence, in in
dividual thinking, in digging out the principles through penetrating
analysis of the material found within separate cases; material which
contains, all mixed in with one another, both the facts, as life creates
them, which generate the law, and at the same time rules of the law
In the fact that, as has
itself, component parts of the general system.
been said before, it has actually accomplished this purpose, lies the
great success of the case method. For it really teaches the pupil to
think in the way that any practical lawyer—whether dealing with writ
It prepares the
ten or with unwritten law—ought to and has to think.
student in precisely the way which, in a country of case law, leads to
to say,
full powers of legal understanding and legal acumen; that
by making the law pupil familiar with the law through incessant prac
tice in the analysis of la\v cases, where the concepts, principles, and
rules of Anglo-American law are recorded, not as dry abstractions, but
as cardinal realities in the inexhaustibly rich, ceaselessly ﬂuctuating,
social and economic life of man. Thus in the modern American law
preceded by
genuine course of study,
school professional practice
the methods of which are ‘perfectly adapted to the nature of the com
'
mon law.”
The general purpose and scope of this series were
clearly stated in
V
the original announcement:
series of schol
“The General Editor takes pleasure in announcing
arly casebooks, prepared with special reference to the needs and limi

Turning

a

'

a

is

i's

“It

PREFACE
tations of the classroom, on the fundamental subjects of legal educa
tion, which, through a judicious rearrangement of emphasis, shall pro
vide adequate training combined with a thorough knowledge of the
general principles of the subject. The collection will develop the law
English cases will give the origin and
historically and scientiﬁcally;
development of the law in England; American cases will trace its ex
pansion and modiﬁcation in America; notes and annotationswill sug
Cumulative references will be
gest phases omitted in the printed case.
avoided, for the footnote may not hope to rival the digest. The law
will thus be presented as an organic growth, and the necessary con
nection between the past and the present will be obvious.
"The importance and difficulty of the subject as well as the time that
can properly be devoted to it will be carefully considered so that each
book may be completed within the time allotted to the particular sub
ject. * 1* * If it be granted that all, or nearly all, the studies re
quired for admission to the bar should be studied in course by every
student—and the soundness of this contention can hardly be seriously
doubted—it follows necessarily that the preparation and publication of
collections of cases exactly adapted to the purpose would be a genuine
and by no means unimportant service to the cause of legal education.
And this result can best be obtained by the preparation of a systematic
series of casebooks constructed upon a uniform plan under the super
*
* "‘
vision of an editor in chief.
“The preparation of the casebooks has been intrusted to experienced
and well-known teachers of the various subjects included, so that the
experience of the classroom and the needs of the students will furnish
a sound basis of selection.”
4
Since this announcement of the Series was ﬁrst made there have
published books on the following subjects:

been

By Ernst Freund,
Administrative Law.
University of Chicago.

Professor of Law in

the

Second Edition. By Edwin C.
Agency; including M aster and Servant.
Goddard, Professor of Law in the University of Michigan.

Bills and N otcs. Second Edition. By Howard L. Smith, Professor of
Law in the University of Wisconsin, and Underhill Moore, Pro
fessor of Law in Columbia University.
Carriers.
By Frederick Green, Professor of Law in the University of
'
‘
Illinois.
Second Edition. By Ernest G. Lorenzen, Pro
Conﬂict of Laws.
fessor of Law in Yale University.
Constitutional Law.
By James Parker Hall, Dean of the Faculty of
in
the
of Chicago.
University
Law
Contracts.

By Arthur L. Corbin, Professor of Law in Yale University.
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Second Edition. By Harry S. Richards, Dean of the
Faculty of Law in the University of Wisconsin.
Criminal Law. By William E. Mikel], Dean of the Faculty of Law in
the University of Pennsylvania.
Criminal Procedure.
By William E. Mikell, Dean of the Faculty of
'
/
Law in the University of Pennsylvania.
Damages. By Floyd R. Mechem, Professor of'Law in the University
of Chicago, and Barry Gilbert, of the Chicago Bar.
Equity.
By'George H. Boke, formerly Professor of Law in the Uni
versity of California.
Equity. By Walter W'heeler Cook, Professor of Law in Yale Uni
versity. Volumes 1 and 3. Volume 2 in preparation.
Evidence.
By Edward W. Hinton, Professor of Law in the Universi
ty of Chicago.
Insurance.
By William R. Vance, Professor of Law ‘in Yale Uni
Corporations.

versity.

International Low. By ]ames Brown Scott, Lecturer on International
Law and the Foreign Relations of the United States in the School
of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. V
Legal Ethics, Cases and Other Authorities on. By George P. Costigan,
_Ir., Professor of Law in the University of California.
Oil and Gas. By Victor H. Kulp, Professor of Law in the University
of Oklahoma.
By Eugene A. Gilmore, Professor of Law in the Uni
Partnership.
versity of Wisconsin.
Persons (including Marriage and Divorce).
By Albert M. Kales, late of
the Chicago Bar, and Chester G. Vernier, Professor of Law in
Stanford University.
Pleading (Common Law). By Clarke B. Whittier, Professor of Law
in Stanford University, and Edmund M. Morgan, Professor of
Law in Yale University.
By Albert M. Kales, late of the Chicago
Property (Future Interests).
Bar.

'

Property (Personal). By Harry A. Bigelow, Professor of Law in the
University of Chicago.
By Harry A. Bigelow, Professor of
Property (Rights in Land).
Law in the University of Chicago.
Property (Titles to Real Property). By Ralph W. Aigler, Professor
of Law in the University of Michigan.
Property (Wills, Descent, and Administration). By George P. Costi
gan, ]r., Professor of Law in the University of California.
Quasi Contracts. By Edward S. Thurston, Professor of Law in Yale
.
University.
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Sales. Second Edition. By
Frederic C. Woodward, Professor of Law
in the University of Chicago.

By Crawford D. Hening,
Suretyship.
in the University of Pennsylvania.

formerly

Professor of Law

Torts. By Charles M. Hepbum, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the
'
University of Indiana.
. _
Trade Regulation.
By Herman Oliphant, Professor of Law in Colum
bia University.
Trusts.
By Thaddeus D. Kenneson, Professor of Law in the Univer
sity of New York.
Casebooks on other subjects are in preparation.

It is earnestly hoped and believed that the books thus far published
in this series, with the sincere‘ purpose of furthering scientiﬁc training
in the law, have not been with_out their inﬂuence in bringing about a
fuller understanding and a wider use of the case method.
WILLIAM R. Vzmce,
General Editor.
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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
In

THE ﬁrst edition of this work no effort was made to cover the
The exigencies of the lawschool
subject of Master and Servant.
curriculum, if not the unity of the subjects, seem to require that Prin
cipal and Agent and Master and Servant be treated in a single course.
Historically the subject of Agency grew out of the much earlier de
Blackstone did not use the
veloped subject of Master and Servant.
term “agent” in reference to the agency relation, nor does he recognize
the subject of Agency apart from that of Master and Servant, and
there only in abrief paragraph. Almost ‘always in the older cases, and
not infrequently to-day, the term “servant” is used inditfefently to
designate one who acts for another, whether ministerially or in estab
lishing contractual relations with third persons.
Reciprocally the word
“agent,” which of course signiﬁes in its origin one who acts for another,
is often used by the courts when a servant is referred to. A
This confused usage, though indicating some lack of precision in
terminology, is natural enough, since in their tort relations fundamental
ly the same rules of law apply indifferently to both agent and servant.
“Qui facit per alium facit per se” is equally applicable to each. Herein
lies the essential unity of the two subjects.
It would be convenient
if inclusive terms, such as constituent and representative, were recog
nized as applying to the .principal or master and the agent or servant.
Though the courts have not done this, yet in this work it is found so
convenient and almost essential in some of the chapter headings that
those terms have been used.
They have the sanction of some legal
writers and of occasional judicial usage.
Op another side, in the cases as we ﬁnd them in .current reports,
there is a great diversity between the two relations. The present im
portance of agency and its great development grow out of the fact that
it is essentially a business relation, developed to meet the imperative
In this it differs widely from its mother
needs of modern business.
subject, and has developed far beyond it and away from it. On the
other hand, the modern extension of the legal rules of master and
servant has introduced the fellow-servant rule and the doctrines of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, all of which have been
largely submerged in the Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Com
pensation Acts; statutes having no application to agency as such,
though sometimes broad enough to include some agents.

(ii)
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This unity and diversity cause embarrassment in the attempt to
treat the two subjects together, but the difficulty is logical rather than
A more real difficulty arises in attempting to give to both
practical.
adequate treatment within the compass of a single casebook of moder
ate size, and this is especially true, in view of the great number
problems growing out of the Workmen’s Compensation Acts.
hoped that the necessary omissions in this second edition have not
fundamental in each subject.
prevented the inclusion of all that
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There is yet a fourth species of servants, if they may be so called,
being rather in a superior, a ministerial, capacity, such as stewards,
factors, and bailiffs, whom, howcver, the law considers as servants pro
tempore, with regard to such of their acts as aﬁect their master's or
employer’s property.

ECHOLS
(Supreme

From

Court or

a conviction

Alabama,

v.
1909.

STATE.
158

Ala.

48,

48

South.

347.)

of embezzlement defendant appeals.

_l.

SIMPSON,
The appellant was convicted of the offense of embez
zlement; the aﬁidavit charging that he, “being an agent, servant, or
clerk of aﬂiant, embezzled or fraudulently converted to his own use
money to about the amount of $18, or fraudulently secretes, with in
tent to convert to his own use, or to the use of another, $18 in money
which has come into his possession by virtue of his oﬁice or employ
ment.”
The evidence for the state, in its strongest light against the

\

Gonn.Pn.& A.(2n En.)—1

\
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(Part

1

defendant, is that the defendant, being a tailor, agreed to make a suit
the prosecutor for a certain amount of money, part of
which was to be paid in cash and the remainder to be paid in the fu
ture; that the prosecutor made the cash payment and demanded his
suit of clothes; that defendant refused to deliver it without the pay
ment of more money, and also refused to return his money.
_
This court said, in discussing a former statute (which was identical
with section 6831 of the Code of 1907, in so far as the point involved
is concerned), that an agent is “one who undertakes to transact some
business or to manage some affair for another, by the authority and on
“
account of the latter, and to render an account of it"; also that ‘agent,’
as employed in this section, imports a principal, and implies employ
ment, service, delegated authority to do something in the name and
stead of the principal.”
Pullam v. State, 78 Ala. 31,‘ 34-, 56 Am. Rep.
21.
The relation of principal and agent did not exist between the
prosecutor and the defendant, but the relation of seller and purchaser.
The defendant did not undertake to do anything in the name and stead
of the prosecutor. The money was not placed in his hands to be used
or cared for, and accounted for to the prosecutor, but was paid to him
in part -settlement for a suit of clothes, and thereby became the money
of the defendant, to use as he pleased. Whatever other liability or
penalty the defendant may have incurred, he could not be convicted
of embezzlement on the facts of this case. Consequently the defend
ant was entitled to the general charge, as requested and refused.
The judgment of the court is"reversed, and the cause remanded.

of clothes for

ii,

STERNAMAN

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

(Court of Appeals of New York. 1902. 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763. 57 L. R. A.
318, S8 Am. St. Rep. 625.)

Appeal from a judgment for defendant in an action upon a policy
of insurance issued to plaintiff upon the life of her husband, George
Sternamanf The contract provided that the application for the insur
ance should becoine part of the contract of ‘insurance, and that the
medical examiner, in writing in the answers of the applicant, was the
Upon the death of the
agent of the latter and not of the company.
insured payment of the policy was refused, on the ground that some
of the answers written in by the medical examiner were not true, and
'

was void.
The decision of this appeal
VANN. ].1
[After stating the factsz]
turns substantially upon the following question: When an applicant
for life insurance makes truthful answers to all questions asked by the
hence

1

the policy

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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medical examiner, who fails to record them as given, and omits an
important part, stating that it is unimportant, can the beneﬁciary show
the answers actually given, in order to defeat a forfeiture claimed by
the insurer on account of the falsity of the answers as recorded, even
if it was agreed in the application that the medical examiner, employed
and paid by the insurer only, should not be its agent, but solely the
"
agent of the insured?
The power to contract is not unlimited. While, as a general rule,
there is the utmost freedom of action in this regard, some restrictions
are placed upon the right by legislation, by public policy, and by the
nature of things. Parties cannot make a binding contract in violation
of law or of public policy. They cannot in the same instrument agree
that a thing exists, and that it does not exist, or provide that one is the
agent of the other, and at the same time, and with reference to the
same subject, that there is no relation of agency between them.
They
cannot bind themselves by agreeing that a loan in fact void for usury is
not usurious, or that a copartnership which actually exists between
them does not exist.
They cannot by agreement change thelaws of
nature or of logic, or create relations, physical, legal, or moral, which
cannot be created. In,other words, they cannot accomplish the impos
sible by contract.
_
The parties to the policy in question could agree that the person who
ﬁlled out part A of the application was the agent of the insured and
not of the company. There is a difference in the nature of the work
of ﬁlling out the blank to be signed by the insured, and that of ﬁlling
The
out the blank furnished for the use of the medical examiner.
former is the work of the insured, and may be done as well by one
person as by another. He may do it himself, or appoint an agent to do
it for him. It is quite different, however, with the work of the medical
examiner, because that requires professional skill and experience and
the insurer permits it to be done only by its own appointee. The in
sured can neither do that work himself, nor appoint a physician to do
because the insurer very properly insists upon making the selection
itself. The medical examiner was selected, employed, and paid by the
The insured had nothing to do with him, except to submit
company.
to an examination by him, as the expert of the company, and to answer
the questions asked by him in"behalf of the company. This he was
forced to do in order to procure insurance; for the company required
medical examination ‘by an examiner selected and
him to undergo
would act upon his application for
instructed by itself, before
pol
icy. He could neither refuse to be examined, nor select the exam
the latter was negligent or unﬁt for
iner, and he was not responsible
the duty assigned to him. He could not direct or control him, but the
required him to make the examination,
company could and did; for
of the application blank, arid report_the facts with his
ﬁll out part
The insured made no contract with the examiner, and was
opinion.
under no obligation to pay him for his services. The company, how
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contract with him to do cer-tain work for
and agreed
the work when done.
As between the examiner and the insured, the relation of principal
and agent did not exist, while, as between the examiner and the com
pany, that relation did exist by operation of law; yet
claimed
that, as between the insured and the company, the examiner was the
agent of the former only, because he had so agreed, not with the ex
aminer, but with the company itself.
Under the circumstances, an
agreement that the ‘physician was the agent of the insured was like
an agreement that the company or its president was his agent.
was in contradiction of every act of the parties and of every fact known
to either.
The law, when applied to the facts, made the physician
the agent of the company, and not of the insured;
and can
be held
that, as the insured agreed that the physician was his_agent, he became
such in spite of the law and the facts?
not
case of agency
This
of one party for one purpose, and of another party for
different pur
pose; for the ‘physician was employed for
single purpose only, and
that was to make
physical examination of the insured, ask him the
questions furnished by the company, record his answers, and report
the result. They were not the questions of the insured, put to himself,
to elicit facts for his use.
He knew the facts. He did not need to
question himself to ﬁnd out what he knew, nor to employ an agent for
that purpose.
The questions were those of the company, carefully
prepared for
by skillful hands, and furnished to its medical examiner
to be asked, so that
could learn what the insured knew about him
self. It needed the facts for its use, and “what was done by its own
examiner to get the facts and report them to the company was its work,
done for its beneﬁt and in the course of its business.
The answers
were not volunteered, but were given in response to questions asked by
the company, as much as if, inipersonated,
had actually asked them
VVliatever
as an individual.
in the
told Dr. Langley to do for
did itself.
alium,
view of the law,
facit
facit
se.”
per
per
“Qui
appointed Dr. Langley its agent for the purpose named, and he derived
all his authority to act from the company, which could regulate his
conduct by its rules, and could provide for such security to protect
its interests from the consequences of his neglect or default as
saw
ﬁt.
.
cer
Can parties agree that facts, which the law declares establish
tain relation, not only do not’ establish that relation, but establish di
deﬁnite ‘purpose,
rectly the opposite? Can A. appoint B. his agent for
not the agent of A., but
and then agree with C. that B.
the agent
of C. for that purpose; there being no agreement whatever between B.
and C.?
An agency
created by contract, express or implied.
It “is a~legal
relation by virtue of which one party (the agent)
employed and au
thorized to represent and act for the other (the principal) in business
ever, made

to pay him
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dealings with third persons.’ The distinguishing features of the agent
are his representative character and his derivative authority.” 3 Mech
em, Ag. § 1; Story, Ag. § 3. “To constitute agency there must be
consent both of principal and of agent.” Whart. Ag. § 1. VVhat was
The defendant,
the contract between the company and the examiner?
Having some work
being a corporation, could act only through agents.
to do in the form of a medical examination, it requested Dr. Langley
to do it. It created the relation of agency between him and itself by
employing him, paying him, etc. It alone could discharge him, and to
it alone was he responsible for disobedience or negligence. It could
control his conduct by any reasonable instructions, and hold him lia
blc if he violated them. It prescribed certain questions that he should
ask, and required him to takedown the answers in a blank prepared
by itself. It could sue him if he did not do it properly, and he could
sue the company if it did not pay him for doing it. Thus we have an
agency between the company and the examiner established by mutual
agreement, with the right on the one -hand to instruct, to discharge, and
to hold liable for default, and on the other to compel payment for serv
ices rendered. Hence what the examiner did in the course of his em
‘ployment the company did, and what he knew from discovery while
acting for it the company knew.
\\/hat was the contract between the insured and the examiner? None
whatever.
The insured did not employ the examiner, and the exam
iner did not agree to work for him. _ Neither was under any legal obli
gation or liabillty to the other. The insured could not instruct the doc
tor, nor discharge him, nor sue him for negligence, and the doctor could
not sue the insured for compensation.
The relation of principal and
agent did not exist between them, either by virtue of any contract or by
operation of law.
What was the contract between the insured and the insurer?
With
the relations above described as existing between the insurer and the
examiner in full force, .and in the absence of any legal relation between
the examiner and the insured, an attempt was made by the insurer, b_v
an agreement imposed upon the insured, to subvert the relation of its
own examiner to itself, and establish a relation between him and the in
sured, without the consent of either given to the other. There was no
tripartite contract. \Vhile the contract between the doctor and the com
pany was still in existence, the latter agreed with a third party only
that that contract did not in fact exist between the two parties who
but did exist between two parties who did not make it. This
made
was not possible by any form of words, any more than to make black
\Ve think that the medical examiner was
white, or truth falsehood.

a

9

2

Harv. Law Rev. $7, agency a trilateral relation. As to the abuse of
See
the word “agent,” see Kennedy v. De Trafford, [1897] A. C. 180, 188.
8Jef[rey Co. v. Lockbridge. 173 Ky. 282, 190 S. W. 1103 (1917),
so-called
automobile agency; International Harvester Co. v. Com., 147 Ky. 655, 145 S.
W. 393 (1912); Fano v. The Registrar, 15 Porto Rico, 313 (1909).
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the agent of theidefendant in making the examination of the in
sured, recording his answers, and reporting them to the -company.
* * *"
t

Judgment reversed.‘

KINGAN
(Appellate

___i.
&

CO.

Court of Indiana,
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SILV_ERS

et

al.

13LInd. App. S0, 37 N. E. 413.)
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Appeal from a judgment for defendant in an action on a promissory
note bearing interest at 8 per cent., “after maturity.”
The note was
procured by p1aintiff’s traveling salesman, one Nichols, who, without
the consent or knowledge of defendants, altered it by striking out the
words “after maturity” and inserting words so as to make it bear 8
per cent. interest “from date.” Plaintiffs never approved the altera
tion, and now sue upon the note as originally made.
It was no part
of the duty of Nichols to make settlements, nor to take notes. but in
this instance he had -been instructed by plaintiffs to procure from de
fendants a note to cover their indebtedness to plaintiffs, and to transmit
the same to his principals.
LOTZ, ].*‘
[After stating the facts, and pointing out the general
principle that public policy demands that a material alteration of a
written instrument shall destroy
so as to prevent
recovery upon
The rules that now prevail, as we gather them from
itz]
the decided ‘cases, are: (1) That the alteration of
note or written in
material matter by
strument in
but
stranger
spoliation, and
and
in its original
does not destroy
recovery may be had on
If
the
the
or
condition.
the
holder
make
an alter-‘
plaintiff,
obligee,
(2)
ation in an immaterial matter, the alteration does not destroy the note,
in its original condition. (3) But
but
recovery may be had on
a material matter, and be purposely or intentionally
the alteration be
made by the plaintiit, the obligee, or the holder, such alteration de
in
stroys the note or instrument, and no recovery can be had upon
the same as one
either
original or altered condition. The last rule
of the rules laid down by Lord Coke in Pigot’s Case, and
still the law.
If the case at bar falls within this latter rule, then the demurrers
were correctly sustained.
The change in the note was not made by
intrusted certain business to
the plaintiiT’s order or direction, but
another as its agent, and such person made the alteration.
If the
teration was made by the agent while in the transaction of the prin
cipal’s business, and in the scope of his authority, then the act of the
facit per alium facit per se.”
the act of the principal;-“qui
agent
The solution of this case depends upon the relation existing between

the opinion is omitted.
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Nichols and the plaintiff at the time the alteration was made.
If he
was the plaintiff's agent, and the act was within the scope of his au
thority, then his act must be deemed the act of the plaintiff, and the
law is with the defendants. If his position was that of a mere stranger
to the note, then the law is with the plaintiff.
[Omitting discussion of the admitted principle that a note wrongfully
altered in a material respect is unenforceable in its altered form, wheth
er the agent were or were not authorized to make the alterations.]
The appellees further insist that Nichols was the agent of the payee
in making the alteration; that he was acting in the line of his agency,
and under color of his employment; that his wrongful act is imputable
In support of this position appellees’ learned counsel
to his principal.
“
‘\\/hatever a man sui juris may do
say this is upon the legal maxim,
of himself, he may do by another,’ and, as a correlative, whatever is
done by such other in the course of his employment is deemed to be
done by the ‘party himself. On this principle the liability of one person
for the acts of another who is employed in the capacity of an agent
is extended to the wrongful and tortious acts of the latter committed
in the line and under color of the agency, although such unlawful acts
were not contemplated by the employment, and were done by the agent
in good faith, and by mistake. In other words, where a principal di
rects an act to be done by an agent in a lawful manner, but the agent
errs in the mode of executing his authority to the prejudice of another
This is a correct state
person, the principal will be held responsible.”
ment of the law. The same principles extend to the relations existing
between a master and his servant. Thus, it the engineer of a railway
company negligently run a train of cars over a person who is without
fault, the company is liable for the injury caused.
The same doctrine
is applied to the willful acts and the mistakes of agents and servants,
committed by them while acting within the scope of the agency or line
of the employment. May v. Bliss, 22 Vt. 477; Luttrell v. Hazen, 3
Sneed (Tenn.) 20; Pennsylvania Co. v. Weddle, 100 Ind. 138; Rail
road Co. v. McKee, 99 Ind. 519, 50 Am. Rep. 102; Crockett v. Cal
vert, 8 Ind. 127.
At the time Nichols made the alteration of the note, was he the agent
or servant of the plaintiff in respect to his duties pertaining to said
rmte? It is averred that he was the traveling salesman, but that he
was not a general agent, and had no authority to make settlements or
take notes on pla.intiFf’s account, nor was that any part ~0f his duties;
that, being about to go to Lebanon in the course of his duties as such
traveling salesman, the plaintiff instructed him to procure for plaintiff
from the defendants a note on account of an indebtedness due from
But the averments of the complaint negativing
them to the plaintiff.
the fact of agency will not control if it appear from all the averments
that the legal relation of agency exists. The same person may be a
special agent for the same principal in several different matters. Nich
ols was the agent of the plaintiff to sell goods. He was also its agent
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to procure the note. VVe are here concerned with the latter agency only.
Did his relation as agent cease when he obtained the note, or did it
continue until the note was delivered to the plaintiff? If the agency
ceased when the note was obtained by him, what relation did he sus
tain to the plaintiff in the interval of time between the delivery to him
and the delivery to the plaintiff? This leads to the inquiry, who are
In the primitive conditions of so-_
agents, and who are servants?
ciety, the things which were the subjects of sale and trade were few
in number. There was little occasion for any one to engage in com
mercial transactions, and when it did become necessary the business
But the
was generally transacted by the parties thereto in person.
strong and ‘powerful had many servants, who were usually slaves.
The servants performed menial and manual services for the master:
As civilization advanced, the things which are the subjects of com
mcrce increased, and it became necessary to perform commercial trans
actions through -the medium of other persons.
The relation of principal and agent is but an outgrowth or expan
sion of the relation of master and servant. The same rules that apply
to the one generally apply to the other. There is a marked similarity
It is often
in the legal consequences ﬂowing from the two relations.
difﬁcult to distinguish the difference between an agent and a servant.
This difﬁculty is increased by the fact that the same individual often
combines in his own person the functions of both agent and servant.
Agents are often denominated servants, and servants are often called
The word “servant” in its broadest meaning, includes an
agents.
however, in legal contemplation,
difference between
agent. There
servant. The Romans, to whom we are indebted for
an agent and
many of the principles of agency, in the early stages of their laws
used the terms “mandatum” (to put into one's hand, or conﬁde to the
discretion of another) and “negotium” (to transact business, or to treat
concerning purchases) in describing this relation.
Story, Ag.
Agency, properly speaking, relates to commercial or business transac
tions, while service has reference to actions upon or concerning things.
An
Service deals with matters of manual or mechanical execution.
the more direct representative of the master, and clothed
agent
servant.
Mechem,
with higher powers and broader discretion than
2.

1,

§§

Ag.
The terms “agent” and “servant”

is

it

a

is

are so frequently used interchange
apt to conclude they mean
ably in the adjudications that the reader
the same thing. VVe thihk, however, that the history of the law bear
diﬁerence between them.
ing on this subject shows that there
Agency, in its legal sense, always imports commercial dealings be
tween two parties by and through the medium of another. An agent
negotiates or treats with third parties in commercial matters for an
other. VV hen Nichols was engaged in treating with the defendants con
cerning the note, he was an agent. \Vhcn the note was delivered to him,
was in law delivered to the plaintiﬁ, and he ceased to treat or deal
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with the defendants. All his duties concerning the note then related to
the plaintiff.
It was his duty to carry and deliver it to the plaintiﬁ.
In doing this he owed no duty to the defendants. He ceased to be an
agent, because he was not required to deal further with third parties
,He was then a mere servant of the plaintiif, charged with the duty of
faithfully carrying and delivering the note to his master. \Vhen Nich
ols made the alteration in the note he was the servant, and not the
agent, of the plaintiff.‘ * * *
judgment reversed.
DAVIS, C. ]., and GAVIN’, ]., dissent.

HOLMES

v.

TENNESSEE COAL, IRON

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. 1897.

49

La. Ann.

& R. CO.

1465, 22 South. 403.)

BREAUX, ]. Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages from
the defendant for asserted negligence in having employed an incom
petent servant, who, it was alleged, threw a large and heavy plank out
of the car he was unloading, inﬂicting a scalp wound upon him (the
plaintiff ), and also fracturing his thigh, causing great pain and perma
nent injury. He was conﬁned 50 days in the hospital, and he was per
manently crippled b_v the blow. The appellant's contention is that the
injury complained of was not one for which it could be held respon
sible; that no act was traced to the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad
Company, but that the injury complained of was inﬂicted by an inde
pendent contractor, for whose negligence the appellant was not re
sponsible. In support of its defense, the appellant averred that it was
a shipper (in cars) of coal to this city, to its agent Grote, who in turn
contracted with one Seals to unload the cars at $1.50 or $2.50 a car;
that Seals was not controlled in unloading the cars. It appears by the
evidence that. when the.accident occurred, Seals was unloading coal
from a car for the Jackson Brewery, on the levee in this city, buyers
and consumers of the coal. The plaintiff was passing near the car at
the time that Seals, aided by a hand he had employed to help him,
was throwing the large and heavy board from the top of a car, which,
The injury, the evidence shows, was in
in falling, struck plaintiff.
connection with the work, i. e. the board was thrown oﬁ’ the car in con
6The rest of the opinion is an historical survey oi! the relation of master
and servant.
it is often said that the distinction between principal and agent
and master and servant is ditiicult to detine. The two relations am essen
tially similar. The true distinction lies in the nature of the service to be
performed and the manner of its performance.
Merritt v. Huber, 137 Iowa,
135, 114 N. W. 627 (l90's').
The distinction is often said to be a question of
discretion; the agent having more or less discretion, while the servant acts
under his master's direction and control.
Singer Mfg. C0. v. Rahn, 132 U.
S. 518. 10 Sup. Ct. 175, 33 L. Ed. 440 (1889); i\icCr0skey v. Hamilton, 108
Ga. 640, 34 S. l-1. 111. T5 Am. St. Rep. 79 (1899); Gibson v. Hardware Co., 94
Ala. 3-I6, 10 South. 304 (1891), post, p. Q,

THE RELATION

10

(Part

1

a

is

is

it

a

a

is

is

is

is

is

a

a

a

is

is

is

a

to

a

a

is

is

a

it.

nection with the work which was being done while unloading
There
‘
was
judgment against the appellant for $2,000.
Servant or Independent Contractor.
The ﬁrst question before us
for determination
whether the person by whose act the injury
charged to have been committed was an independent contractor, and
not appellant's servant.
The employer in this case unquestionably
ruled the servant, who was an old negro who owned the shovel with
which he unloaded the coal from the car. He slept in the coal yard,
and was on the lookout for a job. At times he unloaded carts for the
defendant, for which he was paid by the day. \Vhen he unloaded
car load of coal, he was paid for each car load he unloaded. This was,
as we appreciate the facts, the only difference between the two: when
he unloaded carts, he was paid by the day; when he unloaded cars, he
was paid for each car unloaded by him. Occasionally he employed
hand
help him. If there was delay in unloading cars, the defend
ant would employ additional labor, and attend to the unloading.
From
the facts proven, we judge that the old man could quit when he pleased.
The employer, on the other hand, could discharge him at will, by pay
ing for the work to the moment of the discharge. The laborer, as we
understand, was under the authority of
principal, who directed and
ruled in all matters relating to the work.
A servant
one who, for wages, serves his employer, following his
direction in performing the work.
A workman by the piece, who by
his industry and labor gives the required shape to the material of his
not under
contract,
employer, who has no interest in the work, and
servant, and an ordinary employé. The same
true of a labor
car of coal under the
ing man who works by the job in unloading
direction and subject to the control of the employer.
His (the labor
er’s) task in the case before us was measured by the work required
to unload
car of coal, instead of by the day. The independent con
tractor, on the other hand,
‘one who prosecutes an occupation having
some independence.
VVhile'performing his contract and complying
with its terms, he
not subject to the rule and control of the employ
er, who cannot interfere save to require the performance as agreed.
one of contract, under which the contractor retains some
The relation
degree of independence, while the laboring man follows the emplo_ver’s
direction, and
not independent, in the sense of the independent con
whether this man was
tractor’s independence. The issue
laboring
whether he
man—as such,
servant—or an independent contractor;
was accountable directly to his employer, or holding an independent
occupation.
‘We must, under the deﬁnitions of “servant” and of “independent
VVere
contractor,” conclude that he was-a servant, serving for wages.
different, every workman working by the piece in every shop and
factory, or elsewhere, for an employer, would be an independent con
not more independent, or not more free from
tractor, although he
the control and direction of his employer, than the most ordinary day
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test is found, said this court in Shea v. Recms, 36 La.
in the question whether one person “has placed himself un
der the direction and control of another, in such manner as to confer
Servants,
upon the latter the power of discharge for disobedience."
to an
their
services
says the Code, are those “who let, hire, or engage
other in this state, to be employed therein at any work, commerce or
occupation for the beneﬁt of him who has contracted with them, for
Article 163.
a certain price or retribution, or upon certain conditions.”
judgment aﬁirmed."

The

laborer.

Ann.

967,

____Qi

CASEMENT
(Supreme

Court of the United

v.

BROVVN.

States. 1892.
37

L. Ed.

148

U. S.

615,

13 Sup. Ct. 672,

582.)

Action to recover the value of three barges lost in the Ohio river
by running on the piers of a bridge being constructed by defendants
for two railroads. * * *
,
On January 27, 1882, these corporations entered into a written con
tract with the defendants for furnishing the material and building
these piers. This contract in terms provided that defendants were “to
furnish all material of every kind, name, and description necessary for
the construction of the same, said material to be subject to the approv
al of said engineer, and to be of such quality as may best insure the
durability of said structure; to be at the expense of and subject to all
expenses incident to and connected with said work of construction,
the said work to be done and completed according _to the plan and
speciﬁcations hereto annexed, marked ‘A,’ and subject to the inspec
tion and approval of the said engineer of said companies in charge of
said work, and which said plans and speciﬁcations are hereby express
ly made a part of this contract.” It further provided that “the work
throughout will be executed in the most thorough, substantial, and
workmanlike manner, under the direction and supervision of the engi
neer of the company, who will give such directions from time to time
during the construction of the work as may appear to him necessary
7 As to

distinctions under penal statutes, see Regina v. Walker, 8 Cox C. C.
And compare Gravatt v. State, 25 Ohio St. 162

1, 1 Dears. 85 B. 600 (1858).
(1874), upholding a conviction
at a monthly salary, though

ot embezzlement

as a servant

ot one employed

it appeared his duties were to sell sewing ma
chines, with the often
ease of Reg. v. Negus, L. R. 2 C. C. 3-i, 28 L. T.
, 12 Cox, C. C. 492 (1873), involving conviction for em
4N‘. S.) 646, 21 W. R. 68 sited
bezzlement under a statute of one employed to solicit orders on commission.
See. also, Lewis v. Fisher, S0 Md. 139, 30 Atl. 608, 26 L. R. A. 278, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 327 (1894), in which an attorney at law sought to take advantage of a
statute giving priority to wages or salaries of "clerks, servants or employees."
The opinion enumerates those who were “servants,” as the word was under
In Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo. 533 (1856), defend
stood at the common law.
ant was sued for loss by ﬂre due to carelessness of his alleged servant, a
man employed by defendant to superintend putting on a roof, and paid by
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and proper to make the work complete in all respects, as contemplated
in the foregoing speciﬁcations.
Said directions of the engineer will
in all respects be complied with. The engineer will also have full pow
er to reject or condemn all work or materials which, in his opinion, do
not conform to the spirit of the foregoing speciﬁcations, and shall de
cide every question that may arise between the parties relative to the
execution of the work, and his decision in thevnature of an award shall
be ﬁnal and conclusive on both parties to this contract.”
Under this contract the defendants had, at the time of the injury,
completed the two piers on the banks, and partly constructed the four
piers between the banks. For two weeks before the injury the river
had' been rising rapidly, and the water was very high.
Business on
the river had been partially suspended on account thereof.
On the
Ohio side the bank was under water, which extended inland a quarter
of a mile or more. The stage of the water in the river was then 55
feet above low-water mark.
Three of the piers were from 37 to 47
feet. below the surface of the water, while pier D, on the Ohio side,
which had been completed to 48 feet above low-\vater mark, was cov
* * *
ered to thedepth of only about 7 feet.

The barges in charge of pilots reached

the bridge at 10 0’cl0ck on
but the pilots, though accustomed to the river
and familiar with the work going on at the bridge, did not see any
The high water
buoys or break to indicate where the piers were.
had washed away the buoys which defendants were required to keep
at the piers, and no effort had been made to replace them, though de
fendants knew of their absence early the morning of the accident. Up
on these facts the court found as conclusions of law that defendants
were independent contractors, that they were negligent in not restor
ing the buoys or giving warning, that plaintiffs were free from negli
gence, and that defendants were liable for the injury complained of.
From judgment on these ﬁndings and conclusions defendants sued out
'
a writ of error.
Mr. Iustice BREWER,” after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of
the court.
The defendants contend: First, that they were not independent con
tractors, but employés of the railroad companies, and that, therefore,
were responsible for any
the railroad companies, and not themselves,
negligence; second, that they were not guilty of any negligence; and,
third, that, if they were, the plaintiffs were also guilty of contributory
negligence, and therefore debarred from any recovery.
\\="ith reference to the ﬁrst contention, obviously the defendants were
The plans and speciﬁcations were prepared
independent contractors.
and settled by the railroad companies. The size, form, and place 'of
the piers were determined by them, and the defendants contracted to
build piers of the prescribed form and size and at the places ﬁxed.
a clear, calm morning,

B

Part ot the statement of facts and part ot the opinion are omitted.
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They selected their own servants and employés. Their contract was
to produce a speciﬁed result. They were to furnish all the material
and do all the work, and by the use of that material and the means of
The will of the
that work were to produce the completed structures.
companies was represented only in the result of the work, and not in
the means by which it was accomplished. This gave to the defendants
the status of independent contractors, and that status was not affected
by the fact that, instead of waiting until the close of the work for
acceptance by the engineers of the companies, the contract provided
for their daily supervision and approval of both material and work.
The contract was not to do such work as the engineers should direct,
but to furnish suitable material, and construct certain speciﬁed and
described piers, subject to the daily approval of the companies’ engi
neers. This constant right of supervision, and this continuing duty
of satisfying the judgment of the engineers, do not alter the fact that
it was a contract to do a particular work, and in accordance with plans
and speciﬁcations already prepared. They did not agree to enter gen
erally into the service of the companies, and do whatsoever their em
ployers called upon them to do, but they contracted for only a speciﬁc
The functions of the engineers were to see that they complied
work.
with this contract; “only this. and nothing more.” They were to see
that the thing produced and the result obtained were such as the con
tract provided for. Carman v. Railroad Co., 4 Ohio St. 399, 414; Cor
bin v. American Mills, 27 Conn. 274; \/Vood, Mast. & Serv. p. 610.
* * *
314.
§

Finding that the conclusion of the Circuit Court
D; ma,
other points, judgment affirmed.“

McCOLLIGAN
(Supreme

Court

v.

of Pennsylvania,

was right on the

PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
1906.

214

Pa.

229.

63

[N. S.] 544, 112 Am. St. Rep. T39.)

Atl.

792,

6 L. ‘R. A.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County.
Action by Dominick McColligan against the
Railroad
Eennsylvania
Company.
Judgment for plead-i-H‘, and
appeals.
Defendant presented the following points:
“(l) That, as the evi
dence fails to establish the relation of master and servant between the
driver of the hansom and the defendant, the latter cannot be held re
sponsible for the former's negligence, and consequently the verdict
should be for defendant.
(2) That upon all the evidence the verdict
should be for the defendant.
Answer: I aﬁirm both points.” Judg
.
ment for defendant.
"Compare the very similar case 0! Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 82 U. S. (15
Wall.) 6-ii), 21 L. Ed. 220 (1872). in which n different conclusion was reached.
See, also, Fresnel v. Mariano Uy Chaco Sons & C0., 34 P. I. 122 (1916).
¢
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The decisive question raised by this appeal is whether,

defendant and the driver of the hansom, the relation
was one of master and servant or ofbailor and bailee.
If the former,
the master is liable for the negligence of the servant; if the latter, the
The contract
negligence of the bailee cannot be imputed to the bailor.
of letting is in writing.
The printed rates and regulations are made
part thereof, so that the determination of the relation is a question of
law for the court and not of fact for the jury.
The lease under which defendant let- the hansom to the driver pro
vides that “for and in consideration of the sum of $4.50, and on the
conditions stated below, hires to -H. Priest, driver, hansom No. 65
with two horses, for 13 hours from 9:30 a. in. of the date stamped on
the back of this certiﬁcate.”
The conditions stated therein are in sub
that
the
driver
shall
all liability for damages to any per
assume
stance
son or property, and that he agrees not to use a horse longer than 61/;
hours without returning to the stable for exchange, to wear a uniform,
to abstain fromthe use of intoxicating liquors, to present/a neat and
clean appearance, to conform to the prescribed rates and regulations,
and upon failure to observe these conditions the company reserves the
right to cancel the unexpired term of the lease. There can be no doubt
that upon its face this contract of letting establishes the relation of
'
bailor and bailee.
The learned counsel for" appellant, who has ably and exhaustively
presented the question, concedes that, if the case rested upon the con
tract alone, a bailment would result within the meaning of the law.
It, however, is earnestly contended that this prima facie relation is
changed by reason of the conditions, rules, and regulations, made part
of the contract, to which the driver was subjected. These regulations
provide in considerable detail‘ the rates to be charged for various dis
Certain
tances, different kinds of vehicles, and length of time used.
boundaries are prescribed beyond which the driver cannot go without
permission, and he is not permitted to perform other kinds of work,
of the
such as carrying baggage and doing errands, during the term
P
as between the

‘

lease.

It is also argued that because defendant company employs a cab
agent to supervise this service,‘ to secure men for the work, make con
tracts with the drivers, and enforce the terms and conditions of the
lease, such control is thereby exercised as to make the company liable
\/Ve must ﬁrst consider what is necessary to establish the
as master.
relation of master and servant. This question has been considered by
and frequently passed upon by the
a large number of text-writers
courts. All authorities agree upon the following deﬁnitions of master,
servant, and the relation existing between them: “A master is one who
stands to another in such a relation that he not only controls the re
sults of the \v0rk of that other, but also may direct the manner in
which such work shall be done.” “A servant is one who is employed
to render personal services to his employer otherwise than in the pur

1
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suit of an independent calling, and who in such service remains entire
ly under the control and direction of the latter." “The relation of
master and servant exists where the employer has the right to select
the employé, the power to remove and discharge him, and the right
to direct both, what work shall be done, and the way and manner in
which it shall be done.” 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (Zd Ed.) pp.
11, 12.
In more concise form these deﬁnitions mean that the master
directs the manner in which the work shall be done, and controls the
results of thework.
The servant is under the entire control,_ and al
ways subject to the direction of the master. The relation exists when
the master not only has the right to select his servant, but has the pow
er to remove and discharge him, with or without cause, and to direct
what shall be done and the manner of doing it.
In the pase at bar the defendant company does not control the re
sults of the work, has no right to the proceeds arising from the fares
paid drivers by passengers, and hence the fundamental and essential
The
principle necessary to create the relation of master is lacking.
driver did not remain under the absolute direction and control of the
company, and thereby cannot be said to be a servant within the mean
The right of the master to discharge and re
ing of the deﬁnition.
move the servant is incident to the relation, but in this case the ab
stract right did not exist.
It is true the lease could be canceled for
the unexpired term, but only when the conditions thereof, or some of
them, had been violated.
The cancellation of the lease was a con
tractual right, and did not arise because of the employment relations
of the parties. The driver, under the contract, had legal rights en
forceable against the company and only limited by the conditions there
in contained. If the company undertook to cancel the lease, _or remove
the driver, for a reason not set out in the conditions of letting, it would
Then, again, as has
be liable in damages for breachof the contract.
been stated, the driver is entitled to all the proceeds derived from fares
The aggregate of these
received from passengers who hire the cab.
fares may be $5 or $25 a day, but the company has no control over,
or interest in, the results of the work in this most important respect.
All of these things are inconsistent with the relation of master and
'
servant, and indicate that of bailor and bailee.
\/Ve have, then, under the express terms of the contract, a bailment,
and this relation is supported by the inferences and results just‘ stated.
As against this admittedly prima facie relation of bailor and bailee,
we are asked to say that by reason of the conditions limiting the rates,
ﬁxing boundaries, prescribing kinds of uniforms, requiring cleanly and
sober habits, and other incidental matters, the relation is not what it
The contention
appears to be on its face, but is something different.
is not sound. The conditions and regulations, incident of the contract
of letting, in some instances, it is true, are consistent with the relation
of master and servant, but not inconsistent with that of bailor and
bailee. If the company, in order to protect its property and give the
I
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public modern conveniences and suitable accommodations,
it advisable to embody in the contract of letting certain
reasonable regulations, no legal or business reason can be properly as
signed why the real relation of the parties should be changed thereby.
The contract itself is one of bailment. ‘ The conditions are not neces
sarily inconsistent with this relation, and no sufficient reason is sug
gested why a different construction should be adopted.
[Omitting a discussion of the English Hackney Carriage Act, and
traveling
has

deemed

English

cases contra.]

Judgment

for defendant affirmed.“

-ii,

1

-STANDARD OIL CO.

v.

(Supreme Court of the United States. 1908.

L. Ed.

ANDERSON.

,

212 U. S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252, 53

480.)

On writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit to review a judgment which afﬁrnied a judg
ment of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York in
favor of plaintiff in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Aihrmed.
Mr. Justice MOODY 11 delivered the opinion of the court.
The respondent, hereafter called the plaintiff, brought an action in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
New York to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have
been“ suffered by him through the negligence of a servant of the peti

tioner, hereafter called the defendant.
The plaintiff was employed as a longshoreman by one Torrence, a
master stevedore, who, under contract with the defendant, was en
The plaintiff was
gaged in loading the ship Susquehanna with oil.
working in the hold, where, without fault on his part, he was struck
and injured by a draft or load of cases containing oil, which was un
The ship was alongside a dock belonging to the
expectedly lowered.
defendant, and the cases of oil were conveyed from the dock to the
hatch by hoisting them from the dock to a point over the hatch, whence
they were lowered and guided into the hold. The work was done with
The‘ motive power was furnished by a steam winch
great rapidity.
and drum, and the hoisting and lowering were accomplished by means
of a tackle, guy rope, and hoisting rope. The tackle and ropes were
furnished and rigged by the stevedore, and the winch and drum were
.

‘

case of Laugher v. Pointer, 5 Barn. & C. 547 (1826),
., as to power of dis
especially opinions of Littledaie. 1., and Abbott, O.
missal, and Southern Express C0. v. Brown, 67 Miss. 260, 7 South, 318, 8
South. 425, 19 Am. St. Rep. 306 (1889), in which the alleged servant was hired
party," who was. in the general employment of the
by an "intermediate
1° See the celebrated

express company.
11 Part of the opinion

J

4

is omitted.
\
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owned by the defendant and placed on its dock, some 50 feet distant
from the hatch. All the work of loading was done by employees of
the stevedore, except the operation of the winch, which was done by a
The case was
winchman in the general employ of the defendant.
tried before a jury and the plaintiff had a verdict. The verdict estab
lishes that the plaintiff was in the use of due care, and thatihis injuries
were suffered by reason of the negligence of the winchman in im
properly lowering the draft of cases into the hold.
The only question presented is whether the winchman was, at the
time the injuries were received, the servant of the defendant or of
If he was the servant of the defendant, as he was
the stevedore.
found to be by the courts, below, the defendant was responsible for his
If not, that is the end of.the case. and it is not necessary
negligence.
to inquire what would be the measure of liability of the stevedore.
The decision of this question requires us to consider some further
facts which were not disputed. The winchman was hired and paid by
the defendant, who alone had the right to discharge him. The steve
dore agreed to pay the defendant $1.50 a thousand for the hoisting.
The stevedore had no control over the movements and conduct of the
winchman, except as follows»: The hours of labor of'the winchman
necessarily conformed to the hours of labor of the longshoremen.
The winch and winchman were at a place where it was impossible to
determine the proper time for hoisting and lowering the draft of cases
of oil, and the winchman necessarily depended upon signals from
others.
These signals were given by an employee of the stevedore,
called a gangman, who stood upon the deck of the ship and gave sig
nals to hoist or lower by the blowing of a whistle which could be heard
for a long distance. The negligence consisted in lowering a draft of
cases before receiving this, signal. "‘ * *
\Ve have examined the authorities selected with discrimination, and
pressed upon the attention of the court in the brief, compact, and other
wise excellent arguments of counsel, though we do not deem it neces
sary to refer to all of them.
One who employs a servant to do his work is answerable to strangers
for the negligent acts or omissions of the servant, committed in the
course of the service. The plaintiff rests his right to recover upon this
rule of law, which, though of comparatively modern origin, has come
to be elementary. But, however clear the rule may be, its application
to the inﬁnitely varied affairs of life is not always easy, because the
facts which place a given case within or without the rule cannot alwavs
The servant himself is, of course, liable
be ascertained with precision.
for the consequences of his own carelessness.
But when, as is so fre
quently the case, an attempt is made to impose upon the master the
liability for those consequences, it sometimes becomes necessary to in
quire who was the master at the very time of the negligent act or omis
sion. One may be in the general service of another, and, nevertheless,
G0nn.P3.&
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with respect to particular work, may be transferred, with his ‘own con
sent or acquiescence, to the service of a third person, so that he be
comes the servant of that person, with all the legal consequences of the
'
new relation.
It is insisted by the defendant that the winchman, though in its gen
eral employ, had ceased to be its servant, and had become, for the time
being, with respect to the work negligently performed, the servant of
the master stevedore.
This may be true, although the winchman was
selected, employed, paid, and could be discharged by the defendant.
If it is true, the defendant is not liable. The case, therefore, turns
upon the decision of the question, \/Vhose servant was the winchman
when he was guilty of the negligence which caused the injury?
It will aid somewhat in the ascertainment of the true test for deter
mining this question to consider the reason and extent of the rule of
a master’s responsibility.
The reason for the rule is not clariﬁed much
by the Latin phrases in which it is sometimes clothed. They are rather
restatements than explanations of the rule. The accepted reason for
it is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the case of Farwell v. Bos
ton & \/V. R. Corp., 4 Met. 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339.
In substance, it is
that the master‘ is answerable for the wrongs of his servant, not because
he has authorized them nor because the servant, in his negligent con
duct, represents the master, but because he is conducting the master’s
affairs, and the master is bound to see that his affairs are so conducted
that-others are not injured.
It is said in that case that this is a “great
principle of social duty," adopted “from general considerations of
But whether the reasons of the rule be grounded
policy and security.”
in considerations of policy or rested upon historical tradition, there is
a clear limitation to its extent.
Guy v. Donald, 203 U. S. 399. 406,
51 L. Ed. 245, 247, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63.
The master’s responsibility
cannot be extended beyond the limits of the master’s work.
If the
servant is doing his own work or that of some other, the master is
not answerable for his negligence in the performance of it.
It sometimes happens that one wishes a certain work to be done for
his beneﬁt, and neither has persons in his employ who can do it nor is
willing to take such persons into his general service. He may then en
ter into an agreement with another. If that other furnishes him with
men to do the work, and places them under his exclusive control in
of
those men become pro hac vice the servants
the performance
But, on the other hand, one may
of him to whom they are furnished.
prefer to enter into an agreement with another that that other, for a
consideration, shall himself perform the work through servants of his
own selection, retaining the direction and control of them. In the ﬁrst
responsible for their
case, he to whom the workmen are furnished
his work,
negligence in the conduct of the work, because the work
In the second case. he who
and ‘they are, for the time, his workmen.
agrees to furnish the completed work through servants over whom he
GODD.PB.& A.(2D E113
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retains control is responsible for their negligence in the conduct of
because, though
done for the ultimate beneﬁt of the other,
still, in its doing, his own work.
To determine whether
given case
the
falls within the one class or the other we must inquire whose
work being performed,——a question which
usually answered by as
certaining who has the power to control and direct the servants in
Here we must carefully distinguish
the performance of their work.
between authoritative direction and control, and mere suggestion as
to details or the necessary cooperation, where the work furnished
part of
larger undertaking.
These principles are sustained by the great weight of authority, to
[Omitting English cases].
which some reference will now be made.
In the case‘ of Higgins v. VVestern U. Teleg. Co., 156 N. Y. 75, 66
Am. St. Rep. 537, 50 N. E. 500, where
similar question was under
consideration, O'Brien,
thus expressed the principle:
“The ques
whether, at the time of the accident. he was engaged in doing
tion
*
the defendant’s work or the work of the contractor.
The
whose business he
the person
master
engaged at the time, and
who has the right to control and direct his conduct.” In many cases
this test has been followed.
Among them are Parkhurst v. Swift, 31
Ind. App. 521, 68 N. E. 620: Kilroy v. Delaware
H. Canal Co., 121
N. Y. 22, 2-4 N. E. 192; \Vy1lie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248. 19 L. R. A.
285,-33 N. E. 381; Anderson v. Boyer, 156 N. Y. 93, 50 N. E. 976;
Murray v. Dwight, 161 N. Y. 301, 48 L. R. A. 673, 55 N. E. 901;

4

&

I.

&

Delaware, L.
VV. R. Co. v. Hardy, 59 N.
L. 35, 34 Atl. 986; Con
solidated Fireworks Co. v. Koehl, 190 Ill. 145, 60 N. E. 87; Grace
H. Co.-v. Probst, 208 Ill. 147, 70 N. E. 12; Kimball v. Cushman,
Am. Rep. 528: _Iohnson v. Boston, 118 Mass. 114;
103 Mass. 194,

185 Mass. 126. 64 L. R. A. 114, 102 Am. St. Rep.
N. E. 1078; The Elton, 73 C. C. A. 467, 142 Fed. 367.
In many of the cases the power of substitution or discharge, the pay
ment of wages. and other circumstances bearing upon the relation are

Delory

v. Blodgett.

328, 69

a

it
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dwelt upon. They, however, are not the ultimate facts, but only those
the work and whose
more or less useful in determining whose
the
of
control.
power
Let the facts in evidence now be considered in the light of the fore
going principles of law. Was the winchman, at the time he negligent
failed to observe the signals, engaged in the work of the master steve
dore. under his rightful control, or was he rather engaged in the work
of the defendant, under its rightful control? \\-'e think that the latter
The winchman was, undoubtedly, in the gen
was the true situation.
eral employ of the defendant, who selected him, paid his wages, and
had the right to discharge him for incompetency, misconduct, or any
In order to relieve the defendant from the results of
other reason.
must appear that that rela
the legal relation of master and servant
new like relation between
tion, for the time, had been suspended, and

\
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winchman and the stevedore had been created. The evidence in
this case does not warrant the conclusion that this changed relation had
come into existence. For reasons satisfactory to it the defendant pre
ferred to do the work of. hoisting itself, and received an agreed com
pensation for it. The power, the winch, the drum, and the winchman
were its o\vn. It did not furnish them, but furnished the work they
did to the stevedore. That work was done by the defendant, for a.
price, as its own work, by and through its own instrumentalities and
servant, under its own control.
Much stress is laid upon the fact that the winchman obeyed the»sig
nals of the gangman, who represented the master stevedore, in timing
But when one large gen
the raising and lowering of the cases of oil.
eral work is undertaken by different persons, doing distinct parts of
the same undertaking, there must be co—operation
and co-ordination,
or there will be chaos. The giving of the signals under the circum
stances of this case was not the giving of orders, but of information;
and the obedience to those.signals showed'co-operation
rather than
subordination, and is not enough to show that there has been a change
of masters. The case of Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N. E.
In that case the defendant was engaged in a gen
922, is in point here.
eral teaming business. He furnished a horse, wagon, and driver to the
Boston Electric Light Company.
The driver reported to the electric
light company and received directions as to what to do and where to go
from an employee of that company, but at night returned the horse and
wagon to the defendant’s stable and received pay from the defendant.
While traveling to carry out an order received from the company he
negligently injured the plaintiff, who brought an action to recover for
1t
the injuries, alleging that the driver was the defendant's servant.
was held that there was evidence which would warrant the jury in ﬁnd
ing that the driver continued to be the defendant’s servant. It was said
in the opinion of the court, delivered by Holmes, C. I. (now Mr. ]us
the

Holmes):
“But the mere fact that

tice

a servant is sent to do work pointed out to
him by a person who has made a bargain with his master does not
make him that person’s servant; more than that is necessary to take
him out of the relation established by the only contract which he has
made, and to make him a voluntary subject of a new sovereign,-—as
themaster sometimes was called in the old books. * * *
“In this case the contract between thedefendant and the electric
light company was not stated in terms, but it fairly could have been
found to have been an ordinary contract by the defendant to do his reg
ular business by his servants in the common way.
In all probability
it was nothing more. Of course, in such cases the party who employs
the contractor indicates the work to be done and in that sense controls
the servant, as he would control the contractor, if he were present.
But the person who receives such orders is not subject to the general
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orders of the party who gives them. He does his o\vn business in his
own way, and the orders which he receives simply point out to him
the work which he or his master has undertaken to do. There is not
that degree of intimacy and generality in the subjection of one to the
other which is necessary in order to identify the two and to make the
employer liable under the ﬁction that the act of the employed is his act.”
\Ve think that the courts below correctly held that the winchman
Upon facts not differing in
remained the servant of the defendant.
principle from those before us, the same conclusion was reached in San
ford v. Standard Oil Co., 118 N. Y. 571, l6 Am. St. Rep. 787. 24 N.
E. 313: Iohnson v. Netherlands American Steam Nav. Co., 132 N. 'Y.
S76, 30 N. E. 505; The Victoria, 69 Fed. I60; The Lisnacrieve, 87
Fed. 570: McGough v. Ropner, 87 Fed. 534; The Gladestry, 63 C. C.
A. 198, 128 Fed. 591; The City of San Antonio, 75 C. C. A. 27, 143

Fed.

'

955.

judgment

afﬁrmed.

iii
»

TAYLOR
(Supreme

Court or the United

et al. v.
States.

28 II.

DAVIS’ ADM’X.
1884.

Ed.

110

U. S. 330, 4 Sup. Ct. 147.

163.)

Taylor and Davis were trustees of

the Cairo City property.
Davis
his
trust
to
and
Parsons
then
Taylor
to
one
and
resign
agreed
Parsons.
agreed to pay Davis, out of the trust funds as they should come into
their hands, the amount due him at the time of his resignation. This
they never did. Davis died, and his administratrix sues toihold them
personally on their agreement. They claimed to have acted only for
'
the trust property.
Mr. Justice Wooos.“ [After stating the facts and disposing of a
* * * A trustee is not an agent."
An agent
question of practicez]

ll Part

of the opinion is omitted.
.
Rowe v. Rand. 111 Ind. 206. 12 N. E. 377 (1887). in which one
Lyle v. Burke, -i0 Mich. 499 (1879).
called himself a “trustee.”
See, also,
Wecr v. Gand, 88 Ill. 490 (1878).
Aosucr AND PAB'!'N_ERSHIP.—II'l the leading case or Cox v. Hickman, 9 C.
B. N. S. 47. 99 E. C. L. 47. 8 H. L..Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Reprint, 431. 7 Jur.
N. S. 105. 30 L. J. C. P. 125. 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 185, 8 Wy. R. 754 (1860),
it was laid down by Lord Wensieydaie that the law of partnership Fus a
branch of the law of principal and agent. And the most certain test oi’ part
nership is, not the sharing of proﬁts, but the authority of each partner to
act as principal tor himself and as agent for the other partners.
Per Cooley,
J., in Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785,- 40 Am. Rep. 465 (1881).
But the ordinary agent is. of course. not a partner.
It has sometimes been
urged that he becomes one it it is the agreement that he is to share in the
proﬁts of the enterprise.
That is undoubtedly true it he becomes himself a
principal: but he may still remain a mere agent, provided he acts only for
others in the enterprise, and as compensation for his services receives a share
of the proﬁts. The question is one of intent. to be gathered. not from what
the parties called the relation, but from the legal effect of the acts and con
1! Compare
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represents and acts for his principal, who may be either a natural or
A trustee may be deﬁned generally as a person in
artiﬁcial person.
whom some estate interest or poweriin or affecting property is vested
for the beneﬁt of another. When an agent contracts in the name of
his principal, the principal contracts, and is bound, but the agent is
not. Vi/hen a trustee contracts as such, unless he is.bound, no one is
The trust estate cannot promise; the
bound,_for he has no principal.
contract istherefore the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trus
tee holds the estate, although only with the power and for the purpose
of managing
he
personally bound by the contracts he makes as
trustee, even when designating himself as such. The mere use by
the promisor of the name of trustee or any other name of oﬁice or em
trustee acts in
Of course, when
ployment will not discharge him.
entitled to indemnify him
good faith for the beneﬁt of the trust, he
self for his‘ engagements out of the estate in his hands, and for this
credit for his expenditures will be allowed in his accounts
purpose
by the court having jurisdiction thereof.
The judgment of the court below for the plaintiff, defendant in er
ror in this court, was aﬁirmed.

iii

(Supreme

v.

Court of Georgia,

ARBUCKLE BROS.
-1898.

104 Ga. 362,

30 S.

.

SNELLING

E.

863.)
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The case involved the construction of
contract which Arbuckle
Bros. were accustomed to make with those who sold their coffees. The
contract provided, among other things, that all goods consigned re
main the property of the consignor until sold and paid for, the con
signee holding as factor; that goods shall be sold only at the prices
and terms ﬁxed by the consignors; that the consignee guarantees the
sale of all coffee consigned and payment therefor within 60 days;
that he will remit such payment, whether the whole of the consign
ment
sold or not; and that the consignee assumes the risk of any
in
fall
price and the beneﬁt of any advance.
Before paying for
One Allen sold coffees under such
contract.
certain goods he became insolvent, and his assignee collected for the
coffee so sold. Arbuckle Bros. sue the assignee to recover this money.

7

1

a

5

5

(a

Ellsworth v. Pomeroy, 26 Ind. 158 (1866); Eastman
tracts in the transaction.
leading case); Parchen v.
v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192 (1872)
Anderson,
Pac. 588, 51 Am. Rep. 65 (1885) (collecting the au
Mont. 438,
thorities).
AGENT AND L1=:ssur:.—An agent is sometimes put in charge of his principal's
so-called lease. Here, too, the legal result depends. not upon
business under
the names used by the parties, but upon the legal effect of their acts and
Speers, 408, 40 Am. Dec. 608 (1843); Beecher v.
agreements.
State v. Page.
Bush, 45 Mich. 188,
N. W. 785, 40 Am. Rep. 465 (1881), in which the lessee
conducted a business on his own account, paying as rent part of the proﬁts.
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The case turns upon the proper legal construction to be
F~1sn, ].“
given to the written agreement or contract between Arbuckle Bros.
If, as contended by the defendants in ‘error, the legal
and Allen.
effect of the paper in question is to create between the parties thereto
the relation of principal and factor,--the latter selling the goods of the
former under a del credere commission,—then Arbuckle Bros. are
entitled to the funds in the hands of Allen’s assignee, arising from
accounts against customers to whom Allen had sold goods consigned
If, on the other hand, this paper, properly
to him by the Arbuckles.
construed, rendered the relation of the parties that of vendor and pur
chaser, then Arbuckle Bros. were not entitled to the proceeds of
these accounts.
The contract is certainly a very extraordinary one,
and contains seemingly contradictory provisions.
Some of its stipu
jations, if construed only in connection with others of a kindred na
Other
ture, seem to indicate the creation of a del credere agency.
stipulations, taken in connection with those which readily l‘l21i’I‘l'i0l1lZC
with them, clearly show a contract of sale.
It appears to have been
r
drawn for the purpose of enabling Arbuckle Bros. to “run with the
hare, or hold with the hounds,” according as, in the exigencies of a
given case, their interests might dictate,-—-on the one hand, to hold
Allen absolutely bound, in any event, to pay for all goods shipped to
him by the Arbuckles; on the other hand, in the event of his failure
to pay and his insolvency, to enable them to successfully claim all un
sold goods in Allen's possession, andlthe accounts, or their proceeds,
against his customers, representing goods which he had sold, but for
'
which he had not paid Arbuckle Bros.
be
in
the
light of all of its provisions,
The contract must
construed
and the legal outcome of its several stipulationsjconstrued together,
The mere name which may have been
must control its classiﬁcation.
given to it by the parties thereto cannot change the legal effect of its
stipulations." In Herryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 160,
the supreme court of the United States construed a written contract _be
tween a car manufacturing corporation and a railroad company to be
the fact that the contract, in the language of
a sale, notwithstanding
the court, “industriously
and repeatedly spoke of loaning the cars to
the- railroad company for hire for four months. and delivering them
for use for hire." Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the
‘What, then, is the true construction of the contract?
coiirt, said:
The answer to this question is not to be found in any name which the
parties may have given to the instrument, and not alone in any par
Part of the opinion is omitted.
Taylor v. Burns. 8 Ar-iz. 463, 76 Pae. 623 (1904). aiilrmed 203 U.
S. 120. 27 Sup. Ct. 40, 51 L. Ed. 116 (1906), an agency.
To the same eﬂect are Lenz v. Harrison 148 Ill. 598, 36 N. E. 567 (1893);
Williams Mower & Reaper Co. v. Raynor, 38 Wis. 119 (1875); Dewes Brew
ery C0. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198. 46 N. W. 379, 9 L. R. A. 270 (1890); Norton
V. Melick, 97 Iowa, 564, 66 N. W. 780 (1896).
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ticular provisions it contains, disconnected from all others, but in.the
ruling intention of the parties, gathered from all the language they
have used.
It is the legal effect of the whole which is to be sought for.
The form of the instrument is of little account.” See, also, Hays v.
]ordan, 85 Ga. 741, l1 S. E. 833, 99 L. R. A. 373; Cowan v. Manu
facturing Co., 92 Tenn. 376, 21 S. \-V._663; Manufacturing C0. v.
Cole, 4 Lea, 439, 40 Am. Rep. 20.
Under the ﬁfth clause ofthis contract, Allen was bound to remit
to Arbuckle Bros., at ﬁxed times, the full price of each consignment,
without regard to payments made to him by the customers to whom he
sold the goods, or the terms upon which he sold to such customers, and
without regard to whether any sales had been made by him _or not;
and he was bound, at such ﬁxed times, to remit to the Arbuckles at a
price ﬁxed by them to him at the time when the goods were consigned
to him. Allen’s obligation, then, was radically dilterent from that of
a mere del credere agent; for he did not simply guaranty to Arbuckle
Bros. that the customers to whom he sold their goods on a credit
should pay them, through him, as their agent, the price for which the
goods were sold to such purchasers, but he agreed, at the expiration
of 60 days from each consignment, to remit to Arbuckle Bros. full
payment for the entire consignment, regardless of the question whether
the goods of which such consignment consisted had been sold by him
or not. If none of the goods of such consignment had been sold by
Allen, he was just as much obligated to pay Arbuckle Bros. for them,
at a price ﬁxed by the latter at the time of the consignment, as he
would have been if he had in fact sold all of the goods contained in
In keeping with, and as if to emphasize, this clause
the consignment.
of the agreement, the tenth clause expressly stipulated that if, at the
expiration of 60 days, Allen had not paid for the goods, the Arbuckles
should have the right to draw on him for the price of the same. Vi/hat
stronger feature of a sale on 6O days’ time can there be than a stipula
tion which renders the consignee, from the moment the goods are re
ceived by him, absolutely and unconditionally bound at the end of
that time to pay for them, and to pay for them at a price ﬁxed at the
time they are consigned?
As if the provisions which we have just been discussing were not
enough to hold Allen bound, under any and all circumstances, to pay
for the goods at the price ﬁxed when they were consigned to him,
the sixth clause provided that he was to insure Arbuckle Bros. against
any decline in the price of the goods. So, if the market price fell,
And, as if -to
the loss was Allen’s, and not that of the Arbuckles.
balance this provision, the seventh clause provided that, if the goods
advanced in price, Allen was to have the beneﬁt of such advance. So,
if the market price rose, the proﬁt was Allen’s, and not that of Ar
\Vhy should Allen assume the risk of any decline in
buckle Bros.
the price or market value of the goods, if the goods belonged to Ar
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buckle Bros.? Why should he be entitled to the beneﬁt of any increase
in the price or value of the goods, if they did not belong to him? Why
should he be compelled to pay for the goods at the end of 60 days,
whether he had sold them or not, if he was simply an agent to sell the
These earmarks indicate a sale, and, taking
goods for the consignors?
them together, it is very difﬁcult, notwithstanding the apparently con
ﬂicting provisions of the instrument, to escapethe conclusion that such
is the legal eﬁ'ect of this contract.
VVhen we further consider that no account of sales was tobe ren
that he was
dered by the so-called “factor” to his alleged principals;
not required to furnish to them the names of the parties to whom he
sold upon a credit, and the terms of the credit which he extended, nor
to report or transmit to them the evidences of indebtedness, if any,
which he received from such customers; that, no matter how much
cash he might accumulate from sales within the 60 days, he was under
no obligation to remit it to them until the 60 days had elapsed, and
then was bound to remit not simply as a tlel credere agent accounting
to his principals for the money of such-principals in his hands, and
for the amount of matured indebtedness against customers who had
failed to meet their obligations, but to remit the whole amount of the
entire consignment; and that discounts, such as are usual in cases of
sales upon time, were to be allowed upon all bills paid before the ex
piration of 60 days from their dates,—the conclusion seems unavoid
able that the true legal relation between the parties to this agreement
was that of vendors and vendee.
The stipulation that the title to the
goods should remain in the Arbuckles until Allen had sold them is not
inconsistent with a contract of sale.
It might make the sale, as be
tween the parties, to that extent conditional.
The seller of personal
property often stipulates that the title thereto shall remain in him until
the purchase price is paid. As Allen wanted the goods for the purpose
of reselling them at retail to his customers, if the stipulation had
gone to this extent it would have seriously hampered his business, and
caused him to lose the beneﬁt of the 60-days’ credit extended to him.
The stipulation in question may therefore be treated as simply an
effort on the part of the vendors to retain the title until the vendee had
either sold the goods or paid for them; the retention of title, by
express provision, ceasing when he sold the goods, and by necessary
implication ceasing when he paid for them. Nor is the fact that Allen
was to sell the goods at prices ﬁxed by Arbuckle Bros. necessarily
inconsistent with the idea of a sale. It is not very uncommon in these
times for the manufacturer of a certain article to_endeav0r to ﬁx the
price at which it shall be sold at retail by the merchants who purchase
it for that purpose.
This effort on the part of the manufacturer is
doubtless for the purpose of establishing a uniform price, applicable to
all markets, and to prevent competition between the retailers.
Coming now to stipulations and expressions which really seem to
'
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conﬂict with the idea of a sale, how futile to call the instrument in
question a “special selling factor appointment,” and, in its opening
sentence, to “appoint” Allen a “special selling factor,” when under its
Of what avail was it to intro
provisions he is bound as a purchaser?
duce provisions which, taken by themselves, indicate the creation of a
del credere agency, and yet to bind the so-called “factor” to pay for
the goods, whether he ever sold them or not?
Of what use was it to
declare in one clause that Allen should never become a purchaser of
the goods consigned to him, when in a subsequent clause it was stipu
lated that he should pay for them, at the end of 60 days; at a price
ﬁxed at the time of the consignment?
The latter clause annihilates
the former.
As is well said by Mr. Justice Strong in Herryford v.
Davis, supra, “It is quite unmeaning for parties to a contract to say it
shall not amount to a sale, when it contains every element of a sale,
and transmission of ownership.”
Probably the leading ease among cases of this character is that of
Ex parte White, 6 Ch. App. 397. In that case there was no written
contract, but the course of dealing between the parties showed that
Towle & Co., who were cotton manufacturers, consigned goods oft
their manufacture to Alfred Nevill, accompanied by a price list, and
he sent them monthly an account of the goods which he had sold,
debiting himself with the price speciﬁed in the price list, not specifying
the particular contracts, nor giving the names of the purchasers, nor
the price at which, nor the terms on which, he had sold the goods; and
in the next month he paid to T owle & Co. the moneys which were due
to them in respect of the sales thus accounted for. He frequently had
the goods bleached or dyed before he sold them, but gave no account
In discussing the natureof the rela
to Towle 8: Co. of the expense.
tion between the parties under this course of dealing, Iames, L. ].,
said:
“The case seems very analogous to one suggested by Mr. De
If a publisher publishes for an
Gex in the course of the argument.
author, and sells for the author, and holds all the copies of the book,
and at some speciﬁed time has to return to the author an account of
all those sold, and pay for them at a price ﬁxed between the author
and the publisher, the publisher being at liberty to make his own
bargains with retail booksellers all over the country, it could never
be supposed that the relation of creditor and debtor or vendor and
purchaser ever existed between the author and the retail booksellers.
have not the slightest doubt that a great quantity of ‘agency busi
ness’ is carried on in the same way in the country, and that there are
large dealers who have agents in all the towns of Great Britain and
Ireland.
Possibly they may say: ‘\'Ve will give you the goods. You
shall be the sole person whom we supply in a particular district, and
we shall not call upon you to~ pay until you have disposed of them.
You are at liberty to sell upon your own terms. \Ve have nothing to
do with the persons with whom you deal, but we look to you to pay
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at our trade prices for the goods you sell. You must return the sales
\Ve will give you a certain
that y_ou have made up to certain times.
credit, but when that has expired we look to you to pay us the cash.’
That is a very reasonable bargain, and that is the kind-of bargain
which, in my opinion, the course of dealing shows to have existed in
this case; and, if so, how is it possible to say that the proceeds of
the sales were trust moneys in the hands of Mr. Nevill? Mr. Nevill
was not to pay immediately, and if he sold for'cash, it seems to me
impossible that Towle & Co. could have any right to say: ‘You have
sold the goods for cash.
Therefore hand over the moneys to us at
‘No; the bargain between us is that
once.’ Nevill would have said:
I am to give you an account at the end of the month, and to pay you
at the end of another month.
My selling for hard cash does not alter
the nature of the bargain between you and me, or entitle you to call
upon me to hand the moneys over to you, or to put the moneys in
medio and keep them for you.’ The proceeds of sale were his own
moneys, and not trust moneys, and he was at liberty to deposit thcm
with a banker, or deal with them as he pleased.”
How aptly the lord justice’s illustration of the impossibility of the
existence of any right in Towle & Co_. to demand the proceeds of cash
sales from Nevill applies in the case at bar! To such demand upon
“No; under the
the part of Arbuckle Bros., Allen could have replied:
us,
I
am
not
to
account
of sales at all;
give
any
you
bargainbetween
I am simply to pay you for the goods at the end of sixty days. ‘My
selling for hard cash does not alter the nature of the bargain between
you and me, or entitle you to call upon me to hand the moneys over to
”
In the
you, or to put the moneys in medio and keep them for you.’
Mellish,
which
we have quoted,
L. ]., said: “It is
same case from
quite clear that Nevill, if he sold these goods, was to pay Towle‘ & Co.
for them, at a ﬁxed price,—that is to say, a price ﬁxed beforehand be
tween him and them,—and 'at a ﬁxed time. Now, if it had been his
duty to sell to his customers at that price, and to receive payment for
them at that time, then the course of dealing would be consistent with
his being merely a dcl credere agent, because I apprehend that a del
credere agent, like any other agent, is to sell according to the instruc
tions of his principal, and to make such contracts as he is authorized
to make for his principal; and he is distinguished from other agents
simply in this: that he guaranties that those persons to whom he sells
shall perform the contracts which he makes with them; and there
fore if he sells at the price at which he is authorized by his principal
to sell, and upon the credit he is authorized by his principal to give,
and the customer pays him according to his contract, then, no doubt he
is bound, like any other agent, as soon as he receives the mo'ney, to
But if the consignee is at liberty, ac
hand it over to the principal.
cording to the contract between him and the consignor, to sell at any
price he likes, and receive payment at any time he likes, but he is
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bound, if he sells the goods, to pay the consignor for them at a ﬁned
price and at a ﬁxed time, in my opinion, whatever the parties may
think, their relation is not that of principal and agent.
The contract
his
sale
which
the
makes
with
is not a
agent
alleged
purchasers
of
contract made on account of his principal, for he is to pay a price
which may be different, and at a time which may be different, from
those ﬁxed by the contract.
He is not guarantying the performance,
by the persons to whom he sells, of their contract with him, which is
the proper business of a del credere agent; but he is to undertake to
pay a certain ﬁxed price for those goods, wholly independent of what
the contract may be which he makes with the person to whom he
sells; and my opinion is that, in point of law, the alleged agent in such
a case is making on his own account a contract of purchase with his
This decision was afﬁrmed
alleged principal, and is again reselling.”
by the house of lords, sub nom. Towle v. \\"hite, 21 Wkly. Rep. 465.
\/Ve have quoted at some length from this case, because it has been
regarded as very high authority by the courts in this country, and
has been often cited and followed.
\-‘Vhile there were some features
indicating a sale in that case which are not in the present one, we re
gard the features in this case which indicate a sale, taken all together,
as being really stronger than those of a similar character in thecase
decided by the English court. \-Ve think that the single fact, in the
case at bar, that Allen was bound to pay for all goods which he re
ceived from the Arbuckles, whether he ever sold them or not, out
'weighs any facts indicating a sale in that case which are not found in
this one.“ 2* * *
.
Judgment for plaintiffs below reversed.
10111 passing upon a similar contract in Arbuckle v. Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30
E. 496 (1R98),'the court said: “The agreement was an attempt to accom
plish that which cannot be done: To make a sale of personal property, and
S.

at the same time to constitute the buyer simply an agent of the seller to
hold the property until it is paid for. The two things are incompatible and
The agreement had in it every element of sale. It was, in
cannot coexist.
substance and effect. a sale, and must be so declared.
It does not matter by
what name the parties chose to designate it. That does not determine its
The courts look beyond mere names, and within, to see the real
character.
nature of an agreement, and determine from all its provisions taken together,
and not from the name that has been given to it by the parties, or from some
isolated provision, its legal character and effect."
The court then reviewed
the principal cases on the subject.
and discriminated
An elaborate discus
sion is also to be found in Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, 98 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W.
3, 36 L. R. A. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854 (1897).
Cf. Black v. Webb, 20 Ohio,
304, 55 Am. Dec. 456 (1351), a sale, with Hatch v. MeBrien, 83 Mich. 159, 47
N. W. 214 (1890), an agency.
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SNOW HARDWARE CO.

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

1891.

94

Ala.

346,

10 South. 304.)

Action against Mrs. Gibson on account for hardware sold upon
the order of her son, John Brady, for use upon a building constructed
for her by one Allen. The evidence showed that she had allowed
it.
him to purchase other material for her and that she had paid
folr
Mrs. Gibson denied that he was her general agent, or was ever au
thorized to make the purchases for her.
MCCLELLAN, J.“ [after passing upon various questions of evidence
*
*
*
and charges] held:
Nor was there error in excluding the
testimony of Mrs. Gibson to the‘ effect that she had paid Allen for
the material charged in the account sued on.
That fact could exert

no inﬂuence on this case in any aspect.
If Brady was her agent, and
had authority to bind her to the payment of the account to the J. Snow
Hardware Company, palpably payment by her to Allen or anybody
else would not ‘avoid her liability to plaintiff: and, if Brady was not
her agent, she would"not be liable to plaintiff, whether she had paid to
Allen or not. The inquiry was foreign to the case, and properly
eliminated from it.
Agencies are of three classes,—universal, general, and special. “A
universal agent is one authorized to transact all of the business of
his principal of every kind; a general agent is one who is employed
to transact all of the business of his principal of a particular kind or in
a particular place; a special agent is one authorized to act only in a
Mechem, Ag. § 6; 1 Amer. 8: Eng. Enc. Law,
speciﬁc transaction.”
p. 348 et seq. “A special agency properly exists when there is a dele
gation of authority to do a special act.” Story, Ag. § 17. “A special
1 Ross,
agent is one authorized to do one or two special things.”
“A special agent is appointed only for a particular pur
Cont. 41.
pose, and is invested with limited powers." Chit. Cont. 285.
In the case at bar there was not only the declaration of Brady that
he was Mrs. Gibson’s general agent, but other evidence from which
the jury might have inferred that he represented her generally in mak
ing purchases, or, at least, that he was her agent for all purposes in
respect of the opera-house, including the making of the contract with
Allen, the purchasing of material, the supervision of the work, chang
ing of plans and speciﬁcations, etc. This would, in our opinion, con
stitute him her general agent with respect to that enterprise, if the
jury found the facts in line with these tendencies of the evidence,
having authority to do, not “one or two special things," not “a single
act" merely, but all acts necessary to the consummation of the enter
And the court's charge to the jury at plaintiff's in
prise in hand.
stance, that one who deals with a general agent is not bound to in
quire as to the extent of his authority with respect to the matter of
11

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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the agency, and that, “if the plaintiﬁs show that john Brady was Mrs.
Gibson's general agent in building the opera-house, they [it] would
have a right to deal with him in regard to matters connected with the
opera-house, without inquiring the exact extent of his authority,”
was pertinent to the evidence adduced, and a correct exposition of the
law applicable-to it. Coffin Co. v. Stokes, 78 Ala. 372; Mechem, Ag.
283-287.“ * "‘ *

§§
~

Reversed for‘errors in admission of evidence.

15 See, also, Paciﬁc Biscuit Co. v. Duggcr, 40 Or. 362. 67 Pac. 32 (1901).
post, p. 293, and compare Farmers’ & Mechanics‘ Bank v. Butchers’ 8: Drovers’
Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 1-18, 69 Am. Dec. 678 (1857), post, p. 266, dissenting opin
ion of Comstock, J. For full discussion _sce post, p. 293 1!.
GENERAL AND Srncmr. Aoa:v'rs.—It has o_ften been said that the terms “gen
eral” and “special” mark a diﬂerence in degree rather than in kind, and that
the distinction is not often clear.
Most agents are general, but act more or
In
See post, p. 247.
less under special limitations upon their authority.
Engine Co. v. Kennedy, 7 Ind. App. 502, 34 N. E. 856 (1893),
Springﬁeld
the court says: “The terms ‘general agent’ and ‘special agent’ are relative.
An agent may have power to act for his principal in all matters. He is thcn
strictly a general agent. He may have power to act for him in particular
matters.
He is then a special agent. But within the scope of such particular
matters his power may be general, and with reference thereto he is a gen
eral agent."
In discussing the question in Cross v. Atchison, 'T. & S. F. R.
Co., 141 Mo. 132, 42 S. VV. 675 (1897), the court said that the distinction in
the books between general and special agencies was sometimes very unsatis
factory. It marks, not a diversity of the principles governing the principal’s
liability, but merely adjusts the actual measure of it. But compare Butler
v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, 19 L. Ed. S22 (1869), in which it was held that “the
distinction between the two kinds of agencies is that the one is created by
power given to do acts of a class, and the other by power. to do individual
acts only"; i. e., whether an agency is general or special is dependent on
whether the agent is empowered to do acts of a class, 0r_ only individual acts,
and it is quite independent of whether the authorit-y is limited and restricted,
or not.
_
UNIVERSAL AGENT.—Ii; may well he doubted whether there is such a thing
as a universal agent. In Wood v: McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612 (1845).
the court, in discussing the power of an agent. left in charge of his princi
pal’s business during the absence of his principal from the state. to assim
his book accounts to a creditor, said, per Collier, C. J.: “The precise lan
guage employed in the bill of exceptions, is this: ‘Stedman visited North
Carolina and left Wm. A. Revis his general agent, or agent generally (said
Revis having no written authority), to transact his business in this State;
that he delivered up his books and accounts for medical services to said agent
(including the account against garnishee) for settlement, and that said agency
was advertised and generally known in the neighborhood.’ It is supposed by
the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that as Revis was the general agent of
his principal, it must be presumed he was authorized to make the assignment
in question. This conclusion is by no means a necessary sequence from the
General, are clearly distinguishable
premises.
from universal agents, that
is from such as may be appointed to do all the acts, which the principal can
personally do, and which he may lawfully delegate the power to another to
do.
‘Such ‘an universal agency may potentially exist; but it must be of the
very rarest occurrence.
And, indeed it is diﬁicult,’ says Mr. Justice Story,
‘to conceive of the existence of such an agency, inasmuch as it would he to
make such an agent the complete master, not merely dux facti, but dominus
rerum, the complete disposer of all the rights and property of the principal.’ "
Compare Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. .T. Law, -163. 97 Am. Dec. 728 (1868), in
which a wife, having full authority for her husband in business matters, in
accommodation paper in his name, with Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609
dors;)d
(186 .
_
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CALEY
(Supreme

Court of Indiana.

v.

MORGAN.

1887.

114

Ind.

350,

16 N.

E.

790.)

to forty acres of land of which he was
possession and claimed to be the owner. Cross-complaint by Morgan
Caley
setting up claim of title and demanding that it be quieted.
claimed by conveyance direct from one Lucas; Morgan, upon a sher
iff's sale antedating the conveyance to Caley, upon a judgment entered
by confession by Lucas in favor of one Hendrix. This judgment was
assigned to Morgan by one Milligan, acting under a power of attorney

in

Action by Caley to quiet title

from :Hend_rix.
NIBLACK, J.‘

[After stating the facts and holding that the judg
ment by confession was effective and valid 2] * * * It is next claim
ed that authority to assign a judgment cannot be conferred by a power
of attorney, 'and that, at all events, the power of attorney from Hen
drix to Milligan was inoperative, because it was not_recorded in some
Ahy person
record in the recorder’s office of Huntington county.
capable of transacting his own business may appoint an agent to act
in his behalf in all the ordinary affairs of life. In many cases the ap
pointment may be by 'parol only, but may, in any case, be in writing.
For some purposes the appointment must be by a letter or power of
attorney, which makes the agent an attorneyin fact. A person thus
appointed, however, is none the less the mere agent of the person ap
Story, Ag. p. 2, § 3: Ewell’s Evans, Ag. 1; Roehl v.
pointing him.
A power of at
Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 15 N. E. 345, (No. 13,062.)
torney is valid as between the parties, and for all ordinary ‘purposes,
without being recorded. It is only when notice to third parties is req
usite that the recording of a power of attorney becomes material.
There was, consequently, nothing in the facts, as the court found them,
which restrained Hendrix from constituting Milligan his attorney in
fact to sell and assign his judgment against Lucas, or which invalidat
* * *
ed Milligan’s assignment of the judgment to Morgan.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
1

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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DAVIS
(Superior

v.

(Part

LANE.

1

'

_

Court of Judicature of New Hampshire,

1839.

10 N.

H.

156.)

Foss, plaintiff’s intestate held a note for $50 against Lane.
wife had been his general agent, transacting all his business. On the
day of his death. when he was wholly senseless and beyond hope of
Foss’s

recovery, she delivered this note to one Prescott, to whom deceased
owed $46. Lane paid the note to Pres-cott, and the administrator now
‘
sues to recover the amount of the note. .
*
* * There is no pretence that a wife, as
PARKER, C. ].2
such, has any authority to dispose of the husband's goods, orladjust
his affairs, by reason of his incapacity to transact business. * * *
An authority to do an act, for, and in the name of. another, pre
supposes a power in the individual to do the act himself, if present.
The act to be done is not the act of the agent, but the act of the prin
cipal; and the agent can do no act in the name of the ‘principal which
the principal might not himself do, if he were personally present. The
principal is present by his representative, and the making or execution
of the contract, or acknowledgment of a deed, is his act, or acknowl
edginent.
But it would be preposterous, where the power is in its nature re
vocable, to hold that the principal was, in contemplation of law, ‘pres
ent, making a contract, or acknowledging a deed, when he was in fact
lying insensible upon his death bed, and this fact well known to those
who undertook to act with and for him. The act done by the agent, un
der a revocable power, implies the existence of volition on the part of
the principal.
He makes the contract—he does‘ the act. It is done
through the more active instrumentality of another, but the latter repre
* * *
sents his person, and uses his name.

MacFARLAND
(Supreme

Court of Missouri,

1894.

v.

127 ‘Mo.
629.)

HEIM.
327,

29 S.

W. 1030, 48 Am.'St.

RED.

Action against a guarantor of a lease of land belonging to Mrs.
MacFa1-land, and described “as her general estate.” Her husband had
acted for her in making out the lease, and he and a janitor, Harding,
for her had secured Heim’s signature as guarantor of the lease. ]udg
ment for defendant.
S1-11~:Rwoo1),
J.“ [After passing upon the consideration for the guar
anty and holding there had been no assumption by Heim of any legal
liability 1] * * - * But the trial court erred in holding and instruct
2 The rest of the opinion is on page
8 Part of opinion is omitted.
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ing that Mrs. MacFar1and (not being seised of an equitable separate
estate) could have any agent, either in Harding or in her husband, to
bind her by any act of theirs, o_r that she could ratify their void acts.
A void act is incapable of ratiﬁcation. It is impossible to understand
what is meant by the words “general estate,” of which it is said Mrs.
MacFarland was seised. It sufﬁces, for the ‘present purpose, that it is
stated in the record that it was not her “equitable separate estate.”
It is among the fundamentals of the common law that a married
woman is incapable of contracting, and her supposed contracts are
void.
This is still the law, except where statutory modiﬁcations have
occurred.
thus incapable of contracting, then incapable, also, of
authorizinganother to contract for her; for this would be to make
“ * * *
the stream rise higher than its fountain head.
Story says:
Every person, therefore, of full age, and not otherwise disabled, has a
But infants, married women,
complete capacity" for this purpose.
idiots, lunatics, and other persons not sui juris are either wholly or
partially incapable of appointing an a-gent. Idiots, lunatics, and other
persons not sui juris are wholly ‘incapable; and infants and married
*
*
*
women are incapable, except under special circumstances.
So in regard to married women, ordinarily, they are incapable of
appointing an agent or attorney. * * * \/Vith regard to her separate
or to incumber
property, she may, perhaps, be entitled to dis'pose of
it, through an agent or attorney, because in relation to such separate
feme sole.
say, ‘perhaps’;
property she
generally treated as
for
may admit of-question, and there do not seem to be any satis
factory authorities directly on the point." Story, Ag. (9th Ed.)
A similar doubt h_as been elsewhere intimated. Weisbrod v. Railway
Co., 18 \Vis., loc. cit. 40, 86 Am. Dec. 743, and cases“ cited.
In this state, however,
has long been steadily maintained that
feme sole (Turner
feme covert, as to her separate_estate in equity,
Am. St. Rep. 319, and
\V. 897,
v. Shaw, 96 Mo., loc. cit. 28,
cases cited); and therefore may charge her separate estate, and make
she had
an agent in regard thereto, to all intents and purposes, as
But, where she
not thus seised,
never passed sub jugum matrimonii.
we have held, over and over again, that, not being sui juris, of course
\Vilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388; Hall v.
she could not appoint an agent.
Callahan, 66 M0. 316; Silvey v. Summer, 61 Mo. Z53; Henry v. Sneed,
99 Mo. 407, 12 S. VV. 663, 17 Am. St. Rep. 580; Flesh v. Lindsay, 115
21
Mo.
W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374; Mueller v. Kaessmann, 8-1
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Counsel for defendant, however, make citation of Mead v. Spalding,
W. 384, as asserting
contrary doctrine, and
94 Mo., loc. cit. 48,
there broadly asserted that “there can be no doubt
does, for
so
but the husband may be the agent of the wife." The two cases cited
from our own Reports do not sustain that position, because the ﬁrst
one was one where the land of the wife, the proceeds of which she

I
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Eystra v.
brought suit for, was “her sole and separate property.”
Capelle, 61 Mo. 578. The second one cited is Rodgers v. Bank, 69 Mo.
560, where the subject of the suit was the wife’s money acquired by
her under the married woman’s act of, 1875 (section 3296, Rev. St.
But that section authorizes the wife to appoint her husband as
1879).
her agent for the disposition of her ‘personal property, provided the
authority be in writing, and we have expressly held that, in regard to
that section, a married woman, respecting her personal property held
'
under its provisions, is a feme sole. Blair v. Railroad Co., 89 Mo., loc.
cit. 391, 1 S. VV. 350.
VVe therefore decline to follow
the ruling in
A
Mead v. Spalding.
On account of the reasons expressed in a prior part of this opinion,
the error mentioned is a harmless one, and, when this is the case, such
error in giving erroneous instructions constitutes no ground for re
versal. Fitzgerald v Barker, 96 Mo. loc. cit. 666, 10 S. VV. 45, 9 Am.
St. Rep. 375; Brobst v. Brock, 10 \Vall. 519, l9 L. Ed. 1002. There
fore judgment aﬁirmed.‘
All concur.

WILLIAMS

v.

(Supreme Court of Texas, 1901.

SAPIEHA.
94 Tex. 430, 61 S.

g

W.

115.)

BROWN, ]. The Court of Civil Appeals for the First District has
certiﬁed to this court the following statement andquestions:
“In this cause, now pending before this court on motion for rehear
ing, we respectfully certify for your decision the questions hereinafter
set out. The facts are as follows:
“T. D. Mason, by his guardian, brought this suit to remove cloud
from his title to certain lands, alleging title in himself.
The instru
ments which are alleged to constitute the cloud are a ‘power of attor
ney purporting to have been executed by T. D. Mason to one ]. W.
Tolson, and a‘deed from Tolson to the appellee, Sapieha, conveying
the land'in question. Mason seeks to have both annulled, on the ground
that he was an imbecile at the date of their execution.
Mason acquired
the land through the will of his deceased grandfather, the tract being
devised to him and his brother, D. O. Mason, as tenants in common.
On 6th day of July, 1878, T. D. Mason executed and delivered to J.
W. Tolson a power of attorney, whereby Tolson was authorized, as
his attorney in fact. to sell his interest in the land, and to make a deed
to the purchaser.
This instrument was duly signed and acknowledged
by him, and was promptly placed of record in the county where the
4 As to husband as agent of wife in building house on her land, cf. Wilson v.
Andalusia Mfg. Co., 195 Ala. 477, 70 South. 140, 4 A. L. R. 1016 (1915), with
Milligan v. Alexander, 72 W. Va. 615, 79 S. E. 665, 4 A. L. R. 1022 (1913), and
extensive annotations at page 10256.
Gonn.Pn.& A.(2n En.)
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land was situated. On the 19th day of March, 1879, Tolson, as such
attorney in fact, executed and delivered to the appellee, Sapieha, a
deed conveying the entire tract of land; D. O. Mason, the brother of
T. D. Mason, joining in such deed, and thereby conveying his interest
also. Appellee paid a fair and adequate price for the land, the deed
reciting the amount, and its payment, and the transaction was in all
At the date of the execution of the power of
respects fair and open.
attorney, T. D. Mason was about 35 years old, and the undisputed evi
dence shows that he was at that time, had been from his birth, and was
at the date of the trial, an imbecile, without mental capacity to manage
his affairs, and that on that account he was without mental capacity
to contract at the dates of the two instruments above named. Sapieha
had no knowledge or notice of Mason’s mental condition, and dealt
with Tolson without knowledge of any fact which should have led him
to inquire as to the mental condition of,T. D. Mason.
T. D. Mason
had never been under guardianship at the date of these transactions,
and had never been judicially declared of unsound mind. A guardian
.
was ﬁrst appointed for him in 1891.
“In the absence of opposing testimony, we ﬁnd, as did the trial
court, that T. D. Mason received the consideration ‘paid by Sapieha
for his interest in the land. Vl/ade v. Love, 69 Tex. 524, 7 S. \\". 225.
the pleadings of appellant set up the power of at
.\'otwithstanding
torney and deed which he assails, no offer is made to retum the con
sideration, nor was it shown that the appellee could be placed in statu
quo.
"The questions propounded are: (1) Is the power of attorney from
T. D. Mason to Tolson void as against the appellee, the principal being
non compos mentis at the date of its execution?
(2) If only voidable,
will the appellant be permitted to rescind the power of attorney and
deed made in pursuance thereof, in the absence of an offer to return
the ‘purchase price, or otherwise place the purchaser in statu quo?
“In disposing of this appeal this court, in view of expressions in
Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 81 ; Askey v. VVilliams, 74 Tex. Z94, 11
S. VV. 1101, 5 L. R. A. 176, and other Texas cases, treated the deed
to Sapieha as if it had been made by Mason in person; and held the
power of attorney, as well as the deed, voidable only. The question
seems not to have been directly decided in this state, and we therefore
certify the above questions. Your attention is called to valuable notes
in 16 Eng. Rul. Cas. 735, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 54, and Swaﬁford v. Fergu
Sapieha, being a nonresident of
son. 3 Lea. 292, 31 Am. Rep. 639.
the United States, was cited by publication, and not appearing either
in person or by attorney, the trial court appointed an attorney to rep
resent the nonresident.
“Judgment being rendered in Sapieha’s favor, a fee was allowed him
for his services, which was taxed as costs against the plaintitf. Ques
tion: \Vas it lawful to tax such fee against the plaintiff in a suit of
this character?”
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To the ﬁrst question we answer, the power of attorney mentioned in
this question was voidable, but not void.
Elston v. ]asper,'45 Tex.
409; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11 S. W. 1101, 5 L. R. A. 176;
Ferguson v. Railway Co., 73 Tex. 344, 11 S. \V. 347; Cummings v.
Powell, 8 Tex. 81. The deed of an insane person is not void, but, like
that of an infant, i_syoi'dable, at the election of the party. Irvine v.
Irvine, 9 Wall. 626, 19 L. Ed. 800. We believe that thisdoctrine is
VV e can
not now seriously controverted in the courts of this country.
see no difference in principle between the act of making a deed which
passes the title and making an instrument which authorizes another
person to do the same thing. In this state the powers of persons over
real and personal property are so nearly the same that no distinction
can be said to exist in the capacity required for making a sale and
transfer of the one or the other. The law provides different methods
of executing the will of the party, but places no greater restriction
upon the power to sell the one than the other. It has been held upon
sound reasoning that a lunatic or an infant may make a power of attor
ney by which simple contracts might be entered into for them; such
as the signing of notes, or the indorsement and transfer of commercial
paper. W'hitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229; Hastings v.
Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; Hardy v. Waters, 38 Me. 450.
S
In the case of \Vhitney v. Dutch, cited above, a partnership was
formed between an adult and a minor, and in the course of the busi
When the mi
ness the adult partner executed a note in the ﬁrm name.
nor became of age he ratiﬁed the note, but when suit was brought upon
it he pleaded his infancy, and claimed that the note was void, and not
The supreme court of Massachusetts held that
subject to ratiﬁcation.
the note was voidable, and that
having been ratiﬁed by the minor
valid claim against him. That court
after reaching his majority, was
said: “Then, upon principle, what difference can there be between the
contract made by the infant himself and one made by
ratiﬁcation of
another acting under a parol authority from him?
And why may not
the ratiﬁcation apply to the authority as well as to the contract made
under it?
may be said that minors may be ex'posed
they may
over their property or credit to another. But they will
power
delegate
be as much exposed by the power to make such contracts themselves,
and more, for the person delegated will generally have more experience
in business than the minor. And
sufficient security against the
danger from both these sources that infants cannot be prejudiced, for
the contracts are in neither ease binding, unless, when arrived at legal
competency, they voluntarily and deliberately give effect to the contract
And in such case justice requires that they should be com
so made.
In the cases of Hardy v. \-Vaters and
pelled to ‘perform’ them.”
Hastings v. Dollarhide, before cited, the issue was upon the validity of
promissory note made by the agent of the payee, who
the transfer of
minor; and
was claimed that the transfer was void because
was
the minor could not confer power upon another to transact such busi
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ness for him. In each of the cases, however, the court held the trans
In
fer good when ratiﬁed by the minor after arriving at majority.
other words, the court held the power of attorney to be voidable, and
the act, being ratiﬁed, became valid, just as if it had been done by the
'
infant himself.
The Supreme Court of this state in the case of Cummings v. Powell
intimated very strongly the opinion that a power of attorney executed
by an infant or a lunatic authorizing the sale and conveyance of real
estate was merely voidable; but the question was not involved, and
the opinion is not authority.
In the case of Ferguson v. Railway Co.
the court did in fact decide that the power of attorney given by an
infant was voidable only. The question was in the case, a proper sub
ject for its decision, but in the close of the opinion the court placed the
decision upon another question. In Askey v. \Villiams the defendant,
a minor, employed an attorneyto defend him against a criminal charge,
and to secure the fee gave a "note with a deed of trust upon land con
taining a power of sale. The debt being unpaid, the trustee sold the
land to pay the note, and in suit for the land the validity of the sale
was in issue. It was held that the deed of trust which contained the
power of sale was voidable; that the sale made by the trustee under
the power was subject to be avoided by the minor, just as if the deed
had been executed by the minor in person. \Ve regard this case as
directly in point, and as deciding the very question ‘presented.
It is
true that in the course of the opinion judge Gaines remarked that
powers given by a minor, when coupled with an interest, were held to
The fol
be voidable; but the opinion is not placed upon that ground.
lowing language of the court shows that the power was sustained as
if it had been a deed, placing them upon the same basis: “If the infant
had conveyed the land absolutely as a fee, his deed would not have
been void, but he could have avoided it within a reasonable time after
coming of full age upon payment of a just compensation for the serv
ices rendered by his grantee. \Ve think the same rule should apply in
this case.”
The contention of the appellant that the power of attorney and the
deed made under it which are involved in this controversy are ab
solutely void because the maker of the power of attorney was at the
time a lunatic is supported by the greater number of adjudicated cases.
It is the doctrine of the English courts, and has been followed in the
supreme court of the United States and by the supreme courts of a
number of the states without questioning the soundness upon which it
is based, or its consistency with the system of laws under which prop
Of the cases which sustain this
erty rights are held in this country.
rule we cite the following: Dexter v. Hall, 15 \Vall. 9, 21 L. Ed. 73;
Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435; Armitage v. VVidoe, 36 Mich. 124:
Fetrow v. \Viseman, 40 Ind. 148; Lawrence’s Lessee v. McArter, 10
Ohio, 37; Fonder v. Van Horne, 15 \\/'end. 631, 30 Am. Dec. 77; Pyle
v. Cravens, 4 Litt. 17. In Dexter v. Hall, cited above, the supreme
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court of the United States reviews at length the English cases, and
criticises the doctrine that the contracts of infants and lunatics are
voidable only; ﬁnally basing its judgment upon the proposition that
contracts made by infants and lunatics, and not delivered by the hand
of the maker, are void. We quote the following to show the basis of
that opinion: “The doctrine that a lunatic’s power of attorney is void
ﬁnds conﬁrmation in the analogy there is between the situation and acts
of infants and lunatics. Both classes of persons are regarded as under
*
* * Yet it is universally held, as laid
the protection of the law.
down by Lord Mansﬁeld in Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burrows, 1804, that
deeds ofian infant which do not take effect by delivery of his hand (in
\\“'e are not
which class he places a letter of attorney) are void.
aware that any different rule exists in England or in this country.”
In the same court, the same judge, justice Strong, delivered an opinion
in the case of Irvine v. Irvine, 9 \Vall. 617, 19 L. Ed. 800, which in
volved the validity of a sale made under power contained in a mort
gage, in which case that court held that the sale was voidable; saying:
“Whatever may have been the doubts once entertained, it has long been
settled that the deed of an infant, being an executed contract, is only
voidable at his election; that it is not void. It operates to transmit the
title.”
The ablest judges who have dealt with this question have not under
taken to sustain by reason the rule adopted by the supreme court of'
the United States. In the case of Armitage v. Vi/idoe, before cited,
Iudge Cooley said: “On the authorities, no rule is clearer than that
an infant cannot empower an agent or attorney to act for him.” And
that able judge contented himself with a citation of authorities in
support of a rule for which he could assign no sound reason. - In
Phil'pot v. Bingham, before cited; Judge Stone, of the supreme court
of Alabama, said of this question: “From such an array of authorities,
sanctioned as the principle has been by this court, we do not feel at
liberty to depart, although the argument in favor of the exception is
rather specious than solid. We therefore hold that the power of attor
ney under which the plaintiﬁF’s land was sold, made, as it appears to
have been, while he was an infant, was and is what the law denomi
nates void." In the case of Fetrow v. \Viseman, above cited, the su;
preme court of Indiana, after having stated the proposition, said:
“The proposition may not be founded in solid reason, but it is so held
These are fair samples of the cases which
by all the authorities.”
uphold the doctrine that _the power of attorney of an infant or a
lunatic is absolutely void. The fundamental principle of the cases in
which the doctrine originated is wholly absent from and at variance
with our system of laws, and we feel that the strong reasoning of
Iudge Hemphill in Cummings v. Powell, and the qualiﬁed decision in
Ferguson v. Railway Co., supported by the later case of Askey v. \Vil
liams, furnish a safer guide by which to regulate the property rights
of the people of this country, and are more in harmony with our sys
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tem of la\vs. VVe therefore follow them in preference to the arbitrary
rule asserted in the greater number of decisions upon that question.“
* * *
[The answers to the second and third questions are omitted.
It was not shown that the lunatic had any of the money, or that it had
been spent for him. Therefore he need not return any.]

_

KING

v.

BELLORD.

‘L, J. Ch. 646. 8 L. T.
18133. 1 Hem. & M. 343, 32
Rep. N. S. 633, 2 New Rep. 4-12, 11 Wkly. Rep. 900, 71 Eng. Reprint, 149.)

(High Court of Chancery,

Vice Chancellor Sir VV. PAGE VVo0D. The point raised in this case,
though not covered by express decision, seems to fall within the general
rule that an infant is incapable ofentering into a binding contract.
The actual contest arises thus: A testator having chosen to devise es

a

a

is

is

I

a

if

is

is,

tates, upon trusts requiring discretion as to the expediency, as to the
time, and as to the manner of a sale, to three persons, one of whom. is
an infant, the question
whether
contract for sale entered into
a valid contract, which this court can spe
by those three trustees
ciﬁcally perform. There are numerous authorities which approach this
question, but none which decide it. All of them are distinguished from
this case by the well-known difference ibetween power and property,
a marked distinction which has been invariably upheld.
There can be no doubt upon the authorities from the earliest times,
man, by his will, gives an infant
that
simple power of sale with
out an interest, the infant_may exercise it. All the decisions on the
subject are referredioby Lord St. Leonards in his _w0rk on “Powers,”
need not discuss them minutely.
and
They all turn on the execution
not a single authority upon the question
of powers; and there
whether an infant can sell an estate devised to him upon trust for sale.
an opinion of Mr. Preston's, mentioned without disapproval
There
5

The above case cites the leading cases holding an infant's power of attor
absolutely void.
But see, also, Truebiood v. Trueblood,
Ind. 195, 65
Am. Dee. 756 (1856); Turner v. Bondalier, 31 Mo. 'App. 582 (1888), and note
to

1

8

ney

Am. Lead. Cas. 247.
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a

a

1

Contra: Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 184 Mass. 348. 68 N. E. 673, 63
See, also, Hardy v. Waters, 38
L. R. A. 741. 100 Am. St. Rep. 560 (1903).
Atl. 506, 54
Me. 450 (1853); Patterson v. Lippincott. 47 N. J. Law, 457,
Am. Rep. 178 (1885), and extended note in 18 Am. St. Rep. 629. As to the
relation under this rule of a minor principal to his agent, see Benson v.
Tucker, 212 Mass. 60, 98 N. E. 589, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1219 (1912). The follow
ing may be added as holding power by an insane person voidable merely, at
lucid period, or valid, so far as
the option of the principal when he reaches
to save the rights of third persons “who, before the insanity intervened. be
consideration advanced, or who.
came interested in the power by reason of
consideration
in ignorance of the incapacity. and in good faith, parted with
Matthiessen
nf_ value. relying on the apparent authority of the agent.”
Weichers Reﬁning Co. v. Me-Mahon, Adm’r, 38 N. J. Law, 536 (1876); Blinn
v. Schwarz, 177 N. Y. 252, 69 N. E. 542. 101 Am. St. Rep. 806 (1904), aiﬂrming
63 App. Div. 25, 71 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1901).
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by Lord St. Leonards, that an infant can exercise a power even though
it be coupled with an interest; butlthis is very different from selling
an estate vested in the infant by a devise in fee.
It is to be observed, that all the cases relied on with reference to
powers, have gone upon the principle that the infant, in executing the
power, is a mere conduit-pipe, as it has been termed, of the will of the
cgor gofthe power; so that when the estate is created, the infani (as
was said in the case in Bridgman) is merely the instrument by whose
hands the testator or donor acts.
The donor, it is said, may use any
This principle fails
hand, however weak, to carry out his intentions.
altogether to reach the case of a devise in trust to an infant.
It is not in the power of a testator to confer upon an infant a ca
himself which the law does not give him, although he may
pacity
make the infant his hand, his agent, to execute his purpose. He cannot
when the law
give an estate to an infant and say that he may sell
unfortunate that the testator should
says that he cannot do so.
trustee; but the inconvenience arising
have selected an infant as
from this circumstance in the particular case,
not to be compared
with that which would result from holding an infant to have
capacity
to sell, which the law denies him. If the defendants still adhere to the
offer made by them before the litigation,
shall dismiss the bill with
costs.“

TEBBETTS
(Supreme

v.

MOORE.

Court of Judicature of New Hampshire,

1849.

19 N.

H.

369.)

for goods sold and delivered.
_Verdict for defendant.
No objection
made that the auclitor’s report was per
was offered. We
mitted to be read to the jury, in the form in which
than as containing
statement
can therefore take no other view of
of facts properly laid before the jury.
ﬁnds that the articles in
question were ordered by the sons of the defendant, in his name, and
by the plaintiffs delivered to the sons and charged to the father. That

It
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J.

Woons,

is

Assumpsit

on former occasions articles had in like manner been delivered by the
plaintiffs to the same individuals, and the defendant had paid for them.
without objection but without knowing that articles so ordered and
delivered were included in the account.

1

9,

7,

6,

§§

a

6

In Lyon v. Kent, 45 Aln. 656 (1871), it is said: “Any one, except lunatic,
an imbecile, or child of tender years, may be an agent for another.”
The court
to the effect that monks, infants, femes
inpproves Story on Agency,
covert, persons attainted, outlawed, or excommunicated, villains and aliens,
It the principal is willing to intrust the busi
may be agents for others
ness to an infant and third persons consent to deal with him, they cannot
Cameron v. Ward. 22 Ga. 168 (1857).
later object to his incapacity.
While
the infant agent may bind his principal, the infant himself, of course. will in
no way incur contractual liability thereby, either to his principal or to third
A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 436, 10 Am. Dec. 7-17 (1319).
persons. Talbot v. Bowen,
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Two clear propositions may be stated upon these facts: First, the
relation in which sons stand to a father involves no authority on their
part to contract debts in his name and in his behalf. They cannot bind
him by their acts, without authority emanating from his own will to
do so, any more than mere strangers can. In the case of things neces
sary for their support, the relation of a father to his sons may be
shown in aid of other proof of the authority of the latter; but such
’
'
is not the present case.‘ * * *
[The court found no evidence that the supposed principal knew of

the acts of the son.]

_

7\\'i1e as agent 01 the husband, ante, p. 32; post, pp,
Meyer v. Frenkil, 116 Md. 411, 82 Atl. 208, Ann. Gas. 19130,
(1911).

I
I

71, $3‘;
also
875, and note
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THE PURPOSES OF THE RELATION

SILVER\VOOD

v.

of Appeals of Maryland,

(Court

LATROBE
1888.

68

et al.

Md. 620, 13 Atl. 161.)

_ Bill of complaint by appellant for an injunction to restrain the board
of managers and superintendent of a cemetery company from interfer

ing with appellant's right by obstructing or denying't0 his agents free
to a lot in the cemetery which he owned. The company had
adopted a by-law prohibiting any person, other than a lot holder or a
member of his or her family, from doing any work in the cemetery,
From a judgment deny
except by a permit from the superintendent.
ing relief plaintiff appeals.
* * * Nothing is
YELLOTT, J.‘
[After stating the factsz]
clearer than that if a man, in the transaction of his own business, has
ai right to do any act, he can perform it by the
The
hands of his agent.
general maxim, as old as our system of jurisprudence, is that whatever
a man sui juris may do of himself, he may do by another.
Co. Litt.
258.
I-lad not this principle been always recognized, it is diﬂicult to
perceive how the multiform transactions of mankind could have been
successfully conducted. The maxim, “qui facit per alium facit per se,"
carries with
recognition of the right of every man,
by implication,
unless exercising certain delegated powers, and acting in
ﬁduciary
capacity, to employ an agent in the transaction of his business. There
fore, when, by the terms of
deed or other instrument,
man has a
certain thing, he can do
either with his own hands or
right to do
the agent
interfered with
the
by the hands of an agent, and
an interference with the rights of the grantee.
\\"hen
grantor
cemetery have been conveyed by
burying lots in
corporation,
conferred on the purchaser which
like any other
right of property
Sandf. Ch. 471.
Unlike the
right toreal estate. VVindt v. Church,
Case of Partridge, 39 Md. 631, the appellant has
title to the lot by
virtue of an _inst1'ument of writing, under seal, which operates as
deed
of conveyance. The act of 1837 declares the property thus acquired
The grantee has qualiﬁed fee limited to the purposes
to be real estate.
of sepulture.
The second clause of the instrument, conveying the property, gives
him the right to plant and cultivate trees, shrubs, and ﬂowers. This
he could do either with his own hands or by employing an agent to do
by
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Part of the opinion is omitted.
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the work for him. VVhen he accepted the deed, and paid the purchase
money, he acquired this right. Had he been unable to secure the right,
it is possible, and even probable, that he would not have purchased the
No order subsequently passed by the grantors can be so
property.
construed as to have a retroactive operation, and thus_limit or annul
the privilege secured to the grantee by a solemn instrument under seal.
As said by Alderson, ].: “When the law allows a party to contract, it
will not permit that contract, by any matter arising ex post facto, to
be made of no value.”
Giles v. Grover, 1 Clark & F. 106.
In Ashby v. Harris, L. R. 3 C. P. 523, this very question was decided.
The burial board of the parish of ‘St. Pancras, being a corporation, had
granted, by an instrument under seal,- the privilege of making and
constructing_ a private grave, and the exclusive right of burial and in
terment therein. The grantee had been accustomed to plant and culti
Ten years after the grant had been
vate ﬂowers by the hands of agents.
made, the board determined to undertake the planting of graves them
selves, and the superintendent was authorized to prevent other persons
from entering the cemetery for such purpose. Notice was also given
to the owners of private graves of the determination of the board.
After such notice had been given, Harris, as the agent of the grantee.
entered for the purpose of planting the grave conveyed by the said
He was assaulted, and an action for damages
instrument under seal.
was instituted.
It was held that “the board clearly had no right to
make regulations to interfere with that which they had granted in
perpetuity ;” that “any subsequent regulations made by them would
be repugnant and void.
They might make general rules and regula
tions for the management of the cemetery, but not special rules which
would derogate from prior grants.”
It is clear that the court below committed an error‘ in refusing to
grant-the relief asked for in the bill of complaint, and its decree should
therefore be reversed. Decree reversed and cause remanded.
BRYAN and MILLER, 1]., dissent.

COMBES’ CASE.
(Court of Common

Pleas,

1613.

9 Coke,

75a,

77

English Reprint, 843.)

In replevin by V\/illiam Atlee, against Daniel Banks and Thomas Os
born of taking of his cattle at Harmonsworth, in a place called \/Valnut~
Tree Close, in the county of Middlesex, &c. VVhich plea began Trin.
8 Jae. Reg. Rot. 330. Upon the pleading, and issue joined, and special
verdict given, the case was such. Thomas Combes copyholtler in fee of
ten acres of pasture in H. of the manor of Harmonsworth in the county
i
of Middlesex, by his deed 22 November, 5 E. 6, constituted and
ordained William Combes and Stephen Erlie two copyhold tenants of
the same manor hiswlawful attornies, to surrender vice & nomine suo
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to the lord of the said manor, the said ten acres of pasture to the use
of John Nicholas and his heirs, and afterwards at a court held of the
said manor 8 ]ulii anno 6 E. 6, the said attornies tunc tenentes dom’ per
copiam Rot’ Cur’ in eadem Cur’ ostenderunt scriptum praed’ gerens dat’
przedict’ 22 Nov’ anno 5, supradicto, et iidcm Vl/illielmus et Stephanus
authoritate eis per praed’ literam attornatus dat’ in plena cur’ sursum
reddiderunt in manus dom’ praed’ decem acras pasturae ad opus 8: usum
praed’-johannis Nicholas haeredum et assignatorum suorum, who was at
the same Court admitted accordingly;
and that within the said manor
there was not any custom to surrender copyhold land, &c. by letter of
attorney either in Court or out of Court. And if the said surrender by
letter of attorney of the said lands held by copy, &c. was good or not,
was the doubt which the jury referred to the consideration of the Court.
And this case was argued at the bar, in Michaelmas, Hilary, and Easter\
Terms, and in this term, and in this it was also argued by the ]ust"ces
at the Bench; and in this case two points were moved.
1. If a sur
render could be made by force of the letter of attorney.
2. If the
attornies had pursued their authority.
As to the ﬁrst it was unanimously agreed by all the Judges in their
several arguments, that the surrender in the case at bar made by letter
of attorney, was good; and their reason was, because every copyholder
having a customary estate of inheritance, may de communi jure, with
out any particular custom, surrender his lands held_by copy in full
Court, and therefore in pleading, the copyholder need not alledge a
custom within the manor to surrender in Court; for that which is the
usage per totam Angliam, is the common law as it is held in 34 H. 8, t
Br. Custom 59, & 34 H. 8, Dy. 54. Quod habetur consuetudo inter
mercatores per Itotam Angliam, &c. is no good manner of alledging a
custom, for that is the common law; and in the Book of Entries, Tit.
Tresp. Divisione Copyhold 1..f. 568, no custom is alleged to enable
a copyholder to surrender in full Court, no more than that a copyholder
may make a lease for one year; because that he may do by the general
custom of the realm, which is the common law, vide Bracton, lib. 2, c. 8.
Then if a copyholder may surrender his estate in Court by the general
custom of the realm, which is the common law, from thence it follows
that he may do it by attorney, as a thing incident by the common law;
and that will more clearly appear if the reason of such things which a
man cannot do by attorney be well considered. And therefore if a man
has a bare authority coupled with a trust, as executors have to sell land
they cannot sell by attorney; but if a man has authority, as absolute
owner of the land, there he may do it by attorney, as cestuy que use
might after the statute of 1 R. 3, and before the statute of 27 H. 8,
for cestuy que use had an absolute authority to dispose of the land at
his will, without any conﬁdence reposed in him, as appears in
Eliz.
Dyer, 283, and there a judgment is cited in 25 H. 8, accordingly, against
But in the case at bar, the
the opinion of some Indges in 9 H. 7, 24.
copyholder has a customary estate of inheritance, and not an authority
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or power only. Also there is a difference betwixt a general absolute
power and authority as owner of the land, as aforesaid, and a particular

a

it

is,

power and authority (by him who has but a particular interest) to make
leases for life or years. And therefore if A. be tenant for life, the
remainder in tail, &c. and A. has power to make leases for 21 years
rendering the ancient rent, &c. he cannot make a lease by letter of at
torney by force of his power, because he has but a particular power
which is personal to him; and so was it resolved in the case of the Lady
Gresham at the assises in Suffolk in quadragesim’ 24 El. by \Vray and
Anderson, Chief Justices, Justices of Assise there. Also there are some
things personal, and so inseparably annexed to the person of a man,
that he c_an_rm_t.,do_ them by another, as doing of homage and fealty;
so it is held in 33 E. 3, Trespass, 253,.the lord may beat his villain for
cause, or without cause, and the villain shall not have any remedy;
but if the lord commands another to beat his villain without cause,
he shall have an action of battery against him who beats him in such
case.
So if the lord distrains the cattle of his tenant, although nothing
be behind, the tenant for the respect and duty which belong to the lord.
shall not have trespass vi et armis against him; but if the lord com
mands his bailiif or servant in such case to distrain where nothing is
behind, the tenant shall have an action of trespass vi et armis against
the bailiff or servant. 2 H. 4, 4, a; 11 H. 4, 78, b; l H. 6, 6, a; 9 H.
'
7, 14, a.
Littleton in his chapter of Burgage holds, that where in a borough he
who is seised of lands in fee may devise by custom, there the owner of
such land may devise that his executors shall sell, which they shall do
as attornies to him, 3 E. 3, Coron. 310, by the custom of a manor a
freehold will pass from one to another by surrender in Court, against
the will of the lord, and where the custom is such, the tenant may do it
by attomey, vide 14 H. 4, 1, a, by Hankford, 8: vide 19 Ass. p. 9.
And it was said, as he to whose use a surrender is made may be
admitted by attorney, so a copyholder may surrender by attorney in
full Court; and the case of him to whose use seems the stronger case,
because he who is to be admitted is to do fealty, which none can do
fealty but he who shall be admitted, and therefore in such case'the lord
may refuse to admit him by attorney; but if he admits him by attorney,
it is good enough.
But Hil. 28 Eliz. in Chapman's Case it was held in the King’s Bench,
that the copyholder out of Court
that where the custom of a manor
may su_rrender into the hands of the lord of the manor by the hands
of two customary tenants, who in effect are but instruments or attor
nies of the copyholder to take his surrender, that in such case the
copyholder by his attorney cannot surrender into the hands of the
lord by the hands of two copyhold tenants; for inasmuch as the sur
render in such case ought to be warranted by the custom, the surrender
without special custom to warrant
by attorney will not be good. Also
surrender by othcrs
that was upon the matter by attorney to make
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who are but attornies, for that is not warranted by the particular cus
tom of the manor to make a surrender out of Court. But in the case at
bar the common law, and no particular custom, warrants the surrender,
and therefore it may well be made according to the rule and reason of
the common law by attorney.
But it was resolved, that the attorney
ought to pursue the manner and form of the surrender in all points
according to the custom. as the copyholder himself ought to have done;
as if the surrender by the custom ought to be by the rod, or by any
other thing, or in any other manner, the attorney ought to pursue it.
And the Chief justice said, that the stile of a COpyl‘lOld(-11‘ imports three
1. Nomen, his name.
2. Originem,
3.
his commencement.
things:
Titul’ his assurance: his name is tenant by copy of court-roll, for his
name is not tenant by court-roll, but by copy of a court-roll, who is the
sole tenant in law that holds by copy of any record, charter, deed, or
2. His commencement, ad voluntatem domini;
for
any other thing.
at the beginning he was but tenant at the will of the lord.
3. His
title or assurance secundum consuetudinem manerii, for the custom of
the manor has ﬁxed his estate, and assured the land to him so long as he
doth his services and duties, and performs the customs of the manor.
And therefore Danby saith in 7 E. 4, 19, a, that by the custom he is as
well inheritable to have the land as tenant to hold his f-reehold by the
common la\v. And it was resolved that this case was stronger, because
the letter of attorney was made to those who were tenants by copy, &c.
of the said manor. But it was agreed, that where an infant at the age
of ﬁfteen years may make a feoffment that he cannot do it by attor
ney, because a custom which enables a person disabled by the law,
ought to be pursued, and an infant can do nothing to pass any thing
out of him by attorney: vide ll, H. 4, 33, a, and it would be hard, if
men in prison, or sick, or beyond the sea, could not make surrenders
of their lands held by copy for payment of their debts, or preferment
and advancement of their wives and children, &c. Nota, reader, this
is the ﬁrst case that I have known which was adjudged in this point.
[The rest of Combes‘ Case will be found_on page 308.]
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MITCHELL.

(Court of Appeals of New York, 1867.

36 N.

Y.

235, 682. 93 Am. Dee. 502.)

Action upon an agency agreement with plaintit’f’s testator by which
defendant agreed to pay him a commission of 1O per cent. of the sale
of steamers to be sold by him as agent of defendant. The steamers
were sold to the United States government and defendant refused to
pay the commission.
* * * The defend
HL'N'P, J.’ [After deciding another pointz]
ant insists also that the contract, as established by the evidence, was in
conﬂict with good morals and against public policy, and therefore void.
The evidence showed that the defendant asked the plaintiﬁ‘ if he could
He replied that he did not know. Defendant said:
sell those steamers.
“You are acquainted with the Republican members of the administra
tion ?” The plaintiﬁ’ replied that he was acquainted with some, and had
friends who could introduce him to others, and who could aid him.
The defendant submitted to the court a series of propositions, which
he requested him to charge, and under the fourth one of which he
desires to raise the present question,
_
That proposition commences in these words: “Any contract which
conflicts with the morals of the time, and contravenes any established
interest of society, is void, as being against public policy.”
It then
asks the application of such principles to the present case. This is the
only one of the requests looking to this subject.
The defendant I think had no right to ask a charge that “any con
tract which conﬂicts with the morals of the time," is void, as being
against public policy. To make a contract thus void, it must be against
Morality is deﬁned by Paley to be “that science which
sound morals.
teaches men their duty, and the reason of it.” Paley, Mor. Ph. b. 1, c. Z.
“Morality is the rule which teaches us to live soberly and honestly.
It hath four chief virtues, justice, prudence, temperance and fortitude."
Bp. Horne’s \Vorks, vol. 6, charge to clergy of Norwich. To make a
contract void on the principle claimed, it must be against morality as
thus deﬁned. The “morals of the time" may be vicious; public senti
ment may be depraved; the people may have all gone astray, so that
not one good man can be found. Sound morals, as taught by the wise
men of antiquity, as conﬁrmed by the precepts of the gospel, and as
explained by Paley and Horne, are unchangeable. They are the same
.
yesterday and to-day.
The proposition under consideration also contains a statement that
of society," is
a contract which “contravenes any establishedinterest
void, as being against public policy. This position is equally unsound,
but I will not enlarge upon it.
2

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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the merits has also brought

me to the conclusion that no valid objection can be made to the decision

of

the judge at the circuit.

The whole of

the defendant's fourth request to charge, and upon
which the question ,arises, is as follows: “Any contract which conﬂicts
with the morals of the time, and contravenes any established interest
of society, is void, as being against public policy. If the jury believe
that the agreement on which this action is brought was made in refer
ence to the inﬂuence of the plaintiff, or his friends, with the Republican
members of the administration, or with any persons connected with the
administration, whose duty it was to act in the purchase of steamers,
and the percentage as commissions was ﬁxed in reference to that inﬂu
ence, that the contract is void and no action can be sustained upon it.”
The defendant and those concerned with him had these four steamers
on hand. The coasting trade in which they had been employed was
broken up by the inauguration of war at the south. Open war against
the government of the United States had been commenced nearly a
month before the date of this contract. The vessels were useless for
the service in which they had been employed, and for the business in
A deduction of ten per cent upon
which the defendant was engaged.
their value, or the payment of commissions to that amount was not an
unreasonable inducement to a sale under such circumstances. No infer
ence of corrupt intentions can therefore be drawn from the payment
of a larger commission than was usually paid for the services of an
.
agent or broker.
The proposition under consideration, it will also be observed, makes
no reference to corrupt intentions on the part of the agent, or of pe
cuniary inﬂuences to be used by him, or secret service to be employed.
It presents but a single point, namely, that if the fact that the plaintiff
or his friends had inﬂuence with the administration, or with those whose
duty it was to purchase steamers, was an ‘inducement to the contract,
then the contract is void.
of
cited
in
Two classes
cases are
support of this proposition, viz.:
VV here a contract has been made to induce a particular legislative "ac
tion, and where a contract has been made to procure appointments to
Oﬂ:lC€.
Several cases of these classes’ are referred to in the recent case
of Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 W'all. 45, 17 L. Ed. 868, and are cited with
approval.
Among them is Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16
How. 314, 14 L. Ed. 953, where the principle is laid down that all
contracts for contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to
use personal or secret or sinister inﬂuence on legislators, is void.
That
where an agent contracts to use or does use secret inﬂuences to affect
legislative action, the contract respecting it is void. ‘ The learned judge
in deciding the case says: “Public policy and sound morality do there
fore imperatively require that courts should put the stamp of their
disapprobation on every act, and pronounce void every contract the
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ultimate or probable tendency of which would be to sully the purity or
mislead the judgments of those to whom the high trust of legislation
is committed.”
It was further said that all contracts to evade the
revenue laws are void, as well as all marriage brocage contracts, and
contracts for procuring appointments to oﬁice. In aid of these views
may also be cited Hatzﬁeld v. Gnlden, 7 \Vatts, 152, 31 Am. Dec. 750,
which was an agreement to obtain signatures for a pardon, and Clip
pinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 VVatts & S. 315, 40 Am. Dec. 519, which was an
agreement to procure the passage of a legislative act by personal in
ﬁuence, and Pingry v. Vl/ashburn, 1 Aikens, 264, 15 Am. Dec. 676,
which was an agreement to pay for the withdrawal of opposition to an
act of the Legislature, and Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489, which was an
agreement to obtain legislative action recognizing an ancient land grant,
and Debenham v. Ox, 1 V es. Sr. 276, which was an agreement to pay
for soliciting a will in favor of another. Of the same general char
acter is Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449, where two persons being applicants
for an oﬂice, it was agreed that one should withdraw and aid the other
in procuring the ofﬁice, and in consideration thereof the fees should be
The agreement was held void.
divided between them.
The general rulc as laid down in the cases cited is a salutary one.
Care is necessary however in its application.
Certain other rules and
principles are also to be remembered. Thus the right to sell and dis
It is a right
pose of property is an essential element of ownership.
to which the owner is entitled to the full and unrestricted enjoyment.
So the time, place and manner of sale are within the range of I an own
er’s rights. He may sell personally or by agent, at private sale or by
public auction. He may employ that agent, who by his zeal, his activity,
his acquaintance or his good character may be likely to obtain the best
price for the articles to be sold. So also a suitor in the courts of jus
tice may employ that advocate, who in his opinion has the best qualiﬁca
tions to obtain the judgment he desires. To" do so is his undoubted
right.
high personal character, the
industry, eloquence,
Learning,
esteem in which he is held by the court, may all justly be considered
by the party making the employment. It is allowable to employ coun
sel to appear before a legislative committee, or before the Legislature
itself, to advocate or oppose a measure in which the individual has an
interest. Mills v. Mills, 36 Barb.. 474; Hillyer v. Trarene, 1 Am, Law
It is allowable,
Reg. 146; Howden v. Simpson, IO Ad. & Ell. 193.
and not unusual, to employ counsel thus to appear before the governor
of the state, when he has under consideration the propriety of giving
his sanction to a bill which has passed both branches of the Legislature.
Will it be insisted that no advocate can~be legally employed thus to
appear, unless he is of doubtful reputation, or personally offensive to
the Legislature or governor, or unless he belongs to a different political
An advocate of high personal character
party? I apprehend not.
would naturally and most properly be employed in the discharge of
Gonn.Px.& A.(2n Eo.)—4
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such duties, and one who was likely, by his personal qualities or his
political position, to be acceptable to the body before which he was to
appear. The possession of such qualiﬁcations, and the knowledge of
would form no objection to the employment. For
and reference to
an honest purpose, avowed to the body before which the appearance
made, and by the use of just argument and sound reasoning, this
lawful.
Authorities supra. These principles are equally plain with
Neither class of cases
those restricting the sale of political inﬂuence.
can be overthrown.
applied that both may be
The law
to be
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preserved.
A distinction may also well be made upon those cases which thin]
will dispose of the present question. Personal solicitations of legis~
lators or of judges
not
lawful subject of contract. Personal so
licitations of the president, the governor or the heads of department
for favors or for clemency,
contract.
not the lawful subject of
The apprehension that considerations other than those of
high sense
_ofi_duty and of the public interest, may thus bebrought to inﬂuence
But different principle
the_ir determination, forbids this employment.
offered for sale to the government, and
prevails where property
no
where
bargain
sought to be made with them, and where there
concealment of the agency.
then becomes
matter of trafﬁc. The
agent says that he has vessels or arms for sale, and that he can furnish
the government with what
needs and at
fair price; that the vessels
are owned by Mr. Mitchell, or the arms are manufactured at Provi
As general principle, the seller desires to obtain
dence.
high price,
while the buyer desires to purchase at a low one.
This element
known and appreciated by each party in making
know of
bargain.
no principle upon which
seller should be compelled to employ an agent
who would be looked upon with suspicion and distrust by the party
to whom he wished to sell.
In time of revolution, when the Southern
Confederacy, against wliich the arms or vessels were to be used, had
friends at the North, would
be
legal objection to an agent desiring
to sell munitions of war, that his loyalty to the government was un
doubted?
cannot think so. The present case was one of bargain and
No fraud upon the government
sale simply.
imputed, no suggestion
made of pecuniary inﬂuence to be used, no intended corruption
free from the existence‘of any
suggested. The case to be decided

of

these elements.

An

agent of the same political party with
of departments, having acquaintances and

the executive or
the heads

a

a

a

2

reputation which ,would
enable him to make an advantageous presentation of his merchandise,
may in my opinion, be lawfully employed to make such sale, and with
reference to those qualiﬁcations.
The decision in Tool Co. v. Norris,
VVall. 4'5, 17 L. Ed. 868, confounds
sale or traﬂic openly mahle by
an avowed agent to
party wishing to purchase, with the forbidden
case of an interference with legislative action or executive clemency,
'
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where the party does not profess to act upon commercial

principles.

There is a manifest difference in the principle governing the cases.
I think that case was not well considered, and cannot adopt it as an
authority for the present. Juclged by the principles I have set forth,
‘
the ruling at the trial was correct.
The rule of damages was rightly laid down, and I see nothing in the
other points raised which will require a new trial.
Iudgment should be aﬁirmed.3

TRIST
(Supreme

v.

Court of the United States,

CHILD.
187-}.

21

Wall.

441, 22

L. Ed.

623.)

Bill to enjoin Trist from drawing from the United States Treasury
Department money appropriated by Congress to pay a claim of Trist.
Child had been employed as attorney to secure the allowance of such
claim on a contract to pay him 25 per cent. of any sum secured. Trist
now refuses to pay Child.
;\Ir. justice SWAYNE,‘ delivered the opinion of the court.
[After
*
*
But there is an objection of
considering other matters:]
still greater gravity to the appellee’s case.
\Vas the contract a valid one? It was, on the part of Child, to pro
cure by lobby service, if possible, the passage of a bill providing for
The aid asked by the younger Child of
the payment of the claim.
Trist. which indicated what he considered needful, and doubtless pro
posed to do and did do himself, is thus vividly pictured in his letter
to Trist of the 20th February, 1871. After giving the names of sev
eral members ofcongress, from whom he had received favorable as
surances, he proceeds:
“Please write to your friends to write to any
member of congress. Every vote tells, and a simple request may se
cure a vote, he not caring ‘anything about it. Set every man you know
at work.
Even if he knows a page, for a page often gets a vote.”
In the Roman law it was declared that “a promise made to effect a
base purpose, as to commit homicide or sacrilege, is not binding."
just.
Inst. lib. 3, tit. 19, par. 24. In our juri5Prudence a contract may be
illegal and void because it is contrary to a_constitution or statute, or
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals. Lord Mansfield said
(Jones v. Randal], 1 Cowp. 39)t “Many contracts which are not
against morality, are still void as being against the maxims of sound
policy.”
3Compare with Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 535 (1869), in
which a contract tor services to procure legislation was held to be void, as
“leading to secret, improper and corrupt tampering with legislative action.”
Compare, also, two contracts for services in procuring the location of a post
oﬂice. Elkhart County Lodge v. (‘rar_v. 98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746 (1884);
Beal v. Polhemus, 6T'Mlch. 130, 84 N. W. 532 (1887).
4pm-g of the opinion is omitted.
_

THE

nnnuron

(Part

1

C21
l0

\

I.

I.

a

a

1

1

1

a

1

a

4 7

a

2

3

a

7

a

2

a

4

a

a

].

a

a

6

2

3

1

4

a

8

a

it

a

it

a

is

is
a

It
rule of the common law of universal application, that where
contract express or implied
tainted with either of the vices last
named, as to the consideration or the thing to be done, no alleged right
founded upon
can be enforced in
court of justice.
Before consideﬂng the contract here in question,
may be well, by
way of illustration, to advert to some of the cases presenting the sub
ject in other phases, in which the principle has been adversely applied.
\Vithin the condemned category are: An agreement to pay for sup
N.
candidate for sheriff, Swayze v. Hull,
porting for election
Law, 54, 14 Am. Dec. 399; to pay for resigning
public position to
make room for another, Eddy v. Capron,
R.
395, 67 Am. Dec.
541; Parsons v. Thompson,
H. Bl. 322; to pay for not bidding at
a sheriﬁ"’s sale of real property, ]ones v. Caswell,
Iohns. Cas. 29.
Am. Dec. 134; to pay for not bidding for articles to be sold by the
government at auction, Doolin v. VVard,
Iohns. 194; to pay for not
contract to carry the mail on
bidding for
speciﬁed route, Gulick v.
Law, 87, 18 Am. Dec. 389; to pay
Bailey, 10 N.
person for his
aid and inﬂuence in procuring an ofﬂce, and for not being
candidate
himself, Gray v. Hook,
N. Y. 449; to pay for procuring
contract
from the government, Tool Co. v. Norris,
\Vall. 45, 17 L. Ed. 868;
to pay for procuring signaturesto
petition to the governor for
\Vatts, 152, 31 Am. Dec. 750; to sell
pardon, Hatzﬁeld v. Gulden,
land to
particular person when the surrogate’s order to sell should
have been obtained, Overseers of Bridgewater v. Overseers of Brook
ﬁeld,
Cow. 299; to pay for suppressing evidence and compounding
Vi/ils. 347; to convey and assign
felony, Collins v. Blantern,
part
of what should come from an ancestor by descent, devise, or distribu
Mass. 112; to pay for promoting
mar
tion, Boynton v. ‘Hubbard,
144;
Cas.
Arundel
v.
Tre
Parl.
riage, Scribblehill v. Brett,
Brown
Ch. Rep. 47; to inﬂuence the disposition of property by will
villian,
in
Ves. 276.
particular way, Debenham v. Ox,
See, also, Add.
Cont. 91;
Smith Lead Cas.
Story, Eq. c.-7; Collins v. Blantern,
‘

Am. note.
The question now before us

676,

has been decided in four American
They were all ably considered, and in all of them the contract
was held to be against public policy, and void. - Clippinger v. Hep
315, 40 Am. Dec. S19; Harris v. Roof’s Ex’r,
Watts
baugh,
1O Barb. 489;
Rose
Hawley v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361; Marshall ,v.
Co.,
16
How.
We entertain no doubt
314, 14 L.'Ed: 953.
Railroad
that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement ex
valid. \/Vithin this
press or implied for purely professional services
category are included, drafting the petition to set forth the claim, at
tending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing argu
ments, and submitting them orally or in writing, to
committee or
All these
other proper authority, and other services of like character.
things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be in
ﬂuenced. They rest on the sameprinciple of ethics as professional

S.
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services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable.
are separated by a broad line of demarcation from
personal solicitation, and the other means and applianceswhich the
correspondence shows were resorted to in this case. There is no rea
son to believe that they involved anything corrupt or different from
what is usually practiced by all paid lobbyists in the prosecution of
their business.
The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are
at once sovereigns and subjects.
As the foundation is undermined,
the structure is weakened. When it is destroyed, the fabric must fall.
Such is the voice of universal history.
1 Montesq. Spirit of Laws, 17.
The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts,
and that those clothed with them are to be animated in the discharge
of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public
good.
They are never to descend to a lower plane. But there is a
correlative duty resting upon the citizen. In his intercourse with those
in authority, whether executive or legislative, touching the perform
ance of their functions, he is bound to exhibit truth, frankness, and
Anydeparture from the line of rectitude in such cases, is
integrity.
not only bad in morals, but involves a public wrong.
No people can
have any higher public interest, except the preservation of their lib
erties, than integrity in the administration of their government in all
its departments.
,
V
The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the inﬂuence
and exertions of the lobby agent tobring about the passage of a law
for the payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits, by
means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and considered in con
nection with the pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to
the plainest principles of public policy.
No one has a right, in such
circumstances, to put himself in_a position of temptation to do what
is regarded as so pernicious in its character. The law forbids the
inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the undertaking.
If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire adven
turers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the pas
sage of a general law with a view to the promotion of- their private
interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinc
tively denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption,
and the employment as infamous.
If the instances were numerous, open, and tolerated, they would
be regarded as measuring the decay of the public morals and the de
generacy of the times. No prophetic spirit would be needed to fore
tell the consequences near at hand. The same thing in lesser legisla
tion, if not so proliﬁc of alarming evils, is not less vicious in itself,
nor less to be condemned. The vital principle of both is the same.
The evils of the latter are of suﬁicient magnitude to invite the most
The prohibition of the law rests upon a solid
serious consideration.
A private bill is apt to attract, little attention. It involves
foundation.

But such services

Q
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nogreat public interest, and usually fails to excite much discussion.
Not infrequently the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to
investigate, vouched for by them, and the passage of the measure is
thus secured. If the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing, all is well.

If he uses nefarious means with success, the spring-head and the
stream of legislation are polluted. To legalize the trafﬁc of such serv
ice, would open a door at which fraud and falsehood would not fail
It would
to enter and make themselves felt at every accessible point.
invite their presence and offer them a premium.
If the tempted agent
be corrupt himself, and disposed to corrupt others, the transition re
He has the mean_s in his hands, with every
quires but a single step.
facility and a strong incentive to use them. The widespread suspicion
which prevails, and charges openly made and hardly denied, lead to
the conclusion that such events are not of rare occurrence. \-Vhere the
avarice of the agent is inﬂamed by the hope of a reward contingent up
on success, and to be graduated by a percentage upon the amount ap
in
propriated, the danger of tampering. in its worst form is greatly
i
creased.
It is by reason of these things that the law is as it is upon the sub
ject. It will not allow either party to be led into temptation where
the thing to be guarded against is so deleterious to private morals and
so injurious to the public welfare.
In expressing these views, we
follow the lead of reason and authority.
VVe are aware of no case in English or American jurisprudence like
the one here under consideration, where the agreement has not been
adjudged to be illegal and void.
\/Ve have said that for professional services in this connection a just
compensation may be recovered. But where they are blended and con
fused with those which are forbidden, the whole is a unit and indivisi
ble. That which is bad destroys that which is good, and they perish
Services of the latter character, gratuitously rendered, are
together.
not unlawful. The absence of motive to wrong is the foundation of
the sanction.
The tendency to mischief, if not wanting, is greatly les
The taint lies in the stipulation for pay. Where that exists, it
sened.
affects fatally, in all its parts, the entire body of the contract.‘ In all
such cases, potior conditio defendentis.
Where there is turpitude,
‘
the law will help neither party.
The elder agent in this case is represented to have been a lawyer of
ability and high character. The appellee is said to be equally worthy.
This can make no difference as to the legal principles we have con
sidered, nor in their application to the case in hand. The law is no
respecter of persons.
Decree reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to dismiss
~
the bill.“
vs

by

\7~]

"m,’§\.,,,,¢,_"
5 See, also, Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 53, 17
1. Ed. 868 (1864), and Crocker
V. U. S., 240 U. S. 74, 36 S. Ct. 245, 60 L. Ed. 533 (1916) and compare with
.
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CHAPTER IV
CREATION OF THE RELATION
4

‘iii?

SECTION 1.—IN GENERAL

'

RANEY & CHENEY
(Superior

Court of New York,

v.

1850.

WEED.
3 Sandi’. 577.)

DUER, ].1 This is a motion to set aside a report of a referee, as con
trary to law and evidence.
The action is brought by the plaintiffs, as the printers and publish
ers of a newspaper in the state of Michigan, to recover the amount
of their bill for printing an advertisement of the sale of real estate,
under an execution which was issued from the circuit court of the
United States for that district, upon a judgment recovered in that court
by the present defendants. The plaintiﬁfs were employed and author
ized to publish the advertisement, and to continue its publication with
notices of the postponement of sale from week to week/for a period
of nearly eighteen months, by the deputy marshal, in whose hands the
execution had been placed for collection, and it is insisted that this em
ployment created such a privity between the plaintiffs and defendants
The referee, adopting
as entitles the former to maintain this action.
this view of the case, has reported that there is due to the plaintiffs
the sum of $510, which is the amount of their bill exclusive of interest.
Upon the hearing, various objections to the report. arising upon the
facts as well as upon the law, were forcibly urged by the counsel for
the defendants, but the only question we have found it necessary to
consider, and shall determine, is the main question of law, upon which
the right of the plaintiﬂs to recover at all depends, namely, whether
there exists such a privity of contract or of law, between them and the
*
defendants, as can render the latter personally liable. * *
In our judgment, therefore, the liability of the defendants depends
solely upon the proper answer to be given to the general question,
whether the plaintiff in an execution is directly and personally respon
sible upon every contract which the marshal or sheriff, to whom the
Stanton v. Embry. 93 U. S. 548, 23 L. Ed. 983 (1876), a contract upon n con OK , pw3css1ov~..\ _
tlngent fee for prosecuting a claim against the government.
;>.i.vvt._t_,
And see Bowman
v. Phillips, 41 Kan. 364, 21 Pac. 230, 13 Am. St. Rep. 292, 3 L. R. A. 631
(1889), a contract for services to aid or protect from injurious consequences
in the future violations of the law. bad
1 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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execution has been delivered, may ﬁnd it necessary or convenient to
* * *
make, in order to render the process effectual.
The argument that has been relied on in this case as supplying this
It is said that a mar
demonstration may be stated in a few words.
shal or sheriﬁ, to whom a
fa. or other process has been delivered,
becomes by the very act of its delivery the agent of ' the plaintiﬁi in
whose favor
issued.
VVe have always understood, and until better instructed must con
in all cases
tinue to believe, that the relation of principal and agent
voluntary relation, springing from a contract, to which, as to all
other contracts, the consent of the parties
essential.”
described
and treated as
purely voluntary relation by all the text writers, by
Paley, by Livermore, and by judge Story, whose treatise upon the
subject, although one of the earliest,
perhaps the most complete and
As all these writers explain
accurate of his numerous publications.
from the principal, and from the principal alone, that
the relation,
the agent derives his authority.
It the will of his principal that ﬁxes
the limits of his authority, regulates its exercise and determines its ex
The principal appoints, directs, controls, removes him.
istence.
plain that these observations cannot be applied to the relation be
tween the marshal or sheriﬂ’, and the suitors, who in the prosecution
of their legal rights are constrained to employ him. As they have not
cannot be said
the power of selection, nor he the liberty of refusal,
the creation
that this relation flows from the will of the parties.
of the law, not the result of acontract. He
a public ofﬁcer, who,
when he acts for individuals, acts, not by virtue of their choice or of
positive, independent duty.
his own agreement, but
discharge of
remov
He
appointed by the government, or elected by the people,
able only by the appointing power or by process of law, and unless
where special instructions are given to him,
the law, and the law
alone, that deﬁnes his authority and prescribes his duties, and controls
VVhcn special directions are given to him the
him in their discharge.
plaintiﬁ is, doubtless, responsible for his acts, so far as the directions
are followed, and in such cases the oﬁicer, within a limited sphere and
in
restricted sense of the term, becomes the agent of the suitor.
*
.*

a

a

&

&

may have been true in early English
$CoN'mAc'r or Sisavrci-:.—Whatever
law, when the relation of master and servant was emerging from the status
C0. v. Silvers, 13 Ind. App. 80, 37 N. E.'413 (1894),
of slavery, see Kingan
the present relation of free service is one of contract, requiring consent and
West Point R. C0. v. West,
all the essential incidents of contract, Atlanta
711, 67 L. R. A. 701, 104 Am. St. Rep. 179 (1905), in
121 Ga. 641. 49 S.
volunteer, acting on the request of
which the plaintiff was
servant of
defendant. As to the necessity of wages to establish the contract relation, see
Pugmire v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 33 Utah, 27. 92 Pac. 762, 13 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 565. 126 Am. St. Rep. 805, 14 Ann. Cas. 384 (1907).
The contractual
nature of the relation of master and servant and the usual incidents thereof,
are always to be assumed.
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\\" e do not deny, but on the contrary distinctly admit, that in every
civil suit in which the sheriff is employed, a privity, and therefore a
exist between him and the plaintiff, but it is a
the consent of the parties, creates and
deﬁnes. It does not ﬁow from the ordinary relation of principal and
agent, nor is it governed by the rules upon which the rights and liabili
indeed,
ties of the parties in that relation usually depend.
There
partial analogy, by which the counsel for the plaintiff and the referee
have probably been misled, but the analogy fails in the material cir
cumstances upon which the liability of
principal for the acts of his
agent
reasonably founded.
perfectly just, that he, who em
ploys an agent, should be responsible for the acts, within the scope
of his authority, of the person whom he selects, trusts and controls;
but
not just that any person_should be responsible for the acts of
a public officer, whom, without regard to his own wishes, the law com
mands, and unless he choose to abandon his rights, compels him to
employ.
not just that he should be liable for the acts of
person whom
he does not select, may not trust, and has no power to remove.
So
far as by special instructions he controls his discretion, and so far as
he participates in the wrongful acts of the officer, he
justly liable,
and no further.
The report must be set aside, with costs to abide the event.”
mutual

liability,
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is
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privity which the law, and not

EAGLE IRON CO.
(Supreme

‘C-ourt

of Alabama,

1906.

v.
147

BAUGH.
Ala.

613,

41

South.

663.)

it

Action by Baugh against the Iron Company for failure to take
was alleged plaintiff had sold appellant
500 cords of wood, which
The disputed question was whether
through its agent, one Stewart.
Stewart was an agent with such authority.
ANDERSON, ].‘ “The authority of an agent, where the question of

§

is

it

is

its existence
directly involved, can only be established by tracing
The
to its source in some word or act of the alleged principal.
Evidence of his own
agent cannot confer authority upon himself.
not adrriissible against his
statements or admissions, therefore,
principal for the purpose of establishing, enlarging, or renewing his
authority; nor can his authority be established by showing that he
acted as agent or that he claimed to have the powers which he as
100; Galbreath v. Cole,
Mechem on Agency,
sumed to exercise.”

4

6

8

See. also. Mnrkwick v. Hardingham, 15 Ch. Div. 339, 43 L. '1‘. Rep. N. S.
647. 29 W. R. 361 (1880), holding that the relation of principal and agent
requires the consensus ot both parties; Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed.
C. O. A. 539 (1893); In re Carpenter (D. C.) 125 Fed. S31 (1908).
753. 764,
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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Ala. 140; Wharton on Evidence, § 1184; Scarborough v. Reyn
oids, 12 Ala. 252; Postal Co. v. Lenoir, 107 Ala. 640, 18 South.
266; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Hill, 115 Ala. 334, 22 South. 163. Any
declaration of the agent as to his authority would be admissible, when
other evidence had been shown from which authority to do the thing
may be inferred; or, if the trial court improperly admitted declarations of the agent, the error would be curedby evidence subsequently
introduced from which authority might be inferred, and in case such
evidence was introduced the question of authority would become one
of fact for the determination of the jury.‘ Birmingham R. R. C0.
v. Tenn. Co., 127 Ala. 137, 28 South. 679.
There was evidence from which the jury could infer that 1\-lcClane,
the superintendent, had authority to contract for and buy wood for
to others, and that
the defendant, and to delegate
the authority
Stewart was its agent, independent of the acts and declarations of
There was evidence from which it could be
McClane and Stewart.
inferred that these men were held ,out as agents with authority to
buy wood, and also of a ratiﬁcation by the defendant of their acts.
* * * For error on another point reversed and remanded.
61
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,i___
POLE
(House of Lords,

1862.

9

Jur.
I

v.

LEASK.

N. S. 829, 33 L.
N. S. 645.)

J.

Ch. 155,

8

L. T.

Rep.

Leask, a broker in the colonial fruit trade, was introduced to Pole
& Co. by one Anderson, and was at the interview directed to make
purchases under the direction and orders of Anderson.
Large pur
chases were made, and acknowledged by Pole & Co. as made in accordance with their intentions, up to a certain period.
Thereafter,
Anderson ordered Leask to make further purchases, and fraudulently
appropriated to himself moneys and goods, so that there was a loss
,on the business. Leask sued to hold Pole 8: Co. liable on the ground
that they had made Anderson a partner, or at least an agent. The
Lord Chancellor rendered the prevailing opinion, holding Pole & Co.
liable upon those grounds.
Loan CRANWORTH did not regard the facts as showing even an
agency at the time of the purchases, and in a much quoted dissenting
I
opinion laid down the following propositions:
My Lords, before I examine in detail the facts of this case, I desire
to advert very shortly to one or two general propositions connected
with the law of agency, which I think were sometimes lost sight of

"

5When there is other evidence of the agency, the statements ot the agent
may be received to show that he purported to act for the principal. and not
for some one else. Nowell v. Chipman. 170 Mass. 340. 49 N. E. 631 (1898).
If the agency is admitted. then the statements and acts may an be considered
Bacon v. Johnson, 56 Mich. 182, 22 N. W. 276 (1885).
as part of the ease.

i

"
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in the argument of this case at your Lordship’s bar. First, then, as
to the constitution by the principal of another to act as his agent. No
one can become the agent of another person except by the will of that
other person. .His will may be manifested in writing, or orally, or
simply by placing another in a situation in which, according to ordi
nary rules of law, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, accord
ing to the ordinary usages of mankind, that other is understood to
represent and act for the person who has so placed him; but in every
case it is only by the will of the employer that an agency can be
I
'
created.
This proposition, however, is not at variance with the doctrine, that
where one has so acted as from his conduct to lead another to believe
that he has appointed some one to act as his agent, and knows that
that other person is about to act on that behalf, then, unless he in
terposes, he will, in general, be estopped from disputing the agency,
however, necessary to
though in fact no agency really existed. It
bear in mind the difference between this agency by estoppel,
may
and
real agency however constituted.
so designate
Another proposition to be kept constantly in view
that the bur
on the person dealing with any one as an agent, through
den of proof
whom he seeks to charge another as principal.
He mhst show that
the agency did exist, and that the agent had the authority he assumed
to exercise. or otherwise that the principal
estopped from disput
ing it.“
Unless this principle
strictly acted on, great injustice may be the
for any one dealing with
consequence;
person assuming to act as
agent for another can always save himself from loss or diﬂiculty
applying to the alleged principal to learn whether the agency does ex
ist, and to what extent. The alleged principal has no similar mode of
protecting his interests; he may be ignorant of the fact that any one
is assuming to act for him, or that persons are proposing to deal with
his agent.
another under the notion that that other
therefore,
important to recollect constantly where the burden of proof lies.
1

0

South. 340 (1886), holding that to
See, also, Hill v. Ilelton, 80 Ala. 528,
establish agency the alleged principal must in some way directly or in
directly, be connected with the circumstances.
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GEYLIN
(Superior

v.

(Part

1"

DE VILLEROI.

Court of the State of Delaware,

1860.

2 Houst.

311.)

Assumpsit for work and labor on a contract to construct a. sawmill
the defendant on a large timber estate.
The contract was made
by one Montalant, who had acted for defendant, who could not speak
English, in the purchase of the estate, and in many other matters
connected with its development.
Defendant claimed agency to make
the contract had not been proved.
GILPIN, C. ].,’ charged the jury: * * *
“There is no special character or description of written instrument,
nor any particular form of words, necessary to the appointment of
an agent.
The modes of appointment are various, and the agency may
be created either by express words, or acts of the principal, or it may
be implied or inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the
The authority conferred may be either general or special;
parties.
and the fact of agency, of either description, may be established, either
by direct or indirect evidence. It may be shown directly, by express
words of appointment, either spoken or written.
Or, it may be im
plied or inferred, or indirectly shown, by evidence of the relative sit
uation of the parties, the nature of the business which is the subject
of controversy, and the character of the intercourse between them, pro
vided the facts and circumstance disclosed by the evidence, fairly
justify such an inference. The acts and doings of the party sought
to be charged as principal, in relation to the subject matter, may be,
and often are, quite as expressive and signiﬁcative as words spoken.‘
* *‘ *

for

Plaintiff had a verdict.

._i.

TRUNDY
_

(Supreme

v.

I

FARRAR.

Judicial Court of Maine,

1.950.

32 Me. 225.)

Assumpsit upon three negotiable notes given by defendant to the
proprietors of the town of Baileyville, indorsed by “Samuel Kelly,
The authority of Kelly so to indorse the notes is the question
Agent.”
of the case. To prove his agency plaintiffs offered to show by parol
that he had acted as agent of the proprietary from 1834 to the present
time, giving deeds, indorsing notes, bringing suits, and taking care of
the property.
The court ruled this evidence inadmissible for the
7 The. statement

of facts is abridged, and parts of the opinion

are omitted.

8 See, also, Hall V. Smith, 3 Kan. App. 685, 44 Pac. 908 (1896), and Sterna
man v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., ante, p. 4; Reynell v. Lewis, 15 M. & W.
517, 527 (1846).
As to presumption that one in principal's place of business,
apparently acting for him, is his agent, see ante, p. 8; Miltenberger v. Hulett,
-'
188 Mo. App. 273, 175 S. W. 111 (1915).
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They then introduced records of the proprietors showing the
purpose.
choice of Kelly as agent, and that he had acted as agent from his
election to the present time, that they have no other agent, and that
he had transacted all their business. This and other similar evidence
the presiding judge ruled insuﬂicient to show authority in Kelly to
indorse

notes.

‘

If, in the opinion of the whole court, the aforesaid rulings were
correct, and the evidence insuﬂicient to maintain the action, the plain
tiff is to be nonsuit; otherwise a new trial is to be granted.
TENNEY, J. “A general agency exists, where there is a delegation to
do all acts connected with the particular business or employment."
Story’s Agency, § 17. “The principal will be bound by the acts of his
agent, within the scope of the general authority conferred on him.”
Ibid. § 126.
The authority of an agent may be created verbally, without writing,
excepting for some special acts, and may be inferred from the relation
of the parties, and the nature of the employment, without proof of
any express appointment. It is suFﬁ_cient if there be satisfactory evi
dence of the fact, that the principal employed the agent, and that the
The agency must be antecedently given,
agent undertook the trust.
or be subsequently adopted. 2 Kent’s Com. Lect. 41, pp. 477 and 478.
It is very usual to prove the agency by inference from the habits
and course of dealing between the parties. These may be such as to
show that there was an appointment suﬂiciently broad tp cover the
acts done by the agent, or that there has been a continued ratiﬁcation
thereof: the principal would be bound by _either.
“I~law'ng himself
recognized another as his agent, by adopting and ratifying his acts,
done in that capacity, the-principalpis not permitted to deny the rela
tion to the injury of third persons.” 2 Green]. Ev. § 65; Story on
Agency, §§ 56, 127. “\Vhen an agency actually exists, the mere ac
quiescence may well give rise to the presumption of an intentional
ratiﬁcation of the act.” Ibid. § 256.
On the question, whether a person is an agent of a corporation or
not, the same presumptions are applicable to such bodies, as to in
dividuals, and that a deed, or a vote or by-law is not necessary to
establish a contract; promise or agency. Maine Stage Co. v. Longley,
14 Me. 444; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 62.
“In America the general doctrine is
now ﬁrmly established, that whenever a corporation is acting within
the scope of the legitimate purposes of its institution, all parol con
tracts made with its authorized agents, are express contracts of the
corporation." Story’s Agency, § 53. “In all matters of daily ne
cessity within the ordinary powers of the oﬂicers of a corporation
aggregate, or touching its ordinary operations, the authority of its
2 Greenl.
agents may be proved, as in the case of private persons.”

Ev. § 62.
The notes in suit were given by the defendant to the proprietors of
Baileyvillc, for a lot of land, which he purchased of them, and in

I
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The questions presented are,
dorsed by Samuel Kelly as agent.
whether there was suﬁicient evidence from the vote of the proprietors,
of authority in Kelly to negotiate the notes in their behalf; and wheth
er there was evidence before the jury upon which they should have
passed in relation to the existence-of the agency, arising from the con
duct of the proprietors.
The vote passed June 9, 1834, was introduced as evidence by the
plaintiff, without objection, and is in these words: “Voted, that the
agent be and is authorized to bargain and sell any of the__1ands of the
proprietors, to attend to the disposing of the grass thereon, and the
working out of the proprictor’s taxes, and to attend to such other
business as may concern the general interest.” This vote is very com
prehensive. The terms used, in the vote of an organized proprietary,
The right
would authorize the transfer of their lands by their agent.
to bargain and,sell them involves the power to receive the considera
tion. The authority to attend to such other business as may concern
the general interest, will embrace the power to receive notes, for the
consideration and payment of the same; and if it was found more for
the interest of the proprietors to negotiate those notes, than to obtain
the sums secured thereby, by directly calling upon the makers, it would
'
not exceed the limits of the agency.
It was shown by the records that Samuel Kelly was chosen-agent in
the year 1834, and that he had acted as such from that time, to the
time of the trial of the action, indorsing and transferring notes, given
for lands, sold by him as their agent. giving deeds and generally trans
acting their business, and all their business, they having no other agent;
that in the year 1836 the greater part of their lands, then unsold, was
transferred, to be held in severalty; and that the notes and securities
The proprietors having
held at that time, were transferred to him.
elected Kelly as their agent, for some purpose, these acts of his, it
may fairly be inferred, were known to them, and were acquiesced in.
A jury might be authorized to make the inference, that as he took notes
as the consideration of deeds given by him of the proprietors’ lands,
and transferred notes given therefor; and as the notes and securities
held by the proprietors were transferred by the proprietors them
selves, he was their general agent, and clothed with the power to do
that, which had for so long a time been done without any objection,
The acquiescence of the proprietors in these acts,
made by them.
known, during the time
many of which must have beenigenerally
he acted as their sole agent, and they_l_iad meetings and passed votes in
relation to his authority, was evidence that they had authorized him to
transact their business in the manner in which he did
and that he
was possessed of full power to perform all the duties of their general
agent.

The objection to Kelly’s authority to transfer the notes in suit does
not come from the proprietors, but from the defendant, who dealt with
them through their agent, Kelly. He received the value of the notes,
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and is bound to pay the amount to some one. The facts in proof are
such as would induce the plaintiff to conclude, that Kelly was the
agent; or was held out to the world as such, and if so, good faith re
quires, that the proprietary should be bound by his acts.” This would
eﬁectually protect the plaintiﬁ from loss, and would equally secure the
defendant from all exposure to pay his notes a second time. VVe think,
independent of the vote of the proprietors, there was evidence of the
agency of Kelly, which might with propriety be submitted to a jury.
According to the agreement of the parties, the action is to stand for

triaL

GREGORY
(Supireme Court of Washington,

v.

LOOSE.

1898.

19 Wash.

54 Pnc. 33.)

Action

against Loose, doing business as the Riverside
Shingle
Appeal from judgment for plaintiff.
J. On and prior to February 5, 1895, the Riverside Shingle
Company was the owner of a shingle mill at Machias, in Snohomish
county; and on or about that day it conveyed all of its property,
including the shingle mill, to the Snohomish National Bank, in pay
ment of its indebtedness to the bank. The mill was thereafter known
Soon after the transfer
and designated as the Riverside Shingle Mill.
the bank started up the mill, under the general supervision of appel
lant, Loose, who was the bank's cashier, and proceeded to manufacture
shingles from bolts furnished by other parties having them for sale.
One R. P. Mathews was employed to operate the mill, with authority
to contract for and estimate shingle bolts. subject to the approval of
the appellant. In September or October, 1895, said Mathews employed
one C. R. Gregory to construct a logging road to some timber which
appellant had contracted 'for, and which was to be cut either by ap
pellant or his vendors, and removed within ﬁve years from the date
Said Gregory, by
of the contract, which contract was in -writing.
the direction or consent of Mathews, employed the respondent and
several other persons to labor on the road. As superintendent of con
struction, said Gregory kept the time of the men employed, and on or
about October 25, 1895, demanded from Mr. Loose the amount alleged
to be due them respectively for their lal)or. Payment was refused on
the ground that the making of the road had not been authorized by
appellant, and that neither appellant nor the bank had any knowledge
This action was thereupon instituted
that it was being- constructed.
Company.
ANDERS,

‘The implied authority rests not so much upon the number as upon the
character of the previous acts of the agent. In‘ Anderson v. Johnson, 74
Minn. 171, 77 N. W. 26 (1998), it was held that “a single net of an assumed
agent, and a single recognition of his authority by his principal, it sufficiently
positive and comprehensive in their character, may be sufficient to prove
agency to do similar acts"——quoting Wilcox v. 0., M. 8: St. P. R. Co., 24 Minn.
269 (1877).

-
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to recover the amount claimed to be due respondent and others, whose
claims were assigned to him, for labor performed in the construction
of the road. I
- It is not claimed that either the respondent or any of his assignors
was personally requested or authorized by Mr. Loose to perform the
labor for the value of which this action is waged, but the contention
is that Mathews was appellant’s agent to construct the road, and as such
agent was authorized to bind appellant for the payment for the labor
performed thereon. And it cannot reasonably be claimed that Math
ews’ act in authorizing Mr. Gregory to construct the road was rat
iﬁed by the appellant, for we discover no evidence of such ratiﬁcation
in the record. If, therefore, Mathews was the agent of appellant for
the purpose claimed, it was either because appellant held him out to
the public as such agent, or because what he did in that regard was
within the authority which appellant had actually given him, or within
the apparent authority which he knowingly and without dissent per
1 Am. 8: Eng. Enc. Law (Zd Ed.) pp. 988, 989.
mitted him to assume.
The actual authority, as we have said, which was delegated to
Mathews, was authority to operate the Riverside Shingle Mill, and to
contract for shingle bolts, and estimate the value thereof, subject to
the approval of appellant.
The bolts were paid for in every instance
by appellant at the bank, and generally, if not always, by checks
During
“Riverside Shingle Mill.
U. K. Loose, Agent.”
signed:
Mathews’ employment at the mill, he sometimes gave orders on mer
chants for the delivery of limited quantities of groceries or other mer
chandise to men who were furnishing shingle bolts or working in the
mill.
The amount of the respective orders was reported to appellant
by Mathews, and was generally deducted from the sum due to the
person who received the goods, and paid to the drawee, although it
appears that in several instances such payment, was refused.
Respondent introduced evidence at the trial to the effect that Math
ews negotiated a contract for timbet for appellant with certain desig
nated persons, but the contract was ﬁnally executed by appellant him
self, and contained no provision whatever for the building of a logging
road; and this, too, notwithstanding the fact that the witness C. R.
Gregory testiﬁed that Mathews, when negotiating for the timber, said
to the vendors thereof, who were insisting that a road should be con
“VVe will make the contract with this in
structed to
and we will
build that road immediately.” This
the contract which we mentioned
above as providing for the removal of the timber purchased within
ﬁve years. Evidence was also introduced by respondent to the effect
that Mathews made an arrangement with one Eddy for
right of way
over his land for
logging road in favor of appellant, and located the
same; but, like the timber contract, this contract, which was
lease
term of ﬁve years, was executed by appellant himself,—one
for
Packard, as well as said Eddy, being
lessor.
The ﬁrst and principal question to be determined
do the facts
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above set forth, singly or together, warrant the ﬁnding that Mathews
had the power to bind the appellant by the act of authorizing the build
ing of the road in question? And we are of the opinion that this ques
tion must be answered in the negative, for no such power can legiti
It is true
mately be deduced from the facts appearing in the record.
that an agency to do a particular thing may be implied from the habits
and general course of dealing between the parties, but in this instance
nothing of the kind could be shown, as no logging road had ever been
constructed or authorized by the appellant.
It is also true that the
authority to act as an agent in a particular business or transaction may
often be implied from acts done in the course of the agent's employ
ment in some other business. “But it is not to be inferred, however,
that authority is, in any case, to be implied without reason, or pre
sumed without cause.
The implication must be based upon facts, and
cannot arise from any mere argument as to the convenience, utility, or
propriety of its existence. So, too, the facts from which it is sought to
be implied are to be given their natural, legal, and legitimate effect,
and this eﬁect is not to be expanded or diminished in order to establish
or overthrow the agency.” Mechem, Ag. § 85. See, also, Story, Ag.
But it is well settled in the
§ 87; McAlpin v. Cassidy, 17 Tex. 449.
law of agency that the extent of implied authority is limited to acts
of a like kind with those from which it is implied, and that an implied
power is never extended by construction beyond the obvious purpose
for which it is granted. 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (Zd Ed.) p. 1002;
Mechem, Ag. §§ 85, 274, 312; Story, Ag. § 87; McAlpin v. Cassidy,
supra; Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66, 35 N. VV. 568.“
Applying these principles, it seems plain to us that the building of a
logging road was not within the scope of the authority, real or appar
ent, delegated to Mathews; for it is an act of an entirely different
kind from that of operating ‘a shingle mill, contracting for shingle
bolts. or conducting preliminary negotiations for a right of way, or
In our judgment. if it can be
the purchase of a quantity of timber.
inferred from the facts in this case that he was authorized to build the
road in question, it might with equal propriety be inferred that he
was authorized to construct a railroad at the expense of the appellant,
for the one is as foreign to his employment as the other. It was the
duty of Mr. Gregory to ascertain the extent of Mr. Mathews’ authority
before engaging in this undertaking, and he had no reasonable excuse
for not ascertaining it. Hurley v. V\’atson, 68 Mich. 531, 36 N. VV.
726. He could have ascertained the fact by simply asking a question,
but, instead of doing so, he relied upon the acts and representations of
the assumed agent; and he admitted in his testimony, in effect, that
10 See. also, Hazeltine v. Miller, 44 Me. 177 (1857), in which an accnt having
authority to collect for his principal money from the use and sale of prop
erty embarked on business enterprises for his principal; Winkelmann v. Brick
ert, 102 Wis. 50. 78 N. W. 164 (1899).
Gono.Pn& A.(2n En.)—5
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in so doing he acted unreasonably, and in fact foolishly.
The testi
mony also shows that he himself had previously advised the appel
lant not to build a road at that time of the year. Giving due weight to
all the material evidence in the record, it seems clear to us that there
was not suﬂicient evidence to justify a verdict in favor of the respond
court therefore erred in not taking the case
ent, and the learned-trial
from the jury at appellant’s request.
It was also error, we think, to permit certain witnesses to testify as
to what this supposed agent told them that appellant said, or had con
cluded to do, with respect to this logging road. This was clearly hear
Nor were the acts and dec
say testimony, and hence not admissible.
larations of Mathews competent evidence in proof of agency.
Co
megys v. Lumber Co., 8 VVash. 661, 36 Pac. 1087.
Certain portions of the charge of the court to the jury are objected
to by appellant, /but we perceive no substantial error therein, except
in the application of the general principles of law announced to the
facts of the case; but it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of
the several objections raised, as the judgment must be reversed for
reasons already indicated.
Reversed and remanded for further pro
ceedings.
DUNBAR,
dissents.

-ii-_

COLUMBIA MILL CO.

NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE.

Court of Minnesota,

GILFILLAN,
at Minneapolis,

1893.

_52

Minn.

224,

53 N.

W. 1061.)

I.“ The plaintiff was corporation in the business,
of manufacturing and selling ﬂour, and the defendant
that place. The action
for the conversion of 19 checks
C.

a

(Supreme

v.

11

Part of the opinion
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a
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a

was
bank at
drawn by different persons or ﬁrms upon different banks or concerns,
The
each payable to the order of, and the property of, the plaintiff.
allegations of the complaint are that one Leo Heilpern feloniously ab
stracted and purloined the checks from plaintiff, wrongfully and with
out authority impressed on the back of each, with
rubber stamp, the
words “Columbia Mill Co.,” and wrote underneath his name, L.- Heil
pern, and wrongfully sold and disposed of them to defendant, which
collected and appropriated to its own use the money called for by
that is, he
them. Heilpern was plaintiffs bookkeeper and cashier;
had charge of its books and its “petty cash,”
e. the payments re
ceived upon its sales at retail.
The sole controversy was on Heilpern’s authority to dispose of and
was conceded that he had no
receive the money for the checks.
express authority to do so, and the question was narrowed to that of
be not included in
implied authority, and the further question,
omitted.
Gonn.Pn.&

A.(2n En.)
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that, as to whether the plaintiff had either intentionally or negligently
so conducted its business with defendant, or permitted it to be so con
ducted, that it had a right in good faith _to believe, and did believe, that
Heilpern had the authority he assumed to exercise, and, acting on and
because of such relief, received the transfer of the checks, and paid
him the money. It appeared that, when the relation of banker and
patron between defendant and plaintiff began, the latter left in the sig
nature book of the former the si@ature of S. Zeidler, its treasurer, as
ofithe only person authorized to sign for it in its transactions with the
bank, and except during a short period, when he was absent, his was
the only signature in the bank for that purpose. It also appeared that
there grew up and continued for years a usage that when plaintiff sent
to the bank, for deposit to its credit, checks payable to its order, it
made no other indorsement on them than by impressing it with a rub
ber stamp. (\Vhether there was a similar usage in any other bank is
It also appeared that
immateriaI.", It existed between these parties.
Heilpern arid his predecessors in employment as bookkeeper and cash
ier, extending over a period of two or three years, were accustomed
and receive the money
to take or send to the bank, and transfer to
for, checks, mostly small ones, payable to its order, with no indorse
ment except with the stamp, or with none at all.
was upon this custom mainly that defendant relied to show im
plied or at least apparent authority in Heilpern to transfer the checks
And
without the signature of Zeidler, and receive the money for them.
because one dealing! with an agent may show actual authority in him,——
that is, such authority as the principal in fact intended to vest in the
to be shown by acts and conduct, rath
agent, although such intention
er than by express words,—without showing that he (the person dealing.
with the agent) knew when he dealt with him of the acts and conduct
was competent for de
to be implied,
from which the intention
fendant to show the course and manner of conducting business in the
oﬁice of plaintiff, so far as the bookkeepers and cashier had charge of
it. The officers of plaintiff testiﬁed that Heilpern had no authority to
transfer the checks and receive the money, and that they never knew
But
of the bookkeeper and cashier doing so with plaintiff's checks.
manner of con
Such
the jury were not bound to their testimony.
ducting the business in the ofﬁce might have been proved as would have
justiﬁed the jury in ﬁnding that the ofﬁcers @ilst_have__kno\vr_1 of the
custom of the bookkeeper and cashier in regard to checks; and had
was acquiesced in by plaintiff, the inten
that been found, and that
tion to vest authority might have been implied.
distinction between implied
For the sake of convenience, we make
authority-—that is. such as the principal in fact intends the agent to
have, though the intention
implied from the acts and conduct of the
such as, though not actu
principal—and apparent authority,—that
ally intended by the principal, he permits the agent to appear to have.
The rule as to apparent authority rests essentially on the doctrine of
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estoppel. The rule is that, where one has reasonably and in good faith
been led to believe from the appearance of authority which a principal
permits his agent to have, and because of such belief has in good faith
dealt with the agent, the principal will not be allowed to deny the agen
cy, to the prejudice of the one so dealing.
One may be estopped by his acts of culpable negligence, as well as
through culpable negligence the plaintiff
by his intentional acts; and
permitted Heilpern to appear to the bank to have authority to trans
fer the checks and receive the money, and the latter reasonably and in
good faith was induced by such appearance to believe he had that au
thority, and on that belief received and paid for the checks, plaintiff
cannot deny the authority, for to permit it to do so would sanction a
* * *
fraud.“

Order denying to defendant a new trial reversed, for error in the
charge to the jury.

___.i_

WORRALL
(Court of Appeals of New York,

v.

1851.

MUNN.
5 N.

Y.

_
229, 55 Am. Dec. 330.)

Action for speciﬁc performance of a contract,under seal to sell land.
The defendants objected to the contract for various reasons, one of
which was that it was executed for plaintiff, Noah Vt/orrall, by Henry
Worrall, who was ‘not authorized by a written power of attorney un
der seal to execute said instrument’. From a’ decree of the Supreme
Court dismissing complainant's bill an appeal is taken.
PAIGE, J.“
[After stating the facts and disposing of some other

*
* The only remaining questions to be consid
objectionsz]
ered are, whether the authority of Henry W'orrall to execute the coun
terpart should have been under seal; whether he executed the agree

"

See, p. 65 ﬂ3.; Hackett v. Van Frank, 105 M0. App. 384.79 S. W. 1013
(1904); Clark v. Dillman, 108 Mich. 625, 66 N. W. 570 (1896), in which the
There
court says: “All of the elements of an estoppel must be present.
must be conduct calculated to mislead, and it must be under circumstances
which justify the claim that the alleged principal should have expected that
the representations would be relied and acted upon; and further, it must arr
pear that they were relied and acted upon. in good faith, to the injury of an
Mechem, Ag. §§ 85. 86; Railroad Co. v. Chappell, 56 Mich.
innocent party.
190, 22 N. W. 278.
Maxwell v. Bridge Co.. 41 Mich. 454, 2 N. W. 639: Fergu
son v. Miliikin. 42 Mich. 443, 4 N. W. 185; Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279.
note; De Mill v. Moffnt. 49 Mich. 125, 131, 13 N. W. 387; Fletcher v. Circuit
Judge of Kalkaska, 81 Mich. 193, 45 N. W. 641; Bank v. Todd. 47 Conn. 219."
In Dispatch Printing Co. v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 109 Minn. 440. 124
N. W. 236 (1910). the court attempts a distinction between apparent authority,
resting on the conscious permission by the principal of acts beyond the pow
ers granted. and authority by estoppel, which has its basis in the neglect of
the principal.
_
As to whether there can really be agency by cstoppel, see discussions in 5
Col. Law Rev. 36, 456, 6 Col. Law Rev. 34. See also 3 Col. Law Rev. 395; 15
Harv. Law Rev. 324; 16 Harv. Law Rev. 186; 18 Harv. Law Rev. 400, 13
Green Bag, 50; 35 Am. Law Rev. 707.
13 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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ment in the name of his principal; and if the counterpart was not bind
ing on Noah Worrall, whether the original was binding on Prall.
It is a maxim of the common law that an authority to execute a
deed or instrument under seal must be conferred by an instrument of
This rule
equal dignity and solemnity; that
by one under seal.
purely technical. A disposition has been manifested by most of the
American courts to relax its strictness, especially in its application to
think the doctrine as
partnership and commercial transactions.
now prevails may be stated as follows, viz.:
conveyance or any
act
required to be by deed, the authority of the attorney or agent to
execute
the instrument or act
must be conferred by deed; but
would be effectual without a seal, the addition of a seal will not render
executed under
an authority under seal necessary, and
parol au
thority or subsequently ratiﬁed oriadopted by parol, the instrument or
said that the rule
act will be valid and binding on‘ the principal.
as thus relaxed
conﬁned in its application to transactions between
But
seems to me that
distinction between partners and
partners.
other persons in the application of the rule as relaxed and qualiﬁed by
recent decisions, stands upon no solid foundation of reason or prin
ciple.

_

it
is

1.

§

is

is

The whole authority of a partner to act for his copartners and to
founded
bind them and their interest in the copartnership property
upon the common-law doctrine of agency. So far as he acts for his
Thus,
a general rule
an agent. Story on Part.
partners, he
of the common law that one partner chnnot, from the mere relation of

§

3

partnership, bind his copartners by deed or instrument under seal,
even in commercial dealings unless specially authorized to do so by an
117;
Kent’s Com. (6th
instrument under seal.
Story on Part.

Ed.)

47.

maxim before mentioned,
the common-law
There are
relation
of
principal and agent.
applicable to the general
numerous cases
the American courts in which the rule has been re
to the
laxed as regards partnership transactions, in order to adapt
117;
Kent’s Com. 48. Thus
necessities of trade. Story on Part.
now ﬁrmly established, that
the doctrine as applicable to partners
partner within the scope of the partnership
wherever an act done by
done by an unsealed instrument, then,
business would be valid
will be valid and bind his
though done by an instrument under seal,
prior parol authority or adopted by
authorized by
copartners
121, 122; Anderson
Story on Part.
a subsequent parol ratiﬁcation.
Brock. 462, Fed. Cas. No. 365, Marshall, C. _I.;
v. Tompkins,
N. Y.) 150;
Const.
Kent’s Com. (6th Ed.) 48; Smith v. Kerr,
Hall, 293, ]ones, C. _I.; Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns.
Gram v. Seton,
Hill, 163; Tapley v.
513, 553, 10 Am. Dec. 286; Everit v. Strong,
Butterﬁeld, Metc. (Mass.) 515, 35 Am. Dec. 374; Cady v. Shepherd,
And the rule that one partner
11 Pick. 400, 403, 22 Am. Dec. 379.
cannot bind his copartners by deed without an authority under seal has
1

5

1

3

(3

1

3
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held in several cases not to apply to a case where one partner
conveys by deed property of the ﬁrm which he might have conveyed
by an unsealed instrument or by parol. The mere addition of the seal
does not vitiate the conveyance. Tapley v. Butterﬁeld, 1 Metc. (Mass)
1 Brock.
462, Fed.
515, 35 Am. Dec. 374; Anderson v. Tompkins,
Cas. No. 365; Everit v. Strong, 5 Hill, 165; Milton v. Mosher, 7
Metc. (Mass.) 244.
In Gram v. Seton, supra, Chief Iustice Jones.
of the Supreme Court of the city of New York, held that the authori
ty of one partner to bind his copartners by deed may even be implied
N0 good reason
from the acts and acquiescence of the copartners.
can be assigned for a distinction between partners and other persons
in relation to the technical rule of the common law, that in all cases
an authority to execute a deed must be by deed.
The rights and liabili
ties of partners in their acts for each_other are governed by the same
rules as are the relations of principal and agent; each partner being
considered an agent for his copartners; and the same questions of ex
press and implied, general and special authority, must arise between
partners as between principal and agent.
Upon principle, therefore,
whenever an instrument, either as between partners or principal and
agent, would be effectual for the purpose intended without a seal, the
addition of a seal should not create the necessity of an authority under
seal to authorize an agent to execute it.“
In Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 113, Cowen, ]., speaking of a spe
cialty executed by an attorney without authority under seal, says:
“Yet in such case it does not follow that it shall not operate at all. If
the contract may be made without deed, the seal shall not prevent its
inuring as a simple contract, though the authority be by parol or mere
ly implied from the relations between the principal and agent.” In
Skinner v. Dayton, 19 johns. SS4, 558, 1O Am. Dec. 286, in the Court
of Errors, Spencer, C. ]., held that the contract executed in that case
by Skinner, under seal for the directors of the company, ought not to
be considered a personal covenant of Skinner in equity, and that the
company were liable for a breach of the covenant, although the au
thority of Skinner was not conferred by deed; and such was the deci
sion of the Court of Errors. Skirmer was a director, and the president
of an association for manufacturing cotton, and entered into a con
tract for the making of some machinery for the company.
The con
tract was ratiﬁed by the subs'equent parol assent and acts of the stock
The court decided that such subsequent ratiﬁcation was an
holders.
adoption of the act of the agent and equivalent to a previous positive
and direct authorization to do the act.
In Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 60, 10 Am. Dec. 193, a con
tract under seal had been entered into by the defendants as a commit
been

14 The agent of a corporation
may be appointed for any purpose without
the use of a seal. See Fitch v. Steam Mill Co., 80 Me. 34, 12 Atl. 732 (1888),
and the eases there cited.
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tee of the corporation of the city of Albany, with the plaintiffs, with
out authority under seal from the corporation.
But the corporation
had subsequently recognized by parol the authority of the committee
to make the contract, and
was held that the contract was binding on
the corporation, and that an action of assumpsit would lie against the
corporation for its breach.
In Bank of Columbia v. Patterson,
Cranch, 299, 307,
L. Ed.
351,
committee of the corporation. without any authority conferred
contract in their own names as such committee
by deed, had made
under their private seals, and the Supreme Court of the United States
held that as the whole beneﬁt of the contract resulted to the corpora
tion, and as the corporation had by its acts subsequently adopted the
contract, an action of assumpsit would lie on the contract against the
corporation.
In \Vhite v. Cuyler,
T. R. 176, where wife unauthorized by her
husband made an agreement under seal with
servant, providing for
the services of the latter, and the servant performed the services,
was held that although the covenant of the wife could not bind the
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husband, the servant could. nevertheless, maintain assumpsit against
In Damon v. Granby,
the husband.
was decided that
Pick. 352,
although an agent who contracts for the use of a corporation under
his own seal does not bind the corporation by the deed, yet
he had
shall be binding on the corporation
authority to make the contract
as evidence of such contract.
In Evans v. Wells, 22 \Vend. 340, 341, Senator Verplank said that
these rules as to sealed instruments were not applicable to cases where a
deed
not necessary, and that in such cases an act of the agent un
der seal may be ratiﬁed by acts in pais.
Vi/end. 54, an agent had executed
con
In Hanford v. McNair,
tract under seal for the purchase of timber, not being authorized by
deed. Sutherland, ]., said that subsequent acts of the principal recog
nizing and carrying the agreement into eﬂect might be suﬂicient to
make the contract binding on the principal as
parol contract.
In Blood v. Goodrich, 12 \Vend. 527, 27 Am. Dec. 152, and in Han
\Vend. 54, the Supreme Court, in laying down the
ford v. McNair,
deed must be conferred
common-law rule that an authority to execute
by deed, did not advert to the distinction between cases where the
conveyance or contract must be made under seal and cases where they
deed.
These authorities show that there
would be effectual without
no distinction between partners and other persons in the application
of the modern rule, that wherever an instrument would be eﬂectual
will be valid and binding on the principal, although
without
seal,
author
executed under seal by an agent without authority by deed,
ized by a previous parol authority, or subsequently ratiﬁed or adopted
by parol.
seal was not necessary to the validity of the contract
In this case
All that the statute of frauds
for the sale of the lands at Haverstraw.

'

72

THE RELATION

(Part

1

requires is that a contract for the sale of lands shall be in writing, and
that such writing express the consideration and be subscribed by the
party by whom the sale is to be made, or by his agent lawfully author
ized. The authority of the agent may be conferred by parol; neither
a written authority nor an authority under seal is required.
2 R. S.
135, §§ 8, 9; McVVhorter
& Baldwin v. McMahan, 1O Paige, 386;
Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107.
It results from the foregoing au
thorities that the counterpart of the agreement executed by Henry
VVorrall under seal was binding on his principal, although his author
* * *
ity to execute it was not conferred by deed.
Decree of the Supreme Court reversed.

iii

LAWRENCE

v.

TAYLOR.

(Supreme Court of New York, 1843.

5

Hill,

107.)

The declaration contained the common counts, and also
Assumpsit.
counted upon a contract to convey land in the village of Toledo, Ohio.
The contract was executed by one Pratt for Pratt & Taylor, a co
Pratt was now dead, and the action was against Taylor
partnership.
to recover back money paid to Pratt on the contract.
Defendant
claimed that Pratt was not properly authorized to act for him so as to
make him liable. Verdict for plaintiﬁ sustained.
COWEN,
There was no written authority to Pratt by which
Taylor was bound. Had the subject of the contract been personal
property belonging to the ﬁrm, no special authority would have been
necessary; but at law it is otherwise as to land, whatever may be the
rule in equity.
Out of the court of chancery, real estate, though be
longing to partners and employed in the partnership business-—the title
standing in their joint names—is deemed to be holden by them as ten
ants in common or joint tenants for all purposes. One cannot, in virtue
of the partnership power, sell for the other. Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns.
159, 161, 8 Am. Dec. 231; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 456, 463,
Fed. Cas. No. 365; 2 Bell's Com. 614; Story on Partnership, 146 to
In order to bind Taylor, therefore, a special authority was nec
149.
1
essary for the particular transaction.
[The court found there was evidence of parol authority, or at least

J.“

of ratiﬁcation.]

It was said for Taylor that the authority, not being written, was
But neither the New York nor Ohio
void by the statute of frauds.
statute requires that the authority should be in writing.
Both are in
this respect like the English statute, which, though it requires that an
agent to convey real estate should be appointed by writing, omits that
requisite when the contract is executory, i. e. to convey at a future day.
15

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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R. S. 69 (Zd Ed.) §§ 6, 8, 9: Sudg. on Vend. 120, 121 (Brookf.
Ed. of 1836), and the cases there cited; 3 Wooddes. 428; Story on
Ag. 51, and note (2) ; Lloyd’s Pal. on Ag. 158 to 160; 2 Kent's Com.
613 (4th Ed.). The statute of frauds draws the distinction on its face
between conveying, and contracting to convey lands.
In the former
2

case the agent must be made by writing; in the latter a writing is not
required, but the books all concur that the appointment may be by
parol. The Ohio statute, made an exhibit, is the same in this respect
with our own.
An authority, by adopting the transaction, may as well be conferred
where the question of agency arises under the statute of frauds, as
under the common law. The cases to this effect are cited in Davis
v. Shields, 24 Wend. 325.
See also Story on Ag. 240, and the cases
there cited.
Such adoptive authority relates back to the time of the
transaction, and is deemed in law the same to all. purposes as if it had
been given before. Story on Ag. 234, § 239; Id. 237, § 242.
_
the writing given by the agent be under seal, and that be essen
tial, another rule comes in independently of the statute of frauds. The
authority must be of equal dignity, or the contract can not operate.
Nor can a specialty executed by attorney operate as such in any case,
unless his power be under seal. Story on Ag. SO, § 49; 2 Kent’s Com.
613, 4th Ed. Yet even in such case, it does not follow that it shall
not operate at all. If the contract may be made without deed, the seal
shall not prevent its enuring as a simple contract, though the authority
be by parol, or merely implied‘ from the relation between the principal
and agent; as if they be partners.
Story on Partn. 179; Anderson
v. Tompkins, 1 Brock, 462, Fed. Cas. No. 365, per Marshall, C.
This
doctrine has no connection with the question of what shall be
suffi
cient agency under the statute of frauds.“

MORRO\V
(Supreme

v.

*

*

*

a J‘.

If

HIGGINS.

Court of Alabama,

1856.

-

Ala.

29

448.)
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Bill for injunction to restrain an action at law to recover land, for
the conveyance of the legal title, and for general relief.
Complainant
had purchased the land of an agent, who by the authority of
letter
from the owner had exectued to complainant
deed.
Error from
decree dismissing the bill.
The letter exhibited with complainant's bill, and
\VALK_1=:R,
made
was a clear authority to sell the land. Vi/ilson v.
part of
Troup,
Johns. Ch. 25; [Herbert v. Hanrick] 16 Ala. 581.
“It may be asserted, as
general rule, that in all cases, where an
&

16 As sustaining the older and stricter rule as to sealed authority to make
1 sealed instrument, see Gordon v. Bulkeley, 14 Serg.
R. (Pa.) 331 (1826).
i
Accord: Lyon v. Pollock, post, p. 276.
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agent has contracted within the sphere of his agency, and the principal
is not by the form of the contract bound at law, a court of equity will
enforce it against the principal upon principles ex aequo et bono."
Story on Agency, 209, § 162. Although the deed executed by the agent
in this case may be ineffectual as a conveyance of the legal title, be
cause the authority of the agent was not given by a written instrument
under seal, it may be upheld in chancery as evidence of a. contract to
sell. Story on Agency, 55, § 49; Cocke v. Campbell & Smith, 13 Ala.
286; Welsh v. Usher, 2 Hill, Eq. 167 [29 Am. Dec. 63] ; Dubois v.
Delaware & -H. Canal Co., 4 Wend.,285; Story on Agency, § 160,
notes.
The principles above laid down are conclusive in favor of the equity
of the appellant's bill; and therefore the decree of the court below is
reversed, and the cause remanded, at the costs of the appellee.

SHEPPARD’S

TOUCHSTONE,

p.

54.

is

it,

Every deed well made must be written, i. e. the agreement must be
all written before the sealing and delivery of it; [or as part of the
same transaction, and as a cotemporaneous act, or, at latest, while the
deed is in ﬁeri ;] for if a man seal and deliver an empty piece of paper
or parchment, albeit he do there withal give commandment that an ob
and this be done accord
ligation or other matter shall be written_in
no good deed.
ingly, yet this

CRIBBEN
(Supreme _Oourt of Oregon, 1891.

v.

DEAL.

21 Or. 211, 27 Pac. 1046, 28 Am. St. Rep. 746.)

to set aside
deed of general assignment, in which
an
inserted the name of the assignee
had
authority
agent
parol
by
after the deed had been signed, sealed and acknowledged, but before
a

Suit in equity

it

it

it,

a

"Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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delivery.
LORD, ].“ [After stating the facts and quoting Sheppard’s Touch
This
founded
stone, said of the doctrine there laid downz]
_
upon that ancient and technical rule of the common law that the au
deed, or to alter or ﬁll a blank in some substantial
thority to make
cannot be verbally conferred, but must be created by an
part of
As the deed was under seal, to alter
instrument of equal dignity.
or complete
by the insertion of the name of the grantee required
So ﬁrmly rooted was this principle
the authority to be under seal.
mattered not with what solemnities a deed may have been
that
signed and sealed, unless the grantee's name was inserted, and deliv
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ery was made to him, or some one legally authorized. under seal, it
nor con
was a nullity. It imposed no liability on the party making
was, in fact, no deed.
ferred any rights upon the party receiving it;
Hence
was held that parol authority to ﬁll
blank with the name
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a grantee could not be conferred without violating established prin
ciples of law and rendering the deed void.
This doctrine still prevails in England.
true that in the case
of Texira v. Evans, cited in Master v. Miller, Anstr. 225, Lord Mans
ﬁeld held otherwise, but this was in effect overruled in Hibblewhite
Mees.
v. I\IcMorine,
\/V. ZOO, on the ground that an authority to
execute
sealed instrument could not be given by parol, but must be
given by deed, although this latter case seems more or less trenched
\V. 465, and
upon by the decision in Eagleton v. Gutteridge, 11 Mees.
by Davidson v. Cooper, Id. 778, and in \Vest v. Steward, l4 Mees.
\\’. 47. But the rule has never been universally accepted in this coun
try, and, however the holding of some courts may be, still the better
deed
that when
opinion and the prevailing current of authority
blank left therein for
regularly executed in other respects, with
sufficient to authorize the
the name of the grantee, parol authority
insertion of the name of such grantee, and that, when so ﬁlled out and
valid deed.
delivered,
true that Chief Iustice Marshall, in U. S. v. Nelson,
Brock.
74, Fed. Cas. No. 15,862, felt bound to follow the ancient rule, but
his opinion clearly indicates that he felt that the authority to ﬁll a
blank in an instrument under seal should be held to be valid. He
Cranch, 28,
“The case of Speake v. U. S.,
L. Ed. 645, in
says:
determining that parol evidence of such assent may be received, un
and
probable that the same
doubtedly goes far towards deciding
court may completely abolish the distinction in this particular between
Again: “If this question depended
sealed and unsealed instruments.”
on those moral rules of action which in the ordinary course of things
are applied by courts to human transactions, there would not be much
diﬂiculty in saying that this paper ought to have the effect which the
should have.”
And
parties at the time of its execution intended
he concludes with this statement: “I say with much doubt, and with
a strong belief that this judgment will be reversed, that the law on
in my opinion, with the defendants.”
the verdict
The rule was purely technical, and the outgrowth of
state of af
fairs and condition of the law which does not now exist. The reason
and when the reason fails the law itself
the life of
of the law
At the present day the distinction between sealed and
should fail.
fast disappearing, and the courts are gradu
unsealed instruments
As Judge Redﬁeld said:
“But
ally doing away with them.
[the
rule] seems to be rather technical than substantial, and to found itself
either on the policy of the stamp duties, or the superior force and
sacredness of contracts by deed, both of which have little importance
in this country; and the prevailing current of American authority and
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instincts and business experience and sense of our people
otherwise.”
Redf. R. R. p. 124.
In Drury v. Foster, 2 \Vall. 24, 17 L. Ed. 780, the court says: “Al
though it was at one time doubted whether parol authority was ade
quate to authorize an alteration or addition to a sealed instrument, the
better opinion of this day is that the power is sufﬁcient.”
Again, in
Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119, 3 Sup. Ct. 517, 28 L. Ed. 90, the
the law in Iowa, as in sev
court says: “It may be, and probably
eral states, that the grantors in a deed conveying real property,-signed
and acknowledged, with
blank for the name of
grantee, may au
“But,” he con
thorize another party by parol to ﬁll up the blank.”
tinues, “there are two conditions essential to make
deed thus exe
cuted in blank operate as
conveyance of the property described in it:
The blank must be ﬁlled by the party authorized to ﬁll
and this
must be done before or at the time of the delivery of the deed to the
In the case at bar these conditions were fulﬁlled.
grantee named.”
In Inhabitants of South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89, 87 Am.
Dec. 535, the court held that
party executing a deed, bond, or other
instrument, and delivering the same to another as his deed, knowing
there are blanks in
to be ﬁlled necessary to make
perfect in
strument, must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may be thus
ﬁlled after he has executed it. In delivering the opinion of the court,
Kent, ]‘., said:
Practically
“The rule invoked
purely technical.
there
no real distinction in this matter between bonds, and simple
There
no more danger of fraud or injury or wrong in
contracts.
bond than there
in allowing them in
allowing insertions in
prom
issory note or bill of exchange, and in neither can unauthorized altera
tions be made with impunity.
Considering that the assumed diﬁerence
mere technical rule of the common law, we do not think
rests on
that the rule should be extended beyond its necessary limits, viz., that
sealed instrument cannot be executed by another, so that its distin
in question, unless
sealed instrument
guishing characteristic as
by an authority under seal.”
Likewise, in Bridgeport Bank v. New York, etc., R. Co., 30 Conn.
“Nor can any reason be assigned, which
said:
274, Ellsworth,
blank in
not entirely technical, why
founded in good sense, and
an instrument under seal may not be ﬁlled up by the party receiving
after
executed. as well as any other contract in writing, where
In either case, the contract,
the parties have so agreed at the time.
when the blank has been ﬁlled, expresses the exact agreement of the
parties, and nothing but an extreme technical view, derived from the
ancient law of England, can justify the making of any distinctions
between them."
The court, after citing other American cases to the same eifect, sus
tained the decree dismissing the bill.“
the practical
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are undoubtedly

18 The modern view is upheld
Young, 23 Minn. 551 (1877).

in an able opinion by Mitchell, J., in State
The same view is taken in Lafferty v. Lat
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BALLOU.

47

Iowa,

188, 29 Am. Rep. 470.)

Action to recover possession of land. Defendant claimed under
one Davis, who held a deed which had been perfected in every respect
Plaintiff sent this
by plaintiff, except that no grantee was named.
instrument to one Louther, who inserted the name of Davis as gran
tee. Plaintiff denied the authority of Louther to do what he had done.
SEEVERS,
[After stating the facts, and holding that Louther
had at least implied authority by parol to ﬁll in the grantee’s namez]

II.
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III
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must be remembered that the deed, in its imperfect condition,
was fully delivered to Louther.
\Vhether authority may be conferred
in express terms by parol to insert the name of
deed
grantee in
perfect in all other respects, or that
may be implied from the acts
and conduct of
grantor as between him and
purchaser in good
faith, are questions which have been largely discussed, and the au
thorities are not in accord on the subject.
These questions ﬁrst came before this court in Simms v. Hervey,
19 Iowa, 273, and are there elaborately considered, and the authori
ties referred to by Dillon,
unnecessary to restate the argu
ments or make another citation of the authorities, except to say
apparent the rule that such authority cannot be conferred rests largely,
not entirely, on the common-law doctrine in relation to instruments
under seal, such doctrine being that such authority could only be con
ferred by instrument under seal.
Seals having been abolished by statute in this state, and, therefore,
would
conveyance of real estate,
not necessary to the validity of
seem, as the reason for the rule has ceased, that the rule itself should
The exact question in the present case
not be further recognized.
true, the writer of
It
was not determined in Simms v. Hervey.
the opinion seems to have concluded the better rule would be to deny
certain, how
that such authority could be conferred by parol.
ever, the court did not concur in this view. This
apparent from the
opinion, and the subsequent case of Owen v. Perry, 25 Iowa, 412,
96 Am. Dec. 49, the opinion in which was written by \'\/right, ]., and
See,
who concurred in the conclusion reached in Simms v. Hervey.
also, Devin v. Himer, 29 Iowa, 297; Clark v. Allen, 34 Iowa, 190.
42 W. Va. 783, 26 S. E. 262 (1896), and in Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y.
That authority to till blanks in
deed
& N. H. R. Co., 30 Conn. 231 (1861).
Snood
must be conferred by power under seal is held in Moshy v. Arkansas,
M.
(Tenn) 324 (1857), citing the leading ease of Hihblewhite v. Melllorine.
the earlier
8: W. 200. in which the English Court, per Parke. B., overruled
Anst. 228
case of Texlra v. Evans decided by Lord Mansﬁeld, and cited in
Cf. White v. Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, N. E. 110. 54 Am. Rep. 437 (1885),
(1792).
per Holmes, J.
19 Part of the opinion
omitted.
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may be said the facts in none of these cases present the questions
in the case at bar, yet it will be found difﬁcult to draw a distinction
in legal effect between the present case and Owen v. Perry.
\Vithout entering into a discussion of the reasons, and referring to
authorities at greater length, we conclude, as the result of our in
vestigation, that the decided weight of modern authority, and reason,
is in favor of the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24, 17 L. Ed. 780. It is there said:
“If a person competent to convey real estate sign and acknowledge a
deed in blank, and deliver the same to an agent with an express or
implied authority to ﬁll up the blank and perfect the conveyance, its
validity could not be well controverted. Although it was at one time
doubtful, whether a parol authority was adequate to authorize an al
teration or addition to a sealed instrument, the better opinion at this
See, also, the late cases of Van Etta
day is the power is sufficient.”
v. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33, 9 Am. Rep. 486; Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534,
14 Am, Rep. 435; Schintz v. McManam_v, 33 Wis. 299.
The contrary rule was adopted in California, in the recent case of
Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85, 10 Am. Rep. 266. No authorities are
cited except Story and Dunlap’s Paley on Agency, and it is said the
case comes within the “sixth section of the statute of frauds.”
VVheth
er the statute of frauds of California is different from that of this and
‘
other states, we are not advised." * * *
Afﬁrmed.

A-11

LEVVIS
(Supreme Court of Alabama,

v.

WATSON.

'

98 Ala. 479. 13 South.
1892.
39 Am. St. Rep. 82.)

570, 22

L. R. A.

297,

J.“

MCCLELLAN,
This is a statutory action for the recovery of a
certain lot of land in'the town of Andalusia.
\Vatson is plaintiff. and
Lewis, as administrator of one Holley, deceased, is defendant. Plain
tiff derives title from one Dixon by deed appearing to have been ex
ecuted in 1866.
Defendant claims title through V\/atson, under a sale
and conveyance by the sheriff to his intestate in 1875, made in satis
faction of certain judgments against VVatson, and also by virtue of an
adverse possession on the part of the intestate and himself subsequent
to said sale and conveyance. * * "‘
,
2. The evidence as to the execution of the deed by the sheriff to
Holley was that of the probate judge of the county, and is as follows:
“That ]. A. Thompson, the sheriff, could not write his name, and that
he [the witness]
frequently 'wr0te in the sheriff’s oiﬁce for said
20 On the effect of statutes abolishing
distinctions between sealed and un
sealed instruments. see, also, Streeter Co. v. Janu, 90 Minn. 393, 96 N. W.
1128
21

(1903).

Part of

the opinion Is omitted.
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Thompson; that he indorsed the levies on the execution here in evi
dence, and wrote the deed of Thompson, as sheriff, to Alfred Holley,
dated May 3, 1875; that said deed and indorsements on said levies are
in his handwriting; that said
A. Thompson was present when said
deed was written; that it was written in the sheriﬁ"s oﬁice, at Thomp
son's instance, and under his direction; that, after the deed was writ
ten, Thompson told him to sign his name, as sheriff, to the deed, which
he did, and then,'as judge of probate, took Thompson's acknowledg
ment to the deed, and carried it into the probate oﬁice, and afterwards
* * * and that some one came and
recorded it;
got the deed from
the probate oﬁ"ice after it was recorded, but don’t now remember who
It was."
It is not entirely clear, on this testimony, that Thompson was actual
ly and immediately present when his name was subscribed to the deed
by Fletcher, by his direction; but, manifestly, there was room for an
inference to be drawn to that effect by the jury. If he was so present,
as the jury might have found, the subscription to the instrument was
as eﬁicacious as if he had been able to write his name, and with his
or he being unable to write his name, as
own hand had written
he had made his mark, and the words, “his mark,” had been written
and the signature thus made attested by two witnesses.
against
This on the principle that where the grantor
present, and authorizes
another, either expressly or impliedly, to sign his name to the deed,
as binding upon him, to all intents
then becomes his deed, and
he had personally aﬁixed his signature.
and purposes, as
The rea
thus stated by Shaw, C. ].: “The name being
son for the doctrine
written by another hand, in the presence of the grantor, and at her
her act.
The disposing capacity, the act of mind, which
request,
are the essential and eﬁicient ingredients of the deed, are hers; and
she merely uses the hand of another, through incapacity or weakness,
instead of her own, to do the physical act of making
written sign.
To hold otherwise would be to decide that person having
full mind,
and clear capacity, but, through physical inability, incapable of making
conveyance or execute
deed.” Gardner
a mark, could never make
Devl. Deeds,
v. Gardner,
Cush. 483, 52 Am. Dec. 740;
232, 233;
Ired. 218; Frost v. Deering, 21 Me. 156: \'ideau
Kime v. Brooks,
v. Griﬂin, 21 Cal. 390; Rev. St. Me. 1857, p. 56; Lovejoy v. Richard
son, 68 Me. 386; Bird v. Decker, 64 Me. 551. *
For errors in the trial, reversed and remanded.
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SECTION 2..-—RATIFICATION.
’I. DEFINITION

ELLISON

v.

JACKSON WATER CO.

(Supreme Court of California, 1859.

et al.

12 Cal. 542.)

Action to recover $48,154.14 for the construction of a ditch, or canal,
under a contract with the water com'pany.
Bayerque held a mortgage
on the ditch, and plaintiff claimed that, to induce him to complete the
]udg
construction, Bayerque had adopted and ratiﬁed the contract.
‘ '
ment against defendants, and Bayerque appealed.
FIELD, ].2”
[After stating the facts, and disposing of the case
* *
*
As against the company, the judg
against the companyz]
ment for damages must be affirmed. It is only necessary, then, to de
termine the eﬁect of the alleged “adoption and ratiﬁcation" of Bayer
que, and the validity of the lien asserted upon the ditch.
It cannot in strictness be said that Bayerque “adopted and ratiﬁed”
the contract between the plaintiff and the company.
These terms are
properly applicable only to contracts made by a party acting or assum
The latter may then adopt or ratify the act
ing to act for another.
of the former, however unauthorized.
To adoption and ratiﬁcation
there must be some relation, actual or assumed, of principal and
No such relation existed between the company and Bayerque;
agent.
the contract between it and Ellison was not made in Bayerque’s name,
or for his beneﬁt, or upon any authority from him. What the plaintiff,
however, intends by these terms, is this: That Bayerque assumed the
obligations of the company to Ellison upon the contract, or in other
words, guaranteed the performance of the contract on the part of the
In examining, _then, the evidence contained in the record,
company.
we ﬁnd nothing which establishes or even tends to establish any under
taking u'pon which Bayerque can be personally charged. * * *
Reversed as to Bayerque, and remanded.”
Part of the opinion is omitted.
To the same eﬁect is Pittsburgh & Steubenvllle R. C0. v. Gazzam. 32
See, also. Mattocks v. Young. 66 Me. 459 (1876).
Pa. 340. 347 (1858).
But
compare Greenﬁeld Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447 (1862).
22
23
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FIRST NAT. BANK OF FT. SCOTT
(Supreme

Court

oi! Kansas,

1883.

29

Kan.

311,

81

v.

DRAKE.

44 Am.

Rep. 646).)

Action to recover money claimed to, have been wrongfully appro
priated by Drake while acting as cashier of the bank. He owned four
ﬁfths of the stock, and appropriated as salary and for other purposes
about $6,000, on the assumption that the bank was his and he could
appropriate its assets as he pleased. Later he sold his stock, and the
new ofﬁcers claim that these sums should have been part of the assets.
Defendant lclaimed that the bank books showed the facts, that the
directors are charged with knowledge of what is on the books, and
so had either authorized, or else ratiﬁed his acts.
Iudgment for de
fendant on demurrer to plaintiff's evidence.
BREWER, ].’“
[After holding that as to him the directors are not
* * *
charged with the knowledge which is essential to ratiﬁcationz]
But what is ratiﬁcation?
Counsel for plaintiff in error say it is the
acceptance by a principal of the acts of one who, without original au
thority, acted with third parties, in the name of such principal; that
it is therefore only a branch of the doctrine of principal and agent.
This is too limited. Burrill, in his Law Dictionary, says that “ratiﬁca
tion is the conﬁrmation of a previous act done either by the party him
self, or by another: that it is the conﬁrmation of a voidable act” ; and
cites as authority Story, Ag. §§ 250, 251, and also 2 Kent. Comm. 237.
One of those citations treats of the relations of principal and agent;
the other, of the conﬁrmation of the acts of an infant by himself after
becoming of age. Bouvier, in his La\v Dictionary, gives similar scope
to the meaning of ratiﬁcation.
\\'e think, therefore, it will not do to
say that it is strictly a branch of the doctrine of principal and agent.
It is the conﬁrmation of a voidable act. It is entirely immaterial what
that is which renders the act voidable; whether a lack of ‘present power
to make a valid contract, as in the case of infancy, or because of fraud
and misrepresentation on the part of the other contracting party, or
because it is the unauthorized attempt of an assumed agent to bind his
Wherever there is a voidablc act, conﬁrmation of that act
principal.
by the party assumed to be bound is in law a ratiﬁcation.” * * *
On the ground that the evidence should have been submitted to the
jury, reversed and remanded for a new trial.

"Part

of the opinion is omitted.
Gallup. Trustee, v. Fox.-61 Conn. 491. 30 Atl. 756 (1894). the court
held that “ratiﬁcation is the adoption of a previously formed contract."
This
broad view of ratiﬁcation is approved in Hartman V. Hornsby, 142 M0. 368,
44 S. W. 242 (1897).
25

In

Gonn.Pa.& A.(2o En.)—6
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TURNER FLOURING MILLS CO.

(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1896.

29 Or. 1, 43 I-‘ac.

T19.)

Action to recover money loaned to the promoters of defendant cor
poration prior to its incorporation.
* * *
WooI.vI2RToN,
[After disposing of another point:]
The defendant, while it may not have been in esse at the date ﬁxed by
the complaint, yet it could, at any time after its organization, by adop
tion, make the contract its own. It has been said that the adoption of a
former contract is the making of a contract as of the date of the adop
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tion. McArthur v. Printing Co., 48 Minn. 322, 51 N. VV. 216, 31 Am.
St. Rep. 653. In their primary signiﬁcation, there is a manifest distinc
The one signiﬁes to take
tion between “adoption” and “ratiﬁcation.”
and receive, as,one’s own, that with reference to which there existed no
prior relation, either colorable or otherwise; while the other is a con
ﬁrmation, approval, or sanctioning of a previous act, or an act done, in
the name or on behalf of the party ratifying, without sufficient or legal
authority,—-that is to say, the conﬁrmation of a voidable act. But, as
the terms relate to contracts, some lexicographers treat them as synony
“Of contract. To
mous.
Rapalje ihus deﬁnes “adopt—adoption”:
adopt a contract is to accept it as binding, notwithstanding some defect
person affirms
which entitles the party to repudiate it. Thus, when
contract made by his agent beyond his
voidable contract, or ratiﬁes
said to ado'pt it.” See Rap.
L. Law Dict. 31. See,
authority, he
Now, as regards
contract made or an
also, And. Dict. Law, 36.
corporation in the name of,
obligation incurred by the promoters of
would seem that
contemplated corporation
or for and in behalf of,
had
ratiﬁcation thereof by the corporation after
an adoption or
legal entity would mean one and the same thing, and
developed into
would be accomplished by one and the same process. True, the pro
moters cannot be the agents of an unborn corporation; but, where they
have assumed to act for it. and to contract in its name, the ap'proval
and conﬁrmation of such acts by the corporation, when organization
has been duly accomplished, are but the ratiﬁcation of the acts of an
And the result
the same, whether we call
unauthorized agent.
“adoption” or “ratiﬁcation.” *7
not very material here to determine whether, as relating-to
But
contracts, these terms are synonymous, or are capable of being thus
distinguished, as they might be were the statutes of frauds or limita
to say, authorities are not wanting which
Sufﬁce
tions involved.

Part of the opinion is omitted.
MeArthur v. Times Printing 00., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216, _31 Am.
St. Rep. 653 (1892), the contract was oral and not to be performed within
a year from the date of the agreement between the plnintiﬁ and the promoters
See, also, Wilkinson v. Heavenrich,
of the corporation.
Of. post, p. 92.
58
Mich. 574, 26 N. W. 139, 55 Am. Rcp._708 (1886).
Go1>n.Pn.& A. (21) En.)
*0
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to mean one and the same thing.
See 4 T homp. Corp. § 5321,
and Stanton v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 285, 22 Atl. 300, Z1 Am. St.
Rep. 110. * * *

hold them

ii

Judgment for plaintiif afﬁrmed.

_

STEFFENS

(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

v.

'\

NELSON

1905.

9-1

Minn.

et

ai.

365. 102 N.

W.

871.)

Action to foreclose a mechanic's lien on defendant’s property.
JAGGARD, J.“
[After stating the facts and passing upon another
*
* 2. The plaintiti Steffens had no office; he
*
pointz]
had‘
The
placed the number of his residence on his cards and billheads.
agent of the contractor called there in Steffcns’ absence, gave his wife
a check of the contractor, dated ahead, for the amount of Steffens’
claim, and directed her to sign a recei‘pt.
She signed that receipt, “Pe
ter Steffens, Maria Steﬂens."
She had no express authority from her
This receipt was taken by the contractor to the
husband so to do.
owner and agent of the mortgagee, and was present at the time of set
On
tlement with the contractor about noon on Saturday, April 12th.
the afternoon of that day the wife gave her husband the contractor's
check, and explained that she had to sign a paper for it. The husband
took the check and deposited it; that check was never paid.
The wife, like another person, may be made an agent for her hus
band, and as such impose upon him obligations by his authority, ex
press or implied, precedent or subsequent. Ho'pkins v. Mollinieux, 4
\\"end. 465; Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347, 39 Am. Dec. 384;
\Villingham v. Simnns, 1 Desaus. (S. C.) 272.
The proper decision of the question thus presented depends upon
consideration of a neglected distinction between ratiﬁcation and est0p
pel.” Lord Coke said: “The name ‘estoppel’ or ‘conclusion’ was giv
en because a man’s own act or acce‘ptance stoppeth or closeth up his
Ho\vever much this deﬁnition
mouth to allege or plead the truth.”
may have been criticised as vicious (Everest 81 Strode on Estoppel, 9
16; Bigelow on Estoppel, 5), it is a brief statement of the effect of
the essential principle of estoppel, viz., “that, whenever one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who enables such
third person to occasion the loss must sustain it.” Lickbarrow v. Ma
son, 2 T. R. 63; 1 Smith, Leading Cas. 759; Ewart on Estoppel, 9.
Ratiﬁcation, on the other hand, means conﬁrmation.
“To ratify is to
28

Part of the opinion is omitted.

19 See, also, Blood v. La Serena Land & Water Co., 113 Cal. 221, 41 Pac.
1017, 45 Pac. 252 (1896), showing the importance 01' the distinction between

ratiﬁcation and estoppel when the mode of ratiﬁcation is prescribed by stat
nte; F01-syth v. Day, 46 Me. 176 (1b58), distinguishing between ratiﬁcation
and estoppel to deny ratiﬁcation.
\
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Ev
give sanction and validity to something done without authority.”
The underlying princi
ans, Principal and Agent (Bedford’s Ed.) 90.
is that he who has
ple upon which liability for ratiﬁcation attaches
commanded is legally responsible for the direct results and for the nat
ural and probable consequences of his conduct, and that it is immate
rial whether that command was given before or after the conduct.
The substance of estoppel is the inducement to another to act to his
The substance of ratiﬁcation is conﬁrmation after conduct.
prejudice.
“This
enough," said Mr. Bigelow, “to indicate that there may be
common enough at
danger in using the term ‘estoppel’ freely. -It
present to speak of acquiescence and ratiﬁcation as an estoppel. Nei
ther the one nor the other, however, can be more than part of an es
An estop'pel
right—arising
toppel, at best.
legal consequence—-a
from acts or conduct, while acquiescence and ratiﬁcation are but facts
situation incomplete in its legal aspect,
e., not as yet
presupposing
attended with full legal consequences. The most that acquiescence or
ratiﬁcation can do—and this either may under circumstances do—is
to supply an element necessary to the estoppel, and otherwise wanting,
as, e. g., knowledge of the facts at the time of making
misrepresenta
tion. But each stands upon its own grounds, and must bemade out
in its own way, not necessarily in the way required by the ordinary
estoppel by conduct.”
Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.) pp. 456, 457.
And see Reinhart on Agency, 101.
An unauthorized act may be made to operate by ratiﬁcation as an
was done.
That ratiﬁca
estoppel upon the person in whose behalf
tion presupposes knowledge on the part of such person ratifying. If
he intentionally ratify what another has done for him without author
ity, and actually or constructively knows also of the circumstances con
nected with the unauthorized acts which are the basis of the estoppel,
he should clearly be held bound thereby.
See Dimond v. Manheim, 61
Minn.

In

178, 63

N. \V.

495.
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this case the acceptance of the check given to plaintiff by his wife
operated to ratify the receipt signed by her for him. In the eyes of
the law, at least, he knew that this receipt would be used as evidence
of the payment of the debt by the contractor to whom
was delivered.
He
responsible for the direct results and the natural and probable
consequences of the act he has ratiﬁed. His situation
not therefore
different, in law, from that of other creditors who signed receipts be
fore the date of settlement, and who, as he did also, accepted and now
He
retain the check of the contractor.
not entitled to recover be
See Ewart on Estoppel, 133, 137, 139.
cause of his ratiﬁcation.
afﬁrmed, except as to the plaintiff,
The judgment appealed from
Steffens, and the defendants Delamater
Son. As to them, let judg
ment be entered in accordance with this opinion.
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ALEXANDER
(St. Louis Court of Appeals,

Missouri,
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RATIFLED
v. ‘WADE.

1904.

106 M0. App.

'

141, 80 S.

W.

19.)

offered to sell to Hays and Rodgers his stock of merchan
The latter knew there was a debt for the stock, and refused to
buy unless Wade would deposit with the bank $1,800 to pay his com
mercial creditors.
To this Wade consented, and a de'posit of $1,750
and some duebills was made as the “Chas. \/Vade Fund.” Out of this
fund the bank had paid all but $635.08 to commercial creditors of
1/Vade, when Alexander, who was not such a creditor, commenced suit
by attachment against Wade and had the bank garnished. The bank
alleged that it had no interest in the fund, which it held for creditors,
VVade

dise.

to be protected in disbursing it according to the agreement.
parties interpleaded, each claiming the fund.
P.
[After passing upon some minor and technical mat
*
* 3. The arrangement under which the $1,750 were
ters:]
The deposit
deposited in the bank by VVade is out of the ordinary.
was made on the demand of Hays and Rodgers, yet neither of them
knew who \Vade owed, or what particular ﬁrms or individuals would
They undertook to act for Wade's com
be beneﬁted by the deposit.
for the creditors to whom he
mercial creditors as a class—that
was indebted for the goods they were purchasing from him—and not
for all his creditors, nor for his creditors generally. Their primary
motive was, perhaps, to avoid any imputation of fraud to themselves,
in having made the purchase of the goods with knowledge that Wade
VVhatever may have
was largely indebted for their purchase ‘price.
been their motive, their action was not only lawful, but commendable,
and the contract which they made with VVade in respect to the deposit
was one which his creditors might lawfully have made with him, and
was made, although Hays and Rodgers
therefore might ratify after
had no authority from the creditors to make it.
As
said by Mechem on Agency, at section 112: “It
therefore
the general rule that one may ratify the previous unauthorized doing
by another in his behalf of any act which he might then and could
still lawfully do himself, and which he might then and could still law
fully delegate to such other to be done.” In Suddarth v. Lime Com
was held that,
A. had no authority to
pany, 79 Mo. App. 592,
B. ascertained that he had so contracted, and
contract for B., yet
In McCrackcn v. City
ratiﬁed the act, he was bound by the contract.
of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, Field, C. ]., said: “To ratify
to give
equivalent to previous
validity to the act of another. A ratiﬁcation
It operates upon the act ratiﬁed in the same manner as
authority.

J.”

if

is

is

if

it

is

is

it

is,

and asked
The above
BLAND,
*

"Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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See, also, Ruggles
though the authority had been originally given.”
v. Railroad, 62
3 Mo. 497; Summerville
v. County of \»’\/asliington,
Mo. 391; Hartman v. Hornsby, 142 M0. 368, 44 S. VV. 242; Bank v.
_
Hughlett, 84 Mo. App. 268.
_
The creditors for whose beneﬁt the deposit was made, being pos
sessed with the power to make the contract themselves in their own
behalf,“ might thereafter ratify the contract, made by Hays and Rodg
ers, although the latter were without authority to act as their agents,
and the ratiﬁcation would operate upon the deposit as though Hays
and Rodgers had authority, as agents of the creditors, to contract for
It is admitted
the deposit for the purpose for which it was made.
that the interpleaders are commercial creditors of \Vade, and hence
are creditors for whose beneﬁt the deposit was made. By__their in
terplea they have ratiﬁed the act of Hays and Rodgers, and occupy
the same situation in respect to the deposit as if it had been made for
their beneﬁt under a contract with their authorized agent or with
themselves, and, being for their beneﬁt, ratiﬁcation will be presumed.
Kingman & Co. v. Cornell-Tebbetts Co., 150 Mo. 282, 51 S. \V. 727.
.
FF *
*

for interpleaders afﬁrmed.

Judgment

HENRY CHRISTIAN BUILDING
(Supreme

~

Court of Pennsylvania,

&

1897.

LOAN ASS’N

181

Pa.

201,

St. Rep. 636.)

-

Scire facias sur mortgage.

Appeal

to collect

from

judgment

Atl.

VVALTON.
261,

59

Am.

for defendant.

a balance due on a $1,000 mort

it,

Plaintiff was attempting

37

v.

and the jury found his sig
Defendant denied having signed
nature was
forgery.
FELL,
The distinction between the power to ratify acts void be
fraud affecting individual interests only and the power to
cause of
public wrong has been carefully deﬁned
ratify acts which involve
The right to avoid
and preserved in our decisions.
contract on
privilege given to the injured party for his
the ground of fraud
own protection, and
may be waived; but he cannot give validity to
The earlier cases which heldthat all contracts
an illegal contract.
vitiated by fraud are insusceptible of conﬁrmation, are, in eﬂfeet, over
and Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa.
ruled by Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44 Pa.
9,

it

is
a

a

a

a

].

a

A,

gage.

&

a

31 In Shepardson v. Gillette, I33 Ind. 125, 31 N. E. 788 (1893), it was held
that a board of school trustees could not ratify
tax levy by the trustees
of the civil town, because the act was not one which originally the school
trustees possessed the power to do. See, also, MeCracken v. San Francisco,
16 Cal. 591 (1860), per Field, J. As to‘ ratiﬁcation of void or voidable acts, see
See, also, Daughters of
Memphis
C. R. Co. v. Scruggs, 50 Miss. 284 (1874).
American Revolution v. Schenley, 204 Pa. 572. 54 Atl. 366 (1903); Rnwlings
v. Neal, 126 N. C. 271, 35 S. E. 597 (1900); Boutelle v. Melendy, 19 N. ll. 196.

49 Am. Dee. 152 (1848)._
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is

a

a

it

it

it,

The distinction between the cases pointed out
217, 5 Am. Rep. 427.
in the opinions in Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447, 37 Am. Rep. 702,
and Lyon v. Phillips, 106 Pa. 57, is this:
\Vhere the transaction is contrary to good faith, and the fraud af
but where the
fects individual interests only, ratiﬁcation is allowed;
fraud is of such a character as to involve a crime the adjustment of
which is forbidden by public policy, the ratiﬁcation of the act from
which it springs is not permitted. Forgery does not admit of ratiﬁca
tion.
A forger does not act on behalf of, nor profess to represent,
and the subsequent
the person whose handwriting he counterfeits;
adoption of the instrument cannot supply the authority which the
“A forged bond or note obviously
forger did not profess to have.
wants the essentials of a contract, because the intention is not to bring
the minds of the obligor and obligee together, but to practice a fraud
Hare, Cont. p. 285.
on both.”
All of the assignments of error which are insisted upon at the ar
gument relate to the instruction given to the jury that, if the mort
gage tipon which the action was founded was a forgery, there could be
and that no act of the defendant thereafter could
no ratiﬁcation of
make
binding upon him. There can be no doubt of the correctness
of the ﬁrst part of this instruction, and, in view of, the evidence, the
whole of the instruction was free from error. Magee, who committed
the fraud, was the accredited agent of the building association, and
in the preparation of the mortgage. He may have rcp
represented
resented the defendant in other matters, but there was not the slightest
evidence of his agency for the purpose of executing the mortgage.
Nor was there evidence of any act of the defendant upon which to
base an equitable estoppel.
The attempt to bring the case within the principle of the decision
in Garrett v. Gonter, 42 Pa. 143, that
deed or contract executed by
a professed agent, acting under
pretended authority, may be con
The judgment
ﬁrmed, failed for want of proof.
affirmed.

(Supreme

v.

HAYES.

1889.
40 Minn. 531, 42 N.
196, 12 Am. St. Rep. 754.)

Court of Minnesota,
-

W.

467.

4

WILSON

L. R. A.

Action by Wilson to enforce his right of redemption. The owner
the property, Douglas, had given to \~Vilson
note for $5,000, se
cured by mortgage, which note \\’ilson had negotiated and later repur
chased. A prior mortgage had been foreclosed, and the certiﬁcate of
sale assigned to Hayes.
\Vilson now claimed the right to redeem as
mortgagee of the subsequent mortgage.
appeared that Wilson had

It

a

of

altered the note given him by Douglas by erasing the word “annually,”
and inserting the word “quarterly,” so as to make the interest payable
quarterly, instead of annually.
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a
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MITCHELL, I.”
[After disposing of other defenses in plaintiff’s
favor, and ordering a new trial for errors in the instructions of the
* * *
\Vith reference to a new trial, it becomes
court belowz]
proper to consider the effect of Douglas’ so-called ratiﬁcation of the
The court found that upon the discovery of it he
alleged alteration.
denounced the alteration as fraudulent and unauthorized, and did not
acquiesce therein. This is not justiﬁed by the evidence. i\Vhile it ap
pears that, upon being shown the note by the bank,——then the holder,
—he asserted that it had been altered since he delivered it; yet, so far
from repudiating
according to his o\vn admissions, he repeatedly
If the altera
paid interest on
voluntarily and without objection.
tion was capable of ratiﬁcation, this would, according to all the au
thorities, amount to
ratiﬁcation or adoption, whichever
may be
called.
If the alteration was mere s'poliation by third party, or
made by the holder by mistake or accident or innocently, and with
did not destroy the note, or at least
out fraudulent intent, so that
was the evidence,
would not
did not extinguish the debt, of which
invalidate or affect the mortgage, which can only be discharged by
In such case
the payment or extinction of the debt secured by it.
the question of ratiﬁcation would be wholly immaterial.
But suppose
made, amounting in law to
the alteration was fraudulently
forgery.
The question remains, could this be subsequently ratiﬁed by Douglas
so as to make the note in its altered form his contract?
The question whether
forgery
capable of being ratiﬁed, so as
liability on the forged instrument, in the absence of cir
to create
one upon which there
cumstances constituting an estoppel in pais,
almost as much conﬂict of authorities as upon that of burden of
proof and presumption, already considered. Some of the cases hold
ing the negative of the question place the doctrine upon grounds of
public policy; others, upon the ground that ratiﬁcation involves the
relation of agency, and that ratiﬁcation can only be effectual when
done by the agent avowedly for or on account of the prin
the act
cipal; that the very nature of ratiﬁcation presupposes the act done
for another, but without competent authority, and hence can have
no application to a forgery, for
forger never acts or assumes to act
for another; others put
upon the ground that, in the absence of
any new consideration, the ratiﬁcation or adoption of the forged in
mere nudum pactum.
strument would be
The cases holding
forgery capable of ratiﬁcation take the ground
that, so far as considerations of public policy are concerned, the ratiﬁca
tion of forgeries should stand on the same footing as that of other con
tracts, and should be held valid, unless made in consideration of com
pounding the felony, or for some other illegal consideration;
that as
can make no difference whether the unau
to the want of authority
thorized act was or was not
forgery; that this want of authority
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the very thing which the ratiﬁcation cures, and to which the maxim ap
et mandato priori aequipara
plies, “Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur
tur;” that the ratiﬁcation is “dragged back and made equivalent to a
prior command”; that a ratiﬁcation is not a contract, but .an adoption
of one previously made in the name of the ratifying party, and re
See Brook v. Hook, 6 L. R. Exch. 98; Mc
quires no consideration.
Hugh v. Schuylkill County, 67 Pa. 391, 5 Am. Rep. 445; Shisler v.
Vandike, 92 Pa. 447, 37 Am. Rep. 702 ;'Owsley v. Phillips, 78 Ky. 517,
39 Am. Rep. 258; Ferry v. Taylor, 33 Mo. 334: Workman v. Vi/right,
33 Ohio St. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 546; Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447; Wel
lington v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 157; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Ill. 483,
14 Am.'Re'p. 106; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 176.
In the large majority of the cases usually cited in support of the
proposition that a forgery can be ratiﬁed, it will be found that the
question was presented in connection with circumstances creating an
estoppel, or that there was in fact no fraudulent making or altering,
but merely a lack of sufficient authority; and hence such cases are
not in point. Where the ratiﬁcation is made to a third party,—the
holder of the instrument, who was not a party to the forgery,—we
are not called upon to decide whether or not such ratiﬁcation would
create a valid liability on the instrument.
All the authorities cited by
appellant to the effect that a forgery may be ratiﬁed are of this class."
But we have found no case where it has been held that a forged instru
ment can be ratiﬁed so as to give the forger himself a right of action
upon it. It is legally impossible in such a case that the relation of prin
cipal and agent could exist between the parties, for one man cannot be
the agent of another to make a contract with himself.
Hence it would
seem that the doctrine of ratiﬁcation can have no application to such a
-

case.

If

entire instrument was a forgery, in the popular sense. it
would require no argument to prove that a mere assent to or ratiﬁ
cation of it in the hands of the forger would be a mere nudum pac
tum. But in law there is no distinction between a forgery in making
and a forgery by altering.
The altered instrument is not the contract
of the maker, and in legal contemplation is as entirely a forgery as
the other. If the alteration was not fraudulent, so that it did not de
stroy the instrument, or at least did not extinguish the debt, we can see
the

33 It is well settled that the maker or lndorser of the forged instrument will
be liable when the elements of estoppel are present.
Hefner v. Vandolah. 57
Ill. 520. 11 Am. Rep. 39 (1871); Workman v. Wright. 33 Ohio St, 405, 81
Am. Rep. 546 (1878). And the cases all agree that a ratiﬁcation is not effec
tive it made upon the consideration that the forget shall not be criminally
Brook v. Hook, L. R. 6 Exch. 89. 40 L. J. Exeh. 50, 24 L. T. Rep.
prosecuted.
N. S. 3-l, 19 W. R. 506 (1871). It has been doubted whether there can really
be any other consideration
that would lead one to assume an obligation on a
note to which his name was forged.
Henry v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 16 l\'.
606, 5 Am. St. Rep. 613 (1888).
That a forgery may be ratiﬁed, see Greenﬁeld
Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447 (1862).
Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 IlL 483, 14
Am. Rep. 106 (1872).
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III. Tm:

ESSENTIALS

FIRST NAT. BANK
SHERWOOD, ].3‘

a

TRENTON

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1876.

“$650.00

or Rarrrrcxrron
v.

GAY

et al.

63 Mo. 33, 21 Am. Rep. -130.)

Action on instrument in this form:
Trenton, Mo., May

-

it,

is,

how a subsequent assent to it would create a liability on the instru
ment as altered.
Parties can alter their contract by mutual consent,
and this requires no new consideration, for it is merely the substitu
tion of a new contract for the old one, and this is of itself a suffi
cient consideration for the new.
And what a party may assent to
when done he may assent to afterwards, so as to bind himself, if there
But where there has been a fraudu
be a consideration to support it.
lent alteration of a written contract, which not only destroys the in
strument but extinguishes the debt, it seems to us clear on principle
that a subsequent assent to the alteration, given to the party who made
in any view of the case,
mere
without any new consideration,
naked promise.
McHugh v. Schuylkill Co., supra; Workman v.
Wright, supra; Owsley v. Phillips, supra. Order reversed._

13, 1874.

Ninety days after date we promise to pay to the order of Robert
L. Gillilan, six hundred and ﬁfty dollars, for value received, with in

'

is

if

terest after maturity, at the rate of ten per cent. per aunum, at the
First National Bank of Trenton, Mo.; and
not paid at maturity,
and the same
placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, we
agree and promise to pay an additional sum of ten per cent. as attor
Nathan Gillilan.
ney’s fee.
A
“Samuel Gay."
On the above instrument there was this indorsement:

a

a

it

I

“For value received, assign the within note to First National Bank
of Trenton, Mo., and waive protest, notice of protest, and demand of
Robert L. Gillilan.”
payment.
The petition alleged, among other things, that in consequence of the
was placed in the hands
non-payment of the instrument at maturity,
of an attorney for collection, and asked judgment not only for the
principal sum with interest, but also asked for four per cent. damages
for non-payment, as well as ten per cent. damages as an attorney’s fee.
In addition to other matters, the defendant, Nathan Gillilan, put in
plea of non est factum. A trial was had, resulting in a verdict for
plaintiff and judgment accordingly.
[After ‘ﬁnding that there was not
particle of evidence tending to show that Nathan Gillilan was will
ing, at the outset, to assume
*4

with Samuel Gay, or indeed any one else.

Part of the opinion is omitted.

Ch.

CREATION

1)

or

was nnrwrros

91

In
(Chancery

re

*

*

if

ii

*

is,

outside of his family, a joint liability in the execution of any paper
whatever, much less the instrument in suit. :] But although it may be
true that Nathan Gillilan did not give authority to sign his name to
the instrument on which the claim of the plaintiff is based, yet it was
doubtless in his power, upon full knowledge of what had been done,
to give it the sanction of his approbation.
There have been many reﬁnements adopted about this doctrine of
ratiﬁcation; reﬁnements which savor more of subtlety than of sound
\\/ith some execptions, not necessary to be adverted to
judgment.
here, the general proposition is, however, undoubtedly correct, that
This
he who may authorise in the beginning, may ratify in the end.
is a common sense view of the matter, easily understood, constantly
acted and relied on, in the ordinary occurrences of daily life, and
should not be frittered away by subtleties without soundness, and dis
tinctions without difference.
And there is, therefore, no force in the
point urged on our attention, that there would have to be a new con
No in
sideration in order to attach validity to a conﬁrmatory act.
in
the
of
an
accommodation
consideration
is
case
required
dependent
indorser, surety, etc.. in the ﬁrst instance, and it is difiicult to see why
anything more should be required on subsequent sanction than on orig
inal assent.
Commercial Bank v. \/Varren, 15 N. Y. (1 Smith) 577,
and cases cited.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (McHugh v. County, 67 Pa.
391, 5 Am. Rep. 445, and cases cited) has, it seems, uniformly held
that there could be no ratiﬁcation without a new consideration, where
But this court, in the case of Dow's
the original act was mala ﬁde.
Ex’r v. Spenney’s Ex’r, 29 Mo. 386, where the point, indeed, was not
expressly raised, but where there was no proof of a new considera
tion, held that ratiﬁcation might occur, even where the ratiﬁer’s name
however, no proof ‘of bad faith in this
There
had been forged.
case; so that the Pennsylvania decisions to which we have been cited,
even
regarded as sound, would be inapplicable here.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

EMPRESS ENGINEERING CO.

Division of the High Court of Justice.
L. T. N. S. 7-12. 29 \Vkly. Rep.

1880.
342.)

16 Ch.

Div.

125,

43

&

a

a

&

Archer agreed wtih Cottier, who acted for
Glasier
company,
limited company, to be called the Em
intended to be registered as
press Engineering Company, to sell to the compziny for £3,000. the
right to manufacture and sell the Empress water motor. All costs,
both before and after the company should have been registered, were
Pride, so
to be borne by the company, including 60 guineas to Jones
licitors, for the incorporation and registration of the company. After
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(Part
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1*

ll

that
the company was organized the directors adopted a resolution
On the winding up of the com
the agreement of purchase be ratiﬁed.”
pany, ]ones & Pride put in a claim for the 60 guineas and other charges.
JESSEL, M. R. I must say that I do not see how it was possible
for the Vice-Chancellor to have decided otherwise than he did. The
contract between the promoters and the so-called agent for the com
pany of course was not a contract binding upon the company, for
the company had then no existence, nor could it become binding on
the company by ratiﬁcation, because it has been decided, and, as it
appears to rne, well decided, that there cannot in law be an effectual
ratiﬁcation of a contract which could not have been made binding on
the ratiﬁer at the time it was made, because the ratiﬁer was not then
in existence. It does not follow from that that acts may not be done
by the company after its formation which make a new contract to the
same effect as the old one, but that stands on a different principle.
am of opinion, therefore, that there was.no contract binding the com
* * *
pany to pay this £63. to Messrs. Iones & Pride.
There is another ground suggested,
namely, that as the company
has had the beneﬁt of the registration they ought to pay for it. But
the answer to that is this—that was not the claim brought forward.
The claim brought forward was for an agreed sum of £63., and any
order we make (I do not know whether it is necessary to express it)
will not prejudice that claim, which is merely for an amount due for
services the beneﬁt of which has been taken by the company.
* * * Not
IAMES, L. J. I am entirely of the same opinion.
withstanding what was said by Vice Chancellor Malins in Spiller v.
Paris.Skating Rink Company, 7 Ch. D. 368, it appears to me that it
is settled, both in the Courts of Law and by us in the Court of Ap
peal in that case to which we have been referred of In re Hereford &
South \Vales I/Vaggon & Engineering Company, 2 Ch. Div. 621, that
a company cannot ratify a contract made on its behalf before it came
The only thing that results
into existence—cannot ratify a nullity.“
from what is called ratiﬁcation or adoption of such a contract is not the
ratiﬁcation or adoption of a qua contract, but the creation of an equi
It is inequitable for
table liability depending upon equitable grounds.

I

I

To the same eﬂ’ect, see Melhado v. Porto Allegre, New Hnmpburg & Bra
zilian Ry. Co., Limited, L. R. 9 C. P. 503, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 57, 23 W.
B. 57 (1874), suit by a promoter who spent time and money in forming a
Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328. 16 Am. Rep.
company;
Cf. Wood v. Whelen, 93 Ill. 153 (1879), and Bruner v. Brown, 139
587 (1872).
Ind. 600, 38 N. E. 318 (1894). See, also, Stanton v. N. Y. & Eastern Ry. Co., 59
Conn. 272, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep. 110 (1890); Paxton Cattle Co. v.~ First
Nat. Bank of Arapahoc, 21 Neb. 621, 33 N. W. 271. 59 Am. Rep. 852 (1887),
citing Low v. Conn. & Passumpsic Rivers R., 45 N. H. 370 (1864).
As to a corporation, which with full knowledge of all the facts assumes and.
agrees to the terms or aceepts the beneﬁts of a contract made by its promoters,
see Buﬂlng-ton v. Bardon, S0 Wis. 635, 50 N. -W. 776 (1891); Bel1’s Gap R. Co.
Whether a corporation may ratify
v. Ghristy, 79 Pa. 54. 21 Am. Rep. 29 (1875).
a contract made when it was a do faeto corporation
only, see Whitney V.
Wyman, 101 U. S. 392, 25 L. Ed. 1050 (1879).
85
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a man not to pay for the services of which he has taken the beneﬁt.
That was the only ground upon which we have held that, in that case,
\Valter & Head would have had a claim for services before the regis
tration of the company, had not an equitable defense been effectually
set up on the ground of a fraudulent concealment of the agreement.
]AuEs, L. ]. The appeal will be dismissed with costs. It will be
without prejudice to any equitable claim on a quantum meruit.“
h

*

¥

#

BATTELLE
(Supreme

v.

NORTHWESTERN CEMENT
PAVEMENT CO.

Court of Minnesota,

1887.

37

Minn.

89,

&

33 N.

CONCRETE
W.

327.)

Before the incorporation of the defendant, the plaintiff had agreed
with two of its promoters to buy a piece of real estate and to sell the
same to the company.
This he did, giving a mortgage back, and the
Default was
company, when it was formed, assumed the mortgage.
made, and the mortgage was foreclosed; but the property did not sell
for enough to pay the debt, and the plaintiff was held for the de
He now sues to recover. From ‘judgment for the plaintiff
ﬁciency.
and an order refusing a new trial, the defendant appeals.
GILFILLAN, C. J. It is self-evident that a corporation is not bound
by engagements of its “promoters,” (i. e., those who bring about its
organization,) assuming to contract for it in advance. It cannot have
agents till it has an existence. The promoters are not the corporation,
and their contracts cannot be its contracts. This is so, though the pro
moters become, at the creation of the corporation, its only stockholders,
directors, and oﬁicers.
After it comes into existence and operation,
it may, by adopting the engagements thus made for it in advance, make
them its contracts, precisely as it might make similar contracts had no
previous engagements been entered into. There can be no difference
between its making a contract by adopting an agreement originally made
in advance for it by promoters, and its making an entirely new con
tract.
No greater formality can be required in the one case than in
the other; and if it could make an entirely new similar contract, with
out the use of its seal, or without writing, or without formal action of
its board of directors, it may also so adopt an agreement, assumed to
be made for it in advance by promoters.
It is not requisite that such
adoption or acceptance be express, but may be shown from acts or
acquiescence of the corporation or its authorized agents as any similar
V
contract may be shown.
It is true that the relations between the promoters and the 'agents
and shareholders may be such, or the engagements made in advance
by the promoters be of such a character, that the matter of adoption
30

Parts of the opinions of Jessel, M. R., and James, L.

.'I., are omitted.
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The highest
by the courts with great strictness.
of fairness is required. In this case no complaint can be made
as to the fairness of the transaction.
Not only did every stockholder
'and director and oiﬁcer of the corporation, after it was formed, know
be scrutinized

degree

ii

TUMMAN.

1

Man.

6

&

(Court

v.

of Common Pleas, 1843.
Dowl. 8.: L. 513, 12 L. J. C. P., 306,
Scott, N. R. S94, 46 E. C. L. 235.)
G. 236,

6

VVILSON

a

it,

'

is

it,

that the property was conveyed to it upon the agreement that, when
formed, it should assume and pay the indebtedness to which the prop
erty was subject, but each of them was a party to that agreement.
After receiving the beneﬁt of the previous engagement, and accepting
and using the property in its business, knowing that, as part of the
price of the property, the corporation was to pay the indebtedness,
it can hardly be permitted now to deny its liability to pay it; and the
same may be said as to the claim that, because plaintiff was a director,
the agreement of the corporation, by its adoption of the previous ar
rangement with him, was not binding upon it. The, rule that a. con
tract between a director of a corporation and-the corporation is void
able at the instance of the latter, or of its stockholders, cannot be ap
plicable to a case where all interested in the corporation, its oﬁicers,
directors, and stockholders, not only know of but consent to
and
where the property acquired by the corporation under the contract
no one dissenting.
kept and used by
The evidence was sufficient to sustain
"verdict for plaintiff, within
the rules herein stated.
Order aiﬁrmed.
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Plea, not guilty.
Trespass de bonis asportatis.
TINDAL, C.
This case comes before us, on the rule obtained by
the plaintiffs, to enter
verdict for them against the defendant Tum
man, for the sum of £2. 16s. 6d.
the court should think that the sub
sequent ratiﬁcation made him liable as
trespasser for the original
seizure.
The seizure of the plaintiff's goods was made by an ofﬁcer
of some court, without any previous authority from Tumman, who ap
some other suit, the precise na
peared on the trial to be the plaintiff
ture of which did not transpire, but who was found by the jury not to
have given any precedent authority to take the goods of the plaintiffs.
but to have ratiﬁed the taking after
was made.
The question, there
fore,
dry question of law, whether the subsequent ratiﬁcation by
the defendant Tumman of the seizure under such circumstances,
the same in its consequences as
precedent command given by him;
and we think upon the authorities and upon the reason of the thing
not. That an act done for another by
self, that
person not as
suming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without
any previous authority, would, indeed, become the act of the principal,
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subsequently ratiﬁed by him, is the known and well established rule
In that case, the principal is bound by the act, whether it be
for his detriment or advantage, or whether it be founded on a tort or
a contract, if it be done by his previous authority.
There was this precise distinction taken in the Year Book, 7 Hen.
4, pl. 35, “that if the bailiff ta.ke a heriot, claiming property in it for
himself, the subsequent agreement of the lord would not entitle him
to be considered as the lord’s bailiff at the time. But if he took it at
the time as bailiff of the lord, and not for himself; although he did
so without any command of the lord; yet the subsequent ratiﬁcation
by the lord would make him bailiff at the time.” The same distinc
tion is laid down by Anderson, C. J., in Godbolt’s Reports, 189. “If
one have cause to distrain my goods, and a stranger, of his own wrong.
without any warrant or authority given him by the other, take my
goods; not as bailiff or servant of the other, and I bring an action
of trespass against him, can he excuse himself by saying he did it as
bailiff or servant?
Can he so father his misdemeanor on another?
He cannot,” &c.
In the present case, the sheriff’s oﬁicers, who were the original tres
passers by taking the goods of the plaintiffs, were not the servants or
agents of the defendant Tumman, but the agents of a public ofﬁcer or
minister, obeying the mandate of a court of justice. They did not as
sume to act at the time as agents or bailiffs of the then plaintiff, Tum
man, but as the servants of another, namely, the sheriff, by executing
the process directed to him by the court, and this forms the distinction
between the present case and that of Parsons v. Loyd, which was re
lied on in the course of the argument. In the present case, the sheriff,
or the sheriff's officers, seized under a valid process, but in Parsons v.
Loyd the sheriff had acted, not under the authority of the court, but
under the direction of the plaintiff in the original action, who, by su
ing out a void process. .was in the same situation as if merely he had
really directed the sheriff or his officers to make the arrest; and, on
the latter supposition where a ca. sa. or a ﬁ. fa. has been set aside for
irregularity it becomes a nullity, and no doubt the sheriff acts as the
servant, and by the command of the plaintiff, who sued it- out, and
who is consequently liable as principal for the act of his agent. If the
defendant Tumman had directed the sheriff to take the goods of the
present plaintiffs, under a valid writ requiring him to take the goods
of another person, the previous direction would undoubtedly have made
him a trespasser, on the principle that all who procure a trespass to
be done, are trespassers themselves; the sheriff would be supposed not
to have taken the goods merely under the authority of the writ, but
as the servant of the plaintiff.
But where the sheriff, acting under a
valid writ, has seized the wrong person's goods, a subsequent declara
tion of the plaintiff in the action, ratifying and approving the taking,
cannot alter the character of the original taking, and make it a wrong
ful taking by the plaintiff.
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\/Ve think, therefore, that the defendant Tumman

1

is not shewn to be

a trespasser, and that the rule must be discharged.
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Rule discharged.
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Action on
policy of assurance on goods shipped on steamer La
Plata, on which there was
loss by jettison.
The further facts ap
pear in the opinions.
ERLE, C.
am of opinion that this action cannot be sustained.
an action of contract.
important, therefore, not only to as
certain what
the subject of the contract, but who are the parties
to it; for,
clear law that no one can sue upon
contract unless
has been made by him, or has been made by an agent professing to
Now, here, the
a_ct__fqr him, and whose act has been ratiﬁed by him.
contract was not made by the plaintiff; nor did
purport to be made
on his behalf;
purported to be made by Smith on his own behalf.
And
clear that the plaintiff never intended to ratify that contract
in toto, but part of
as was sought to be ap
only, viz., so much of
A very wide extension has been given
propriated to him by Smith.
to the principle
have adverted to as to the parties to
contract, in
respect of policies of insurance, viz., that persons who could not be
named or ascertained at the time the policy
effected are allowed to
come in and take the beneﬁt of the insurance.
But then they must be
Here,
persons who were contemplated at the time the policy was made.
however, \Vatson was not and could not be contemplated as being
party to whose beneﬁt the policy should enure, at the time
was ef
fected. The policy was effected by Smith in December, 1860. He was
not at that time employed by \Vatson.
The ﬁrst intimation he re
ceived from \/Vatson that he wanted to effect an insurance, was re
ceived by him in January, 1861, when he was requested to take out
Find
on his behalf an open policy for £5000. against jettison on deck.
policy as Vi/atson required, he had
ing himself unable.to effect such
recourse to the expedient of appropriating
part of his own contract
I
to Watson.
No doubt, the principle contended for on the part of the plaintiﬁ‘
one of considerable importance to the mercantile community.
But
am clearly of opinion that VVatson cannot sue upon this policy.
may be that Smith might maintain an action as trustee for the parties
will be time enough to consider that
the
but
really interested:
running policy hav
question should arise. No case can be found of
ing been appropriated to cover a risk not contemplated at the time.
VVith
entirely unknown to the law of contract.
proceeding
Such
the consequences we have nothing to do, even though the effect of our
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decision should be to throw doubt upon the validity of running poli
cies. The cases to which the learned counsel for the plaintiff have
referred seem to me to be entirely in conformity with our present de
In Lucenna v. Craufurd and Routh v. Thompson, the prizes
cision.
were vested in the Crown; the Crown, therefore, was interested in
the policies, and substantially they were effected on the behalf of the
Crown: in both, the very risk insured against was the risk in respect
Here, it is quite certain that the
of which the action was brought.
underwriters did not undertake this risk; and that, if asked to do so,
I therefore think, that, upon the declaration
they would have refused.
and the ﬁfth plea, denying that the policy was made for the use and
beneﬁt or on account of the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to judg
’
ment.
_
To entitle a person to sue
\\"ILLl3S, ]. I am of the same opinion.
or
upon a contract, it must clearly be shown that he himself made
was made on his behalf by an agent authorized to act for him
that
at the time, or whose act has been subsequently ratiﬁed and adopted
by him. The law obviously requires that the person for whom the
person capable of being ascertained
agent professes to act must be
not necessary that he should be named; but there
at the time.
must be such
reasonable
description of him as shall amount to
In
designation of the person intended to be bound by the contract.
the present case, the policy was effected on goods “to be valued and
declared as interest might appear.” No person was pointed out at the
time the policy was effected as the person who was to be the owner
of the goods insured. Smith was professing to act for himself at the
time of making the policy.
Goods shipped on his own account, or
possibly by him as agent for another person, would be covered by the
But stranger who had given him no orders to effect policy
policy.
for him clearly cannot by any supposed ratiﬁcation assume the beneﬁt
of the contract. The cases of administrators and of assignees of bank
The doctrine of ratiﬁca
rupts stand upon
totally different footing.
tion involves this, that the act of ratiﬁcation shall have reference to
the time when the act was done which the supposed principal professes
to ratify. To illustrate our opinion, we may refer to the case of an
ordinary policy. In the ordinary policy, the broker who effects
de
clares that he does so as well in his own name as for and in the name
and names of all and every other person or persons to whom the same
death, may, or shall appertain, &c.: and the person who sues upon
must be either the broker by whom
effected or the person on whose
was intended to be effected.
behalf
No subsequently acquired in
37
terest will give
stranger
right to sue upon the policy.
\Vrr.I.IAus and KEATING, ]]., also rendered opinions.
Rule nisi to direct
verdict for the defendant made absolute.
8'! Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327 (1880). holding that “the doctrine properly
applies only to eases where one has assumed to act as agent for another." And
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of

Wisconsin,

1898.

99

v.

Wis.

LEEK

1‘

et al.

49, 74 N.

W.

572.)

This is an action to enforce a material man's or subcontractor’s
lien upon ‘a church building.
The action was tried by the court, and
the facts are not materially in dispute. It appeared that the defendants'
church building was remodeled in the year'l893 by the defendant
Parsons as principal contractor, the work being ﬁnished about Sep
tember 18, 1893. The plaintiff corporation furnished building materials
to Parsons to be used in the building, and which in fact went into
the building (except a few small items), amounting to $705.60, the last
item being furnished September 18th, and no part of the a-mount has
been paid.
The defense was that the trustees of the church never
made or authorized any contract with Parsons for the work, and that
the 60 days notice required by section 3315 of the Revised Statutes
was never served upon the trustees or their agent. Upon these issues
it appeared that there were four trustees of the church, and that the
defendant Leek was the pastor of the church; that no contract was
made by the trustees;~ but that Mr. Leek and one Coe, acting for the
church, made a written contract with Parsons for the remodeling of
the church without speciﬁc authority so to do from the trustees. The
work went on under the contract, numerous changes being made from
time to time, all under the direction of Leek, who acted as superin
tendent on behalf of the church. The work occupied from May until
September, and the congregation worshiped in the basement during
that time. The trustees attended church, and knew of the work, and
The work was practically done September 21,
made no objection.
1893, and the church was then dedicated.
Difﬁculties then arose as to
The church found it hard to raise money. In November
payment.
it appears that the trustees gave a mortgage on their parsonage for
$500 to pay a part of the indebtedness for remodeling, but there was
it

has been held that the agent must not merely assume, but that he must
Ferris v. Snow, 130 Mich. 254. 90 N. W. Q50 (1902);
Mitchell v. Minn. Fire Ass’n, 48 Minn. 278. 51 N. W. 608 (1892); Keighley v.
Durant. [1901] A. C. 240, 70 L. J. K. B. 662, 84 L. T. R. N. S. 777. 17 T. L.
Rep. 527; In this last case it had been decided by the lower court. 1 Q. R. 629.
69 L. J. Q. B. 382, 82
T. Rep. N. S. 217, 16 T. L. R. 244. 48 Wkly. Rep. 476
(1900), that an undisclosed intention
to act as agent was enough, though the
agent had not openly professed to act for another.
To the same effect is
Hayward v. Lnngmaid. 181 Mass. 426, 63'N. E. 912 (1902). In Greenﬁeld Bank
v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447 (1862), the court went so far as to hold that an act
“may be ratiﬁed where there was no pretense of agency."
Cf. Security Loan
Trust Co. v. Powell, 119 Va. 231, 89 S. E. 91 (1916). and Wilson v. Andalusia
Mfg. Co., 195 Ala. 477, 70 South. 140, 4 A. L. R. 1016 (1915), with Burnett v.
Lynn, 118 Wash. 315, 203 Pac. 389 (1922).
See also, 2 Mich. Iaw Rev. 25;
Wycoff, Seaman & Benedict v. Davis, 127 Iowa, 399, 103 N. W. 349 (1905), in
which tho agent pledged his pi-iucipal’s typewriter to get a loan with which
to pay his principal a debt he owed him, and Marsh v. Joseph, 1 Ch. 213, 66
L. J. Ch. 128, 75 L. T. Rep. N. S. 558, 45 W. R. 209 (1897).
p_r9,tess to act as mzent.

L

_

"

Gonn.Pn.& A. (20 En.)

Ch. 4)

.

CREATION

or

'r1u~:

nnnxrrou

99

still a considerable amount left due. In October or November a meet
ing was arranged between the creditors and the trustees and Leek,
Plaintiﬁ"s repre
and efforts were made to settle with all creditors.
sentative was present at the meeting, and its claim was recognized, and
an agreement was made in writing to settle at 80 cents on the dollar.
This agreement was signed by’ all the creditors, and by four men
acting for the church, of whom at least two were trustees; but it was
never carried out. It is uncertain whether this meeting was a valid
meeting of the trustees or not. The plaintiff demanded the production
of the records of the corporation on the trial, but they were not pro
duced.
On the 6th of November, 1893, the plaintiff caused to be
served upon Mr. Leek a sufﬁcient notice, claiming a subcontractor's
lien, but he did not hand it to the trustees until two or three months
Afterwards this action was commenced against Leek and the
later.
trustees and Parsons.
The court found that the materials were fur
nished to be used in rebuilding the church, but that no notice of the
plaintiﬁ"s claim for a lien was served on the trustees within the time
required by law, and that said trustees had no agent; also, that Leek
was not a trustee, and never became personally liable therefor—and
judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs, as to
Leek and the trustees, and -awarding a personal recovery in favor of
the plaintiff against Parsons for the amount of its claim, with costs.
The plaintiff appealed from the entire judgment, except that part in its
'
favor against Parsons.
VVI.\'sL0w, ]. (after stating the facts). The claim on behalf of the
church is (1) that the trustees never made any contract with Parsons,
and hence that Parsons was not a principal contractor;
and (2) that
Leek was not its agent, so that valid service of the notice of the plain
tiﬁ's claim for lien could be made upon him.’ Both of these claims we
regard as untenable. It seems to be true that Parsons did not orig
inally contract with the trustees, but the evidence abundantly shows
A corporation
that the trustees ratiﬁed the contract made by Leek.
may ratify the unauthorized act of one claiming to act as its agent,
as well as a natural person, and such ratiﬁcation, when made with
knowledge of the facts, operates as though previous authority had been
given.“ Mechem, Ag. §§ 158, 167; Kickland v. \Vooden-\Vare Co.,
88 Ranncanos BY Con.Pom\'noNs.—That
a municipal corporation can ratify
an unauthorized action of its agents, which the corporation could in the ﬁrst
instance have authorized, was held in Bell v. Waynesboro Borough, 195 Pa.
A board of supervisors, with no power to vote or issue
299. 45 Atl. 930 (1900).
bonds without a vote of the county. cannot ratify a subscription without a
vote of the county, because they could not make a subscription in the ﬁrst in
stance.
Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676, 19 L. Ed. 1040 (1870).
There may be ratiﬁcation by a state, either by formal act of the Legislature,
State of Wisconsin v. Torinus, 26 Minn. 1. 49 N. W. 259. 37 Am. Rep. 395 (1879) ;
or by acquiescence by the Legislature after full knowledge and enjoyment of
the beneﬁts of it. Jewell Nursery O0. v. State, 5 S. D. 623, 59 N. W. 1025
The ratiﬁcation, to be effective, must be made by the same agency
(1894).
of the state which would have had original power to do the act. State of
Ohio r. Ex'r of Buttles, 3 Ohio St. 309 (1854).
\

THE

100

nannrox

(Part

1

Wis. 34, 31 N. ‘W. 471. We regard the acquiescence of the cor
poration and its trustees in the acts of Leek, and the subsequent ap
proval thereof, by partially paying for the improvements, and accepting
and using the building with full knowledge of the facts, as an ef
Nor can it
fectual ratiﬁcation of Leek’s transactions with Parsons.
be doubted that Leek was the agent of the church in the matter 0'
the rebuilding, within the meaning of section 3315, Rev. St., so that
valid service of the subcontractors
claim for a lien could be made
upon him. Leek was not only the pastor of the church, but transacted
the entire business from start to ﬁnish, without objection from the
It was not
church corporation or from the trustees individually.
These con
necessary that he have a power of attorney in writing.
siderations require a reversal of the judgment so far as the church
No personal liability on the part of Leek was shown,
is concerned.
however, nor was he a trustee of the church; hence the judgment
was right as to Leek.
That part of the judgment dismissing the complaint as to Leek is
afﬁrmed, without costs:
that part of the judgment dismissing the
complaint as to the trustees is reversed, and the action femanded,
with directions to enter judgment for a lien in accordance with the
'
prayer of the complaint.
68

-

TRUDO

v.

ANDERSON.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1862.

10

Mich.

357, S1 Am. Dec. 795.)

T rudo left his horse with one McAlister to be sold. \’Vl1ile Mc
Alister was absent, his employé, Miller, exchanged it for another horse.
McAlister suspected that this other horse was stolen, which was the

fact, but nevertheless hold him conditionally to one Gleason.
An
derson loaned $30 to the party who had traded for plaintiffs horse,
taking the horse as security. Plaintiff now brings replevin. judgment
for the defendant.
CHRISTIANCY, J.”
[After ruling on a matter of jurisdictionzl
* * * The Court found as a fact that the plaintiff, in July, 1860,
was the owner of the horse in question; and to warrant the judg
ment in favor of the defendant, it must appear, ﬁrst, that the prop
erty, or the plaintiffs right of possession, had been divested, or second,
we must be satisﬁed that the Court below was right in holding that
a demand of the property was necessary before the institution of the
suit. To authorize the judgment on the ﬁrst ground the Court must
have found, as a fact, the ratiﬁcation by the plaintiff of the exchange
made by the servant of his agent, and of the subsequent conditional
gle by McAlister of the horse received in exchange; for the simple
authority of McAlister to sell the horse for the plaintiff would not
39

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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have authorized the exchange if made by McAlister himself, much less
when made by his servant; and the conditional sale of the horse re
ceived in exchange could in no way bind the plaintiff, unless ratiﬁed
and adopted by him.
But while the ﬁnding sets forth the particular
facts and circumstances in evidence with more particularity than nec
essary, and is therefore thus far more in the nature of evidence than
of a ﬁn'ding of facts, it fails entirely to ﬁnd directly the fact of rati
ﬁcation, or any fact or state of facts which would, in law, constitute
such ratiﬁcation.
Certain facts are set forth in reference to a condi
tional sale made by McAlister of the horse received by his servant in
exchange for the plaintiffs horse; but these facts, though probably
with others considered by the Judge as circumstances tending to the
proof of ratiﬁcation, cannot be treated as a ﬁnding of that fact by
the Court.
If admissible and sufﬁcient to authorize the inference of
ratiﬁcation, they were certainly no more than mere evidence, and it
was for him to draw the inference.
A ﬁnding of facts should set
forth the facts found, not merely the evidence tending to prove them.
Upon a special verdict the Court can draw no mere inference of fact
which the jury have failed to draw from the evidence. But we see
nothing in this evidence which, without other facts not found, could
even tend to the proof of ratiﬁcation;
as the plaintiff himself does
not appear to have had any connection with the conditional sale, nor
even to have been informed of
either before or after the transaction.
And an agent cannot ratify an act do‘ne by himself or his servant be
yond the scope of the agency, so as to bind the principal: otherwise
an agent might enlarge his own powers to any extent without his
“'
principal’s consent.
judgment reversed.“

Ariz.

v.

BROWN.

311,

% Pac.

362.)

I

a

judgment -of the District Court in favor of the plain
'
and appellee.
CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff below, appellee here, was
depositor of
In December, 1902, the bank, by its president
the defendant bank.
and manager, drew
check for $1,000 against plaintiff's deposit, and
loaned that sum to one L. D. McClure, taking
promissory note pay
able to plaintiff, due in one year, and bearing interest at the rate of

tiﬁ

a

a

a

J.“

&

3

6

4

4° See. also, Bullard v. De Groﬁ, 59 Neb. 783, 82 N. W.
(1900); U. S. Exp.
Co. v. Rawson, 106 Ind. 215.
N. E. 337 (1886); State of Ohio v. Ex'r of
Buttles,
Ohio St. 309 (1854); Marqusee v. Ins. Co. of North America, 211
Fed. 903. 128 C. C. A. 281 (1914): Ironwood Store Co. v. Harrison
Green.
T5 Mich. 197. 42 N. W. 808 (1889): Britt v. Gordon, 132 Iowa. 431, 108 N.
Vt’. 319 (1906), in which an agent tried to ratify his own unauthorized
acts.
Pnrt of the opinion is omitted.
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10 per cent. per annum.
McClure was a retail druggist, carrying on
business in thecity of Phoenix.
As collateral security for the loan,
he pledged a warehouse receipt for whisky in bond in Kentucky, and
agreed to set apart a portion of his stock of goods, to be held by one
F. H. Lyman, his attorney, as receiptor. The warehouse receipt was
A
of small value. The goods to be set aside inventoried $1,042.07.
Mr. Lyman re
large part of them were of a perishable character.
ceipted for the goods, and saw some of the goods segregated from
the stock, but was not requested by the bank to check them over, nor
did he do so, nor was he requested to exercise more than a nominal
control over them; the actual custody and control remaining in Mc
Clure. There was a verbal agreement between McClure and the bank
to the effect that, should McClure desire to use any of the goods men
tioned in the inventory, he could pay the bank the schedule price and
take them.
About one month after the loan was made, plaintiff was called to
the bank, and told by the president that he had loaned $1,000 of her
money to McClure on “gilt-edged” security. This was the ﬁrst knowl
She was not told the nature of the
edge she had of the transaction.
security, nor the manner in which it was held. Thereafter McClure
paid the interest monthly to plaintiff, who receipted to him for the
same.
During the month of March, 1903, the cashier of the bank
suggested to plaintiff that she had better look over the securities con
nected with her loan, and handed the papers relating -to them to her.
These papers, with the exception of the receipt given by Lyman, are
not in evidence. She did not examine the papers, but returned them
at once to the cashier, who assured her that the securities were per
Some time
fectly good. All of the papers remained with the bank.
thereafter, plaintiff attempted to negotiate a purchase of real._estate,
and told the broker of the McClure note.
The broker, in response to
her suggestion, and with a view to accepting the note if satisfactory
in part payment, examined the note and securities, and declined to
Short
accept it; merely telling her that the note was not satisfactory.
ly before the note became due, McClure failed in business. Investiga
tion disclosed that of the goods supposedly set aside as security for
plaintiﬁ‘ but a small portion remained. During this investigation plain-'
tiff learned for the ﬁrst time the precise nature of the goods pledged,
and the conditions under which they were held. Shortly after learning
the facts, she notiﬁed the bank that she repudiated the act of the bank
in making the loan, tendered the interest she had received, offered
to indorse the note to the bank without recourse, and demanded pay
The bank refused payment, and this action was
ment of the $1,000.
brought.
The principal question requiring our attention is, did the plaintiff
ratify the action of the bank in making the loan under such circum
The principles of law involved
stances as to be binding upon her?
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are clear. “No doctrine is better settled, both upon principle and au
thority, than this, that the ratiﬁcation of an act of an agent previously
unauthorized must, in order to bind the principal, be with full knowl
edge of all the material facts."
If the material facts be either sup
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pressed or unknown, .the ratiﬁcation is treated as invalid, because
founded in mistake or fraud.” Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 9 L. Ed.
246.
Speaking through Chief Justice Bigelow in the case of Combs v.
Scott et al., 12 Allen, 493, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts say:
“Ratiﬁcation of a past and completed transaction, into which an agent
has entered without authority, is a purely voluntary act on the part
of the principal. No legal obligation rests upon him to sanction or
No duty requires him to make inquiries concerning it.
adopt it.
\\' here there is no legal obligation or duty to do an act, there can be
no negligence in an omission to perform it. The true dpctrine is \vell
stated by a learned text-writer: “If I make a contract in the name of
a person who has not given me an authority, he will be under no obli
nor will he be bound to the performance of it.’
gation to ratify
Livermore on Agency, 44. See, also, Paley on Agency, 171, note
‘o.’ \Vhoever, therefore, seeks to procure and rely on
ratiﬁcation
was made under such circumstances as in law
bound to show that
to be binding on the principal, especially to see to
that all material
facts were made known to him. The burden of making inquiries and
of ascertaining the truth
not cast on him who
under no legal obli
en
gation to assume
responsibility, but rests on the party who
beneﬁt or advantage for himself.
This
not
deavoring to obtain
practicable. The needful information or knowledge
only just, but
either party or,privy to
always within the reach of him who
transaction which he seeks to have ratiﬁed, rather than of him who
did not authorize
and to the details of which he may be
stranger.
\Ve do not mean to say that
person can be willfully ignorant, or
purposely shut his eyes to means of information within his own pos
session and control, and thereby escape the consequences of
ratiﬁ
cation of unauthorized acts into which he has deliberately entered
that ratiﬁcation of an antecedent act of an agent
but our opinion
which was unauthorized cannot be held valid and binding where the
person sought to be charged has misapprehcnded or mistaken ma
terial facts, although he may have wholly omitted to make inquiries
of other persons concerning them, and his ignorance and misappre

1

8.

8,

4! See especially the opinion of Brewer. J., in First National Bank v. Drake,
29 Kan. 311, 44 Am.-Rep. 646 (1883); Tehbetts v. Moore, 19 N. H. 369 (1849).
43 Johnson v. Ogren, 102 Minn.
112 N. W. 894 (1907); Jones v. Atkinson,
68 Ala. 167 (1880). citing Meehan v. Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277 (1873); Smith v.
Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79 (1867); Shuli v. New Birdsall Co.. 15 S. D.
S6 N. W. 654
(1901); Heinzerling v. Agen, 46 Wash. 390, 90 Pac. 262 (1907): Marsh v.
Joseph [1897]
Ch. 213, 66 L. J. Ch. 128, 75 L. '1‘. Rep. N. S. 558, 45 W. R. 209.
As to acceptance by the principal of money lawfully due him from the agent.
me post, D. 140.

"
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hension might have been enlightened and corrected by the use of dili
See, also, Story on Agency,
gence on his part to ascertain them.”
Sleigh Co. (C. C.) 39 Fed. 347 ; 1
§ 243; V\/heeler v. Northwestern
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1190.
The trial court found as a fact that the plaintiff was not informed
as to the character or value of the securities, and, after a careful con
sideration of the evidence, we are not prepared to say that it was not
justiﬁed in so ﬁnding. A lack of such knowledge is a material circum
stance, and a ratiﬁcation without it is not binding, unless the igno
rance resulted from willfulness and not mere carelessness. The in
ventory or other papers concerning the collateral held by the bank,
with the exception of Mr. L_vman’s receipt, are not in evidence, and
we cannot say how much information plaintiff would have acquired
had she examined them. VVe think the evidence shows the plaintiff
* * *
to have been careless, but not willfully ignorant.
"
Judgment aﬁirmed.
.

,

MOYLE

v.

CONGREGATIONAL SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
CITY.

(Supreme

Court of Utah,

1897.

16 Utah

69, 50 Pae. 806.)

it

it,

it,

Action by Moyle, as assignee of the Burton-Gardner Company,
against the defendant for $11,012.85, alleged to be due for work and
The original
materials in building the defendant’s church building.
contract was with Barber & Co. Owing to dissatisfaction, this was
assigned by the consent of the building committee to the Burton-Gard
ner Company.
It was claimed by the latter that the written assign
ment was made merely to get rid of Barber & Co., and that the chair
man of the building committee, one IjI_0l_lister, now deceased. made
an oral agreement with the Burton-Gardner Company to complete the
Plaintiff claimed that
church and be paid whatever it was worth.
Hollister had ostensible authority to make the oral contract, and in
any case the society, by accepting and keeping the building, had rati
ﬁed the contract and was bound to pay in accordance with it. Judg
ment for plaintiff for $6,801.84 and interest.
MINOR, J. [After stating the facts and holding there was no im
* * * The
plied authority in Hollister to make the oral contractz]
the
committee
to
make
a
contract with
building
trustees authorized
Barber & Co. to build the church on the terms stated in the contract,
Neither the trustees nor the building
and with no other persons.
committee ever directed any contract to be made with Burton or the
Burton-Gardner Company to build the church, or to complete building
Nor has
except that which grew out of the written assignment.
ever knowingly ratiﬁed any con-'
either body, or any member of
tract with the Burton—Gardner Company to build the church.
Nor
does
appear that either of the bodies representing the church, and

cnmrtox
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having authority to speak for it or any member of
except Hol
lister, had 'any notice or knowledge of any verbal contract between
Hollister and the plaintiff company to complete the church in violation
of the written agreement made and agreed to by all the parties. \Vhen
completed, the church paid the full contract price, together with ex
tras, as provided for and agreed upon under the contract. These pay
ments were mostly made to Burton, until after Hollister’s death, and
then, by the direction of Burton, they were paid to the Burton-Gardner
Company, and many of the checks passed through Mr. Burton’s hands.
It
well established that the ratiﬁcation of an unauthorized act of
any agent, in order to be effectual and binding on the principal must
have been made with full knowledge of all material facts; and igno
rance, mistake, or misrepresentation of any of the essential circum
stances relating to the transaction alleged to have been ratiﬁed will
absolve the principal from all liability, by reason of the supposed adop
tion or assent to the previously unauthorized acts of the agent. Bald
win v. Burro\vs, 47 N. Y. 199; Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U.
S. 355. 26 L. Ed. 990; Dupont v. Werthcman, 10 Cal. 354.“
_
And, in adopting and ratifying what the principal had authorized
the agent to do, he was not adopting and ratifying that which was
unauthorized.
Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79. \Ve are satisﬁed that the
church did not. through its directors or building committee, ratify
true, the church retains the struc
the alleged acts of Hollister.
ture built upon its real estate: but we know of no way by which the
alleged work performed upon the church building can be segregated
and returned to the plaintiff.
from
does not follow that be
cause the church used the building after its completion, thereby un
avoidably having the beneﬁt of the work and materials furnished, the
church would therefore be liable for the value thereof.
Mills v. Berla
(Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S. VV. 910; Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199.
\\'e are of the opinion that the plaintiﬁ‘ offered no valid testimony to
show that Mr. Hollister had authority to‘ bind the defendant by the
Nor was there any ratiﬁcation of his alleged
alleged parol contract.
acts in that respect by the church, building committee, or trustees of
the church. shown. The alleged verbal contract varies and contradicts
the written contract and assignment by which the parties were bound,
and that testimony concerning the verbal contract with Hollister was
improperly received in evidence, and should have been stricken out on
defendant's motion at the close of plaintiff's case.“
Reversed and remanded.
Other parts of this opinion are found post, p. 740.
Tucker v. Jerris. 75 Me. 184 (1883), in which the ratiﬁcation
by a principal of a tort of the agent was involved.
44

45 See. also,
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THOMPSON
(Supreme

v.

(Part

1

.

LABORINGMAN’S MERCANTILE &'MFG. CO.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1906.
908, 6 L. _R. A. [N. S.] 311.)

60

W. Va.

42, 53

S.

E.

Action by Thompson on a note for $382.39, signed “Laboringman’s
M. & M. Co., P. M. Murphy, Pres.” judgment for plaintiff.
Re
versed and judgment for defendant.
* * * It is not
POFFENBARGER, I.“ [After stating the facts :]
pretended that Murphy had any inherent authority or power as presi
dent to borrow money, and execute the company’s note therefor.
That
such authority is not possessed by the president of a corporation, in
the absence of an express delegation thereof, has been determined by
this court.
Bank v. Kimberlands,
16 W. Va. 579; Third National
Bank v. Laboringman’s, etc., Co., 56 W. Va. 446, 49 S. E. 544. Nor

is it pretended that he had any antecedent express authority from the
board of directors to so bind the corporation.
_[After ﬁnding that the corporation did not hold the agent out as
authorized to borrow money :]
The other view is that of ratiﬁcation of the unauthorized act of the
The con=
president.
There is "no claim of an express ratiﬁcation.
tention is that it is a ratiﬁcation by acquiescence and retention of
beneﬁts.
As noted in the statement of the evidence, it does not appear
that the account which was set off against the note at the time of its
Mr. Thompson's
execution was due from the defendant company.
evidence goes no further than to say it was so represented to him by
VVhether the company
Murphy, and he acted upon that information.
received the beneﬁt of the check given for the balance of the note
The alleged recep
does not in any way appear from the evidence.
tion of beneﬁts stands wholly upon the representations made to Mr.
The check is not produced, so as to show
Thompson by Murphy.
whether it was payable to Murphy individually or to the defendant,
nor if payable to the defendant, whether it was deposited to its credit
or cashed by Murphy and the money used by him. Starting with the
admitted fact that the act of Murphy in borrowing this money was
outside of, and beyond, his authority, it would be contrary to legal
principles to say that his representations or acts, relating thereto, are
binding upon the company. W'hat he said as well as what he did was
beyond the scope of his authority, and it is well settled that, only such
acts and declarations of an agent are binding upon his principal as
Had said sum
were done and made within the scope of his authority.
of $200 been a debt due the defendant it may be that it could have
This we do not decide.
But it
been rightfully paid to its president.
was borrowed money. The acquisition of it was an unauthorized act,
and the custody of it was, therefore, necessarily not on behalf of the
46 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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Hence, the agent’s_possession of
raises no presumption,
and lays no foundation for an inference, that the principal received
*
the beneﬁt of it.
This may not, however, be conclusive of the case. A principal may
ratify the unauthorized act of his agent without having received the
beneﬁt thereof.
may be that the defendant did receive the money
The
the lack of evidence hereto show that fact.
notwithstanding
authorities do not seem to hold the reception of beneﬁts to be an es
Nor
sential element of ratiﬁcation.
any reason perceived why
should be.
necessary, therefore, to consider the other evidence
This consists of the silence of the
relied upon to show ratiﬁcation.
claimed, the note
defendant from March or April, 1901, when,
was brought to the attention of the general manager and one or more
of the directors until the 5th of September, 1901,
period of probably
ﬁve or six months.
“VVhere an agency actually exists, the mere ac
quiescence of the principal may well give rise to the presumption of
The
an intentional ratiﬁcation of the act.” Story on Agency,
256.
authorities almost uniformly say that acquiescence after knowledge
evidence of ratiﬁcation,'and such acquies
of an unauthorized act
cence need not be for any considerable length of time. What length
of time will depend upon the nature of the transaction and the situ
ation of the parties affected or interested.
“Silence of the'alleged
principal, when fully advised of what has been done in his behalf by
one who attempts to act as his agent without authority, may be suf
ratiﬁcation of the unauthorized act.”
ﬁcient from which to infer
Lynch v. Smyth, 25 Colo. l03J 54 Pac. 634: King v. Rea, l3 Colo. 69,
21 Pac. 1084; Union M. Co. v. Bank,
Colo. 248; Bank v. Fricke,
“Where the relation of principal and
75 Mo. 178, 42 Am. Rep. 397.
agent exists, but in the particular transaction the agent has exceeded
his authority, an intention to ratify will be presumed from the silence
of the principal beyond a reasonable time after having knowledge of
he has an opportunity to express his dissent.”
the transaction,
Mc
“It
Geoch v. Hooker, 11 Ill. App. 649.
salutary rule, in relation
informed of what has been done,
to agencies, that when the principal
reasonable time, or otherwise, his
he must dissent, and give notice in
assent to what has been done shall be presumed.” Cairnes v. Bleecker,
To the same effect, see Bredin v. Dubarry,
12 Johns. (N. Y.) 300.
R. (Pa) 30; Fuel Co. v. Lee, 102 Wis. 426, 78 N. \V.
14 Serg.
584: McLaren v. Bank, 76 Wis. 259, 45 N. \V. 223; Hoosac M.
M. Co. v. Donat, 10 Colo..529. 16 Pac. 157; Breed v. Bank,
Colo.
481; Smith v. Fletcher, 75 Minn. 189, 77 N. W. 800; Sheldon, etc.,
Co. v. Eickemeyer, etc., Co., 90 N. Y. 607; Alexander ,v. Cauldwell,
83 N. Y. 480: Phillips v. Lumber Co., 130 Cal. 431, 62 Pac. 749;
Thomp. Corp.
Bank v. Railway Co., 117 Cal. 332, 49 Pac. _197;
5286,

5288.

is

a

found which seems to conﬂict with the prop
case
Occasionally
Thus, in Railway Co. v. jay, 65 Ala. 113, the court
osition just stated.
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seems to have inclined to the view that silence and acquiescence,
after
knowledge received, is not evidence of ratiﬁcation, and that no duty
rests upon the principal to disavow the unauthorized act of his agent,
unless the party _dealing with the agent would be misled to his injury
by failure to repudiate the act properly or the act is in reference to
a matter as to which, by the usage of trade, a prompt reply is demand
ed when notice is given_.
For this proposition, Smith v. Sheeley,
12 \-‘Vall. 358, 20 L. Ed. 430, and 2 Greenl. Ev. § 66, are cited.
2
Greenleaf on Evidence, §'67, seems to assert two propositions, the
ﬁrst of which is that mere silence after notice of an unauthorized act,
with full knowledge of the circumstances, is evidence of ratiﬁcation,
but not conclusive; and the second, that if the silence of the principal
is contrary to his duty, or has a tendency to mislead the other party to
As an instance of this the rule gov
the transaction, it is conclusive.
erning transactions among merchants, under which an act is deemed
to be assented to, after the lapse of a reasonable time when notice
thereof has been given is mentioned. This is a species of estoppel.
rather than an instance of ratiﬁcation by acquiescence, and it seems to
be the principle which rules the case of Smith v. Sheeley.
This dis
tinction is marked in other cases.
See Smith v. Fletcher, 75 Minn.
189, 77 N. I/V. 800; Lynch v. Smyth, 25 Colo. 103, 54 Pac. 634; Breed
v. Bank, 4 Colo. 481.
That acquiescence, with full knowledge of the material facts attend
ing an unauthorized act is evidence from which a ratiﬁcation may be
inferred, when no element of estoppel is involved, is made plain by
a number of decisions.
\Vhere the president of a corporation, with
out authority of the board of directors. sold all of its personal prop
erty, and the purchase moncy_ was garnished in the hands of the ven
dee by a creditor of the corporation and no steps were taken by the
debtor corporation either to aﬁirm or repudiate the act of its pres
ident, the silence of the corporation was held to be sufﬁcient evidence
of ratiﬁcation of the unauthorized sale. Fuel Co. v. Lee, 102 VVis.
\/Vhere officers of a corporation, without author
426, 78 N. W'. 584.
ity, have given liens upon its property by mortgage, third parties.
such as unsecured creditors, cannot impugn ‘the transaction on the sole
ground of want of authority in the officers. Moller v. Fiber Co., 187
Pa. 553, 41 Atl. 478; Cooper v. Potts, 185 Pa. 115, 39 Atl. 824; Rag
land v. McFall, 137 Ill. 81, 27 N. E. 75. ~In these cases the only evi
dence of ratiﬁcation is the mere silence and acquiescence
of the prin_
'

cipal.
These authorities may justify the position of counsel for the appel
alone is evidence of ratiﬁcation.
The
lee in saying that acquiescence
books assert the proposition over and over and contain numerous il
lustrations of it. But there is one element which enters into it that
Vi/hen the circumstances are such as to
must not be lost sight of.
call for the application of the law of estoppel, rather than the mere
|
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can bind himself

with

facts.“ The situation may be
such as to make it his duty to know.
The means of knowledge may
be at hand or within easy reach, and his relation to the third party_
But, in
such as to estop him from saying he is without knowledge.
the absence of such circumstances, the authorities are unanimous in
holding that there can be no _ratiﬁcation by acquiescence, unless the
principal has full and complete knowledge of all the material facts
attending the unauthorized act. “Any ratiﬁcation of an unauthorized
the material

act, in order to be made effectual and obligatory upon the alleged prin
cipal. must be shown to have been made by him with a full knowledge
of all the material facts connected with the transaction to which it
relates; and especially must it appear that the existence of the con
tract and its nature and consideration were made known to him.”
Mechcm on Agency, § 129. “A ratiﬁcation of the unauthorized acts
of an attorney in fact, without a full knowledge of all the facts con
N0 doctrine
nected with those acts, is not binding on the principals.
is better settled on principle and authority, than this, that the ratiﬁca
tion of the act of an agent previously unauthorized must, in order
to bind the principal, be with a full knowledge of all the material
facts. If the material facts be either suppressed or unknown, the rat
iﬁcation is invalid, because founded on mistake or fraud.” Owings
1
v. Hull, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 607, 9 L. Ed. 246.
Want of such knowledge prevents the possibility of ratiﬁcation by
silence, and it invalidates an express ratiﬁcation, as will be clearly
disclosed by an examination of the following decisions:
Bosseau v.
O’Brien, 4 Biss. 395, Fed. Cas. N0. 1.667; Fuller v. Ellis. 39 Vt.
345, 94 Am. Dec. 327'; Meyer, Vyeis 8: Co. v. Baldwin, 52 Miss. 263;
Forrestier v. Bordman, 1 Story, 43, Fed. Cas. No. 4,945; Bank v.
Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.) 526, 26 Am. Rep. 211; Craighead v. Peterson,
72 N. Y. 279, Z8 Am. Rep. 150; Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84
Am. Dec. 611; Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U. S. 355, 26 L. Ed.
990; Lynch v. Smyth, 25 Colo. 103, 54 Pac. 634; Smith v. Kidd, 68
N. Y. 130, 23 Am. Rep. 157; Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 69,
7 L. Ed. 606; -¥Vard v. \¢Villiams, 26 Ill. 447, 79 Am. Dec. 385; Nav
igation Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill & ]. (Md.) 248. 29 Am. Dec. 543;
Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) 495; Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. 811;
White v. Davidson, 8 Md. 169, 63 Am. Dec. 699; Bannon v. \Varﬁeld,
42 Md. 23; Bohart v. Oberne, 36 Kan. 284, 13 Pac. 388; Bryant v.
Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96; McCants v. Bee, 1 McCord, Eq.
(S. C.) 383, 16 Am. Dec. 610; Billings v. Morrow, 7 Cal. 171, 68 Am.
Dec. 235.
4'1 As to whether the principal must know the legal effects of the facts, see
Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563. 23 N. E. 891 (1890); Kelley v. Newburyport
& A. H. R. C0., 141 Mass. 496, 6 N. E. 745 (1886): Pope v. Armsby C0., 111
Cal. 159, 43 Pac. 589 (1896).
.
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From the review of the evidence herein given and conclusions stated
respecting the same, it is plain that full knowledge of the material
facts relating to the transaction between Murphy and Thompson is
not shown to have been in the possession of the defendant corporation
at any time before the institution of this action. Mr. Thompson does
not testify to any statement, on his part, to the general manager or
Mr. Getty, as to what the consideration of the note was. Nor is
there anything in"the testimony of ]'ohn F. Thompson or George B.
Thompson, tending to show that they revealed to any director the cir
cumstances which constituted the ground for executing the note. No
notice was given of the satisfactionof the Blackwater Lumber Com
pany account out of the note, or that the residue of it was represented
Nothing in the evidence shows
by a check payable to the corporation.
that any record in the bank in which the corporation kept its deposits,
or on the books of the corporation itself, discloses the receipt of the
to the use of the defendant company.
money,’ or its appropriation
This failure to bring home to the defendant knowledge of the mate
rial facts, in connection with its silence, makes a fatal defect in the
case, and, therefore, the court should have sustained the demurrer to
* * '*
the evidence.
As the demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, and
no error has been shown in the action of the court in excluding evi
dence offered, the judgment must be reversed, the demurrer sustained,
and judgment rendered here for the defendant, with its costs in the
court below, as well as costs in this court.
\

EHRMANTRAUT
(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

v.
1893.

ROBINSON
52

Minn.

et al.

333, 54 N. W. 188.)

Appeal from an order, denying motion of defendants for a new trial.
M1'rcH1~:LL, J. This action was brought on the covenants of a lease
to recover rent for the last eight months of the term, viz. from Sep
tember 1, 1890, to May 1, 1891. The evidence discloses the following
facts: Nora Grove No. 23, U. A. O. D., of which the defendants were
members, was an unincorporated association or society of individuals,
formed for social and benevolent purposes, and not for gain or pecun
Among other oﬁicers, they had three trustees, of whom
iary proﬁt.
defendants Robinson 8: Larson were _two. The scope and extent of
the powers and duties of these trustees was to take charge of the prop
In May, 1886, Robinson & Larson, without
erty of the association.
authority, so far as appears, from their associates, procured from plain
tiff the lease referred to, of the upper story of a certain building, for
the term of ﬁve years, at an annual rent of $300, payable $25 monthly
in advance. The lease runs to them as trustees of the association, and
there is and can be no question but that in taking the lease these trus
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assumed to act for and in behalf of the society. In Iuly, 1886,
the members of the association, including the defendants, entered into
possession of the premises, and continued to hold their meetings there
until some time in the fall of 1890, when the society disbanded. While
the society occupied the premises, they paid rent therefor, $25 per
month, up to September 1, 1890. The lease was never reported to or
acted on by the society at any of its meetings, and it may also be as
sumed that neither Hervin nor VVilson ever knew what the terms of
the lease were, and that Hervin, perhaps, did not even know that there
was any written lease.
But there is abundant evidence to show that
both of them knew that some agreement had been made in behalf of
the association, with plaintiff, for the use of the premises, and that
without inquiring, or in any way attempting to inform themselves, as
to what the terms of that agreement were, they, in common with their
associates, went into possession and continued to use and occupy the
premises for the purposes of their society until they disbanded.
It seems to us that neither of the counsel has fully grasped the legal
principles applicable to this state of facts. Of course, a benevolent or
social club or association of this’lcind is not a partnership, in any prop
er sense of that term. The members are liable, if liable at all, for the
acts of their associates, on the ground of principal and agent, and not
of partnership. Hence, it is undoubtedly true that only those members
who authorized or subsequently ratiﬁed the act of these trustees in
taking this lease would be bound by it. Bates, Partn. § 75; Lindl.
Partn. 50; Story, Partn. § 144; Flemyng v. Hector, 2 Mees. & \V. 172;
Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. 493, 39 Am. Rep. 818. But it is true that all the
members who subsequently ratiﬁed the act are liable, and in our opin
ion the act of Hervin and Wilson amounted to a ratiﬁcation.
It is sometimes said that, to constitute a ratiﬁcation of an unauthor
ized act of an agent, the principal must have had knowledge of all the
material facts. As to a past and completed transaction, this would be
generally true, but there are many eases where the conduct of the prin
cipal may amount to a ratiﬁcation, although he may not know all the
He may
facts as to the unauthorized act of the agent in his behalf.
ratify by voluntarily assuming the risk without inquiry, or he may de
liberately ratify upon such knowledge as he possesses, without caring
for more. Lewis v. Read, 13 Mees. & \-V. 834; Kelley v. Railroad Co.,
141 Mass. 496, 6 N. E. 745.“
Where, as in the present case, the defendants Hervin and \Vilson had
notice that an unauthorized contract had been made in their behalf for
the use of these premises, it was their duty, before accepting its bene
ﬁts, to ascertain what the terms of that contract were. By going into
tees

48 To hold one responsible for a tort not committed by his orders, his adop
tion of and assent to the same must at all events be clear and explicit, and
founded on a clear knowledge of the tort which has been committed.
Adams
v. Freeman, 9 Johns. 117; West v. Shockley, 4 Har. 287; Kreger v. Osborn,
7 Blaekf. 74; Abbott v. Kimball, 19 Vt. 551 [47 Am. Dec. 708].
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possession, and enjoying the use of the premises, without any attempt
to ascertain the terms of the lease under which they entered, they must
be held to have d/e_lie_rately_ intended to take the risk of ratifying upon
O
such knowledge as they had.“
2. The statute of frauds, which defendants invoke, has no applica
tion to the case.
Of course, to bind the plaintiff, the lessor, it was
necessary that the lease should be in writing, and subscribed by him.
But a lessee neither “creates, grants, nor declares” any estate or in
terest in lands. By accepting a lease, he is bound by all its covenants
to be by him_ performed, and this acceptance need not be in writing.
The authority of an agent to procure or accept it for him is not re
quired to be in writing, and, as original authorization may be by iparol,
so may ratiﬁcation.
Order affirmed.

RUDASILL

v.

FALLS.

(Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1855.

‘

92 N. C. 222.)

Plaintiff, defendant,

and one Green became sureties on_a notc for
given by the ﬁrm of jenkins, Homesley & Oates to A. V. Falls.
Green and Jenkins became insolvent and Oates died. Homesley wished
to keep the factory running to protect the sureties.
Defendant got a
bill of sale of $2,000 of property, which plaintiﬁ" claimed was in behalf
of the sureties, and to protect them and enable Homesley to continue
to run the factory.
Defendant denied that he had ever come into
possession of any property for such purpose, or that plaintiff had
Action to recover from defendant the
agreed to the arrangement.
moiety, paid by plaintiff, on the allegation that the defendant received
from their principals property sufﬁcient in value to discharge the entire
debt.
The court instructed the jury to ﬁnd for plaintiff if they believed
for defendant if they believed his. Iudgment for
his testimony;
plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
I
SMITH,‘ C. ].“° * * * The instruction in this alternative form
But there is an intermediate
is unexceptionable as far as it goes.
aspect of the case presented in the testimony, and perhaps warranted
which was not brought to the attention of the jury. The result
by
does not necessarily depend upon the terms of the ﬁrst arrangement,
nor the extent of the authority conferred upon the defendant, as agent
of his associate sureties.
Assuming the plaintiff’s representation to be true and his memory
of what occurred entirely accurate, his statement
not in accord with
the understanding of Homesley, who made the proposal, and the lat

is

it,

$1,600,

1

5

49 But cf. Walker v. Walker,
Heisk. 425 (1871), and Stokes v. Mackey,
Hun, 639, 19 N. Y. Supp. 918 (1892).
5° Part 01 the opinion is omitted.
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the assignment at all, except upon the

If then, the
the factory operations.
defendant could not effect the object of the agency under the pre
scribed limitations and exceeded them in what was done, the plaintiff
had an election to ratify or repudiate what was done on behalf of all.
This he was bound to do, and he could not sever parts of a single agree
ment embraced and expressed in the two writings, so as to take advan
t§g\e' of that which was favorable without the whole being assumed.
The agency being exceeded, he was not bound by what the agent did
in the name _and for the common beneﬁt, but he was bound to take the
arrangement in its entirety or not to recognize its obligations at all.
“The principal cannot of his own mere authority ratify a transac—
tion in part and repudiate as to the rest,” is the language of Mr. Jus
tice Story in section 250 of his work on Agency.
“He must either
‘
'
adopt the whole or none.”“
Another recent author lays down the same doctrine thus: “A nulli
ﬁcation must extend to the whole of a transaction.”
So well established
is this principle, that if a party is treated as an agent in respect to one
part of a transaction, the whole is thereby ratiﬁed. From this maxim
results a rule of universal application that where a contract has been
entered into by one man as agent of another, the person on whose behalf
it has been made “cannot take the beneﬁt of it without bearing its
The contract must be performed in its integrity.”
burdens.
Ewell's
Evans’ Agency, 7O (Ed. of 1879, p. 95).
The rule rests upon sound reason and abundant authority.
Craw
ford v. Barkley, 18 Ala. 270; Hodnett v. Tatum, 9 Ga. 270; Bank v.
I-Ianner, 14 Mich. 208; Coleman v. Stark, 1 Or. 115.
The record, and these instructions asked, present this view of the
case, and the defendant had a right to have them, or their equivalent.
given for the guidance of the jury. The judge was mistaken in his
hurried reading of the series of instructions asked, in supposing they
were embodied in his charge.
Had they been given the result might have been different, but at least
the charge ought to have presented the case in this aspect to the con
sideration of the jury, and there is error in his mistake to do so.
2-

a=

#

For error

in the record a new trial was ordered.

51Mund0rff v. Wlekershnm,
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NYE
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

(Part.

1

S\VAN.

1892.

49

Minn.

431, 52

N. W.

39.)

MITCHELL, J.“ Thiswvas an action to have deed from plaintiff to
defendants, in form an absolute conveyance, declared a mortgage, and,
as such, adjudged usurious and void, or, if the court should ﬁnd it
not void, that the plaintiff be allowed to redeem by paying the de
fendants the amount which the court should ﬁnd due thereon. In their
answer the defendants stood upon the ground that the deed was in
fact, as it was in form, an absolute conveyance. The facts, as found
by the court and jury, were as follows:
That in November, 1886,‘ the plaintiﬂf was the owner of the land
in question; that at that time one VVhite was the agent of the defend
ants for the purpose of purchasing lands for them, and for no other
purpose, and was furnished by them with money to pay for such lands
as he might buy; that, assuming to act as the agent of defendants,
he loaned $800 of this money to plaintiﬁ’ under an agreement that it
should be repaid within 100 days, with an additional $100 for the
use of the $800 for that period of time, and at the same time as se
curity for the loan took from plaintiff, and plaintiff executed, the deed
in question to defendants, the consideration named in the instrument
This deed (was executed, not as an absolute sale and
being $1,000.
conveyance, but merely as security. VVhite had no authority from de
In the spring of 1887,
fendants to lend money for them to any one.
defendants, having been informed that plaintiff claimed that the deed
‘was given merely as a mortgage, inquired of VVhite as to the facts,
and were informed by him that plaintiff's claim was false; that he had
made an absolute purchase of the land from him, and had never loaned
him any money or taken the deed as a mortgage. Defendants, relying
on \Vhite’s statements, and believing them true, have always claimed
that the deed was an absolute conveyance, and treated it as such,
claiming that they were the owners of the land.
The court also found that VVhite charged defendants $1,000 as the
purchase price of the land, and that “the defendants allowed and paid
the same to \-Vhite before they, or either of them, had any notice or
knowledge that the plaintiff made any claim that the deed was given
This ﬁnding is probably not im
as a mortgage or to secure a loan."
portant, but the part of it quoted is unsupported by any evidence.
There is the bare statement of one of the defendants that they paid
$1,000 for the land, but not a particle of evidence as to when or how
it was paid. So far as appears, White is still their agent, and his ac
count as such unclosed, and, for anything that appears, the “payment”
referred to might have been a mere matter of bookkeeping by White’s
charging defendants and crediting himself with $1,000.
52
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Aside from this, we think that the ﬁndings were justiﬁed by the
The only one, the correctness of which defendants’ counsel

evidence.

disputes, is the one to the effect that the deed was executed
for a loan of money, and not as an absolute sale and con
veyance of the land; and this contention, as we understand him, he
makes, not upon the ground that the evidence was insufﬁcient to justify
a ﬁnding that the actual agreement between \Vhite and plaintiff was
that the deed was to be merely security for the loan, but that inasmuch
as \\’hite had no authority to make loans and take mortgages for de
fendants, but had authority to buy lands, and pay for them, and take
absolute conveyances, therefore the deed was an absolute sale and
conveyance of the land by plaintiff to defendants, and that the defend
ants have a right to retain and hold it as such. It would seem that to
state such a proposition is to refute it. Plainly stated, it is that if an
agent, intrusted with money to buy land for his principal, should, with
out authority, lend the money and take a mortgage as security, the
principal would have a right to change it into such a contract as the
agent was authorized to make, and hold it as an absolute conveyance
of the land, although the other party never made any such contract.”
The only legal principle which counsel invokes in support of his
the elementary one that
person who deals with an
contention
bound to inquire as to the nature and extent of his authority,
agent
only bound by the acts of the agent which
and that the principal
his
of
authority,—a rule the correctness of which
the
within
are
scope
no one will dispute, but which counsel has in this case wholly mis
He has overlooked the equally elementary rule that, where
applied.
an agent has entered into an unauthorized contract in behalf of his
and repudiate the re
part of
principal, the latter cannot ratify
fortiori,
he
mainder, but must either adopt the whole or none, and,
he must adopt
as made, and not as something entirely dif
adopts
There may be cases where the transaction includes several
ferent.
which
are severable and independent of each other, some of
things
which are within and some beyond the authority of the agent, where
the principal has the right to adopt the former and repudiate the latter.
mortgage to
But in this case the transaction was an entirety, viz.,
loan, and the defendants must either adopt
as
mortgage
secure
seriously

or repudiate

it

if

a

a

it

a

it

it,

a

a

it,

is

is

a

_is

as security

entirely.

ratiﬁcation the principal takes the contract as it was made, not as
might have been or ought to have been made. Drennan’s Adm'r v. Walker,
21 Ark. 5'39 (1860); Johnson v. Hoover, 72 Ind. 395 (1880).
See. also, Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42, 17 Atl. 278, 14 Am. St. Rep.
88 (1889); Id.. 59 Conn. 588, 22 Atl. 437 (1890); Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich.
519,
N. V7. 225, 38 Am, Rep. 278 (1880); Henderhen v. Cook, 66 Barb. 21
Pick.) 495 (1826); Gould v.
(1866). But cf. Peters v. Baliistier, 20 Mass.
Blodgett, 61 N. H. 115 (1881).
right to make is not a
Enforcing
contract of loan which an agent had
ratiﬁcation of his unlawful and unauthorized exaetion of usury in making the
loan. Estevez v. Purdy, 66 N. Y. 446 (1876). See, also, Bank of St. Mary’s v.
Calder,
Strob. 403 (1849).
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The fact that the instrument was in form a deed of conveyance,
such as White was authorized to take in the purchase of land, is
wholly immaterial, at least in the absence of facts which would equi
tably estop plaintiff from denying that it was an absolute conveyance.
No such state of facts exists here. It follows that the only rights, if
any, which defendants have under the deed are those of mortgagees.
2. The plaintiff, however, claims that the defendants take it with the
taint of usury; that they have ratiﬁed the act of W'hite in exacting
usury, by omitting to disavow the contract within a reasonable time
after notice of p1aintiﬁ”s claim, and by retaining the contract, and
claiming title to the land under it. But they never recognized it as a
mortgage, never treated the transaction as a loan, and have never re
ceived'or claimed any usurious interest under it; but, on the contrary,
have always believed and insisted that it was an absolute sale and
coﬂveyance of the land as it appeared on its face to be, and as their
agent asserted that it was.
VVe fail to see wherein they have ratiﬁed the act of \/Vhite in bar
gaining for a usurious rate of interest, or why, having failed in main
taining their claim that the deed was an absolute one, they are not
entitled to have it stand as security for the amount of their funds ac
Had they placed the money in \Vh_ite’s hands,
tually loaned by \Nhite.
to be loaned at a legal rate of interest, and he had, without their au
thority or knowledge, exacted and included usurious interest, they
could have enforced the mortgage for the amount actually loaned, and
lawful interest, and an attempt to do so would not have amounted to
a ratiﬁcation of the act of the agent in exacting usury.
Iordan v.
So here while, as the deed
Humphrey, 31 Minn. 495, 18 N. \/V. 450.
was executed as a mortgage, the defendants must adopt
at all,
as
as
mortgage, yet their doing so, and availing themselves of
security for the amount actually loaned, will not, of itself, amount
to
ratiﬁcation of the act of \'Vhite in exacting usury.
Because the court below refused to permit plaintiﬁ' to redeem and
have
reconveyance upon payment of the loan, with interest, the
cause was remanded, with directions
to modify the judgment in
accordance with this opinion, allowing the plaintiff to redeem within
such reasonable time as the court may ﬁx, and, upon his failure
do so
within that time, that he be barred of all equity in the premises, and
that the present deed stand and operate as an absolute conveyance.
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HENRY.

Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

1859. 172 Muss. 559, 52 N.

E.

1078.)

Action on contract to recover damages for refusal to deliver about
25.000 pounds of eon-l», alleged to have been sold to plaintiffs by a
broker.
The latter gave a “bought note.” which defendants rejected.
Defendants except to verdict for plaintiffs.
K.\'owL'roN, J. It appeared upon the undisputed evidence that the
b‘r_oker inserted in the written memorandum of sale certain ptgvisions
which were not expressly authorized by the defendants.
The jury
found that there was no custom under which he could bind the de
fendants by these agreements. He was not the defendants’ general
agent, and the terms of his authority to make a sale could be inquired
into.
He could bind the defendants only by such contract as they
authorized him to make. Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray, 436; Rem
ick v. Sandford, 118 Mass. 102.
Under the instructions of the court, and the ﬁnding above stated,
the verdict for the plaintiffs must rest on a ﬁnding that the defend
ants ratiﬁed the broker’s contract.
The jury were allowed to ﬁnd
ratiﬁcation on the ground that the plaintiffs were right, and the de
fendants wrong, in regard to the defendants’ contention that the broker
was not authorized to sell the wool at the price named in the contract;
it appearing that the defendants stated, as their reason for repudiating
the contract, that the broker had no authority to sell the wool at that
price, and failed to make any objection to the provisions of the con
tract about credit, and the allowance of interest, unexpired storage,
These latter provisions were inserted in the con
and ﬁre insurance.
There was no evidence that the
tract by the agent without authority.
situation of the plaintiffs was changed, or that their rights were in any
way affected by reason of the form of the defendants’ objection and
disavowal.
\Vhere something is to be done by one of two parties as a condition
precedent to his exercise of a right against the other, the other may
waive theperformance, either wholly or in part. If there is an attempt
at performance, which falls short of the requirement, and if objection
is made by the party for whom it is done, with a statement of the
grounds of his objection, the objector often is held to have waived his
right afterwards to object, on other grounds,-when the other has gone
forward, relying upon the implied representation that the performance
Clark v. Insurance Co., 6 Cush.
is satisfactory in other particulars.
44;
Searle v. Insurance Co., 152 Mass. 263, 25 N.
342, 53 Am. Dec.
E. 290; Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass. 187, 19 Am. Rep. 332; Insur
ance C0. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234, 24 L. Ed. 689; Titus v. Insurance
Co., 81 N. Y. 410. These cases rest upon the ground that, when one
is stating objections, a failure to disclose a ground of objection, in a
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particular which easily could be remedied, tends to mislead the other
party to his detriment, and is so ,contrary to justice and good morals as
to work an estoppel against doing it afterwards.
No such principle is applicable to the present case. \/Ve have an
unauthorized contract made by an agent.
The plaintiffs had no rights
under it immediately after it was made.
They have no rights under
it now, unless the defendants ratiﬁed it. “Ratiﬁcation of_ a past and
completed transaction, into which an agent has entered without au
No
thority, is a purely voluntary act on the part ofthe principal.
legal obligation rests upon him to sanction or adopt it.” Combs v.
Scott, 12 Allen, 493; Bank v. Crafts, 2 Allen, 269.
If, however, one
is acting in the execution of a general power, but in a mode not sanc
tioned by its terms, and if any beneﬁt comes to the principal from the
act, ratiﬁcation may be implied pretty quickly from lapse of time with
Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. 167.
knowledge of the circumstances.
The evidence is undisputed that, within a reasonable time after being
informed of the contract, the defendants in the present case repudiated
it. The naked question is presented whether, if a principal, on learning
of an unauthorized contract of an agent, repudiates
reason
giving
for so doing which proves to be without foundation, such repudiation
equivalent to an adoption of it. In the absence of anything beyond
not. Ordinar_ily,
this to work an estoppel, we are of opinion that
ratiﬁcation of an agent’s act
mere matter of intention.“ In the
present case, the defendants, as soon as the facts were ascertained,
manifested in the clearest manner their intention not to ratify, and their
subsequent conduct has all been consistent with their original repudia
in part, and
tion of the attempted sale.
They could not repudiate
in part.
Am.
adopt
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1192, and cases cited.
There
class of ‘cases in which the principal receives
direct
held that,
beneﬁt from an act of an agent, and
he retains this
beneﬁt for
considerable time after he obtains full knowledge of the
transaction, he thereby ratiﬁes the act.
Brigham v. Peters,
Gray,
139; Sartwell v. Frost, 122 Mass. 184; Coolidge v. Smith, 129 Mass.
an element of estoppel which does not exist
Here, too, there
554.
in the case at bar. One cannot have the beneﬁt of an unauthorized
act of an agent without conﬁrming it. Ordinarily,
not
principal
called upon to give reasons for declining to be bound
an act under
taken without authority.
The controlling reason
that
was unau
The particulars in which
lacks authority, usually, are of
thorized.
If the other party relies upon
no importance.
he has the burden

it

“In Smith v. Fletcher, 75 Minn. 189, 77 N. W. 800 (1899), it was said by
Mitchell, J.: “Ratiﬁcation, like authorization,
is generally the creature of
intent; but that intent may ‘often be presumed by the law from the conduct
of the party and that presumption may be conclusive, even against the actual
intention of the party, where his conduct has been such that
would be in
equitable to others to permit him to assert that he had not ratiﬁed the un
authorized act of his agent."
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the principal insists that it is unauthorized,
showing ratiﬁcation.
and does nothing and says nothing which warrants the other party in
treating it as ratiﬁed, the mere fact that he is incorrect in his statement
of the particulars of the want of authority does not change his repudia
tion of the act into an adoption of it.
We are of opinion that the instructions in regard to ratiﬁcation were
erroneous, and that the jury should have been instructed that there
was no evidence that the defendants ratiﬁed the contract declared on.
See Price v. Moore, 158 Mass 524, 33 N. E. 927. Exceptions sustained.

IV. Mmusn or RATIFICATION
ZOTTMAN
(Supreme

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO.

Court of California,

1862.

20

Cal.

96.

81

Am.

Dee.

96.)

Action to recover for extra services performed by plaintiff in mak
A contract
ing improvements on a certain square in San Francisco.
was made by the common council, but afterwards the special corn
mittee and superintendent appointed by the council concluded that a
stone base for an iron fence should be substituted for the wooden
one, contracted for, and that the fence should be painted. According
ly in the presence of the other city officers they ordered the contractor
to perform this extra work, and assured him the city would pay. Dur
ing the progress of the work all the members of the common council
were aware of the order and of the extra work done, but the bill was
never paid. The city charterprovided for action by the council by
“All contracts
aye, and nay vote, with publication in a city ‘paper.
for work" were to be let to the lowest bidder after public notice. From
judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
* * * A contract made
FIELD, C. J.“ [after stating the factsz]
in disregard of these stringent b’ut wise provisions cannot be the ground
of any claim against the city.
Individual members of the common
council were not invested by the charter with any power to improve
the city property, and any directions given or contracts made by them
upon the subject, had the same and no greater validity than like direc
tions given and like contracts made by any other residents of the city
assuming to act for the -corporation. And if individual members could
not thus make any valid contract originally, they could not by any
But
subsequent approval or conduct impart validity to such contract.
we go further than this; the common council even could not by any
The mode in
subsequent action give validity to a contract thus made.
which alone they could bind the corporation by a contract for the im
provement of city property was prescribed-by the charter, and no valid
ity could be given by them to a contract made in any other manner.
55
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The rule is general and applies to the corporate authorities of all
municipal bodies; where the mode in which their power on any given
subject can be exercised is prescribed by their charter, the mode must
be followed.
The mode in such cases constitutes the measure of the
Thus, where authority is conferred to sell property, with a
power.
clause that the sale shall be made at public auction, the mode prescribed
is essential t_o the validity of the sale; indeed there is no power to sell in
any other way. Aside from the mode designated there is a want of all
power on the subject. This is too obvious to require argument, and so
are all the adjudications.
Thus in Head v. Providence Insurance Com
pany, 2 Cranch, 156, 2 L. Ed. 229, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in
speaking of bodies which have only a legal existence, says: “The act
of incorporation is to them an enabling act; it gives them all the power
they possess; it enables them to -contract, and when it prescribes to
them a mode of contracting, they must observe the mode, or the in
strument no more creates a contract than if the body had never been
See McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 619;
incorporated.”
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Carroll, 5 Barb. 649; New York Fire
Insurance Co. v. Ely, 5 Conn. 568, 13 Am. Dec. 100.
As a necessary consequence ﬂowing from these views, a contract not
made in the prescribed mode, -cannot be afﬁrmed and ratiﬁed in disre
gard of that mode by any subsequent action of the corporate author
ities, and a liability be thereby fastened upon the corporation.
Ratiﬁca
tion is equivalent to a previous authority; it operates upon the contract
in the same manner as though the authority to make the contract had
The power to ratify, therefore, necessarily sup
existed originally.
poses the power to make the contract in the ﬁrst instance; and a pow
er to, ratify in a given mode ‘supposes the power to contract in the
same way. Therefore, where the charter of a city authorizes a sale of
city property only at public auction, a sale not thus made is from its
very nature incapable of ratiﬁcation, because it could not. have been
So where the charter authorizes a con
otherwise made originally.
tract for work to be given only to the lowest bidder, after notice of the
contemplated work in the public journals, a contract made in any
other way-—that is, given to any other person than such lowest bidder
——cannot be subsequently affirmed. VV ere this not so, the corporate au
thorities would be able to do retroactively what they are prohibited
from doing originally.
VVe had oocasion, in the case of McCracken v. City of San Francisco,
to give to this subject great consideration, and we there held that
where authority to do a"particu1ar act can only be exercised in a par
ticular form or mode, the ratiﬁcation must follow such form or mode,
and that a ratiﬁcation can only be made when the principal possesses
at the time the power to do the act ratiﬁed.
The doctrines there laid
down we regard of vital importance for the protection of the interests
of municipal corporations, and without an adherence to them, restric
tions such as were embodied in the charter of San F.rancisco—or at
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present are embodied in the consolidation act—upon the corporate au
thorities, may be practically disregarded and defeated.
Since that
decision was rendered, we have had our attention called to the case of
Brady v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 16 How. Prac. 432, where these
doctrines are afﬁrmed in an opinion of great force, and applied to an
alleged contract for work done upon a street in the city of New York.
The alleged contract in that case was made by the street commission
er on behalf of the city, and was for the performance of work upon
the street in accordance with certain speciﬁcations, the stipulated price
to be paid upon the conﬁrmation of an assessment for the work by the
common council.
The work was performed in accordance with the
provisions of the contract, and seventy per cent. of the contract price
was paid. and an assessment for the entire price was made for the
work and conﬁrmed. The amendment of 1853 to the charter of that
city requires that “all work to be done and all supplies to be furnish
ed for the corporation, involving an expenditure of more than $250,
shall be by contract founded on sealed bids or on proposals made in
compliance with public notice for the full period of ten days; and
all such contracts, when given, shall be given to the lowest bidder with
In consequence of the manner in which the bids,
adequate security.”
made upon the proposals for the work, were tested, the lowest bidder
could not be ascertained; it was therefore held that the contract was
The question was then raised whether, under the
illegal and void.
circumstances, the defendants were liable for the work "done.
And
this question was discussed by the court in two aspocts—whether they
were liable to the plaintiff as upon a quantum meruit, because the
work had been performed and accepted: and whether the common
council had the power to waive the original defect in the plaintiﬁ’s
claim, and by their action aﬁirm his title to recover, so as to give him
a right of action, notwithstanding the requirements of the charter had
not been complied with.
It is under similar aspects that the question of the liability of the
“The corpo
city of San Francisco presents itself in the present case.
ration,” said the court, “can only act through its chosen ofﬁcers and
agents. If they not only may pay for work and labor actually done
without a compliance with the statute requisites, but are legally bound
to such payment, then no contract is necessary, and the restrictions
in the statute are a dead letter. If they may dispense with a contract,
then and then only can they conﬁrm an illegal and void contract, and
then also by any acceptance of the work and a conﬁrmation of the
contract by resolution, they repeal the statute pro hac vice. The rela
tion which the corporation and its oﬂicers bear to the subject, the duties
they owe to the public and those upon whom the burden is to fall, and
the nature of the powers they possess, forbid us to concede any such
force to their acts.
By the charter the power is limited and it is a
familiar rule that corporations can only bind themselves by contracts
It may sometimes
they are expressly or impliedly authorized to make.
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for work done,
should be denied him; but it should be remembered that he, no
less than the ofﬁcers of the corporation, when he deals in a matter ex
pressly provided for in the charter, is bound to see to it that the char
ter is complied with.
If he neglect this, or choose to take the hazard,
he is a mere volunteer, and suffers only what he ought to have antici
pated. If the statute forbids the contra-ct which he has made, he knows
before he places his money or services at hazard.
or ought to know
The analogy drawn from the obligation of an individual to pay for
work which he accepts, although there has been no previous contract
Here,
for its performance, wholly fails to reach the present case.
neither the ofﬁcers of the corporation nor the corporation, by any of the
agencies through which they act, have any power to create the obliga
tion to pay for the work, except in the mode which
expressly pre
scribed in the charter; and the law never implies an obligation to do
forbids the party to agree to do. And for the like reason
that which
the defendants cannot be treated as ratifying the unauthorized acts of
The difﬁculty lies not merely in the want of original power
its agents.
in the agents to make the contract, but in the want of power in the cor
poration itself to make the contract otherwise than in the mode pre
scribed by the charter. An individual having ‘power to make
contract
when made by one who without authority as
may ratify or afﬁrm
the individual have himself no such power,
sumes to be his agent, but
he can no more bind himself retroactively to its performance by affirm
ance or ratiﬁcation than he could have done so prospectively in the ﬁrst
instance. The power to ratify ex vi termini implies
power to have
made the contract, and the power to ratify in
particular nlode implies
the power to have made the contract in that manner." 5°
Judgment afﬁrmed.
seem a hardship upon a contractor that all compensation

.

JUDD

v.

Court of Minnesota,

Appeal by defendants from

*

-iii

a

(Supreme

*

*

a

a

if

it,

a

it

is

it,

it,

etc.,

ARNOLD.

1884.

31

Minn.

430,

18

N. W.

judgment for restitution in

for unlawful detainer.
GILFILLAN, C. J.”

151.)

an action

*

1,

a

5,

It

Action under chapter 84, Gen. St. 1878, to re
cover rented premises detained after the expiration of the term.
appears that ‘plaintiff rented the premises to defendant Arnold for
1883, he, as
one year, terminating April 30, 1883; and February
suming to act as plaintiif’s agent, executed in her name to defendants
Tibbitts and Myers written lease of the premises; the term as to part
1883, and to continue as to all till one
of them to commence May
Arnold had no authority in writing to rent
year from the last date.
opinion of Cope, .T.; is omitted.
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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the premises.

The lease stipulated for a gross monthly rental for the
rooms.
It was therefore an entire and not a severable lease, and for
a term exceeding one year. By the terms of the statute it was requir
ed to be in writing, and, being executed by an agent, his authority to
execute it was required to be in writing.
“No estate or interest in
lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, * * *
shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared,
unless by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing,
subscribed by the parties creating, granting, assigning, surrendering,
or declaring the same, or by their lawful agent thereunto authorized,
Section 10, c. 41, Gen. St. 1878. Our statute of frauds
b_y_zt>(‘i1i3ig._”
is peculiar, among other things, in this: that while, by section 10,
authority in an agent to execute an instrument creating or conveying
the estate must be in writing, by section 12 his authority to make an
Minor
executory contract to create or convey it need not be in writing.
'
v. Vi/illoughby, 3 Minn. 225 (Gil. 154).
A rgtiﬁcation by the principal of the not properly authorized act
of the agent mqst be by an act of the character‘ required for original
agorityffa Where that must be in \vriting, the ratiﬁcation must also
Browne, St. Frauds, § 17; Fitch, Real Est. Ag. S7;
be in writing.
McDowell v. Simpson, 3 VVatts, 129, 27 Am. Dec. 338; Lawrence v.
Taylor, 5 Hill, 113; Ingraham v. Edwards, 64 Ill. 526; Holland v.
Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238. To permit an oral ratiﬁcation would, in many
The evi
cases, let in the very evils which the statute aims to exclude.
dence of oral ratiﬁcation by plaintiff of the lease executed by Arnold
was therefore of no effect. Of course, a principal may, by his acts
or declarations, lay the basis for an estoppel as to the due authority
But, in a case like this, to make the assent
of the assumed agent.
and acquiescence of the principal, and acts of the lessees in reliance
thereon, operate as an estoppel as to the authority of the assumed
agent to execute the lease, it is essential that she should have known
what sort of lease the agent had assumed to execute in her name.
The
lessees must be supposed to have known the law——that written au
thority in the agent was required to execute such a lease. And before
they could rightfully rely and act on her assent to and acquiescence
in a lease as evidence that she had authorized it in writing, they should
have been sure that she was informed of the character of lease the
The only evidence as to her informa
agent had assumed to execute.
tion on the point was that defendant Arnold testiﬁed he told her he had
agreed to rent the rooms to the other defendants for a year from May
1, 1883, and defendant Tibbitts testiﬁed he told her he and Myers
"See, also, Marqusee v. Ins. Co. or North America, 211 Fed. 903, 128 C. C.
A. 281 (1914); Johnson v. Feeht, 185 Mo. 335, 345, 83 S. W. 1077 (1904), citing
Hawkins v. McGroarty, 110 Mo. 546, 19 S. W. S80 (1892), and Despatch Line
01' Packets v. Bellamy Mfg. 00., 12 N. H. 205. 2-"$0-25-I2,37 Am. Dec. 203 (18-11),
a leading ease.
The effect of a statute prescribing the mode of ratiﬁcation is
discussed in Morris v. Ewing, 8 N. D. 99, 76 N. W. 1047 (1898).
See Acuna V.
Iloilo, 2 P. I. 217 (1903).
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This was not
had a lease- for one year, to commence May 1, 1883.
such a lease as was in fact executed. The information thus given was
not sufficient as a basis for an estoppel as to the lease in question.
'3 *
*
judgment affirmed.

HEATH

.

(Supreme

Judicial

v.

NUTTER.

Court of Maine,

1862.

50 Me.

378.)

Writ of entry. Both parties claim under Charles D. Robbins, Heath
under his quitclaim deed, dated February 17, 1858, Nutter under deed
Nutter of
of Robbins, by Rich, his attorney, dated May 3, 1854.
fered to prove by Robbins that Rich was his agent under power of
attorney, given him to enable him to make the deed; that Robbins
told Heath he had nothing to quitclaim, but was induced by Heath
to believe there would be no impropriety in giving said quitclaim deed;
that he had by letter and verbally ratiﬁed the act of Rich. The judge
ruled that the power of attorney was not sufficient to authorize the
deed by Rich, and excluded the evidence offered.
APPLETON, C. J. The power of attorney to Rich did not empower
him to convey the demanded premises to the inhabitants of Tremont.
The authority “to grant any and all discharges by deed or otherwise,
both personal and real,” as fully as the principal might do, cannot be
fairly construed as enabling the agent to convey by bill of sale. or by
all the personal and real estate of his principal.
deed of warranty,
Nor can the authority to -convey by deed be found elsewhere.
_
\Vhenever any act of agency is required to be done in the,name
of the principal under seal, the authority to do the act must be con
A power to convey_ lands must
ferred by an instrument under seal.
possess the same requisites and observe the same solemnities as are
Gage v. Gage, 30
necessary in a deedpdirectly conveying the land.
N. Ti. 424; Story on Agency, §§ 49, SO; Montgomery v. Dorion, 6 N.
H. 250. So the ratiﬁcation of an unauthorized conveyance by deed
A
Story on Agency, § 252.
must be by an instrument under seal.
parol ratiﬁcation is not sufficient. Stetson v. Patten, 2 Greenl. 359, 11
Am. Doc. 111; Paine v. Tucker, 21 Me. 138, 38 Am. Dec. 255; Han
ford v. McNair, 9 W'end. 54; Despatch Line Co. v. Bellamy Mfg. Co.,
12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203.
The plaintiff received his conveyance with a full knowledge of the
The remedial processes of a. court
equitable rights of the tenants.
of equity may perhaps afford protection to the defendants. At com
mon law their defence fails.
Defendants defaulted.
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31

S. W. 938.)

Action for $2,700 and interest for rent. The lease was in writing
and under seal, signed by defendants in person and by plaintiffs by
agent. Defendants paid the rent for six months, but gave timely no
tice in writing that because the lease was not signed by plaintiffs, nor
by their agents duly authorized in writing, they would end their ten
Nine months before the expiration of that time
ancy September 30.
they moved out and sent the keys to plaintiffs, who refused to ac
cept them and each month demanded the rent. Upon the defendants’
refusal to pay, this suit was brought.
SHERWOOD,
[After holding that performance by plaintiffs took
* * *
the lease out of the statute of fraudsz]
(d) But, in addi
tion to the foregoing reasons, others readily occur why the defense
of the statute of frauds must prove unavailing.
That statute does
not require that a lease, or, indeed, any instrument, should be under
seal. Admit, then, that plaintiffs’ agents had no authority to bind them
by a sealed instrument. still the unauthorized and unnecessary seal
may be treated as superﬂuous and disregarded, and the sealed instru
ment deemed an unsealed one, and may be ratiﬁed as a simple contract
Mechem, Ag. §§ 95, 141, and cases cited. And _that a
in writing.
simple contract in writing made without authority is susceptible of
or_al_gtjiication_, no one questions.
‘Q
In illustration of this point is the early case of Maclean v. Dunn,
4 Bing. 722, where Lord Chief Justice Best said: “It has been argued
that the subsequent adoption of the contract by Dunn will not take
this oase out of the operation of the statute of frauds, and it has been
insisted that the agent should have his authority at the time the con
tract is entered into.
If such had been the intention of'the legisla
ture, it would have been expressed more clearly.
But the statute only
requires some note or memorandum in writing to be signed by the
party to be charged, or his agent therennto lawfully authorized, leav
ing us to the rules of common law as to the mode in_ which the agent
Now, in all other cases a subsequent sanc
is to receive his authority.
tion is considered the same thing in effect as assent at the time,—
‘Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato aequiparatur'; and, in my
opinion, the subsequent sanction of a contract, signed by an agent,
takes it out of the operation of the statute more satisfactorily
than
an authority given beforehand.
\Vhere the authority is given before
hand, the party must trust to his agent.
If it be given subsequently to
the contract, the party knows that all has been done according to his
wishes.”

J.“

B9 Part

I“-8

?a->T

of the opinion is omitted.
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(e) There are authorities, also, which hold that one partner may
ratify by parol an act under seal done by his co'partner. Gwinn v.
Rooker, 24 Mo. 290; 3 Kent, Comm. (13th Ed.) 49; Story, Partn. § 117.
(f) The doctrine has in some instances been extended beyond the
limit here mentioned, so as to embrace cases where one person “not
sustaining the relation of partner to another may execute an instru
ment under seal, and the same may be ratiﬁed by matter in pais with
like effect as were they partners. This is the rule announced in Mas
sachusetts.
Holbrook v. Chamberlin, 116 Mass. 155, 17 Am. Rep.
146, and cases cited.“
(g) In VVorrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, S5 Am. Dec. 330, after an
elaborate review of the authorities, it is there said: “These authori

ties show that there is no distinction between partners and other per
sons in the application of the modern rule that wherever an instru
ment would be effectual without a seal it would be valid and binding
on the principal, although executed under seal by an agent without
authority by deed, if authorized by a previous ‘parol authority, or sub.
S N. Y. loc. cit. 243, 5 Am.
sequently ratiﬁed or adopted by parol.”
Dec. 330, and cases cited. See, also, Hunter v. Parker, 7 Mees. 8: W.
322; State v. Spartanburg & U. R. Co., 8 S. C. 129; Hammond v.
Hannin, 21 Mich. 374, 4 Am. Rep. 490; Adams v. Power, 52 Miss.
828; State v. Shaw, 28 Iowa, 67.
As the result of these authorities, it should be held that the act of
plaintiffs in putting defendants into possession of the premises, which
they did on April 1, 1891, and the acceptance by them of rent for sev
eral months thereafter from defendants in conformity to the written
lease, was an ample ratiﬁcation of that instrument.
.
the
Besides,
old
lease
its
own
terms
having
expired
by
on A‘pril
(h)
1, 1891, defendants were put into possession under and by virtue of
the new lease, and enjoyed all the advantages they could have received
had the new lease been formally valid in every particular.
It does not
lie in their inouths to denounce as invalid a lease under and by virtue
of which those advantages were obtained. Holbrook v. Chamberlin,
* * *
116 Mass. loc. cit. 161: State v. Shaw, 28 Iowa, loc. cit. 75.
Judgment

for plaintiff affirmed.

6° See. also, Adams v. Power. 52 Miss. 828 (1876).
lock, 27 Tex. 120, 84 Am. Dee. 611 (1863).

Compare
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HENSLER.
1893.

'91 Cal.

290,

35 Pac.

243.)
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Action to foreclose a mortgage on defendant's property, given to
secure three promissory notes, executed for defendant by her attorney
in fact, James P. McCarthy, to plaintiﬁ”s testator, Kimball Hardy.
Qefendant denied that McCarthy’s power of attorney authorized him
to make the notes or.mortgage, and for a further defense set up that
he had, as her agent, paid the interest and secured an extension of
the notes. To show this a writing purporting to be signed by Hardy
was “introduced. Judgment for plaintiﬁ‘.
* * * There was no
VANCLIEF, C.“ [After Stating the factsz]
evidence tending to disprove the genuineness of this writing, or the
signature of Hardy; but the testimony of McCarthy that the interest
had been paid was disputed by the testimony of the plaintiff.
But
for the purpose of the question now being considered (that of ratiﬁca
tion) it is immaterial whether the defendant paid the interest or not,
for, whether she complied with the conditions upon which Hardy
agreed to extend the time of payment or not, her averment, in her an
swer, that she authorized the procurement of the agreement for the
extension of time, in the absence of evidence that she ever repudiated
the execution of the notes or mortgage by her assumed agent, is
prima facie sufficient evidence of her ratiﬁcation of such execution.
In Taylor v. Association, 68 Ala. 229, Brickell, C.
said: “\Ve do
was shown that there was assent to and conﬁrmation
not mean that
not essential, for rat
of the transaction expressed in words. That
more often implied from the acts and conduct of parties
iﬁcation
having an election to avoid or conﬁrm than expressed in words; and
implied whenever the acts and conduct of the principal, having
full knowledge of the fact, are inconsistent with any other supposi
tion than that of previous authority, or an intention to abide by the
See, also, Mechefn, Ag.
was unauthorized.”
act though
146-157.
think the power of attorney was admissible as
circumstance tend
ratiﬁcation, by show
ing at least to strengthen the other evidence of
showed that
ing the relation between defendant and ;\IcCarthy.
that he was authorized
stranger to defendant;
McCarthy was not
to act as her attorney to some extent
regard to all her real ‘prop
erty in this state, even though he may not have been authorized to
mortgage it. “All the authorities,” says Mr. Mechem (section 160),
“agree that the relations of the parties have much to do in determin
ratiﬁcation.”
Where an author
ing whether or not there has been
ized agent transcends his authority, the liability of the principal to be
held to have ratiﬁed the unauthorized adts by mere acquiescence
much greater than
would b'e in case an utter stranger had assumed

ll Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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any authority for any purpose whatever; be
“in general, where an agent is authorized to do, an act, and he
transcends his authority, it is-the duty of the principal to repudiate
the act as soon as he is fully informed of what has been thus done
* * * else he will be bound by the act as having rati
in his name,
ﬁed it by implication.”
\Vard v. \Villiams, Z6 Ill. 447, 79 Am. Dec.
to act as agent without

cause,

385.

But where an utter stranger assumes to act as agent, without any
authority for any purpose, the assumed principal is not required to
repudiate so promptly, in order to repel the charge of having ratiﬁed
the unauthorized acts by acquiescence ;‘ since in the latter case the
assumed agent bears no ostensible relation as agent to the person for
whom he assumes to act, and tlierefore third persons are not so liable
to he deceived by his pretensions, it being their own fault if they deal
with \him as agent without some apparent evidence of his authority.
And since the undisputed evidence made a prima facie case of ratiﬁca
tion, the ﬁnding that the notes and mortgage were executed by de
fendant was thereby justiﬁed, the ratiﬁcation being equivalent to orig
* * *
inal authority.
Judgment and order reversed.“

DANAHER
_

(Supreme

v.

Court of Michigan,

GARLOCK.
1876.

33

Mich.

295.)

Danaher had a contract for railway construction, and sublet a part
the work to Fahy 8: Dye.
Garlock sues for the board of laborers,
contracted for by Fahy § Dye.
The evidence showed payment by
Danaher’s agent of a previous board bill u'pon their order.
‘We think there is no material distinction between
PER CURIAM.
-this case and Wells v. Martin, 32 Mich. 478,03 as to the proof intro
duced to show’ liability.
We discover no evidence in the record tending to show an original
undertaking by Danaher, or any act of ratiﬁcation, of any arrange
ment which Fahy & Dye may have made, and the bill of exceptions
states that the substance of all the testimony given is set out; and the
judge, after referring in his charge to the evidence supposed to bear

of

also, Ballard v. Nye, 138 Cal. 588, 596. 72 Pac. 156 (1903); Lee v.
10 Ala. 755, 770, :44 Am. Dec. 505 (1846), quoting Story on Agency,
82, 83, 234 to 253; Kraft v. Wilson, 10-1 Cal. xvii, 37 Pac. 790 (1894).
63 See, also, Humphrey ‘v. Havens, 12 Minn. 298 (Gil. 196) (1867) in which
the principal had ratiﬁed a previous act of the agent of an entirely different
character; and Gilman Linseed Oil Co. v. Norton, 89 Iowa, 43-1, 56 N. W.
663, 48 Am. St. Rep. -100 (1893), involving an abortive attempt to settle with
an agent who had surreptitiously sold his prineipal’s property.
6* See,

Fontaine,
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The judgment should

be set aside,

dered.

testimony produced

with costs, and a new trial or
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v.

FRANCKLYN.

Pleas of New York City and (‘ount_\'. IS92.
46 N. Y. St. Rep. 396.)

19

N. Y. Supp. 377,

Action by VVoods to recover for work, labor, and services performed
Appeal from judgment for
by request of defendants’ alleged agent.
'
plaintiﬁ.
BISCHOFF,
The decisive question in this case is whether plaintiff
has established, hyicompetent evidence. authority on the part of Still
man to bind defendant as his principal.
_In considering this question.
evidence of Stillman’s declarations'tending to show his authority to act
for defendant should be eliminated, because it is admissible for no
such purpose, but only for the purpose of showing credit was intended
to be given to the defendant.
Stringham v. Insurance Co., 4 Abb.
Dec. 315; Marvin v. Wilber, 52 N. Y. 270; People’s Bank v. St. An
thony's R. C. Church, 109 N. Y. 512, 17 N. E. 408.
Otitside such declarations the validity of the judgment depends upon
facts substantially as follows: Plaintiff performed certain work, labor,
and services in repairing the buildings 873 and 879 Broadway and 17
East Eighteenth street, which were owned by Sir Bache_Cunard, upon
Stillman’s request and representation that he was authorized by de
fendant to employ plaintiff for such purpose. Of these premises Still
man had assumed full management and control at the request of the
defendant;
but the defendant, in making such request, acted for and
as the agent of Cunard, the owner.
Stillman did whatever he thought
necessary for the preservation of the premises, caused repairs to be
made, collected rents, paid expenses, and remitted the balance to de
fendant for the owner's, Cunard’s. account.
Prior to plaintiFf’s last
employment and the accruing of the claim in suit he had performed
similar services under precisely the same circumstances, for which, at
Stillman’s direction, he on one occasion rendered a bill to defendant,
which was paid when presented.
It cannot be said that the facts recited would support an inference
of Stillman’s authority to bind defendant, construed most favorably to
plaintiﬁ, despite Stillman’s apparent equivocation as a witness for him.
It is obvious, though Stillman entered upon the agency of Cunard’s
buildings at defendant's request, that he was Cunard’s, and not defend
The fact that defendant was the depositary of the rents
ant’s agent.
Gonn.Pn.& A.(2n En.)—9
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accruing to Cunard from the buildings no more had the effect of sub
stituting defendant for Cunard as principal than would an agent’s de
posit in any case of his principal’s funds with a banker for transmis
sion create the relation of principal and agent so as to charge the
It is true that au
banker with liability for the acts of the depositor.
thority to do .a particular act may be inferred by a course of dealing
between an alleged principal and his assumed agent, as in a case where
a principal has repeatedly recognized and approved of similar acts,
(Bank v. Putnam, 1 Abb. Dec. 80; Wood v. Railroad Co., 8 N. Y.
160; Hammond v. Varian, S4 N. Y. 398; Olcott v. Railroad Co., 27
N. Y. 546, 84 Am. Dec. 298; Bank v. Clements, 31 N. Y. 33;) but
we are unable to ﬁnd any sanction in principle or authority for holding
that the ratiﬁcation of a'single act would justify an inference that any
further similar act would likewise meet with recognition, or that the
assumed agent is thus empowered to subject the alleged principal to
liability upon subsequent unauthorized contracts. For this reason we
must regard defendant’s payment of plaintiﬁ”s bill for services on a.
former occasion insufficient to justify the inference that Stillman had
The facts
authority from defendant to employ plaintiff as his agent.“
therefore did not authorize plaintiff's recovery, and the motion to dis
his complaint should have been granted.
miss
'
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant
to abide the event.

.

VVADE

v.

VVOLFSON.

(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate

Term,

1904.

90'N. Y. Supp.

1078.)

From judgment for defend

Action for goods sold and delivered.
ant, plaintiff appeals.
The defendant’s wife had no apparent authority to
PER CURIAM.
bind him to the purchase of stock for his perfumery business, and,
crediting his testimony, there was no ground for holding him to a
ratiﬁcation, his acts in relation to the goods being in no way incon
sistent with the actual oral agreement made by him with the salesman,
was to sell the goods on commission.
That
whereby he (defendant)

“That a railway company had paid a physician, hired by a conductor, to
attend a person injured by his train, does not show a ratiﬁcation of such un
authorized employment, so as to bind the company for a subsequent unau
thorized employment ot the physician for another person injured. Wills v.
Int. & G. N. R. Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 58, 92 S. W. 273 (1906). But a single
net of an agent and a recognition of it by the principal may be so unequivocal
and of so positive and comprehensive a character as to place the authority of
The value
the agent to do similar acts for the principal beyond any question.
of such proof does not depend so much upon the number of acts as upon their
If the evidence is doubtful, it is a question for the jury. Wilcox
character.
v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 24 Minn. 269 (1877).
GODD.PB.& A.(2D En.)
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this was the agreement,

the justice has found upon a simple conﬂict
evidence, and there is nothing improbable in the defendant's asser
tion that he knew of no other.
judgment affirmed, with costs.”

of

ii

HANEY SCHOOL FURNITURE

CO. v. HIGHTOVVER

BAPTIST INSTITUTE.

(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

1901.

113

Ga. 289, 38 S. E. 761.)

a

70 Ark. 351, 68 S. W. 32 (1902);
Co., 136 N. C. 128, 48 S. E. 575 (1904).

Bromley v. Aday,

Hill

&

85 Accord:

lng Mach. Co. v.
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Action on an open account for thirty school desks, a reading chart,
and some blackboards.
Defendant was a corporation, created to carry
on a school, and was managed by a board of trustees.
This board
hired one Booth as principal of the school, and he had bought the
supplies sued for. Judgment for defendant.
LITTLE, I.
[After stating the facts and ruling on a motion by
* * * 2. Plaintiff
plaintiff on a motion to amend the petitionz]
sought to have the verdict set aside on the ground that it was contrary
to the evidence, and without evidence to support it. It is our opinion
that under the evidence the plaintiff was entitled to have a verdict in
its favor. It is undeniably true that the board of trustees were un
willing to have a debt created against the corporation which they rep
resented, and it is equally true that they did not authorize Booth to
It cannot be gainsaid,
create the debt on which the suit was brought.
however, that by their express and recorded action they did authorize
Booth to purchase certain equipment for the school, although in doing
so they limited him to the expenditure of the amount of money on
hand; and clearly, as an ‘original proposition, he had no right to go be
nor to create any debt at all. But in authorizing Booth to
yond
purchase the equipment to the extent of the funds on hand they con
stituted him their agent that far. When he went beyond that limit,
he exceeded his authority, and could not primarily contract
debt
which, without their acquiescence, would be binding on the corporation.
In such case,
clear case of the agent exceeding his authority.
must appear that he in some way rati
in order to bind the principal,
liable;
he did not, he
ﬁed the unauthorized act. If he did, he
in no way liable for the debt.
ratiﬁcation by the
Section 3019 of the Civil Code declares that
originally
principal relates back to the act ratiﬁed, and takes effect as
A ratiﬁcation may be express, or implied from the acts
authorized.
ratiﬁcation once made cannot be re
or silence of the principal, and
voked. VVe accept the evidence of members of the board of trustees
matter of fact
must
who were swom in this case as true, and as
be conceded that when the board ascertained that Booth had exceeded
White Sew
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66 Cf.
103

is

on this point National Improvement
118, 72 N. W. 431 (1897).

Iowa,

8:

is

is

it

it,

his authority, and purchased the desks and other equipment of the
school on a credit, they in words repudiated that action, and notiﬁed
plaintiff through its attorney that the goods bought were subject to its
order. Therefore they were not silent, and the ratiﬁcation of Booth’s
contract cannot be declared in this case from the silence of the prin
The question, then,,is narrowed to the inquiry whether the
cipal.
board of trustees ratiﬁed this contract of Booth by their acts.
It
was undoubtedly originally contemplated that the schoolroom should be
supplied with desks and other equipment according to the means in
the hands_ of the trustees.
It cannot be made a cause of difference in
the determination of the question of liability that Booth took the
school for what he could make out of it. The school building and the
equipment which it contained were the property of the corporation,
and under the direct control of the trustees, and in turning over the
school building and the furniture therein to Booth the trustees of the
defendant corporation were but carrying out the object of the incor
It is conclusively shown
poration, which was to maintain a school.
that, while the trustees were unwilling to better equip the school build
ing by incurring a debt, yet, after having learned that the desks, etc.,
which were placed in the school building for the use of the school
which they were appointed to maintain, had been purchased by Booth
on credit, they allowed such desks and other equipment to__rem_ain in
said school building, and__be used by the president and scholars from
the time of such discovery up to the time of the trial of the case.
The trustees, then, are placed in this position: They did not author
ize Booth to purchase this furniture on credit. As soon as they learned
he had done so, they notiﬁed the seller that Booth had no authority to
contract the debt for them, and that they would not be bound thereby,
Had they stopped here, and
and disclaimed title to the property.
caused this property to be taken from their building, or stored it un
used there or elsewhere, their claim would have been perfectly sus
tained;““ but, after having disclaimed title, the fact remains that they
continued to use it for a year or more, having all the beneﬁts of
for the use of the school.
and, notwithstanding their disclaimer, kept
It must be held that such action ratiﬁed the purchase made by Booth.
It not a suﬁicient answer to this proposition to say that this equip
ment
being used by Prof. Callaway, the successor of Booth. This
so for the reason that Callaway was put there by the trustees, and was
furnished the school building and the furniture belonging to it. VV hen
Booth left the building, he left therein this equipment, which the de
fendants claimed belonged to the plaintiff.
Callaway was admitted by
their action, and permitted by them to use the furniture which was in
their building, and this, having been bought by Booth in their name,
and placed in their building, they should, in some manner, have ex
Construction
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cepted such furniture from Callaway’s control in carrying on the
school for them. They
could not permit such use of it by him as a
part of the furniture of their school building without working a rat
And, while a disclaimer of
iﬁcation of the purchase made by Booth.
title and notiﬁcation to the seller that the trustees of the school build
ing had no claim to this furniture which was being used therein was
made, it was not, alone, such a suﬁicient repudiation as would free the
trustees from liability if they continued to use it in the business of
their corporation.
In the case of Wright v. Methodist Church, 72 Minn. 78, 74 N. W.
1015, the pastor of a church purchased an organ for the use of the
church, and claimed that it was purchased by its authority.
This was
denied. At the time of its receipt the trustees of the church did not
know that it had been purchased, but were told that the pastor_ had
ordered it for a particular occasion.
After ascertaining the fact of
the purchase, the trustees notiﬁed the plaintiff that the pastor had
no authority from them to purchase the organ, but it was allowed
to remain in the church. and was continually used therein.
The su
preme court of Minnesota, in passing on these facts, ruled that, if
the pastor was not originally
authorized to purchase the organ for
the church, under the facts its trustees subsequently ratiﬁed his acts.
The general rule is found stated
148.
Mechenr, Ag.
The author
precedes a statement of the rule with the assertion that the methods
by which ratiﬁcation may be effected are as numerous and as various
as the complex dealings of human life. But he adds that:
“He who
would avail himself of the advantages arising from the act of another
in his behalf must also assume the responsibilities.
If the principal has
knowingly appropriated and enjoyed the fruits and beneﬁts of an
agent’s act, he will not afterwards be heard to say that the act was un
authorized.
One who voluntarily accepts the proceeds of an act done
by one assuming, though without authority. to be his agent, ratiﬁes
the act, and takes
as his own, with all its burdens as well as all its
beneﬁts. He may not take the beneﬁts and reject burdens, but he must
either accept them or reject the'm as
whole.” °"
This court. in the case of Byrne v. Doughty, 13 Ga. 52, citing Story,
no necessity for
Ag. says: “To bind th_e principal, there
positive or
direct conﬁrmation on his part of the act of the agent, but
may arise
implication from the acts or proceedings of the principal in pais.
* And for this purpose the acts and conduct of the
principal
are construed favorably in favor of the agent.
Slight circumstances
and small matters will sometimes sufﬁce to raise the presumption of
* *
ratiﬁcation.
Authority to do the act
presumed from sub
In the case of Hodnett v.
sequent acts of assent and acquiescence.”
Tatum,
Ga. 70,
was ruled that the principal cannot, of his own
mere authority, ratify the acts of his agent in part in regard to
par
50 (1908).
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ticular transaction, and repudiate them as to the rest; and in the opin
“If he
ion, Judge Warner, referring to the facts in that case, said;
[the principal] did not intend to ratify the act of his agent in receiv
ing the Alabama money, he ought to have returned it within a reason
able time, and not have retained it upon his own arbitrary terms.”
Mc
Cay, 1., in the case of Ketchum v. Verdell, 42 Ga. 538, said: “If the
principal accepts the property knowing all the facts, that is a ratiﬁca
tion of the agency.” In Murray v. Walker, 4-4 Ga. 58, it was ruled that
“the taking of Confederate currency by the Principal, and its use by
him, was a ratiﬁcation of the act of the agent.” To the same effect is
the ruling made in the case of Gilbert v. Dent, 46 Ga. 238.
The trustees of the defendant corporation were evidently unwilling
to create a debt, and did not intend to buy this furniture on credit, and
but, when they
they. had the right to refuse to do so if they wished;
discovered that Booth had purchased the furniture on their account, \
then was the time not simply to repudiate the action of Booth in words,
but to repudiate it altogether. If, after such discovery, they had de
clined to use the desks and other property sold, which, being in their
building as a part of the equipment, were being used by them through
Callaway, their agent, but had returned them or taken them out of their
building after proper notiﬁcation, their wishes would have been accom
plished. But when, after the knowledge of Booth’s purchase, they con
tinued to use it by their agent and employé knowing that Booth claimed
to have bought it for them, that use of it made it their property by
ratiﬁcation.“ Its use by the school was their use.
It must therefore, be ruled that, as this evidence of ratiﬁcation and
use of the property was uncontradicted, the verdict rendered was con
trary to the evidence in the case. and the court erred in overruling the
motion for a new trial. judgment reversed.
B8 U. S. School Furniture O0. v. School District, 56 Nah. 645, 77 N, W,
a suit for money paid to an agent of plaintiff for school furniture.
Rogers v. Hardware Co., 24 Neb. _653, 39 N. W. 844; Manufacturing Co. v.
Vvagoner. 2-5 Neb. 439. 41 N. W. 287; YVaterson v. Rogers, 21 Kan. 529.
court, by Green. J., in Wheeler & Wilson Co. v. Aughey.
The Pennsylvania
144 Pa. 398. 22 Atl. 667. 27 Am. St. Rep. 638. put the ease thus:
“It is of no
62,

avail to raise or discuss the question of the means of proof of the agent's au
thority.
The very essence of the rule is that the agent had no authority to
make the representation. condition. or stipulation by means of which he ob
tained the property or right in action‘ of which the principal seeks to avail
It is not because he had speciﬁc authority to bind his principal for
himself.
the purpose in question that the principal is bound, but notwithstanding the
tact that he had no such authority.
It is the enjoyment of the fruits of the
agent's action which charges the principal with responsibility
for his act.
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Action upon a joint and several note executed by defendants, paya
ble to Peters.
Peter’s agent sent the note to a bank, which sold it to
plaintiff. Judgment for defendant.
F men, ]. [Omitting discussion of position of sureties on the note.]
Their sole defense, therefore, was that which prevailed with the ref
eree:
That the bank had no authority to sell, and so plaintiff got no
title. Undoubtedly, Peters might have repudiated the act of his agent,
when he learned what it was. The moment he became possessed of
that knowledge, he was bound in common honesty to return the money
The law
Qa._i5l_him__by_n1istake, or retain it as it was given to his agent.
will not endure that he shall keep the product of the agent's act and
yet repudiate his authority.
Even in a case of fraudulent represen
tations by the agent, never at all authorized or suspected by the prin
cipal, a reception and retention of the proceeds may make the latter
National L. Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y.
responsible for the fraud.
144; Hathaway v. ]ohnson, 55 N. Y. 93, 14 Am. Rep. 186.
No
wrong or violence is done to the rights of Peters by the process. His
agent obtained plaintiff’s money by a pretended sale of the note in ex
If, then, he
cess of the authority conferred, and Peters knows it..
keeps the money, and avails himself of the fruits of the unauthorized
act, he cannot be allowed to repudiate it. But he does not repudiate
or attempt to do so. He sets up no claim to the note, and says only
that he wanted the money and did not care how he got it; that
sale or a payment. The fact, then, that the note was not
whether by
was, fol
time he thought that
although for
paid, and he knew
lowed by his continued retention of the money, his omission to demand
admits of no other interpretation than
the note, or assert any title to
It
ratiﬁcation of the sale.“
all the more easily inferred because
made the money in his possession
his interest lay in that direction.
lawfully his, and took him wholly out of the controversy.
just
to the plaintiff, who parted with his money as purchaser, and upon the
does no injustice to the sureties, for
faith and credit of the note.
Circumstances
they have no equity to be discharged without payment.
release.
might have occurred which would have entitled them to
false security by information
Possibly,
they had been lulled into
and
consequent belief that the note was paid, and due to the silence
and delay of the purchaser, the principal in the mean time becoming
insolvent, some just ground might exist for their discharge. But noth
in the case.
No such defense
pleaded, and no
ing of the kind
The evidence
suggestion made of any injury resulting from the sale.
shows that Terwilliger, one of the sureties, was notiﬁed of a proposed
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and not only did not object, but promised to see his associ
They do not
say only that they never consented to a sale.
say that they were not notiﬁed of an intended transfer; and since they
make no complaint, either in the pleadings or the proof, that they have
been misled or harmed by the transaction treated as a sale, and ratiﬁed
as siich by Peters, there is no injustice done to them.
Certainly, they
have no equity to compel the plaintiff, in hostility to his intention and
against his will, to pay their note, for which he was in no manner
bound.
VV e ﬁnd no diﬂiculty, therefore, in applying to the case the doctrine
of ratiﬁcation. Coykendall made the purchase before he had seen the
note or the indorsements upon
Peters knew the whole truth,—at
witness on the trial,—and, instead of re
least, when examined as
pudiating the sale, said only that he got the money for his loan, (‘and
that was the end of it.” 7°‘
The judgment should be reversed, and
new trial granted; costs to
abide the event.
transfer,
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GEORGE ANDREWS,
Mrs. Storm, the defendant, was the equitable
owner of
farm in Roane county. \/Vith the purpose of cultivating
and improving the premises, she leased them to one Brinkman, and
also constituted him her agent, to make certain improvements upon the
estate, the nature and character of which improvements do not appear
in proof.
For the purpose of enabling Brinkman to carry on the
farm, and make the necessary improvements, Mrs. Storm gave him a
letter of credit, authorizing him to draw on one De Armond, to the
amount of three hundred dollars.
De Armond being unable, or un
willing to furnish the money, Brinkman applied to \V. S. McEwen,
who agreed, upon the personal guaranty of Brinkman, to furnish the
required credit, and did accordingly supply Brinkman with cash and
various articles for the use of the farm, to the amount of over three
hundred dollars.
Two hundred and ﬁfty dollars of this amount, and
perhaps the whole, was afterwards repaid to McEwen by Mrs. Storm.
But Brinkman, after this time, requiring further supplies, and Mc
Ewen being unwilling, in consequence of delay in the former payment,
to make further advances, Brinkman presented the‘ letter of credit to
complainant, Williams, who, upon the credit of Mrs. Storm, gave to
Brinkman
letter of credit to McEwen, for the further amount of
three hundred dollars.
does not appear whether Vl/illiams was
aware of the previous advances made by McEwen. Upon the credit
of Williams, thus obtained, Brinkman procured from McEwen, cash
'10Part

of the opinion is omitted.

0

Ch. 4)

cnmxrrou

or

THE RELAT_ION

137

and other articles, to the amount of about three hundred and eighty
dollars, which were employed, as Brinkman testiﬁes, in improvements
and expenses on Mrs. Storm’s land, but in what manner does not ap
This amount has been repaid to McEwen by complainant.
pear.
.\Trs. Storm resided in Europe, and there is no evidence that she
had any knowledge of the transaction with Williams, till the ﬁling of
complainant’s bill. The bill in this cause, is ﬁled by Williams, to com
pel payment by Mrs. Storm, of the amount thus advanced by him.
Upon the hearing, on pleadings and proof, the chancellor dismissed
the bill, and the complainant appealed to this court.
The letter of credit given by Mrs. Storm to Brinkman, and ad
dressed to De Armond, constituted no authority to Brinkman to pro
cure this loati by credit from V,Villiams, and there is no proof what
ever, that Brinkman had any authority, as Mrs. St0rm’s agent, to bind
her in the transaction.
But it is claimed for complainant, that Mrs.
Storm, by her conduct, held Brinkman out to the world as her agent,
and thus rendered herself liable for any contracts he might make in
her name, and that, as the supplies procured through complainant’s
credit were applied to her use and beneﬁt, she is legally bound to pay
for them. There is nothing to'show that, in the present case, Mrs.
Storm held Brinkman out to the world as her agent, duly authorized
to borrow money, or to purchase property on creditgin her name.
There is nothing in the agency proven to have existed, which requires
the existence of such authority; and the simple fact, that she paid the
debt ﬁrst incurred by Brinkman to McE\ven, cannot be considered as
a binding admission on her part, of his authority to make similar con
tracts in her name in the future.
There is no proof that Vl/illiams knew of the former transaction
with McEwen.
So far as appears, he proceeded solely upon the letter
of credit to De Armond, which was exhibited to him, and upon his be
lief in the good faith of Brinkman, and the responsibility of Mrs.
Storm.
The authority of Brinkman extended only to the borrowing of the
sum of three hundred dollars, and that only upon his letter of credit
to De Armond. And even if that authority were held to extend to the
borrowing of that particular sum of McEwen, instead of De Armond,
it was then exhausted, and could not be extended into a general au
thority to borrow as many sums and of as many different persons as
he might subsequently think ﬁt to require.
The complainant ha_d no
tice of Brinkman’s want of authority; and though his case is a hard
one, he must be held to have loaned to him his credit at his peril.
The general rule is unquestioned, that, if an agent exceeds his au
thority in purchasing property, or otherwise making engagements in
the name of his principal, and the principal knowingly receives and re
tains the property, or accepts the beneﬁt of the engagement made, he
thereby ratiﬁes the contract made by his agent. But this rule only ap

1
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is no ratiﬁcation. Martin v. Hickman, 64 Ark. 217, 41 S. W.
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plies in cases where the principal has knowledge of the transaction,
and an opportunity to repudiate the acts of the assumed agent."
If an agent has, by acts andcontracts, beyond the scope of his au
thority, and without the knowledge of his principal, purchased prop
erty or borrowed money in the name of his principal, and expended
the same in the care, preservation, or improvement of his principal’s
estate; and at the time when the transaction comes to the knowledge
of the principal, the property has been consumed, or expenditures
made in such manner that the property cannot be restored, or the con
tract repudiated, the principal is not bound. Where the principal has
the option to repudiate the contract, or to ratify
he
bound prompt
to do either the one or the other. But
party cannot so deal with
an unauthorized person assuming to act as agent, as to leave the prin
cipal no option, and to compel him by force of the mere fact that the
transaction has been for his beneﬁt, to ratify the contract.
Am.
Lead. Cases, 574.
does not appear in this case, how the money obtained by Brink
man, upon the complainant’s credit, was expended; what improve
ments were made; what expenses of the farm were defrayed or what
property purchased by its means or whether any such property or im
provements remain for the beneﬁt of the defendant, orthat the im
provements and purchases were such as Brinkman was authorized by
her to make; and while the hardship to the complainant
obvious,
cannot be permitted that unauthorized persons shall make improve
ments in their own discretion, upon the estates of others, without the
knowledge of the owner, and when too late to repudiate the unauthor
by payment of the ex
ized action, call upon the owners to ratify
may or may not be, that the beneﬁt accruing to the
penses incurred.
moral obligation to pay
defendant in this case, may impose upon her
for these purchases, expenses and improvements; but to hold that the
in the power of unauthorized
legal one, would place
obligation
persons, to improve the holders of property out of their estates.
The decree will be afﬁrmed.
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Suit upon a note for $75, given as part consideration on the sale of
a horse to defendant.
To this action defendant set up as a defense
that the horse was warranted sound at the dateof sale, and that he
was not sound at that time. The horse was sold by one Woodward,
an agent, who was not authorized by Cooley to make any representa
tions or warranties, nor did Cooley in his lifetime, nor his executors,
who brought this action, before the death of the horse, know of the
representation made by \Voodward. Upon exceptions to the instruc
tions and for failure to instruct, plaintiffs brought certiorari.
DIXON,
[After holding that under the circumstances of- this case
\Voodward had neither implied nor incidental authority to warrant
*
the soundness of the horsez]
has been in
Sometimes
timated that
distinction might be based upon whether the war
suit against
ranty by the agent were set up by
plaintiff to maintain
the principal, or by
defendant to resist the principal’s suit for the
price, and that the attempt of the principal to collect the price, after
he has learned of the warranty,
ratiﬁcation of it. On the idea that
the authority does not cover the warranty, and that the purchaser
not plain how he can
chargeable with knowledge of the authority,
withstand the vendor’s claim on contract made, by alleging
contract
there be anything at all in the dis
which he knew was not made. But
tinction, it__must be conﬁned to those cases where, when the principal
obtains knowledge of his agent’s unauthorized warranty, the sale
ﬁeri, or can be declared void and the parties restored to their original
position. \V hat the principal does in pursuance of
bargain which he
has authorized his agent to make, without knowledge that his agent
not
ratiﬁcation of such
has entered into an unwarranted contract,
contract. Combs v. 'Scott, 12 Allen, 493; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y.
79; Titus v. Phillips, IS N.
Eq. S41; Giilick v. Grover, 33 N.
Law, 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728.
And §_,_when he acquires knowledge, he cannot, in justice to him
s_t3l_f, disavow the whole of his agent’s contracts, he
entitled to stand
upon what he authorized, and repudiate the rest; the purchaser, who
special agent without noting the bounds of his power,
dealt with
must suifer rather than the innocent principal.
Bryant v. Moore, 26
Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96."

a

a

a

"Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. R4. 45 Am. Dec. 96 (1846); Watson v. Bigelow-,
Compare Henderson v. Railway Co., 17 Tex. 560, 576, 67
47 Mo. 413 (1871).
Am. Dec. 675 (1856).
Neither can the ratiﬁcation of one act be established from a previous ratiﬁ
cation of another similar, but distinct, act. Forsyth v. Day, 41 Me. 382 (1856),
. 76.
ante.
railway company of
promise by an agent to
So 131150ratiﬁcation by
sum oi! money does not ratify an additional promise by the
pay plaintltf
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These views are not at all in conflict with the class of cases which
hold that the principal is responsible for the fraud or deceit of his
agent, committed in the course of his employment, for his employer’s
beneﬁt.
Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 VVend. S18, 28 Am. Dec. 476; Sand
ford v. Handy, 23 \Vend. 260; Barwick v. Eng. ]oint Stock.Bank, L.
R. 2 Ex. 259; Mackay v. Com. Bank of N. Brunswick, L. R. 5 P. C.
'

394.

.

Those cases are well founded upon the principle that, as every man
is bound to be honest in his dealings with others, so is he bound to
whether they be general or special, and if in
employ honestagents,
transacting his business, and within the range of their authority, they
be dishonest, the consequences are legally chargeable to the employer,
and not to a ‘stranger.
Hern v. Nichols, l Salk. 289.
In the present suit, I think that the unauthorized warranty, inferred
from the honest statement of the agent that the horse was all right.
not communicated to the vendor or his representatives until after the
horse was delivered to and had died in the possession of the venilee,
formed no defense to the claim for the price, and that the appellee’s
prayer for instructions to the jury was justiﬁed by the facts and the
law, and should have been granted. Its refusal was error, for which
the judgment should be reversed, with costs.
The cause may be remitted to the Common Pleas for a new trial.
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Thacher sold one Gray potatoes and left with him a horse to keep,
but not to sell. Gray owed Pray, and sold him thehorse to satisfy the
This check he indorsed
debt, receiving in addition a check for $100.
was in payment for
and mailed to Thacher, who cashed
supposing
the potatoes. \Vhen he learned that Pray had the horse he demanded
its return, but refused to give up the proceeds of the check. The court
below charged that the retention of the $100 after full information
to Pray, was an adop
of the transaction, and the refusal to restore
Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff
tion of the whole transaction.
leges exceptions.
The instructions upon which this case was given to
ENDICQTT,
the jury failed to notice an important portion of the evidence. If the
only dealings between the plaintiff and Gray related to this horse, and

&

&

agent to give defendant employment for life, of which promise the company
and furnished
had no knowledge. even though the company made the_pa_vment
Bohannn v. B.
M. R. Co., 70 N. H. 526, 49
the employment for a time.
To the same effect is St. John
Marsh Co. v. Cornwell,
Atl. 103 (1900).
52 Kan. 712, 35 Pac. 785 (1891); Roberts v. Francis, 123 Wis. 78, 100 N. _W.
1076 (1904).
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the money paid for the horse by the defendant to Gray, who had no
authority to sell, had been sent to the plaintiff, the taking and keeping
it might be a ratiﬁcation of the sale by Gray; or if the plaintiff had
wished to rescind
he should return the money so received. But the
evidence in the case required other and further instructions.
ap
peared that the plaintiff had sent potatoes to Gray for sale, and there
was evidence tending to show that the check for $100, taken
Gray‘
on account of the wrongful sale of the horse, was paid over to the
plaintiff, received by him, and credited on account of the potatoes, and
the plaintiff did not know the horse had been sold, for
long time aft
erward.
These facts justify the plaintiff's prayer for instructions, and
we think they should have been given.
it
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does not affect the rights of the parties that the same check which
defendant gave Gray was given to the plaintiff,
was applied to
the settlement of an existing account between them, without any no
tice that
was
part of the proceeds of the unauthorized sale of the
horse." Being indorsed by Gray
was in the plaintiff’s hands payable
to bearer, transferable by delivery, and subject to the same rules as
bank bills, coupons, or other instruments payable in money to bearer.
Am. Rep. 491.
as
Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503,
Gray
had cashed they check and sent the identical or other bills to the plain
was held in Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton, 17 Pick. 159, 28_
tiff.
Am. Dec. 286, where an agent had lent the money of his principal to
his private creditor, who appropriated
to the payment of the debt,
the creditor not knowing at
that the principal could not recover
time of the loan that the money belonged to the principal.
The cred
itor had the right to secure his private debt, and being money having
did not stand on the same ground as chattels. A party
no ear mark,
not bound to inquire into the authority of
person from whom he
debt, for
receives money in payment of
different doctrine would be
In that case as in this, there was no
productive of great mischief.
privity between the parties, and the equities were much stronger than
here.

sustained.

‘

Exceptions

&

also. Wycoﬂ, Seaman
Benedict V. Davis, 127 Iowa. 399, 103 N. W.
(1905); Wheeler v. Nortlnyestern
Sleigh Co. (C. C.) 39 Fed. 347 (1889):
Stephens v. Board of Education.
79 N. Y. 183. 35 Am. Rep. 511;
Hatch v.
Bank, 147 N. "Y. 194. 41 N. E. 403; Justh v. Bank. 56 N. Y. 478; Smith v.
Bank, 107 Iowa, 620. 78 N. W. 238: Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 212; Gulick
v. Grover, 33 N. J. Law, 463. 97 Am. Dec. 728: Bohart v. Oberne, 36 Kan. 284.
Co. v. Dandrldge,
Gill
J. 323, 29 Am. Dec. 543;
13 Pac. 388: Pennsylvania
Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton, 17 Pick. 159. 28 Am. Dec. 286, post p. 773;'Ca.se
Packing Co., 105 M0. App. 168, 79 S. W. 732 (1904).
v. Hammond
73 See.

&

8

849

142

'rm-1'

MOBILE
(Supreme

RELATION

& M.

(Part 1

RY. CO.

Court of Alabama,
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1880.

JAY.
65

Ala.‘ 113.)

Action by Dr. Jay for surgical services in amputating the leg of one
Richardson, who had been injured by the cars while in defendants’
employ. Plaintiff was called by one O’Brien, a supervisor of de
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fendants’ road, who had no authority to employ him. Burnett, plain
titf’s attomey, wrote the president of the road, Daniel Tyler, and
Tyler’s reply was, over the defendants’ objection, admitted in evi
dence to show that he had knowledge of O’Brien’s act and did not re
pudiate it. The letter _said the writer had no knowledge of the plain
titf’s claim, but when the superintendent of the road returnedihe would
submit the matter to him. Judgment. for plaintiﬁ.
SOMERVILLE, J. The letter of Daniel Tyler, president of the defend
ant railway company, was improperly admitted as evidence in the
trial before the nisi prius court. It bears no date. It does not appear
when it was written, nor when received.
No evidence was oﬁered
to prove the contents of the letter of Burnett, to which it was a reply;
nor was it proposed to make it relevant by any such extraneous evi
dence.
Without the light of other facts, we are left in the dark as
to whether or not it related to the subject-matter of this particular
suit. Prima facie, therefore, the letter was irrelevant, and‘ the objec
tion to its admission should have been sustained.
The ﬁrst charge given by the presiding judge to the jury does not
embody an accurate exposition of the law of agency and ratiﬁcation.
The correct rule seems to be, that, where the principal has a full
direct
knowledge of the acts of his agent, from which he receives
beneﬁt, he must dissent, and give notice of his nonconcurrence, within
.a reasonable time, or his assent and ratiﬁcation will be presumed.
Gray (Mass.) 147.
Brigham v. Peters,
the case of Powell’s Adm’r v. Henry, 27 Ala.
The ﬁrst head-note
612, which holds, that, “if an agent exceeds his authority, although
he
the principal may ratify the act; yet, to avoid
not obliged
too comprehensive in its state-.
to give notice that he repudiates it,”
ment of the law.
true that mere knowledge, on the part of the
principal, of an agent's unauthorized action, will not make silence, or
non-interference, in all cases amount to ratiﬁcation.
would,
But
misled or preju
in those cases where [the party dealing with the agent
diced (Smith v. Sheeley, 12 VVall. 358 [20 L. Ed. 430]); or where
‘the usage of trade requires, or fair dealing demands,
prompt reply
In all such cases,
from the principal (\Vharton on Agency,
86).
the principal,
dissatisﬁed with the act of the agent, and fully in
formed of what has been done, must express his dissatisfaction within
Greenl. Ev.
666.
_a reasonable time.
The railway company received no direct beneﬁt from the medical
services rendered by Dr. Jay to one of its employés. The charge in

‘
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question does not conform to the above principles, and the exception
to it must be sustained.
It is unnecessary to consider the other points raised by the record.
Reversed and remanded.“

WHITLEY
(Supreme

Oourt

of Georgia,

v.‘

IAMES

1904.

121

et al.

Ga.

521,

49

S. E. 600.)

petition for the recovery of certain land, removal of cloud,
alleged that defendant James, as agent of Gen.
Gordon to sell land for cash, had without authority sold on credit to
Plaintiff claimed under a
corporations of which he was president.
quitclaim from Gen. Gordon, and makes _Tames and all the corporations
The court below sustained de
claiming under his deeds defendants.
murrers to the petition as to all the corporations.
Plaintiff excepted.
1. The petition alleges that
LAMAR, J.
[After stating the factsz]
the unauthorized credit sale was made by the agent in 1889, that the
deed was recorded in the same year, and that the defendant corpora
tions had been in possession from that date until April, 1903, when
If the original pur
the present suit was ﬁled—a period of 14 years.
chaser knew, or was charged with notice, that the agent was exceeding
his authority in making a sale on credit instead of for cash, this would
put the conveyance where it could be treated as void at the option of
the principal.
Civ. Code 1895, § 3021. Compare Loveless v. Fowler,
79 Ga. 135, 4 S. E. 103, 11 Am. St. Rep. 407; Lumpkin v. Wilson, 5
Heisk. (Tenn.) 555.
2. If, on the other hand, the sale is attacked because the agent of
the vendor was also president or agent of the purchaser, the effect of
the dual agency would authorize the principal to repudiate the trans
action. Civ. Code 1895. § 3010; Red Cypress Lumber Co. v. Perry,
118 Ga. 876, 45 S. E. 674: Moore v. Casey, 116 Ga. 28, 42 S. E. 258;
Story on Agency (8th Ed.) § 211.
Equitable

etc.

The petition

74 The cases often tail to distinguish between ratiﬁcation by silence and
estoppel.
Ct’. Owens Pottery Co. v. Tnrnbull Co., 75 Conn. 628, 51 Atl. 1122
(1903); Metcalt v. Williams. 144 Mass. 452, 11 N. E. 700 (1887): Hall v.
Harper, 17 Ill. 82 (1855); Reid v. Alaska Packing Co., 47 Or. 215, 83 Pac. 139
(1905); Cooper v. Mulder, 74 Mich. 374, 41 N. W. 1084 (1889).
See ante, DD. 83, 108: Pope v. Armsby Co., 111 Cal. 159, 43 Pac. 589 (1896).
there is no element of estoppel, mere silence does not amount to estoppcl.
California Bank v. Sayre, 85 Cal. 102, 24 Pac. 713 (1890).
It is sometimes said that ratiﬁcation cannot be inferred from mere silence.
Something more is required-—an affirmative act. Hatton v. Stewart, 70 Tenn.
This is certainly not the case in ratiﬁcation by estoppel.
(2 Lea) 233 (1879).
See Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431, 438 (1876), approved in Heyn v. O’Hagen,
See, also, Robbins v. Blanding, 87 Minn.
60 Mich. 150, 26 N. W. 861 (1886).
246, 91 N. W. 844 (1902).
And ct. St. Louis Gunning Adv. C0. v. Wanamaker 6: Brown, 115 M0. App.
270, 90 S. W. 737 (19%), with Iron City Bank v. Fifth Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ.
533 (1898).
App.) 47 S.
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3. But whether the attack is because of the dual agency, or of a
violation of the instructions, the sale was not absolutely void, so as
to be incapable of ratiﬁcation.
The agent actually had the power to
sell. There was at least an attempted execution of the power, and
the principal could waive the violation of instructions or the results of
the inconsistent positions. The ratiﬁcation, whether soon or late, was
the equivalent of an original command, and cured any defect in the
execution of the power.
The ratiﬁcation must, of course, be with
knowledge of the material facts; nor would the principal be required
to repudiate the act of his agent immediately upon the discovery that
But if,
there had been anything which rendered the sale voidable.
after knowledge of what the agent had done, the principal made no
objection for an unreasonable time, a ratiﬁcation would result by op
eration of law. A
\Vhat is a period long enough to bring about such a resultwould
usually be a question for the jury, depending upon the peculiar cir
But in proceedings to recover the land and
cumstances of each case.“
set aside the deed the pleadings of the principal may themselves allege
enough to show a ratiﬁcation results as matter of law. In the anal
ogous caseof voidable sales to himself by an administrator, it has been
held that failure to repudiate for seven years will raise the presump
tion that the owner acquiesces in the irregular and voidable sales.
Ad
Civ. Code
vantage can be taken of such lapse of time by a demurrer.
l895,§ 3775; Grifﬁn v. Stephens, ll9 Ga. 139, 46 S. E. 66, and cita
If there be a good and sufﬁcient explanation as to why the
tions.
principal did not know of the transaction, or had been unable to dis
there be an excuse for delay in bringing the suit, these
or
cover
facts would have to be specially averred in order to prevent the de
fendant from taking advantage of the acquiescence implied by nonac—
tion for
long lapse of‘ time.
\-Vhether, therefore, the statute of limitations be treated as
bar to
the remedy, or raising
presumption of payment, the demurrer was

a

75111 Peck v. Bitches‘, 66 Mo. 11-1 (1877), the court said that each case must
Under some circumstances
be “governed by its own peculiar circumstances.
the act of the agent would bind the princip:-ii, if he did not immediately re
pudiate it, while other cases may be supposed where his silence for
week
See, also, Stearns v. Johnson, 19 Minn. 540 (Gil.
would not have that effect."
470)

(1873).

In Bredin

&

9

a

:1

&

v. Du Barry, 14 Serg.
R. 30 (1825), Gibson, .T., says that the dis
avowal by the principal must be prompt, at the moment the tact that the
agent has transcended his authority comes to his knowledge. The circum
stances may be such as to demand immediate action; but the better rule re
quires the dissent to be expressed within
reasonable time, under the circum
Lyon v. Tams, 11 Ark. 189 (1850), citing Story
stances oi! the particular case.
on Agency.
The extent to which mere silence may he evidence of ratiﬁcation, even
stranger, at least if he has in good faith assumed to act as
of the act of
agent, is fully discussed in Ladd v. Hildebrant, 27 Wis. 135,
Am. Rep. 445
.T., in Philadelphia, W.
B. R. Co. v.
(1870), citing at length from Woodward,
Cowell. 28 Pa. 336, 70 Am. Dec. 128 (1857).
See, also, Robbins v. Blanding, 87
Minn. 246, 91 N. W. 844 (1902).
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properly sustained. The purchaser took possession in 1889. This was
itself some notice, and, when followed by continued possession under
a deed recorded for 14 years, with nothing to explain why the prin
cipal did not know, or could not learn by the exercise of ordinary care,
of what had been done, the case was within, and not without, the rule.
The period was long enough to raise the presumption of acquiescence
in the act of the agent.
The
Such acquiescence validated the deed.
validation conveyed the title completely to the purchaser.
The claim
for purchase money is barred, there being no averment of a written
or sealed promise to pay the purchase price.
Hays v. Callaway, 58
Ga. 288 (2).
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the effect of the
recitals in the transfer or conveyance to VVhitley. They are strength-‘
ened, however, by a consideration of the recital therein as to the “land
This itself goes far to indicate a ratiﬁcation of the
sold by James."
sale, but with a transfer of the principal’s claim for what would be an
But while the question was argued, the record does not
accounting.
present any question as to whether, under Civ. Code 1895. § 3079, this
claim could be assigned, for James did not except to the judgment re
taining him as a party defendant, and that dismissing the corporations
was proper.
'
Iudgment aﬁirmed.

NICHOLS, SHEPHERD
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

& CO. v.

188.6.

63

Mich.

SHAFFER.
599, 30 N. VV. 383.)

\
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Plaintiﬁ brings error. Afﬁrmed.
Replevin.
CA.\IPBEl.L, C.
10 horse
Plaintiff brought this suit to replevy
power engine, with truck and other appendages, claiming to hold
under
chattel mortgage given in April, 1883. upon this property, and
separator, to secure $1,390 in
upon a 17 horse-power engine and
In Iuly, 1884, one Adams, an agent of plaintiff,
several installments.
Shaﬁer at that
went to defendant to get the mortgaged property.
time gave him up all the other property, but desired to keep this en
This was in fact left, and the rest taken away. At the same
gine.
time
portable saw-mill was turned over to Adams, and included in
All
new chattel mortgage of the same conditions as the old one.
the other property, including this saw—mill, was sold under the mort
No extension of time, or other legal consideration
gage security.
The whole dispute
the
sa\v-mill
the case
mortgage.
for
passed
arises upon whether this was merely an additional security, or whether
the saw-mill was put in upon the consideration that the property now
replevied should be released from the mortgage. The jury found for
Gonn.Ps.& A.(2n En.)—10
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If defendant and his witnesses told the truth, and the jury evidently
believed them, then there was no question but that the saw-mill wa_s
intended to be a substitute for the engine which was released. Upon
this question the verdict is conclusive, if the other difficulties suggested
do not stand in the way.
The
The principal contest is upon the authority of Mr. Adams.
court told the jury he had no authority to make the exchange, unless
it was ratiﬁed, but left itto the jury to determine whether it was rat
iﬁed or not. The several assignments of error all bear upon this ques
i
tion of ratiﬁcation.
It appears from the record that one \lVorden, the collecting agent
of plaintiff, went in October, 1884, to Shaffer, and wanted this en
and that Shaffer claimed
had been released;
gine, and did not get
and this replevin suit was the sequel to this visit.
also appears that
the saw-mill was sold on foreclosure, as well as the other property,
and appropriated for the beneﬁt of plaintiff.
There was considerable
testimony concerning the value of the various articles, and about the
dealings of the parties, which had some bearing on the probabilities.
We see no reason why’
was not admissible, and we think
was also
proper to show the profession and assumptions of authority of the
various agents who appeared in the matter.
These alone would not
But
was of the utmost im
p'rove agency, and so the court held.
portance to know on what understanding the saw-mill mortgage was
given.
We have no doubt that the court was correct in its various instruc
tions to the effect that plaintiff could not avail itself of the saw-mill
was made.
mortgage, and repudiate the consideration for which
Whatever may have been the authority of Adams to release the en-‘
gine from the ﬁrst mortgage, there can beino doubt that what he did
and represented
obtaining the saw-mill mortgage bound the plain
tiff,
plaintiff chose to keep and enforce that instrument.
thereby,
at least, ratiﬁed his agency in taking
and must be responsible for
was obtained. Any other doctrine would lead
the manner in which
could not demand or recover the prop
to strange consequences.
erty involved in this suit without restoring what was taken by its agent
in lieu of it." Whether the,corporate action had become irrevocable
or not before Gordon’s visit in October, 1884, full notice was given
them, and its liability was thereafter ﬁxed. No attempt has been made
Plaintiff has_put itself upon
to restore Shaffer’s rights.
denial of
them, and the jury has found against its denials.
The issue
very simple one, and does not call for much discus
sion. The judgment must be afﬁrmed.

a

1'! But an action against the agent to hold him accountable for his wrongful
acts against the principal ls not necessarily a ratiﬁcation of his acts, so as to
affect
third person's liability to the principal. Barnsdall
‘ v. O'Day, 134 Fed.
828, 67 o. 0. A. 278 (1905).
Gono.Pa.& A. (21) En.)
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32, 24 Rev.
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Assumpsit on a contract for the sale of ninety tons of oil per ship
Naiad.
At the trial, before
Plea, the general issue, non-assumpsit.
Abbott, C. ]., at the GuildhalL sittings, after last term, the plaintiff had
a verdict.
The case was this: Messrs. Soames and Tennant, the plaintiffs,
were jointly interested in part of the cargo of the ship Naiad.
Before
the arrival of the vessel, Soames, without the knowledge or authority
of Tennant, sold the‘ oil in question, in which they were jointly inter
The
ested, to the defendants, through the medium of Lintot, a broker.
only evidence of the contract was the broker’s note, signed by the
broker, but Tennant was not named in the note.
Some time after this,
Tennant, hearing of the contract, wrote to the defendants, apprizing
them that he was jointly interested in the oil with Soames, that the
contract had been entered into without his knowledge or authority,
and that he considered himself released from, and would not be bound
A communication then tool-: place between the defendants and
by it.
Tennant, who endeavored to prevail upon them to release him from the
contract, but they declined, saying they would hold him and the other
plaintiﬁ to it. In consequence of this intimation, Tennant acquiesced,
and said, the oil “then must be delivered.”
All this took place in the
month of September, 1819, before the vessel arrived, each party con
sidering himself bound by the contract. The vessel arrived in Janu
ary, 1820, and then Lintot, the broker, waited on the plaintiﬂs with
He saw one of the defendants, to whom the samples were
samples.
delivered, and by him accepted.
The broker asked him if he was in
clined to take the remainder of the plaintiff's share of the Naiad’s
cargo, but he declined. The prompipwould expire on the 12th of Feb
ruary, and six or seven days before then, the defendants refused to be
bound by the contract.
The learned judge charged the jury, under
these circumstances, that the plaintiffs, were entitled to recover, and
they had a verdict accordingly, with liberty to the defendants to move
to enter a nonsuit if the Court should be of opinion, that the contract
declared upon was not binding.
A.Bno'r'r, C. J. I am of opinion, that the verdict in this case was
The case turns upon the question, whether the original con
right.
He was no party to it at ﬁrst, and, in
tract was ratiﬁed by Tennant.
but in the‘result he assents to
fact, afterwards repudiated
and
then understood by all
says—“then the oil must be delivered.”
to be
in the month of
This
parties that
binding contract.
September. In january the oil arrives, and then the defendants, act
not until the very last
ing upon the contract, take samples, and
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moment, when the prompt is about to expire, that they make any ob
The jury asked me, whether, in point of law, they might ﬁnd
jection.
a verdict for the plaintiffs.
‘I said, that in my opinion, a subsequent
ratiﬁcation of a contract is equivalent to a prior authority ; and I told
them, that if they thought Tennant did ratify the contract, and that
with the knowledigemof the" defendants, and they acceded to it, it was
t@late__f<l'_ them to say, at any after time, that they were not bound
That is the way I left the case to the jury. They
by the contract.
found for the plaintiffs, and I think they came to a just conclusion.
within
BAYLEY, I. I am of the same opinion. The broker's note
The original
the statute of frauds, evidence -of
written contract.
Tennant subsequently
authority to sell need not be in writing, and
became
ratiﬁed the contract entered into by assenting to
binding
'
.
contract.
In this case, according to the evidence, there was
HOLROYD,
subsequent ratiﬁcation by Tennant of the original contract, and,
think, that
sufficient to give
validity though originally made with
out his authority.- His subsequent ratiﬁcation amounts to an original
and the maxim of the law is: “Omne actum ab agentis in
authority
tentione est judicandum."
Rule refused.
/

»

;

R

(Court

of Common

Pleas,

1s2s.

4

'

MACLEAN

v.

DUNN.

Bingham,

722,

13

o. L. 712.)

a

One Ebsworth,
London wool broker, sold for the account of plain
tiff Russian and German wool to defendant, and in turn bought from
defendants for plaintiff Spanish wool, giving bought and sold notes
The notes were not signed by Dunn, but there was evidence
therefor.
that he afterwards orally ratiﬁed the act of the other defendant, Vl/at
kins, in authorizing Ebsworth to make the contract.
Maclean now
brings special assumpsit for not accepting and paying for the Russian
and German wool. Verdict for plaintiff and defendant obtained a rule
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new trial.
nisi to enter
nonrsuit or have
BEST, C.
has been argued, that the subsequent adoption of
the contract by -Dunn will not take this case out of the operation of the
has been insisted, that the agent should have
statute of frauds; and
entered into. If such had been
his authority at the time the contract
would have been expressed more
the intention of the legislature,
clearly; but the statute only requires some note or memorandum in
writing, to be signed by theparty to be charged, or his agent thereunto
lawfully authorized; leaving us to the rules of common law, as to the
Now, in all other
to receive his authority.
mode in which the agent
considered the same thing in effect as
cases,
subsequent sanction
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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assent at the time. “Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato sequi
And in my opinion, the subsequent sanction of a contract
signed by an agent, takes it out of the operation of the statute more
\V here the author
satisfactorily than an authority given beforehand.
ity is given beforehand, the party must trust to his agent: if it be
given subsequently to the contract, the party knows that all has been
done according to his wishes. But in Kinnitz v. Surry, where the bro
ker, who signed the broker’s note upon a sale/of corn, was the seller’s
held, that if the buyer acted upon the note,
agent, Lord Ellenborough
that was such an adoption of his agency as made his note sufﬁcient
within the statute of frauds; and in Soames v. Spencer, 1 Dow. & Ry.
32, where A. and B., being jointly interested in a quantity of oil, A.
entered into a contract for the sale of
without the authority or
knowledge of B., who, upon receiving information of the circumstance,
refused‘ to be bound, but afterwards assented by parol, and samples
were delivered to the vendees,
was held, in an action against the ven
bind
dees, that B.’s subsequent ratiﬁcation of the contract rendered
was to be considered as
contract in writing within the
ing, and that
statute of frauds.
That
an express decision on the point, that under
the statute of frauds the ratiﬁcation of the principal relates back to
*
the time when the agent made the contract.
Rule discharged.

TOWN OF ANSONIA
(Supreme

Court of Errors of Connecticut,

v.

189-1.

*

*

is

a

it

it

it

it,

paratur."

COOPER.
64 Conn.

536,

30

Atl.

7G0.)
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Part of the opinion is omitted.
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fund paid into court by the
Interpleader among the claimants of
school site.
the answer and
town of Ansonia for land taken for
claim of Henry Alling, Elizabeth Downs demurred, and the court sus
Chas. Cooper had owned the land. On his death
tained the demurrer.
to his widow for life. She sold the fee and gave a warranty
he left
On her death her four sons divided
deed under which Alling claimed.
the unused balance of the purchase price and the other personal prop
verbal agreement to accept such
erty left by their father, under
amounts as complete distribution and settlement of their claims under
The fourth son, Alfred
his will. Three sons quitclaimed to Alling.
Cooper, after the beginning of these proceedings, assigned his claims
to Elizabeth Downs.
The said Alfred Cooper knew when
ANDREWS, C.
he made said agreement and received said money that the amount he
received under and pursuant to the said agreement was the money
which the said Elizabeth Cooper received from the sale of the said
real estate conveyed by her, the said Elizabeth Cooper, as aforesaid,
and he had full knowledge that the said real estate had been sold and

ran
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conveyed by full warranty deed, and that the said Henry G. Ailing
was then in the possession of said land, claiming title thereto by virtue
of‘ the deed which had been given by the said Elizabeth Cooper as
aforesaid.
These facts, being admitted by the demurrer, must, for the purposes
of the present discussion, be taken as proved and found by the court.
Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper may be laid out
of the case. They have each released to Mr. Alling. The rights of
Elizabeth Downs are just the same as, and no greater than, the rights
of Alfred Cooper. Her assignment from him was since the commence
ment of the condemnation proceedings.
Before the Superior Court, the parties seemed to have discussed only
the question of estoppel. The ‘court, in its memorandum of decision,
The
placed its conclusion on the ground that there was no estoppel.
briefs in this court are largely made up of the same discussion.
that was the only question in the case, we might we led to agree with
the Superior Court.
But estoppel is not the doctrine of the case.
There is another ground clearly set forth in the answer of Mr. Alling,
on which it seems to us the answer should have been held suﬁicient,
and the demurrer overruled.
And that ground is that Alfred Cooper
has ratiﬁed the sale of his land made by his mother.
The language of
the answer is explicit: That Alfred Cooper and his brothers
received
said sum of money in lieu and in place of the real estate which had
been devised to them by their father, but had been sold by their moth
er, and said parties intended, by the division of said money among
them, to ratify and conﬁrm the sale of said real estate by the said Eliza
beth Cooper. And the said Alfred Cooper knew when he received said
money that the amount which he received was the money which the
said Elizabeth Cooper had received from the sale of the said real es
tate, and he had full knowledge that the said real estate had been sold
and conveyed by a full warranty deed.
then, the condition of things:
This
Mrs. Elizabeth Cooper, with
out authority to do so, sold and undertook to convey land which be
She received the full ‘value of the land in
longed to Alfred Cooper.
money. Her grantee entered into possession of the land conveyed, and
Alfred Cooper, knowing all
claims to. have a complete title thereto.
these facts, and intending to ratify and conﬁrm the sale of his said
land, has received that money and applied
to his own use, and still
Ratiﬁcation means the adoption by
person, as binding up
keeps it.
on himself, of an act done in such relations that he may claim
as
done for his beneﬁt,“ although done under such circumstances as
would not bind him, except for his subsequent assent, as where an act
was done by
stranger having at the time no authority to act as his
The acceptance
agent, or by an agent not having adequate authority.
of the results of the act with an intent to ratify, and with full knowl
a
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80Compare

ante, p. 96 and note.
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Ratiﬁcation
edge of all the material circumstances, is a ratiﬁcation.
makes the contract, in all respects, what it would have been if the requi
site power had existed when it was entered into. It relates back to the
execution of the contract, and renders it obligatory from the outset.“
The party ratifying becomes a party to the contract, and
on the one
hand, entitled to all its beneﬁts, and on the other,
bound by its terms.
Am. Rep. 427; Edwards v. Rail
Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. 217,
road Co.,
C. 650-672; And. Law Dict. in verb.; Stanton
Mylne
v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 285, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep. 110.
Alfred Cooper, having ratiﬁed the sale of his land by his mother,
and now, through his assignee, seeking to obtain the money in the
hands of this court,
in the position of one who has verbally con
tracted to convey his land to another, has put that other into possession,
has received his pay in full in money, and, while keeping the money,
needs no argu
trying to get the price of his land the second time.
the strongest possible
ment—or, rather, the statement of the case
And, as
cannot
argument—to show that he ought not to succeed.
succeed, so also his assignee, Elizabeth Downs, cannot.
er
There
ror. The demurrer should be overruled.
The judgment sustaining the demurrer
reversed. The other judg
es concurred.

GRANT
Judicial

(Supreme

Court

v.

BEARD.

of New Hampshire,

.
1870.

50

N. H. 129.)

if

a

is

I.

ly

Plaintiff alleged
Assumpsit to recover for repairs on two wagons.
that defendants’ father, who brought the wagons to be repaired, was
their agent and could and did bind them to pay for the repairs.
Whether the father was their agent, whether they owned the wagons
or received any beneﬁt from the repairs, and whether they subsequent
assented to and ratiﬁed the contract, were the questions in dispute,
on which the evidence was conﬂicting.
The ratiﬁcation, upon full knowledge of all the circum
Fos'r!~:R,
stances of the case, of an act done by one who assumes to be an agent,
prior authority.
By such ratiﬁcation the party will
equivalent to
he had originally
be bound as fully, to all intents and purposes, as
given express authority or direction concerning the act.
A parol contract may be ratiﬁed by an express parol recognition of
or by silence when the
the act, or by conduct implying acquiescence,

a

a

a

§

81 See. also, Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627 (1852). quoting from Story on
244, and Grant v. Beard, 50 N. H. 129 (1870) ante p. 125.
Agency,
retrospective effect and is equivalent to
"Subsequent ratiﬁcation has
prior command. To say that an agent entered into
contract without author
ity trom his principal, and that the principal subsequently ratiﬁed such con
tract, is in legal intendment and eﬁect the equivalent of saying the agent was
duly authorized to make the e0ntract." Kraft v. Wilson, 104 Cal. xvii, 37 Pac.
790

(1894).
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party, in good faith, ought to speak. And so the principal may be
Story on Agency, §
estopped to deny the agent’s original authority.
239; Metcalf on Contracts, 112; Hatch v. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538;
Despatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 232, 37 Am. Dec. 203;
Davis v. School District, 44 N. H. 399; \/Varren v. Wentworth, 45 N.
H. 564; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 194; Ohio & Mississippi R. C0. v.
Middleton, 20 Ill. 629.
Such ratiﬁcation relates back to and incorporates the original con
tract or transactions, so that, as between the parties, their rights and
interests are to be considered as arising at the time of the original act,
and not merely from the date of the ratiﬁcation; and a suit to enforce
to all intents» and
the obligation assumed by the party who ratiﬁes
suit founded upon the original act or contract, and not on
purposes,
the act of ratiﬁcation.
Davis v. School District, before cited; Low
v. Railroad, 46 N. H. 284; Doggett v. Emerson,
Story. 737, Fed.
\'Voodb.
M. 342, Fed. Cas. No.
Cas. No. 3,960; Mason v. Crosby,
Cranch, 153,
9,234; Clark's Executors v. Van Riemsdyk,
L. Ed.
688; Culver v. Ashley, 19 Pick. 301; Forsyth v. Day, before cited.
Therefore the original consideration applies to the ratiﬁcation, thus
made equivalent to an original contract, and supports the implied prom
founded.
ise upon which the present action
The ratiﬁcation operates directly, and not merely as presumptive evi
dence that the act was originally done by the authority of the defend
ants; and therefore
unnecessary to consider whether or not the
The subsequent assent
evidence tends to show an original authority.
no valid dis
conﬁrmation of the agent’s act; and there
is, per se,
ratiﬁcation of the agent's act, and
direct and orig
tinction between
Where
inal promise to pay_ for the services rendered by the plaintiff.
consideration for the original engagement
ever there would have been
no agent or party assuming to act as agent had intervened, such orig
suﬁicient to sustain the act of ratiﬁcation.
inal consideration
the subject of a new consideration, to
In none of the cases cited
ratiﬁcation,
to as necessary; but the logical de
alluded
the
support
duction from the principle that the ratiﬁcation relates back to and cov
wholly inconsistent with such
proposi
ers the original agreement,
tion; and the contrary doctrine
expressly held in numerous cases.
Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Warren, l5 N. Y. 583, and cases cited.
There was abundant evidence, in the‘present case, from which the
jury might have found that the defendants owned the wagons and re
ceived
positive beneﬁt from the repairs; but such evidence and such
not material that the par
ﬁnding were wholly unnecessary, because
beneﬁt from the other party's
ty making the promise should receive
sufficient
act;
any trouble, prejudice, expense, or inconvenience
made.
Metcalf on Con
accrued to the party to whom the promise
Parsons on Contract, 431.
tracts, 163;
We are therefore of the opinion that the instruction of the court to
the jury “that
they found that the defendants did not authorize their
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father to make the contract as their agent, but after_war_ds assented to
what he had done, their assent would not make them liable unless they
owned the wagons at the time they were repaired, or received some
beneﬁt from the repairs,” was erroneous; and for this reason the ver
dict must be set aside, and a new trial granted.”

GRAHAM

v.

\-VILLIAMS.

(Supreme Court of Georgia, 1901.

114 Ga. 716. 40 S.

E.

790.)

" See.

also. First National Bank of Trenton v. Gay.
ante, p. 90_

430 (1976).

61-‘!
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a

a

a

a

a
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SIMMONS, C.
An equitable petition was ﬁled by Graham against
certain lot of land
Williams and others.
alleged that he had title to
in Appling county, and that the defendants, claiming the land under
some pretended title which they had failed to record, had entered upon
the land, and committed trespass by cutting timber and boxing the trees
chain of title, and alleged that
for turpentine.
The petition set out
the plaintiff and defendants claimed under
named common grantor.
The defendants admitted that they claimed under the common grantor
named in the petition, and alleged that they had title to the land. The
petition alleged that the plaintiff's immediate grantor was one Einstein,
who conveyed the land to plaintiff in 1892. The plaintiff prayed for
an injunction to restrain the defendants from committing any further
trespass, for a cancellation of the defendants’ deeds, and for damages
for the trespass.
At the trial of the case he introduced in evidence deeds commenc
ing with that from the common grantor, and closed his evidence with
deed purporting to have been made by an attorney in fact of Einstein,
deed from Einstein himself to the
plaintiff's immediate grantor, and
plaintiff, made and executed after the commencement of the suit. In
this last deed Einstein, after reciting, in substance, that the power of
attorney given his attorney in fact was not sufﬁciently comprehensive
in its terms to authorize the attorney in fact to sell and convey this
tract of land fully ratiﬁed and conﬁrmed the deed made by the said
The record does not dis
attorney, and conveyed the land to Graham.
close that Graham was, or ever had been, in possession of the land.
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the court, on motion, granted
rlonsuit upon the ground that the evidence showed that at the com
mencement of the action by the plaintiff he did not have sufﬁcient title
Graham excepted, and brought the case here
to authorize a recovery.
for review.
wheth
Under the above facts the sole question to be determined
er the deed of ratiﬁcation made by Einstein after the commencement
of the suit related back to the execution of the deed by the attorney
in fact, so as to authorize the plaintiff to recover against the defend
M0. 33, 21 Am. Rep.
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ants.
It was contended in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error
that the ratiﬁcation by Einstein of the act of his agent related back to
the time of the execution and delivery of the agent’s deed to the plain
tiff, although the power of attorney given the agent did not authorize
him to convey this land. There is no doubt that the contention of the
plaintiffs counsel embodies a rule which is generally true. Generally
the ratiﬁcation of an unauthorized act by an agent relates back and
becomes the act of the principal 'as of the time when the unauthorized
act was performed.
\Vhile this is generally true, there is an exception
to the rule,“ which is that such a ratiﬁcation does not so relate back__as
to affect the rights of other parties which have intervened and accrued
between the time of the unauthorized act and that of the ratiﬁcation.
Mechem,iAg. § 168; Story, Ag. (9th Ed.) § 245; Whart. Ag. § 77;
Evans v. Coleman, lOl Ga. 152, 28 S. E. 645. These authorities, and
the decisions which they cite, all hold that, when rights of third par
ties have intervened between the unauthorized act and its ratiﬁcation,
the latter does not relate back so as to affect those rights.
If such
were not the rule, Einstein might have conveyed this land to a third
person subsequently to the unauthorized deed by his agent, and there
after, by ratifying and conﬁrming the agent’s act, defeated the rights
of the person to whom he had himself conveyed the land.
2. Having established that there is an exception of this nature to the
general rule, it remains only to determine whether the defendants had
in the present case acquired such rights as would come within the ex
ception. In the ﬁrst place, it is a well-established rule that a plaintiff
must recover upon facts as they existed at the time of the commence
ment of the action. Those facts constitute his cause of action.
new and additional facts arise after the commencement of the suit, he
cannot rely upon them as ground for a recovery.
If the facts upon
which his suit is predicated are insufficient to authorize a recovery by
him, the defendants have a legal right to ask the court for a nonsuit,
and, under the law, the court would be compelled to grant it. In the
present case the plaintiff virtually admitted, by putting in evidence the
deed of ratiﬁcation, that‘ his title was not sufficient, at the time suit
was brought, to have sustained a recovery; for the deed of ratiﬁcation
states, in substance, that the power of attorney made by Einstein to
his agent was not broad enough to authorize the agent to convey the
land. The defendants had the right, under the facts as they stood at
the time suit was commenced, to have a nonsuit.
They had the right
to have the case tried upon the facts as they existed at the time of the
The plaintiff had no right to interject
commencement of the suit.
what might be called a new party, Einstein, and a new title originating
after the commencement of the suit.

If

/

83 See, also, Shnenfeldt v. Junkerman (Oi O.) 20 Fed. 857 (1884), ratiﬁcation
as affecting locus contracti ; Harrison v. Colton, 31 Iowa, 16 (1870), ratiﬁcation
of‘ a Sunday contract; and Right v. Cuthell, 5 East, 491 (1804).
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of Wittenbrock v. Bellmer, 57 Cal. 12, it appeared that
of a building and loan association had, without authority,

transferred a note and mortgage to \Vittenbrock, who commenced pro
ceedings to foreclose the mortgage. After the action had been pending
for several months, the trustees of the association ratiﬁed the previous
action of its president in the premises.
“VVe are
The court said:
unable to discover any principle upon which the defendant’s rights
could be affected by such ratiﬁcation.
Conceding that at the date of
the commencement of the action the plaintiff had no cause of action, it
does not seem to us that he could maintain the action upon la cause of
action subsequently acquired against the defendant.
The case was at
issue, and, if it had been tried at any time prior to the date of the rati
ﬁcation, the judgment must have been for the defendant.
Could a
stranger to the action step in at any time before the trial, and deprive
the defendant of that right by placing in the hands of his adversary an
instrument upon which he might have maintained an action, or one
which he alleged that he had, but in fact did not have, when he com
menced the action?
Clearly not. If a party has no cause of action
at the time of the institution of his action, he cannot maintain it by
ﬁling a supplemental complaint founded upon matters which have sub
sequently occurred.”
Similar rulings were made by the same court
in Taylor v. Robinson, 14 Cal. 396, and McCracken v.’ City of San
Francisco, 16 Cal. 624. In 61 Am. Dec. 88, Mr. Freeman, in his notes
to Persons v. McKibben, 5 Ind. 261, in which the ruling was contrary
to that made in Wittenbrock v. Bellmer, cites_the latter case, and says
* is the better de
* *
that “the ruling of the California case
cision."
The same view of the law was taken by the supreme court of the
United States in Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 VVall. 86, 18 L. Ed. 542, and
In the latter case VVit
in Cool-: v. Tullis, 18 Vi/all. 338, 21 L. Ed. 933.
tenbrock v. Bellmer is cited with approval.
In the notes to Atlee v.
Bartholomew
(~VVis.) 5 Am. St. Rep’. 103, 114 (s. c. 69 Wis. 43, 33
N. \V. 110), it was said: “As a general rule, if a party has a com
plete cause of action or defense when a suit is commenced, he cannot
be deprived thereof, pendente lite, by his adversary, or some other
party, ratifying some act or contract which at the commencement of
the action was without any binding force for want of such ratiﬁca
See, also, Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St. 5,14; Fiske v. Holmes,
tion."
41 Me. 441 : Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 806. 42 Am. Dec. 612.
Having shown that ratiﬁcation does not so relate back as to affect
the intervening rights of third persons, and that these defendants ac
quired rights before the ratiﬁcation pendente lite, we are of opinion
that the judge did not err in granting a nonsuit.“ Judgment afﬁrmed.
All the justices concurring.

“See especially
Cohen. cited supra.

Wood v. McCain, Taylor v. Robinson.
Contra as to cause of action, p. 156.
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PERRY
(Supreme

v.

(Part

1

HUDSON.

Court of Georgia,

1851.

10 Ga. 362.)

Action by Oliver H. Perry to recover money paid as security for
Plea, gen
defendant under judgment in \Vilcox county, Alabama.
eral issue and payment.
Verdict for defendant. The court refused
a new trial.
Plaintiff excepted and now assigns theseiexceptions for
error.
WARNER, ]. The plaintiff in error insists upon two of the grounds
only, taken in the bill of exceptions, and our judgment will be restricted
thereto.
[1.] First, that the Court erred in admitting the evidence of Theresa
Killabren, a' witness offered by the defendant. It appears from the
record, that Melton, as the agent of Hudson, the defendant, went to
the state of Alabama,
and instituted three actions of trover in the
name of Hudson, to recover sundry slaves. Being a non-resident, he
was required to give security for the costs of the respective suits, and
the plaintiff became his security; the suits were instituted in the name
of Hudson; were subsequently dismissed, and the costs thereof paid
by Perry, who now brings suit against Hudson, to recover the amount
of costs so paid.
It appears that after the suits had been instituted by Melton, as the
agent of Hudson, in the name of the latter, he went to Alabama, as
sisted in the prosecution of the suits, and continued the same twice on
his afﬁdavit. The continuance of the causes on the afﬁdayit _of‘Hudson,
the plaintiff therein, is not only shewn by the records of the Court in
which the suits were pending, but is also shewn by the testimony of
James T. Johnson, Esq., the attorney, who conducted the suits.
Here, then, we have the most conclusive evidence that Hudson rati
ﬁed the act of his agent in instituting the suits, whatever may have
been the original authority delegated
to him, and by such ratiﬁcation
made the act his own, and bound him as a party plaintiff, for the legal
1 Livermore on Agency, 44.
VVhen
results of the suits thus instituted.
the principal adopts the acts of his agent, such adoptive authority re
lates back to the time of the transaction, and is deemed in law the same
to all purposes, as if it had been given before.
Lawrence v. Taylor,
5

Hill,

113.

The

acts

of ratiﬁcation of the authority of Melton to institute the
suits by Hudson, were not controverted at the trial; indeed, the fact
that he continued the causes twice on his afﬁdavit, appeared of record.
Upon this state of facts, Hudson attempted to shew that the suits were
instituted in Alabama, by Melton, his agent, without his authority, and
therefore he was not liable to pay the costs of the same, and for that
This evidence
purpose the testimony of Killabren was introduced.
was inadmissible, in our judgment, to destroy the effect of his own
conduct, ratifying the institution of the suits as before stated, by prov

I

l
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ing the private understanding between himself and Melton in relation
to the suits, prior to the time it was shewn he had ratiﬁed the institu
tion of them by continuing them, and aiding and assisting in their
The suits were instituted in his name, and if done with
prosecution.
out his authority, why did he not dismiss them? \Vhy did he can
tinue them twice, and aid in the prosecution of them?
[2.] Chancellor Kent states the true doctrine in relation to this ques
tion, when he says:
“It is a very clear and salutary rule in relation
to agencies, that where the principal, with knowledge of all the facts,
adopts or acquiesces in the acts done under an assumed agency, he
cannot be heard afterwards, to impeach them, under the pretence that
they were done without authority, or even contrary to instructions.”
2 Kent’s Com. 616.
The defendant having ratiﬁed the institution of
the suits in Alabama, after a full knowledge that the same had been
done by Melton, in his name, he cannot now be heard, to repudiate
the act, under the pretence that the suits were instituted without his
authority, or contrary to his instructions.
The second objection is to the latter part of the charge of the Court
,
to the jury.
[3.] The Court in the ﬁrst part of its charge to the jury, stated the
principles of the law applicable to the case before it. with clearness
and precision.
But in that portion of its charge, in which it instructed
the jury “that if they believed that Hudson did not order the suits, nor
subsequently adopt them, but that by an agreement with Melton, per
mitted Melton to use his name only, at Melton’s own costs, then, they
.
should ﬁnd for the defendant,” we think there is error.
There is not a particle of evidence in the record, that we can dis
cover, going to shew that Hudson did not adopt and ratify the act of
Melton in instituting the suits, but on the contrary, the evidence is,
that he did adopt and ratify the institution of them, by continuing them
twice on his own aﬁidavit, and assist in the direction and prosecution
of them. This evidence of the plaintiff was not impeached or contro
verted in any manner whatever, as we can ﬁnd in the record; conse
quently, it was" error to instruct the jury in regard to an assumed state
of facts which did not exist; for there was no evidence before them,
which would authorize the belief that Hudson did not subsequently
adopt and ratify the suits, after they had been instituted in the name
of Melton; but the \vhole of the evidence in relation to that point, was
The
the other way, and this was the controlling question in the case.
whole of the latter part of the charge, in our judgment, destroyed the
legal effect of the ﬁrst portion of the charge, which stated the law cor
rectly, and was based upon the evidence of the adoption and ratiﬁca
In Paschal v. Davis, 3 Ga. 256,
tion of the suits by the defendant.
we held it to be error in the Court to charge the jury upon an assumed
state of facts, which had not been proved, and have re-afﬁrmed that
principle in subsequent cases.
Let the judgment of the Court below be reversed.
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COFFIN

v.

(Part

1

GEPHART.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, 1865.

18

Iowa,

256.)

Replevin for a bull. The animal was left by his owner, the plain
tiff, with his tenant, who, after treating him as his own for some time,
sold him to defendant.
Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
COLE, I.“ I. There appears to have been no controversy between
the parties, as to the former ownership of the property by the plain
tiff; but the defendants claim that plaintiff, after a full knowledge of

(M-‘

/:

|'

I

'

LINGENFELDER
(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1895.

v.

*

ii.

*

1

4

8:

:

is

it

a

it,

the sale by his tenant, to the defendant Gephart, acquiesced in and
ratiﬁed the sale, and looked to his tenant for pay for the property.
There was evidence introduced, tending to show these facts.
The defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that, “if any
person, being in the lawful possession, sells the personal property of
another without authority, and the owner subsequently, and with
knowledge of all the circumstances of the sale, acquiesces in, and rati
ﬁes
short time, he becomes thereby bound by
although but for
the sale, and cannot afterwards repudiate
to suit his convenience.”
This instruction, with others of like import, was refused, and such re
fusal
assigned as error.
We think this instruction embodies the law of the case“ and should
have been given. Pars. on Contr. 45, 46, and note a (3d Ed.)
Smith
East, 126-130; Therold v. Smith, 11 Modern,
Durn.
v. Hodson,
* Reversed.
Iowa, 242.
71; Mathews v. Gilliss,

LESCHEN.

13-1 Mo. 55, 34 S.

W.

1089.)

it

Action to recover from an agent $5,009, the alleged difference be
tween the value of certain real estate and the price at which defendant
to plaintiff.
Defendant‘\without
written authority from the
sold
owner contracted that the latter would convey to plaintiff the land in
question by warranty deed free from incumbrances.
Defendant was
willing to return to plaintiff $500 earnest money paid by him, with in
From judgment for $517.75 in his favor, plaintiff
terest thereon.
appeals.
Part of the opinion is omitted.

-

85

86 Accord:
Sanders v. Peck, 87 Fed. 61, 30 C. C. A. 530 (1898); Rowland V.
Barnes, 81 N. C. 234 (1879): Brock v. Jones, 16 Tex. 461 (1856); Hunter v.
Cohe, 84 Minn. 187, 87 N. W. 612 (1901); Woodward v. Harlow, 28 Vt. 338
(1856), in which the principal at ﬁrst disapproved.
But
the principal repu

if

of the agent, he cannot speculate on the rise or fall in
value. and after an unreasonable time ratify it, if
shall appear advantageous
to him. VVilkinson v. Harwell, 13 Ala. 660 (1848).
it

diate the contract
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* "‘ * There is perhaps no principle of law bet
BURGESS,
ter established than that, where an agent undertakes to bind a princi
pal when he has no power to do so, he thereby renders himself per
sonally responsible; and the fact that he, in so doing, may have acted
in the utmost good faith, and honestly believed that he had such pow
er, makes no difference.
Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & VV. 1; Wright
v. Baldwin, 51 M0. 269; Gestring v. Fisher, 46 Mo. App. 603.
The
case last cited was an action for damages against the defendants, who
had, without authority, sold plaintiff a lot in the city of St. Louis, and,
by a written contract executed in the name of Bridge (the supposed
owner of the property) by Fisher 8: Co., agents, promised to make a
perfect title. Rombauer, P. ]., in speaking for the court said: “But
a contract of a real-estate agent in selling property intrusted to him
for that purpose is peculiar. In absence of an express agreement to
the contrary, he does not undertake to bind all claimants of the title,
nor that he will sell an unincumbered, fee-simple title, but only that
he will sell such title as his principal has. Vlfhether the sale be ﬁnally
consummated depends generally upon the further question whether his
principal has ‘a perfect title, or, if not, whether the vendee is satisﬁed
with an imperfect title. The agent, by his agreement to negotiate a
sale, assumes no obligation in reference to the title, unless it was made
a part of his duty to have the title examined before attempting to effect
"‘ *
* or unless he warrants the title to the vendee."
a sale,
We do not understand that defendant, by the terms of the contract
now under consideration, undertook to warrant the title to be in Mrs.
T iekemeier, but that the extent of his undertaking was that she would
This seems clear from the provision in the contract by which
(_i2__§o.
it is agreed by and between the parties thereto that the title to the
property will be conveyed by warranty, and perfect and free from all
There is nothing in the contract which can
liens and incumbrances.
be fairly construed as a promise or agreement on the part of defend
ant to warrant the title, orethat Mrs. Tiekemeier had the title in fee
He only contracted to sell,
at the time the contract was entered into.
for her, her interest in the land; that she would make a warranty deed
thereto,—and as, in doing this, he acted without authority from her,
he should be held to respond in damages to the purchaser, unless the
contract was subsequently, and before the expiration of the time with
in which the deed was to be delivered, ratiﬁed by her.
In Story, Ag. § 251, it is said: “Where a contract which has been
originally made by the agent without authority is afterwards ratiﬁed
that ratiﬁcation will, in general, relieve the agent
by the principal,
from all responsibility on the contract, if it purports to be executed by
him merely as an agent, although, without such ratiﬁcation, he would
or
be liable to the other contracting party for his misrepresentation
Thus, if a person should, in his own name, but
mistake of authority.

I.”

81

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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in the character of agent of the owner, sign a written agreement for
the sale of an estate, without any authority from the owner, and the
latter should afterwards sign the same agreement, and declare thereon
that he sanctioned and approved the agent’s having signed it in his be
half, the agent will no longer be personally liable on the contract, but
his principal only.will be liable, although the agent, without such rati
ﬁcation, might have been liable thereon.” Roby v. Cossitt, 78 Ill. 6381
- The ratiﬁcation
makes the instrument binding on the principal, to
all intents and purposes, as if originally authorized by him; and the
agent will not, under such~ circumstances, be ‘personally liable, unless
his -personal liability is created by the instrument. Bray v. Gunn, 53
Ga. 144. W'hile the authorities are somewhat in conﬂict as to whether
or not the act of a person who assumes to re'present as agent, without
authority from the person in whose name the act is done, may be sub
sequently ratiﬁed by such person, the decided weight is that it may be,
when done with a full knowledge of all the facts, and the evidence of
such knowledge is clear. Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33, 21 Am. Rep. 430.
supra, p. 95, and authorities cited; Bless v. Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647, 31
'
S. W. 938, supra, p. 125.
Mrs. Tiekemeier, with a full knowledge of all the facts and circum
stances attending the execution of the contract, seems to have done
everything that was necessary to ratify the same and make it her con
tract. 'She not only procured a foreclosure of the deed of trust given
by her deceased husband, and tendered to plaintiff a deed to the prop
erty from the purchaser at such sale, but she ‘procured from the heirs
of her husband quitclaim deeds, at the request of plaintiff, and, to
gether with a deed of general warranty executed by herself, tendered
them to plaintiff, and thus, by unequivocal acts, ratiﬁed the contract
of sale made by defendant. It is true that defendant had not obtained
a deed for the property under the trustee's sale, but that fact did not
in any way affect the ratiﬁcation of the contract of sale by her. Mrs.
Tiekemeier being_ unable to pass the title ‘in fee to the property, and
plaintiff having declined to accept such title as she could convey, he
was only entitled to recover from defendant the amount paid by him
as earnest money, and interest thereon, and the court cor_rectly so
ruled.
VVe accordingly affirm the judg
Gestring v. Fisher, supra.
ment.
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TRIGGS
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

1891.

161

JONES.
46

Minn.

277.

48 N.

W.

1113.)

Action by Triggs against his agent Jones (impleaded with \Villiam
O. Cook and Vi/ilton George) asking for the cancellation of deeds from
Triggs to Cook of land in Duluth, and for such other relief as might
be just and equitable. It appeared that Cook owned a patent, half of
which he offered to transfer to Jones if he would promote a corpora
tion for its manufacture.
]ones induced Triggs to subscribe for $15,
000 of stock and to convey the Duluth land in payment. Triggs sent
the deed to Jones, as he claimed, to be held in escrow till the corpora
tion should be formed.
_Iones at once delivered it to Cook, who con
The corporation was never
veyed to George, an innocent purchaser.
formed.
Appeal from judgment for $15,000, with interest, against
Jones.

-

I.” [After disposing of certain questions of procedure,
*
*
*
evidence, and damagesz]
The remaining, and really the
only important question in the case is as to the alleged ratiﬁcation by
plaintiif of the act of ]ones in delivering the deed. It is claimed that,
after knowledge of the facts, plaintiff ratiﬁed jones’ act, and that such
ratiﬁcation operated the same as original authority, and absolved Jones
from all liability, even if the delivery of the deed was unauthorized
when made. The court ﬁnds that Jones immediately informed plain
tiﬂ‘ (by letter dated August 8, 1887) that he had delivered the deed to
Cook, and that plaintiff did not at once repudiate the act, and never
prior to the commencement of this action notiﬁed Cook that he repudi
ated, but left the deed in the possession of Cook. and joined with
Jones in taking the preliminary steps in the formation of the contem
plated corporation, in which it-had been agreed that plaintiff was to
It was_ because of this delay to promptly
receive stock as already stated.
repudiate the act of ]ones that the court refused to grant plaintiff re
lief against defendant George, who was an innocent purchaser.
But
while the facts found may be evidence of a ratiﬁcation, they do not,
as a matter of law, amount to that, at least in favor of ]ones, the party
who committed the unauthorized act.
It is, however, assigned as error that the court failed to ﬁnd that
plaintiﬁ had ratiﬁed the delivery of the deed. It is impracticable to
A careful perusal of it
state. or even discuss, the evidence at length.
satisﬁes us that, while plaintiff was informed by letter as early as
August, 1887, that the deed had been delivered, yet this information
was accompanied and frequently followed by statements and assur
ances from ]ones to the effect that the original arrangement was be
ing or would be carried out, so that he would get his stock as had been
MITCHELL,

j
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agreed, and that Cook would return the deed or reconvey the prop
erty if he (plaintiff) desired, etc., which were calculated to keep plain
tiff quiet, and allay any possible fears on his ‘part; and that, igﬂuenged
and induced by these considerations, he made no express repudiation
of ]ones’ act, but let matters rest, hoping and expecting that the deal
would still be consummated according to agreement, and he get the
stock to which he would be entitled; and that with this hope and ex
pectation, and at the instance of jones, in whom he seemed still to
have implicit conﬁdence, he sent a proxy to one Mahle, authorizing
him to subscribe for stock in his name, and to vote it for officers of
the company at the meeting for organization; "but that ﬁnally having
discovered that the whole scheme had fallen through, and would never
be consummated, he brought this action to recover either the land or
At least, the evidence is such that it would have justiﬁed
damages.
the court in taking this view of the facts.
There is no doubt that the general rule is that, by a ratiﬁcation of
an unauthorized act, the principal absolves the agent from all respon
sibility for loss or damage growing out of the unauthorized transac
tion, and that thenceforward the principal assumes the responsibility
of the transaction, with all its advantages and all its burdens. Neither
is there any question but that, where the rights and obligations of
third persons may depend on his election, the principal is bound to act
and give notice of his repudiation or disaﬂirmance of the unauthorized
act at once, or at least within a reasonable time after knowledge of
the act, and, if he does not so dissent, his silence will afford conclusive
evidence of his approval.
Such a rule is necessary to protect the
If the principal,
rights of third parties who have dealt with the agent.
after knowledge, remains entirely passive, it is but just, when the pro
to presume that what, upon knowl
tection of third ‘parties require
But
edge, he has failed to repudiate, he has tacitly conﬁrmed.
rule do not apply with equal force
apparent that the reasons for such
in favor of the agent himself, who has wrongfully committed the un
authorized act,
Consequently mere passive inaction or silence, which
would amount to an implied ratiﬁcation in favor of third parties, might
not amount to that in favor of the agent, so as to absolve him from
liability to his principal for loss or damage resulting from the unau
such inaction or failure to immediately dis
thorized act, especially
afﬁrm was induced by the assurances or persuasion of the agent him
self.
Nor in this case does the affirmative action of the plaintiff, after
knowledge of the delivery of the deed, in taking part in the prelimi
nary ste‘ps for the organization of the contemplated stock company, of
itself amount to
ratiﬁcation of the unauthorized act. Such steps
were right in the line of the original agreement between the parties,
and were designed to carry
into effect.
Induced, as such action
probably was, by the assurances of ]ones that the enterprise would
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still go on, and plaintiff get his stock, it really amounted to nothing
more than an effort on plaintiﬁ’s part, after knowledge of Jones’ de
viation from his instructions,’ to avoid loss thereby, which is not such
a ratiﬁcation as will relieve theiagent.
Mechem, Ag. § 173.
Upon
proof that Jones’ act was without original authority, the burden was
upon him to show such a subsequent ratiﬁcation as would relieve him
from liability.
The court has not found any such ratiﬁcation, and, in our opinion,
under the evidence, he was justiﬁed in ﬁnding, as he in effect does,
that there was none. Order afﬁrmed.
\r<
.):i~ , .

GOSS
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

A‘

1

'

I
|

4-5

A

STEVENS.
1884.

32

Minn.

472, 21 N.

W.

549.)

a

J.

DICKINSON,
The plaintiffs seek to recover
stipulated compen
for their services, as agents of the defendant, in selling real
At the trial, upon the plaintiffs case being
property of the latter.
The appeal
from an order
closed, the court dismissed the action.
new trial.
refusing
It appeared upon the trial that the defendant, by written memoran
dum, authorized the plaintiffs to sell for him
certain tract of land
upon terms, as to price_ and manner of payment, particularly set forth;
and promised, upon sale of the property, to pay plaintiifs
stated com
mission. The evidence went to show that after this authorization the
plaintiffs agreed with certain parties (Avery and Walters) for the
sale of the property to them, upon terms materially different from
and that the plaintiffs, as agents,
those prescribed b_y the defendant;
statement of the
executed with the purchasers a writing embodying
contract of sale, and
speciﬁc agreement, on the part of Avery and
Walters, to purchase the property on the terms stated therein. In the
body of this instrument the plaintiffs are recited to have made the sale
“as authorized agents,” and to their signature are added the words,
“Agents of L. H. Stevens.” The plaintiffs having proved the execution
of this contract, and having offered evidence going to show that the
offered the contract in evidence. This was
defendant had ratiﬁed
rejected.
\Ve think the court erred.” There was abundant evidence to entitle
the ‘plaintiffs to go to the jury upon the question of ratiﬁcation, going
to show that the defendant, after he had been advised as to the terms
of the contract which had been made by his agents in his behalf, ac
it,

a

a

a

a

a

a

is

sation

6

09 Shepherd v. Gibbs, S5 Mich. 85. 48 N. W. 179 (1891): Hermann v. Sherln,
S. D. 82, 60 N. W. 145 (1894): Schanz v. Martin, 37 Misc. Rep. 492, 75 N. Y.
Supp. 997 (1902), holding that ratiﬁcation does not relieve the agent of all

liability, but only for acting without authority.

Menkens

v. Watson,

27 Mo. 163 (1858).

He must still account.

C_t.
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quiesced in and conﬁrmed their acts. Since the agents might have been
orally authorized to make the sale (Brown v. Eaton, 21 Minn. 409;
Dickerman v. Ashton, 21 Minn. 538), their unauthorized acts done in
defendant's behalf might be ratiﬁed in any manner expressing his as
sent thereto.
It was not necessary that the ratiﬁcation be in writing.
Brown v. Eaton, 21 Minn. 409, 410. Ratiﬁcation of the unauthorized
sale would relate back to the acts of the agent and be equivalent to
Stewart v. Mather, 32 VVis. 344; Nesbitt v. Helser,
prior authority.

Mo. 383.
This contract, if ratiﬁed by the defendant so as to cure the variance
from the prescribed terms of sale, would have been prima facie proof
of the plaintiffs’ right to recover. It bound the purchasers .to take the
property upon the terms stated, and this constituted a sale of the prop
erty within the meaning of the agreement between the plaintiﬂs and
the defendant.
Goss v. Broom, 31 Minn. 434, 18 N. W. 290; Rice v.
Mayo, 107 Mass. 550. The contract bears upon its face the character
of a contract between the plaintiffs’ principal, executed through them

49

In an action upon the contract parol
and the purchasers.
evidence would be admissible, if any proof was necessary, to disclose
the defendant as the principal in whose behalf thecontract was made.
Rowell v. Oleson, 32 Minn. 288, 20 N. W. 227, and cases cited. Hav
ing bound the parties by an authorized contract, any inability or re
fusal of the principal to consummate the contract which he had au
thorized should not affect the agents’ right to compensation.
Mooney
v. Elder, 56 N. Y. 238; Delaplaine v. Turnley, 44 VVis. 31; Phelan v.
Gardner, 43 Cal. 306; Nesbitt v. Helser, 49 Mo. 383. .
The order refusing a new trial is reversed, and a new trial awarded.
as agents,

QVERBY

V.

OVERBY.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1866.

18

'

La. Ann.

54-6.)

HYMAN, C. ]. In the year 1863, one of plaintiﬁ"’s brothers brought
of plaintiffs cotton and stored it at Mr. Billings’ plantation, in
the parish of Morehouse.
Plaintiff, who resided in Kentucky, came to this state, and, when
about to return to that state, he left the cotton in charge of his brother,
E. P. Overby, to do with it as if it was his own.
‘
In the year 1864, the cotton-burners of the Confederate States vis
ited the said ‘parish, and commenced their work of destruction.
E. P. Overby, desirous of saving his brother’s cotton from being
a lot

burned, applied to several persons to get them to remove and con
ceal the same from the burners, offering a half of the cotton that
might be saved by removal and concealment, to any person who would
undertake to remove and conceal it. This proposition, refused by sev
eral, was accepted by \\’illiam R. \Vard, who removed, concealed and

camrron
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saved one hundred and seventeen bales of the cotton, and E. P. Overby
(Ward) 581/§ bales of same.
,Ward to recover of him the 581/2 bales
Plwaintiﬁ’ in this’case sued
of cotton, or their value. One of the defenses set up by Ward in his

gave him

answer is, that the agent, E. P. Overby, had authority to make the con
tract, and that plaintiff had ratiﬁed the acts of the agent. The trial
of the case resulted in a verdict-and judgment for defendant. Plain
tiff has appealed.
;
On plaintiff’s coming again into this state, he was informed, on
inquiry, that his brother, E. P. Overby, had saved some of his (plain
tiff’s) cotton, by giving one-half for removing the other. He replied,
on receiving this information,
that whatever his brother had done
would be satisfactory to him.
His not dissenting, but rather assenting, to what had been done by
his agent, ratiﬁed the contract that his agent had made with \/Vard.
A ratiﬁcation by the principal, of a contract made by his agent, not
authorized to make such contract, binds the principal, as fully as if
the agent had been empowered to make the contract.
Civil Code, No.
2990.”
Judgment affirmed, plaintiff to pay costs.

E.

\
(Supreme Judicial

DEMPSY

v.

CHAMBERS.

Court pt Massachusetts, 1891. 154 Mass.
13 L. R. A. 219, 26 Am. St. Rep. 249.)

330, 28 N.

E.

279,
-

HOLMES, J. This is an action of tort to recover damages for the
The glass was broken by the neg
breaking of a plate-glass window.
ligence of one McCullock while delivering some coal which had been
It is found as a fact that
ordered of the defendant by the plaintiff.
McCullock was not the defend.ant’s servant when he broke the window,
but that the “delivery of the coal by [him] was ratiﬁed by the de
fendant, and that such ratiﬁcation made McCullock in law the agent
On this
and servant of the defendant in the delivery of the coal.”
ﬁnding the court ruled “that the defendant, by his ratiﬁcation of the
delivery of the coal by McCullock, became responsible for his negli
"1
The defendant excepted to this
gence in the delivery of the coal.”
9° See, also, Brock v. Jones, 16 Tex. 461 (1856); Hunter v. Cobe, 84 Minn.
187. 87 N. W. 612 (1901); Lee v. Fontaine, 10 Ala. 755. 44 Am. Dec. 505 (1846):
Walker v. Walker, 5 Heisk. (’1‘enn.) 425 (1871).
And. in general it matters
not whether the agent used his name or that of his principal, so long as the
bargain as carried out was ratiﬁed by the principal, Campbell,
., in Stansell
V. Leavitt, 51 Mich. 536, 16 N. W. 892 (1883).
91 Moore v. Rogers, 51 N. C. (6 Jones) 297 (1859), quoting Lord Coke:
“He

J

that receiveth a trespasser and agreeth to a trespass after it is done is no
trespasser, unless the trespass was done to his use or for his benefit, and then
his agreement subsequent amounteth to a commandment;
for in that omnis
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ruling, and to nothing else. VVe must assume that the ﬁnding was war
ranted by the evidence, a majority of the court being of the opinion
that the bill o'f exceptions does not purport to set forth all the evi
dence on which the ﬁnding was made. Therefore the only question be
fore us is as to the correctness of the ruling just stated.
If we were contriving a new code to-day we might hesitate to say
that a man could make himself a party to a bare tort in any case merely
by assenting to it after it had been committed. But we are not at lib
erty to refuse to carry out to its consequences any ‘principle which we
believe to have been part of the common law simply because the grounds
must be justiﬁed seem to us to be hard to ﬁnd.
policy on which
and probably to have belonged to
different state of society.
master
liable to the extent that he
hard to explain why
his servant, act
for the negligent acts of one who at the time really
his
within
the
of
general
employment.
Probably
scope
ing
master and
ﬁction which
an echo
servant are “feigned to be all one person” by
of the patria potestas and of the English frankpledge.- Byington v.
Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 170, 45 Am. Rep. 314; Fitzh. Abr. “Corone,”
another aspect of the
pl. 428.
Possibly the doctrine of ratiﬁcation
The requirement that the act should be done in the
same tradition.
name of the ratifying ‘party looks that way.
New England Dredging
Co. v. Rockport Granite Co., 149 Mass. 381, 382, 21 N. E. 947; Fuller
Trimwell’s Case,
12; De Reg. Jur.
Leon. 215, 216; Sext. Dec.
14, gloss., and cases next cited.
Reg. 9; D. 43, 26, 13; D. 43, 16,
The earliest instances of liability by way of ratiﬁcation in the Eng
man retained prop
lish law, so far as we have noticed, were where
erty acquired through the wrongful act of another. Y. B. 30 Edw.
128 (Roll’s Ed.
39 Lib. _Ass. 223, pl. 9; S. C. 38 Edw. III. 18; 12
ad ﬁn. 27, 31. See Bract. 158b, 159a,
pl. 23; Plowd.
Edw. IV.
171b.
But in these cases the defendant’s assent was treated as relat
ing back to the original act, and at an early date the doctrine of rela
tion was carried so far as to hold that, where
trespass would have
been justiﬁed
had been done by theauthority by which
purport
ed to have been done,
subsequent ratiﬁcation might also justify it.
Hen. IV. 34, pl.
Y. B.
This decision
qualiﬁed in Fitzh. Abr.
and doubted in Brooke, Abr. “Trespass,” pl. 86, but
“Bayllye,” pl.
has been followed and approved so continuously and in so many
would be hard to deny that the common law was
later cases that
as there stated by Chief ]ustice Gascoigne.
Godb. 109, 110, pl. 129;
Leon, .196, pl. 246; Hull v. Pickersgill,
Brod.
B. 282; Muskett
v. Drummond, 1O Barn.
C. 153, 157; Buron v. Denman,
Exch. 167,
178; Secretary of State v. Sahaba, 13 Moore, P. C. 22, 86; Cheetham
v. Mayor, etc., L. R. 10 C. P. 249; Wiggins v. U. S.,
Ct. Cl. 412.

1

21

4

ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato aequiparatilr."
Inst. 317; Broom’!
Le ga 1M xim s,
Cf. Avakian v. Noble, 121 Cal. 216, 53 Pac. 559 (1898), with Marsh v.
Joseph, [1897]
Ch. 213, 66 L. J. Ch. 128, L. T. 558, 45 W’. R. 209.
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we assume that an alleged principal, by adopting an act which was

unlawful when done can make it lawful, it follows that he adopts it
at his peril, and is liable if it should'turn out that his previous com
mand would not have justiﬁed the act. It never has been doubted that
a man’s subsequent agreement to a trespass done in his name and for
his beneﬁt amounts to a command so far as to make him answerable.
The ratihabitio mandato comparatur of the Roman lawyers and the
earlier cases (D. 46, 3, 12, § 4; D. 43, 16, 1, § 14; Y. B. 30 Edw. I.

128) has been changed to the dogma aequiparatur ever since the days
of Lord Coke. 4 Inst. 317. See Brooke, Abr. “Trespass,” pl. 113, Co.
Litt. 207a; Wing. Max. 124; Com. Dig. “Trespass.” C. 1; Railway
Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327, and cases hereafter cited.
Doubts have been expressed, which we need not consider, whether
this doctrine applied to a case of a bare ‘personal tort.
Adams v. Free
man, 9 Johns. 117, 118; Anderson and Warberton,‘_I].,
in Bishop v.
If a man assaulted another in the street
Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824.
out of his own head, it would seem rather strong to say that if he
merely called himself my servant, and I afterwards assented, without
more, our mere words would make me a party to the assault, although
in such cases the canon law excommunicated the principal if the as
sault was upon a clerk. Sext. Dec. 5, 11, 23. Perhaps the application
of the doctrine would be avoided on the ground that the facts did not
show an act done for the defendant’s beneﬁt, (\Vilson v. Barker, 1
Nev. & M. 409, 4 Barn. & Adol. 614; Smith v. L020, 42 Mich. 6, 3
N. \V. 227;) as in other cases it has been on the ground that they did
not amount to such a ratiﬁcation as was necessary, (Tucker v. Jerris,
.
75 Me. 184; Hyde v. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552.)
But the language generally used by judges and text-writers, and
such decisions as we have been able to ﬁnd, is broad enough to cover
a case like the present, when the ratiﬁcation is established.
Perley v.
Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464; Bishop v. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824; Sander
son v. Baker, 2 W. Bl. 832, 3 VVils. 309; Barker v. Braham, 2 W. Bl.
866, 868, 3 \/Vils. 368; Badkin v. Powell, Cowp. 476, 479; \/Vilson v.
Tumman, 6 Man. & G. 236, 242; Lewis v. Read, 13 Mees. & W. 834;
Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167, 188; Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786, 799;
Railway Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327; Roe v. Railway Co., 7
Exch. 36, 42, 43; Ancona v. Marks, 7 Hurl. & N. 686, 695; Condit v.
Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219, 225, 78 Am. Dec. 137; Exum v. Brister, 35
Miss. 391; Railway Co. v. Donahoe, 56 Tex. 162; Murray v. Lovejoy,
See Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall.
2 Cliff. 191, 195, Fed. Cas. No. 9,963.
1, 9, 18 L. Ed. 129; Story, Ag. §§ 455, 456.
The question remains whether the ratiﬁcation is established. As we
understand the bill of exceptions, McCullocl< took on himself to de
liver the defendant’s coal for his beneﬁt, and as his servant, and the
The rat
defendant afterwards assented to McCullock’s assum'ption.
iﬁcation was not directed speciﬁcally to McCullock’s trespass, and that
act was not for the defendant’s beneﬁt, if taken by itself, but it was so
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connected with McCullock’s employment that the defendant would have
as master if McCullock really had been his‘ servant when
delivering the c0al.. \1\/e have found hardly anything in the bool-rs deal
ing with the precise case, but we are of opinion that consistency with
the whole course of authority requires us to hold that the defendant's
ratiﬁcation of the employment established the relation of master and
servant from the beginning, with all its incidents, including the anoma
See Coomes v. Houghton,
102
lous liability for his negligent acts.
'
Mass. 211, 213, 214; Cooley, Torts, 128, 129.
The ratiﬁcation goes to the relation, and establishes it ab initio. The
relation existing, the master is answerable for torts which he has not
ratiﬁed speciﬁcally, just as he is for those which he has not command
ed, and as he may be for those which he has expressly forbidden.
In
Gibson’s Case, Lane, 90, it was agreed that if strangers, as servants
to Gibson, but without his precedent appointment, had seized goods by
color of his oﬂice, and afterwards had misused the goods, and Gibson
ratiﬁed the seizure, he thereby became a trespasser ab initio, although
not privy to the misusing which made him so; and this proposition is
stated as law in Com. Dig. “T1'e.s'pass," C. 1; Elder v. Bemis, 2 Metc.
(Mass.) 599, 605. In Coomes v. Houghton, 102 Mass. 211, the alleged
servant did not profess to act as servant to the defendant, and the
decision was that a"subsequent payment for his work by the defendant
.
would not make him one.”
._
For these reasons, in the opinion of a majority of the court, the ex
Exceptions overruled.
ceptions must be overruled.
been liable

92 As to the effect of the ratiﬁcation of the agent’s tort on the liability of
the agent to third persons, see Wright v. Eaton. 7 Wis. 595 (1859); Richardson
v. Kimball, 28 Me. 463 (1848); Perminter v. Kelly, 18 Ala. 716. 54 Am. Dec.
177 (1851); Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535 (1852); Josselyn v. McAllister, 22
Mich. 300 (1871); even when the agent acts in good faith, as when he sends
the goods of a third person to his principal, supposing them to belong to his
principal, Stephens v. Elwell, 4 Maule & Selwyn, 259 (1815). Such ratiﬁcation
will relieve the agent of tort liability to the principal.
The latter need not
ratify; but, it he does, he waives the wrong committed by the agent, and
can hold him only as for an authorized act. Judah v. Trustees of Vincennes
University. 16 Ind. 56 (1861); Szymanski v. Plassan, 20 La. Ann. 90, 96 Am.
Dec. 382 (1868).
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HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.

\

(Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States, Second Circuit, 1912. 198 'Fed.
475 ' 119 C. C. A. 251 42 L; R. A. [N. S.] 1025, aﬂinliod 229
U. s. 621, 33,Sup. cc. 1049, 57 L. Ed. 1355.)
¢¢F|'iw=»i~|

Action at law by Iulius Marqusee against the Hartford Fire Insur
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

ance Company.

Reversed.

March l6, 1909, one Mclntosh telephoned
\V.~\RD, Circuit judge.”
from his country place to \Vilson, the agent of the Hartford Fire In
surance Company (the defendant) at Quincy, Fla., asking him to coven
the stock of tobacco belonging to Kline Bros. & Co. (plaintiﬁ"s as
signor) at that place with insurance against ﬁre for one year from
March 16, 1909, for the sum of $3,500.
On the same day VVilson
wrote the policy in suit for the defendant and took it to the ware
house of Kline Bros. & Co. with the intention of delivering it to Mc
March
Intosh, and, not ﬁnding him, left the policy there for him.
19th the property was totally destroyed by ﬁre. _\Vithin a week there
after McIntosh tendered to the defendant's agent the premium, which
the latter refused to take; but the defendant did not deny liability un
til April 30, 1909, when it wrote:
“Messrs. Kline Bros. & Company, Quincy, Fla.-Gentlemen:
This
is to notify you that the paper which you hold, purporting to be a
policy of insurance against loss by ﬁre, dated March 16, l909, No. 985,
we have just learned after diligent inquiry is not and never was a con
In the event that it shall appear we are mis
tract of this company.
taken either as to the fact or the law upon which this conclusion is
based, we further notify you that this company hereby speciﬁcally
denies liability under such policy.
“Yours very truly,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
'
“Egleston & Prescott, General Agents.”
The statement that the policy delivered “is not and never was a
contract of this company” is founded upon the proposition that Mc
Intosh had no authority to represent Kline Bros. & Co. when he
A great deal of evidence on this subject pro
ordered the insurance.
and con was offered at the trial.
McIntosh was a stockholder, had
been president, and was at the time he ordered the insurance in pos
session of the warehouse and claiming to act as president.
The cir
cumstance that the premium had not been paid is immaterial, because
the delivery of the policy before receiving it amounted to a giving of
credit. Stewart v. Insurance Co., 155 N. Y. 269) 49 N. E. 876, 42
L. R. A. 147.
The trial judge directed

a verdict for the defendant, apparently upon
two grounds, which he had passed upon in a previous action arising
out of the same ﬁre (Kline Bros. & Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. [C. C.] 192
93 Part

of the dissenting opinion of Lncombe, Circuit Judge, is omitted.
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Fed. 378) viz.: First, that McIntosh had no authority to make the
contract for Kline Bros. & Co. ; and, second, that they could not ratify
it after the ﬁre had occurred.
N0 one disputes the general principle that one may ratify an un
authorized contract made on his behalf and that the effect is the
It is ex
same as if he had himself originally made the contract.
pressed in the Latin maxim: “Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et man
dato equiparatur."
The very idea of ratiﬁcation implies that one par
ty has an option to ratify or not, and that he has this advantage over
the other party, to wit:
That he may hold the other party whether
the other party wish it or not, whereas the other party cannot hold
him if he is not willing to be held. The English cases go so far as
to hold that one may ratify even after the other party has- withdrawn
from the contract.
Boiilton Partners v. Lambert, 41 Chan. Div. 295;
In re Tiedeman, [1889] 2 Q. B. D. 66; In re Portuguese Consoli
dated Copper Mines, Limited, [1890] 62 L. T. R., 88.
It is not surprising that the trial judge refused to follow these cases,
and it is not necessary for us to go so_ far in holding that the judg
ment below is erroneous. Before ratiﬁcation an unauthorized contract
The party discovering the
is not binding, because it is not mutual.
VVhen he has done so
lack of authority may therefore withdraw.
there is nothing to ratify. \Vhat shocks us at ﬁrstblush is-that one
may ratify an unauthorized contract after he knows that it is to his
own advantage to do so, and so bind the other party to his apparent
Further reﬂection, however, causes this apparent un
disadvantage.
fairness to disappear. The other party, having agreed to be bound by
has no ground to
this contract and not having withdrawn from
compelled to perform; the original lack of authority hav
complain
ing been cured.
The latest English case cited fully sustained the view of the court
K. B. 401. In
the plaintiffs
below. Grover v. Mathews, [1910]
had
policy of the defendant on their factory for £1,000 for 12
It had been effected through their
months from March 26, 1908.
broker, Brows, by another broker, Dott, representing the defendant.
1909, Brows wrote to Dott asking that the policy be renewed.
March
March 27th the factory
March 5th Dott sent
binder renewing it.
was destroyed by ﬁre; and on_ that date two directors of the plaintiff
company sent the premium to Dott. who declined to accept it. The
valid contract for ﬁre insurance
question was whether, assuming that
had been made through Brows with the defendant by Dott on behalf
of the plaintiff, but without their authority, the plaintiffs could ratify
after the loss occurred. Hamilton, ]., held that they could not. VVe
cannot approve this conclusion.
Cases arising out of policies taken out by carriers or bailees and
maritime policies for the beneﬁt of whom
may concern throw no
lightion the question under consideration, because in them the insurer

\
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it,

must be held to have insured any person whose interest the -insured
'
intended to cover.
We agree with the court below- that the plaintitf failed to prove
If
that McIntosh was authorized to contract for Kline Bros. & Co.
they had been sued for the premium on the policy, they could have
But
successfully defended, unless the company proved ratiﬁcation.
as in this case their assignee is claiming on the policy, proof of rati
ﬁcation lay upon him. It is true that the record.does not show ex
pressly whether Kline Bros. & Co. ratiﬁed the contract before April
may be in
although
30th, when the defendant withdrew from
ferred from the defendant’s letter of that date, the pleadings, the con
duct of the parties, and the course of the trial that they had made
However, as the case was decided,
claim on the policy before it.
is

concerned, on the ground that they could
far as this question
new trial, at
ratify after the ﬁre, we think there ought to be
he can,
which the plaintiff will have an opportunity of showing,
that they did ratify the contract before
the defendant withdrew, from,
_
reversed.“
The judgment
am unable to concur with
LACOMBE, Circuit Iudge (dissenting).
seems too clear for discussion that Mc
the majority of the court.
Intosh, the old president of the company, had no authority—express,
so

66

C. R. Go., 83 Fed. 870
N. W. 1091 (1896);

Pam-ind? r-47133 ﬂy?“
vviﬁvdv-wv-»\"
ha

it

a

5

7

Am. Dec. 47 (1811).
Mass. 319,
Kelley v. Munson,
Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 630 (1861), is the lending case for the doctrine
that ratiﬁcation by the principal will not bind the third person without
subsequent assent by him, because of want of mutuality.
The principal before
mtiﬁcation being free to repudiate or to assent, the third person must be
equally free, and cannot be bound by the unilateral act of the principal alone.
In England
has been held that the maxim of ratiﬁcation holds. By rati

ﬁcation the agreement relates back and is the same as though it had been
previously authorized, binding principal and third person alike.
Bolton Part
ners v. Lambert, 58 L. J. Ch. 425, 41 Ch. D. 295, 60 L. T. Rep. 685, 37 W. R.
434

(1888).

386

(1911).

In McClintock

It

_

&

it

the principal does not deny the authority of an agent to act for him,
not, in general, lie in the mouth of any third persons to call in question
the power of the agent.
Scott v. Detroit Young Men's Soclety’s Lessee,
Doug. 119 (1843); Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218 (1833); Leonard v. Ma
son, 69 Tenn.
Lea) 384 (1878).
(1

1

will

\

a

a

v. South Penn Oil Co., 146 Pa. 144, 23 Atl. 211, 28 Am. St.
Rep. 785 (1892),
more equitable and practical rule was laid down. The Wis
In any contract there
consin case presses too far the doctrine of mutuality.
must be an interval between offer and acceptance when one party is bound
and the other is tree. The English rule presses the maxim too tar.
Ratiﬁca
tion is not always the same in effect as
previous authorization.
Substantial
justice is done both parties if the third person may, up to the time of ratiﬁca
tion, but not after, withdraw from his agreement.
If he has not withdrawn,
and the principal ratiﬁes, the parties will then occupy the same position as
though there had been previous authority.
There are logical diﬂiculties in
any solution of this anomalous act, but practically this solution seems satis
factory. 62 Cent. Law J. 338. For a valuable discussion of the various rules,
see the late ease or Kline Bros.
Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (C. C.) 192 Fed. 378,

7

&

Trust Co. v.
Farmers’ Loan
Memphis
73,
Baldwin v. Sehiappacasse, 109 Mich'.7

5

“Accord:

(1897);

8:
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(Part

1

implied, or to be inferred—-to make a contract of insurance binding
on Kline Bros. & Co. * * 3"
As to ratiﬁcation I am in entire accord with Judge Hand’s discus
sion of the question, and' as to his conclusion that until after the ﬁre
“dﬁfendant had no knowledge that McIntosh had not bound the plain
tii¥’s assignor to pay the premium and that its own undertaking had,
I cannot
therefore, been without consideration from the outset-.”
reach the conclusion that there is no unfairness in the application of
the doctrine of ratiﬁcation to the case at bar.
It seems to be an ele
ment of that doctrine that the party sought to be bound by the rati
ﬁcation of a contract, until then void because of lack of mutuality,
should have a;_iai;_and,equal opportunity to withdraw at any time
before ratiﬁcation.
It certainly is a very harsh rule which would al
ﬂow Kline Bros. & Co. to hold this policy, it may be for weeks, with
out ratiﬁcation, able to defend against a suit for premium on the
ground that it never made a contract, but with the privilege of con
summating the contract by ratiﬁcation as soon as a ﬁre might break
out. It can only be sustained on the theory that until ratiﬁcation ei
ther side has the right to withdraw; but the insurance company’s
“right to withdraw” is a mere illusion, if it has no knowledge of_ the
facts which would authorize it to exercise such right. * * *

a
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CHAPTER V
TERMINATION OF THE RELATION

SECTION 1.—BY OPERATION OF LAW
’AHERN
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

BAKER.

1885.

34

'

.

Minn.

98,

24

N. W. 341.)

VANDERBURC-H, ]. The defendant, on the ninth day of September,
specially authorized one \Vheeler, as his agent, to sell the real
property in controversy, and to execute a contract for the sale of the
same.
He in like manner on the same day empowered one Fairchild
to sell the same land; the authority of the agent in each instance
being limited to the particular transaction named. On the same day,
\Vheeler effected a sale of the land, which was consummated by a
conveyance.
Subsequently, on the tenth day of September, Fairchild,
as agent for defendant, and having no notice of of the previous sale
made by \Vheeler, also contracted to sell the same land to this plain
tiff, who, upon defendant’s refusal to perform on his part, brings
this action for damages for breach of the contract.
This is a case 'of special agency, and there is nothing in the case going
to show that the plaintiff (defendant?) would be estopped from setting
up a revocation of the agency prior to the sale by Fairchild. A revoca
tion may be shown by the death of the principal, the destruction of
the subject-matter, or the determination of his estate by a sale, as well
as by express notice. The plaintiff (defendant?) had a right to employ
several agents, and the act of one in making a sale would preclude
the others without any notice, unless the nature of his contract with
them required it. In dealing with the agent the plaintiff took the risk
of the revocation of his agency. 1 Pars. Cont. *7l.
Order affirmed, and case remanded.
1884,

T \
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HUNT
(Supreme

v.

(Part

1‘

ROUSMANIER’S ADM’RS.

Court of the United States,

1823.

8 Wheat.

174, 5

L. Ed.

589.)

Bill to compel defendants to join in the sale of the brig Nereus
and the schooner Industry.
In the bill Hunt set forth that Rous
manier applied to him for a loan of $1,450, offering as security'a bill
Counsel
of sale, or a mortgage of his interest in the brig Nereus.
was consulted, and he advised that a power of, attorney to sell the
ships in case of default was as effectual as, and simpler than, a mort
gage, since it avoided any change in the papers of the vessels, or
The
need to take possession of them when they came into port.
loan was made and such a power of attorney was made out to Hunt.
On a later loan of $700, a similar power to sell the Industry was ex
ecuted.
Rousmanier died insolvent, and defendants forbade Hunt to
sell the vessels.
Defendant's demurrer being sustained, plaintiff ap
].,

peals.

if

a

2.

1.

MARsnALL, C.
delivered the opinion of the court.
The counsel
for the appellant objects to the decree of the circuit court on two
He contends,
That this power of attorney does, by its
grounds.
own operation, entitle the plaintiﬁ‘, for the satisfaction of his debt, to
Or,
the interest of Rousmanier in the Nereus and the Industry.
court of chancery will, the conveyance being de
this be not so, that

fective, lend its aid to carry the contract into execution, according to
of the parties.‘
VVe will consider the effect of the power of attorney.
This in
strument contains no words of conveyance or of assignment, but
simple power to sell and convey. As the power of one man to act for
another depends on the will and license of that other, the power ceases
when the will, or this permission,
withdrawn.
The general rule,
that
letter of attorney may, at any time, be revoked by
therefore,
revoked by his death. Bufthis general
the party who makes it; and
rule, which results from the nature of the act, has sustained some
VVhere
letter of attorney forms
modiﬁcation.
part of
contract,
and
security for money, or for the performance of any act which
valuable,
deemed
generally made irrevocable, in terms, or
deemed irrevocable in law.
not so,
Esp. 565.
Although
letter of attorney depends, from its nature, on the will of the person
and may, in general, be recalled at his will; yet,
making
he binds
consideration, in terms, or by the nature of his con
himself, for
tract, not to change his will, the law will not permit him to change
it. Rousmanier, therefore, could not, during his life, by any act of
his own, have revoked this letter of attorney.
But does
retain its
V\"e think
does not.
efficacy after his death?
We think
well
a

2

1

The discussion of whether
the parties is omitted.

the court would
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settled, that a power of attorney, though irrevocable during the life
the party, becomes extinct by his death.
_
This principle is asserted in Littleton (section 66), by Lord Coke, in
his commentary on that section (52b), and in \Villes’ Reports (105,
'
note, and 565). The legal reason of the rule is a plain one. It seems
founded on the presumption, that the substitute acts by virtue of the
authority of his principal, existing at the time the act is performed;
and on the manner in which he must execute his authority, as stated
In that case, it was resolved, that
in Combes’ Case, 9 Coke, 766.
“when any has authority. as attorney, to do any act, he ought to do it
The reason of this resolution
in his name who gave the authority.”
is obvious.
The title can, regularly pass out of the person in whom it
is vested only by a conveyance in his own name; and this cannot be
executed by another‘ for him when it could not, in law, be executed
A conveyance in the name of a person, who was dead at
by himself.
the time, would be a manifest absurdity.
This general doctrine, that a power must be executed in the name
doctrine founded on the nature of the
of a person who gives
transaction,
most ‘usually engrafted in the power itself.
Its usual
empowered to
language is, that the substitute shall do that which he
do, in the name of his principal.
He
put ‘in the place and stead of
to act in his name. This accustomed form
ob
his principal, and
Hunt
constituted the
served in the instrument under consideration.
authorized to make, and execute,
regular bill of sale,
attorney, and
Now, as an authority must be pursued, in
in the name of Rousmanier.
order to make the act of the substitute the act of the principal,
necessary, that this bill of sale should be in the name of Rousmanier
would be
deed should purport to be
gross absurdity, that
and
executed by him, even by attorney, after his death for, the attorney
in the place of the principal, capable of doing that alone which the
principal might do.
This general rule, that
power ceases with the life of the person
If power be coupled with an “in
admits
of
one
exception.
giving
the
and may be executed after his
survives
person
giving
ter_est,f’
laid down too positively in the books to
death. As this proposition
becomes necessary to inquire, what
be controverted,
meant by the
an interest in
expression, “a power coupled with an interest?”
to be exercised?
or
an interest
the subject on which the power
\Ve hold
produced by the exercise of the power?
in that which
power, after the death
tobe clear, that -the interest which can protect
must be an interest in the thing itself.
In
of a person who creates
other words, the power must be engrafted on an estate in the thing.
The words themselves would seem to import this meaning. “A power
con
power which accompanies, or
coupled with an interest,”
The power and the interest are united in
nected with, an interest.
we are to understand by the word “interest,”
the same person. But
to be produced by the exercise of the pow
an interest in that which
a
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er, then they are never united.
The power, to produce the interest,
Theipower
must be exercised, and by its exercise, is extinguished.
ceases, when the interest commences, and therefore, cannot, in accurate
law language, be said to be “coupled” with it.
But the substantial basis of the opinion of the court on this point,
The interest or title in
is found in the legal reason of the principle.
the thing being vested in the person who gives the power, remains in
him, unless it be conveyed with the power, and can pass out of him
The act of the substitute, there
only by a regular act in his own name.
fore, which, in such a case, is the act of the principal, to be, legally
effectual, must be in his name, must be such an act as the principal
himself would be capable of performing, and which would be valid, if
Such a power necessarily ceases with the life of
performed by him.
the person making it. But if the interest, or estate, passes with the
power, and vests in the person by whom the, power is to be exercised,
such person acts in his own name.
The estate, being in him, passes
from him, by ‘a conveyance in his own name. He is no longer a sub
stitute, acting in the place and name of another, but is a principal, act
ing in his own name, in pursuance of powerswhichi limit his estate.
The legal reason which limits a power to the life of the person giving
exists no longer, and the rule ceases with the reason on which
The ‘intention of the instrument may be effected without
founded.
violating any legal principle.
This idea may be in some degree illustrated by examples of cases
clear, and which are incompatible with any other
in which the law
If the" word
exposition of the term “power coupled with an interest.”
“interest,” thus used, indicated
title to the proceeds of the sale, and
not
title to the thing to be sold, then
power to A., to sell for his
own beneﬁt, would be
power coupled‘ with an interest; but
power
naked power, which
to A., to sell for the beneﬁt of B., would be
could be executed only in the life of the person who gave it. Yet,
for this distinction, no legal reason can be assigned. Nor
there any
in justice; for, a power to A., to sell‘ for the beneﬁt of
reason for
B., may be as much
part of the contract on which B. advances his
the power had been made to himself.
If this were the
money, as
power to A., to sell for the use of
true exposition of the term, then
B., inserted in
conveyance to A., of the thing to be sold, would not
be a power coupled with an interest, and, consequently, could not be
exercised, after the death of the person making it; while
power to
A., to sell and pay a debt to himself, though not accompanied with
any conveyance which might vest the title in him, would enable him
title not in him, even after the
to make the conveyance, and to pass
vivifying principle of the power had become extinct. But every day’s
not as the ﬁrst case put would
experience teaches us, that the law
power to A., to sell for the beneﬁt of B.,
suppose. VVe know, that
engrafted on an estate conveyed to A., may be exercised at any time,
not affected by the death of the person who created it.
and
is,
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then, a power coupled with an interest, although the person to whom
is given had no interest in its exercise.
His power is coupled with
an interest_in_the thing, which enables him to execute it i_n_h_is,own
name, and
therefore, not dependent on the life of the person who
created it.
The general rule, that
power of attorney, though irrevocable by
not affected
the party, during his life,
extinguished by his death,
by the circumstance, that testamentary powers are executed after the
death of the testator. The law, in allowing
testamentary disposition
will to be considered as
of property, not only permits
conveyance,
not allowed to deeds which have
but gives
an operation which
An
their eﬂ'ect during the life of the person who executes them.
future time, or on
future
estate given by will may take ettect at
contingency, and in the meantime, descends to the heir. The power
is, necessarily, to be executed after the death of the person who makes
the intention, that
shall be
and cannot exist during his life.
executed after his death. The conveyance made by the person to whom
given, takes eﬁect by virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds
will,
considered
power given in
his title under it. Every case of
trust for the beneﬁt of the person for
in a court of chancery as
made, and as
devise or bequest to that person.
whose use the power
It is, then, deemed perfectly clear,'that,t_l1e power given in this
naked power, not coupled with an interest, which, though
case,
irrevocable by Rousmanier himself, expired on his death.
Reversed and remanded for the second consideration.
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DAVIS
(Supreme

v.

WINDSOR SAVINGS BANK.

Court of Vermont,

1874.

46

Vt.

728.)

by

a

it

if

Assumpsit for money deposited" in July, 1865, by the sister of plain
tiﬁs’ intestate, in defendant’s bank in the name of the intestate. She
drew out the money in December, 1865. Meantime, in October, 1865,
The court expressed the view that
her brother died in Panama.
the bank paid the money in good faith, and in ignorance of his death,
revocation of his sister's
would not be affected by his death as
Plaintiff excepted.
agency. Iudgment was directed for defendant.
PIERPOINT, C. I.” The only question presented
the bill of ex

8

it

is,

whether the defendant bank was justiﬁed in paying the
ceptions
held to the credit of the deceased, to Mrs. Dudley,
money which
his sister, who deposited the money in the bank as his agent, such pay
ment being made after the revocation of her agency by the death of
her principal, said bank having no knowledge of such death, and paid
The statementlof facts is abridged.
Gonn.Pn.&

A.(2n En.)—12
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the money in good faith.
That the death of the principal terminates
the agency, all the authorities agree; but the effect of such death upon
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the acts of those who in good faith deal with the agent without knowl
edge of the death, is a subject upon which there is some diversity of
decision. But the weight of authority seems to be decidedly in favor of
the principle, that the death of the principal instantly terminates the
power of the agent, and that all dealings with the agent subsequent
to that event, are void and of no effect, even though the parties were
ignorant of that fact.“
Kent lays down the rule, that “the authority of an agent determines
by the death of his principal.
By the civil law, the acts of an agent done
bona ﬁde after the death of the principal, and before notice of- his death,
are valid and binding on his representatives. But this equitable princi
ple does not prevail in the English law, and the death of the principal
is an instantaneous revocation of the authority of the agent, unless the
2 Kent. Com. 646.
Story lays
power be coupled with an interest.”
down the same doctrine, and says: “As the act of the agent must, if
done at all, be done in the name of the principal, it is impossible that it
can properly be done, since a dead man can do no act, and we have al
ready seen that every authority executed for another person, presup
poses that the party could at the time, by his personal execution of
have made the act valid
and numerous authorities, both English and
American, are referred to in support of the position.
This principle
was expressly held in Bank v. Estate of Leavenworth, 28 Vt. 209, a_nd
also in Mich. Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11. In the latter case,
Judge Bennett, in delivering the opinion, says: “Though
may be true
revoked by the act of the party, notice may be
that when
power
‘necessary, yet when revoked by his death, the revocation at once takes
an act
effect; and
subsequently done under the power, though
void." Many other
without notice of the death of the party, the act
cases might be referred to in support of the rule, but
do not deem
'
necessary.
A diiferent doctrine was held in Cassiday v. McKenzie,‘
Watts
said in a note in
S. 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76; but as
Kent Com. 873,

1,

&

a

8

4
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a

&

&

a

;

6:

2

3Aecord: Vance v. Anderson, 39 Iowa. 426 (1874), citing many authorities
Greenl. 14, 11 Am. Dec. 25 (1822). and!
and quoting from Harper v. Little,
The harshness and ineongruity of this
Lewis v. Kerr. 17 Iowa, 73 (1864).
rule is recognized in many cases. See Farmers’ Loan
Trust Co. v. Wilson,
Clayton v. Merrett, 52
139 N. Y. 284. 34 N. E. 784, 36 Am. St. Rep. 696 (1893)
The death of the principal is
fact equally within the
Miss. 353 (1876).
knowledge of all the parties. and all are equally charged in law with
knowing it. Smout v. Ilbery, 10 M.
W.
12 L. J’. Ex. 357 (1842). post. p. 653.
Safe Deposit Co., 219 N. Y. 12, 102 N. E.
Cf. Glennnn v. Rochester Trust
537. 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 302, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 441, refusing to apply the New
check at
bank.
York rule to the cashing of
4The leading cases for this view are Cassiday v. McKenzie,
Watts
S.
282, 39 Am. Dee. '76 (1842), and Ish v. Crane,
Ohio St. 520 (1858), Id., 13
Ohio St. 574 (1862), in the latter of which is an exhaustive review of the
deed which must be made in
authorities.
The court distinguishes between
Gonn.Pn.&

A.(2n En.)
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“It is substituting the rule of the civil for the rule of the common
law." Indeed it is difﬁcult to see how there can be an agent when there
is no principal.
The question whether in this case there was an inter
est coupled with the agency, and some other questions that were dis
cussed in the argument, do not arise upon the exceptions as made up.
judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

_i_
‘

DAVIS

v.

\

LANE.

(Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire,
See ante, p. 32, on which

will

be

1

1839.

10

N. H.

156.)_

found the facts, and another por

tion of the opinion.
PARKER, C. J. * * * But it is contended, in this case, that the
wife having had a general power to transact business for her husband
previous. to his illness, nothing but an express revocation of that power,
or some occurrence which divests and transmits the property, as death,
or bankruptcy, will terminate her authority to act as the agent of her
husband, and that she therefore might well dispose of the note in ques

it,

tion, notwithstanding her husband was utterly insensible and incapable
of any volition whatever, and this well known to her and to Prescott, to
and notwithstanding he continued in that state
whom she passed
until his decease.
He denies the
name of the principal. and acts in pals by the agent.
power of death to do tor revocation what the principal could not do if he
were alive, and insists on the equity of requiring the heirs and representa
tives to take the estate subject to the burdens caused by the nets of the
principal, for which he would have to assume responsibility were he alive.
Says the court: “Now. upon what principle does the obligation, imposed by
the acts of the agent after his authority has terminated, really rest? It seems
The great and practical purposes and
to me the true answer is, public policy.
interests of trade and commerce, and the imperious necessity of confidence in
the social and commercial relations of men, require that an agency, when
constituted, should continue to be duly accredited.
To secure this conﬁdence,
and consequent facility and aid to the purposes and interests of commerce, it
is admitted that an agency, in cases or actual revocation, is still to be re
garded as continuing, in such cases as the present, towards third persons, un
til actual or implied notice of the revocation. And admit that can perceive
no reason why the rule should be held differently in cases or revocation by
mere operation of law. It seems to me that in nil such cases the party who
has by his own conduct purposely invited conﬁdence and credit to be re
posed in another as his agent, and has thereby induced another to deal with
him in good faith, as such agent, neither such party nor his representatives
ought to be permitted, in law, to gainsny the commission of credit and con
think the authorities go to
ﬁdence so given to him by the principal. And
E. 469." The soundness of this
Adol.
that extent. See Pickard v. Sears,
reasoning is recognized in Lenz v. Brown, 41 Wis. 172 (1876), in Deweese v.
Muﬂ. 57 Neb. 17, 77 N. W. 361, 42 L. R. A. T89, 73 Am. St. Rep. 488 (189-S), and
in Murdock v. Leath, 10 Heisk. 166 (1872).
But compare Rigs v, Cage,
.
Humph. 350, 37 Am. Dec. 559
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show that the death of the constituent terminates
unless
the power is coupled with an interest so that
authority,
it may be executed in the name of the agent.
Harper v. Little, 2
Greenl. (Me.) 18, 11 Am. Dec. 25; Hunt v. Rousmaniere’s Admr.,
2 Mason's R. 244, Fed. Cas. No. 6,898; Id., 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed.
589; \'Vatson v. King, 4 Camp. ‘Z74; 2 Livermore on Agency, 302.
Parker v. Smith,
So bankruptcy, on his part, operates as a revocation.
16 East’s R. 386.
So marriage of a Single woman terminates a power to
confess a judgment in her behalf. Anonymous, 1 Salk. 399; 2 Liver
more on Agency, 307.
In all these cases an end is put to the power of the principal to act;
and, moreover, the operation of law transfers the estate, upon which
In this
the power might operate, to the custody and control of others.
us;
and
no
these
cases
are
unlike
the
one
before
author
respect
latter
ity has been cited, or found, which will directly settle the present case.
\Ve are of opinion, however, that the authority of the agent, where
the agency is revocable, must cease, or be suspended, by an act of
Providence depriving the constituent of all mind and ability to act for
himself, and that this doctrine can be sustained by very satisfactory
i
* * *
principles.
the constitution of an agent or attorney_to act for
Farther—-Upon
another, where the authority is not coupled with an interest, and not
irrevocable, there exists, at all times, a right of Supervision in the
principal, and power to terminate ‘the authority of the agent at the
The law secures to the principal the right
pleasure of the principal.
of judging how long he will be represented by the agent, and suffer
him to act in his name.
So long as, having the power, he does not
'
exercise the will to revoke, the authority continues.
When, then, an act of Providence deprives the principal of_the
power to exercise any judgment or will on the subject, the authority
of the agent to act should thereby be suspended for the time being;
otherwise the right of the agent would be continued beyond the period
when all evidence that the principal chose to continue the authority
had ceased; for after the principal was deprived of the power to ex
ercise any will upon the subject, there could be no assent, or acqui
escence, or evidence of any kind to show that he consented that the
agency should continue to exist. And, moreover, a conﬁrmed insanity
would render wholly irrevocable an authority, which, by the original
nature of its constitution, it was to be in the power of the principal at
any time to revoke.
It is for these reasons that we are of opinion that the insanity of the
principal, or his incapacity to exercise any volition upon the subject,
by reason of an entire loss of mental power, operates as a revocation,
or suspension for the time being, of the authority of an agent acting
under a revocable power. If, on the recovery of the principal, he mani
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fests no will to terminate the authority, it may be considered-as a mere
And his assent to acts done during thesuspension may be
suspension.
inferred from his forbearing to express dissent when they came to his
I Livermore on Agency, 300, Cairness v. Bleecker.
knowledge.
The act of the agent, in the execution of the power, however, may
If the prin
not in all cases be avoided on account of the incapacity.
cipal has enabled the agent to hold himself out as having authority,
by a written letter of attorney, or by a previous employment, and the
incapacity of the principal is not known to those who deal with the
agent, within the scope of the authority he appears to possess, the trans
actions may be held valid, and ‘binding upon the principal.
Such case
forms an exception to the rule, and the principal and those claiming
under him may be precluded from setting up his insanity as a revoca
tion, because he had given the agent power to hold himself out as
having authority, and because the other party had acted upon the
faith of
and in ignorance of any termination of it. They would be
so precluded in the case of an express revocation, which was unknown
to the other party.
D.
Livermore on Agency, 310;
E. 215,
Greenl. (Me.) 18, 11 Am. Dec. 25.
Salte v. Field; Harper v. Little,
And
revocation by operation of law, on account of the insanity of the
greater effect than the express revocation of
principal, cannot have
not of that character. Here there
But this case
the party himself.
was full knowledge of the situation of the plaintiﬁ"s intestate, by Pres
cott, when he received the note.
revocation cannot apply
The principle that insanity operates as
can be exercised
where the power
coupled with an interest, so that
in the name of the agent; for such case does not presuppose any voli
tion of the principal at the time, or require any act to be done in his
name, and
not revoked by his death.
\Vhether
power which
applicable to the case of
part of
security, or executed for a valuable consideration, and thus
by its
and
irrevocable;
nature
which
seems to be regarded in Eng
or
terms
land as a power coupled with an interest (10 Barn.
Cres. 731;
Camp. 272), may be a question of more doubt ([Hum v. Ennis]
Mason, 249 [Fed. Cas. No. 6,889]). Such
power could not be re
Livermore, 308),
his sanity was continued
voked by the principal,
and any volition of his could not alter the case.
Some of the reasons,
therefore, which have been adverted to, would not exist in
case of
to be executed in the name
that character. But
power of that kind
was held, in Hunt v. Rousmanier’s Adm’rs
of the principal; and
Wheat. 174,
L. Ed. 589, ante, p. 174], before cited, that the death
revocation of
of the principal operates as
for'the -reason that after
he himself performed
that event no act can be done in his name, as
it. This reason would not exist where he was still living; and perhaps
he and others might in such case be precluded from setting up his
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insanity-in avoidance of the act, on the ground that he would have had
no right to interfere, if sane, and had therefore no right to insist on his
* * *
insanity as an objection.“
that the wife of the intestate
the
view
we
have taken
The result, of
had at the time no authority to dispose of this note to Prescott, and
and had no right to receive the money.
that he acquired no title to
former case, in this suit, that
payment
\/Ve have already held, on
to him by the defendant, under such circumstances, could not‘ operate
N. H. 224. The instructions
to discharge the note. Davis v. Lane,
no agreement in the case by
to the jury were erroneous; but there
which we are authorized to enter judgment for the plaintiﬁ, and the
new
action must, therefore, be transferred to the common pleas, for
in
further
between
the
trial,
parties.
thing
controversy
there
any

if

is

iii
\

(Court

v.

GETMAN.

of Appeals of New York. 1890. 119 N. Y. 109,
A. 728, 16 Am. St. Rep. 806.)

23
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N. E.
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Action by Thomas Lacy against Sophronia Getman, as executrix,
contract with defendant’s
to recover for services performed under
testator.
no longer bounded
FINCH,
The relation of master and servant
has broadened with the advance of civilization,
by its original limits.
until the law recognizes its existence in new areas of social and business
life, and yields in many directions to the inﬂuence and necessities of its
\-Vhen, therefore,
said generally, as the com
later surroundings.
mentators mostly agree in saying, that the contract relations of principal
and agent and of master and servant are dissolved by the death of either
very certain that the statement must be limited to cases in
party,

[18701).
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5That insanity may not annul, or even suspend, a contract of agency is
held in Sands v. Potter, 165 Ill. 397, 46 N. E. 282, 56 Am. St. Rep. 253 (1897).
power coupled with an
The bankruptcy of a principal will not revoke
Dickinson v. Central Nat. Bank, 129 Mass. 279, 37 Am. Rep. 351
interest.
will terminate an ordinary agency. Markwicl: v. Harding
(1880), though
ham, 15 Ch. D. 339, 43 L. T. 647, 29 W. R. 361 (1880).
As to the death of one partner, or joint owner, Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S.
partnership,
of
520, 14 Sup. Ct. 189, 37 L. Ed. 1167 (1893); the dissolution
ﬁrm name, Bill
mere change in
Schlater v. Winpenny, 75 Pa. 321 (1874);
ingsley v. Dawson, 27 Iowa, 210 (1869).
an agency when the
so as to terminate
War interrupts communication
principal and agent reside on opposite sides of the hostile lines. Insurance
But see, contra, Sands v.
Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, 24 L. Ed. 453 (1877).
This is not so,
N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626, 10 Am. Rep. 535 (1872).
is necessary, and where no
however, in cases where no intercommunication
is required, especially if the agent acts only for the
business intercourse
purpose of preserving the property of the principal (Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala.
656; Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, 18 Sup. Gt. 279, 42 L. Ed. 658 [1898]),
Ct. Cl. 3-10
in the hostile country (Stoddart v. U. S.,
even by investing
_

1

7

7

_,

7,

_

_

_

_,__l

\

Ch. 5)

TERMINATION

or

THE RELATION

183

I

it,

it,

which the relation may be deemed purely personal, and involves neither
property rights nor independent action. Beyond that, a further limita
tion of the doctrine is asserted, which approaches very near to its
utter destruction, and is claimed to be the result of modern adjudica
tion. That limitation is that the rule applies only to the contract of the
servant, and not to that of the master, and not at all, unless the service
employed is that of skilled labor, peculiar to the capacity and experi
ence of the servant employed, and not the common possession of men
in general; and it is proposed to adopt, as a standard or test of the
limitation, an inquiry in each case whether the contract on the side of
the master can be performed after his death by his representatives,
substantially and in all its terms and requirements, or cannot be so
The
performed without violence to some of its inherent elements.
agitation of that question has kept the present case passing, like a
shuttle, between the trial and the appellate couﬂs, until it has been
tried four times at the circuit, and reviewed four times at general term,
and at last has been sent here in the hope of securing a ﬁnal repose.
The facts are few and undisputed on this appeal. The plaintiff,
Lacy, contracted orally with defendant's testator, McMahan, to work
for the latter upon his farm, doing its appropriate and ordinary work,
for a period of one year, at a compensation of $200.
Lacy entered
upon the service in March, doing from day to day the work -of the farm
under the direction of its owner, until about the middle of July, when
McMahan died. By his will be made the defendant executrix, but
devised and bequeathed to his widow a life-estate in the farm, and the
use and control of all his personal property whatsoever, in the house
and on the farm, during the term of her natural life. Lacy knew in a
general way the terms of the will. He testiﬁes that he knew that it
gave to the widow the use of the farm, and that she talked with him
It is admitted that the executrix did not
about the personal property.
hire or employ him, but he continued on to the close of the year, doing
the farm work, under the direction of the widow, until the end of his
full year. He sued the executrix upon his contract with the testator,
and has recovered the full amount of his year's wages.
From that
decision the executrix appeals, claiming that the judgment should
have been limited to the proportionate amount earned at the death "of
McMahan, and that the death of the master dissolved the contract.
It is obvious at once that an element has come into the case, as now
presented, which was not there when the general term ﬁrst held that
It now appears that the executrix could not
the contract survived.
have performed her side of the contract at all after the death of Mc
Mahan, by force of her ofﬁcial authority, because she had neither the
and no right to
possession of the farm, nor personal property upon
such possession during the life of the widow.
She had no power to
and in her rep
put her servant upon the land, or employ him about
resentative character she had not the slightest interest in his service,
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and could derive no possible beneﬁt from it. The plaintiffs labor,
after the death of McMahan, was necessarily on the farm of the widow,
by her consent, for her beneﬁt, and under her direction and control,
and equitably and justly should be a charge againstlher alone. The
test of power to perform on the part of the personal representative
of the deceased fails in the emergency presented by the facts, except
We have, then, the
possibly upon proof of the consent of the widow.
peculiar case of a contract made to work for McMahan, and under
his direction and control, which could not be performed because of his
death, transmuted into a contract to work for Mrs. Getman upon a
farm which she did not possess, and had no right‘ to enter, and per
formed by working for the widow, and under her direction and control
alone; and this, because of the supposed rule that the contract sur
vived the death of the master, and remained binding upon his personal
representatives.
_
It is true that some interest in the personal property on the farm
is claimed to have vested in the executrix notwithstanding the terms
of the will, and the inventory ﬁled by her is appealed to, and the neces
sity of a resort to the personal property with which to pay debts, and
there is no proof that the testator owed any debts, and the inventory
covers nothing as to which Lacy’s labor was requisite or necessary,
All the
except, possibly, some corn on the ground valued at $18.
grain inventoried was in the barn, needing only to be threshed, and
must' be assumed to have been there when testator died; and the other
property consisted of farm tools and a cow and horse, to the use of
which the widow was entitled, and which, if sold to pay possible debts,
would have left the servant without means of doing his work, and with
So that the bald question is pre
nothing to do unless for the widow.
sented whether the contract survived the testator’s death, and bound
his executrix, who was without power or authority of her_own to
perform, and had no interest in performance.
It seems to be conceded that the death of the servant dissolves the
contract. \/Volfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197; Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y.
40; Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 14; Fahy v. North, 19 Barb. 341;
Clark v. Gilbert, 32 Barb. U1\1O\ Seymour v. Cagger, 13 Hun, 29;
Boast v. Firth, L. R. 4 C. P. 1. Almost all of these cases were marked
by the circumstances that the services belonged to the class of skilled
labor. In such instances the impossibility of a substituted service by
the representative of the servant is very apparent.
The master has
selected the servant by reason of his personal qualiﬁcations, and ought
not, when he dies, to abide the choice of another, or accept a service
which he does not want. VVhile these cases possess, with a single ex
ception, that characteristic,'I do not think they depend upon it. Fahey
v. North was a contract for farm labor, ended by the sickness of the
servant, and quite uniformly the general rule stated is that the servant’s
agreement to render personal services is dissolved by his death. There
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and so further performance is excused, and the contract is apportioned.
If, in this case, Lacy had died on that day in July, his representative
McMahan, surviving, -would
could not have performed his contract.
have been free to say that he bargained for Lacy's services, and not
for those of another, selected and chosen by strangers, and either the
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I have no doubt that it
contract would be broken or else dissolved.
must be deemed dissolved, and that the death of the servant bound to
render personal services under a personal control ends the contract,
and irrespective of the inquiry whether those services involve skilled
or common labor; for, even as it respects the latter, the servant’s
character, habits, capacity, industry, and temper, all enter into and
affect the contract which the master makes, and are material and es
sential, where the service rendered is to be personal, and subject to the
daily direction and choice and control of the master. He was willing
to hire Lacy for a year; but Lacy's personal representative or a la
borer tendered by him he might not want at all, and at least not for a
ﬁxed period, preventing a discharge. And so it must be conceded that
the death of the servant, employed to render personal services under
the master's daily direction, dissolves the contract.
Babcock v. Good
'
rich, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) 53.
But, if that be so, on what principle shall the master be differently
and more closely bound?
And why shall not his death also dissolve
the contract? There is no logic and no justice in a contrary rule. The
same reasoning which relieves the servant's estate rel.ieves also the
master’s for the relation constituted is personal on both sides, and
If the master selects the servant, the
contemplates no substitution.
servant chooses the master. It is not every one to whom he will bind
himself for a year, knowing that he must be obedient and render the
Submission to the master’s will is the law of the
service required.
contract which he meditates making.
He knows that a promise by the
servant to obey the lawful and reasonable orders of his master, within
the scope of his contract, is implied by law; and a breach of this prom
ise in a material matter justiﬁes the master in discharging him. Rex
v. St. ]ohn, 9 Barn. & C. 896. tOne does not put himself in such rela
tion for a ﬁxed period without some choice as to whom he will ser_ve.
The master's habits, character, and temper enter into the considera
tion of the servant before he binds himself to the service, just as his
own personal characteristics materially affect the choice of the master.
The service, the choice, the contract, are personal upon both sides, and
more or less dependent upon the individuality of the contracting par
ties, and the rule applicable to one should be the rule which governs
to the simple and normal
the other. If, now, to such a case—that
relation of master and servant, involving dail_v obedience on one side,
and constant direction on the other—we apply the suggested test of
possibility of perfomiance in substantial accord with the contract, the
not different.
result
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It is said that if the master dies his representatives have only to pay,
and any one may do that. But under the contract that is by no means
all that remains to be done. They must take the place of the master in
ordering and directing the work of the farm, and requiring the stipu
lated obedience. That may prove to effect a radical change in the
situation of the servant, as it seems to have done in the present case,
leading the plaintiff to the verge of refusing to work further for either
widow or executrix, whose views apparently jangled. The new master
catmot perform the employer’s side of the contract as the deceased
and may vary so far, from incapacity or
would have performed
ﬁtful temper or selﬁsh greed, as to make the situation of the servant
materially and seriously different from that which he contemplated and
for which he contracted. \Ve are therefore of opinion that in the case
at bar the contract of service was dissolved by the death of McM_ahan,
and his estate was only liable for the services rendered to the date of
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted,
his death.
with costs to abide the event. All concur.‘
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SECTION 2.—BY ACT OF THE PARTIES

MOORE

v.

STQNE.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, 1875.

40

.

Iowa,

259.)

Action to recover certain land which Moore claimed under

a

tax
and Stone by conveyance from one Scarlett.
Scarlett had em
commission for
ployed Moore to purchase the land and had paid him
his services, after paying one-half the purchase price and receiving
contract for
deed upon payment of the balance.
Later the vendor
sent the deed to Moore to be delivered to Scarlett upon payment of
the balance.
Meantime Moore had purchased some thousands of
acres of land at tax sale, including the land in question. but he had
to Scarlett when
not noticed this fact, and of course did not mention
Defendant claimed Moore was his agent,
later he delivered the deed.
Decree for de
and could not set up this deed against his principal.
fendants.
-

-it

a

a

a

deed,

S

&

8:.

1

I.

7

3

6

B.
L. T. 356 (1863), approved
S. 826,
See. also, Taylor v. Caldwell,
R.
589. 84 Am. Dec. 578 (1863), and Mendenhall
in Yerrlngton v. Greene,
v. Davis, 52 Wash. 169. 100 Pac. 836, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 914, 17 Ann. Gas. 179
the effect (as to compensation) of the death of the em
(1909), considering
ployee.
As to the etfect of temporary incapacity of the servant, see Fisher v.
Monroe, 12 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1891); Cuekson V. Stones,
El.
E1. 248 (1859);
Loates V. Maple, SS L. T. N. S. 288 (1903).
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* * * Upon these
C. ]."
[After stating the facts:]
facts it is quite clear that the agency of the plaintiff, or of Moore &
McIntire, for the purchase of the land for Scarlett, terminated at the
time theygdelivered to him the written contract for a conveyance of the
land on the receipt of the one-half of the purchase money, and the
When this was
payment of their fees for the services performed.
accomplished Moore & Mclntire had done all that they, or the plain
tiff, had been employed to do. They had made the purchase as Scarlett
had desired them to do, delivered to him the written contract sent to
them for Scarlett, received the ﬁrst payment as per agreement. This
Scarlett himself so re
completed the services they had undertaken.‘
for when these things were done he inquired how much they
garded
charged him for their services, and on being informed as to the amount
They had performed the business for which the
he paid the same.
agency had been constituted, and by operation of law the agency was
499, and cases cited;
Kent's
terminated.’
See Story on Agency,
Com. *643, and cases cited. This was in Iuly, 1868. The purchase
Mclntire was not made until Oc
of the land at tax sale by Moore
tober of that year. At that time they were as free to purchase the
same as any other persons. Their agency no longer existed; they had
good title for Scarlett, nor to examine the
not undertaken to procure
title for him. The land was situated in another county from where the
plaintiff resided; nothing was said to them about the title, and they
might well suppose that Scarlett, since he resided near the land and
had examined or procured some one to examine the
desired to buy
records, in the county where the lands were situated.
also quite clear that the fact that the deed to Scarlett was sent
McIntire, for the purpose"
by Everett to the banking house of Moore
of being delivered upon payment of the balance of the purchase money,
did not operate to revive the prior agency for the purchase of the land.
Mclntire acted for and as agents of the
In this transaction Moore
no evidence that Scarlett procured the
There
deed.
the
grantor
plaintiff, or his ﬁrm, to obtain the deed for him. On the contrary
Mcintire for the purpose of collecting
was sent by Everett to Moore
They performed that
the balance of the purchase money then due.
service for Everett, and received their compensation from him.
equally clear that the plaintiff was not guilty of any fraud, in
Mclntire.
failing to disclose the fact of the tax purchase by Moore
Their relations were not such as required such disclosure to be made,
affirmatively shown that they had no actual knowl
especially when
is

is

is

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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purchaser, see Short v.
an agent employed to sell land has found
Millard, 68 Ill. 292 (1873). An act done by the agent after the full accomplish
Tuite v. Wakelee, 19
ment of the agency purposes terminates the agency.
Cal. 692 (1862). For a wrong committed by the agent after he has performed
Co. v. Silvers, 13 ind. App. 80, 37 N. E. 413
his employment see Kingan
'
(1891),

ante, p. 6.
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of purchase at the time they deliv
ered the deed to Scarlett.
The decree of the court below will be reversed, and a decree entered
for plaintiff in this court if he so elects, or the cause will be remanded
for a decree to be entered in conformity with this opinion by the dis
trict court.
Reversed.
edge that they held the certiﬁcate

ii

M ARBURY
(Supreme

v.

BARNET.

Court of New York, Appellate Term, First Department,
17 Misc. Rep. 386, 40 N. Y. Supp. 76.)

MCADAM,

1896.

action was to recover for services alleged to have
to the defendant under what upon their
face are entitled “Articles of Agreement,” made and entered into Au
1892.
gust
By these so-called “Articles,” the defendant appoints
the plaintiff his sole agent and attorney to represent his interests in
the production and representation of an extravaganza called “l492,”
under an agreement between the defendant and one Edward E. Rice,
dated July 26, 1892, and to collect and receive the royalties thereunder.
For the services to be rendered, the defendant agrees to pay the plain
tiff 8,p_er cent. of the sum or sums which the defendant may be en
titled to under the agreement with Rice.
The last-mentioned'agree
ment was for three years from July 26, 1892, thus terminating, by its
terms, July 26, 1895. On July 20, 1893, the contract between the de
fendant and Rice was extended for two years from July 26, 1895;
and the plaintiff claims that such extension operated to extend the
like period.
agreement between her and the defendant for
conceded that the defendant paid the plaintiff all the commis
sions earned under the so-called "Articles" during the lifetime of the
ﬁrst agreement between the defendant and Rice. The suit was really
to recover the commissions which would have accrued from August
the plaintiff’s agreement had embraced
1895, to January 11, 1896,
It contemplated, at
But
that period.
did not cover that period.
most, the existence of the agreement between the defendant and Rice
to which
particularly refers, and terminated by “eﬁiux of time and
performance of the condition” (Dunl. Paley, Ag. 184); or, in other
words, by the expiration of the period during which
was to exist and
The
minds
of
the
and de
plaintiff
to have effect (Story, Ag.
480).
could not have
fendant never met respecting the extended term, and
been within their contemplation at the time, because
came into ex
istence long after the power was given, and as the result of
new un
derstanding, with which the plaintiff has_no concern.
But, apart from this, the power seems one capable of revocation at
any time by the donor. A letter of attorney depends, from its nature,
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if

if

it,

on the will of the person making
and may, in general, be recalled
at his will; yet
he binds himself for a consideration in terms, or by
the power be
the nature of his contract, not to change his will, or
coupled with an interest, the law will not permit him to change it.
Hunt v. Rousmanier’s Adm’rs,
Wheat. at page 202,
L. Ed. S89;
To make the power irrevocable, there must be an
463.
Story, Ag.
mere interest in
interest inthe subject of the agency itself, and not
the result of the execution of the authority, such as arises from com
Mansﬁeld v. Mansﬁeld,
Conn.
pensation for executing the power.
Am.
S59, 16 Am. Dec. 76;
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1216; Stier
v. Insurance Co., 58 Fed. 843; Missouri v. VVall<er, 125 U. S. 339,
Sup. Ct. 929, 31 L. Ed. 769. So that, whetherthe plaintiff's power
comprehended the extended agreement or not, the defendant had
and effectually exercised the privilege before the
right to revoke
claimed by the plaintiff.
period for which compensation
The “Articles of Agreement” upon which the plaintiff sues express
no consideration, and the plaintiff in no manner obligates herself to
to be inferred from
serve thereunder for any speciﬁed time, unless

is

a

it
is

is

is

is

the mere fact that the contract under which she was to collect the
Even indulging this inference,
royalties extended to July 26, 1895.
which
the most favorable the plaintiff can demand, there
not the
slightest ground for holding that her obligation extended beyond that
If her duties ended at that time, so did the obligations of the
period.
defendant, and there
no theory upon which the alleged right of ac
tion Ban be sustained.” If the plaintiff’s rights attached to the exten
sion granted, they would continue to attach to every extension there
after made, and cease only when the defendant and Rice severed their
relations.
in fact founded
The action, though in form for services rendered.
on readiness to perform, and in the nature of wrongful discharge. In
apparent that the com
whatever light the matter may be viewed,
plaint was properly dismissed, and, as I necessary sequence, the judg
ment must be aﬁirmed.

\

1

&

2

9

Blackf.
Gundlach v. Fischer, 59 Ill. 172 (1871); Longworth v. Conwell,
Gibbs Sewing Machine
469 (1-S31). And when the agency is at will, Willi,-ox
C0. r. Ewing. 141 U. S. 627, 12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 L. Ed. SS2 (1891); Rhodes v.
For-wood, 47 L. J. Ex. 396,
App. Cas. 256, 34 L. T. 890, 24 W. B. 1078 (1876).
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BURKE

v.

PRIEST.

(Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri,
SMITH,

P.

I.

The principle

1892.

is rudimentary

50 Mo.

App. 310.)

that as between prin

cipa.l and agent the authority of the latter is revocable at any time if
not coupled with an interest.” The authority‘ of the agent to rep

resent the principal depends upon the will and license of the principal.
It is the act of the principal which creates the authority; it is for his
beneﬁt and to subserve his purposes that it is called into being; and,
unless the agent has acquired with the authority an interest in the
subject-matter, it is in the principal’s interest alone that the authority
The agent has no right to insist upon a further
is to be exercised.
execution of the“authority if the principal desires it to terminate.
It is a general rule that as between principal and agent the authority
of the latter may be revoked by the former at his will at any time
and with or without reason therefor, except where the agent's au
thority is coupled with an interest. Mechem on Agency, § 204; State
ex rel. Walker v. \Valker, 88 Mo. 279 ; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Vl/heat.
201, 5 L. Ed. 589, ante, p. 174_
p
The exceptions to the general rule just stated is where the power
is given as a part of a security or for a valuable consideration, or
where the power is coupled with an interest. But the interest in such
cases is an interest in the subject-matter on which the power is to be
An interest in that which is produced by the exercise of
exercised.
the power is not suﬂicient. The power must be engrafted on an inter
est in the property on which the power is to be exercised, and not an
Hunt
interest in the money derived from the exercise of the power.
v. Rousmanier, supra; Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609; Coﬁin v. Lan
dis, 46 Pa. 431; Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266, post, p. 193,
And so it has been held that a power to collect money and receive
property and to sell and convey’ the property of the principal, the agent
to receive one-half of the net proceeds as compensation, is not a power
Hartley’s Appeal, 53 Pa.
coupled with an interest and is revocable.
212, 91 Ani. Dec. 207, post, p. 196.
In this case, the defendants who had lately been copartners, en
gaged in the practice of medicine, entered into a parol contract with
plaintiff who was an attorney, whereby it was agreed that the defend
ants would turn over to plaintiff their books of account for collection
and adjustment, and for which the former would pay the latter as
a compensation for his services ten per cent. on all sums collected,
and ﬁve p_er cent. on all accounts adjusted by note. The defendants
refused to deliver their books of account to plaintiff, and so did not
10 Accord:

Agency, § 463.

Rochester

v. Whltehouse,

H.

15 N.
_

468

(1844),

quoting

Story on
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carry out the contract. This the defendants could do, and on account
of which the plaintiff has no legal ground of complaint.

Of

course, where the principal has the power to revoke the authority
the agent, he may, nevertheless, subject himself to a claim for
damages if he exercise such power contrary to his agreement.
The evidence does not show that the plaintiPf’s employment was ﬁxed
for any period of duration. The written admission of one of the
defendants offered in evidence by plaintiff showed no more than that
plaintiﬂ‘ was to “try and have all notes and accounts adjusted in eight
een months."
The duration of the contract was contingent and un
It might have been performed by plaintiﬁ’ in a week, a month
certain.
or year. So it has been held that an appointment of an agent to do
certain acts during a given period does not, of itself, amount to an
agreement that he should be permitted to continue to act durjng that
period. Mechem on Ag., § 211. In any view which we have been
able to take of the case, we are unable to ﬁnd that the court below
erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment will be affirmed. All concur.

of

I

BROOKSHIRE

v_.

VONCANNON.

(Supreme Court of North Carolina,

1845.

28 N. C. [6 Ired.]

231.)

Defendant in right of his wife, and plaintiff in his own right, were
entitled to a share of the personal estate of one Clark who had died
intestate in Alabama.
Defendant by power of attorney authorized
Plain
plaintiff to receive his share of the estate and bring it home.
tiff made one trip which resulted in nothing, whereupon defendant re
He made a second trip, and now seeks, accord
voked his authority.
ing to the terms of the power of attorney, to recover one-sixth of
The court
his expenses and ten per cent. for his time and trouble.
charged

that such agreement to pay

made

the

power

irrevocable.

is

it

_]'.

it,

Judgment for plaintiff for more than one-sixth of his expenses on the
ﬁrst trip, and defendant appeals.
DANIEL,
The charge of the judge was, as we understand
in
conformity to the prayer of the plaintiff’s counsel; and, received in
A power of attorney, or
was erroneous.
that light, we think that
in general revocable from its nature; and the power
other authority,
of revoking an authority may be exercised at any moment before the

it

a

is

a

it

if

be true
actual execution of it. Paley on Agency. 184, 185. Even
part of
security for money, or coupled
power, which
at law, that
with an interest, cannot be revoked,-yet the doctrine has no application
The plaintiﬁ‘, neither when the power was given to him,
to this case.
was revoked, had any in
nor when the defendant contended that
If he did the labor,
terest in the distributive share of the defendant.
he was then to be compensated as above mentioned; but there was no

I
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obligation on the plaintiff to go to the VVest for the property,‘ and
when the defendant insisted, that he had made the revocation, the
plaintiff had never received any of the said property. VVe think that
there must be a new trial.
_
PER CURIAM. judgment reversed, and venire de novo.

MacGREGOR
(Supreme

v.

Court of Iowa,

'

GARDNER.
1862.

14

Iowa,

326.)

Suit to set aside certain deeds made by Alexander MacGregor, as
to George D. and Egbert Gardner.
attorney of james MacGregor,
James claimed that the lands conveyed were purchased with his money
and forihis use, and the deeds were without consideration and for a
fraudulent purpose. He prays that the same may be canceled and de
clared void.
Alexander claims that the lands were purchased for his
use, the titles being in James because Alexander was then involved
and could not hold property in his o\vn name, that $2,000 of the pur
chase money was a trust fund belonging to his wife and children, and
that he deeded the lands under an irrevocable power of attorney to
the Gardners to be held in trust f_or these beneﬁciaries.
Decree for
plaintiff.
.
_
BALDWIN, J.“ * * * The mere fact that the power of attorney
is itself declared irrevocable does not prohibit its revocation, nor does
it establish the fact that the person making the same yields all right
or claim to the property authorized to be sold, or that the person upon
whom such power is conferred has the right to sell and dispose of the
property entrusted to his care, without consideration, or without being
held accountable for the faithful discharge of his trust. “The general
rule is,” says Story on Agency, par. 476, “that the principal may revoke
the authority of his agent at his mere pleasure.
But this is open to
some exceptions, which, however, are entirely consistent with the rea
son upon which the general rule is founded.
One exception is when
the principal has expressly stipulated that the authority shall be ir
revocable and the agent has an interest in its execution.
Both of these
circumstances must concur, for although in its ferms an authority may
be expressly declared to be irrevocable, yet if the agent has no inter
est in its execution, and there is no valid consideration, it is treated
as a mere nude pact and is deemed in law to be revocable, upon the
general principle that he who alone has an interest in the execution of
/
»
an act is also entitled to control it.”
The use of the word “irrevocable” alone is not evidence that the
power is coupled with an interest; if so, it would not be necessary
11 The portions of the opinion dealing with the contention that there was a
trust are omitted. Lowe, J., dissented. Accord: Walker v. Denison, 86 I11.

142 (1877).
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that both of these circumstances should concur. The powers of at
torney under which these deeds were made read as follows: “Know
all men by these presents, that I, James MacGregor, ]r., &c, being
seized in fee of certain lands in the county of Clayton, Iowa, have
nominated, constituted and appointed Alex. MacGregor * * * m_v
true and lawful attorney, irreyocable, for me, and my name to lease,

* *
* to such person or persons, upon
devise and sell said lands
* "‘ * and for such prices as he may see ﬁt.”
such terms,
The word “irrevocable” signiﬁes, nq,t to be recalled or revoked.
Therefore, when used in the above connection it shows, that it was
the intention of the principal that the authority thereby conferred,
should not be recalled." It cannot however, be inferred from its use
that the agent was thereby invested with any greater power of disposi—
tion or authority in relation to the property to be sold, than if this
word had been omitted. But it is not the policy of the law to deny to
the person making such powers irrevocable the right to revoke such
authority, notwithstanding the fact that it was the ﬁxed design of the
If, however, the power is
parties so to do when they were made.
coupled with an interest, or the agent is interested in its execution, it
I
shall not be revoked.
Conceding, therefore, that the power is by its terms made irrevocable,
and when the agent has an interest in its execution, the law declares
that it then cannot ‘be revoked, this fact still does not of itself give
the agent any power to dispose of the property, except in the nianner
directed by the principal.
The authority is continuous, but in other
exceeds his
respects the same as if revocable. If the agent
a ord the principal
authority or abuses the trust reposed, equity willtheéefore
the proper relief. Alexander had no authority conferred upon him to
He was required to a_ct
dispose of the lands without consideration,
for the best interest of the principal, and granting that he had an in
terest in the execution of the authority conferred, he could not dispose
of the property of which he had the sale, in such a manner as the title
would inure to his beneﬁt, for the rule of equity is, that a purchase by
an agent of the property of which he has the sale, or in which he rep
resents another, whether he has an interest in it or not, per interpositam
"‘
* *
personam, carries fraud on the face of it.
Decree as to the deeds afﬁrmed.
12 As to power of attorney in terms "exclusive,"
or “irrevocable” till a cer
tain date, see Blackstone v Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266 (1867); Kolb v. Bennett
Land Co., 74 Miss. 567, 21 South. 233 (1896); Chambers v. Seay, '73 Ala. 372
Gt’. opinions in Weaver v. Richards, 144 Mich. 395, 108 N. W. 382, 6
(18.82).
L. R. A. (N. S.) 855 (1906).
Gonn.Pn.& A.(2n En.)—13
.
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WALSH
‘

v.

(Part

>1

WHITCOMB.

(Nisi Prius, King's Bench,

1797.

2

Espinasse,

565.)

De
Assumpsit to recover money for work done by Walsh, a tailor.
fense that Walsh having become insolvent had executed a power of at
torney to one Barker, together with a general assignment by deed, au
thorizing him to receive all debts due Walsh and give proper receipts;
also to appoint a substitute to act in his room for the same purposes.
Barker appointed Hindley, who received from \-Vhitcomb the debt in
question, giving him a receipt. Plaintiff claimed to have revoked the
power to Barker by the appointment of another agent.
There is a difference in cases of powers of attor
LORD KENYON.
ney; in general they are revocable from their nature; but there are
these exceptions:
Where a power of attorney is part of a security for
money, there it is notrevocable ;" where a power’ of attorney was made
to levy ﬁne, as part of a security, it was held not to be revocable; the
principle is applicable to every case where a power of attorney is nec
essary to effectuate any security; such is not revocable. In the pres
ent case Walsh assigned all his effects, &c., over to Barker, to whom,
amongst others, he was indebted; the power of attorney was made
it was
to Barker to call in the debts for the beneﬁt of the creditors;
It was there
part of the security for the payment of the creditors.
‘fore by law not revocable; and the payment by the defendant is good.
The jury found a verdict for the defendant.
13 An agency
upon a valuable consideration, or as a security, is not
cregted
'a power coupled with an interest. Bonney v. Smith, 17
to be confused wit
Ill. 531 (1856); Buffalo Land & Exploration C0. v. Strong, 91 Minn. 84. 97
The two are often spoken of as though they were identical.
N. W. 575 (1903).
Carmichae-l’s Case, 65 L. J. Ch. 902, 2 Ch. 643, 75 L. T. 45 (1896), in which
Lindley, L. J., quotes from Clerk v. Laurie, 2 H. & N. 199 (1857):
“What is
meant by an authority coupled with an interest being irrevocable i this—t.hat
where an agreement is entered into on a. suﬁicient consideration whereby an
authority is given for the purpose of receiving some beneﬁt to the donee of
In Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal.
the authority, such an authority is irrevocable."
609 (1867), the power was given as security “for the payment of money.
See, also, Evans v. Fearne, 16 Ala. 689. 50 Am. Dec. 197 (1849), quoting Story
on Agency 5 477, and Parke v. Frank, 75 Cal. 364, 17 Pac. 427 (1888).
As to a power coupled with an interest, the great case is Hunt v. Rous
manier, ante, D. 174.
See, also, Montague
v. McCarr01l,
15 Utah, 318, 49
Pac. 418 (1897), and Terwiliiger v. Ontario C. 8: S. R. Co., 149 N. Y. 86, 43 N.

E.

432 (1896).

Gonn.Pn.&

A. (21) En.)

|
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(Supreme Court of Arizona, 1904.

8

195

et al.

Ariz.

.

463, 76 Pac. 623.)

Suit to quiet title to three mining claims located by Burns, who sold
one-fourth interest to one Duncan.
On March 9, 1903, Burns and
Duncan contracted for the sale of the claims with Kaufman, as trustee.
Taylor bases his claim on an agreement made with Burns March 26,
1901. judgment for defendants.
* * * Taking the in
SLOAN, J.“
[After stating the factsz]
strument as a whole, it appears that it was intended merely as a pow
er of attorney authorizing Taylor to effect a sale of the mines, upon
the terms mentioned, as the agent of Burns.
Nor is this power of at
torney one which, in legal effect, can be construed as being coupled
with an interest in the mining claims, so that it could not be revoked.
There is nothing in the instrument which evidences an intention that
Taylor should acquire an interest in the premises pending a sale of the
same.
Mention of future labor as part consideration is of no avail
as conferring an interest, for it fails to bind Taylor to perform any
work; nor does it state by whom this labor was to be performed, when
it was to be done, or of what it should consist. It is not even provid
ed that Taylor should have any right of possession during the pend
ency of the sale, or should pay any of the expense of the annual labor
requiredlby law. Manifestly the only interest which Taylor acquired
under the agreement was the contingent one of sharing in the proceeds
of the sale in case he should effect it. The interest which will render
the power of attorney irrevocable must be in the subject of the power,
and not pertain to the power itself.
As we have said, there is nothing in the instrument, taken as a
whole, which gave Taylor any interest in the mining claims. He did
not have the right of possession. His sole interest related to the con
sideration or proceeds to be derived from the sale. His power or agen
cy was not, therefore, in legal contemplation, one coupled with an in
In the case of Trickey v. Crowe, 8 Ariz. 176, 71 Pac. 968,
terest.
this court declared, in speaking of a power of attorney coupled with
an interest, that by “such interest is not meant an interest in that which
is produced by the‘ exercise of power, but it must be an interest in the
property on which the power is to operate"; and further, that “the
authority to sell on commission is not an authority coupled with an
interest." 1"
_
VVe hold, therefore, that the agreement did not confer any title to
A portion of this opinion is omitted.
pledge of property, accompanied by an irrevocable
coupled with an interest.
Miller v. Home Ins. 00., 71 N.
14

WA

98 (1901).

agency. is a power

J.

Law,

175, 58

Atl.

‘
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or estate in the mines in question upon Taylor, and that the ﬁndings
and decree of the trial court are correct.
The judgment will be af
ﬁrmed.1°

q

,

SHEAHAN

v.

NATIONAL s. s. co.

(Circuit Court of Appeals of United States, Second Circuit,
30 C. C. A. 593.)

1898.

87 Fed. 167,

for defendant and plaintiﬁ‘ sued out this writ of error.
Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an action to recover damages for breach of
The plaintiff was the sole witness, and the only contract
contract.
with defendant which his testimony tended to establish was one made
in 1867, whereby defendant employed him as its agent to sell tickets
on commission, with no limitation as to time or provision requiring no
tice of termination. After he had continued in such employment about
Iudgment

In the ab
nine years, defendant abruptly terminated the contract.
sence of any provision requiring notice as a condition ‘precedent to
termination, or of any clause ﬁxing a term' of employment, defendant
was entitled to dismiss its agent at pleasure, without thereby giving
plaintiff a cause of action for damages sustained by reason of such dis
charge. The judgment of the circuit court is afﬁrmed.

THULLEN

v.

TRIUMPH ELECTRIC CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals of the_Unitecl States, Third Circuit,
837,

142 C. C.

1915.

227

Fed.

361.)

Action by L. H. T hullen against the Triumph Electric Company.
There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Af
ﬁrmed.
See, also, 215 Fed. 939.
_
McPHERsoN, Circuit Iudge. At the trial below the court directed
a verdict for the defendant, and the only question to be considered on
this writ is whether the evidence required submission to the jury. The
facts are as follows:
L. H. Thullen, an electrical engineer, was in the service of the elec
tric company for 3 years ande5 months from December, 1909. In May,
1913, he was discharged, and is now suing for salary alleged to be due
from the time of discharge until February, 1914. The original contract
The company had advertised for a
was made in November, 1909.
chief engineer, Thullen had replied, several letters were exchanged, a
16 Authority to sell property and take as compensation a per cent. of the
proceeds: State ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 88 M0. 279 (1885); Appeal of ‘Hart
ley, 53 Pa. 212, 91 Am. Dec. 207 (1866).

I
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personal interview followed, and ﬁnally the company wrote a letter
on November 22d, which was accepted by Thullen, and was acted»
under by both parties for a year and a half. The parts of that letter
now pertinent are as follows:
“Dear Sir: Conﬁrming our conversation of Saturday, we will pay
you a salary at the rate of four thousand ($4,000.00) dollars per annum
as chief electrical engineer of this company, the duties to be those gen
erally appertaining to such position as discussed in -detail by us.
* * * It is understood that the above shall go into effect as soon as
you are ready to report here for duty, which we now understand will
be Monday, Dec. 6th. It is the writer’s hope in concluding this agree
ment that it will prove so mutually satisfactory as to mark the com
mencement of a long period of pleasant and proﬁtable business asso

ciation.”

At the trial, the only witnesses examined were Thullen and one of
the company’s oﬂicers, and both were allowed to testify to the conver
sation that preceded the letter. They differed in some particulars, but
Thullen himself testiﬁed that the letter was dictated in his presence,
was submitted to him, and was accepted as containing his idea of the
discussion.
\Ve agree, therefore, with the trial judge that the letter
is the best evidence of the agreement and is binding upon both. From
December 6, 1909, when the plaintiff began his service, until July 1.
1911, he was paid “at the rate of four thousand ($4,000) dollars per
I
annum."
On ]uly lst, following several conversations between the parties, a
new arrangement about salary was made, and a second letter was writ
ten and accepted, which states: “Conﬁrming our conversation of a few
days ago, we agree to make your salary for the year 1911, commencing
Feb. 1, 1911, and ending Feb. 1, 1912, ﬁve thousand ($5,000.00) dol
lars, payable in such equal monthly installments, commencing July lst,
as will equal the above amount at the end of the year.
\Ve further
agree that at the end of the year (February, 1912), provided you have
remained in our employ that length of time, to transfer to you ten
shares of the’ common stock of this company.
Commencing Feb. 1,
1912, we agree to make your salary at the rate of $6,000 per year, pay
able in equal monthly installments, and at the end of the year (Feb. 1,
1913) to transfer ten shares of the common stock of the company to
you on the same condition as above.”
Salary was paid in accordance with this letter, which may perhaps
make a distinction (as will be observed from the words we have itali
cized) between the year 1911-12, and the year 1912-13. It is not neces
sary to dwell on the distinction, however,‘ as no dispute arose until
May, 1913. On February 20, 1912, a third letter was written to sup
plement the letter of July 1, 1911. The letter of November, 1909, con
tained several provisions about patents that are not now material, but
were regarded as important by the parties. The letter of July 1 was

'
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1

silent about these provisions, and, lest this silence should be miscon
strued, the third letter states: “In response to your request please note
that it is our understanding that our agreement with “you of July 1,
1911, applies solely to the amount of compensation and the terms of
payment; all other clauses of our agreement of November 22, 1909,
remaining in eﬁect. In other words, we have not canceled the original
but have simply added a supplemental agreement covering
agreement,
compensation and terms of payment.”
A few weeks later the company discharged the plaintiﬁ for a rea
son it considered sufﬁ-cient, paying him two weeks’ salary in advance
and three shares of stock. He sues for the balance of $6,000 from
February, 1913, to February, 1914, as stated in the letter of July 1.
The authorities show some difference of opinion concerning the
method of stating the American rule that governs a contract of hiring
for an indeﬁnite period. The subject is discussed in \Vood, Master
and Servant (2d Ed.) § 136, and in the note to Warden v. Hinds, 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 529. Numerous cases are collected also in 26 Cyc.
at page 974, where we think the situation is accurately presented: “In
the United States a general or indeﬁnite hiring is presumed to be a
hiring at will, in the absence of evidence of custom or of facts and cir
cumstances showing a contrary intention on the part of the parties.
While it is generally held that the fact of a hiring at so much per day,
week, month, quarter, or year raises no presumption that the hiring
was for such a period, but only at the rate ﬁxed for whatever time
the party may serve, yet the rate and mode of payment are often de
terminative of the period of service, and in some cases it has been held
that they raise a presumption as to the period of service.”
The rule in Pennsylvania has been referred to in the very recent case
“
‘In a contract
of Hogle v. De Long Co., 248 Pa. 471, 94 Atl. 190:
of hiring, when no deﬁnite period is expressed, in the absence of facts
and circumstances showing a different intention, the law will presume
a hiring at will.
The fact that the hiring is at so much per week, or
month, or year, will raise no presumption that the hiring was for such
period.’ \/Veidman v. United Cigar Stores Co., 223 Pa. 160 [72 Atl.
377, 132 Am. St. Rep. 727]. This is a statement of a general rule, so
widely recognized that this is said of it by Labatt in his yvork on
Master and Servant, in section 160: ‘A preponderance of American
authority in favor of the doctrine that an indeﬁnite hiring is pre
sumptively a hiring at will is so great that it is now scarcely open to
”
’
criticism.’
Applying this rule to the record before us, we ﬁnd that no period of
service was expressly ﬁxed (except perhaps for the year 1911-12, with
which we are not concerned), but merely that payment was to be made
at a yearly rate during an unspeciﬁed period, which the parties hoped
in courteous phrase might be “a long period of pleasant and proﬁtable
therefore, the hiring was at
business association.”
Presumptively,

é
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will, and the plaintiff was obliged to overcome the presumption by prov
ing facts and circumstances from which the inference could safely be
drawn that the real agreement of the parties was a hiring by the year.
But this burden was not sustained. We have found nothing of sub
stance in the record to contradict or to modify the letters already
quoted, and the trial judge was therefore right in giving the instruc
tion complained of.
The judgment is aﬁirmed.“

FARNHAM
(Court

oi! King-'s

v.

Bench,

ATKINS.
1671.

1

Sid.

446.)

An infant feme entered into covenant with an adult, and the case
was that the adult covenanted to teach the infant to sing and dance,
and the infant covenanted to serve her, and the adult (who was the
mistress) covenanted to find meat, drink, washing and lodging for the
infant, and {he infant brings covenant and assigns as breach that the
other did not ﬁnd meat, etc., for her, and after judgment by default
it was moved in arrest, etc., that the action did not lie because the cove
nant of the infant did not bind her and therefore the covenant of the
mistress did not bind her, for they are reciprocal,
But by the court,
although the covenant of the infant does not bind, yet the covenant of
the adult binds her as she is of full age.

.i.__
HARTLEY v. CUMMINGS
(Court

\

of Common Pleas,

18-16.

2 Car.

et al.
&

K.

433.)

Case for enticing away the plaintiffs’ servants. The plaintiffs in this
action were glass and alkali manufacturers, and owners of the exten
sive works at Sunderland called the Vi/ear Glass VVorks; the defe'nd
ants were also manufacturers and proprietors of the works known by
the name of the British Glass Works, at Gateshead, near Newcastle
upon-Tyne. ' By the promise of a higher rate of wages, and otherwise,
the defendants had induced four workmen, who were what are called
crown glass makers, and who had been instructed at a considerable

"In

England there is a presumption that a general hiring is for a year.
This has been often referred to, but not followed, in the United States.
Compare the often cited case or Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y.
117, 42 N. E. 516 (1895), with Maynard v. Royal Worcester
Corset Co., 200
Mass. 1, 85 N. E. 877 (1908). as to whether a hiring at so much a year, no
time speciﬁed, is at will. That the presumption is affected by the "surround
ing circumstances” is well brought out by comparing two New York cases,
both citing the Martin Case (Watson v. Gugino, 20-i N. Y. 535, 98 N. E. 18, 39
L. R. A. [N. S.] 1090, Ann. Gas. 1913D, 215, and Guppy v. Stollwerck Bros.,
In both cases the Appellate Division ro
216 N. Y. 591, 111 N. E. 249 [1916]).
versed the trial court, and was itselr reversed by the Court of Appeals.
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expense in their particular art at the cost of the plaintiﬁs, to leave
their employment.
The plaintiffs had been in consequence obliged to
send to France and Belgium for substitutes, and had sustained heavy
furnace in
damage from being compelled to keep their manufacturing
operation during the interval, though no work was going on. Each of
the workmen was engaged to work for the plaintiffs for a period of
seven years under a written contract, and of this-the defendants had
notice. The contracts were all drawn in the same terms,’and the follow
ing were the principal clauses as far as regarded this action:
“The said‘ John Hartley’ shall and will provide for the said Roger a
reasonable quantity of work; and in case the said Roger shall be sick
or lame, or shall become incapacitated to perform, or shall not perform
the work and service aforesaid,” or “if the said John Hartley shall
discontinue the said trade or business during the said period of seven
years, then, in either of such cases, the said John Hartley shall and
may be at liberty to employ and retain any other person or persons in the
room of the said Roger, and thereupon shall not be obliged to make
any payment, daily wages, or other satisfaction to the said Roger. And
the said Roger shall and will from time to time, and at all times, for and
during the said term of seven years, work and serve the said John
Hartley, and shall not nor will at any time during the said term~w0rk
for or serve any other person orpersons whatsoever, without license
from the said John Hartley.”
ERLE,
intimated that, in his opinion, there was
mutuality of
contract in the respective agreements, looking especially at the last
clause inserted above, from which an obligation on the plaintiffs’ part
must be implied to employ the workmen during the seven years. The
contracts could be put an end to only by
breach of the agreement, or
incapacity on the part of the men respectively, or of discontinuance of
the business on the part of the plaintiffs.
The learned judge gave leave to Allen, Serjt., to move the court
above upon the point.
Verdict for plaintiffs.
Damages, £657. 6s. 8d.
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NEWHALL
(Supreme

v.

Court of Minnesota,

JOURNAL PRINTING CO.
1908.

105

Minn.

44, 117

N. W.

228, 20

.

L. R. A.

[N. S.] 899.)

JAGGARD, I. Plaintiff sought to recover damages for the breach of
contact made by the defendant with plaintiff's assignor for the de
livery of newspapers and for collection of the price thereof. -The con
tract in question set forth that for a consideration of $135, paid by
a

plaintilT’s assignor to the defendant, the defendant gave to such as
signor, and therefore to defendant, the exclusive right to sell defend
ant's publication within certain speciﬁed territory under the terms and
conditions stated in the contract. The speciﬁcation of the time of the
duration of the contract was as follows: “Either party to this contract
may at any time terminate said contract upon 30 days’ written notice
to the other party, and upon the expiration of the 30 days from the
date of the service of said notice all the rights of said second party
under said ‘contract shall cease, except the right of reimbursement as
herein provided; provided, however, that said ﬁrst party shall not
terminate this contract, except for the dishonesty, incompetency, neg
The jury
ligence, inattention, or irresponsibility of said second party."
A motion for a new trial was granted,
returned a verdict of $928.40.
unless plaintiff would remit all of the verdict above $728, in which event
the court ordered that the verdict should stand in all respects as if
originally rendered for $728. Plaintiff duly remitted in accordance with
This appeal was taken from that order.
the order.
One of the essential questions in this case is whether the contract
was terminable by defendant, with or without cause, on 30 days’ notice.
Defendant contends that, where a contract for the employment of a
person in a particular business as long as the latter may elect to serve
has been broken by the employer, the employé, having never ﬁxed by his
election the period of service, cannot recover substantial damages for
the breach, inasmuch as the obligation violated is too uncertain.
Bolles
Cf. McMullan v. Dickinson Co.,
v. Sachs, 37 Minn. 315, 33 N. W. 862.
And see St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v.
63 Minn. 415, 65 N. \¢V. 661, 663.
Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S. W. 902, 39 L. R. A. 467. It is, however,
well settled that a contract for employment is not lacking in mutuality
because the party employed does not bind himself to continue in the
employment for a deﬁnite period (Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46
N. E. 117, 35 L. R. A. 512, and note, 57 Am. St. Rep. 488), and that a
contract for agency, which leaves the agent free to terminate his rela
tions with the principal on reasonable or speciﬁed notice, must be con
strued to confer the same right upon the principal unless provisions to
the contrary are stipulated. \/Villcox, etc., Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627,
12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 L. Ed. 882; Smith v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry., 60
Minn. 330, 62 N. VV. 392. And see Penna. C0. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App.
109, 32 N. E. 802, 51 Am. St. Rep. 289.

THE RELATION

202

(Part

1

There is no doubt that by the present contract the parties intended,
and clearly expressed their intention, that the defendant should not
terminate that contract “except for dishonesty, incompetency, negli
gence, inattention, or irresponsibility" of the other party thereto, who,
for present purposes, is the plaintiff.
The conclusion follows that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover in some amount unless the evidence
showed that he was discharged for cause.
An examination of the record has satisﬁed us that the defendants
were not, as a matter of law, justified in terminating the contract for
cause, and that the verdict of the jury on this point is sustained by the
evidence.
[Omitting a question of damagesz] Reversed, and new
trial granted.“,

_

HARPER
(Supreme Judicial

v.

HASSARD.

Court of Massachusetts,

1873.

113 Mass.

187.)

Contract for damages for wrongful dismissal from employment.
Verdict for plaintiff.
GRAY, C. J.“ The written agreement in which the parties have
expressed the contract between them, and by the construction of which
this case must be determined, consists of, ﬁrst, a recital that the de
fendants intend to carry on the business of making oil and wa
ter colors and wish to secure the services of the plaintiff in the making
of said colors; second, an agreement of the plaintiff with the de
fendants “that he will, during the term of not exceeding three years
from the date of this agreement, render and give his exclusive time,
service, skill and energy to them in the manufacture of oil and wa
ter colors, and also instruct and teach them during the said term the
art of manufacturing or making colors in all its details, so far as it is
in his power to do so ;” third, in consideration of the above, an
agreement of the defendants “during said term" to pay to the plaintiff
“thirty dollars per week as compensation for his services so ren
dered ;” fourth, an agreement of the plaintiﬁ that he will not “during
the continuance of this agreement” be connected with any other per
sons in the manufacture of colors.
v. Whitcomb, 225 Ill. 605. 80 N. E. 247, 8 L.
in which the contract read, “It is mutually under
stood" that the position is given for ﬁve years; Keith v. Kcllerman (C. C.)
169 Fed. 196, in which the court ﬁnds mutuality in the hiring for the winter
season, but not in that for the summer.
Many eases involve agreements for permanent employment in consideration
of release by the person employed of n claim for liability for injuries received
or the like. Sax v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 125 Mich. 252. 84 N. W. 314,
34 Am. St. Rep. 572 (1900); Pierce v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co., 173 U. S. 1,
Ed, 591 (1899). See, also, Stearns v. L. S. 8: M. S. Ry. Co.,
19 Sup. Gt. 335, 43
post, p. 204.
19 The statement ot facts is omitted.
18 Compare

R. A. (N. S.)

Butterick Pub. Co.

1004

(1907),
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The preamble declares the intention of the defendants to carry
on the business, and their purpose to secure the services of the plain
tiff, and speciﬁes no time. The agreement of the plaintiff is to serve
the defendants “during the term of not exceeding three years,” that is
to say, a term which cannot be more, but may be less, than that
time.
The agreement of the defendants is to pay him a weekly
compensation, not for_any deﬁnite time, but only “duringisaid term”
of three years or less.
And the further agreement of the plaintiff
not to be connected with others in the same manufacture ‘is likewise
limited “during the continuance of this agreement.”
There is no express agreement of the defendants to employ the
plaintiff for three years, and no stipulation from which, in our judg
ment, such an agreement can be implied.
The agreement appears
to have been framed and adapted to secure to the defendants the right
to the exclusive services of the plaintiff for such time, not extending
beyond three years from its date, as he should perform such services
and they should continue the business and require his services, pay
ing him the stipulated compensation weekly, so long only as he
should be employed by and faithfully serve them; but not to oblige
them to continue the business, or to employ him therein, except at
their own election, or to pay him any compensation after reasonable
notice that they should no longer require his services.
This case
does not present the question whether the plaintiff had a similar right
of election.
\Ve ﬁnd no decision, in any of the cases cited in the able and elab
orate arguments of counsel, which is inconsistent with this view. ~In
Aspdin v. Austin, 5 Q. B. 671, and in Dunn v.‘ Sayles, Id. 685, the
plaintiff was held riot entitled to recover anything but the compensa
tion which the defendant had agreed to pay for a ﬁxed time. In
Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247, the agreement of the plaintiff
was to serve the defendants “at all times for and during the term of
In Elderton v. Emmens, 6 C. B. 160, 4 H. L. Cas.
seven years.”
624, the agreement which was held binding for one year was in terms
to employ a solicitor at “an annual salary,” which was held to imply
In Pilkington v.
an agreement to employ him for one year at least.
Scott, 15 M. & VV. 657, and in Revere v. Boston Copper Co., 15
Pick. 351, the expression of a contingency in which the employer
might terminate the contract precluded the implication that he could
terminate it otherwise.
For these reasons, it is the opinion of the majority of the court that
the defendants had the right to elect to terminate their agreement
with the plaintiff at any time by reasonable notice;*° and none of
£0 See Vogel v. Pekoe, 157 Ill. 339, 42 N. E. 386. 30 L. R. A. 491 (1895),
service so long as satisfactory, with forfeit it servant quits without speciﬁed
notice; L. & N. R. Co. v. Oﬂfutt, 99 Ky. 427, 36 S. W. 181, 59 Am. St. Rep.
467 (1896).
The English cases cited in Harper v. Hassard, supra, are leading eases.
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have any doubt that this point, having been set up in the
answer and insisted on at the trial, and affecting the very foundation
of the plaintiff’s action, is open to the defendants upon the report._
Verdict set aside.
the judges

STEARNS
(Supreme

LAKE SHORE

v.

Court of Michigan,

1897.

112

& M._ S.

RY. CO.

Mich.

71 N.

651,

w.

148.)
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Judgment for
Assumpsit for breach of contract of employment.
Defendant brings error.
plaintiff.
IVIONTGOMERY,
The plaintiff brought this action to recover (lam
contract of employment.
The declaration
ages for the breach of
averred that, in the year 1872, plaintiff, while in the employ of the de
fendant received serious personal injuries; that
claim was made
against the defendant company; that in settlement of this claim the
plaintiff paid him the sum of $175, and at the same time entered into an
agreement to employ him in the capacity of train baggage master on
the train running between Jackson and Adrian, at a salary of $47.50
per month, during his natural life or his ability to do the work;
that the defendant had on the lst of April, 1895, discharged plain
tiff from employment, and has ever since refused to employ him
or to pay him. The case was tried before
jury, and
verdict ren
dered sustaining the plaintiff's claim. Defendant moved for
new
trial, which was refused, and has now brlought the case here for re
view on error.
The case is, in many of its aspects, similar to the case
of Brighton v. Railway Co., 103 Mich. 420, 61 N. VV. 550, and re
ported on second appeal in 70 N. VV., at page 432.’ We shall not dis
cuss now the points decided in that case.
The declaration did not state whether the contract counted upon
Defendant contends that an oral
was in writing, or rested in parol.
contract would not be valid, and that the declaration should have de
clearly settled the
scribed the contract as one in writing. The rule
It
not necessary in pleading to aver that
contract
other way.
required by the statute of frauds to be in writing was reduced to
contract was made, which im
enough to aver that
writing.
valid contract, and admits the requisite proof to show its valid
ports
661.
ity. Supply Co. v. Fisher, 81 Mich. 136, 45 N.
not enforceable, because not
insisted that the contract
The plaintiff was not bound to work for any stated time
mutual.
case where no consideration passed for the
for the defendant. In
employment, there 1night' be force in this contention; but in this case,
valuable consideration was paid to the defendant
under the proofs,
H. L. Cas. 624 (1852). the true bearing of such
Emmens v. Elderton,
eases as Aspdin v. Austin, cited supra, is set out especially at page 647, by
Crornpton, J. Ct. Piikington v. Scott, cited supra per Rolfe, B., to the same
point.
4
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for the conditional agreement which the defendant saw ﬁt to enter
into, leaving it optional with the plaintiff to continue in defendant’s
employ,—the engagement of the defendant resting, not upon the con
sideration of any promise by the plaintiff, but upon a consideration
actually paid in hand at the time of the engagement, namely, the com
Upon this question the following
promise of the disputed claim.
cases are in point: Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan (Ind. App.) 32 N. E.
802; Harrington v. Railway Co., 60 Mo. App. 223; Brighton v. Rail
Affirmed.
way Co., supra.“ [Omitting other matters:]
I

A

BLUMENTHAL
(Supreme

(hurt or California,

v.

1891.

I
GOODALL.
89

_

Cal. 251, 26 Pac. 906.)

Action to recover commissions claimedito have been earned by one
a real estate agent, under authority from defendant
Oesterreicher,
to sell certain blocks for $1,500 each, on which he was to have a com
mission of $100 for each block, “This contract to be in force for ten
On the same day the agent agreed orally
days from date hereof.”
with one Fulder for the sale of the blocks at the price named, but.
he failing to put the agreement in writing, the agent afterward made
Next day defendant re
a written agreement with Von Rhein & Co.
voked the authority, claiming it had been procured by misstatements
by the agent. The court found there had been no fraud or misrep
The latter assigned his claim to plaintiff.
resentations by the agent.
Motion for new trial denied. Plaintiff
Iudgment for defendant.
appeals from the judgment and order.
The absolute right of dismissing an employee. with or without cause. is
with review oi’ the cases, in Derosia v. Ferland, 83 Vt. 372, 76 Atl.
153, 28 Ia R. A. (N. S.) 577. 138 Am. St. Rep. 1092 (1910), and the correspond
ing right of the employee to quit in Kemp v, Division No. 241, Amalgamated
Ass‘n St. & Electric Employ-es of America, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389, Ann.
and citation of many cases.
Cas. 1913D, 347, with exhaustive discussion
The action was for an injunction to prevent a labor union from procuring the
discharge of plaintiffs by threatening a strike. Whether damages are recov
erable in such cases is discussed post, p. 210.
See, also, Bradlee v. Southern Coast Lumber Co., 193 Mass. 378, 79 .2
777 (1907); Rhodes v. Forwood, 1 App. Cas. 256, 47 L. J. Exch. 396, 34 L.
Rep. N. S. 890,24 Wkly. Rep. 1078 (1876).
There is much conﬂict of authority as to mutuality of obligation.
Cf.
Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1, 85 N. E. 877 (1908),
Ry. Co., 121 N. G. 490, 28 S. E. 137 (1897),
with Edwards v. Seaboard A.
and Frank v. Manhattan Maternity & Dispensary, 107 N. Y. Supp. 404 (1907).
As to mutuality under the statute of frauds, see Wilkinson v. Hoavenrich, 58
Mich. 574, 26 N. W. 139, 55 Am. Rep. 708 (1886); as to “satisfaction con
tracts," Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N. W. 457 (1912);
as to “exclusive” brokers’ contracts, Schoenmann v. Whitt, 136 Wis. 332, 117
N. W. 851, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598 (1908). And et. Stier v. Imperial Life Ins.
21

dismissed,

L

Co. (C. C.) 58 Fed. 843 (1893).
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* * * It is a gen
GAROUTTE,
[After stating the factsz]
eral principle of law that, as between the principal and the agent,
the authority of the agent is revocable at any time, if not coupled with
an interest, and this principle is recognized by section 2356 of the
Civil Code. Mechem, upon the Law of Agency (section 209), says:
“But this power to revoke is not to be confounded with the right to
revoke. Much uncertainty has crept into the books and decisions from
*
*
* As has
a failure to discriminate clearly between them.
been seen, the relation of the agent to his principal is founded in a.
It “is essentially» a
greater or less degree upon trust and conﬁdence.
If, then, for any reason, the principal determines
personal relation.
that he no longer desires or is able to trust and conﬁde in the agent,
it is contrary to the policy of the law to undertake to compel him
* * * But it by no means follows that, though possess
to do so.
ing the power, the principal has the right to exercise it without lia
bility, regardless of his contracts in the matter.“ It is entirely con
sistent with the existence of the power that the principal may agree
and for the violation
thatifor a deﬁnite period he will not exercise
as much liable as for the breach
of such an agreement the principal
of any other contract.” In section 615 the author says: “In using the
will be understood
expressions rightfully and wrongfully revoked,
not involved,
that the question of the principal's power to revoke
but whether by express or implied agreement, having undertaken not
in violation of
to exercise that power, he has, nevertheless, exercised
Thus if, after
bro
Section 620 reads:
the agreement.”
ker employed to sell property had in good faith expended money and
purchaser, and was in the midst
labor in advertising for and ﬁnding
of negotiations which were evidently and plainly approaching to suc
cess, the seller should revoke the authority with the purpose of avai1—
a

*

*

a

‘T

*

it

is

it

p

is

it,

J.”

Part of the Opinion is omitted.
The distinction between the power and the right to revoke is empha
sized in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 197 Mo. 123, 95 S. W. 213 (1906); Singer v.
Morton
McCormick,
See also Jones v. Graham
Watts
S. 265 (1842).
Transp. Co., 51 Mich. 539, 16 N. W. 893 (1883), followed in Shaver v. Ingham,
58 Mich. 649, 26 l\'. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712 (1886), and cited (misprint in re
The Shaver
port) in Potter v. Barton, 86 Minn. 288, 90 N. W. 529 (1902).
denies that
Case, admitting that willful disobedience justifies dismissal,
“every act of disobedience may be lawfully punished by the penalty of dis
missal," even in the case of menial servants, much less in higher orders of
Larkin v. Hecksher. 51
employment, as in the case of skilled mechanics.
L. IL A. 137 (1889). As to discharge for willful
N. J. Law, 133, 16 Atl. 703,
disobedience, see Ernst v. Grand Rapids Engraving Co., 173 Mich. 254, 138
N. W. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1025, note; Dodge v. Reynolds. 135 Mich. 692,
L.
98 N. W. 737 (1904); Von Heyne v. Tompkins, S9 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901,
W. 161 (1843), and
R. A. (N. S.) 524 (1903). Cf. Cussons v. Skinner, 11 M.
F.
F. 157 (1862), with the Von Heyne Case as to justifica
Smith v. Allen,
tion of dismissal, if the master does not know of the disobedience and rely on
The rule is settled in England in Boston Deep Sea
as the real reason.
Fishing
Ice C0. v. Ansell, L. R. 39 Ch. D. 339 (1888), rejecting earlier English
rule. See Thomas v. Beaver Dam Mfg. Co., 157 Wis. 427, 147 N. W. 364, Ann.
22
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Steel C0. v. Norcross,

204 Fed. 537, 123
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Cas. 1916A, 1020, and note; Carpenter
C. O. A. 63, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1035.
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of the broker’s eﬁorts, and avoiding the payment of his

ing himself

it could not be claimed that the agent had no remedy.
it might well be said that there was an implied contract
on the part of- the principal to allow the agent a reasonable time for
performance, that full performance was wrongfully prevented.by the
principal’s own acts, and that the agent had earned his commission.”
In the case of Lane v. Albright, 49 Indy. 279, where the owner of
the real estate sold it pending the negotiations of the agent in making
a sale, and prior to the expiration of the time given by the owner to
the agent, and where the agent within the time given did ﬁnd a pur
chaser, the court says: “The appellant performed all that he was re
quired by the contract to do, and was prevented by the appellee from
The appellee disabled himself from carrying out
selling the land.
the contract of sale made by the appellant."
“The fact that the ap
pellee had authorized appellant to sell his land did not deprive him
self of the power of selling
but he could not thereby avoid his lia
In Hawley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183, upon full con
bility to appellant."
sideration the court decided that the rule
that, where the perform
ance by one party
prevented by the act of the other, the party not
in fault should recover in damages such sum as will fully compensate
him for the injury which he has sustained by reason of the non-per
formance of the contract. To the same effect
466.
Story, Ag.
In the case at bar
may be conceded that the agent had not en
tirely carried out his contract at the time the defendant revoked his
authority, but upon the 19th day of july, and within the limit of time
ﬁxed by the contract, he did produce the purchaser, with his money
deed.
in his hand, demanding
The court found that the plaintiff
entered into this'c0ntract in good faith, and that the writing was un
The record discloses that the agent was most
tainted with fraud.
indeed, the real reasons of
active in his efforts to ﬁnd a purchaser;
defendant’s revocation of the agency appear to be that the agent was
too active, as he had found two purchasers for the property instead
of one. The case of Brown v. Pforr_ 38 Cal. 553, would seem to
cursory examination, views hostile to the principles
indicate upon
expressed in the authorities cited in this opinion, but, upon examina
can readily be seen that no hostility exists.
tion of that case,
The
contract in that case does not expressly stipulate that
shall remain
in force 30 days, and the opinion of justice Sanderson clearly inti
there had been
the contract that
mates that,
provision
should
remain in force for such length of time, the defendant would not have
been permitted to prevent performance, and escape without making
compensation to the agent.
The remaining cases cited by respondent upon this question add no
The defendant expressly agreed that his con
merit to his contention.
tract with the agent should remain in force for the period of 10 days.
The act of the agent in ﬁnding
purchaser required time and labor
commissions,
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for its completion, and within three days of the execution of the con
tract, and prior to its revocation, he had placed the matter in the posi
tion that success was practically certain and immediate, and it would
be the height of injustice to permit the principal then to withdraw the
authority and terminate the agency as against an express provision_of
the contract, and perchance reap the beneﬁt of the agent's labors,
without being liable to him for his commissions.
This would be to
make the contract an unconscionable one, and would offer a premium
for fraud by enabling one of the parties to take advantage of his own
wrong, and secure the labor of the other without remuneration. 1
Let the judgment and order be reversed, and the cause remanded,
with

direction

as prayed

to the court below to enter judgment

for

the

plaintiff

for.

DEGEN

v.

MANISTEE, F.

(Supreme Court of Michigan,

1897.

C.
113

8:

E. L. RY.VCO.“

Mich.

66, 71 N. W. 459.)

Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with de
LONG, C. J.
The agreement was to continue ,at
fendant on February 27, 1893.
least one year from June lst, thereafter, at the rate of $1,000 per
year up to June 1, 1893, and after that date at the rate of $1,200 per
year. It could. by its terms be terminated by either party by giving
“The
It contained the following stipulations:
60 days’ notice.
of,this
the
ﬁrst
The
of
are
as
conditions
party
agreement
follows:
the
‘of
the
of
enter
into
party
to
employment
part hereby agrees
the second part as superintendent of its lines of electric street rail
way in Manistee, Michigan, and perform such duties as may be re
quired of him by said second party ; hereby agreeing to give his
Mr. C. A.
entire time, labor, and attention to such employment.”
Hart was the president of the defendant company, and made the
No one gave plain
contract with plaintiff, signing it as president.
tiff any orders, except Mr. Hart.
Plaintiff commenced work on
l\Iarch 13th, and was discharged by Mr. Hart on October 23d fol
Plaintiff claims that he was illegally dismissed, and brings
lowing.
this action to recover for the balance of the time. On the trial the
Plaintiff brings error.
court directed verdict in favor of defendant.
It appears that some fault was found with plaintiff by Mr. Hart
at different times, in that he could not ﬁnd plaintiff when he want
About September 28th, plaintiff went away to the \Vorld’s
ed him.
.Fair, with permission of defendant, and returned about October 10th.
By permission of Mr. Hart, he then went to Milwaukee for a few
24 Cf. Matthews v. Industrial Lumber Co., 91 S. G. 568, 75 S. E. 170, 45 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 644, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 45, involving obedience to the rules of
the master.
See. also, Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N. E. 181, 54 N.
E. -137. 71 Am. St. Rep. 381 (1899), and Development Co. v. King, 1.61 Fed. 91,
88 C. C. A. 255, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 812 (1908), with extensive note.
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days, to attend a street-railway convention. When he left he made ar
rangements for the proper management of his business, leaving the
foreman at the power house in charge. During his absence, Mr. Hart
On the plaintiff's return
assumed the management of the business.
from Milwaukee, he found that Mr. Hart had made some changes.
He had made a new arrangement on what is called the “bulletin
board,”—made changes in the schedule of the men. This the plaintiff,
on his arrival, at once wiped off the board, made a new schedule, and
put another man in place of a man whom Mr. Hart had put on. The
next morning, when Mr. Hart came, he asked the plaintiff why he
took off the man he put on. Plaintiff told him the other man was
entitled to the run.
On being asked if he would reinstate the man
whom Mr. Hart had put on, he refused.
Some altercation took
place; Mr. Hart insisting that his man should go back, and the plain
tiff refusing to comply with his orders. The plaintiff then said:
“As long as you hold me responsible for the conduct of the men, I want
you to understand that I will boss them. I will hire them, and I will
discharge them, and not you; and. if to-day is the last day I am super
intendent, to-day, at any rate, this man will not be put back to a
He was asked again by Mr. Hart to put the man
regular run.”
back, and refused, when Mr. Hart told him he would take charge.
The court stated, in determining the case, that the plaintiff was right
There was no substantial dis
fully discharged for insubordination.
pute or contradiction between the plaintiff and Mr. I-Iart as to what
took place, and what is here stated is taken from plaintiff's own ver
\Ne are satisﬁed that the court below was not in
sion of the affair.
error in holding, under the circumstances, that the plaintiff was prop
erly discharged, and no recovery could be had. Mr. Hart was the
He made
president of the company. He had charge of all its affairs.
the contract on behalf of the company with the plaintiff.
Evidently
he was the only one connected with the company who had supervi
The company had intrusted to him the manage
sion of the works.
ment, and the plaintiff had taken his orders ffom him up to that time,
and'under the contract he was “to perform such duties as may be
Mr. Hart was the agent
required of him by said second party.”
of the second party, and with full power to act for it. The rule
is that the neglect or refusal of an employé to obey the directions
of the employer as to the manner of performing his work is a breach
of the contract which justiﬁes his discharge. Matthews v. Park Bros.
& Co. (Pa. Sup.) 28 Atl. 435; Child v. Manufacturing Co., 72 Mich.
623, 40 N. W. 916.
The judgment is affirmed. The other justices
concurred.
Gonn.Pa.& A. (20 En.)—14
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The hiring was, by express agreement, for
payments for service were to be made monthly.
Law,
This constituted an entire contract. Beach v. Mullin, 34 N.
breach of this contract by discharging
343.
The action
brought for
the plaintiff, without lawful cause, before the expiration of the year
has
for which he was hired, and to recover damages for the loss
caused him. The only reason which appears in the case for his dis
that the plaintiﬁ‘ and an under-gardener had a disagree
charge
ment, which resulted in blows.
The causes which justify the dis
certain time by express agree
charge of servants employed for
ment, or by implication, are said to be various, and depend much on
the nature of the particular employment.
They are generally reduced
willful disobedience of
to these classes:
lawful order, gross moral
misconduct,”
habitual negligence or other serious detriment to the
master's interest, incompetence, or permanent disability from illness.
They must be in some way connected with the duties of the service.
612; Wood,
Instances will be found collated in Schouler, Dom. Rel.
Smith, Mast.
Serv.
139, and cases
Mast.
Serv.
109, etc.;
there cited.
The circumstances are not given by which we can judge of the
exact character of the plaintiff's offense in this case.
sudden aﬁray
on the grounds, resulting in no injury to the mistress’ business and
while a
good ground for discharge;
employment, would not be
ﬁght in the dwelling-house, causing damage to property, alarm to the
employer and her servants. and disturbance to the good order and
quiet of her residence, might be good justiﬁcation for an immediate
On the bare fact given in this case, coupled with the
discharge.
statement that the two contestants were kept in her service for sev
does not appear that their misconduct on
eral months afterwards,
SCUDDER,

it
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one year, although,the

The statement of facts and part of the opinion are omitted.
As to discharge for drunkenness, see Willis v. Lowery. 101 Miss. 118, 57
South. 418, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339, and note, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1018, and note
(1912), where at the time of the discharge
the servant had quit drinking;
Kirwyn, 662, 47 E. 0. L. 662 (1845);
Denman, C. J., in Wise v. Wilson, Carr
Cf. Child v. Boyd
Gonsolis v. Gearhart, 31 Mo. 585 (1861).
Corey Boot
Shoe Mfg. Co., 175 Mass. 493. 56 N. E. 608 (1900), setting limits on the rule;
for stealing, Libhart v. Wood,
Watts
S. (Pa.) 265, 37 Am. Dec. 461 (1841);
disgraceful
conduct of an agent in associating with
woman of ill repute,
Gould V. Magnolia Metal Co., 207 Ill. 172, 69 N. E. 896 (190-1), afﬁrming 108
Ill. App. 203 (1903); engaging in
rival business by the agent, though not
causing principal any injury Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311, 24 Am. Rep. 415
See, also, Singer v. McCormick,
Watts
S. 205 (1842).
(1877).
cause, Myers v. Roger J. Sullivan Co., 166 Mich. 193, 131
Double agency as
N. W. 521, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217 (1911).
See, also, post, p. 363 fr.
Gonn.Pa.& A.(2n E0.)
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this one occasion was so injurious as to justify the breach of her
contract with a servant who had been in her employment_for about
15 years.
It is said that, without cause, menial or domestic servants
may be discharged by general custom or usage at any time, on one
month’s notice, or a month’s wages. The reason given is that con
tracts for services which bring the parties in such close proximity
and frequency of intercourse that they are valuable only when mu
tually agreeable, and otherwise intolerably annoying, should be readily
Schouler, Dom. Rel. 608,
terminated at the option of either party.
Smith, Mast. & Serv. § 92. A head gardener, living in a house on his
master's grounds, was said to be such menial or domestic servant
who could be discharged on a month’s notice, though hired for £100 per
year. Nowlan v. Ablett, 2 Comp., M. & R. S4.
The cases cited, however, are English, and the custom, if there be
such in this country, is not so generally known and established as to
and an intention in persons making such
presume knowledge of
in their agreement, or annex
contract for hiring to incorporate
In Tatterson v. Manu
\¢Vood, Mast.
as an incident.
Serv.
was said, in
case where three months’
facturing Co., 106 Mass. 56,
notice was given to end
year’s employment as superintendent of
was an attempt “to import into such engagements
factory, that
rule of law analogous to that which applies to tenancies of real estate
by oral agreement, or to ‘that which governs contracts for domestic
But we are aware of no such rule of law ap
service in England.
There
no such general custom in this state;
plicable to the case.”
there be
special custom of this character where these parties
and
and
should appear that the plaintiﬁ? had knowledge of
reside,
also said that by
made the contract subject to such qualiﬁcation.
He testiﬁes that he did
remaining after notice he waived his objection.
not, and insisted on his employment for the year. The act, in itself,
purpose to remain so long as he was permitted to
is consistent with
If he had left im
stay, and assert his right when ﬁnally dismissed.
might be said he assented to go and
mediately, without objection,
abandon his contract.
new trial on the ground of excessive damages,
The refusal of
and for the alleged violation of the rule of damages in such cases, was
not erroneous. In actions for breach of contract of hiring, brought for
wrongful discharge, soon after the dismissal, the amount of damages
usually
question for the jury to determine, or for the judge,
waived, based on the amount of wages agreed for, or
jury
where
the usual rate for the employment contracted for, where no speciﬁc
wages have been agreed upon, and estimating what time will reason
ably be lost before similar employment can be obtained by using prop
er diligence. In such case the recovery should be limited to the amount
Wood's
of damages actually sustained by the unlawful discharge.
277, 279; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; VVilloughby
Mayne, Dam.
must also be considered that where an
v. Thomas, 24 Grat. 522.
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action for wrongful discharge has been brought, and damages recov
ered and .paid, no other action can be brought upon the same agree
Smith, Mast. 8: Serv. 194.‘ The action was begun November
ment.
Up to that time
23, 1887, and judgment rendered january 23, 1888.
it does not appear that the plaintiff had obtained or could obtain other
employment, although he had endeavored to ﬁnd it.
The damages were not excessiveand unlawfully estimated. Judg
ment aﬁirmed, with costs.

ii.

ATKIN
(Court of King’s Bench,

1830.

v.

ACTON.

4

Car. & P.

~

,
208;

19

E. C. L.

478.)

It

I

it
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it,

A clerk and traveller, hired by the year, attempted to take improper
The ‘employer discharged
liberties with his employer’s housemaid.
him, and said he would pay him the wages already earned. Plaintiff
refused this, and sues in assumpsit for £130 wages under the contract
of hiring. Plea: General issue, a set-off, and a tender of £14.
LORD TENTERDEN, C. ].
Assuming that the effect of the agree
ment is that it creates a hiring for a year, yet, if the plaintiff miscon
ducted himself in the way described, the defendant had a right to
discharge him, and was not compellable, according to my judgment, to
pay him any money at all; at all events, he was not liable to pay him
any more than for the time during which he actually served, which will
bring it round to the demand on the counts for work and labour-.
VVith respect to the tender, it appears to me that it has been proved.
The plaintiff refused to take the money offered, and as the sum was
think
mentioned, and he would not accept
quite sufficient, be
cause his objection was not, that the sum put before him was not the
precise amount offered, but his answer shows that he was not willing
therefore was not necessary for the de
to take the money at all.
fendant to get the sovereign changed so as to offer the precise sum.
Verdict for the defendant.

-

(Supreme

IACOBS

v.

WARFIELD.

Court of Louisiana,

1871.

23

La. Ann.

395.)

_

I.

WYLY,
The defendant has appealed from the judgment con
demning her to pay the plaintiff $2,610 for violating the contract which
she made with him on the sixth day of October, 1865, and for money
advanced by him for her beneﬁt under said contract.
In this contract the plaintiff was employed as an agent to super
intend all the business of the defendant in the parish of St. John the
Baptist, in relation to certain wild lands which the defendant owned in
said parish; and he was specially authorized to take charge of and ex

_
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é

m
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ercise general control over said property; to prevent the commission of
trespass or wastes upon said lands, and to appear in court to prosecute
and defend all suits in reference thereto, as occasion might require
“with the distinct understanding that no other charge shall be made by
the said ]acobs for his services in taking charge of the said lands and
removing therefrom all trespassers, than one-fourth in_terest in the rev
enue derived from the sale of wood a'nd timber cut therefrom by said
]acobs and his employés, as herein expressed, which shall be a full
and adequate remuneration and compensation for all services that he,
said Jacobs, may render the said Mrs. Vl/arﬁeld tinder and by virtue
of this procuration.”
It was further stipulated that the said agent was not to institute pro
ceedings against any trespasser without ﬁrst obtaining the written con
sent of the defendant ; and, also, that the said ]acobs was in no wise to
disturb or interfere with such persons as might have the written sanc
tion of Mrs. \Varﬁeld to be on said lands and cut and sell timber there

from.
There was no period ﬁxed in the act as the term for which the said
Jacobs was employed. Under this contract we think the defendant had
the right to discharge her agent and employé whenever she saw ﬁt to
do so.

From the evidence we are satisﬁed that the plaintiff did not comply
with his contract, and the defendant had good cause~ to discharge him.
His demand for damages for breach of contract must, therefore, fail.
It appears, however, that the plaintiﬁ paid ten dollars to an attorney
and twenty-ﬁve dollars costs in a suit for the beneﬁt of the defendant,
and we think he was justiﬁable in doing so‘ under the act of procura
For these sums he should have judgment. The demand for
tion.
the other sums which the plaintiﬁ claims to have paid for the defend
ant pursuant to the contract is not supported by the evidence.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment herein be reduced to thirty
It is further
ﬁve dollars, and as thus amended that it be aﬁirmed.
ordered that the plaintiff pay costs of this appeal. Rehearing refused.

MAIR v. HIMALAYA TEA
(Court of Chancery,

1865.

L. R.

1 Eq. 411, 11

Jur.

CO.

N. S. 1013, 14 W. R. 165.)

Mair & Co. had for many years been in business in London and Cal
cutta, and organized the Himalaya Tea Company for the cultivation
of tea. A prospectus was issued stating the object of the company
The latter took a large
and the appointment of Mair & C0. as agents.
number of shares. The directors, three years later, induced Mair &
Co. to resign as agents upon assurance of relief of all payments on
account of the shares subscribed. They then appointed new agents, but
sued Mair for the amount due on his shares and interest. He ﬁles his
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bill for relief by way of an accounting, and by _inj,u‘n_c,ti_on
restrain
them from acting uponhis resignation, or alternatively from suing for

payment upon the shares accepted by him.
Sir W. PAGE \/V0oD, V. C. I cannot see my way to granting the
plaintiff the relief asked, the whole matter being one for a court of
law to deal with, so long as care is taken that the plaintiﬁ’ shall not
be prejudiced in the proceedings at law by his voluntary resignation.
The contract between the plaintiff and the company must be regulated
by the articles of association only, on the faith of which other persons
have incurred their liability, and the Court cannot enter into any ar
rangements antecedent to the articles.
Even assuming, in favour of
the plaintiff, the construction given by him to the articles that he was
to be irremovable, except by the authority of a general meeting, or that
his acceptance of shares was conditional on his being retained as agent,
the Court cannot act in his favour, as the duties of an agent are in
the nature of personal service, and as such incapable.of being enforced
inequity.“ Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Railway Company,
3 D. CM. & G. 914, etc.
The plaintiff will have his cross action in re
contract;
of
the
as he cannot be relieved by this Court, there
and
spect
As, however, the plaintiff
will be no order upon the presentmotion.
has some reason for saying that his resignation was given under the
impression that he would be thereupon relieved from all liability, the
defendants must undertake not to set up in any proceedings at law the
alleged resignation of the plaintiif.

CLARK

v.

MULLENIX.

(Supreme Court or Judicature of Indiana, 1858.

11

Ind.

532.)

J.“

Bill in chancery, ﬁled under the old practice, by the
WORDEN,
appellee against the appellant, for the speciﬁc performance of a con
tract for the sale of land. . The cause was tried since the code took
effect, but there was a motion for a new trial, on the ‘ﬁnding of the
Court for the plaintiff below, which was overruled, and exception tak
en, the bill of exceptions setting out the evidence.
The bill avers that in May, 1848, the plaintiff purchased of the de
fendant, Nancy Clark, a certain piece of land therein described for
the sum of $400, to be paid in four equal payments, on the 25th of
December, of the years 1848, 1849, 1850, and 1851, with interest from
B7 As to an agent trusted, but not personally
acceptable to the principal,
Pickering v. Bishop of Ely, 2 Y. & Coll. C. C. 249, 12 L. J. Ch. 271, 7 Jur. 479
(1843); Singer v. McCormick, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 265 (1842).
To enforce the
agency speciﬁcally would deny the right ot the principal to revoke, Elwell v.
Coon (N. . Ch.) 46 Atl. 580 (1900) ; and be inequitable, Aiwortlrv.-Seymour, 42
Minn. 526, 44 N. W. 1030 (1890); Harlow v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 45 Or. 520, 78

J

"

Pac. 737 (1904).
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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the 1st of May, 1848; that he executed to the defendant four notes
for the purchase-money, as above speciﬁed, and was put, by her, in
possession of the land, and has made valuable and lasting improve
ments thereon; that he has paid to the defendant the purchase-money,
and demanded a deed, which she refuses to execute.
The facts charged in the‘ bill are denied under oath.
i
The Court, on its ﬁnding, decreed speciﬁc performance.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant, who resided in
Kentucky, by her letters to one John Allee, of Indiana, authorized him
to sell the laridin controversy;
and that in pursuance of such authori
ty, said Allee, as agent of the defendant,'sold the land to the plaintiff,
and put him in possession thereof, and also took from the plaintiff the
notes above speciﬁed for the purchase-money, which notes were re
tained in the possession of Allee until they were paid to him by the
plaintiff, and taken up. Soon after the land was sold, Allee received
letters from the defendant ratifying and conﬁrming the sale.
This
7
was in 1848.
Afterwards, the defendant became dissatisﬁed with the sale thus
made, on the alleged ground that it had been sold for less than its val
ue, and sought to repudiate it.
On the 24th ‘of September, 1850, she
executed to Henry H‘. Clark, a power of attorney, whereby she au
thorized and empowered him to sell and convey the land in contro
versy, and to receive the purchase-money, and all rents or claims due
her in the state of Indiana.
About the 1st of October, 1850, said
Henry H. Clark, having with him the power of attorney, came to the
county of Putnam, and had an interview with the plaintiff in relation to
the land. The plaintiff and said Henry H. Clark went to see said Allee.
In the language of said Allee the plaintiff’s witness, “Henry H. Clark
came to my house in company with the complainant, and said his sister
(the defendant) was dissatisﬁed with the trade, and gave notice to the
complainant that she wanted the land, and exhibited his power of at
It appears that after some consultation be
torney from defendant.”
tween the plaintiff and Allce, it was agreed that the power of attor
ney should be submitted to some lawyer of Greencastle, and according
ly the whole matter was submitted to ]udge Farley for his opinion.
On the same evening after consulting Judge Farley, the complainant
agreed to set aside the contract, and give $500 for the land.
At the time of this transaction none of the principal had been paid
on the notes for the purchase-money, and perhaps but a portion of the
interest. The principal and interest due on the notes were afterwards
paid by complainant to said Allee, but no part of it appears ever to
have been paid to the defendant, nor does it appear that she has ever
received anything upon the land.
The question arises whether, upon the foregoing facts (admitting
the original contract to be valid and binding, and not set aside and
canceled by the subsequent agreement between the plaintiff and said
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Henry, as the agent of the defendant); the payment of the purchase
money by the plaintiff to said Allee, was a payment to the defendant?
We are clearly of opinion that it was not. The authority of Allee
in the matterlwas clearly revoked and ended, and la payment to him
after the plaintiff had notice that he was not authorized to receive
was a nullity, so far as the defendant was concerned.
In Story on Agency,
said that an authority may be re
474,
voked by a “direct -and formal declaration publicly made known, or
by an informal writing, or by parol; or
‘may be implied from cir
cumstances. VV hat circumstances will or will not amount to
revoca
tion, or to notice of
revocation by implication, cannot be stated with
But there are some acts which admit
little
any deﬁnite certainty.
Thus,
for
doubt.”
the
another
example,
appoints
principal
or_no
person to do the same act, this will ordinarily be construed to be
revocation of the power of the former agent.”
Here, before the purchase-money was paid to Allee, the defendant
had executed
power to Henry H. Clark, by which she not only au
thorized him to sell and convey the land, but to receive the purchase
money and all claims due her in the state of Indiana, and of this fact
It
useless to say that the defendant’s
the plaintiff had full notice.
leaving of the notes in the possession of Allee, impliedly gave the plain
tiff the right to pay the money to him. The plaintiff knew that the
defendant wished to avoid the contract, and did not wish to receive
at all.
There could be no implied authority, under
the money upon
such circumstances, for Allee to receive the money, and his express
he had previously had any, was revoked.
The revocation
authority,
of Allee’s authority would not, of course, affect the validity of
sale
took away his right to
made by him previous to the revocation, but
act further as the agent of the defendant, either in receiving the pur
chase-money, or otherwise executing the contract.
The payment of the purchase-money to Allee, under the circumstanc
es, not being
payment to the defendant, and thisbeing all the pay
failure to make out the case so far as this
ment made, there was
concerned, and on this ground
essential particular
new trial should
have been granted.
Cause remanded for
new trial.
judgment reversed, with costs.
Morton Trnnsp. Co., 51 Mich. 539,
Graham
agent’s resignation demanded.

Jones

(1883),

v.

&

29

16

N. W.
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C. [8 Ired.] 74, 47 Am.

N.

Dec. 341.)

Plaintiﬁ was appointed by deed of defendant and others as agent to
go to Alabama to settle the estate of their brother and bring back to
each his share. After on‘e trip the defendant by parol revoked the au
thority. Plaintiff made a second trip and now sues defendant for his
share of the expenses.
NASH,
It is not denied by the plaintiff, that, in this case, it was
within the power of the defendant to put an ‘end to his agency, by-re
voking his authority. Indeed, this is a doctrine, so consonant with jus
tice and common sense, that it requires no reasoning to prove it. But
he contends, that it is a maxim of the common law, that every instru
ment must be revoked by one of equal dignity. It is true an instrument
under seal cannot be released or discharged by an instrument not un
der seal or by parol, but we do not consider the rule as applicable to
the revocation of powers of attorney, especially to such an one as we
are now considering.
The authority of an agent is conferred at the
mere will of his principal and is to be executed for his beneﬁt; the
principal, therefore, has the right to put an end to the agency when
ever he pleases, and the agent has no right to insist upon acting, when
the conﬁdence at ﬁrst reposed in him is withdrawn.
In this case,
was not necessary to enable the plaintiff to execute
his agency, thatﬂhis power should be under seal; one by parol, or by
writing of any kind, would have been sufficient;
certainly cannot
require more form to revoke the power than to create it, Mr. Story,
in his treatise on Agency (page 606), lays
down that the revocation
of a power may be, by
direct and formal declaration publicly made
known, or by an informal writing, or by parol; or
may be implied
from circumstances, and he nowhere intimates, nor do any of the au
thorities we have looked into, that when the power
created by deed,
must be revoked by deed. And, as was before remarked, the nature
of the connection between the principal and the agent seems to be at
stated, by Mr. Story, in the same page,
war with such principle.
that an agency may be revoked by implication, and all the text-writers
another agent
lay down the same doctrine. Thus,
appointed to
execute powers, previously entrusted to some other person,
rev
ocation, in general, of the power of the latter. For this proposition,
Mr. Story cites Copeland v. The Mercantile Insurance Company,
was decided that
Pick. 198. In that case,
power, given to one
Pedrick to sell the interest of his principal in
vessel, was revoked by
a subsequent letter of instruction to him and the master, to sell.
As then, an agent may be appointed by parol, and as the appointment
a

a

it
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a
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is

a
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is

it

a
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_of a subsequent agent supersedes and revokes

the powers previously
granted to another, it follows, that the power of the latter, though cre
ated by deed, may be revoked by the principal, by parol. But the case
in Pickering goes further. The case does not state, in so many words,
that the power granted to Pedrick, was under seal, but the facts set
forth in the case, show, that was the fact; and, if so, is, a direct au
thority in this case. This is the only point raised, in the plaintiff’s bill
of exceptions, as to the ]udge’s charge. * * *
judgment afﬁrmed.
\

-|__.i_
DAVOL

(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

QUIMBY.

Massachusetts,

1865.

93

Mass.

[11

Allen]

208.)

Contract, to recover wages. The defence was payment to the plain
tiff’s agent ; whose agency was denied by the plaintiff.
_
At the trial in the superior court, before Wilkinson, ]., it appeared
that the plaintiff ordered one Keach to collect the debt of the defend
ant, and, after paying to one Howe a sum due to him from the plain
tiff, to remit the balance to the plaintiff. A creditor of Keach, ascer
taining that the latter had demanded the money of the defendant, and
supposing it to be his own debt, commenced a trustee process against

Keach, summoning the defendant as trustee. The plaintiff then au
thorized Howe to settle the trustee process “the best way he could,”
receive the money due from the defendant, apply so much thereof as
was necessary in payment of the sum due from the plaintiff to Howe,
Afterwards the defendant re
and pay the balance to the plaintiff.
ceived notice from an attorney at law, demanding the money for and
on account of the plaintiff.
After this, the defendant paid the money
The plaintiff did not notify Howe of any withdrawal of
to Howe.
I
his authority.
The plaintiff’s counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that
if the defendant had notice to pay the attorney of the plaintiff, he
could not be justiﬁed in paying the money to Howe after such notice
from the plaintiff, and if he did so he did it at his own risk, and did
not discharge himself from liability to the plaintiff. The judge re
fused so to rule, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant;
and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
BIGELOW, C. J. The instruction asked for by the defendant was
It appeared distinctly from the evidence that the
rightly refused.
plaintiff authorized Howe to receive the money from the defendant;
but it was not shown that this authority was subsequently revoked.
The mere fact that the plaintiff also authorized another person to re
ceive the same money did not prove a revocation.
There may be two

\
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persons appointed to exercise the same power as agents for a princi
pal.“ If there is nothing in the nature of the agency to render an au
thority in one person inconsistent with a like authority in another, both
may well be authorized, and the acts of either or both, within the scope
of the agency, will be valid and binding on the principal.
So it was in
the case at bar. The defendant paid to one agent of whose authority
he had had notice. This authority was not revoked by the notice giv
en to the defendant that the plaintiff had also appointed another.agent
with similar authority.
There was no other evidence of revocation.
'
Exceptions overruled.

-_-_
(Court of King’s Bench at

v.

HARRISON."

Niqi

Prius,

1699.

.

12 Modern,

346.)

A servant hadpower to draw bills of exchange in his master s name,
and afterwards is turned out of the service.
HOLT, Chief Justice.
he draw a bill in so little time after that
the world cannot ‘take notice of his being out of service, or if he were
a long time out of his service, but that kept so secret that the world
cannot take notice of
the bill in those cases shall bind the master.
1

it,

If

LOOMIS

ads.

Zi

(Supreme Court or Judicature of New York, 1839.

19 Wand. 641.)

of

a

a

is

a

a

Motion by defendant to set aside report of referees, on the ground
plea of payment, or
that neither
notice
replication to
hearing
had been served. The defendant, who
an attorney, defends in per
son. Pending the suit he appointed
new law agent in Albany, with
out notice to the ﬁrst agent that his services were no longer required.
The plaintiff's attorney not being informed of the change, continued
to serve papers on the old agent, who being also ignorant of the change.
received and forwarded papers as usual, and among others, received
the replication and notice of hearing in question. These papers, though
forwarded did not reach the defendant.

5

a

(a

6

“CC
1

31 Cf. Williamson v. Richardson,
Fed. Cas. No. 17,754 (1867), second agent
to do same duties as to same contract, and Hatch v. Ooddington, 95 U. S. 48,
See,
2-1 L. Ed. 339 (1877), two agents employed to sell the same property.
also, Ahern v. Baker, 34 Minn. 98, 24 N. W. 341, ante, p. 173; ‘Copeland v.
Pick. (Mass) 198 (1828) joint agents.
Mercantile Ins. Co.,
A power of attorney will not be revoked by the giving of some other instru
deed or trust) which is not inconsistent with the continuance of the
ment
Nor by other acts of the
French v. Townes, 10 Grat. 513 (1853).
power.
principal (bringing suit to collect
debt) which are entirely consistent with
an intent to continue the agency.
Wniker v. Barrington, 28 Vt. 781 (1856).
As to effect of Withdrawing power of attorney, Kelly v. Brennan, 55 N. J. Eq.
423, 37 Atl. 137 (1897).
32 This case was quoted with approval in Morgan v. Stell,
Bin. 805 (1812).
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BRONSON, J.
Parties are not bound to search the agency book
When these proceedings were con
every time they serve a paper.
menced, Mr. Dean was the defendant’s law agent, and the plaintiff’s
attorney was regular in continuing to serve papers upon him, so long
as he acted as agent.
the defendant had advised Mr. Dean that he
had appointed a new agent and no longer desired his services, Mr.
Dean would not have received the papers, and would have told the
plaintiff's attorney of the change. The accident which has happened
is chargeable to the defendant’s own neglect. But he swears to merits,
and must be relieved on payment of costs.
'
Ordered accordingly. .

If

\

KELLY
(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,

v.

'

PHELPS.

1883.

57

Wis.

425, 15 N.

W.

385.)

it

is

is

it,

Action by an agent for commissidns on sales of wood for the prin
The ﬁfst commission to the agent was modiﬁed by later let
cipal.
ters, and defendant testiﬁed that on March 31st/he revoked the au
This plaintiff denies.
On April 11th he made a written con
thority.
tract for the sale of the last of the wood.
LYON, J. The authority to the plaintiff to sell the defendant’s wood
is found in _the letter of the defendant of February 13th, the price be
ing modiﬁed by the letter of Mafch 2d. The testimony tends to show
that plaintiff made contracts for the sale of 500 cords before any fur
It is con
ther modiﬁcation, of plaintiff's authority was attempted.
tended on'behalf of the defendant that the letter of March 26th re
quired the plaintiff to sell all of the wood in one lot, and consequently
If that
deprived him of authority to dispose of the same in parcels.
is so, it could have no effect upon sales made before that letter was
received. The previous letters, under which it is claimed that the 500
cords were sold to Case & Co. and Billings, contained no Such restric
tion upon the power of the plaintiff, and if he made those sales, as he
claims, he is entitled to his commission thereon. But we do not think
the letter of March 26th admits of the construction contended for.
We
think the fair and reasonable construction of it is that the dry and
green wood should be sold together in such proportions that the whole
of the wood should be sold at the speciﬁed prices. The dry wood be
ing the most valuable and ﬁnding a readier sale, would, if sold with
facilitate the sale of the green wood. This, we think,
the plain and
obvious meaning of the letter of March 26th.
If the plaintiff produced customers ready and willing to purchase
the wood at the speciﬁed ‘prices before revocation of his authority, he
entitled to his commissions on the amount those customers would
have taken, although the defendant refused to deliver the wood.
To
entitle him to his commission we do not think
essential that the
plaintiff should have entered into written contracts for the defendant

I
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to bind them under the statute of frauds.
sufficient if the customers were ready and willing to perform their
It was sub
verbal contract with the plaintiff to purchase the wood.
stantially so held in the late case of O'Connor v. Semple, S7 Wis. 243,

with such customers in order

It is

"
~
N. \V. 136.
of
learned
circuit
the
Thus far our views seem to accord with those
But
he
one
in
in
his
instructions
to
the
gave
jury.
judge, expressed
It is in these words:_ “If the
struction which we think erroneous.
defendant revoked the agency of the plaintiff, _and the plaintiff, not
withstanding such revocation, went on and completed the sale of the
15

wood, and immediately thereafter notiﬁed the defendant thereof, the
defendant was bound to give the plaintiff notice of his dissent within
a reasonable time thereafter;
otherwise he must be held to have ac
quiesced in and ratiﬁed the acts of the plaintiff, and will be liable for
his commissions.
Such dissent on the part of the defendant must
This instruction applies the rule of
have been clear and positive.”
law which binds the principal, in certain cases, to a third person for
the acts of a former agent, whose agency has been revoked, to a con
If, after rev
troversy between the principal and such former agent.”
ocation, the former agent enter into a contract for the principal, with
in the scope of his original authority, with one who had dealt with the
agent as such before the revocation, and who makes the contract in
good faith, without notice of the revocation, the principal will be bound
to such third party, or at least he will be bound unless he promptly re
The rule rests entirely upon the
pudiates the act of his former agent.
good faith of the person so dealing with the former agent, and holds
the principal to liability or to the duty of prompt action, because he had
given credit to his agent by appointing him, and thus put it in the power
of the latter to commit the fraud.“
83 In Jones v. Hodgkins. 61 Me. 484 (1872), Story on Agency, § 470, is quoted
to the cﬁfeet that as to the agent the revocation takes ettect from the time
when it is made known to him; as to third persons when it is made known
to them. This statement is approved in Capen v. Paciﬁc Mutual Ins. Co., 25 N.
J. Law, 67, 61 Am. Dee. 412 (1855) and Lamothe v. St. Louis Marine Ry. &
v. Cloud, 47 Miss. 208
See, also, Robertson
Dock Co., 17 Mo. 204 (1852).

(1872), notice sent by mail.
84 Accord:
Insurance Co. v.‘McCain, 96 U. S. 84, 24 L. Ed. 653 (1877);
Claﬂin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301 (1876); McNeilly v. Cdntinental Life Ins. Co.,
66 N. Y. 23 (1876), cited in Stevens v. Schroeder, 40 App. Div. 590, 58 N. Y.
Supp. 52 (1899); Ulrich v. McCormick, 66 Ind. 243 (1870).
Notifying the agent, but leaving in his hands a written power, will not
protect the principal as to third persons relying on the power and having no
notice or the revocation.
Beard v. Kirk, 11 N. H. 397 (1840). . And the same
Tier v. Lamp
result follows when the agent has had aeneral employment.
son, 35 Vt. 179, 82 Am. Dec. 634 (1862).
In Williams v. Bit-beck, Hoffman’.
Ch. 359 (1840), may be found a useful survey of the early cases, especially
as to what constitutes a suﬂicient notice. See, also, Burch v. Americus Gro
cery Co., 125 Ga. 153, 53 S. E. 1008 (1006); Rollos v. Yanuco, 20 P. 1. 269 (1911).
As to special agency, see Donnan v. Adams, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 615, 71 S. W.
580 (1902).
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But when it comes to a transaction between the principal and the
formeragent, the reason of the rule utterly fails, -and the rule has
no application.
Should a stranger, without authority, assume to act
as the agent of another, it would be intolerable if such other would
be bound to compensate the interloper for his services unless he gave
the latter “notice of his dissent within a reasonable time thereafter.”
The law im'poses no such obligation upon business men in respect to
If the de
those who, without authority, interfere in their affairs.
fendant revoked the au_thority of the plaintiff to sell wood for him, such
revocation was a perpetual notice to the plaintiff that he dissented
from each and every act of assumed agency, and as to him no other
notice of dissent is required. The jury may have found the revocation,
and still, under the instruction, the plaintiff would be entitled to re
cover commissions on the wood thereafter sold, because the defendant
did not dissent when notiﬁed of the sale. This is error.
We think the record discloses another error, also fatal to the judg
ment. The plaintiff testiﬁed to an express contract that his commis
sion on sales should be 5 per cent.
This was substantially denied by
If the jury believed the testimony of defendant, the
the defendant.
In this aspect of the case the de
recovery would be quantum meruit.
fendant offered competent testimony of the customary commissions in
procuring sales of wood. The testimony was rejected. It should have
been admitted, to enable the'jury to determine the amount of the re
covery in case they found there was no express agreement as to com
_
missions.
Other errors are assigned and have been argued by the respective
counsel. It is not deemed necessary to consider them. The judgment
of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for
.
a new trial.

SECURITY TRUST
(Supreme

Action
of

&

LIFE

Court of Wisconsin,

‘INS. CO. v.

1906.

129

Wis.

ELLSWORTH.

349,

109

N.

W.

125.)

to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a note, made as part

between plaintiff company and defendant, by which de
fendant became the general agent of plaintiff company.
The note was
to be paid out of commissions and renewals to be earned by the agents,
and represented money advanced to the agent and used by him to
build up the business. Not being successful he resigned, and this suit
is now brought to collect the note.
Iudgment for plaintiff and defend
'
ant appeals.
KERWIN, I.“ [After holding that the agreement was that the mort
gage debt should be paid out of renewals only, and that no demand
* * * 2. It is further
was to be made in excess of renewals:]
a contract

35

The statement of facts is abridged and part of the opinion is omitted.
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contended by counsel for respondent that the withdrawal
from the
agency of Henry Ellsworth and his son put it out of their power to pay
the debt provided in the contract, hence the debt became payable in
the usual way.
This involves the question of the right of the agent
to resign, and whether or not if such right existed it was reasonably
exercised.
Both contracts of agency are silent as to the time they
should remain in force, and both recognize the right of resignation by
providing, “in case of the resignation or removal of the said agents,
the said company may, and it is hereby authorized and empowered to
pay such subordinate agents any commissions or other remuneration
which said agents shall have agreed to pay such subordinate agents
and to offset against all claims under this contract such commissions or
other remuneration so paid.” The general rule is that where there is
no express or implied covenant to the contrary, the agent may resign
at any time. Mechem on Agency, § 233.
- It is claimed, however, by counsel for respondent that there was an
implied covenant on the part of the agents that they should not resign,
and it is insisted that this covenant arises not only out of the fact of
the existence of the indebtedness and the obligation to pay
but as
well out of the agreement on the part of the debtor im‘plied in all such
cases not to voluntarily put an end to the conditions upon which his
of value to the creditor. This branch of counsel’s con
agreement
tention, therefore, rests upon the assumption of implied covenant. Con
ceding for the sake of argument that the law would impose some ob
ligation upon the agents not to unreasonably abandon their undertaking,
still such rule must have reasonable construction. If the law implied
covenant for the continuance of the agency,
would not extend be
yond such time as was reasonably necessary to make an effort to suc
cessfully accomplish the purpose of the agency.
Clearly, there was
no implied covenant that the agency should be continued indeﬁnitely
when the continuance of
proved fruitless.
were otherwise, the
agents might be compelled to indeﬁnitely continue the agency without
proﬁt to themselves or their principal.
Reversed and remanded.
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CANNON COAL CO.
(Court

of Appeals

of Colorado,

1891.

v.

(Part
\

TAGGART.

1 Colo.

1

App. 60, 27 Pac. 238.)

it

it

a

a

a

a

a

it

it,

Action by Taggart for $272.80, loaned the company. Defense of
denials, and counterclaim for damages due to Taggart’s breach of the
contract to sell appellant’s coal. Exceptions to instructions of the trial
court.
B1ssELL, ]."'6 The right construction of the contract into which the
The interpretations put
parties entered will determine this appeal.
on it by the trial court led to the giving of the instructions which are
complained of. If it was a contract for the sale of personal property
not in existence at the time of the bargain, and to be produced by the
vendor, it would be necessary to decide whether such a sale carried
with it an implied warranty that the goods sold were merchantable.
The nisi ‘prius court so regarded
and told the jury that the coal must
be of
merchantable quality, and, should they ﬁnd otherwise,
would
justify the defendant in refusing to receive the coal tendered. The mat
ter was not put on the basis of
right to terminate the agency, which
was created by the agreement, because of
breach of its terms by the
sale, and
rejection of the goods.
principal, but on the theory of
This was wholly unwarranted by the legal obligations which the par
ties were under, and by the case as
was made, and
must have'misled
.

jury.

the

In

86

a

is

a

a

a

it

a

it

a

a

a

a

it

no sense which permits the application of that rule can
be said
There was no sale
that the contract was one of purchase and sale.
of
speciﬁc quantity of coal, or of the output of the mine. T_aggart
ton of coal. He might buy
was not bound to buy
thousand tons
month, all that the mine produced, or none.
What he ordered he
was bound to receive, and pay for at the price agreed on. In some
respects, chieﬂy relating to the obligation to pay for what he might
order,
was like
contract of sale.
In the absence of an obligation
to order, take, or ‘purchase any amount, deﬁnite or indeﬁnite,
lacked
an element which always accompanies
contract of sale.
The com
pany was obliged to ﬁll any orders which Taggart might send, to the
extent of their output, at so much per ton. The correlative promise
by Taggart was in reality the assumption of an agency to dispose,
as far as he might be able, of what the company might produce.
The
pith of the agreement, which was of advantage to the coal company,
was the contract to work up a trade for their coal, which Taggart
assumed. His compensation was in the price at which he was per
mitted to buy. Any breach of this agreement by Taggart without
legal excuse would necessarily subject him to
liability enforceable
,
by action.
The time speciﬁed in the contract for the duration of the agency
not essential to the liability.
As
general thing, an agent may at
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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any time renounce his employment, but_he must do it in good faith,
and in such fashion as not to injure his principal.
VVhen once he has
entered on his employment, he may not renounce it without reasonable
cause; and, failing in this, he will render himself liable for the con
sequences.
Story, Ag. § 478; White v. Smith, 6 Lans. 5; U. S. v.
Jarvis, 2 Ware (Dav. 274) 278, Fed. Cas. N0. 15,468; Elsee v. Gat
Ward, 5 Term R- 143-" Wheﬂ the 3gi'¢.8mCnt.is that he shall continue
for agdeﬁnite period, and he commences to do what he has promised,
a. fortiori will he be liable to respond in damages if he break his en
gagement without legal excuse. * * *
Reversed.

WM. ROGERS MFG. CO.
(Supreme

v.

ROGERS.

Court of Errors of Connecticut, 1890. 58 Conn.
7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. _278.)

356,

20

Atl.

467,

to restrain defendant from leaving employment of plain
or engaging in other business in violation of a contract to act
for 25 years as agent and manager of plaintiff's business. It is averred
that defendant is now, after 14 years, negotiating with other persons,

Injunction

tiffs,

$1 In U. S. v. Jarvis, 2 Ware (Dav. 274) 278. Fed. Cas. N0. 15,468 (1846). Ware,
District Judge, thus puts the law: “There is no doubt, as a general rule,
that the appointment of an agent may at any time be revoked by the princi
pal without giving a reason for it. because it is the right of every man to
employ such agents as he sees tit. The agent also has the same general right
to renounce the agency at his own will; for it is an engagement at the \vlll
*
' " And so the agent, after entering on the business,
of both parties.
But then this must he done in good faith, and
may renounce the agency.
be preceded by reasonable notice, or the agent will be liable to the principal
for any 108s that may result to him from this cause. The agent cannot with
draw himself from his engagement wantonly, and without reasonable cause.
without rendering himself responsible for the consequences. Id. Nos. 3, 4;
Poth. hiandat. No. 44; Dig. 17, 1. 22, § 11, Id. 1, 27, § 2. And when a man has
undertaken an agency, he will not merely render himself liable for damages
to his principal if he renounces the agency without notice and without just
cause, but a court of equity will go further. If an agent is employed to make
a purchase. and. ﬁnding the speculation likely to prove proﬁtable, he renounces
the agency and purchases for himself, equity will hold him a trustee for the
principal, and give him the benetlt of the purchase directly, without putting
him to an action for damages. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 5 316. It may be true that
in our jurlsdisprudence a precise authority may not be found for all these
propositions among the adjudged cases. But they rest on such clear grounds
of justice and good faith, that they may be well taken for granted without the
authority of a direct decision (Story, Ag. I 467). and they all stand approved
by the authorities of the Roman law. They all ﬂow from a. great principle of
social justice. A man cannot. wantonly and without reasonable cause, retract
or annul his own acts and change his purpose. when others, in the ordinary
course of business and in good faith. have acquired an interest in them, to the
injury of such persons. without rendering himself liable to repair uch in
jury. The greatest of the Roman jurisconsults reduced the rule to a short and
pithy maxim: No man can change his will to the injury of another.
Dig.
50. 17. 75.
‘Nemo potest mutari consilium suum in alterius injurlam.'
Sec. also. Hitchcock v. Kelley, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 808, at page 813, 4 0. C.

D. 180;

Duﬂield

v. Michaela

Gonn.Pa.& A. (20 En.)—15

(C. C.) 97 Fed. 825 (1899);

Cody v. Raynaud,

1
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competitors of plaintiffs, to leave the employ of plaintiffs, and to give
to these rivals his services, and the use of his name on the stam'p of
silver plated ware to be made by such rivals.
Contracts for personal service are matters for
ANDREWS, C. ].
courts of law, and equity will not undertake a speciﬁc performance.
2 Kent, Comm. 258, note b; Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. ch. (N. Y.)
529; Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 315; Haight v. Badgeley,
15 Barb. (N.'Y.) 499; ‘De Rivaﬁnoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 264.
A speciﬁc performance in such cases is said to_ be impossible because
obedience to the decree cannot be compelled by the ordinary processes
of the court.“ Contracts for personal acts have -been regarded as the
Colo. 272 (1871): Bishop v. Runney, 59 Vt. 316, 7 Atl..S20 (1887); 1 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1110; Newcomb v. Insurance C0. (C. C.) 51 Fed. 725
(1892).
38 Contracts

‘

involving the performance of a continuous and protracted se
ries of acts, or of acts demanding‘ the exercise of individual skill, taste, talent
For breach
or discretion, are of necessity incapable of judicial supervision.
of such agreements the remedy is to be sought in an action at law. Thiebnud
v. Union Furniture Co., 143 Ind. 340, 42 N. E. 741 (1895); Arthur v. Oakes,
63 Fed. 318, 11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R. A. 414 (189-1). To enforce a contract
In re Mary Clark,
for personal services would result in a state of slavery.
To attempt to enforce a contract de
1 Blackf. 122, 12 Am. Dec. 213 (1821).
manding personal conﬁdence would make that conﬁdence impossible.
Bourget
v. Monroe, 58 Mich. 563. 25 N. W. 514 (1885).
An early and interesting case
in this country is De Rivaﬁnoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige, Ch. 264. 25 Am. Dec.
532 (1833), in which Chancellor
Wolworth has humorously set forth the pow
erlessness of the law to realize the old adage that a bird that can sing and
will not must be made to sing. He doubted that any oﬁicer of the court
had_ that perfect knowledge of the Italian language, or that exquisite sensi
bility in the auricular nerve, requisite to enjoy-with a proper zest the pe
culiar beauties of the Italian opera. He also doubted the effect of coercion
especially in the livelier airs. though admitting that
upon defendanﬁslsinging
fear of that dismal cage. the debt.or’s prison, would deepen his seriousness in
See, also, Hamblin v. Dinneford,
the graver parts of the drama.
2 Edw. Ch.
In Boquemore v. Mitchell, 167 Ala. 475, 52 South. 423. as re
529 (1835).
ported in 140 Am. St. Rep. 52 (1910), is an extended note on the-whole subject.
The leading English case is Lumley v. Wagner; 1 De G. M. & G. 60-1 (1852),
which has been somewhat limited by Whitwood Chemical O0. v. Hardman,
This is approved in
[1891] 2 Ch. 416, in which there was no negative clause.
Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 Iowa, 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115
Most American cases stress unique services rather than presence or
(1906).
absence of negative clauses.
Of. Philadelphia Ball Club v. La Joie; 202 Pa.
210, 51 Atl. 973, 58 L. R. A. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 627 (1902). in which a base
ball player was restrained, with American Baseball & Athletic Exhibition Co.
v. Harper, 54 Cent. L. J. 449 (1902), in which another court in the same year
See, also, Keith v. Kellermann (C. C.) 169
refused to restrain another player.
Fed. 196 (1909), a case of a fancy diver.
That the remedy must be mutual is held in Stanton v. Singleton. 126 Ual.
657, 59 Pac. 146, 47 L. R. A. 334 (1899),.citlng
many cases; Cort v. Las
sard, 18 Or. 221. 22 Pac. 1054, 6 L. R. A. 653, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726 (1889).
That injunction is negative speciﬁc performance is held in Welty v. Jacobs.
171 Ill. 624, 49 N. E. 723, 40 L. R. A. 98 (1898), quoting Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp.
That may be the effect, but not of necessity. Injunction may merely
5 1341.
prevent a wrong not capable of other adequate remedy, without resulting in
performance of the contract, and so be Justified even when the courts could
not speciﬁcally enforce the agency.
Standard Fashion Co. v. Sicgel-Cooper
Co., 22 Misc. Rep. 624, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1056 (1898), which held this was not
'
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most familiar illustrations of this doctrine, since the court cannot in any
direct manner compel the party to render the service. T_he courts in
this country and in England formerly held that they could not negative
ly enforce the speciﬁc performance of such contracts by means of an
injunction restraining their violation. 3 \Vait, Act. & Def. 754; Marble
Co. v. Ripley, 10 \/Vall. 340, 19 L. Ed. 955; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill.
487, 45 Am. Dec. 171; De Pol v. Sohlke, 30 N. Y. Su'per. Ct. 280;
Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333; Baldwin v. Society, 9 Sim. 393; Fother
gill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132.
The courts in both countries have, however, receded somewhat from
the latter conclusion, and it is now held that where a contract stipu
lates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services or acts, or
where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual, or are peculiar
and individual in their character, the court will grant an injunction in
aid of a speciﬁc performance.
But where the services are material or
mechanical, or are not peculiar or individual, the party will be left to
his action for damages.
The reason seems to be that services of the
former class are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of giving
the injured party adequate compensation in damages, while the loss of
services of the latter class can be adequately compensated by an, action
for damages. 2 Story, Eq. ]ur. § 958a; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 754; 3
Pom. Eq. ]ur. § 1343; California Bank v. Fresno Canal, etc., Co., 53 Cal.
201; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union Button Hole Co., Holmes,
253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Lumley v. \Vagner, l De Gex, M. & G. 604;
Railroad Co. v. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880; Montague v. Flock
ton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189.”
The contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs is made a
part of the complaint. The services which the defendant was to per
form for the plaintiffs are not speciﬁed therein, otherwise than that
they were to be such as should be devolved upon him by the general
manager; “it being understood that such duties may include traveling
for said companies whenever, in the judgment of said general agent,
the interests of the business will be thereby promoted,” and also “in
cluding such duties as traveling for said companies as said general
agent may devolve ,upon him, including also any duties as secretary
or other ofﬁcer of either or both of said companies as said companies
These services, while they may
may desire to have him perform.”
proper case for injunction. and was on this point overruled in 157 N.
Rep. 753 (1898). 43 L. R. A. 854, with mono
Y. 60. 57 N. E. 408, 68 Am.
graphic note. This is especla ly applicable when one party has already per
formed. The remedy will then no longer lack mutuality. Singer Sewing Ma
diinc Co. v. Union Buttonhole Co., Holmes, 253 Fed. Cas. N0. 12,901 (1-573),
leading ease.
39 As to injunction to restrain an agent who has signed
contract that his
services are unique, see Kupfersmith v. Hopper, 122 App. Dlv. 31, 106 N. Y.
Supp. 797 (1907); Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Ncb. 544, 98 N. W. 57, 113 Am. St.
Rep. 802 (1903); Id., 65 Neb. 167, 91 N. W. 181, 101 Am. St. Rep. 614 (1902);
Duly v. Smith,‘ 49 How. Prac. 50 (1874), containing an elaborate review of the
authorities.
1
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not be material and mechanical, are certainly not purely intellectual,
nor are they special, or unique, or extraordinary; nor are they so
peculiar or individual that they could not be performed by any person
of ordinary intelligence and fair learning. If this was all there was
in the contract it would be almost too ‘plain for argument that the
plaintiffs should not have an injunction.
The plaintiffs, however, insist that the negative part of the contract,
by which the defendant stipulated and agreed that he would not be
engaged in or allow his name to be employed in any manner in any
other hardware, cutlery, -flatware or hollow-ware business, either as
a manufacturer or seller, fully entitles them to an injunction against
its violation.
They aver in the complaint, on information and belief,
that the defendant is planning with certain of their competitors to en
gage with them in business, with the intent and purpose of allowing his
name to be used or employed in connection with such business as a
and they say such use would do
stamp on the ware» manufactured;
them great and irreparable injury. If the plaintiffs owned the name
of the defendant as a trade-mark, they could have no difficulty in pro
but they make no such claim, and all argu
tecting their ownership;
ments or analogies drawn from the law of trade-marks may be laid
.wholly out of the case.
There is no averment in the complaint that the plaintiffs are enti—
tled to use, or that in fact they do use, the name of the defendant as
a stamp on the goods of their own manufacture, nor any averment
that such use, if it exists, is of any value to them.
So far as the court
is informed, the defendant’s name on such goods as the plaintiffs
manufacture is of no more value than the names of Smith or Stiles
There is nothing from which the court can see that
or John Doe.
the use of the defendant’s name by the plaintiffs is of any value to
them, or that its use as a stamp by their competitors would do them
any injury other than such as might grow out of a lawful business
rivalry. If by reason of extraneous facts the name of the defendant
does have some special and peculiar value as a stamp on their goods,
or its use as a stamp on goods manufactured by their rivals would
do them some special injury, such facts ought to have been set out
so that the court might pass upon them.
In the absence of any alle
gation of such facts we must assume that none exist.
The plaintiffs also aver that the defendant intends to make known
to their rivals the knowledge of their business, or their customers, etc.,
which he has obtained while in their employ. But here they have not
shown facts which bring the case within any rule that would require
an employé to be enjoined from disclosing business secrets which he
has learned in the course of his employment, and which he has con
tracted not to divulge. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec.
664.

There is no error in the judgment of the superior court.
judges concurred.

The other
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SECTION 3.—EFFECT OF TERMINATION
GUNTER
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

1888.

v.

STUART.

87

Ala.

Rep. 21.)

196,
.

6

,

South.

266.

13

Am.

St.

Action on account against Gunter and others, late partners, for
The partnership was dissolved
goods furnished for their steamboats.
on October 5, 1885. The court below refused to charge that if McKee
had ceased to be their agent, or if the partnership had been dissolved
before ,McKee'indorsed the accounts as correct, then defendants
can
'
not be bound.
STONE, C. J. Part of Stuart's evidence, on which he relied for re
covery against the steamboat company, the appellants, consisted in
certain stated accounts, certiﬁed to be correct by one McKee, styling
himself “clerk.” These certiﬁcates, several of them, bear date in Octo
ber, 1885, and some of the items appear to be later than this. There
was testimony tending to show that McKee ceased to be clerk or
agent of appellants abouf June 1, 1885, and that he was not afterwards
in their employment.
It is too clear to admit of argument that after McKee ceased to be
clerk and agent of appellants he could neither do any act, state an ac
count, or make an admission, that would bind them.
Vi/hile the rela
tion of principal and agent exists, the agent can bind hisprincipal by
any act done within the scope of his authority, and by any admission
made contemporaneous with and explanatory of the act of agency so
done (3 Brick. Dig. p. 25, §§ 107, 108): and it may be that, acting
as clerk of the boat, it was within the purview of his duties to make
purchases for the boat, and to state accounts. All these powers, how
ever, would necessarily terminate when his connection with the boat
To obtain, after that time, any information he might
was severed.“
possess, he must needs have been made a witness.
Charges 2 and 3 asked by appellants ought to have been given.
Reversed and remanded.
"Though a discharged agent may perhaps to a limited extent, close up
transactions entered into through him (Farmers' A: Mechanics‘ Bank v. Stick
ney. Fed. Cas. No. 4.657. B1‘"""Pl', Col. Cas. 543 [18-15]), still this power is
very narrow and unusual (Baudouine v. Grimes, 64 Iowa. 370, 20 N. W.
476 (151841). and is usually conﬁned to cases in which third persons have not
had the notice of the revocation which the principal is bound to give (Easton's
Admit v. Ellis, 1 Handy, 70 [185-fl).
As between the agent and the principal. after an effectual termination of the
agency. see In re Overweg;
Haas v. Durant, [1900] 1 Ch. 209, 81 L. '1‘. 776,
By such acts he only
69 L. J. Ch. 255; Soule v. Dougherty, 24 Vt. 92 (1852).
subjects himself to liability. McEwen v. Kerfoot, 37 I11. 530 (1865).
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BURCHARD
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

1898.

v.

HULL.
71

Minn.

430, 74

N. W.

163.)
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Plaintiff was a customer of the Vermont National Bank of Brattle
boro, and requested the bank to loan $1,200 for her on \/Vestern real
estate security.
The bank made the loan, through A. F. & L. E. Kel
ley, of Minneapolis, to defendant Hull, who executed a mortgage on
the land in question to secure the payment of the note which he exe
cuted,. payable in ﬁve years, according to_ten coupon notes of even
date, attached to the principal note and payable one on January lst,
After recording the mortgage,
and one on ]u1y lst, of each year.
with- the note and coupons, to the bank,
the Kelleys transmitted
which delivered them to plaintiff, who has ever since retained them,
except asshe has detached and delivered to the bank for collection
She did not know of the Kelleys, ex
the coupons as they matured.
The
cept as she saw their names printed on the margins of the notes.
custom of the bank was to send these coupons to the Kelleys, who
would collect and re'mit the proceeds to the bank, which then placed
the amounts to the credit of plaintiﬁ"s account.
_
1892, and fanuary
Hull defaulted in payments due july
1893,
but the Kelleys did not report this, and advanced the amounts out
of their own funds. They placed these coupons in the hands of an
in at $1,
attorney to foreclose the mortgage, and A. F. Kelley bid
There was no redemption, and in November, 1894, A. F. Kelley
400.
conveyed the land to the defendant \Vells for $1,750, and appropri
ated the money tp his own use. \Vells seems to have bought in good
faith, and neither plaintiff nor the bank knew of the pretended fore
closure until the Kelleys failed in 1896, for the Kelleys had kept up
the coupon payments. Plaintiff, upon ascertaining the facts, promptly
(230)
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action.

From orders denying her motions to amend pleadings‘and for a new
trial, she appeals.
Mn'cHELL, J.‘ * * * There is a mass of evidence tending to
show that it was the custom of the Kelleys to advance‘ money to pay
interest on loans placed by them for others, and then foreclose the

is

it
is

it,

mortgages, bid the land in, in their own names, and sell it if not re
But there is not a particle of evidence that plaintiff had
deemed.
any knowledge of such a custom, and, there being nothing in the facts
we dismiss the evidence as to the Kel
making it her duty to know
leys’ custom with the simple statement that
wholly irrelevant and
immaterial.
\Ve have not overlooked the fact that the Vermont bank had,
through the Kelleys, made one or two other loans for the plaintiff
under similar authority, the securities for which were delivered and
retained by her, and the principal and interest as they matured col
But there
lected through the bank.
nothing in these transactions
which at all affects the present one, or at all tends to enlarge or change
the authority, either express or implied, of the bank or the Kelleys
The case IS entirely free from
in the matter now under consideration.
any element of estoppel by conduct, or of apparent, as distinguished
from actual, authority, or of ratiﬁcation.
The defendant VVells must stand exclusively upon the proposition
that the act of the plaintiff in delivering or transmitting these interest
coupons (she herself retaining the mortgage and principal note) to
another, with authority to collect the same, gave such other person
the coupons were not
implied authority to foreclose the mortgage
paid. The learned trial judge saw clearly that this was so, and hence,
in his memorandum, placed his decision squarely on the ground that
placing the coupons in the hands of the bank for collection, she
might employ to use the usual
and such subagents as
authorized
and, as the coupons
and customary methods of enforcing payment:
power of sale, the foreclo
mortgage containing
were secured by
the usual and customary
sure of the mortgage under the power
method of enforcing payment.
axiomatic in the law of agency that no one can become the
agent of another except by the will of the principal, either express or
implied from the particular circumstances; that an agent cannot cre
particular act merely by its per
ate in himself an authority to do
equally axiomatic that the extent of the authority
formance.
of an agent also depends upon the will of the principal, and that the
latter will be bound by the acts of the former only to the extent of
the authority, actual or apparent, which he has conferred upon the
is
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It is, of course, a fundamental principle in the law of agency, that
by implication, the author
every delegation of power carries with
ity to do all those things which are reasonably necessary and proper
to carry into effect the main power conferred, and which are not for
bidden.
But the doctrine of implied authority goes no further than
this.
also true that where the principal confers upon his agent
kind, or empowers him to transact business of a
an authority of
well-deﬁned and publicly
nature, in reference to which there
known usage,
the presumption of the law, in the absence of any
thing to indicate
contrary intent, that the authority was conferred
in contemplation of the usage; and therefore third persons who deal
with the agent in good faith have
right to presume that the agent
has been clothed with all the powers with which, according to such
But,
are clothed.
usage in that particular business, similar agents
in order to give the usage this effect,
must be known to the prin
length of time, and become so widely
cipal, or have existed for such
known, as to warrant the presumption that the principal had
in view
at the time he appointed the agent."
On the facts of this case, the doctrine of implied power cannot
If an agent
be successfully invoked under either of these principles.
sent for collection (while his principal
to whom an interest coupon
retains in his own possession the collateral mortgage and principal
note not yet due) has implied power to foreclose the mortgage, the
the better.
VVe apprehend the announcement of
sooner men know
any such doctrine would take both the legal profession and business
men by surprise.
may be that the power to collect would carry
with
power to sue on the coupon. But the foreclosure of the secu
an entirely different
matter.
rity which the principal may have
The mortgage and the evidence of the debt are separate instruments,
The creditor may commence
and afford independent remedies.
per
sonal action on the note or other evidence of the debt, or he may
proceed to realize on his security; and the pursuit of one remedy
not waived or impaired
no bar to the other. The right to foreclose
A creditor might desire
by the recovery of judgment upon the debt.
to sue on the debt, but not to foreclose his security, and vice versa.
He might be willing to intrust an agent with the collection of an in
terest coupon, but unwilling to intrust him with the foreclosure of
collateral mortgage, which might result in sacriﬁcing his security
As suggested in appellant's brief, suppose the
for the whole debt.
mortgage on real estate, had held, as security,
plaintiff, instead of
elevator receipts for grain, and had transmitted these interest coupons
to an agent for collection, she retaining the receipts for the grain;

I.

7

1

2

In Hill v. Helton, 80 Ala. 528, South. 340 (1886), the court held that, while
the authority as agent may be proved by circumstances. those circumstances
must in some way, directly or indirectly, be connected with the principal.
P.
553 (1907).
See Macke v. Camps,

_Ch.
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be claimed that the agent would have implied authority to
sell the grain?
The fact that in this case the mortgage was on real
property, and on record, does not alter the principle.
\\/hether, had the principal note been due, and been transmitted
for collection, the agent would have had implied authority to fore
close, is a question not before us, and which need not now be consid
But very clearly, where an interest coupon on a principal note
ered.
not yet due is sent to an agent for collection (that being the extent
of his express authority), the principal retaining the principal note and
collateral mortgage. the implied authority of the agent is limited to a
resort to such remedies as may be pursued on the coupon, irrespective
of the collateral mortgage. It may be, as suggested by the trial court.
that foreclosure is the usual way of collecting debts secured by mort
gage. If so, it must be because the personal pecuniary irresponsibility
of the mortgagors renders it the only effective method. But that is
a very diﬁerent thing from holding that an agent employed merely
to collect a coupon for interest on a principal note not yet due has
implied authority to foreclose a mortgage which his principal holds
There is no proof of any such usage
as security for the entire debt.
in that business, unless the practice of the Kelleys proves it.
But,
fortunately, the business methods of the Kelleys are not suﬁicient to
establish a general custom or usage with reference to which other peo
‘
ple are presumed to contract.
It is suggested that, under the registry laws, VVells is protected as
a bona ﬁde purchaser, for value, because Kelley’s title appeared per
fect of record. This claim might be urged with equal force if one
of the deeds in the chain of title had been forged. This case illus
trates the fact that our system of registration will not always protect
those who purchase in reliance upon the public records.
This may
be partly owing to defects in the system, and in part owing to causes
that are remediless under any system.
The defect which was the prin
cipal cause of trouble in this ca_se was remedied, in part at least, by
Gen. Laws 1897, c. 262, which requires the authority of an attorney to
foreclose a mortgage under a power to be in writing and recorded.
The suggestion that the Kelleys had authority to foreclose, because the
mortgage provided that it might be foreclosed by the mortgagee, her
“attorney or agent,” is not entitled to extended notice. If the per
son assuming to foreclose had no authority to do so, he was not the
The defendant \/Vells
agent of the mortgagee for any such purpose.
the victim of the fraud and dishonesty of the Kel
is unfortunately
leys, but this is no reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of her
mortgage. Order reversed.
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CUMMINS
(Supreme

v.

(Part 2

BEAUMONT.

Court of Alabama,

1880.

68

Ala.

204.)

I

§
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it,

SOMERVILLE, I. This is an action of detinue, brought for the re
covery of a piano, which was hired by the appellant, Cummins, to one
Mrs. Phillips, and by her sold to the appellee, Beaumont. The con
tract was in writing, and from its terms was a mere bailment, and
not a conditional sale.
The intention of the parties, as expressed in
this letting for hire, is evidently to repudiate expressly the idea of a
I sale.
Mrs. Phillips was, at the same time, constituted by Cummins
as his agent to sell pianos and organs;
and the authority was also
in writing.
She was to receive commissions on all sales of them, and
“to make all orders for the same to said Cummins”; and it was fur
ther provided, that “the instruments [were] to be sent direct from the
The appellee, Beaumont, purchased the piano in question
factory.”
from Mrs. Phillips, paying her three hundred dollars cash for
and
without any notice of the limited agency, or her want of authority
to sell; and she failed to pay over the money to the appellant.
She
had made no other sales to any one, except of one organ; and this
sale was known to Beaumont, when he purchased.
We think the principle must control here, that one who deals with
an agent,
bound always, at his peril, to ascertain the extent of his
Brick. Dig. p. 55,
Powell’s Adm’r v. Henry, 27 ‘Ala. 612;
authority.
The appellee, when he made the purchase in question, was re
35.
quired to know the status of the personal property sued for in this
action, and the written limitations upon the agent's authority to deal
with it. Its sale by Mrs. Phillips was an unauthorized conversion, and
The contract of letting for hire
conferred no title on the purchaser.
out of the operation of the other agreement author
expressly took
The
izing sales of pianos and organs on certain stipulated conditions.
exercise of proper diligence, by inquiry, might have led to this knowl
Furthermore,
was clearly Eontemplated, by the contract of
edge.
agency, that the agent was “to make all orders” to the principal for
such instruments as might be sold, and that they were to be shipped
A knowledge of the agency
“direct from the factory” by the principal.
knowledge of the contents of this writing; for “the vital
was, in law,
principle of the law of agency lies in the legal identity of the agent
and the principal, created by their mutual consént;” and a principal
not bound by the acts of his agent, who transcends the scope of
59.3
And such powers of attorney are
Greenl. Ev.
his authority.
2

19

I

9

2

8

K. B. 399,
Com. Cas. 252, 72 L. J. K.
v. Burnand [1903],
T. L. R. 584, 51 Wkly. Rep. 652, reversed on other grounds in
Com. Cas. 251, 73 L. J. K. B. 669, 90 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)
K. B. 10,
[1904]
J., in passing upon the
S03, 20 T. L. R. 398. 52 Wkly. Rep. 583, Bingham,
authority conferred by the documents of appointment of the agent. saysr
and
“It. is said that even if the plaintiffs had asked to see the authorities,
had read them, they had no means of ascertaining whether the policies were

3In Hambro

B. 626,
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ordinarily subjected to a strict construction, so as to preclude all au
Dearing
thority not expressly given, or necessarily to be inferred.
v. Lightfoot, 16 Ala. 28; Scarborough v. Reynolds, 12 Ala. 252;
,
Fisher v. Campbell, 9 Port. 210.
The circuit court erred in the charge given; and the judgment is
reversed, and the cause remanded.

MUS5EY
(Supreme Judicial

v.

BEECHER.

Court of Massachusetts,

1849.

3 Cush. 511.)

SHAW, C. ].
This is an action of assumpsit for goods sold and
delivered, which are alleged to have been purchased of the plaintiff by
the defendant, through the agency of \/Villiam Pierce, acting under a
power of attorney from the defendant. The question is upon the legal
construction of the defendant's power of attorney to Pierce, which is
in writing, and is slated at large in the report.
To this power was
annexed the following proviso: “Provided, however, that said Pierce
shall not make purchases or incur debts exceeding in amount at any
one time the sum of two thousand dollars, and also that this power
or agency shall not extend for a period of time beyond January lst,
1842.” The power was afterwards extended by a memorandum to the
lst of ]anuary, 1843.

it,

The presumption is, that the plaintiff knew of the terms of this pow
er and of its limitation, before he sold goods to Pierce, on the strength
of
and on the credit of the defendant; and, indeed, the evidence was,
Various questions of fact were sub
that he had seen the instrument.
mitted to the jury on the evidence, as to the extension of the power, or

6
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But my
issued for the beneﬁt of the principals or not. That may be true.
man is not to be held liable because it has been ditlicult or
that
answer
If :1 person con
even impossible to ascertain whether he was liable or not.
is for him to see as best he can that the acont is acting
tracts with an agent,
holding out, then
within his authority. . It the authority exists by reason of
the person making the contract must take care that the agent does nothing
which the holding out does not warrant; it the authority does not arise from
holding out, then care must be taken to see that what is being done is
within the terms of the actual authority. It is often dlﬂicult, or inconvenient,
or impolitic to make inquiries about an agent's authority, but that circum
stance does not make the principal liable where he is otherwise not liable.
The other contracting party takes the risk, and, though now and then it turns
frequency to
out that the risk is serious and real, the event is not oi’ suﬂicient
'
interfere with business."
In Dispatch Ptg. Co. v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 109 Minn. 440. 124 N. W.
the jury that the burden was
236 (1910), the trial court. having instructed
upon the plaintiff to prove that his agent had no actual authority to do the
thing complained oi‘, it was held to be error.
v. Jackson Paper Mfg. Co., 120 Mich. 242, 79 N. W.
See. also, Deifenbaugh
197 (1899): Rosendort v. Poling. 48 W. Va. 621. 37 S. E. 555 (1900); Shull v.
New Birdsall Co., 15 S. D. 87. 86 N. W. 654 (1901); 31 Cyc. 1822; Ermentrout
v. Insurance Co., 63 Minn. 305. 65 N. W. 635, 30 L. R. A. 346, 56 Am. St.
P. I., 680 (1906).
Rep. 481; Strong v. Gutierrez Repide,

\
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of the limitation, and the like; but the real question arises
upon the correctness of the instructions, in matter of law.
The court instructed the jury, that the plaintiff must show, that such
goods were sold under the power to Pierce, as his agent, and not upon
the personal credit of Pierce; and that, although the power was lim
ited, and such limitation was known to the plaintiﬁ‘, yet that the de
fendant would be liable for Pierce’s purchases, even though he had
already exceeded the amount authorized by the power; if they were
satisﬁed, from the evidence, that, at the time of the purchases, Pierce
represented, that by such purchases he would not exceed his limit.
In another connection, the same instruction, in effect, was given,
with a slight variance of form, as follows: “That if the plaintiﬁ’ had
inquired of Pierce about the agency, and had been informed by him
that it was not full, and he had no reason to suspect the truth of
Pierce’s declaration, and if the plaintiff then sold goods to Pierce, as
agent, as aforesaid, the defendant would be liable for such goods, even
though the agency was then full.”
The former part of this instruction, that it must appear, that the
goods were not sold on the personal credit of Pierce, is unquestionably
correct; but, in regard to the latter part, which makes the defendant
responsible for the veracity and accuracy of Pierce, a majority of the
court are of opinion, that it was not correct in point of law.
This power of attorney, which is in the nature of a letter of credit,
is precise and limited in amount; and, though it contains some expres
sions, intimating that the attorney is the general agent of the con
stituent, to purchase and sell goods, yet this is controlled by the pro
and, taken all together, as every written
viso and express condition;
instrument must be, it is an authority to purchase in the name and on
the credit of the author of the power, to the amount of $2,000, and no
more.
The precise point is this, whether, if Pierce, through design or mis
take, represented to the plaintiff, that when he made the purchase in
question, he had not purchased on the credit of his principal to the
amount of $2,000, when, in truth, his purchases exceeded that sum,
It is unquestionably true, that the
the defendant was bound by it.
statements, and representations, of an agent, in transacting the business
of his principal, within the scope of his authority, are as binding on
his principal, as any other acts done within the scope of his authority;
But an agent cannot enlarge his au
they are res gestze, and are acts.
thority any more by his declarations, than by his other acts; and the
rule is clear, that the acts of an agent, not within the scope of his au
It is often said, indeed, that one is
thority, do not bind the principal.
bound by the acts of a general agent, though done against his instruc
tions. This is because the acts are within the scope of his authority;
and the violation of his instructions, in the execution of such authori
ty, is a matter solely between himself and his principal, which can
not affect a stranger dealing with him without express notice.
a waiver
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The argument
that the defendant ought to be bound, because
in
Pierce was his agent, and he, by his letter of attorney, had put
his power to make such purchase. This,
appears to us, assumes the
very point to be proved. The plaintiff knew that he was limited to
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$2,000; he knew, therefore, that
he had purchased to that amount,
his power, by its own limitation, was at an end.' If
were otherwise,
a power to purchase to the amount of $2,000, would operate as
power
to purchase to an unlimited amount. But
urged, that, upon this
construction, no one could‘ safely deal with the agent- This objection,
we think
answered by the consideration, that no one
bound to deal
with the agent; whoever does so
admonished of the extent and lim
itation of the agent’s authority, and must, at his own peril, ascertain
the fact, upon which alone the authority to bind the constituent de
'
not to be pre
pends. Under an authority so peculiar and limited,
sumed that one would deal with the agent, who had not full conﬁdence
in his honesty and veracity, and in the accuracy of his books and ac
counts. To this_extent, the seller of the goods trusts the agent, and
he
the principal.
It
deceived by him, he has no right to complain
he himself, and not the principal, who trusts the agent beyond the
expressed limits of the power; and, therefore, the maxim, that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer, he who reposed conﬁdence in
the wrong-doer must bear the loss, operates in favor of the constituent,
and not in favor of the seller of the goods.
Parsons v. Armor,
Pet.
Hill, 279; Attwood v. Mun
413,
L. Ed. 724; Stainer v. Tysen,
Barn. & Cr. 278. The case of Putnam v. Sullivan,
Mass.
nings,
Am. Dec. 206. was decided on the ground. that the defendants,
45.
by leaving blank indorsements with their clerk, had authorized him by
his act tocbind them as indorsers.
On the whole,
majority of the court are of opinion, that the verdict
new trial granted.‘
must be set aside, and

(Supreme

Court of Michigan.

1905.

v.

WALSH MFG. CO.

1-12 Mich.

4,

GRAND RAPIDS ELECTRIC CO.

105

N. W. 1.)

for goods sold and delivered. Defendant's superintend
Edsall, ordered of plaintiff
dynamo for the mill of which he was
There was a dynamo in the mill, and the defendant
superintendent.
Assumpsit

a

ent,

4

_

to buy one, or to do anything but operate the mill,
d§ni_e_<_l_his authority
Plaintiff knew nothing further of the
hire and discharge the men.
authority except the agent’s own representations, his business card,
and the letter heads, furnished by defendant company for Edsall’s
correspondmce, onwhich appeared “J. C. Edsall, Supt.”
Judgment
for plaintiff and defendant brings error.
Afﬁrmed.
The opinion of Wilde,

J.,

dissenting,

is omitted.
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BLAIR, J.‘ * * * Defendant’s counsel contend that a party deal
ing with an agent is bound to inquire into the extent of his authority,
This is undoubtedly a correct
ignorance of which is no excuse.
statement of a general principle of the law of agency, but this rule
is not to be applied without qualiﬁcations and under all circumstances.
It is equally well settled that, having ascertained the general character
or scope of the agency, the party is authorized to rely upon the agent's
having such powers as naturally and properly belong to isuﬁch *ch‘ar
acter, and, in the absence of circumstances putting him upon inquiry,
isvnot bound to inquire for secret qualiﬁcations or limitations of the
Inglish v. Ayer, 79 Mich. 516, 44 N.
apparent powers of the agent.
VV. 942; Allis v. Voigt, 90 Mich. 125, 51 N. VV. 190; Austrian &
Co. v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. 50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350.
The legitimate powers of a general agent, in the absence of known
limitations, must depend largely upon the circumstances of each par
ticular case, and usually present questions of fact for the determination
of a jury. The apparent right of thesuperintendent andigeneral man
ager of a small business to make a purchase of machinery costing over
$600 might be quite different from the right of the superintendent
of a large business to make the same expenditure.
The defendant
company was a foreign corporation, carrying on, through Edsall, as its
local representative, extensive business enterprises at Frederic, con
sisting of a large heading milland auxiliary lumber camps, an opera
house, and a general store, employing many men, of all of which, as
we understand the record, Edsall was the superintendent and general
manager. \’\"e do not think it can be said, as a matter of law, that
the purchase of the dynamo which was necessary for the lighting
of the plant was so clearly outside of the apparent powers with which
defendant had clothed Edsall as to justify the court in directing a
We therefore think that the court committed
verdict for defendant.
no error in submitting the question to the jury. * * *

MOORES

v.

CITIZENS’ NAT. BANK.

(Circuit Court of United States, S. D.iOhi0, W. D., 1883.

15 Fed.

141.)

Robt. B. Moores was cashier of defendant bank.
Plaintiff loaned
him $9,100, for which he assigned to her 91 shares of stock in de
fendant bank, which he claimed to own.
As a matter of fact, he
had previously transferred to other parties all his shares, but neither
plaintiff nor defendant knew of the cashier’s fraud for some years.
He is now insolvent, and defendant bank declines to recognize plain
tiff as a stockholder, and denies to her all rights pertaining to that rela
tron.
5

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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BAXTER, J.‘ * * * But it must be borne in mind that Moores,
in his efforts and negotiations to borrow, was acting for himself and
not as cashier of the bank. His representations that he was the owner
of a large amount of defendant's capital stock were not official rep
resentations, and cannot, upon any principle of law known to this
court, bind the bank. They were but the representations of an indi- ,
vidual, contending with pecuniary embarrassments, and if believed to
be true and acted upon by the plaintiff, and loss resulted therefrom,
the bank is in no way responsible for the same.
As cashier, he was
but the agent of the defendant, and could only bind it within the scope
of his authority, and in the regular course of business. But Moores, when assuming to borrow money, either for himself or his friends,
was acting for himself, in a. matter in which the bank had no inter
est, and it therefore cannot be affected by anything that he may have
promised or said, as an inducement to make the loan.
If plaintiff relied on such representations, as she evidently did, and
the same turned out to be false, the defendant is under no legal obli
gation to make good the loss. This much will not be seriously ques
tioned by the plaintiff’s counsel.
But they say that, as cashier, he
was intrusted with the custody of the defendant's certiﬁcate-book,
containing blank certiﬁcates signed by the president, and that he was,
as cashier, authorized to accept and cancel surrendered certiﬁcates,
transfer the same, and issue new certiﬁcates to transferees, and that _
such service came within the scope of his agency; that the issuance
by him of the certificate held by the plaintiff, and constituting the
foundation of this action, was an official act within the scope of his
special duties; and that he, having afterwards obtained a loan or ad
vance of money from the plaintiff upon the faith of its regularity and
genuineness, and in ignorance of its spurious and fraudulent character,
perpetrated a wrong for which the defendant, the bank, who clothed
him with the power to inﬂict the injury, is justly and legally amenable.
It may, as we have already said for the sake of the argument, be
conceded that money loaned or advanced by an innocent party, upon’
the faith of such a certiﬁcate, could be recovered from the corpo
But is the plaintiff, in the eye of the law, such an innocent
ration.
These terms have in law a technical meaning.
person?
ignorance
of facts, which the law under the circumstances of the particular case
requires a party to know. does not excuse the want of diligence or
throw around the party the immunity which attaches to persons ex
empt from all laches or blame. In other words, if there is any fact
which. in contemplation of law, puts a party on inquiry, and he fails
to make the investigation which, if made, would develop the fraud,
he is to be treated in all respects as if he had actual knowledge of
the facts.

l Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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An agent
There is another principle of law applicable to this case.
cannot lawfully act in the same matter for his principal and for him
To
self, in cases wherein their interests are adverse to each other.‘
If a cashier were to draw a check in his own favor, and
illustrate:
then, as cashier, certify for the bank that the check was good, and
he had funds in the bank to meet
the bank would be bound to pay
But if, in point of fact,
upon proper indorsement and presentation.
he had no funds in the bank to check upon, the bank could not
be held liable upon his certiﬁcate, although made in his_capacity of
cashier of the bank, notwithstanding the party suing the bank may
have in good faith, bought the check in the belief, predicated on the
cashier’s certiﬁcate, that the check was drawn against
fund in the
was good and would be paid on proper
hands of the bank, and that
Yet,
such check was drawn in favor of
stranger,
presentation.
and certiﬁed by the cashier to be good, his bank would be legally bound
and liable thereon. The reason why the bank
not liable for a check
drawn by a cashier in his own favor and certiﬁed to be good, even in
in good faith and in ignorance of any fraud,
the hands of one buying
An agent cannot act for his principal and himself
has been stated.
in matters in which they have adverse interests, and every one pur
check
chasing such
upon its face, admonished by the law of the
necessity of making inquiry into the fairness and good faith of the
transaction, and
he does not do this, however honestly he may rely
on the integrity of the agent, the loss_ must be’ sustained by him.
Now,
this principle applicable to the facts of this case? Keep
in mind that the plaintiff was dealing with Moores, the cashier, in
his individual capacity.
She agreed to loan her money to him on
condition that he would have a certiﬁcate issued to her for 91 shares
of the defendant’s capital stock. Heundertook to do this. The un
dertaking was for his own beneﬁt, in order to enable him to consum
mate the loan.
He had possession of the bank’s book of certiﬁcates.
One of the certiﬁcates contained therein was signed by the president
in blank, and left with him for use when occasion required it.
He
took this, and without authority, without consideration, and without
the knowledge of any other oﬁicerof the bank, ﬁlled
up in the
to her, with the contract of the ﬁf
plaintiff's name and delivered
teenth of July, .1867, as
security for the repayment of the money
loaned. This certiﬁcate, made by Moores for his own beneﬁt,
ﬁlled
up in his handwriting and signed by him as cashier. Now, while the
plaintiff relied upon his honesty, and believed that the certiﬁcate had
been issued in good faith and by competent authority, she knew that

1071

(1889).

3,

W.

-

14 S.

Q

4

J

it

a

'lSee, also, Jacoby v. Payson, 85 Hun, 367. 32 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1895), in
which the agent applied the proceeds of
check to the payment of his indi
vidual debts and N. Y. Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank, 39 Mich. 644 (1878), in
was held by Cooley,
.. that the fact that an agent of large powers
which
drew negotiable paper in his own favor. should have put the bank upon inquiry.
See, also, Taylor Mtg. Co. v. Brown,
Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App.
p, 19,
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issuing it ,Moores was acting for himself; that the certiﬁcate was
issued by him for his own beneﬁt, to be used for the purpose and
in the manner stated.
This knowledge, we think, was enough to put
her on inquiry.
If she had made the inquiry, which the law as well
as prudential reasons required, under the circumstances of this case,
Moores’ fraudulent action would have been developed, and the loss
resulting therefrom avoided.
Agents intrusted with important interests and invested with large
Nev
powers have many opportunities for an abuse of their trusts.
ertheless, if their fraudulent acts are within the scope of their agen
cies, and a loss must result either to their principals or to an inno
cent person, who relied upon their action in the belief that the same
was valid, the law would cast the loss upon the principal who selected
and placed the agent in the position to do the wrong, and not on the
But if the complaining party knows, when accept
innocent party.
ing a check, certiﬁcate of stock, receipt, or other acquittance or obli
gation, issued or executed by the agent in the name of the principal.
that he was acting in regard thereto for himself and in his own in
knowledge would put such party on inquiry, and divest
t_efe§f,“'such
him or her of the legal rights and incidents pertaining to that class
of persons.
The plaintiff having had knowledge of the fact that Moores, upon
whom she relied to have the stock transferred to her, was acting for
himself as well as in his capacity of cashier—that
acting for the
bank upon one side and for himself on the other, in reference to the
not, in the judgment of this
matter of issuing this certiﬁcate-—she
court, an innocent holder of the stock; and as the certiﬁcate was
sued without authority and in fraud of the rights of the bank, the
not entitled to recover in this
court instructs you that the plaintiﬁ
action. Your verdict will therefore be for the defendant.
is

is

is

is,

in
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SECTION 2.—AUTHORITY AND INSTRUCTIONS

GRIGGS

v,

(Supreme Court of Vermont,

SELDEN!‘
1886.

58

Vt. 561, 5 Atl. 504.)

Assumpsit for leather ordered by one Gibson, who was the agent
He
of defendant to manage her custom business in boots and shoes.
had no express authority to buy, but had on one occasion been per
mitted by letter of defendant to buy a bill of plaintiff, and the latter
supposed he had authority in the present case. The matter was sub
mitted to a referee.
ROWELL, I. The referee has found a fact, if it is a question of fact,
as it certainly is (Sessions v. Newport,
23 Vt. 9), that the plaintiff
was justiﬁed in his belief that Gibson, in carrying on the business, and
making purchases and sales, “had the usual authority of an agent who
had the sole management of the business.”
He further ﬁnds that the
defendant “held out” Gibson as her agent, which was known to the
This ﬁnding makes
plaintiff, and acted upon by him in good faith.
the defendant liable, on the ground that if one holds another out to
the world, and accredits him as his agent, he is bound by that person's
acts done within the scope of the agency thus given to him.
In such
cases the question is not what authority wasiintended
to be given to
the agent, but what authority was the third person dealing with him
justiﬁed, from the acts of the principal, in believing was given to him.
l Amer. Lead. Cas. 568; Story, Ag. § 127, note 2.’
judgment afﬁrmed.
8Approved in Aldrich v. Wllmarth, 3 S. D. 523, 54 N. W. 811 (1893).
See,
also, Weleh v. Clifton Mtg. Co., 55 S. G. 568, 33 S. E. 739 (1899).
9 In Brooke v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 108 Pa. 529, 1 A‘tl. 206, 56 Am. Rep.
235 (18-S5). the doctrine was laid down that “as between principal and third
parties, the true limit or the agent's authority to bind,’ the former is the ap
parent authority with whieh the agent is invested;
but as between the prin
cipal and the agent the true limit is the express authority. or instruction,
given to the agent. Baker v. K. 0., St. J. & O. B. Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 152, 3 S. W.
486 (1886).
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Missouri,

PAGE MILL CO.
1898.

77

M0. App. 672.)

Plaintiffs were retail grocers. Defendant manufactured flour. One‘
Gardner, a broker, at plaintiffs’ request, telegraphed defendant for
Defendant wrote, naming a price of $3.95 per
quotations on ﬂour.
barrel, and at the same time telegraphed. By error in transmission,
the telegram read $3.25, and on receipt of the telegram, without wait
ing for the letter, Gardner sold plaintiff a car load at $3.25.
SMITH, _]'.‘° * * * Immediately on receipt of this letter, Gard
ner wired defendant that he had sold the ﬂour at three dollars and
The defendant. immediately, on the same day,
twenty-ﬁve cents.
wired Gardner that it would not ﬁll the orders at any such ﬁgures.
Gardner immediately investigated the matter and ascertained at once
that the price in the telegram should have been three dollars and nine
ty-ﬁve cents per bartel.
After ascertaining this fact, Gardner on the same day wrote a letter
to the defendant referring to the sale of the ﬂour and to the mistake
in the price, and inclosing the memorandum of the sale hereinbefore
At the time the sale was made flour of all grades was ad
set forth.
vancing in price at Brenham, and continued to advance until after the
time the flour in question ought to have been delivered, and at the
time delivery should have been made, the flour contracted was worth,
on the Brenham market,_ the sum of $4.05 per barrel, and all other
grades had made the same proportionate advance, so that it was impos
sible for plaintiffs to have purchased any grade of flour without having
sustained a loss. Plaintiffs testiﬁed that they ﬁnally had to buy ﬂour,
and pay $4.40 per barrel in order to supply his trade. The plaintiffs
further testiﬁed on the trial of said cause that, when they bought the
ﬂour from said Gardner. the,contract was that they were to have a
credit of forty-ﬁve days. or one and one-half per cent off for cash, and
that the ﬂour was to be shipped in ten days.
The plaintiffs by their appeal question the propriety of the action
of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence adduced.
The defendant insists that there was not shown in evidence any such
memorandum of the sale as _meets the requirements of the statute of
frauds and therefore the demurrer was properly sustained. An agent
is a competent witness to establish his own agency. Leete v. Bank,
115 Mo. 204, 21 S. W. 788; Pump Co. v. Green, 31 Mo. App. 269.
His agency may be implied from the conduct and acquiescence of the
Sharp v. Knox, 48 Mo. App. 169; Cummings v. Hurd, 49
principal.
Mo. App. 139. And it may be stated as a general rule that wherever
a person has held out another as his agent, authorized to act for him
in a given capacity, or has knowingly and without dissent permitted
1°
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such other to act as his agent in such capacity, or where his habits and
course of dealing have been such as to reasonably warrant the pre:
sumption that such other was his agent authorized to act in that ca
pacity, whether it be a single transaction or a. series of transactions,
his authority to act for him in that capacity will be conclusively pre
sumed so far as it may be necessary to protect the rights of third per
sons who have relied thereon in good faith and in the exercise of rea
sonable prudence; and he" will not be permitted to deny that such other
was his agent authorized to do the act he assumed to do, provided that
such act is within the real or apparent scope of the presumed authority.
Johnson v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513, 22 S. W. 492 (quoting Mechem on
AgenC)'); Rice v. Groffmann, 56 Mo. 434; Summerville v. Railway, 62
Mo. 391. And it seems well settled in the law of agency that where it
appears that an agent had repeatedly performed acts like the one in
question, which the principal has ratiﬁed and adopted, his authority for
the performance of the undisputed act may be inferred.
Cummings v.
Hurd, 49 Mo. App. loc. cit. 139, and cases there cited. Gardner testiﬁed
that he had been acting as agent of defendant for a number of years in
making sale of the latter’s flour and that his contracts as such had al
ways been carried out by such latter. He further testiﬁed that he sold
and handled the defendant’s flour as a broker on commission, and that
his orders were always promptly ﬁlled. One of the plaintiffs testiﬁed
that he had bought flour of Gardner regularly for three or four years
as agent of defendant and the_contracts so made with him had always
been promptly complied with by defendant.
In the light of the prec
edents just referred to we must conclude tha't Gardner was the agent
of the defendant authorized to make the sale of the ﬂour to plaintiffs.
The fact that Gardner was a broker selling on commission rendered
him none the less an agent of defendant.
Tiedeman on Sales, §§ Z71,
272.

Having reached the conclusion that the evidence adduced tends to
prove that Gardner was the agent of the defendant, invested with the
authority to enter into the contract with the plaintiffs for the sale of
the ﬂour, we ﬁnd no difficulty in reaching the further conclusion that
the signing of the written memorandum thereof by Gardner himself
was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds.
Such
a contract may be signed for the principal by a person thereunto law
fully authorized, and though the agent sign his own name alone the
principal may be still charged by parol evidence. The rule, of course,
is otherwise where the agent enters into a contract in his own name
under seal. * * *
Gardner offered and sold the plaintiffs the flour in accordance with
the authority conferred upon him by the telegram of the defendant.
He acted within the scope of that authority in making the sale to the
The plaintiffs appear to have purchased in good faith and
plaintiffs.
are not to be affected by the communications had prior thereto be
tween the defendant and its agent.
It seems to us that the plaintiffs
»
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made out a prima facie case entitling them to a submission, and there
fore the action of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the evi
dence was such an error as requires a reve§_s_a1 of the judgment, which
All concur.
is ordered accordingly.

ii

'

I

LUDLOW-SAYLOR WIRE CO.
(Supreme Court of Kansas,

1903.

67

Kan.

v.

FRIBLEY.

710, 74 Pac. 231.)

The traveling salesman of plaintiff sold defendant
ROLLOCK, ].
company 1,500 bales of wire ties, and reported such sale to have been
made at the price of $1.10 per bale, f. 0. b. the cars Baxter Springs.
This sale was made in February, payment to be made May 1st. De
fendant paid on the purchase price $1,425, leaving a balance due, as
shown by the account of plaintiff, of $225. This action was brought on
a veriﬁed account of the transaction to recover the remainder of the
purchase price. By veriﬁed denial, defendant put in issue the correct
ness of the account, and also alleged as a complete defense the fact that
the traveling salesman, as agent of plaintiﬁ‘, duly authorized thereto,
had guarantied the price of the goods purchased as of the date of pay
ment, May 1, 1900; that the price of like goods f. 0. b. the cars Baxter
Springs, May 1, 1900, was 95 cents per bale, and not $1.10, as demand
ed by plaintiff, and alleged the full payment of the purchase price at
such ﬁgure. By proper reply the authority of the agent to attach such
condition to the sale was put in issue. Defendant oﬁered no defense in
support of the authority of plaintiff's agent to guarantee the price.
There was judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.
The sole question is, was the general authority of plaintiﬁ"s agent
as traveling salesman, in the absence of notice to the contrary on the
part of defendant, as a matter of law, sufﬁcient to bind nlaintiﬁ‘ to the
conditions attached to the contract of sale as pleaded? The trial court
The sale of the goods out of which this controversy
so instructed.
\Vhile
arose fell directly within the scope of the agent’s authority.
that authority may, as between the agent and his principal, have been
limited, and the agent responsible to his principal for exceeding its
bounds, yet, as between plaintiff and defendant, as no limitation upon
the agent’s authority was known to defendant, and as the agent acted
within the apparent scope of his authority, the conditions attached to
Babcock v. Deford, 14 Kan. 411; Banks v.
the sale bound plaintiff.
Everest & Waggener, 35 Kan. 687. 12 Pac. 141."
'
It follows that the judgment must be aﬁirmed.

It would be dangerous to hold that a person who invests an agent with
apparent authority could limit that authority hy n secret reservation.
Edmunds v. Bushell, L. R. 1 Q. B. 97. 12 Jur. N. S. 332, 35 L. J. Q. B. 20 (1866).
per Mellor, J. Such a rule would be the height of injustice and lead to the
grossest frauds. Western H. & I. Co. v. Bank, 9 N. M. 1. 47 Pac. 721 (1897).
11
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HUTSON

v.

PRUDENTIAL INS. CO."

(Supreme Court of Georgia,

1905.

122 Ga. 847, 50 S. E. 1000.)

Action on an insurance policy. Exceptions to a nonsuit. A premium
due August lst was offered to, and accepted by, the general agent of
the company September 11th, and another payment was made in Oe
Insured died November
tober for the premium due November lst.
lst. The company refused to pay the policy and returned the above
I
mentioned payments.
There was evidence tending to
EVANS, ]. (after stating the facts)?”
establish that Adams was the general agent of the confpany. Assum
ing that the evidence was sufficient to establish that he was, did he have
authority to waive any of the forfeitures stipulated in the policy? It
is elemental that a general agent may bind his principal with respect
Underlying
to all matters within the apparent scope of his authority.
the doctrine of the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent,
The agent
whether general or special, is this fundamental principle:
can only bind his principal within the sco'pe of his agency, Private
instructions or limitations not known to persons dealing with an agent
who assumes to act within the apparent scope of his authority cannot
In special agencies for a particular purpose, persons deal
affect them.
Civ. Code 1895, § 3023.
ing with the agent must examine his authority.
A general agency does not necessarily import an unqualiﬁed authority
to act for and in behalf of his principal in every instance. The agent's
authority may be limited, and, if the party dealing with him has notice
that his ‘powers have been restricted, his principal will not be bound if
'
,
he exceeds his authority.
The defendant company in its contract of insurance expressly lim
ited the powers of all of its agents with respect to certain matters. It
was expressly covenarited that no condition, provision, or privilege of
the policy could be waived or modiﬁed in any case except by indorse
ment on the policy signed by its president or other designated oﬁicials.
The insured was put upon notice that the premiums werepto be paid

J

.; Smith v.
See, also, Babeock v. Deford, 14 Kan. 408 (1875), per Brewer,
Droubay, 20 Utah. 443. 58 Pac. 1112 (1899); Patterson v. Neal, 135 Ala. 477,
33 South. 39 (1902); Edwards v. Schaﬂfer, 49 Barb. 291 (1867).
As to the effect on third persons of speciﬁc instructions by the principal,
v. U. S. Exp. Co., 50 W. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398, 88 Am. St. Rep.
see Rohrbough
849 (1901); Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. 50, 34 Am. St. Rep.
350 (1802); Howell v. Grail’, 25 Neb. 130. 41 N. W. 142 (1888), a special agent:
Hall v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 23 Wash. 610, 63 Pac. 505, 51 L. R. A. 288,
83 Am. St. Rep. 844 (1000), secret understanding
with agent; Catholic Bishop
of Chicago v. Troup, 61 Ill. App. 641 (1895), limitations in Latin; Rathbun
v. Snow. 123 N. Y. 343, 25 N. E. 379, 10 L. R. A. 355 (1890), by-laws of business
corporation.
12 Acc., Longworth v. Conwell, 2 Blackf. 469 (1831), where the limits were
not secret, but known to the third party.
Marvin v. Universal Life Insurance
Co., 85 N. Y. 278, 39 Am. Rep. 657 (1881).
13 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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at the

com‘pany’s home oﬂice, or to an agent who held the company s
receipt signed by one of its governing ofﬁcers; and the insured bound
himself to pay these premiums on certain speciﬁed dates, or within
When the August
the period of graceprovided for in the policy.
premium fell due, it was not paid, nor was it paid or tendered within
the 30 days’ grace thereafter.
On September 11th the policy had, un
der its terms, become lapsed, and the insured and his beneﬁciary were
bound to know this fact.
Provision was made in the policy for its
being revived within a period of two years, ‘provided past due pre
miums. were paid, together with interest thereon, and provided, fur
ther, that the insured furnished to the company satisfactory evidence
of his insurability.
After the policy had become lapsed, neither the
insured, nor any one acting in his behalf, made to the defendant com
pany an application for a revival of the insurance, or furnished the
defendant with any proof‘of the insurability of the insured.
Plaintiff maintains that the acceptance of the August premium by the
general agent without requiring an application for revival, or proof
that the insured was in good health, amounted to a waiver of the sti'p
ulations in the policy touching the manner in which it might be revived.
This contention is not sound, for the reason that there was an express
provision in the policy that no waiver of any forfeiture could be made,
save by certain designated officials of the company, and that no agent
had any power to waive any stipulations upon which the contract of in
surance was based. * * *
\Ve have not dealt with the question as to the admissibility of the
testimony of Adams, the general agent, with regard to the circum
stances under which he received the money for the August premium,
for the reason that, had this testimony been excluded, the result would
inevitably have been the same. judgment aﬁirmed.

-ii.
-

tSupreme

BANK

v.

\

OHIO VALLEY FURNITURE CO.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1905.
880, 70 L. R. A. 312.)

57

W. Va.

625, 50 S.

E.

a directed judgment for $2,625.96, on a note for $2,
signed by the defendant, and indorsed in blank by the payee and
prominent stockholders of defendant company. The note, one of sev
eral similar notes, was sent to one Huston, agent of defendant, to be
Huston ,re'presented
discounted, the proceeds to be sent to defendant.
to the bank that he was agent of the maker, but that he had secured au
As he was well known
thority to discount the note for his own beneﬁt.
to plaintiff bank, and had an account there, the cashier discounted the
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POFFENBARGER, ].“ * * * When the party has possession of
the paper, and neither the fact of agency nor any other circumstance
inconsistent with title in the holder is known to the other party, he may
deal on the basis of ownership, although there is in fact an unknown
agency. He may take good title despite this indisputable fact of which
Th'ese cases furnish no authority for the posi
he has no knowledge.
Owner
tion that the note is the equivalent of a power of attorney.
ship of the note, and possession thereof in the capacity of agent, are
inconsistent things. Ownership includes, of course, all ‘powers of con
trol and disposition.
Agency is no part of this, but is a new and dis
tinct thing which the owner may create out of it and in respect to
If the holder the owner, he cannot be the agent of himself, because
his agency
Had the-fact of agency been
merged in his ownership.
known in any of these cases,
would therefore have negatived the
possibility of ownership in the holder, and no dealings could have been
had with him on the basis of ownership.
Knowledge of the fact of agency destroys the apparent title of the
holder, and the intending purchaser must then look to the authority
of the agent. That one having possession of negotiable ‘paper has only
prima facie title has been demonstrated by cases already cited relating
to accommodation paper.
The same principle certainly allows
man
to part with
title by admission which can be defeated by proof. The
note cannot be considered
power of attorney, giving such authority
as
claimed, for the power would run into ownership, a status which
“If the agency of the
negatives the character of agency necessarily.
made to appear, the ‘principal will not be bound beyond the
party
authority given.“ And, where the holder has notice that the party
such, he
bound to inquire into his authority.”
acting as agent
Rand. Commer. Paper,
388.
The maker, by constituting the agency and intrusting the note to the
might be disposed of by mere delivery, held
agent in such form that
the agent out to the world as possessing power to pass the title to it.
Upon the apparent authority with which the principal had thus clothed
the agent, ‘persons dealing with the latter might rely,
they had no
notice of any limitation upon such authority.
“Private instructions to
general agent circumscribing his power will not avail to shield the
principal from liability to parties dealing with him in ignorance of the
limitation.
But
such persons are aware of the instructions, the prin
not bound.”
Am.
cipal
Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 994.
“A
principal may confer as much or as little authority as he sees ﬁt upon
his agent, and he may also impose such lawful restrictions and limita
tions upon his agent as he may deem pro‘per, and such restrictions and
limitations will be as binding upon third persons who had notice of
Part of the opinion is omitted.

15 Modern

1

Woodmen v. Tevis, 117 Fed. 369, 54 C. G. A. 293 (1902).
U. S.
Ware, 173 (1830) applying the rule whether
v. Williams, Fed. Cas. N0. 16,724.
general
agent
special.
he
or
the
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them as upon the agent himself, provided the principal does nothing
South.
to waive them."
Lead Pencil Co. v. Wolfe, 30 Fla. 360,
488. The law does not permit an agency to be loaded down with se
cret instructions inconsistent with the authority actually or apparently
conferred, but if a stranger dealing with the agent knows of the limita
tion, he has no cause for complaint, and in this respect there is no
1 Am. & Eng. Ency.
difference between a general and a special agency.
Law (Zd Ed.) 994, 995. “If limitation of the agent's authority is ‘pub
lic, or known to the person with whom he deals, the principal will not
be bound if the agent exceeds his authority; but if such limitation be
private, the agent may bind his principal, although the former exceed
his authority.”
Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96. “If the
shipper of goods on freight contracts for the price thereof with the
general agent of the owner of the vessel, having reason to know, that
although his agency might be general, yet that his authority was re
stricted in that particular instance, the shipper cannot claim to have
the terms of the contract fulﬁlled as against the principal of such
/
agent.” Barnard v. Wheeler, 24 Me. 412.
The difference between general and s'pecial agencies in the law of
commercial paper is stated in Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, at
section Z78, as follows: “Where the agency is specially given to do a
particular thing, the agent is circumscribed within the limits of actual
authority; but where the agency is general—as that of a bank cashier,
for instance—all acts within the scope of that general authority are
On the subject of limitation of authority
binding on the principal.”
this work says, in the next sentence, "‘And if he seeks to avoid lia
bility, he must show not only limitation of the general authority, but
also that the party dealing with the agent had notice.”
Under the au
thority conferred upon the agent in this case by placing the note in his
hands, ready for delivery to a purchaser, he could have passed the
title to a purchaser who knew that he was acting in the capacity of
agent. The purchaser would have been warranted in relying upon the
apparent authority with which the agent was clothed, provided he knew
of no limitation. Bank v. Real Estate Co., 150 Mo. 570, 51 S. W. 691.
The declaration on the part of the holder, after having admitted the
agency, that he had secured the right to use the note for his own beneﬁt,
calls for the application of another principle of the law of agency,
which is a limitation imposed by law upon the power of every agent,
genegal or special, of which all persons must take notice, namely, that
an agent has no power to use his ofﬁce otherwise than for the beneﬁt
of his principal.
When he undertakes to exercise it for a purpose
which can in no way beneﬁt his principal, but will beneﬁt himself or
some third person, he ‘places himself in a position in which the law
determines that he is outside of the scope of his agency, and the person
who deals with him in such position will not be heard to say he was in
ignorance of the want of authority, for ignorance of law excuses no
man.
It is of the very essence of an agency that it shall be used for
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Men appoint agents to subserve their in
the beneﬁt of the principal.
terests, carry on their business, preserve their property, and not for
the purpose of giving it away to others and converting it to their own
“If one who is known to be an agent for the negotiation of his
use.
princi'pal’s draft transfer the draft to a third person in payment of the
agent’s debt, that person will acquire no title to the draft, however
honest his actual intention may be. The declarations of an agent, al
though accompanying his acts, constitute no evidence of the extent of
* * * If a. transaction between an agent and another
his authority.
person be entire, and be known to such other person to be a breach of
trust on the part of the agent, the principal is not bound at all, although
some portions ofithe transaction might, if standing alone, have been
within the agent’s power and duty.” Dowden v. Cryder, 55 N. J. Law,

Atl. 941.
The reasons underlying these legal propositions are stated in the
opinion in the case just cited, as follows: “It is a universal principle
in the law of ‘agency that the powers of the agent are to be exercised
for the beneﬁt of the principal, and not of the agent or third" parties.
329, 26

Persons dealing with one whom they know to be an agent and to be
exercising his authority for his own beneﬁt acquire no rights against
the principal by the transaction.
Such a transaction is usually, and per
haps properly, spoken of by the courts as fraudulent; but, however
honest the intention of the parties, the agent’s act is invalid, merely
because the circumstances known to both ‘prove it to be ultra vires."
Tiedeman on Commer. Paper, § 92, says: “It is implied in every agen
cy, in the absence of express evidence to the contrary, that the power
of the agent is to be exercised for the benefit of the principal, and not
for his own private advantage.” This principle was applied by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grat.
269, in which, after stating the nature of the agent’s powers, the court
held as follows: “A party dealing with the agent, with knowledge or
means of knowledge that under such a ‘power he is indorsing the name
of his‘ principal for his own beneﬁt, is not entitled to recover from
the principal.”
In Stainer v. Tysen, 3 Hill, 279, the rule is declared
in this language: “The naked power to do acts for and in the name
of the principal negatives all authority on the part of the-attorney to
act for the beneﬁt of any one besides the principal, and persons dealing
Other
with the attorney as such are bound to notice this limitation.”
cases illustrating the rule are Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262; Suckley v.
Tunno, 1 Brev. 257; Holden v. Durant, 29 Vt. 184; Odiorne v. Maxcy,
13 Mass. 178; Bank v. Studley, 1 Mo. App. 260.
Most of these are cases in which the agent pledged or sold the ‘paper
in payment of his own debt, so that the third party dealing with 'him
derived a peculiar beneﬁt from the unauthorized transaction.
This,
however, does not seem to be the reason for denying validity of title in
such purchaser.
It seems to stand upon the want of authority in the
agent to exercise his powers for his own beneﬁt or for the beneﬁt of
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anybody except his principal.
Knowledge of this perversion of author
ity on the part of the purchaser is necessary to the invalidity of his
title, of course. But when he does have such knowledge, he is bound
to know the want of authority in the agent to so use his powers.
In
the case of Dowden v.. Cryder the ‘purchaser was not a creditor of the
agent. He took the draft in exchange for $2,060 in cash and a diamond
necklace valued at $1,100.
There was no advantage in the transaction
to the purchaser, except a possible proﬁt on the necklace and the
discount of $40 allowed. In Trust Co. v. Abbott, 44 N. ]. Law, 257,
the agent held a power of attorneyrauthorizing him to sign the princi
pal’s name to any paper or papers, notes, etc. He drew a note in his
own favor, and signed the principal’s name by himself as agent, and
sold it to the defendant. In the action on the note, the court held that
the power did not justify the signing of such documents as were
described in it for ‘purposes outside of the principal’s business, and that
the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that he was a bona ﬁde hold
er, for value, before maturity.
In stating the reason for the rule, the
court said: “But in whichever form the instrument- was delivered, it
did not justify the signing of notes for purposes outside of the princi
pal’s business. The note in suit was not given for such a purpose, but
was put forth for the personal beneﬁt of the attorney, who convert
It was therefore issued under an ap
ed its proceeds to his own use.
The court reversed
parent authority, but in fraud of the princi'pal."
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because the evidence did not
show when, from whom, and under what circumstances the attorney
,
had received the money.
The same principle was enunciated and applied by this court in
Rohrbough v. Express Co., 50 W. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398, 88 Am. St.
This is a
Rep. 8-1-9. See, also, Express Co. v. Trego, 35 Md. 47.
heavy penalty to visit upon the bank, but nothing worse than would
have befallen it had any other limitation upon the agent's power been
Other instances of such ‘penalties, consequent upon non
disregarded.
observance of legal rights, are to be found all along the beaten high
way of the administration of the law. Take one who pays full value
for property, knowing the sale is made to defraud creditors. He loses
everything, while, if the same sale had been made to a person ignorant
,
of the intent, it would have been valid.
On the basis of an assertion of title to the note and repudiation of
t.he agency by the representation of right to use the money, the case
stands no better. If H_uston had no title under the paper, taken in con
nection with his former representation of agency, the bank had no
right to rely upon his mere verbal assertion of title. Title to property
Having knowledge of a fact, sulﬁ
cannot be acquired in that way.
cient to put it upon inquiry, at least—the admission of agency-—the
bank was bound to make a proper inquiry, and this requirement could
not be satisﬁed by an inquiry directed to the party whose interest it
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would be to misinform as to, and deny, the very fact sought for- 7
i
Cyc. 942; Carter v. Lehman, 90 Ala. 126, 7 South. 735.
For the error of the court in excluding the defendant's evidence and
directing a verdict for plaintiff, the judgment must be reversed, the
i
verdict set aside, a new trial allowed, and the case remanded.

GATES IRON WORKS

v.

DENVER ENGINEERING WORKS
CO.

(Court

of Appeals of Colorado,

1901.

17 Colo. App.

15, 67 Pac.

173.)

Action for the price of mining machinery, sold by the Denver Com
On
pany to one Berkey, who was sales agent of the Gates Company.
the window of his oﬁice was printed: “Gates Iron Works, B. L. Berkey,
His cards and letter
Manager.
Mining Machinery of all Kinds.”
Plaintiff made no further inquiry
heads contained similar statements.
as to Berkey’s authority.
From a directed verdict for plaintiff, de
fendant appeals.
* * * Discussing the question of the duty of
THOMSON, ].‘°
third persons dealing with an ostensible agent, Mr. Mechem says: “In
approaching the consideration of the inquiry whether an assﬁmed au
thority exists in a given case, there are certain fundamental principles
which must not be lost sight of. Among these are, as has been seen:
That the law indulges in no bare presumption thatan agency exists.
It must be proved or presumed from facts. That the agent cannot
establish his own authority, either by his representations or by assuming
to exercise it. That an authority cannot be established by mere rumor
That even a general authority is not an un
or general reputation.
limited one, and that every authority must ﬁnd its ultimate source in
Persons dealing with an assumed agent,
some act of the principal.
therefore, whether the assumed agency be a general or special one, are
bound, at their peril, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency, but
the extent of the authority; and, in case either is controverted, the
burden of proof is upon them to establish it.” Mechem, Ag. §- 276.

In Lester v. Snyder, 12 Colo. App. 351, 55 Pac. 613, the foregoing
was expressly approved.
In the case at bar Mr. Miller, the general manager of the plaintiff,
who conducted the transaction in question in its behalf, made no in
qniry with reference to the authority of Mr. Berkey; and neither him
self nor his company had any knowledge of the relations existing be
tween Berkey and the defendant, except what was shown by the letter
It was in reliance upon these that the
head, sign, card, and circular.
property was sold. Mr. Berkey was the general agent of the defendant
He was the manager of its Denver ofﬁce. The defendant
at Denver.
16

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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was bound by the acts of Mr. Berkey within his apparent authority.
\/Vhere a person holds out another to the public as having a general
authority to act for him in the particular business in which he is en
gaged, third persons may safely deal with the agent in the transaction
of such business. But there is a limit to the authority of an agent,
general or special, and the principal is not bound by his act outside of
such limit.
No matter how extensive the authority of an agent may be
in the transaction of his principal’s business, it is still conﬁned to that
business; and his act outside of the boundary by which the business is
circumscribed would not bind his principal.
Stewart v. \Voodward, 50
V t. 78, 28 Am Rep¢ 488; President, etc., of Mechanics’ Bank v. New
York & N. H. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 599; Richmond v. Greeley, 38 Iowa,
666; Fouge v. Burgess, 71 Mo. 389; Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540,
24 N. E. 827; Navigation Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill 81 I. 248, 29 Am.
Dec. 543; McAlpin v. Cassidy, 17 Tex. 450; Story, Ag. § 87.
Now, Mr. Miller knew that the defendant was engaged in the man
ufacture of general mining machinery.
He was so advised by the
letter head. The sign on the window appears to have been substantially
the same as the letter head.
The card did not describe the defendant
as a manufacturer, but presented a picture of its manufacturing
estab
lishment and machine shops, with the wor_ds “Mining Machinery of
Every Description”; and, as Berkey was held out as the agent of a
manufacturer, his apparent authority extended only to the sale of the
That the defendant allowed him
goods manufactured by his principal.
to style himself its manager is immaterial, because he could bind .the
defendant only in the management of the business in which it was
engaged. There was nothing in the evidence of authority which Mr.
Miller saw and upon which he relied to warrant him in assuming that
Mr. Berkey had any authority to buy mining machinery.
So far as
appearances went,-—at least appearances for which the defendant was
responsible,—the purchase of mining machinery was no part of the de
fendant's business; and there was nothing to indicate that Mr. Berkey
was empowered to act outside of its business. There was no apparent
authority in Berkey to buy this machinery, and, in order to bind the
defendant by his contract, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that
Mining C0. v. Fraser, 2
the purchase was specially authorized by it.
Colo. App. 14, 29 Pac. 667.
\Vhile the plaintiﬂ‘, in making the sale, relied exclusively upon the
visible indicia of Berkey’s authority, at the trial it undertook to prove
a custom among agencies handling mining machinery in Denver of
When or how the custom
purchasing goods from local companies.
originated, or how long it lasted, is not stated, except that it prevailed
in Denver in the fall and winter of 1896 and 1897. We do not think
this assertion of a custom requires very elaborate discussion.
Respect
ing the effect which custom or usage may have upon the manner in
which an agent may transact the business of his principal, Mr. Mechem
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Where the principal confers upon his agent an authority of a
kind or empowers him to transact business of a nature in reference to
says:

it

it,

which there is a well-deﬁned and publicly known usage, it is the pre
sumption of the law, in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary
intent, that the authority was conferred in contemplation of the usage;
and third persons, therefore, who deal with the agent in good faith
and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, will be protected against
limitations upon the usual authority, of which they had no notice.
In order to give the usage this effect, it must be reasonable; it must
not violate positive law; and it must have existed for such a time, and
become so widely and generally known, as to warrant the presumption
that the principal had it in his view at the time of the appointment of
'
'
the agent.”
It is only, however, the mode of transacting the business which can
No man can be compelled by custom to alter the
be affected by usage.
character of his business. Concluding the section" from which we have
already quoted, Mr. -Mechem says further: “Usage, however, cannot
operate to change the intrinsic character of the relation, nor will it be
permitted, as between the principal and the agent, or as between the
principal and third persons having notice of them, to contravene express
So
instructions, or to contradict an express contract to the contrary.
a usage not known to the principal cannot operate to authorize the
making of an invalid instead of a valid contract, or to bind him to take
one thing when he has ordered another.” '
Aside from the fact that the custom mentioned in the evidence here
was not deﬁned, it had no such term of existence as to make it binding
on any one; but, waiving this objection, whatever may have been its
nature and limits, it could afford no protection to the plaintiff.
S_o
far as the plaintiff knew or had any right to believe, and so far as we
know or have any right to believe, the business of the defendant was
and no
conﬁned to the manufacture and sale of mining machinery;
custom in any locality where it sentian agent to act for it could force
it to do a different business.
Presumptively because it manufactured
mining machinery it did not desire to buy mining machinery, and no
custom, however ancient or well-deﬁned, could compel it to do so.“
It seems that some time after the transaction in question Berkey in
formed the defendant of his purchase as having been made on his own
account, and the defendant proposed to assist him in doing an individual
Proof was proffered by the
business, but there was no ratiﬁcation.
defendant that it knew nothing of the purchases as having been made
that Berkey had no authority to make the purchase, and that
for

a

17 General customs are judicially known, and form Dart of the law.
Local
customs cannot alter the law, and must be proved. Moore v. Tickle, 14 N. C.
244 (1831).
What is usual is not always matter of judicial knowledge.
Ex
istence of
custom is often for the jury on the evidence.
Reese v. Bates, 94
Va. 321, 26 S. E. 865 (1897); Hichboru v. Bradley, 117 Iowa, 130, 90 N. W.
59:3 (1902).
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never in any manner recognized the purchase as having been made in its
behalf; but the evidence was all excluded. Of course, the exclusion
was error; but it can hardly be said that it worked harm to the defend
ant.
The burden was on the plaintiff to prove the agent's authority
and every fact which might tend to make his contract the contract of
his principal, and, in the absence of such proof, disproof by the defend
ant was unnecessary.
Upon the evidence there was no question to
submit to the jury. To this extent we agree with the court.
But it
was on the plaintiff's side that the failure was, and the judgment should
have been for the defendant.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further pro
Reversed.
ceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

BARKSDALE

BRO\VN.

v.

(Constitutional Court of South Carolina.

1815.

Dec. 720.)

1

Noit

&

McC.

517,

9

Am.

Action for the proceeds of rice sent to defendants to sell as factors,
with iflstrucfions to sell for cash.
They sold to one Powers, who
without
and
went
off
paying for it.
shipped it
That usage does, in many instances constitute the law,"
No'r'r,

J.“

18 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
inicontravention of a Well-settled and salutary rule of law can
Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158, 20 Am. Rep.
not be sustained by courts of justice.
66 (1874); Ferguson v. Gooch. 94 Va. 1, 26 S. E. 397, 40 L. R. A. 234 (1896);
Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. L. 802, 44 L. J. C. P. 362, 33 L. T. R. N. S.
19 Usage

544 (1874).

As to authority of a selling agent to give warranties, see Herring v. Skaggs,
Ala. 180, 34 Am. Rep. 4 (1878), warranty that a sate was burglar-proof ;
Brady v. Todd, 9 C. B. N. S. 592, 7 Jur. N. S. 827, 30 L. J. C. P. 223, 4 L. T.
R. N. S. 212, 9 W. R. 483 (1861), followed in Cooley v. Perrine, 41 N. J. Law,
322, 32 Am. Rep. 210 (1879). warranty of a horse.
And ct’. Westurn v. Page,
I
94 Wis. 251, 68 N. W. 1003 (1896).
Cf. Dennis v. Ashley, 15 Mo. 453 (1852), in which giving a warranty is held
to be a usual means of making a sale. citing especially Benson, J., in Nelson
But in Smith v. Tracy. 36 N. Y. 79 (1867),
v. Cowing, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 338 (1844).
this is denied as to a special authority to sell particular property, and in
the leading case of Wait v. Borne. 123 N. Y. 592, 25 N. E. 1053 (1890), the
implied power of an agent to warrant quality is limited to cases where a
usage to warrant can be shown.
The distinction between usual and unusual
warranties is further brought out in Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321, 26 S. E. 865
The question of whether a warranty is usual in a particular trade is
(1897).
in general for the jury upon the evidence. Dingle v. Hare, 7 C. B. N. S. 145,
97 E. C. L. 145 (1859).
The agent may make himself liable on the warranty, or both himself and
principal, but a recovery against one bars a right against the other. Dahl
strom v. Germunder.
N. Y. 449, 92 N. E. 106. 19 Ann. Cas. 771 (1910).
As to authority of he agent to ﬂx terms, see Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin,
Misc. Rep.
51 N. H. 56, 12 Am. Rep. 45 (1871), Stirn v. Hoffman House Co.,
246, 28 N. Y. Supp. 724 (1894); to exchange for goods, see Hook v. Crowe,
100 Me. 399. 61 Atl. 1080 (1905).
To the same effect is Baldwin v. Tucker, 112 Ky. 282, 65 S. W. 8-41, 23
S
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and that contracts must be construed with reference to the usage of
trade or business to which they relate, are principles too well estab
lished to be questioned now.
Numerous examples are to be found
among the cases arising on policies of insurance ; and perhaps no
stronger case can be found than that of three days grace allowed in
cases of bills of exchange.
But to entitle a usage to that high respect,
it must'be a reasonable one. It must be for the beneﬁt of trade general
ly, and not for the convenience and beneﬁt of a particular class of
individuals.” And I can conceive of no usage that will authorize a
The instructions of a principal
departure from positive instructions.
to his agent make the law by which he 15 to be governed. And to au
thorize him to depart from them would be depriving the parties of the
privilege of making their own terms. I can see no beneﬁt resulting to
the community from such usage.
It is calculated rather to destroy that
No
conﬁdence which is necessary for the encouragement of trade.
planter would dare to trust his property in the hands of a factor upon
such terms. That such courtesy has been indulged until now, and that
it would be thought uncivil to refuse
have no doubt; and
have
different method of doing
as little doubt that any factor attempting
once become general, and no
business would suffer by it. But let
be understood that
factor
to
inconvenience would result. Let
not to sacriﬁce the in-_
give indulgence at his own risk, and that he
terest of the planter to the feelings of the merchant, and the evil will
correct itself.
to be placed in the man
do not mean to say that no conﬁdence
of good credit, or that property may not, in any instance,'be delivered
to the purchaser until the money
paid. On the contrary all the con
think
ﬁdence which
necessary, in the usual course of business,
should have thought that
the factors had re
ought to be allowed.
bank for the money when they delivered the rice,
check on
ceived
that they would have acted within the \scope of their authority, even
had been dishonored.
Such conduct in
purchaser would
though
of
could not have been
have been
species
swindling against which
The whole doc
expected that the seller would have been guarded.
few words.
If factor reposes
trine, indeed, may be expressed in

7

&

Ky. Law Rep. 1538, 57 L. R. A. 451 (1901), containing an extensive and valu
Wilson v. (livan, 65 Mo. 89
able review of the authorities; Wheeler
N. H. 446 (1835); G01-ham v. Felker, 102 Ga. 260,
(1877); Holton v. Smith,

28 S. E. 1002
20 Accord:

(1897).

Hall

&

1

3

J

7

v. Storrs,
Wis. 253 (1858): “The general rule in regard
to the admissibility of usage requires that it should be reasonable, certain,
and consistent with the general known import of the words used in the con
., in Catlin v. Smith, 24
tract to which the usage is to be applied." Redﬁeld.
B.
Vt. 85 (1851).
Adol. 728 (1832); Clark v. Van
Cf. Smith v. Wilson,
Northwick,
Pick. 343 (1823). Proof of usage is admissible to interpret the
meaning of the contract, or, where its meaning is equivocal or obscure, to
ascertain its nature and extent, but not to vary its terms, o'r introduce new
Parsons v.
conditions. or contravene the speciﬁc instructions to the agent.
Martin, 11 Gray, 111 (185-S).
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conﬁdence which amounts to giving credit to a purchaser, when he has
been directed to sell for cash, he does it at his own risk, and must
'
* * *
be answerable for the consequences.“
Motion for a new trial refused.

I-Iitl

é

SECTION 3.—APPAREN’I‘ AUTHORITY
PICKERING
(Court of King's Bench,

1812.

15

v.

BUSK.

East,

38,

13

Rev. Rep. 364.)

Trover for hemp. Swallow, a broker, had bought for plaintiff. two
of hemp, one of which was transferred in the books of the
wharﬁnger to the name of Swallow, the other to the name of Picker
The hemp was paid for by the plaintiff, and later
ing or Swallow.
sold by Swallow to defendant’s assignor in bankruptcy.
Loan ELLENBOROUGH, C. ]. It cannot fairly be questioned in this
case but that Swallow had an implied authority to sell.
Strangers can
only look to the acts of the parties, and to the external indicia of prop

parcels

erty, and not to the private communications which may pass between a
principal and his broker, and if a person authorize another to assume
the apparent right of disposing of property in the ordinary course of
trade, it must be presumed that the apparent authority is the real au
I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that a broker’s engagements
thority.
are necessarily and in all cases limited to his actual authority, the
reality of which is afterwards to be tried by the fact. It is clear that
he may bind his principal within the limits of the authority with which
he has been apparently clothed by the principal in respect of the subject
matter; and there would be no safety in mercantile transactions if he
could not. If the principal send his commodity to a place, where it is
the ordinary business of the person to whom it is conﬁded to sell, it
must be intended that the commodity was sent thither for the purpose
of sale. If the owner of a horse sent it to a repository of sale, can it be
implied that he sent it thither for any other purpose than that of sale?
Or if one send goods to an auction-room, can it be supposed that he
VVhere the commodity is
sent them thither merely for safe custody?
sent in such a way and to such a place as to exhibit.an apparent pur
pose of sale, the principal will be bound, and the purchaser safe.
The case of a factor not being able to pledge the goods of his prin
cipal conﬁded to him for sale, though clothed with an apparent owner
ship, has been pressed upon us in the argument, and considerably dis
The court, however, will decide that question
tressed our decision.
I1 The dissenting
Gonn.Pn.&

opinion

of Cheeves, J., is omitted.

A. (21) En.)—17

»'
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when it arises, consistently with the principle on which the present deci
sion is founded.
It was a hard doctrine when the pawnee was told
that the pledger of the goods had no authority to pledge them, being
a mere factor for sale; and yet since the case of Paterson v. Tash, that
I remember Mr. VVallace arguing
doctrine has never been overturned.
in Campbell v. Wright, 4 Burr. 2046, that the bills of lading ought to
designate the consignee as factor, otherwise it was but just that the
consignors should abide by the consequence of having misled the
pawnees. The ‘present case, however, is not the case of a pawn, but that
of a sale by a broker having the possession for the purpose of sale. The
sale was made by a person who hadiall the indicia of property; the
hemp could only have been transferred into his name for the purpose
of sale; and the party who has so transferred it cannot now rescind
If the plaintiff had intended to retain the dominion over
the contract.
the hemp, he should have placed it in the wharﬁnger’s books in his own
.
name.

GILLMAN

v.

ROBINSON.”

1825.
1 Car. & P. (H2, Ryan 8:
M. 226, 28 Rev. Rep. 795, 12 E. C. L. 364.)

(At Nisi Prius in the Court of Common Pleas.
.

Assumpsit for goods sold. One I/Vomack ordered goods on defend
ant’s account, but intercepted them on the way, and applied them to his
own use. He had bought goods of plaintiffs and others several times
‘
before as the agent of defendant, for which defendant had paid.
BEST, C. I. Upon principle, if a man holds another out to the world
as his general agent, he is responsible for his acts; and it is important
that it should be so, because, otherwise, a man might accredit another,
and, after he had cheated many to their ruin, turn round and say,
“Though this man appeared as my agent, yet he had no authority from
me.” You must be satisﬁed, not only that the goods were ordered for
the defendant, but that the authority of the party ordering them was
so far recognized as to render the defendant responsible. It is admitted,
that, in the cases of policies and bills of exchange, agency is proved by
several instances. This feature in the law of agency is not conﬁned to
those cases, but applies equally and similarly to the ordering of goods.
Verdict for the plaintiffs.
Z2 Another case, based upon orders of the same agent. was similarly de
Todd v. Robinson, Ryan & Moody, 217,
cided in the Court of King's Bench.
21 E. C. L. 736 (1825).

Gonn.Pa.& A.(2o En.)
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STODDARD.

Court of Maine,

1898.

91 Me. 499, 40

Atl.

547.)

VVISWELL, I. Replevin for a piano. The piano was at one time the
property of the plaintiff, who intrusted it to one Spencer for the pur
pose of taking it to, and leaving it at, the house of the defendant,
but without any authority, as the plaintiﬁ claims and as has been found
by the jury, to sell the piano or to make any contract for its sale;_ the
arrangement being, as the plaintiff claims, that Spencer should merely
take it to and leave it at the defendant’s house, and that a day or two
later the plaintiff would go there and make a. sale of it if he could.
had the piano taken to the defendant’s house, but, instead
he
so that the plaintiﬂ might subsequently sell
assumed authority in himself to sell
to the defendant, who bought
and paid in cash and otherwise the full purchase price ﬁxed by Spen
cer, without any knowledge of his want of authority.
dealer in pianos and musical instruments, and,
Spencer was himself
upon the very day when he made the arrangement with the plaintiﬁ
to take one of his (plaintiff’s) pianos to the defendant’s house, he had
seen the defendant and attempted to sell him one of his pianos.
Upon the question of Spencer’s authority as an agent the presiding
justice instructed the jury as follows: “The mere fact that Spencer
had possession of that piano and sold
to the defendant, even as the
defendant says, Heath’s name not having been mentioned to the de
title to the defendant.
fendant, would not necessarily give
To illus
trate: Suppose you are
livery stable keeper, and you let
man have
horse to go from here to Portland.
You let him have that horse,
for
but
He
special purpose—to go from here to Portland.
meets
man on the road, and asks him what he will give him for the
horse, and they dicker, and ﬁnally the man whom he meets buys that
You do not suppose that would divest you of the
horse for $125.
title as a livery stable keeper, because you never have given authority
You gave authority to that man to drive to
to that man to sell?
Portland and back. and
any man was foolish enough to buy that
horse of that man he will have to stand his chances.
give you this
Now,
as an illustration.
may be an extreme illustration.
party
and
piano, and go into the country to leave
allows another to take
sells
and there
not any authority for
that party who takes
in the country, or wherever
that sale, then whoever purchases
left, or on the way, can obtain no greater title than the party has who
comes back to the question of whether this man Heath,
sells it. So,
the plaintiff in this case, ever authorized Spencer to so deal with that
sale of
as to constitute him ‘an agent for
property, in the way of
that purpose.”
While these instructions were technically correct, so far as they go,
we do not think that they were adequate, in view of the defendant’s
Spencer
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position, and we fear that the illustration given was so extreme as to
be misleading.
A principal is not only bound by the acts of his agent, whether
general or special, within the authority which he has actually given
him, but he is also bound by his agent’s acts within the apparent au
thority which the principal himself knowingly permits his_agen_t_t_o
assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing.
1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (Zd Ed.) p. 969, and cases cited.
\'\"'l'i€ill€I' or not a principal is bound by the acts of his agent, when
dealing with a third person who does not know the extent of his
authority, depends, not so much upon the actual authority given or
intended to be given by the principal, as upon the question, what did
such third person, dealing with the agent, believe, and have a right
to believe, as to the agent’s authority f_rom the acts of the principal?
Griggs v. Selden, 58 Vt. 561, 5 Atl. 504; Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H.
360, 55 Am. Dec. 195; \-‘Valsh v. Insurance Co., 73 N. Y. 5.
For instance, if a person should send a commodity to a store or
warehouse where it is the ordinary business to sell articles of the same
nature, would not a jury be justiﬁed in coming to the conclusion
that, at least, the owner had by his own act invested the person with
whom the article was intrusted with an apparent authority which
would protect an innocent purchaser?
In Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 43, ante, p. 319, quoted by Mellen, C.
in Parsons v. Webb,
Me. 38, 22 Am. Dec. 220, Lord Ellenborough
“Where the commodity
sent in such
says:
way, and to such
place, as to exhibit an apparent purpose of sale, the principal will be
bound and the purchaser safe.” 23
Let us apply this principle to the present case. Spencer was
_deal
er in pianos.
Immediately before this transaction he had been try
There was evidence tending
piano to the defendant.
ing to sell
to show that the plaintiff knew these facts. VVith this knowledge, he
intrusted the possession of this piano with Spencer for the purpose of
its being taken by Spencer to the defendant’s house with
view to
bailee.
its sale.
He did not
Spencer was not acting merely as
done by
personally take the piano to the defendant's house, but had
Spencer was employed for some other
truckman or expressman.

Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195 (1851), in which
carriage was left for repair with a carriage maker, and by him sold con
See, also, Parry Mfg. Go. v. Lowenberg, 88 Miss. 532,
trary to instructions.
41 South. 65 (1906); Gilman Oil Co. v. Norton, 89 Iowa, 434, 56 N. W. 663. 48
Am. St. Rep. 400 (1893).
full and discrim
In Leigh v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 58 Ala. 165 (1877), is
inating discussion of the exceptions to the maxim of the law of sales, “nemo
dat quod non habet," including the case of the agent who is intrusted with
possession of his prin(;'lpal’s property, and with the indicia of ownership, or
of authority to sell. Such was the case in Columbus Buggy Co. v. Turley, 73
Miss. 529. 19 South. 232. 32 It R. A. 260. 55 Am.- St. Rep. 550 (1895), where
livery and sale stable was intrusted with carriages for
the proprietor of
sale, which he wrongfully sold for his own debts.
a

a

a

53 Compare
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Whatever may have been the private arrangement between
purpose.
the plaintiff and Spencer or the limit of authority given by the plain
tiff, would not a jury have been warranted in coming to the conclu
sion that the purchaser was justiﬁed in believing, in view of all of
these facts, that Spencer had authority to sell, and that the plaintiff
knowingly placed Spencer in a position where he could assume this
We think that
apparent authority, to the injury of the defendant?
a jury might have properly come to such a conclusion, and that eon
that it
sequently the instructions were inadequate in this respect:
was nowhere explained to the jury that a principal might be bound
by the acts of an agent, not within his actual authority, but within
the apparent authority which the principal had knowingly and by his
own acts permitted the agent to assume.
~
Exceptions sustained.

ANTRIM IRON CO.
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

1905.
1

140

v.

Mich.

St. Rep. 434.)

J.“

ANDERSON.
702,

104 N.

W. 319, 112 Am.

CARPENTER,
Plaintiff brings this action of replevin to recover
timber cut from section 31, Star township, Antrim county, Mich., by
one Elgie Dow, and by Dow sold to defendant.
On the 10th of Sep
tember, 1902, plaintiff, the owner of said timber, acting through its
agent, Charles L. Bolio, entered into a contract with Dow, whereby
Dow -agreed to cut, skid, draw, and load on cars the timber in ques
tion and the timber standing on four other sections belonging to
In February, 1903, this contract was rescinded. and a new
plaintiﬁ’.
and oral contract made, by which Dow purchased from the plaintiﬁ‘,
through said Bolio, its agent. certain timber standing on the land cov
ered by the former written contract. * * *
Plaintiff contends that there was no evidence tending to prove that
Bolio had even verbal authority to sell this timber to Dow. The un
/disputed evidence shows that Bolio did have authority to contract
with Dow for the lumbering of all this timber, and that he also had
to sell Dow all the standing timber coveredby said contract
a_yQ19;i_ty
except that on section 31. There was also evidence that Dow bought
thePtifrib'ér_belie\'ing Bolio had authority to sell it. The legal rule
applicable to this case is correctly stated by Mr. Mechem in his work
“The principal is bound to third
on Agency (section 283) as follows:
persons who have relied thereon in good faith and in ignorance of
any limitations or restrictions by the apparent authority he has given
to the agent, and not by the actual or express authority where that
=4 Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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differs from the apparent; and this, too, whether the agency be a
general or a special one.” 2“
Under this rule it cannot be said that Bolio did not have verbal
The court charged, in
authority to make the contract in question.
effect, that the jury might ﬁnd that plaintiff ratiﬁed the action of its
Plaintiff contends that there was no evidence justifying
agent, Bolio.
this charge. If so, the charge was not erroneous, because it bore only
upon the question of Bolio’s authority, and under the rule we have just
* * "‘
stated the undisputed testimony established that authority.
‘
Affirmed.

PATTERSON
(Supreme Court of Alabama,

1902.

v.

NEAL.

135

Ala.

-

477, 33 South. 39.)

Appeal from judgment of $1,500 for plaintiff, on the ground that
the court refused to charge:
“If the jury believe the evidence they
'
must ﬁnd for the defendant.”
_
DOWDELL, ]., While the complaint in this case, as originally ﬁled
and afterwards amended, contained a number of counts, the cause
No questions are raised on
was tried alone on the seventh count.
the pleadings.
By the seventh count the plaintiff claims for the
death of his minor son, a boy 16 years of age, who was killed by
falling rock while he was digging coal in the defendant’s mine. The
complaint avefs a wrongful employment of plaintiff’s minor son by
the defendant, in that he was so employed to dig coal without the
It is not charged
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, his father.
that the death was caused by any negligence on the part of the de
fendant or his agents, but the right of action is rested upon the
wrongful employment as alleged in the complaint.
On the trial the undisputed evidence showed: That Matthew Neal,
the minor son of the plaintiff, was killed by falling rock, while en
gaged in mining coal in one of the several mines operated by the
defendant.
Matthew had been employed by the defendant, with the
95 See Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 2%, 8 N, W. 1 U!U1
, O0
-I Am. Rep. 827 (1881),
quoting Story on Agency, § 127; Baker v. K. 0., S. J. & G. B. By. Co., 91 M0.
152, 3 S. W. 486 (1887) ; McAlpin v. Ziller, 17 Tex. 508 (1856) ; Trickett v. Tom
linson, 13 G. B. (N. S.) 663, 7 L. T. 678, 106 E. O. L. 663 (1863) ; Osborne & Co.
This is so equally, whether
v. Gatewood (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S. W. 72 (1903).
he is a general or a special agent (Lister v. Allen, 31 Md. 543, 100 Am. Dec.
though a general agency allows more latitude than a special
78 [1869]),
See, also, Smith v. McGuire. 3 H.
(Wilcox v. Routh, 17 Miss. 476 [1848]).
8: N. 554, 27 L. T. Exch. 465, 6 W. R. 726 (1858); Plummer v. Knight, 156 M0.
App. 321, 137 S. W. 1019 (1911); Renick v. Brooke (Mo. App. 1916). 190 S. W.
641; Johnston v. Milwaukee & W. Inv. Co., 46 Neb. 480, 64 N. W. 1100 (1895),
R.
followed in Harrison Nat. Bank v. Austin, 65 Neb. 632, 91 N. W. 540, 59
A. 294, 101 Am. St. Rep. 639 (1902); Same v. Williams, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 400, 89
N. W. 245 (1902); Thomson v. Shelton, 49 Neb. 644, 68 N. W. 1055 (1896). In
St. Louis Gunning Adv. Co. v. Wanamaker, 115 Mo. App. 270. 90 S. W. 737
(1905), ante. p. 143, in which “apparent authority" is deﬁned.
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knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, as a. driver in the mine; and,
three days before the accident, Matthew exchanged places with his
brother, who was employed as a coal digger in the mine,-—Matthew
taking the place of his brother as a coal digger, and the brother the
place of Matthew as a driver,—and pending this exchange of places
and work between the two brothers the accident resulting in the
death of Matthew occurred.
The defendant, Patterson, was at the
time the owner and operator of several coal mines, including the one
in question.
Clark was the general superintendent of the defendant’s
mining business. Winters was an assistant under Clark, and was
the mine boss of the mine in question.
Clark alone, as superintend
ent, was given authority by the defendant to employ coal diggers in
the mines.
Winters had no such authority given him. That his au
thority and duty was to boss and direct the miners, and the opera
tions in the mines. That sometimes persons would apply to him for
employment as coal diggers, and that whenever such was the case he
would report the application for employment to Clark, who would
approve or disapprove, and that he never employed any one to dig
coal without havingwﬁrst obtained the approval and consent of Clark.
That whenever Clark employed a coal digger for the mine in question,
he sent such person to Winters, who assigned the coal digger to his
place of labor in the mine, and that, whenever Clark approved the
application of one seeking employment through W'inters, upon such
approval or consent by Clark he (Winters) would then make the em
ployment, and assign such applicantto a place in the mine to dig coal.
It is not pretended that either the defendant or Clark, his general su
perintendent, employed Matthew to dig coal in the mine, or that either
of them had any actual knowledge that he was engaged in that work.
Neither is it pretended that there was any express employment of
Matthew to dig coal in the mine by Winters.
The ﬁrst contention is that there was an implied contract
em
ployment with Matthew by Winters, and, furthermore, that Winters
had implied authority to employ, by reason of the principal’s acqui
escence in previous acts of employment of coal diggers by Winters.
And the second contention of the plaintiff
that \Vinters had ap
parent authority to give employment to dig coal in the mine.
As to the
[After holding that Winters had no implied authority]
second contention-—that Winters was clothed with apparent authority
to contract for his principal with persons to dig coal in the mine—it
not one where the doctrine of apparent authority
clear that the case
This principle of the law operates by way of es
has any application.
If the plaintiPf had con
toppel, and to prevent the practice of fraud-.
tracted with \Vinters for the employment of his (plaintiff's) son to
mine coal, and was suing for his son’s wages, and the defendant should
deny the authority of Winters, as agent, to make the contract, the
The doctrine of ap
doctrine of apparent authority might be invoked.
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parent authority can be invoked only by one who has been misled to
his detriment‘ by the appearance of authority in an agent with whom
he deals, though not existing in fact.
The principal is liable for the
agent’s act within the scope of his actual authority, because it is his
own act, and is liable for the agent's act within the scope of the appar
ent authority which he holds the agent out as having, but which in
fact he has not, because to dispute the existence of such apparent au
thority would enable the principal to commit a fraud on innocent third
1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (Zd
persons relying on such appearance.
hold
990.
The
not
out his agent to the world
principal
may
p.
Ed.)
as possessing authority, and escape liability from his acts in dealing
with innocent third persons within the scope of the agency, by secret
limitations upon his authority.
But if the party dealing with the agent
does not rely upon his apparent authority, the principal will not be
bound by" the unauthorized acts, which are apparently, but not ac
Tallmadge v. L0uns
tually, within the scope of the agent’s authority.
bury, 50 N. Y. St. Rep. 531, 21 N. Y. Supp. 908.
It is clear that the plaintiﬁ‘ here did not rely or act upon any ap
The boy was not induced to dig coal
parent authority in the agent.
by an appearance of authority in Winters, for the undisputed evidence
shows that he began to dig coal without ever having consulted Win
ters. \Ve are unable to see how the doctrine of apparent authority can
It cannot be pretended that either the plaintiﬁ
have any application.
or his son was misled by dealing with the agent underthe appearance
The authorities cited in the brief of appellee on this
of authority.
question are all cases where the agent, within the scope of his agency,
dealt with persons relying upon his apparent authority, and lay down
Not one of these cases is analogous
the doctrine we have stated above.
in the facts to the one before us.
Our conclusion is that, on the law and the undisputed evidence in
this case, the defendant was entitled to the general charge as.re
The view we have
quested, and the trial court erred in its refusal.
taken of the case, we think, renders it unnecessary to notice other
Reversed and remanded.“
assignments of error.
26 St.

Louis Gunning

Adv. Co. v. Wanamaker,

Sigel-Campion
Live
737 (1905);
71 Colo. 410. 207 Pac. 82 (1922).
-
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LERNER.

(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department,
52 App. Div. 216, 65 N. Y. Supp. 293.)

1900.

Wooowaan, ]. This ,is a proceeding, brought under the provisions
of subdivision 4 of section 2232 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to
oust the occupant of certain premises in the borough of Brooklyn, on
the ground that said occupant had intruded into said premises without
permission of the owner, and that the occupancy thus commenced had
The occupancy was admitted by
continued without such permission.
the answer, but it was urged that it wasiwith the permission of the
The
owner, given by one Marks, acting as agent for the owner.
leamed justice, upon the trial of the issue thus raised, determined the
matter in favor of the owner of the premises, and an appeal from the
order entered upon this decision comes to this court.
\Ve are asked to reverse the order upon the ground that the weight
of evidence preponderates in favor of the appellant, that the ﬁnal order
is against the evidence,
and that it is contrary to law; but an ex
The question
amination of the record does not warrant this relief.
presented was whether Marks was in fact the agent of the owner of
the premises, with authority to rent and give possession to the appel
lant.
Upon this point there was a direct conﬂict of evidence, and, the
learned justice having decided in favor of the owner of the premises,
it is not for this court to disturb this conclusion.
Fowler v. Marcus.
i
41 App. Div. 425, 58 N. Y. Supp. 867.
The evidence clearly warrants
for there is practically no dispute that Marks was merely
the decision;
authorized to bring a tenant to the owner of the premises, or to his
As to
general agent, and to receive a commission for such work.
whether this authority was extended at a subsequent interview with
the owner in respect to the renting of the premises to the defendant,
the evidence is conflicting, and the justice before whom the question
was tried has found in favor of the petitioner.
VVhile a principal is bound by his agent's acts when he justiﬁes a
party dealing with his agent in believing that he has given to the agent
authority to do those acts, he is responsible only for that appearance
of authority which is caused by himself, and not for that appearance of
conformity to the authority which is caused only by the agent; that is,
he is bound equally by,the authority he actually gives, and by that which
by his acts he appears to give. F_or the appearance of authority he is
responsible only so far as he hasmcaused that appearance. For the
appearance of the act the agent alone is responsible. The fundamental
proposition is that one man can be bound only by the authorized acts
of another.” He cannot be charged because another holds a commis
21 Accord:

130 (1902);
373. 50 W.

Leary v. Albany Brewing Co., 77 App. Div. 6, 79 N. Y. Supp.
Wright v. Glyn, [1902] 1 K. B. 745, 71 L. J. K. B. 497, 86 L. T.
R. 402.
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sion from him, and falsely asserts that his acts are within it.‘ Edwards
v. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540, 24 N. E. ,8Z7. The limited scope of Marks’
agency was indicated to the defendant when he announced that he
must see the owner of the premises before renting the same, and if
the owner did not extend the authority, and did not do any acts from
which the defendant would be justiﬁed in‘ believing that the powers of
Marks had been extended, the defendant did not come into the pos
session of the premises with the consent of the owner, and the order
appealed from should be afﬁrmed.
The decision of the justice below, upon the conﬂict of evidence in
respect to this point, must, as we have already indicated, be conclusive.
All concur.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

___i:_i__.
SECTION 4.—EXPRESS AND IMPLIED AUTHORITY
.

l

FARMERS’ & MECHANICS’ BANK
DROVERS’ BANK;

(Court

of Appeals

of New York,

1857.

16 N.

v.
Y.

BUTCHERS’
125,

69 Am.

&

Dec. 678.)

Action by a holder for value of three checks for $1,000 each, and
two for $1,500 each, for the face of the checks. They had all been
certiﬁed as good by defendant’s paying teller, who had full authority
funds in the bank,
to certify checks when the drawer hadisuﬂicient
but who was instructed not to certify when there were not suﬁicient
Green, the drawer of these checks, induced the
funds on deposit;
teller to certify when there were no funds by telling him he wanted
them for temporary use, and they should not become a charge upon
the bank.
* * * The question I now propose
COMSTOCK, J. (dissenting).”
to examine is whether the teller had power to enter into these contracts
Presenting oneself as agent, and making declaration to that effect, create
no valid apparent authority.
Tompkins Mach. C0. v. Peter, S4 Tex. 627. 19
Agents cannot empower themselves to act. Crawford v.
S. W. 860 (1892).
Whittaker, 42 W. Va. 430, 26 S. E. 516 (1896); Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y.
The apparent authority is that which he appears to
540, 24 N. E. 827 (1&)0).
have from that which he actually does have, and not from that which he may
pretend to have, or from his actions on occasions which were unknown to and
unratiﬁed by his principal. Oberne v. Burke, 30 Neb. 581, 46 N. W. 838 (1890).
containing
a valuable
discussion.
There is a distinction between the ap
parent powers and the acts apparently, but not really, within the power.
Mechanics’ Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. Ry. Co., 13 N. Y. 599 (1856); Van Eppes
v. Smith, 21 Ala. 317 (1852).
28 Part of the dissenting
opinion is omitted.
The majority opinion [here
omitted] held the bank liable on the ground that there was a distinction
between the terms of a power and facts entirely extraneous, upon which the
right to exercise the authority conferred may depend. One dealing with the
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as the agent of the defendants.
In the ﬁrst and most obvious view
an agency of any description, the principal is bound by such acts as
he has authorized, and no others.” In a just sense, this is universally
and necessarily true, because the proposition is involved in the very
idea of agency. If there are apparent exceptions in the books, they are
not such in fact, but are merely varieties in the application of the rule,
which do not contradict the rule itself. This will appear when we con
sider the modes in which powers are derived from a principal to an
agent so as to bind the former in favor of third parties.
An agency may be constituted by writing.
\Vhen this is the case,
the agent takes precisely such authority as the instrument confers, up
on a fair construction of the language used, taken in connection with
the general or particular purpose of the power. An authority thus de
rived of course includes, in the absence of special restrictions, all such
incidental powers and means as are necessary in the execution of the
main purpose.
The agency may also be created by a special verbal
I use the word special, not with reference to the powers
appointment.
to be exercised, but to the mode of creating them by special or express
words. When the language of such an appointment is once ascertained,
it is perfectly obvious that the authority of the agent is precisely what
it would be if it were conferred by a writing in the same language.
But there is another, and, for all purposes connected with the pres
ent inquiry, only one other, mode of delegating power.
Without any
express or special appointment, an implied agency may arise from the
conduct of a party.
Story on Agency, § 54. \Vhere a person has
recognized a course of dealing for him by another, or a series of acts
of a particular kind, an implied agency is thereby constituted to carry
on the same dealing or to do acts of the same character.
Now, the
only difference between such an agency and those which are created
by express appointment, whether verbal or in writing, is that the latter
may, by the very terms of the power, be conﬁned to a single transac
tion or act, while the very existence of the former is derived from a
course of recognized dealing or a series of recognized acts.
This im
plied agency is therefore never a special one, in the sense in which
All express agencies may or may
that term has generally been used.
not be special, according as they authorize, or do not, more than a single

of

r

act.

Although much

.

said concerning general and special agen
cies, there never was any other intelligible distinction indicated by those
has been

agent ls bound to know the extent or the power, but not these extrinsic facts,
As to this peculiar New York doc
such as whether the drawer had funds.
trine, see 5 Col. Law Rev. 261.
99 The authority of an agent may be shown, either directly by express words
of appointment, either spoken or written, or it may be implied or indirectly
shown, by evidence of the relative situation of the parties, the nature ot the
business and the character ot the intercourse between the parties justifying
such an inference.
Acts and doings are often quite as signiﬁcant as words
spoken. Geylin v. De Villeroi, 2 Houst. 311 (1860).
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not exist, in other words, where
by express appointment
and those implied from conduct are entirely similar in all their char
acteristics and incidents.
In the one class, the authority is manifested
by an express delegation; in the other, it is presumed or implied from
the conduct of the principal.
This presumption is allowed even against
the real facts of the case, where the rights of bona ﬁde dealers are
concerned. In all this class, it is presumed that the principal has actual
ly delegated power to do the acts which he has been in the habit of
The power thus presumed is to be judged
recognizing and approving.
in all respects as though the delegation were actually shown.
It will
justify and uphold acts of the same kind, or, in other words, within
the presumed authority, but no others.
I have observed that there may be seeming contradictions of the
fundamental doctrine, that a principal is bound only by such a‘cts of
his agent as he has duly authorized.
This presumptive or implied
agency is one of these, because a man may have accepted and approved
acts which he never authorized, and so be bound, as to third persons,
Another and the only other of these apparent con
by similar acts.
tradictions is where the acts done by the agent are justiﬁed, as to in
nocent dealers, by the authority, whether conferred by express dele
gation or presumed in the manner indicated, but are opposed to special
In such cases the liability of the principal rests
private restrictions.
upon a just distinction between the power conferred and private in
structions as to its exercise. But the power must in all cases be vested
either actually or presumptively, and if it be not, the principal cannot
be charged.
The principles, so far stated, are simple and elementary, although
they have been somewhat obscured by loose and indeterminate expres
sions in the books. Applying them to the present inquiry, it becomes
plainly of no importance whether the power of Mr. Peck, the defend
ants’ teller, to certify checks, was derived from a special appointment
or from a recognition of his acts.
At the circuit it appears to have
been placed on the ground of recognition, and no special appointment
was shown. The difference is merely in the mode of constituting the
The power in either case is the same. Viewing it as derived
agency.
or implied from acts recognized and approved, the inquiry at the cir
cuit should have been, what were those acts? If they were conﬁned
to the certiﬁcation of checks drawn upon actual deposits, then the
power to be implied or presumed was to do acts of the same character.
but not of a character wholly different, although clothed in the same
form.
In a word, the certifying authority of the teller is to be construed
and treated in all respects as though it had been given to him by a
written instrument specially deﬁning and restricting it; and viewing
the authority in this manner, we are to inquire whether, under a power
expressly conﬁned to the certiﬁcation of checks drawn upon sufﬁcient
terms.

VVhere this distinction

does

the power is not special in this sense, agencies
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funds on deposit with the defendants, the teller could bind them by
certiﬁcates which were ﬁctitious and false. These certiﬁcates, as we
have seen, are to be regarded as acceptances; and another mode of stat
could the teller, with authority only to
ing the inquiry therefore
accept checks drawn upon actual funds, bind his principals, by accept
ing for the accommodation of the drawer, when there were no funds
on deposit and none in expectancy?
This question,
proper now to observe, cannot be determined in
the plaintiffs’ favor on the ground that the limitations upon the agent’s
power were in the nature of private instructions merely, in regard to
its exercise. The difﬁculty which meets us in this view of the case
An
that the power exercised
not embraced at all in the commission.
authority to accept drafts, in the regular business of the principal, up
It
on funds of the drawer,
precise and well deﬁned authority.
cannot, in my opinion, include acceptances out of the principal's busi
So, an authority to
ness, and for the accommodation of third persons.
accept or certify checks, in the regular course of banking business,
does not embrace
would seem to be equally deﬁnite.
power to
pledge the responsibility of the bank for the accommodation of per
sons who are not depositors and have no funds.
urged that the teller
proper agent or officer to answer ques
tions and give information as to the funds of
person who draws his
But this
check.
very different thing from entering into a written
which operates to transfer the fund,
there be any, from
engagement
the depositor, and which, whether there be any funds or not, imposes
pecuniary obligation on the bank, to last until barred by the general
It ought not to be contended seriously that such
statute of limitations.
bank of turning
power can be derived from the simple practice in
to its books and communicating to inquirers, through the teller or book
keeper, the condition of its customers’ accounts.

ROBINSON.

of West Virginia,
Rep. 771.)

1881.

19 W.

Va. 49, 42 Am.

it

*

Part of the opinion is omitted.
1
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*
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a

a

Action for speciﬁc performance of
contract for the sale of land.
One Hunter, as agent of Mann, sold the land to Robinson for part
cash and part bonds. Hunter received payment of all the bonds. Both
The circuit court held the pay
principal and agent were now dead.
ment to Robinson good and decreed
deed to Robinson.
GREEN, ].*°
Some of the text-books lay
down broad
ly, “that an agent employed to sell has no authority as such to receive
payment of the purchase-money."
See Sugden on Vendors (14th Ed.,

THE AUTHORITY
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8th Am. Ed. 1873) vol. 1, c. 1, § 3, par. 11, p. 70, bottom p. 48. I
If the
apprehend, that this broad proposition needs qualiﬁcation.
property be personal property, the authority to sell for cash would
carry with it generally the power and authority to receive the purchase
See Hackney v. jones, 3 Humph. 612; Taylor v. Nussbaum,
money.“
2 Duer, 302; Higgins et al. v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Cross v. Haskins,
13 Vt. 536, 540.
But if the subject-matter of the authority to sell be
land, it is important to determine accurately, what is meant by author
There cannot be a perfected sale of land but by convey
ity to sell.
ance; and a power of attorney under hand 'a.nd seal authorizing an
agent to sell and convey land for cash would confer on the agent the
power to receive in cash the purchase-money, when the sale was made.
See Peck et al. v. Harriott et al., 6 Serg. & R. 146, 9 Am. Dec. 415.
On the other hand a verbal or parol authority to sell would mean sim
ply an authority to contract to sell.the land; for no verbal or parol
authority could be given to make a perfected sale, that is, a convey
ance.
Such authority must be under seal. Ordinarily an authority to
contract to sell would not carry with it an authority to collect the pur
chase-money, See Mynn v. Iolliﬁe, 1 Moo. & R.‘ 327.”
In Ireland v. Thompson, 56 E. C. L. 167 and 168 (4 Man. G. &
S.), Maule, Judge, in speaking of this case, says: “In the case of
Mynn v. ]olliﬁ‘e, 1 M. & R. 326, it was decided that an agent employed
to sell an estate is not, as such, authorized to receive the purchase
money. And there is no doubt, that on the sale of an estate to imply
such an authority would be most inconvenient and unnecessary;
it
being clearly for the interest of the vendor, that he, and not his agent,
and no inconvenience to any one
should receive the purchase-money;
arising out of the limit to the authority of the agent, which excludes his
right to receive the money. The proper course is clearly, that the ven
dee should retain the money and the vendor the estate, till the convey
ance is made; and thus neither of them runs any risk of losing the
money.”
These general views seem to rne eminently sound; and as
under
stand the case of Peck v. Marriott, 6 Serg. & R. 146, 9 Am. Dec. 415.
they are the views entertained by that court, though not so expressed
in that case.

I

81 In case

v. Moorhead, 62 Iowa, 91, 17 N. W. 202
'
,
to agent.
a sale is to be for cash. A usage at the place of sale may
Winders v. Hill, 141 N. C. 694, 54 S. E. 440 (1906);
rebut this presumption.
Marble v. Bang, 54 Minn. 277, 55 N. W. 1131 (1893). But the authority, always
understood, to do all things necessary to the execution of the power requires
the agent empowered to sell and convey as a mediate act, to receive the price.
It the agent makes
Peck v. Harriett, 6 Serg. & R. 146. 9 Am. Dec. 415 (1820).
a contract he has no power to make, then he has no right to receive part 0!
the purchase price, neither has he before any contract of sale is entered into.
Schaetfer v. Mut. Beneﬁt Ins. Co., 38 Mont. 459, 100 Pac. 225 (1909).
Vvhite
v. Lee, 97 Miss. 493. 52 South. 206 (1910), as to mere authority to contmct for
sale,
but not to convey.
a

of sale of land, Hampton

(1883), $2,000 paid
83 Presumptively
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Sugden to sustain his general proposition refers also to Pole v.
Beav. 562, but I have not access to this case. Doubtless there
cases, where a parol or verbal authority to sell land would
under the circumstances be held to confer authority to receive the cash
Thus if an auctioneer be
payment on the sale of the land being made.
verbally authorized to sell a lot at public sale upon certain terms, one
of which was, that ten per cent. of the purchase-money should be paid
in cash on the day of sale, the auctioneer has authority to receive this
“His authority to receive the stipu
cash—payment ; as the court says:
lated deposit cannot be questioned. He receives the deposit not mere
ly as the agent of the seller. He is bound to keep it for the indemnity
of the purchaser, until ‘the latter is enabled to look into the title pro
posed to be conveyed to him and decide on its suﬁiciency, or until the
lapse of time limited for the purpose in ﬁxing the day for the payment
and security for the residue of the price.”
So in the case of Yerby v. Grigsby, 9 Leigh, 387, a decree was ren
dered, which impliedly afﬁrmed, that an agent, who had been appointed
by a verbal authority to sell land, had under thecircumstances appear
ing in that case authority to receive the cash-payment. The court says
not one word on this subject; and this inference is to be drawn only
The reporter too fails to state, what the circum
from the decree.
stances or evidence was; in stating the law he merely says: “In the
opinion of the court bel0w_ as of this court the evidence established.
that Iohn Green was authorized by Charles to make such a contract as
The contract which was made was
was made with the complainant.”
a sale of- two lots for $425.00, of which $250.00 was to be paid and,
So far as
as the agreement states, was paid in cash to ]ohn Green.
can see, there was no authority from anything appearing in this case
to justify the reporter in stating in the syllabus in this case, that so
as that “when the owner of lands
broad a proposition was held in
contract for the sale thereof, the authori
authorized another to make
to be
ty of the agent to receive so much of the purchase-money, as
paid in hand,
necessary incident to the power to sell.” Nothing of
said by the court; and no such broad proposition can pos
the sort
sibly be inferred from the statement of the case or the decree entered.
But be this as
may, there
certainly nothing in this or in any
have seen, that gives any countenance to the idea,
other case, which
the same thing, to
that
simple parol authority to sell land or, what
make’
contract of sale would impliedly authorize the agent making
the sale to receive the deferred payments of the purchase-money.
Such
implication would be entirely unnecessary in order for the agent to
execute the authority conferred on him; and on every correct prin
In such case
could not be made.
clear, that no authority
ciple
to the agent to cpllect any deferred instalments of the purchase-money
can be inferred.
In this case not only was no authority given by Mann to Hunter to
oollect these deferred payments; but the paper, which Mann signed,

Leask, 28
are some
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seems to me to go/much further than was necessary and clearly to
negative the idea that Hunter was to collect the deferred payments,
if he sold the land. The language used is: “That should H. F. Hunt
er sell said land, I, \Villiam T. Mann, will endorse said sale and take
lt
my interest in money or bonds as contracted by said H. Hunter."
is perfectly obvious, that the bonds here referred to are the bonds for
the purchase-money of the land when sold. Mann stipulates here ex
pressly, that his share of these bonds was to be given to him, which
is utterly inconsistent with the idea, that all these bonds were to be
collected by Hunter. But even had there been express authority given
by Mann to Hunter to collect the deferred payments of the purchase
money, when the land was sold, yet he would‘ have had no authority
before
was due,
to collect it in the manner, in which he did, that
according to the deposition of the purchaser, Robin
receiving for
son, cattle, horses, sheep and notes of third parties, which were pay
An agent authorized to receive money or collect a
able to Robinson.
third per
house or
bond of
debt can not receive another thing, as
Leigh,
Co. v. Holloway,
debt.
See VVi'lkinson
son in discharge of
284; Gullett v. Lewis,
Stew. 27; \Viley v. Mahood, 10 W'. Va. 221.
These were cases of attorneys at law, who being authorized to collect
debts received payment in something else than money; but they show,
that the principle
just as applicable to any other agent as to attor
at
law.
Indeed
they are based on the ground, that the authority
neys
the same as that of any other agent to collect
of an attomey at law
a debt.

*

if

* is

is

a

a

is

a

it
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debt before
due by an agent authorized
The collection too of
violation of his duty; and the person.
debt
generally
to collect
responsible,
who knowing his authority pays him money in this way,
Parnther v. Gaitskell, 13
not paid to_ the principal.
the money
*
East, 432.
Decree reversed; cause remanded.“
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Biss. 395, Fed. Cas. No. 1.667 (1869), in which the
3-1Bosseau v. O’Brien,
court holds that authority to/an agent to sell real estate must be clear and
distinct, of such character that a fair and candid person must see without
hesitation that the authority-is given. An answer to an agent, “I will sell" on
terms speciﬁed, gives the agent no authority to make a contract of sale, even
By common law the power to convey must be under seal.
on those terms.
Heath v. Nutter, 50 Me. 378 (1862), ante, p. 124. Cf‘. Linan v. Puno, 31 P.
opinion.
259 (1915), with dissenting
Authority to an agent to sell land does not per so confer authority
ex
Fullerton v. McLaughlin, 70 Hun, 568, 24 N. Y.
tend the time ot payment.
Supp.,280 (1893).
Nor to rescind and cancel the contract of sale, West End
Hotel
Land C0. V. Crawford, 120 N. C. 347, 27 S. E. 31 (1897). Nor does
given manner, give any power to sell
authority to sell at
ﬁxed price. or in
National Iron Armor Co. v. Brunet, 19 N. J. Eq. 331
at any other price.
Dayton v. Buford, 18 Minn. 126 (Gil. 111) (1872). Nor in any other
(1868)
Minn. 248 (Gil. 214), 83 Am. Dec. 778 (1863).
manner.
Rice v. Tavernier,
Though when the principal leaves discretion with the agent he will be bound,
even though the agent sell for less than the amount he has suggested. Sprigg's
Ex’rs v. Herman,
Mart. (N. S.) 510 (1828).
Moreover, the authority must be exercised within
reasonable time. Mat

t
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McREAVY.

1890.

1 Wash.

359. 25 Pac. 471.)

Action to compel speciﬁc performance of an alleged agreement
to
I
two lots in the city of Seattle.
STILES, J.” * * * The appellant was the owner of certain real
property in the city of Seattle, and the court found that, at-a certain

convey

date, agents named, who were real-estate agents in Seattle, “were the
agents of defendant for the sale of the aforesaid real estate, and were
then and there duly authorized and empowered by the defendant, by
writing under the (lefendant’s hand, to make and negotiate_a__sale of
said real estate." The agents, thus authorized, executed and delivered
to the appellee a contract for the sale of the appellant's property, with
out his knowledge, and in his absence from the state, and received a
portion of the purchase money. Appellant refused to recognize the
contract thus made, claiming that the authority by him given .to “sell”
did not include the authority to execute a contract, or anything more
This was the vital point in the case, upon
than to ﬁnd a purchaser.
which the court held with the appellee, and directed that the contract
thus made be performed.
The statute of frauds may be satisﬁed by, the execution of a contract
for the sale of lands by the hand of another person than the party to
be charged, if that person be thereunto lawfully authorized, and it is
well settled that such third person may be thus lawfully authorized
orally, by written direction not under seal, and even by a course of
conduct amounting to an estoppel. It, therefore, only remains to de
termine whether the ordinary real-estate agent or broker, authorized to
sell land, is thereby empowered to enter into a contract binding upon
his principal, in an action 'for speciﬁc performance.“ A real-estate
agent is a person who is, generally speaking, engaged in the business
of procuring purchases or sales of lands for third persons, upon a
He owes no affirmative duty to
commission contingent upon success.
his client, is not liable to him for negligence or failure, and may re

It a considerable time
thews v. Sowie, 12 Neb. 398, 11 N. W. S57 (1882).
elapses, conditions may have chanzcd so as to raise a presumption that the
principal no longer holds the agcnt out as having authority. Wasweylcr v.

Martin, 78 Wis. 59. 46 .\'. W‘. 890 (1890).
The agent, of course, cannot ﬁx terms for his own advantage, even though
Finch v. Conrnde's Ex’rs, 154 Pa.
no fraud is intended and no injury results.
326, 26 Atl. 368. 32 Wkly. Notes Cns. 196 (1893); Hill v. Helton. S0 Ala. 528.
1 South. 340 (1886).
36 Part of the opinion

_
IS omitted.

30 See Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6 Am. Rep. 617 (1870); Armstrong v.
Lowe. 76 Cal. 616, 18 Pac. 758 (1888); Scully v. Book, 3 Wash, 182, 28 Pac.
556 (1.591) : Milne v. Kiel), 44 N. J. Eq. 378, 14 Atl. 6-16 (1888), containing a re
view of the cases.
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cede from his employment at will, without notice.
On the other hand,
courts almost unanimously unite in holding that in case of an ordinary
employment to sell, when he has procured a party able and willing to
buy upon the terms demanded by his principal, and has notiﬁed him
of the purchaser’s readiness to buy, the agent’s work is ended, and
he is entitled to his commission.
It is not his duty to procure a con
tract, or to make one, and he is not in default if he fails to do either.
Therefore, to our minds, it seems clear that, ordinarily, it is not within
the contemplation of the owner and agent, where property of this char
acter is placed in the hands of the latter for sale, that he shall, without
consultation with his client, execute a contract."
We are aware that courts have held to this extent, basing their de
cisions upon a distinction between an authority to sell and an authori
ty to ﬁnd a purchaser, and upon the well-known rule that an authori
ty to an agent to do a thing is presumed to include all the necessary
But such holdings do not
and usual means of executing it with effect.
commend themselves to our judgment, and as this is a new question
in this state, and we are satisﬁed that it is not the general practice of
agents to make such contracts, we do not hesitate to dissent from the
decisions above mentioned, especially as there is no lack of authority
for the position we take. We cannot shut our eyes to the_obvious de
fect in the argument that authority to sell, in this instance, necessarily
implies authority to execute a contract. A sale of land “executed with
effect” includes the execution of a deed, and the delivery of posses
sion, neither of which the agent can do, unless his authority to sell is
supplemented by the delivery of possession to him, and a power of
attorney to convey; so that he does not, although in possession of the
authority -to “sell,” have all the necessary means of executing that au
He stops short somewhere, and, when we
thority with ﬁnal eﬁ‘ect.
are inquiring where the probable and proper place of his stoppage is,
the evils that would attend the extension of his actual authority, be
yond the ﬁnding of a purchaser, furnish ample reasons for ﬁxing his

limit there.”

37 Cf. post, pp. 276.

278.

'

.

A leading and well-reasoned, case in which the court held that an agent
may do such things as are most usual and proper to accomplish the thing
intended to be done, including the giving of a deed with the usual warranties
and covenants, and also the breaking up of a great tract of land into smaller
tracts such as would he salable. Rice v. Tavernier, 8 Minn. 248 (Gil. 214), 83
Am. Dec. 778 (1863); Smith v. Allen, 86~Mo. 178 (1885).
It is sometimes held
that to justify the agent in executing a warranty deed, he must have broader
power than a naked power to sell. Bronson v. Coﬂin, 118 Mass. 156 (1875);
See, also, the leading case of 15
Id., 108 Mass. 175. 11 Am. Rep. 335 (1871).
Roy v. Beard, 8 How. 451, 12 L. Ed. 1151 (1850).
As to the effect of a warranty deed. given under authority to execute a
quitclaim deed. see Robinson v. Lowe. 50 W. Va. 75. 40 S. E. 454 (1901); Kane
v. Sholars, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 154. 90 S. W. 937 (1905).
38 McCullough v. Hitchcock, 71 Conn. 401. 42 Atl. 81 (1899)- For an interest
ing discussion of the powers of factors and brokers, and of the consequent re
Gonn.Pr.& A.(2n En.)
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An agency of this kind may be created by the slightest form of
words, without any writing, leaving it to litigation to determine wheth
er the substance of the authority is “to sell,” or “to find a purchaser,”
wherein the unscrupulous and dishonest agent would be at once ar
rayed as the principal witness against his client, with every advantage
from some note, “made at the time,” of what the instruction was.
Perjury

would go at a premium in such cases, and the conﬁding and

unlettered would be its victims. Scarcely any man, when listing his
property with a real-estate agent, stops to give details, either as to the
property itself or as to the arrangements he desires to make, yet no one
would sell upon equal terms to a first-class business man, and to an
habitual drunkard, or well-known insolvent; and the ordinary own
er would not sell at all to a person whose very occupancy would tinge
the neighborhood with a bad repute. These are good reasons, and are
probably some of the reasons why custom and the law have made it
not necessary that real-estate agents should actually procure contracts
in order to earn their compensation, and why, in this connection, the
common understanding of the phrase “authority to sell” means only
authority to ﬁnd a purchaser, whether the authority be given orally, or

&
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a
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2. §

2

6

_I.

by written request.
In considering this case, we have examined the numerous authori
ties cited by both sides, as well as many others, and ﬁnd the position
we take fully sustained by Morris v. Ruddy, 20 N. ]. Eq. 236; Milne
Eq. 378, 14 Atl. 646; Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 2-1-O,
v. Kleb, 44 N.
Am. Rep. 617; Armstrong v. Lowe, 76 Cal. 616. 18 Pac. 758;
Mechem, Ag.
966; Warvelle, Vend. 213;
Eng. Enc. Law,
Amer.
The earlier cases in New York were to the same ef
p. 573, note
fect, notably Coleman v. Garrigues, 18 Barb. 60, and Glentworth v.
Luther, 21 Barb. 145; ~but they were overthrown by Haydock v. Stow,
We note
seems to us.
40 N. Y. 363, without sufficient reason, as
not all, the states where the counts at any time held
that in nearly,
agents to sell real estate authorized to execute contracts of sale, espe
cially in New York and Illinois, the legislatures very soon after amend
ed the statutes of frauds, so as to require the agent's authority to con
tract to be in writing.
Lyon v. Pollock, 99 U. S. 668, 25 L. Ed. 265, presents a state of
facts not found, to any extent whatever, in the case at bar, and
therefore not applicable, and the same may be remarked of Rutenberg
broker must do to “complete a sale"
What
v. Main, 47 Cal. 213.
well deﬁned in McGavock v. \Voodlief, 20 How. 227, 15 L. Ed. 884,
thus: “The broker must complete the sale; that is, he must ﬁnd
situation, and ready and willing, to complete the pur
purchaser in
entitled to his commission.”
chase on the terms agreed on, before he
the broker has “completed the sale" so as to be entitled
Per contra,
strictions of the powers of real estate brokers,
E. 35 (1891).

559, 13 S.

see

Davis

v. Gordon,

87

Va.

'rn1;:
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to his commissions, by ﬁnding a purchaser, without a contract, his duty
is thereby performed, and his authority exhausted.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the action.
dismissed; costs to appellants.

ii

'

LYON

(Supreme Court of the United

v.

POLLOCK.

States, 1878.

99 U. S. 668, 25

L.

Ed. 265.)
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Action in equity to compel conveyance by Lyon of land sold to Pol
lock by Lyon's agent.
man during the Civil
Lyon, who was a Union
f
1/Var, had left Texas.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of
i
.
the court.
This case turns upon the construction given to the letter of Lyon
to Paschal, of the 24th of August, 1865.
That letter clearly did not
authorize the execution of a conveyance by Paschal in the name of
Lyon to the purchaser. Its insuﬁiciency in that respect was authori
tatively determined in the action at law for the lands; the instrument
executed by Paschal as the deed of Lyon being held inoperative to
pass the legal title. The question now is, was the letter suﬁicient to
authorize a contract for the sale of the lots? To determine this, and
give full effect to the language of the writer, we must place ourselves
in his position, so as to read
were, with his eyes and mind.
as
It
appears from his answer, as well as his testimony, that he was in great
danger of personal violence in San Antonio, shortly after the com
mencement of the rebellion, owing to his avowed hostility to secession,
or at least that he thought he was in such danger.
He apprehended
that his life was menaced, and was in consequence induced to ﬂee the
He possessed at the time
country.
large amount of property, real
and personal, in San Antonio. This he conﬁded to the care of his
partner, Bennett, to whom he gave a power of attorney, authorizing
him
take charge of and control the same, and sell
for whatever
consideration and upon such terms as he might judge best, and execute
all proper instruments of transfer; and also to collect and receipt for
debts due to him.
Bennett took possession of Lyon’s property and
until ]uly, 1865, when he transferred
with the business
managed
and papers in his hands, to Paschal, and at once informed Lyon by
was under these circumstances that the letter
letter of the transfer.
the subject of consideration, was written.
of Lyon to Paschal, which
Its language is: “I wish you to manage [my property] as you would
If good opportunity offers to sell every thing
with your own.
would be glad to sell.
have,
may be parties will come into San
Antonio who will be glad to purchase my gas stock and real estate.”
could hardly
fugitive from the state,
Situated as Lyon then was,
have been intended by him that
propositions to purchase his proper
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made to Paschal, they were to be communi
cated to him, and to await his approval before being accepted. He was
at the time at Monterey, in Mexico; and communication by water be
tween that place and San Antonio was infrequent and uncertain; and
he states himself that it was impossible to send letters by Matamoras,
as the road was blockaded.
Writing under these circumstances, we
think it clear that he intended by his language, what the words natural
ly convey, that if an opportunity to sell his property presented itself
to Paschal, he should avail himself of it and close a contract for its
sale.
His subsequent conduct shows, or at least tends to show, that such
was his own construction of the letter, and that he approved, or at least
He must have
acquiesced in, the disposition made of his property.
been aware, from the laws of the state, which he is presumed to have
known, that taxes were leviable upon his property, and that unless they
were paid the property would be sold for their payment; yet he con
fessedly took no steps from 1865 to 1873 to meet them, and thus pre
vent a forced sale of his property;
a course perfectly natural if it be
conceded that the property was in charge of an agent. with power to
His indiﬁ‘eren_ce,
manage and sell it as his judgment might dictate.
also, after rumors reached him that a sale of his property had been
made by Paschal in 1867, can scarcely be explained upon any other
hypothesis. _The same may be said of his inattention to the payment
of the assessments upon his stock in the San Antonio Gas Company, of
which he had received intimations.
From the time Paschal took charge
of his property, in 1865 to 1873, a period of eight years, he certainly
manifested, if his own story be accepted, a most extraordinary
want
of interest in regard to his real property, of great value, situated in
an unfriendly community, subject to taxation, and liable to be sold if
the taxes were not promptly paid; and also in regard to his personal
property, consisting of shares in the San Antonio Gas Company, of
great value, liable to assessments, and to sale if the assessments were
It is much more reasonable to suppose that he
not paid when due.
knew of the sales made of the real property and of the assessments on
the shares, and that he was undisturbed by the reports which reached
him, because he considered that the sales were made and the assess
ments paid from the proceeds, by his authorized attorney.
The testimony of Bennett tends also to corroborate this view. He
states that he knew from his correspondence with Lyon_ that he treated
Paschal as his agent for the sale of his property.
The conduct of Lyon.
as expressive almost as any language which he could use, cannot, of
course, change the construction to be given to the words contained in
his letter to Paschal, but it tends to strengthen the conclusion as to the
intention of the writer.
Holding the letter to confer sufﬁcient authority to contract for the
sale of Lyon's real property in San Antonio, there can be no doubt
of the right of the complainants to the relief prayed.
The deed exe
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cuted to them by Paschal in the name of Lyon, though invalid as a
conveyance, is good as a contract for the sale of the property de
scribed in it; and is sufficient, therefore, to sustain the prayer of the
bill for a decree directing Lyon to make a conveyance to them and
enjoining the enforcement of the judgment at law.”
'
Decree aﬁirmed.

VALENTINE
(Supreme Judicial Court ot Massachusetts,

v.

PIPER.

1839.

22

Pick.

85, 33 Am. Dec. 715.)

Writ of entry, wherein was demanded the premises appurtenant
to an ancient wharf. Demandants relied on a deed, executed by Geo.
Sullivan as attorney of Andrew Price, a clergyman in England, to
.
Lawson Valentine, father of the demandants.
The present case comes before the Court upon a
SHAW, C. ]."°
motion of the defendant to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial,
on the grounds of misdirection, and mistake ofi law in the admission
of evidence, and as a verdict against evidence.
was
heirs
of
to re
Valentine,
action
the
Lawson
by
brought
_The
cover a tract of ﬂats, over which the sea ebbs and ﬂows, as appurte
nant to, and parcel of a tract of land, bounded on salt \vater, and the
plaintiﬂs began by showing a title to the upland, in respect to which
this tract of ﬂats was claimed. The land consisted of a wharf, lying
near the bottom of Summer street, bounding on Boston harbour,
known at different periods, as Valentine's wharf, Price's wharf and
Bull’s wharf. Valentine claimed under several persons of the name
of Price.
The ﬁrst exception is to an instrument, purporting to be a letter
of attorney from Andrew Price to George Sullivan. Evidence was
given, tending to show, that Andrew Price, at the time of making the
instrument, and for many years previous, had resided in England, and
the instrument purported to have been executed there.
Under these
circumstances, secondary evidence was oﬁered to prove the execution
of the instrument, which was objected to, without calling the attesting
witnesses, or proving that they were not within the jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection was overruled, and the secondary evidence
admitted. And the Court are of opinion. that this was correct. * * *
Some objection was taken to the legal effect of this instrument.
It purported to authorize the attorney tg make sale of the real estate
89 Authority as sell on special terms authorized
an agent to make an ex
ecutory contract to convey, but not on different terms.
Jackson v. Badger,
The power must be interpreted with ref
35 Minn. 52, 26 N. W. 908 (1886).
and the circumstances
erence to the subject-matter
under which the agent
acts. Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78 (Gil. 58) 77 Am. Dec. 539 (1861); Blssell v.
Terry, 69 Ill. 184 (1873). Authority to do with land as “it it was your own"
gives no authority to sell or lease. Ward v. Thrustin, 40 Ohio St. 347 (1883).
4° Part of the opinion is omitted.
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as therein described, but there were no express
But the
authorizing the attorney to execute a deed or deeds.
Court are of opinion, that the instrument is not open to this excep
tion. Vl/here the term “sale” is used in its ordinary sense, and the
to confer on the attorney
general tenor and eﬁ'ect of the instrument
a power to dispose of real estate, the authority to execute the proper
instruments required by law, to carry such sale into effect,
neces
in pursuance of a general maxim, that an au
sarily incident.
deﬁnite end, carries with
an authority, so
thority to accomplish
far as the constituent can confer
to execute the usual, legal and
A
appropriate measures proper to accomplish the object proposed.
power of attorney might be so drawn as to authorize the attorney to
make sale of an estate, where
was the
might be apparent that
intention of the constituent to authorize the attorney to negotiate for
sale, leaving
to the constituent afterwards to ratify
and to ex
ecute deeds. Should
appear, either from the restricted words used,
or from the tenor of the whole instrument, that such was the intent,
restricted power only.
ought to be construed as conferring such
In the present case, we think
was the intent of the constituent to
*
*
confer on the attorney an authority to transfer the estate.“
Judgment upon the verdict for demandants.
the constituent,
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CLAFLIN

v.

CONTINENTAL JERSEY WORKS.

(Supreme Court of Georgia,

1890.

85 Ga. 27, 11 S.

E.

721.)

a

a

&

&

if

a

&

&

a

merchant in Savannah, by fraudulent representa
One '\/Veisbein,
tions as fo his solvency, secured large amounts of goods from Claﬂin
Co. By
Co. and Iaﬂray
heavy sale he secured $60,000 in cash,
with which he absconded. He left his manager, Lichtenstein, in charge
written power of attorney to manage the business, and make
under
collections, pay bills, and do any acts necessary and proper for carry
ing on the business, as fully as the principal might do
personally
Co. and Iafiray
Co. demanding pay, and Lichten
present. Claflin
stein having no money, he offered to pay in goods, and turned over to
them goods of sufﬁcient amount to settle their accounts,
large part
of such goods being the same originally purchased from said ﬁrms and

7

a

9,

41 Accord: Farnham v. Thompson, 34 Minn. 330, 26 N. W.
57 Am. Rep.
While power to sell lands must be strictly construed, it should not
59 (1885).
Hcmstreet v. Bur
he so construed as to defeat the intention of the parties.
dick, 90 Ill. 444 (1878). The distinction between
power to contract to convey
and a power to convey is brought out in Hunter v. Sacramento Valley Beet
Sawy. 498 (1882).
Sugar C0. (C. C.) 11 Fed. 15,
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The Continental VVorks and other creditors attacked
this conveyance as a fraud upon the rest of the creditors, and outside
the scope of Lichtenstein’s authority.
Appeal from a verdict and de
cree against defendants.
SIMMONS, J.“ The errors assigned in the ﬁfth to eighteenth (inclu
sive) grounds of the motion for a new trial go to the refusal of the
court to give in charge to the jury certain principles of the law of
agency which bear upon the question of the extent of Lichtenstein's
The requests may embody sound law, but it is immaterial
authority.
whether they do or not. Where an agent's authority is conferred and
deﬁned in writing, the scope or extent of such authority is a question
Mechem, Ag. § 104 ; 1 Thomp.
for determination by the court.
Trials, § 1370; Berwick v. Horsfall, 29 Law ]. C. P. 193; Dobbins v.
Manufacturing Co., 75 Ga. 238, 243; Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St.
514.
As said by this court in the case above cited (page 243): “That
it was the duty of the court to construe both the charter and the letter
of attorney, and to determine the extent of power conferred by both
and each of them upon the agent, we’ think, is a plain proposition.
Taken alone, and without proof of other circumstances to which it
was necessary to resort to clear ambiguities or to explain doubtful in
T he-question was
tention, there was nothing for the jury to ﬁnd.
purely and simply one of law, to which it was the exclusive right and
duty of the judge to respond.”
In requesting charges upon the extent and nature of a general
agency, there seems to have been an attempt by the plaintiffs in error
to enlarge the authority of Lichtenstein beyond the limits of his power,
or at least to establish the construction that the instrument created a
general agency. If there was any such effort, the court did not err
in defeating it. It is not allowable, by the adduction of extrinsic oral
evidence, to add to the powers expressly given in the writing. The
authority must be proved by the instrument itself. Neal v. Patten, 40
Ga. 363. The very purpose of a power of attorney" is to prescribe and
publish the limits within which the agent shall act, so as not to leave
him‘ to the uncertainty of memory, and those who deal with him to
the‘ risk of misrepresentation or misconception, as to the extent of his
To confer express authority is to withhold implied au
authority.
There can be no parol enlargement of a written authority.
thority.
VV'hart. Ag. § 225; Mechem, Ag. § 306; Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex.
1 Amer. Lead. Cas. 687,
120, 84 Am. Dec. 611; Batty v. Carswell,
notes; Pollock v. Cohen. 32 Ohio St. 514.
Besides. the power of attorney was relied upon throughout the whole
The plaintiffs in error believed Lichtenstein’s acts to be
transaction.
within the letter of his authority, having taken the advice of counsel in'
reference thereto, so that theycannot claim to have been misled by
still unpaid for.

42 The

statement of facts is abridged

and part of the opinion

is omitted.
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other than that which the writing
any appearance of authority
=u *
*
givesfs
The court found the act of Lichtenstein to be outside his authority,
'
but the case was reversed on other grounds.

DUNWOODY
(Supreme

Court of Florida,

v.

1905.

SAUNDERS.
50

Fla.

202, 39 South.

965.)

J.“

The plaintiffs in error, as plaintiﬁs below, sued for
The declaration consisted
and hire of a barge or lighter.
of three counts—the ﬁrst an ordinary count in bailment for the loss
through the alleged negligence of a bailee for hire; the second count
alleged a special contract whereby the bailee became an insurer of
the barge; and the third count was for the rental value of the lighter
between the hiring and the loss. There was verdict and judgment on
the last count alone, and to the judgment the plaintiffs sued out this
writ of error.
No question is raised here on the pleadings, all assignments of er
ror therein being expressly abandoned, and the only assignments, in
view of the disposition of the case, that we shall consider, are those
based upon certain instructions given, modiﬁed, or refused.
The barge was hired for the purpose of being towed from Pensacola
to St. Andrews Bay and there receive on board a cargo of lumber,
when it was to be towed back with such cargo to Pensacola by the
defendant’s tugboat, and there was evidence that the owners of the
barge placed thereon a master, with direction to see to it that the
barge was loaded in a certain way, and that this manner of loading
caused its loss. * * *
The court erred in giving this charge: “If you ﬁnd that iiyer had
authority from the defendant to hire the barge Brainard for the trip
from Pensacola to St. Andrews and return, yet the existence of such
power would not authorize him to bind the defendant by a contract
that the barge, during the possession of her under such hiring, should
The defendant in error asserts that
be at the risk of the defendant."
this instruction “was intended to present boldly to the jury the asser
tion that there was no evidence to show that Hyer had the power, or
that the plaintiffs had the right to rely on his having the power, to
COCKRELL,

the loss

48 Sec. also. Savage v. Pelton, 1 Colo. App. 148, 27 Pac. 948 (1891).
One
who deals with an agent acting under a written authority is to be regarded
him,
as dealing with the power before
and must at his peril know that the
act of the agent is one that is authorized by the power.
Stainback v. Read,
11 Grat. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648 (1854);
Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wcnd. 260
(1840): Cnmmins v. Beaumont, 68 Ala. 204 (1880), ante, p. 291; Quay v. Pre
sidio & Ferries Co., 82 Cal. 1, 22 Pac. 925 (1889).
44 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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bind the defendant by a contract that the barge during bailment should
of the
be at defendant’s risk.”
Vi/'e shall accept this interpretation
charge.
There was evidence from which we can legitimately infer that Hyer,
who alone participated in the transaction on behalf of the bailee, was
at the time acting as his general agent in the barge and towboat busi
ness, though Saunders had other lines of business not represented by
Hyer, and, further, that subsequent to the loss of the barge when
Hyer was charged with having made the contract, Saunders, though
There was no proof of custom or
present, did not deny his authority.
usage or previous dealings, or that the bailors had knowledge of any
VVhile a general
limitations
upon the agent’s apparent authority.
agent’s authority is conﬁned to such transactions and concerns as are
incident and appurtenant to the business of his principal, and to that
branch of his business that is intrusted to his care, yet within these
limits the principal is bound. Mechem on Agency, §§ 286, 287.
'
The same authority says: “\V here the agent is authorized to trans
act all the principal’s business of a certain kind, the very breadth of
the employment and variety of the duties to be performed necessarily
involve more or less of discretion and choice of methods, and render
impracticable, if not impossible. much of particularity or precision,
either as to the exact means and method to be employed, or as to the
\\/here so little is expressed,
scope or extent of the authority itself.
more may well be implied.
The fact of such an authority, of itself,
presupposes a general conﬁdence bestowed upon the agent, and a
general committal to his discretion and judgment of all beyond the
essential objects to be attained and the outlines of the course to be
It may not unreasonably be presumed, where nothing is
pursued.
indicated to the contrary, that such an agent possesses those powers
which are commensurate with his undertaking, and which are usually
and properly exercised by other similar agents under like circum~
This presumption may well be and is constantly relied upon
stances.
by persons dealing with such agents, and so reasonable. proper, and
necessary is this reliance, that it may justly be required that, if the
principal would impose unusual restrictions upon the authority of such
an agent, he should make .them known to persons who may have oc
casion to deal with the agent.” 4‘
45 Some independent judgment
on the part of the agent
Hilliard v. Weeks. 173 Mass. 304. 53 N. E. 818 (1899).

is usually neces»
This is especially
true where the agent's duties are not merely ministerial, capable of being de
ﬁned and executed strictly, but involve large powers and wide discretion.
Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 618 (1796). The principal, by his declarations or
conduct, may have justiﬁed the opinion that he had in fact given to the agent
more extensive powers than those in the writing. Rawson v. Curtiss. 19 Ill.
Ins. Co. v. New Mexico Lumber Co., 10 Colo. App.
456 (1858); Merchants’
A written power may be expanded by the declara
223, 51 Pac. 174 (1897).
tions or acts of the principal. Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit 6: Ins. Co.
Ct‘. Mechanics’
v. Seventh Nat. Bank (D. C.) 6 Fed. 114 (1881).
Bank v.
Schaumburg, 38 M0. 228 (1866).
When the appointment has been expressly
sary.
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For the purpose of conducting this business over which he had gen
eral charge, should the circumstances arise, rendering such a course

necessary, we see no limitation upon his power from the facts disclosed
here, to buy a barge outright and bind his principal thereby. Much
less are there limitations upon his power to buy the barge for the
limited time required for the performance of this contract, since, as
it may be gathered from the evidence, these were the only terms upon
which he could secure it.
The question of the scope of the authority of an agent is generally
one of fact, or of mixed law and fact, and therefore, under our system,
that prohibits charges upon the facts, such question is best left to the
determination
of a jury under general instructions for its guidance.
Other and different facts may be evidenced on another trial, and we
refrain therefore from any further expression of our views.
It is unnecessary to discuss the form or effect of the verdict.
For the error pointed out, the judgment is reversed at the cost of
the defendant in error and a new trial awarded.
_.@-__.

REESE
(Supreme

Court oi! Texas,

v.

1863.

MEDLOCK.
27 Tex.

120, 84 Am. Dec. 611.)

Action for the recovery of land and the cancellation of a deed ex
ecuted by one Powers as agent for Reese, deceased, under a power
of attorney authorizing him “to sell, transfer and convey all lands
that
may have in the said state of Texas.” Powers exchanged the
land for a slave, and sold the slave for $875, but there was no evidence
that this money came into the hands of Reese, or that he was ever
informed of the conveyance to Medlock.
Evidence was admitted of a
custom to make such an exchange of land, but the jury was instructed
,
to disregard this evidence. Verdict for defendant.
Mooma,
It is a well settled general principle that, when an
agency is created and conferred by a written instrument, the nature
and extent of the authority given by it must be ascertained from the
instrument itself, and cannot be enlarged by parol evidence of the
usage of other agents in like cases, for that would be to contradict or
There may, however, be
vary the terms of the written instrument.
some qualiﬁcations and limitations properly belonging to this general
rule, whereby, especially in cases of general or implied agencies, the
usages of a particular trade or business, or of a particular class of
persons, are properly admissible, not, indeed, for the purpose of en
larging the powers of the agents employed therein, but for the means

I

J.“

made in writing, some item is almost inevitably omitted in drawing the
instrument. Adams Express Co. v. Byers (Ind.) 95 N. E. 513 (1911), quoting
31 Cyc. 1355.
45 The statement

of facts is abridged and part of the opinion is omitted.
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and rightly understanding those powers which are
The power of attorney under which the agent sold
actually given.
the land in controversy to the defendant, Medlock, did not authorize
him to barter or exchange it for other property.
It cannot surely be
seriously insisted that there has become such a general and uniform
custom or usage of trade, by agents for the sale of land in this state,
in contravention to the legal import of the instrument under which
they derive their authority, as to overturn and abrogate the well estab
lished rules of legal construction, by which the courts would other
If, however, such was the fact, the testimony of
wise be governed.
fered by the defendant falls far short of justifying the application in
this case of such an exception to the general rule to which reference
has been made, and the court did not err in excluding it from the,
jury. * * *'

of interpreting

For error

in instructions

iii

as to ratiﬁcation,

ROBERTS

v.

reversed and remanded.“

MATTHEWS.

(High Court of Chancery,

1 Vernon,

1682.

150.)

The case was, the defendant Matthews employed one Smith a
scrivener to place out £50. for him at interest, which the scrivener
did to the plaintiff, and took the plaintiff's bond for it in the defend
ant’s name; and about three months afterwards delivered the bond
to the defendant.
Plaintiff Roberts all along paid his interest to
the scrivener, and about ﬁve years after the entering into this bond,
the scrivener calling upon him for the principal, he paid £30 of it,
and the scrivener not having the bond in his custody, gave the plain
tiff a receipt for £30. received in part for the use of the defendant
i
Matthews.
.
Adjudged this was a void payment; for the bond being in the
custody of the defendant Matthe\vs, and not in the scrivener’s, the
plaintiff ought to have seen his money indorsed on the bond; and
though this alone were enough to make it an ill payment, yet this
for that the plaintiff was not ignorant whose
case was the stronger;
money it was; the receipt he took for the payment of the £30. being
And many precedents were cited to
for the use of the defendant.
the same purpose.
47 Quoted and applied in Henry v. Lane, 128 Fed.
As to the extent of express and implied authority,
19 Wash. 599, 54 Pac. 33 (1898), ante, p. 63; Moyle

243, 62 C, C. A, 6251
see Gr-e_:or_v v. Loose,
v. Congregational
So

eiety, 16 Utah, 69, 50 Pac. 806 (1897), ante, p. 104, post, p. 740; Blum v.
Robertson, 2-1 Cal. 128-141; Hirshﬁeld v. Waldron, 5-1 Mich. 649, 20 N. W. 628. _
As to the limits of implied power, see, also, Gates Iron Works v. Denver
Engineering Works, ante, p. 252.

_

i

_

f

_

_____

_
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MARTYN
(High

Court of Chancery,

1702.

v.

285

/

KINGSLEY.

Finch, Precedents

\

in

Chancery,

209.)

In this case a difference was made, where a man trusts his scrivener
(who puts out money for him) with the custody of his bond, and
where with the custody of his mortgage; in the ﬁrst case, if he re
ceive the money, ‘and delivers up the bond, this shall bar the obligee;
not so in the case of a mortgage, because a legal estate is vested, which
cannot be divested without assignment.

WOLSTENHOLM
(High Court of Chancery,

1705.

v.

DAVIES.

2 Freeman,

Ch. 289, 2 Eq.

Cas. 709.)

The plaintiff having borrowed £100. of the defendant’s testator
upon bond, which was procured by Williams, a scrivener in the Old
Bailey; when the bond was sealed, it was delivered to the obligee;
the plaintiff paid several years interest to V\/illiams, the scrivener,
and £50., part of the principal money, which the scrivener paid to
the obligee, but the last £50. of the principal money being paid to the
scrivener, he broke before he paid it to the obligee; and the question
was, whether Sir Jo. W. the plaintiff was to lose the money, or the
And the Master of the Rolls said, that it was the constant
obligee?
rule of this court, that if the party, to whom the security was made,
trusted his security in the hands of the scrivener, that payment to
the scrivener was good payment, but if he took the security into his
own keeping, payment to the scrivener would not be good payment,
unless it could be proved that the scrivener had authority from the
party to receive it; and although in this case the scrivener had re
ceived the intcrest and part~of the principal, and paid it to the obligee,
yet that did not imply that he had any authority to receive it; but
as long as he paid it over, all was well, and any one else might have
carried to the party as well as he; and the plaintiff not proving that
the scrivener had any authority from the obligee to receive. he was
forced to pay the last £50. again, although the Master of the Rolls
declared that he thought it a very hard case.

I
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DROUGHT.“

(High Court of Chancery’ in Ireland,

1828.

1

Molloy,

487.)

D. Robert, the common agent of Margaret Bradford and of Thos.
Drought, negotiated a loan of £300. by the former to the latter, taking
and delivering to Miss Bradford a bond therefor.
Drought regularly
In 1816 she
paid the interest, and ﬁnally the principal, to Robert.
died and her executor sues on the bond.
* * *
HART, LORD CHA:~1cELLoR.'“’
As to the acquittance of
the debtor by the agent, if one employs an agent to lend money, and
take a security which he delivers to his principal, he has no authority
to discharge the debfor.
No'one would be safe if an attorney who was employed to take a
security for money could be permitted to say he had received back
the amount and discharged the debtor. There has often been a ques
tion touching the extent of the authority of an agent who has been
permitted to hold the security in his hands, whether he had power to
cancel the security and discharge the debt; and there are some cases
of great nicety upon that. Martyn v. Kingsley, Pre. Ch. 209, ante,
p. 285_ But it has never been heard of when the owner has had the
precaution to take the instrument containing the evidence of the debt
into his own custody, that the agent then had authority to receive the
amount and give a valid acquittance. * * *
\
‘

i-1-4

___i.

JOY

v.

VANCE.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1895.

10-1

Mich.

97, 62 N.

W.

140.)

Bill to foreclose a mortgage. Defense payment. Complainants
purchased the mortgage and four accompanying notes, and as the in
terest notes fell due, sent them to the Michigan Mortgage Company
for collection. The Vance mortgage became due February 28, 1891.
March 11, 1892, Vance paid the mortgage, taking a receipt of the
Michigan Mortgage Company in full. The latter failed to pay it to
complainant and soon after failed.
HOOKER, '].“° * * * The case is reduced, therefore, to the
single question of the authority of the Michigan Mortgage Company
to receive the money upon the mortgage. Unless .we are to say that
the collection of the interest through this company, from time to time,
constituted it an agent for the collection of subsequent installments of
interest and the principal, we cannot deny complainants the relief
Accord: Whitlock v. Walthnrn.
Part of the opinion is omitted.
WPart 01 the opinion is omitted.

43
49

1 Salkeld,

157 (1708).
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Vance admits he paid the interest to the company without
the trouble to ascertain whether they had the mortgage or who
owned it. When he paid the mortgage, he was satisﬁed with the state
ment that the mortgage was mislaid, although he received a receipt
which indicated that it did not belong to the company to whom he was
in re
paying it. It was perhaps the natural thing for him to pay
was
of
men
with
whom
he
acquaint
liance upon the statement
these
ed and in whom he had conﬁdence; but his rights must depend upon
their authority to receive the money, not upon his conﬁdence in them.
Defendants’ counsel claim that there was
general authority to col
lect from the fact that Mr. Cutcheon was in the habit of having his
company make collections for his clients, including this’ estate for
which he had purchased several mortgages from the company._ The
authority of the company does not depend upon the amount of busi
ness done by
for the com'plainants, but upon the character and ex
tent of the employment, as evidenced by the express authority con
ferred and the method of their dealing with it. Campbell v. Sherman,
49 Mich. 536, 14 N. W. 484.
So far as shown, Mr. Cutcheon retained
the custody of his papers, sending from time to time speciﬁc author
ity and directions for the performance of particular and designated
acts.
\Ve search the .record in vain for evidence that he gave
gen
eral authority to collect mortgages purchased or held by him. He
found them proﬁtable business acquaintances, for they had mortgages
which he wished to buy; but he appears to have carefully managed
way which enabled him to keep track of them,
the collections in
sought.“

a

a

it

a

it,

taking

&

7

5

a

7,

;

a

7

51As to the implied authority of an agent authorized to collect the interest,
to receive the principal also, see Security Co. v. Grayheal, &3 Iowa, 543, 52
N. VV. 497, 39 Am. St. Rep. 311 (1892); Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10
Am. Rep. 502 (1872); \Vilson v. Campbell. 110 Mich. 580, GS N. W. 278, 35
L. R. A. 544 (1896); White v. Madigan, 78 Minn. 286, 80 N. W. 1125 (1899).
‘When one bond is left with the agent and the others are not in his posses
Wall. 447, 19 L. Ed. 207 (1869). And when the
sion, see Ward v. Smith,
third person makes various payments he will be protected as to payments
made while the securities are in the agent’s possession, but not as to pay
Crane v.
ments made after the securities have left the hands of the agent.
When the
Gruenewald, 120 N. Y. 274, 24 N. E. 456, 17 Am. St. Rep. 6-13 (1890).
principal withdraws the instruments evidencing the debt, that is an implied
revocation of the authority of the agent. Bloomer v. Dau, 122 Mich. 522, 81
N. W. 331 (1899). And it has even been held that the authority is revoked when
Crane v. Gruene
the agent wrongfully assigns'the debt to another party.
loan, Fortune v. Stockton,
wald, upra. Neither mere authority to make
182 Ill. 454, 55 N. E. 367 (1899); Antioch College v. Carroll, 11 Ohio Dec. (Re
print) 220 (1890); nor mere possession of the securities by an agent who has
had no other connection with the loan, gives implied authority to collect the
Union Cent. L.
debt, Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502 (1872)
Ins. v. Jones. 35 Ohio St. 351 (1880); McMahon v. Germ. Am. Nat. Bk., 111
Both conditions must
29 L R. A. (N. S.) 67 (1910).
Minn. 313, 127 N. W.
Central Trust Co. v. Folsom, 167 N. Y. 285, 60 N. E. 599 (1901). The
concur.
designation
mere fact that a note is payable at the agent's otiice amounts to
of the place of payment, but not of the person authorized to receive it.
Klindt v. Higgins, 95 Iowa. 529. 64 N. W. 414 (1895); Caldwell v. Evans,
Wall. 447, 19 L. Ed. 207
Bush, 380, 96 Am. Dec. 358 (1869); Ward v. Smith,
Trust Co., 41 111. 267 (1866).
(1869); Wood v. Merchant's Savings Loan
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lawyer should for clients who conﬁde their business to
He had a right to suppose that the mortgagor would not pay
or mortgage without receiving them, and by keeping them in his

as a prudent

him.
notes

it

it,

own hands he interposed the only practicable obstacle to the 'perpetrati0n
of a fraud by the mortgage company. Had the mortgagor been as
careful to ascertain the authority of the company as the complainants
is, the loss should
were to restrict
no one would have suﬁered. /As
fall upon him, and not upon the complainants, who are in no way re
sponsible for it.
The decree of the circuit court must be reversed, and one entered
here for the complainants, as prayed in the bill, with costs of both

I

'

courts.“

EXCHANGE BANK
(Supreme Court of Georgia,

1903.

v.

THROWER.

118 Ga. 433, 45 S.

E.

316.)

_T.

is

a

if

Drafts to one Prince were indorsed “]as. T. Prince, Manager, by
Defendant, Thrower, de'posited these
Kelly H. Brinsﬁeld, Cashier.”
checks in the bank to his credit. The pliaintiﬁ‘ bank refunded to Prince
the amounts of the checks on his agreement to indemnify
they fail
ed to recover from Thrower. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff ap
new trial.“
peals from an order refusing
LAMAR,
Authority to borrow money
among the most dangerous

a

a

\/Vhoever lends
powers which
principal can confer upon an agent.
to one claiming the right to make or indorse negotiable paper in the
name of another does so in the face of all the danger signals of busi-"
ness.
He need not lend or discount until assured beyond doubt that
the principal has in fact appointed an agent who by the stroke of

'

a

52 See, also, ante, p. 230, and Harrison Nat. Bank of Cadiz, Ohio, v. Austin,
65 Neb. 632, 91 N. W. 540, 59 L. R. A. 294, 101 Am. St. Rep. 639 (1902).
The various “Kelly Cases" in Minnesota well illustrate all the variations, of
the agent's powers.
See Springﬁeld
Sav. Bank v. Kjaer, 82 Minn. 180, 84
N. W. 752 (1901), and the cases there discriminated; Thornton v. Lawther,
169 Ill. 228, 48 N. E. 412 (1897),
case of. remarkable conﬁdence reposed in
the agent.
Possession of the securities, or the want of it, while a fact of great sig
niﬂcance, is not in every case essential to determine implied power, or the
lack of it, to collect the debt. Union Trust C0. v. McKeon, 76 Conn. 508, 57

Atl.

109 (1904).

8

a

it

When the third person attempts to show ostensible authority in the agent
to collect, notwithstanding the securities are not in his possession, the bur
den of proof is on such third person, and it the evidence is such that diﬂferent
minds might reasonably draw diﬂerent conclusions therefrom, then
is
question for the jury. Reid v. Kellogg,
S. D. 596, 67 N. W. 687 (1896).
See
also, Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 23 Am. Rep. 157 (1877), in which there was
maturity,
collection before
and Tappan v. Morseman, 18 Iowa, 499 (1865).
53 The statement of facts is abridged.
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may wipe out his present fortune, and bind his future earnings.
nature of the act is a warning, and if the lender parts with his
money, he does so at his own peril. If the power was not in iact,con
ferred, he must bear the loss occasioned by his own folly. A power
so perilous is not to be implied from acts which in other matters less
hazardous might create an agency. It must be conferred in express
terms, or be necessarily and inevitably inferable from the very nature
of the agency actually created.“ So strict is the rule that it will not be
presumed even from an appointment of one as general agent, unless
the character of the business or the duties of the agent are of such a
nature that he was bound to borrow in order to carry out his instruc
tions and the duties of the oﬁice. Civ. Code, §§ 3004, 3021; Dobbins
v. Etowah Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. 238; Mechem on Agency, § 536; Tappan
v. Bailey, 4 Metc. 536; Iackson Co. v. Com. Nat. Bk., 199 Ill. 151,
65 N. E. 136, 59 L. R. A. 657, 93 Am. St. Rep. 113; Doubleday v.
Kress, SO N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502.
\Nhile the agent here was given the rather high title of “cashier,”
that, of itself, did not clothe him with the powers which might have
been exercised by an ofﬁcer bearing that title if employed by a bank.
In view of the reluctance with which the law presumes the existence
of the power to borrow, this title will be considered to indicate that
he was a cash keeper, rather than a cash borrower.
Nor will the
fact that he was authorized to ﬁll out the blank, and indorse drafts
with a rubber stamp reading, “Pay to the order of the Third National
Bank for deposit. James T. Prince, Manager, by
, Cashier,"
be treated as authority to indorse in blank.
On the contrary, the
character of the stamp itself indicated that the principal only au
thorized a restricted indorsement for the mere purpose of allowing
the bank, rather than the agent, to collect. It does not import a gen
eral authority to indorse, nor does possession of the draft indicate that
the agent had the right to discount the draft or collect the proceeds.“

The very

54 As to form of authority to make negotiable paper, and whether it must be
express, see Fountain v. Bookstaver, 141 Ill. 461, 31 N. E. 17 (18%); Gambrill
v, Brown Hotel Co., 11 Colo. App. 529, 54 Pac. 1025 (1898); Whitten v. Bank
of Flneastle, 100 Va. 546, 42 S. E. 309 (1%); Pansing v. Warner, 43 Wash.
'
i
531, so Pac. 667 (1900).,
55Accord: Paige v. Stone, 10 Metc. (Mass) 160, 43 Am. Dec. 420 (184Q, in
which it is said that to facilitate note making, and thus aifect the interest
and estates oi! third persons to an indeﬁnite amount. is not within the ob
ject and intent of the law in regulating the common duties of the agent. Sin
clair 8: C0. v. Goodell, 93 Ill. App. 592 (1900). Evidence that the agent had in
dorsed in the principal’s name thirty-three checks is no proof of his authority
unless the principal knows of it. Sewunee Mining Co. v. McCall, 3 Ilead, 619
(1859), denying the authority of an agent to accept a bill, even in an extra
ordinary emergcncy not amounting to an overruling necessity.
As to implied power of general manager of a business to make or indorse
negotiable paper, see Connell v. McLouglilin, 28 Or. 23, 42 Pac. 218 (1993);
N. Y. Iron Mine v. Negaunee Bank, 39 Mich. 644 (1878); Bank v. Ohio Valley
Furniture Co., 57 W. Va. 625, 50 S. E. 880, 70 L. R. A. 312 (1905) ante, p. 247;
Bank of Morganton v. Hay, 143 N. C. 326, 55 S. E. 811 (1906); Gulick v.
_
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The stringent rules of agency are intended to ‘protect a principal
against unauthorized acts, but not to shield one who has in fact con
Here the plaintiff de
ferred such authority, or ratiﬁed his conduct.
been given further than that implied in
nied that any authority-had
conferring the title “cashier,” and the right to use the stamp above
copied. It denied that Prince had knowledge of the conduct on the
part of Brinsﬁeld, or that he in any manner ratiﬁed the indorsements
The
or collections which were shown to have been made by him.
testimony for the defendant was to the contrary, and was to the ef
fect that the trouble was not so much a want of authority to indorse,
as the improper use Brinsﬁeld made of the money after it was col
lected; that he was a general agent, indorsing drafts, handling the
cash, paying out money, occasionally drawing checks, and in full‘ and
complete charge of the business during the frequent and necessary
absences of the principal; that he had discounted another draft with
Thrower some months before, for $394, which was paid without ob
jection; that on these and other like drafts, indorsed in the same way,
of which Prince denied knowledge, Brinsﬁeld had collected some $8,
SOO, which he had appropriated to his own use; that he originally wrote
the indorsements in his own handwriting before "the stamp above re
ferred to was prepared; and that there were other stamps in the oﬁice
used by him, on which the words “for deposit" were wanting, ap
parently contemplating that he had authority to indorse in blank and to
collect.
The evidence, while conﬂicting, was suﬁicient to sustain the ver
We have no power to interfere where the
dict for the defendant.
judge of the lower court has re-examined the evidence on the motion
for a new trial, and by his refusal to set it aside expressed himself
as fully satisfied with the verdict.
Iudgrnent affirmed.

J.

Grover, 33 N.
Law. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728 (1867); Boord
v. Strauss,
'
381, 22 South. 713 (1897). _
As to the power when it exists, see Bank of Deer Lodge v. Hope
Co., 3 Mont. 146, 35 Am. Rep. 458 (1878).

39

Fla.

Mining

6

tlfar

Sometimes the power must be regarded a mere idle declaration
unless
the authority was meant to be conferred.
Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 465
As to inference that the rincipal intended his general agent, man
(1877).
aging his business, to give notes
money borrowed or goods purchased to
carry on the business. Lytle v. Bank of Dothah. 121 Ala. 215, 26 South.
The power is presumed to be commensurate with the necessity of the
(1898).
situation.
Whitten v. Bank of Fincastle, 100 Va. 546, 42 S. E. 309 (1902).
See the leading case of Stainback v. Read, 11 Grat. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648 (1854),
and the recent case of Bank of Morganton v. Hay, 143 N. C. 326, 55 S. E. 811
(1906).
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BOWEN.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, 1868.

26

Iowa,

§:'>\\'r
77.)

it

if

a

if

1

is

is

'

if

I

I

if

a

I

of

J’.

Detinue_for a promissory note, claimed by defendant under an in
dorsement by one Bowen as attorney in fact for plaintiff.
Cole,
The material ‘parts of the power of attorney under which
the defendants claim the authority was given to transfer the note in
controversy, are as follows: “For me and in my place and stead, to
sell, convey and dispose
any and all property both personal and
real, which
have or may have in Delaware county, Iowa, and give
in my name any bill of sale that may be necessary, of personal prop
erty, and in my name to give
warranty deed or otherwise for any
of my real estate sold, and to collect in my name any money now or
hereafter to become due to me, and to do all other matters in relation
could do,
Lc_>_any_of my property or debts which
present. Giving
and granting unto my said attorriey full power and authority to do
and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever, required and
necessary to be done in and about the ‘premises, as fully as
might or
personally present.”
could do
\Ve hold that this language gave the attorney in fact therein named,
the authority’ to transfer the title and possession of the note in con
We need not decide
troversy to the defendant claiming the same.
whether the indorsement thereof would subject the principal to all
the ordinary liabilities of an indorser, as that question
not neces
not in conﬂict with the
sarily involved in this case. This holding
Pars. on Notes and Bills, 106, recognized by this
doctrine stated in
court in the case of Whiting v. \Vestern Stage Co., 20 Iowa, 554,‘ that
be expressed in
a general authority to transact business, even
words of very wide meaning, will not be held to include the power
of making the principal
party to negotiable paper. For, in this case,
the attorney in fact was not only empowered to dispose of all per
sonal property and to make bills of sale thereof, but also to do all
other matters in relation to the debts of the principal which she could
In other words we hold, that by a fair construction
do
present.
of the power of attorney offered in evidence, the agent was clothed
with the pciwer to make the transfer claimed."

a

a

a

56 Ornzn ILLUBTB.A'I."I0l‘1S.—Tl1e
principles enunciated in the foregoing cases
as to implied authority of agents authorized to sell, to collect, and to make com
Au
mercial paper might be illustrated in many other lines of employment.
particular business, or in particular matters
thority to an agent to act in
business, is constantly implied or denied according to the usages and cus
in
toms of the business, the course of‘ dealing of the particular principal, and
But the inference must al
the reasonable necessities of the employment.
ways be based upon facts, for which the principal is responsible, and not
Moreover, implied authority is
upon mere supposed convenience or propriety.
kind pertaining to
limited to acts for the interests of the principal, and of
the business upon which the agent.is employed, and which are reasonably
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There was no error, therefore, in admitting the evidence as offered,
and the judgment of the district court is afﬁrmed.
_
These principles have been applied to
necessary to accomplish that business.
agents employed:
To Bu-y: Beecher v. Venn, 35 Mich. 466 (1877); White v. Langdon, 30 Vt.
599 (1858); Born v. Simmons, 111 Ga. 869, 36 S. E. 956 (1900); Heald v. Hendy,
89 Cal. 632, 27 Pac. 67 (1891); Smith Premier Typewriter Co. v. National
Hartel Light Co., 72 Misc. Rep. 405, 130 N. Y. Supp. 136 (1911); Salmon
v. Austro-American Stave & Lumber Co., 187 Fed. 564, 109 C. C. A. 254 (1911);
Brown v. Johnson, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss) 398, 51 Am. Dec. 118 (1849) ; Sanger
ties & N. Y. Steamboat Co. v. Miller, 76 App. Div. 167, 78 N. Y. Supp. 451
(1902); Hackett v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App. 384, 79 S. W. 1013 (1904);
Cleveland v. Pearl, 63 Vt. 127, 21 Atl. 261, 25 Am. St. Rep. 748 (1890);
Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 VVis. 23, 13 N. \V. 881 (1882); Brittain v.
Westall, 137 N. C. 30, 49 S. E. 54 (1904); Sprague v. Gillett, 9 Metc. (Mass)
91 (1845); Morey v. Webb, 58 N. Y. 350 (1874).
To manage the/principal’s business: Gregory v. Loose, 19 Wash. 599, 54
Pac. 33 (1898), supra, p. 63; Baldwin v. Garrett, 111 Ga. 876, 36 S. E.~966
(1900); Claﬂin v. Continental
Jersey Wks., 85 Ga. 27, 11 S. E. 721 (1890).
supra, p. 279; Dearing v. Llghttoot. 16 Ala. 28 (1849); Gulick v. Grover, 33
N. J. Law, 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728 (1868); Duncan v. Hartman, 143 Pa. 595,
22 Atl. 1099, 24 Am. St. Rep. 570 (1891); Vescelius v, Martin, 11 Colo. 391,
.
18 Pac. 338 (1888).
To lease or rent his principal’s property: Duncan v. Hartman, 143 Pa. 595,
22 Atl. 1099, 24 Am. St. Rep. 570 (1891); Babin v. Ensley, 14 App. Div. 518.
43 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1897); Fishbaugh v. Spunaugle, 118 Iowa, 337, 92 N. W. 58
(19%); Peddicord v. Berk, 74 Kan. 236, 86 Pac. 465 (1906).
To prosecute and settle claims for his principal: Scarborough v. Reynolds,
12 Ala. 252 (1847); Scales v. Mount, 93 Ala. 82, 9 ‘South. 513 (1890); Hill v.
Shpe Co., 150 Mo. 483, 51 S. W. 702; Geiger v". Bolles, 1 Thomp_ & O. 129
(1873); Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St. 514 (1877); City of N. Y. v. Du‘Bois'
(C. C.) 86 Fed. 889 (1897).
To lend or borrow mane;/.' Exchange Bank v. Thrower, 118 Ga. 433, 45
S. E. 316 (1903), ’ante, p. 288; Bickford v. Menier, 107 N. Y. 490, 14 N. E.
438 (1887); Rider v. Kirk, 82 Mo. App. 120 (1899); N. Y. Iron Mine v. Ne
guunee First Nat. Bank, 39 Mich. 644 (1878); Jacobs v. Morris (1901) 1 Ch.
61, 70 L. J. Ch. 183, 84 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 112, 49 Wkly. Rep. 365 (affirmed in
[1902] 1 Ch. 816. 71 L. J. Ch. 363, 86 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 275. 18 T. L. R. 384,
50 Wkly. Rep. 371); Klindt v. Higgins, 95 Iowa, 529, 64 N. W. 414 (1895);
Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. 580, 68 N. W. 278, 35
R. A. 544 (1896).
To make contracts of employment: Campbell v. Day, 90 Ill. 363 (1878) (au~
thority of architect to employ workmen);
Bush v. S0. Brewing,Co., 69 Miss.
200, 13 South. 856 (1891) (employ attorney); Sevier v. Birmingham, etc.,
Co., 92 Ala. 258, 9 South. 405 (1800), and Holmes v. McAllister, 123 Mich. 493,
82 N. W. 220, 48 L. R. A. 396 (1900) (employ medical aid).
As to the authority
of the agent to employ other agents, see post, p. 341.
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SECTION l5.—GENERAL AND SPECIAL AUTHORITY

PACIFIC BISCUIT CO.
(Supreme

Court of Oregon,

1901.

v.

40

DUGGER.
Or. 302, 67 Pac.

82.)

Verdict and judgment for the defendant.
Plaintiff ‘appeals.
BEAN’, C. I. This is an action to recover the value of goods, wares,
and merchandise allegedto have been sold and delivered to the de
In March, 1899, the defendant purchased of her son a cigar
fendant.
and confectionery business in Independence, some miles distant from
her home in Linn county. It was agreed that he should remain in
general charge of the store as her agent, with authority to sell and
dispose of the goods and replenish the stock as it might be necessary,
but he was instructed not to buy on credit. In October, November,
and December, 1899, he purchased on credit of the traveling salesman
of the plaintiff and its assignors, who had no knowledge of his instruc
tions, the merchandise mentioned in the complaint, which was received
in the store, and either sold and disposed of by him in due course of
business, or by the defendant a short time thereafter, when the stock
was sold in bulk.
Upon these facts, the single question presented is whether the de
fendant is liable for the goods so purchased by her son, and this de
pends upon whether he is to be regarded as a general or special agent.
his agency was special, the defendant is not liable, because he ex
ceeded his authority\; but, if general, his princi'pal is bound, notwith
A general agent is
standing he acted contrary to her instructions.
one authorized to transact all his principal’s business, or all his busi
ness of some particular kind, while a special agent is one authorized to
do one or more speciﬁc acts in pursuance of particular instructions, or
within restrictions necessarily implied from the act to be done. 1 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 985." Within these deﬁnitions, the de
fendant’s son must be regarded as a general agent.
The mere fact
that his authority was conﬁned to a particular business did not make
him a special agent. He was given full charge and control of the

If

57 For deﬁnitions of general and special agents, see ante, p. 29.
That there
is a well-settled distinction in the rules of liability for the acts of general and
of special agents is often asserted, particularly in the older cases.
Munn v.
Commission Co., 15 Johns. 44, 8 Am. Dec. 219 (1818).
That the authority is
limited to a particular business does not make it special, therefore it may be
as general in regard to that as though its range were unlimited.
Anderson

v. Coonley. 21 Wend. 279 (1839), approved and elaborated in Cruzan v. Smith,
See, also, Fishbaugh
41 Ind. 288 (1872).
v. Spunaugle, 118 Iowa, 337, 92
X. W. 58 (1902); Noble v. Nugent, 89 Ill. 522 (1878); Wheeler v. McGuire, 86
Ala. 402, 5 South. 190, 2 L. R. A. 808 (1888); Liddell v. Sahline, 55 Ark. 627,
17 S. W. 705 (1891).
As to a general agent, acting under speciﬁc instructions
known to third persons, see U. S. v. Williams, Fed. Cas. No. 16,724, 1 Ware
(175)

173 (1830).
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business, with power to sell and dispose of the stock and replenish it
by purchasing new goods; and therefore his principal is liable for his
he
acts, within the scope of his apparent authority, notwithstanding
If a general agent dis
may have disregarded his secret instructions.
regards his instructions, his acts will nevertheless be binding on his
principal, so far as third persons who deal with him without notice are
concerned, although he may be personally liable to his principal there
‘
for.
This rule has been frequently applied by the courts to facts similar
to those in hand. Thus, in Drug Co. v. Lyneman, 10 Colo. App. 249,
50 Pac. 736, a drug business belonging to a married woman was con-'
ducted by her husband as general manager, and she was held liable
for the goods purchased by him, although she told plaintiﬁ"s salesman
that her agent must no longer buy goods of his company; it being
assumed that, because the goods were delivered and mingled with the
stock and sold, the limitation on the authority of the agent; had been
In VVhite v. Leighton, 15 Neb. 424, 19 N. VV. 478, the
withdrawn.
defendant was carrying on a business through an agent, under an agree
ment that he-was notito give orders \for goods without the consent
of his principal. The court held, however, that because the agent was
in charge of the business, and held out to the world as having_author
ity to do everything necessary to carry it on, his principal was liable
for merchandise purchased by him of parties having no notice of the
limitation of_his authority.
In Palmer v. Cheney, 35 Iowa, 281, the
defendant was engaged in the mercantile business, which was under
The goods constituting
the control of her son as her general agent.
the foundation of the plaintiiT’s claim were purchased by the son, re
ceived at the store, and sold as other goods were. The defendant was
held to be liable, although she was present when the order was given,
and directed her son, in the presence of the plaintiiT’s agent, to buy
The court ruled
no more goods than he could pay for at the time.
that the fact that the goods were received at the store and disposed
of by the defendant’s agent amounted to a ratiﬁcation of the contract
of purchase, and that the instruction given by defendant to her agent
to buy no more goods than he could pay for did not have the effect
of limiting his authority, or depriving him of the character of a general
In McDowell v. McKenzie, 65 Ga. 630, it was held that a mer
agent.
chant whose agent purchased goods in New York on credit, although
the credit was unauthorized, could not refuse to pay, when he had
received and sold the goods and pocketed the proceeds. See, also, Smith
v. Holbrook, 99 Ga. 256, 25 S. E. 627; \/Vebster v. Wray, 17 Neb. 579,
24 N. W. 207; Stapp v. Spurlin, 32 Ind. 442; Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Ind.
288.

It follows from these views that the judgment of the court below
must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
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CASSIDY.

(Supreme Court of Texas, 1856.

17 Tex. 449.)

Suit for $915.20 for goods and merchandise furnished,
Answer, payment to agents of plaintiffs.

delivered.

sold, and

J.“
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There were two principal questions contested at the
VVHI-;ELER,
(1) Whether Hill was the agent of the plaintiffs; (2) wheth
er, as agent, he had authority to receive payment of the debt of his
principal in satisfaction of his own individual debts.
The decision
of the case tumed mainly on the latter question; -and the verdict and
judgment affirm that he had such authority.
There .is no question that Field was the general agent of the plain
tiﬂ's. He appears to have had authority for soliciting, receiving and
forwarding orders upon their house, collecting moneys due them, and
promoting generally the extension of their business. This appears
to have been the general scope of his authority; and the evidence was,
perhaps, sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that Hill had a
This, however, is the utmost which the
like agency and authority.
evidence respecting his general authority can be claimed to have es
whether
tablished.
The question then
was with~in the scope of
his authority, as such agent, to accept satisfaction of the debt of his
clear that, with
principal in the payment of his own debts. And
was not. His
out the consent of his principal, express or implied,
collecting agent gave him no right to change the secu
authority as
rity of his princi'pal for the debts, or to make himself the debtor to
the principal for the like amount in lieu of the persons who owed
the debts, without the consent of the principal, express or implied, to
99, 413.
that effect. Story on Agency,
There
no evidence of any express authority or assent, on the
part of the plaintiffs, to any such arrangement; or of any usage of
trade, or of any course of dealing between the parties, from which
There
such authority might be implied.
nothing in the evidence
to warrantthe belief that the agent had authority to receive payment
otherwise thanin the ordinary mode of business; and that is, ordi
in money only. Story on Agency,
98, 99, 181;
nairily, to receive
Robson v. Watts, 11 Tex. 764. There may be circumstances which
will vary this duty. But there are none such in this case. The same
general principle pervades all cases of agency, whether general or spe
that the principal
bound by all the acts of his agent
cial; that
within the scope of the authority which he holds him out to the world
But when the agent exceeds the scope of that authority,
to possess.
A general agency properly
binding on his principal.
no act of his
exists where there
delegation of authority to do all acts con
particular trade, business or employment. But such an
nected with

trial:

58

Part of the oplnlon ls omitted.
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agent can no more bind his principal when he transcends the scope
of his employment, than can a special agent whose authority is lim
or includes in
ited to a single act.
Every agency carries with
as an incident, all the powers which are necessary, or proper, or usual,
as means to effectuate the purposes for which
was created, and
none other.
In this respect there
no distinction, whether the authority given
to an agent
general or special, expressed or implied. In each'case
embraces the appropriate means to accomplish the desired "end, and
If the agency arises by impli
limited to the use of those means.
cation from acts done by the agent with the tacit consent or acquies
like na
deemed to be limited to acts of
cence of the ‘principal,
ture;
from the general habits of dealing between the parties,
from the
deemed to be limited to dealings of the same kind;
in like manner
particular business,
employment of the agent in
“And the authority
deemed to be limited to that particular business.
must be_implied from facts which have occurred in the course of
such employment, and not from mere argument, _as to the utility and
arises from an authority
propriety of the agent’s possessing it. If
to do
limited to the appropri
single or particular act, the agency
ate means to accomplish that very act, and the required end;
and
the implied agency stops there.
In short, an implied‘ agency
never
construed to extend beyond the obvious purpose for which
ap
parently created. The intention of parties, deduced from the nature
and circumstances of the particular case, constitutes the ground of
every exposition of the extent of the authority, and when that inten
tion cannot be clearly discovered, the agency ceases to be recognized
87.
or implied.”
upon this principle that
Story on Agency,
not, in general,
held that an agent employed to receive payment
clothed with authority to compound the debt, pr to commute
for
in money,
something else, as his own debt; but can only receive
unless his ‘particular employment confers the authority, or
can be
implied from the general usage of business, or the habits of dealing
the well settled doctrine of the law, and
between the parties. This
obviously founded in reason and justice.
For errors in the trial, reversed and remanded.
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CARSWELL.

(Supreme Court of Judicature of New York. 1806.
.

2

Johns.
,

-18.)

Assumpsit upon a promissory note. Verdict for plaintiff.
LIVINGSTON, ]., delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a
But the note,
special power, and ought to have been strictly pursued.
to which Abner Carswell authorized the witness to put his name, was
to be payable in six months; whereas, the one he signed had only
sixty days to run. The note, then, as far as it concerned Abner, ad
mitting there was no revocation, was made without his authority. His

after the suit was commenced, does not alter the state
It was merely that he had allowed David to put his name
This must have been the one of which the ﬁrst witness
to a note.
speaks, which was to be payable in six months.
There must be a new trial, with costs to abide the event of’ the suit.
confession,

of

the case.

New trial granted.
I

YOUNG

v.

HARBOR POINT CLUB HOUSE ASS’N.

(Appellate

Court of Illinois, 1901.

99

Ill.

App. 290.)

J.”

The plaintiff in error brought this suit to recover
HARKER. P.
breach of an alleged contract with the defendant in error whereby he
was employed as room clerk for the hotel of the defendant in error
for the summer season of 1899, at a salary of $100 per month. The
case was tried by the court by agreement without a jury in connection
with the one brought by L. C. Young against the Harbor Point Club
House Association already considered in review by this court, 99 Ill.
App. 292. The court found the issues against the plaintiff and en
tered judgment against him‘ for the costs.
VVe agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court.
There was
no valid contract of employment made between the plaintiff and his
father as agent of the defendant. The agency of plaintiff's father was
a special and not a general one.“ He was authorized to employ a room
clerk subject to.the approval of defendant as to_ salary. The proper
construction to place upon the language of Tracy in his letter of March

for

'

Part of the opinion is omitted.
so “This distinction between general and special agencies is sometimes very
unsatisfactory.” Cross v. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 1-11 Mo. 132, 42 S. W. 675
59

(1897).

See

the dissenting

opinion

Bank v. Butchers‘ & Drovers’ Bank,
Mt-Intosh 8: Huntington Co. v. Rice,

of Comstock,

J.,

Farmers’

& Mechanics’

16 N. Y. 125, 148, 69 Am. Dec. 678 (1857);
13 Colo. App. 393, 58 Pac. 358 (1899).

It

seems impossible to deﬁne the terms “general” and “special” in terms which
It by no means fol
make the deﬁnition applicable to each particular case.
lows that one called a general agent has a certain power, but that when he is
called a special agent this power may not be taken to be within the limits of
his authority. Merchants’ Insurance Co. v. N. M. Lumber Co., 10 Colo. App.
223, 51 Pac. 174 (1897).
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ll
25th, We have always paid $75 per month for this position and trust
you can see your way to have your "son accept at that price," is that
it was a limitation upon his authority‘ as to price.
When the agency
is special, the authority must be strictly pursued, and the principal
is not bound if the agent exceeds his authority.
It is the duty of a
person dealing with a special agent to ascertain the extent of his au
thority, and if he does not, he must suffer the consequences. Williams
v. Merritt, 23 Ill. 623; Blackmer v. Summit Coal 8: Mining Co., 187
Ill. 32, 58 N. E. 289.61 All the knowledge the plaintiff had of his
father's agency was derived from Tracy’s letters. His father was not
in control of the hotel but was more than a thousand miles away from
*
it. * *
Iudgment aﬁirmed.

iii.

BASS DRY GOODS CO.
(Supreme

v.

Court of Georgia,

|

GRANITE CITY MANFG. CO.
1903.

119 Ga. 124, 45 S.

E.

980.)

Action on contract for failure to deliver goods sold. Verdict for de
fendants.
The court charged: “If you believe from the evidence
LAMAR,
* * * that Arnold sent Brown to the plaintiff, with instructions to
sell the goods in question to them at a certain price, or at ﬁgures not
below a certain price, you would be authorized to ﬁnd that Brown was
the special agent of Arnold, and, as between Arnold and plaintiﬁ, the
plaintiff would be bound to take notice of the instruction given Brown
This was error. Assuming that the goods were not on
by Arnold.”
hand, and that therefore Arnold was principal, it appeared that he had
written Brown, “While in Atlanta call on_Bass Dry Goods Co. and try
to close them the following pants.”
As Brown had been appointed
traveling-salesman, it could hardly be claimed that this letter amount
ed to a suspension of his general powers as such.
But even if it be treated as creating a special agency to sell particu
lar goods to a particular person, the purchaser was only required to
examine his authority.
This the purchasers did when they read the
letter. They were not bound by private instructions not included in
the writing, but were justiﬁed in assuming that he could ﬁx the price;
that being an essential element in the contract of sale.
While a gen
eral agent has broader powers than one selected to do a particular act,
the authority in both cases must be construed to include all necessary
and usual means for effectually executing it. Where one is appointed

I.“

61 This is the more true when the special authority is in writing, and the
act of the agent is not essential to the accomplishment of the Purpose. Martin
v. Farnsworth, 49 N. Y. 555 (1872).
See, also, Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R, 757
(1790).
6! Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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to sell a particular

article to a particular person, this coniers on the
special agent authority to agree on the price; otherwise the appoint
ment is illusory, and not real; Civ. Code 1895, § 3023; Barclay v.
Hopkins, 59 Ga. 562; Holman v. Ga. R. Co., 67 Ga. 595.” * * *
I
Judgment reversed.
65 Some cases distinguish between the extent or the authority, whether lim
ited or unlimited, and the nature of the agency, whether general or special.
In either case an agent, acting within the general scope of the authority, held
out to the world "by the principal, will bind him. Noble v. Nugent, 89 Ill.
-522 (1878). citing Donn v. Duncan, 17 lll. 272 (1855).
Others regard an agency
under limited and circumscribed powers as a special agencyl See Gibson v.
Snow Hardware Co.,-94 Ala. 346, 10 South. 304 (1891), ante, 11- 29; Bohart
v. Oberne. 36 Kan. 284, 13 Pac. 388 (1887), and Littleton v. I081! Ass’n, 97
Ga. 172, 25 S. E. 826 (1895), especially the dissenting opinion of Atkinson, J.
»
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BRANTLEY

-

~

SOUTHERN LIFE INS.

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

1875.

53

554.)

a note for $1,000, signed by West, Brown & Brantley.
appeared that Brantley, a farmer, had signed a surety bond for West
& Burns, as agents of the Insurance Company.
He had made one
Berry his agent, and while he was absent from the state, Berry had
signed his name to this note to settle a breach of the bond by the agents,
and the surety bond had been cancelled.
BRICKELL, C. J.‘ * * * All contracts must be read in the light
of surrounding circumstances. The occasion which gave rise to them,
the relative position of the parties, and their obvious design as to the
objects to be accomplished, must be looked at, in order to arrive at
their true meaning, and to enable the court to carry out the intention
of the parties. Pollard v. Maddox, 28 Ala. 325. The letter of attor
ney, introduced as evidence of Berry’s authority to make the note on
which the suit is founded, in the name of appellant, is very broad and
general in its terms. Standing without explanation of the nature and
character of the usual and general business of appellant, and of the
circumstances under which the letter was executed, it would be impos
sible to limit the authority of the agent, or to give it any deﬁnite ap
There is scarcely a conceivable transaction, lying within
plication.
the scope of lawful delegation of authority, into which the agent could
The operative words of the grant
not enter, and bind the principal.
in the general transaction of my
“to
name
are,
of authority
sign my
business, giving and granting unto my said attorney full power and
authority to do and perform all and every act or thing whatever, req
uisite and necessary to be done in the general transaction of my busi
ness,” etc.
Powers of attorney are, ordinarily, subjected to a strict
or, rather, the authority given is not extended beyond,
construction;
A distinction is
the meaning of the terms in which it is expressed.
carefully observed, between such powers, and other powers created
The
by deed or will, for the accomplishment of particular purposes.
in
the
than
in
latter,
is
more
the
regarded
be
accomplished
to
purpose
former class of powers, and a more liberal interpretation of the words
Story on Agency, § 67 (n. 2). In a
creating the powers is allowed.
power of attorney, words, however general, must be construed and

It

Action on

Ala.

CO._

1

Part ot the opinion is omitted.
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limited in subordination to the subject matter. Thus, a general power
to draw or indorse promissory notes will not authorize the drawing or
indorsing of promissory notes for the mere accommodation of third
The authority must be conﬁned and limited to the drawing
persons.
and indorsing of ‘promissory notes, in matters of business in which the
principal has a direct and immediate interest. \Vallace v. Branch Bank
at Mobile, 1 Ala. 571. A physician, being about to remove from the
State, left his books and accounts for professional services with a friend

for

settlement, giving him general authority to transact all his business
The agent had no authority to assign the accounts, for
the indemnity of a surety of the principal.
Vi/ood v. McCain, 7 Ala.
800, 42 Am. Dec. 612.
In Scarborough v. Reynolds, 12 Ala. 252, a
general authority to transact business was’limited to the management
and control of a plantation, and declared not to authorize the adjust
ment of other concerns of the principal.
The circuit court properly received evidence that the principal, at
the execution of the power, had no other occupation or pursuit than
that of a farmer, cultivating and renting this lands, and that it was
executed in view of a contemplated temporary absence from the State.
This evidence was proper, to enable the court to determine the scope
of the agency, and to ascertain whether the act in question was within
the power conferred.
The general expressions of the power must be
the
prigcipal business of the party; for it is this which is
restrained to
presumed to have been, and doubtless was, within his contemplation.
and which he was willing to submit to the agent. A merchant, about
going abroad temporarily, delegated to an agent full and entire author
ity to sell any of his personal property, or to buy any property for him,
or on his account, or to make any contracts, and also to do any acts
whatsoever, which he could, if personally present; this general language
would be construed to apply only_to buying or selling connected with
his ordinary business as a merchant. Story on Agency, § Z1. So, this
power must be restrained and limited to the ordinary, general business
of the principal in the cultivation and renting of his lands. and the duties
It cannot fairly and properly be extended
and transactions it involved.
to other concems of the principal, which cannot be presumed to have
been within his contemplation, and may have required an agent of an
other character and qualiﬁcations to transact.”

in this State.

i Accord:
424

(1911).

Porges

v. U. S. Mortgage

&

Trust Co.,

203

N. Y.

181,

96 N.

E.
.

the case of written powers, it must appear upon a fair construction of
the whole instrument that the authority in question is to be found within the
four corners of the instrument, either in express terms, or by necessary im
plication. Bryant v. La Banque du Peuple, [1893] A. C. 170. 62 L. J. P. C.
68. 68 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 546, 1 Reports, 336, 41 Wkly. Rep. 600; Delaﬂeld v.
Illinois, 26 Wend. 192 (1841); Id., 2 Hill, 159 (1841): Doubleday v. Kress,
50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502 (1872); Johnston v. Wright, 6 Cal. 373 (1856).
it will not be extended beyond what is necessary and proper to carry into
full effect the authority. Golinsky v. Allison, 114 Cal. 458. 46 Pac. 295 (1896);
Rhine v. Blake, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 1066 (1881); Gouldy v. Met
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When the power was executed, the principal was surety of VVest
and Burns, agents of appellees, on a penal bond, with condition for
their faithful performance of the agency. If a breach of the bond had
then occurred, and any liability rested on the principal, he was not in
formed of it; and of course, an adjustment of such breach, and a
change of the character and form of his liability, with an extension of
the time of payment to his principals, was not within his contemplatio_1_1.
These matters were distinct and separate from his general and ordinary
business, to which his attention was directed, and in reference to which
The power did not authorize the agent
he was delegating authority.
to adjust them, and tomake the note on which the suit is founded. , The
circuit court erred in charging otherwise. Whether the facts disclose
a recognition, and acquiescence in the act of the agent, imparting to it
validity, is not a question presented for our consideration.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

VERY

v.

LEVY.

(Supreme Court of the United States, 1851.

How.

345, 14

L. Ed.

173.)

is

it,
it

Suit in equity to foreclose a mortgage. Answer, satisfaction of the
mortgage by an agreement with one Davis, agent of complainant, to pay
in goods, part of which, to. the amount of $1,898.25, were delivered,
and the rest of which had been constantly subject to the order of com
plainant. Davis had full power to trgdg, sell, and dispose of any notes,
bills, bonds, or mortgages, held, or owned, by Very on any resident
of Arkansas.
The circuit court decreed the mortgage satisﬁed.
CURTIS, _I.3 * * * Upon this state of facts we are of opinion
Davis had authority to enter into the agreement in question. Besides
the power to collect and sell, is the power to trade this bond and mort
It might be diﬁicult to attach any general legal signiﬁcation to
gage.
But considered in reference to the particular facts of this
this word.
case, we think its meaning sufﬁciently clear.
It is proved by Davis, that the power, though general in its ‘terms,
was given solely in reference to this particular bond and mortgage.
The bond had yet four years to run. When, therefore, Davis was
authorized to collect this bond, the parties to the letter of attorney must
have had in view some agreement respecting its extinguishment, which
should vary its original terms of payment; and when he was further
not an inadmissible interpretation that the
empowered to trade
new agreement for its extinguishment, which he was empowered to
make, might be an agreement to receive speciﬁc articles in payment.
calf,

75 Tex. 455. 12 S. W. 830, 16 Am. St. Rep. 912 (1889); Campbell v. Foster
Home Ass’n, 163 Pac. 609, 30 Atl. 222, 26 L. R. A. 117, 43 Am. St. Rep.
818
'
(1894).

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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If by
has been said that special powers are to be construed strictly.
this is meant, that‘ neither the agent, nor a third person dealing with
him in that character, can claim under the power any authority which
It

they had not a right to understand its language conveyed, and that the
authority is not to be extended by mere general words beyond the ob
But if the words in question
ject in view, the position is correct.
touch only the particular mode in which an object, admitted to be within
the power, is to be eﬁccted, and they are ambiguous,‘ and with a rea
sonable attention to them would bear the interpretation on which both
the agent and a third person have acted, the principal is bound, although
upon a more reﬁned and critical examination the court might be of
opinion that a different construction would be more correct. Le Roy
v. Beard, 8 How. 451, 12 L. Ed. 1151; Loraine v. Cartwright, 3 Wash.
C. C. 151, Fed. Cas. No. 8,500; De Tastett v. Crousillat, 2 Wash. C. C.
1 Liv. on Agency,
132, Fed. Cas. No. 3,828;
403, 404;
Story on
Agency, § 74. Such an instrument is generally to be construed, as
a plain man, acquainted with the object in view, and attending reason
ably to the language used, has in fact construed it. He is not bound
to take the opinion of a lawyer concerning the meaning of a word not
technical, and apparently employed in a popular sense.
Witherington
v. Herring, 5 Bing. 456.
In thiscase, the complainant, besides empowering Davis to collect a
bond not yet payable, has authorized him to trade it—a word frequently
used in popular language to signify an exchange of one article for
another, by way of barter. This power was intended by the complain
ant to be acted on by the respondent, a jeweler, in the state of Arkansas,
and we think he cannot complain that it was understood in its popular
sense ;‘ more especially when he accepted, without objection, goods
amounting to $1,898.25, and gave the defendant no notice of his dis
sent from that construction of the power under which his agent received
them, in part payment of the bond. * * *
Decree aﬁirmed.
4 The ambiguity
may often be resolved by considering the situation of the
parties, as, e. g., the illiteracy of the principal and the remoteness of the busi
ness (Texas Loan Agency V. Miller, 94 Tex. 464, 61 S. W. 477 [1901]), the
exigencies of the business (Muth v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237, 72 Pac. 621, 98
Am. St. Rep. 553 [1903]). or the position of the principal (Le Roy v. Beard, 8
It
How. 451, 12 L. Ed. 1151 [1850]; Maynard v. Mercer, 10 Nev. 33 [1875]).
is the duty of the principal to make his terms so clear that they cannot be
misconstrued.
Hall! v. 0’Conner, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 191, 37 S. W. 238 (1896).
But because the instructions are not clear the agent ls not thereby authorized
to disregard them entirely.
Oxford Lake Line v. First Nat. Bank, 40 Fla.
349,

24

Though
South. 480 (1898).
a permissible construction.

he

will

be excused

Berry v. Haldeman,

it

he has bona tide

Mich. 667, 70
N. W. 325 (1897).
5 The construction
should be according to the spirit rather than according
Taylor v. Harlow, 11 Barb. 232 (1851);
to the letter of the instrument.
Hopwood v. Corbin. 63 Iowa, 218, 18 N. W. 911 (1911), construed most strong
ly against the contractor.
adopted
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v.

BURDICK.

'

\

HEMSTREET

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1878.

90

Ill.

444.)

a

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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a
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it

it

is

is

a

I

I

is

it
is

it

is

it,

It

a

it

it

*

*

a

a

a

it,

In 1856, D. B. Gardner bought certain land, giving a mortgage
back. He paid little on
and in 1859 sold to Hempstead, taking
mortgage back, and
power of attorney, authorizing him to sell,
or lease, or collect rents, for these lands. The ﬁrst mortgage was
still outstanding, and, the interest and note being unpaid, suit was
brought in 1862, which was settled by the conveyance to the mort
B. Gardner under his power of attorney, of the land
gagees, by
in controversy and other land.
In 1874, Hempstead and wife con
tract including this land to Spencer.
The bill charges that
veyed
this was
fraud upon the rights of the appellee, who holds under the
conveyance of 1862 and prays that Spencer's title bedecreed to be
held in trust for Burdick. Decree granted and defendants appeal.
* It also insisted that the power of attorney
VVALKER, J.“
to D. B. Gardner from Hemstreet conferred no power to convey;
that
authorized him to sell, lease, collect rents, etc., and that such
was the construction put on
by Gardner and Hemstreet, as the
sale, sent the" deed to the latter to ex
former always, on making
immaterial what construction the parties to the instru
ecute.
ment gave
as
does not appear that \the trustees‘ knew of their
so doing.
They purchased under the advice of an attorney that Gard
ner had power to make the conveyance, and we presume they acted
in good faith.
But
not material what the attorney in fact, or his
principal, may have supposed,—the question is, whether the instru
This
the language of the power of
ment did confer the power.
attorney conferring the power to act: ,“T0 sell or lease any and all
real estate belonging to me in said county of Iroquois, and to. ’_col—
lect rents for any such property so rented or leased by him, and in
and about the leasing, selling and collecting of rents, or any of them,
as aforesaid, to do any and all matters and things as fully as
could
do were
personally present and doing the same.”
The whole question turns on the meaning that shall be given to the
word “sell.”
Its popular meaning, we think, clearly embraces the
power to contract,to sell and to convey or transfer the thing sold.
transfer of the title as well as
To complete the sale there must be
applied to personal property, there
the thing sold. 'When the term
embraces the delivery as well as the bargain for the
no doubt
in such -cases means the bargain for the sale, the receipt
sale——that
of the purchase money and the delivery of possession, by which the
sale
So in regard
completed and the title vested in the purchaser.
to real estate, the word “sell,” in its popular sense, implies the con
tract and its completion by conveyance. All know that
_sale of land
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is not complete until a conveyance is made to the purchaser—until
the title has passed to and vested in him. A contract or agreement.
to sell does not pass the title at law, although in equity the land is
considered as belonging to ~the buyer; but even in that forum the
sale is not considered as complete, as it will compel a speciﬁc per
formance, and complete the sale by a conveyance of the title.
\Ve
regard the word “sell,” as used here, as giving ample power to com
plete a sale by making a deed of conveyance to the purchaser.
Such
is the ruling of the courts of California and Massachusetts.
See
Fogarty v. Sawyer, 17 Cal. 591, and Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85,
33 Am. Dec. 715.
This is, then, we think, supported by reason, and
also by authority.
But it is said the power must be strictly construed. This may be
true, but it does not require that it shall be so construed as to de
feat the intention of the parties. Where the intention fairly appears
from the language employed, that intention must control. A strained
construction should never be given to defeat that intention, nor to em
brace in the power what was not intended by the parties.’
Accord
ing to the fair and reasonable meaning of the words, we think power
* * *
to convey was conferred.
_
Decree aiﬁrmed.

RENWICK

V.

WHEELER.

(Circuit Court of the United States, D. Iowa,

1880.

48 Fed.

431.)

MCCRARY, ].' This is a bill in equity praying the cancellation of a
certain judgment appearing upon the records of the district court
of Scott County. Iowa, in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff, on the ground that the same has been settled and satisﬁed.
The judgment was rendered on the 18th day of February, 1861, in a
The
suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon certain real estate.
mortgaged property was sold under the judgment in 1861, and bought
in by \Vheeler, for $700, and the sheriff's deed was immediately made
This left a balance unsatisﬁed on the record which now
to him.
amounts, including interest at lO per cent., to something over $2,000.
review of the principles of construction. and of the authori
Muth v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237, 72 Pac. 621. 98 Am. St. Rep. 553
The power will, it possible, be so construed as to give effect to the
(1903).
intent of the parties as it is found in the words of the instrument (Snell v.
Weyerhauser,
71 Minn. 57, 73 N. W. 633 [1S9S]), and in the object to be ac
complished (Posner v. Bayless, 59 Md. 56 [I882]; Holluday v. Daily, 19 Wall.
606. 22 L. Ed. 187 [I873]: Perry v. Holi, 2 De G., F. & J. 38, 29 L. J. Ch.
677 [1S60]: National Bank v. Old Town Bank. 112 Fed. 726. 50 C. C. A. 443
[1902]). and so as to give effect, if possible, to all the grants of power (Vanada's
Heirs v. Hopkins’ Adm’r. 24 Ky. [1 J. J. Marsh.] 285, 19 Am. Dec. 92 [1S29];.
8 Part of the opinion is omitted.
Gooo.Pn.& A.(2p En.)--20
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No attempt was ever made to collect this balance until December, 1878,
about 17 years after the date of the judgment, when a general execu
tion was issued, and attempts were made to enforce its payment, which
led to the ﬁling of this bill, and the allowance of a temporary injunction
to restrain, until further order, the collection of the judgment.
The note and mortgage on which said judgment of foreclosure was
rendered were made by complainant, James Renwick, to defendant,
\-Vheeler, April 8, 1857, for the purchase money of a piece of land in
Davenport, then purchased by Renwick from Wheeler through \Vheel
Wheeler resided in
er’s agent and attorney in fact, Erastus Ripley.
Pennsylvania, and Ripley in Davenport, Iowa. Renwick, who also re
sided in Davenport, made certain payments on the mortgage debt,
The sum secured by the mort
amounting in the aggregate to $565.
gage was $1,400, with interest, and the mortgage covered, besides the
land purchased from VVheeler, another adjoining tract, for which Ren
wick had paid $600.
Before the commencement of the foreclosure
suit, Renwick had become ﬁnancially embarrassed, and was unable to
pay the balance of the debt; and he alleges in the present bill that he
entered into an agreement with Wheeler, through his agent, Ripley,
that Wheeler should take the entire mortgaged property in satisfaction
of the balance due, and that to carry out this agreement (Renwick be
irig unable to make a good title by deed on account of judgments against
him) an amicable foreclosure was had, in which the judgment in ques
tion was rendered by default, and was left unsatisﬁed, after the sale,
The controversy here is (1) as to the
by negligence or oversight.
truth of this allegation; and (2) as to its suﬁiciency as a matter of
law to entitle the complainant to the relief sought. * * *

It is insisted on behalf of defendant that it does not appear that
Ripley, the agent of \Vheeler, had authority to make the contract re
lied upon. This depends upon the construction of the power of attor
That instrument, which is before us,
ney under which Ripley acted.
after authorizing the agent to sell, convey, or mortgage any real estate
belonging to \Vheeler within the state of Iowa, and to collect all sums
due on that account, provides as follows: “And_ we do further con
stitute the said Erastus Ripley our general attorney in fact to transact
any or all business for us, or either of us, of any kind whatsoever,__ii1
the state of Iowa; to rent houses and sign leases, and to collect money,
execute receipts for the same, and to satisfy any mortgages made or
to be made to us, or either of us, upon any lands in the state of Iowa;
it being the true intent and meaning-“of this instrument to confer upon
the said Erastus Ripley full and unrestricted power and authority to
act for us in all matters of every kind whatsoever arising, or that may
arise, in the said state of Iowa."
g
It is said that the general language in this power of attorney is re
strained by the special and speciﬁc authority elsewhere in the same
G0oo.PB.&

A.(2n En.)
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instrument conferred.
The general rule is that general terms follow
ing, in the same instrument, words which confer a speciﬁcauthority,
are to be held subordinate to, and as limited by, the speciﬁc authority.
Instruments of this character are strictly construed; and the authority
is never extended beyond that which is given in terms, or which is
necessary or proper for carrying the authority so given into full eﬁ'ect.
Story, Ag. par. 68.” And language, however general in its form, w_hen
used in connection with a particular subject-matter, will be presumed
to be used in subordination to that matter, and therefore to be con
strued and limited accordingly.
Id. par. 62. Applying these rules to
the power of attorney under consideration, it appears that the par
ticular subject-matter was the business of Wheeler in the state of
Iowa, relating to his real estate, including selling, mortgaging, leasing,
collecting moneys due for rents or as purchase money, and including
VVith respect to all business of this
the satisfaction of mortgages.
general nature within the’ state of Iowa, Ripley, as Wheeler's agent,
had “unrestricted power and authority," and was to act as his “gen
The settlement in question was a transaction
eral attorney in fact.”
relating to the particular subject-matter of the agency; and therefore
the agent had discretionary power to accept the mortgaged premises
in full for the debt. * * *
Decree for complainant.
Author
Rountree v. Denson, 59 Wis. 522, 18 N. W. 518 (1884).
to act concerning mining operations, followed by authority to sign the
principal’s name to any paper of a certain sort. does not give authority to sign
paper except about the mining business, and also paper of the sort speciﬁed.
General power to bind the principal,
Wiiashburn v. Alden, 5 Cal. 463 (1855).
in the absence of evidence of a different intent, must be construed as giving
authority to bind him separately, and not conjointly with another, Harris v.
Johnston, 54 Minn. 177, 65 N. W. 970. 40 Am. St. Rep. 312 (1893).
As to whether the construction of the agent's power is for court or jury,
see post, p. 8; Claﬂin v. Continental Works, S5 Ga. 27, 11 S. E. 721 (1890),
ante, p. 279; and Booth v. Kessler, 62 Neb. 704, 87 N. W. 532 (1901).
W'hile the existence of an agency is a question of tact, what may lawfully
Long Creek Building Ass'n v. State
be done thereunder is a question of law.
Ins. Co.. 29 ‘Or. 569, 46 Pac. 366 (1896): Halladay v. Underwood, 90 Ill. App.
130 (1899); Berry v, Haldeman, 111 Mich. 667, 70 N. W. 325 (1897); London
Sav. Fund Society V. Hagerstown Sav. Bank, 36 Pa. 498 (1897); 78 Am. Dec.
390 (1860).
9Acc0rd:
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EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY
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1

1
-

(Court

COMBES’ CASE.

of Common Pleas,

1613.

9 Coke,

75a,

77 Eng.

Rep. s43.)

‘

the opinim will be found ante, p. 43.]
was resolved, that when any has authority, as attorney, to do
any act, he ought to do it in his name who gives the authority; for
he appoints the attorney to be in his place, and to represent his person;
and therefore the attorney cannot do it‘in his own name, nor as his
proper act, but in the name, and as the act of him who gives the au
And where it was objected, that in the case at bar, that the
thority.
attornies have made‘ the surrender in their own names;
for the
entry is Quod iidem VVillielmus et Stephanus, &c. sursum reddiderunt
&c. It was answered and resolved per totam curiam, that they have
well pursued their authority; for ﬁrst they showed their letter of
attorney, and then they authoritate eis per praed’ literam attomat’ dat’
sursum reddiderunt, &c. which is as much as to say, as if they had
said, we as attornies of Thomas Combes surrender, &c. and both these
ways are sufficient; as he who has a letter of attorney to deliver
seisin saith, I as attorney to I. S. deliver you seisin; or I by force
of a (this) letter of attorney deliver you seisin; and all that is well
but if attornies have
done and a good pursuance of his authority;
power by writing to make leases by indenture for years, &c. they can
not make, indentures in their own names, but in the name of him who
But if a man by his will in writing devises that
gives them warrant.
his executors shall sell his land, and dies, there the executors in their
own name may sell the land for necessity, because he who gives them
authority by his will (which takes effect after his death) is dead; and
yet in such case the vendee is in by the devisor.

[The facts and part of
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142, 6

R. R.

409.)

of arbitration.
The bond of submis
sion to arbitration had been signed: “Mathias Wilks.
[L. S.] For
Browne,
Mathias
Wilks.
was
sealed
and de
James
[L. S.]".—and
livered by Wilks for himself and also for his late partner, Browne.
LAWRENCE, J. No doubt in point of law, the act done must be the
act of the principal, and not of the attorney who is authorized to do
it.
The whole argument has turned upon an assumption of fact that
This
this was the act of the attorney, which is not well founded.
is not like the case in Lord Raymond’s Reports, where the attorney had
demised

set aside an award

to the

defendant

in her own

name,

which

she

could

not

do; for no estate could pass from her, but only from her principal.
But here the bond was executed by Wilks for and indthe name of his
pringipal: and this is distinctly shewn by the manner of making the
Not that even this was necessary to be shewn; for if Wilks
signature.
had sealed and delivered it in the name of Browne, that would have
been enough without stating that he had so done. However, he ﬁrst
signs his own name alone opposite to one seal to denote the sealing
and delivery on his own account, and then opposite the other seal he
denotes that the sealing and delivery was for James Browne.
There
is no particular form of words required to be used, provided the act be
done in the name of the principal.
LE BLANC, J. Wilks ﬁrst signed it in his own name, as for himself,
and then to denote that the act was also done in the name of Browne,
I cannot see what diﬁerence it
he signed it again for James Browne.
can make as to the order in which the names stand.
Rule discharged.

POST
(Supreme

Court of the United
‘

v.

PEARSON.

States. 1992.

L. Ed.

774.)

108 U. S. 418, 2 Sup. Ct. 799, 27
‘

Action against \/Vhitney and Post, as partners under the name of
the Keets Mining Company, on a contract made by \\/hitney as super
intendent of the company, and signed:
“A. VV. NVhitney, [Seal.]
Supt. Keets Mining Co.
[Seal.]
John B. Pearson.
[Seal.].” Oral
evidence was allowed to show that Post was a partner of \Vhitney,
and Post brings error.
_
GRAY, J. It is unnecessary to consider whether, if this were to be
treated as a contract under seal, it could be held to be upon its face the
contract of the Keets Mining Company, and not of Whitney only, or
whether the oral testimony would have been admissible to charge Post:
because, by the Civil Code of Dakota, “all distinctions between sealed
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S.

S. a

a

a

is

§§

is

‘if

and unsealed instruments are abolished,” and “any instrument within
the scope of his authority, by which an agent intends to bind his prin
such intent
cipal, does bind him,
plainly inferable from the instru
925, 1373.1
Civ. Code Dak. 1877,
ment itself.”
the delivery and
By the subject-matter of this contract, which
mine;
of
ore
from
the
Keets
the
milling
by
description of Whitney,
both in the body of the contract and in the signature, as superintendent
of the Keets Mining Company; and by the use of the words “parties
of the ﬁrst part,” which are applicable to company and not to single
individual, the contract made by the hand of Whitney clearly appears
upon its face to have been intended to bind, and therefore did bind,
partner in the company,
the company; and, upon proof that Post was
bound him.
392, 25 L. Ed. 1050;
Vl/hitney v. Wyman, 101 U.
416, 26 L. Ed. 1078; Goodenough v.
Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U.
Thayer, 132 Mass. lS2I
The order sustaining Post’s demurrer to the original complaint gave
the plaintiff leave to amend, and did not preclude the plaintiff from
renewing, nor the court from entertaining, the same question of law
upon a fuller development of the facts at the trial on the amended
Allen, 387.
Calder v. Haynes,
complaint.
'
affirmed.
Judgment

(Supreme Court of Nebraska,

MAXWELL, C.
follows: Wilson

\

BEARDSLEY.

v.

1886.

’

~

WILSON

_

I

—i

20 Neb. 449, 30 N.

W.

529.)

5

a

&

a

a

& J.

The facts in the above case are substantially as
Larison, the plaintiffs in error, were, at the time
referred to herein, and are now, importers and jobbers of tea, cigars,
and spices, having their principal place of business at Omaha, Nebras
ka. During the times aforesaid they had in their employ
traveling
Under their contract of hire with him
salesman named A. P. Nichols.
salary of $7 per month, and commissions upon
they were to pay him
all sales, and he was to pay his own expenses. On the ﬁfth of January,
letter to Nichols, at Ogden, Utah,
1883, VVilson
Larison wrote

it

a

it

telling him, among other things, that he might draw on them for $75.
This letter Nichols received, and altered by preﬁxing the ﬁgure “l”
The change was skillfully made, and
read $175.
to “75,” so that
well calculated to deceive.
The testimony shows that Nichols, at this time, was
guest of de
fendant in error; that Nichols desired to draw on plaintiffs in error
was made to appear that an indorser to the draft
for $150; that
about to be drawn was necessary; that defendant in error was request
ed by Nichols to indorse said draft, and, as an inducement to do so,
1Wheeler v. Walden. 17 Neb. 122, 22 N. W. 346 (1885). But contra,
deeds executed by agents: Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518 (1878).
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the bank cashier the letter of plaintiffs in error,
altered as aforesaid, apparently authorizing him to draw on them for
$175; that on the faith and credit of that letter defendant in error did
indorse said draft; that in due course of business said draft was pre
sented to plaintiffs in error at Omaha for payment, and payment by
them was refused on the ground of “no funds”; that said draft was
thereupon duly protested, and returned unpaid to the bank at Ogden,
where defendant in error was required to pay, and did pay, the full
amount of the draft, with protest fees, amounting in all to $152.25.
On the trial of the cause in the court below judgment was rendered
for $75 in favor of Beardsley, from which the plaintiffs herein bring
the cause into this court by petition in error.
No case has been'cited exactly in point by either party, and we are
compelled to adopt such a rule as will, as far as possible, do justice
between the parties. The rule is well settled that a principal will be
bound by the acts of his agent within the scope of his apparent au
thority. St. Louis & M. P. Co. v. Parker, 59 Ill. 23; Fatman v. Lcet,
41 Ind. 133; Kerslake v. Schoomaker, 3 Thomp. & C. 524; Tucker v.
\Voolsey, 64 Barb. 142; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v.,Weaver, 34 Md.
431; Bronson v. Chappell, 12 Wall. 681, 20 L. Ed. 436; Golding v.
Merchant, 43 Ala. 705. The plaintiffs must have intended that their
letter, above referred to, should be used as a letter of credit to enable
Nichols to obtain the $75 upon the draft which he was‘ authorized to
draw on them. To this extent he was acting within the scope of his
authority, and his acts were valid. The draft, therefore, was unau
Nichols was the plaintiffs’
thorized only as to the excess over $75.
agent, and so held out by them, to some extent at least, as being trust
This fact, while it would not ma.ke them liable for any ma
worthy.
terial alteration in the letter made by such salesman, is yet a circum
stance tending to show that he had some claim upon them, and there
by, no doubt, led to less careful inquiry in regard to the erﬁcnt of the
agent's authority than otherwise would have been had. The letter was
in the nature of a power of attorney, by which the principals agreed
to ratify the act of the agent to a certain extent, authorizing him to
draw in his own name upon them for a certain amount. Now, sup
pose that the agent had changed this so as to show authority in him
to draw two drafts on the plaintiffs, each for $75, could they plead,
as a defense to the ﬁrst draft, that it was unauthorized, and that, there
fore, an innocent indorser, relying upon their letter, should be de
frauded? \V e think not. The authority would be wanting only as to
the second draft. The same rule is applicable here; there being an
actual authority to draw to the extent of $75.
The judgment of the court below is clearly right, and is aﬁirmed.
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LOEB

V.

DRAKEFORD.

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

1883.

75

Ala.

464.)

SOMERVILLE, J.” The purposeiof the present bill is_to claim the
beneﬁt of certain mortgages and other collateral securities placed in
the hands of Lehman, Durr & Co. by one Thomas B. Dryer, in the
latter part of the month of March, in the year 1881.
Dryer was in
debted to complainants for advances made to him during that year, and
also for antecedent debts aggregating about two thousand dollars, and
The theory of the bill is, that there
based on previous transactions.
was an express agreement made by Dryer, during his life-time, that the
The
old, or pre-existing debt should be paid out of these securities.
It is not
whole question is as to the existence of such an agreement.
contended that such a contract was made with the deceased in person,
* * *
but only with his authorized agents.
It is claimed, however, that this agreement was authorized by one
Felts, who acted under a written power of attorney executed by Dryer,
The testimony shows very con
and bearing date March 28th, 1881.
to
such
an arrangement, claiming his
that
Felts
did
assent
clusively,
authority under a certain power of attorney, which was at the time
exhibited to the other contracting parties. But this was a- joint power
of attorney, given to VV. G. Campbell, M. B. Swanson and W. VV.
Felts, authorizing the three to act as agents in this transaction jointly.
Such a power conferred upon several can not be exercised by one
It isrequired that all
alone, at least in the case of private agencies.
must act together jointly in the execution of such an agency. Cald
well v. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; Story on Agency, § 42; Evans on Agen
cy (Ewe1i’s Ed.) *32.3
Nor could such a trust be delegated by one of such agents to another.
The prindpal is supposed to rely upon the personal integrity and ability
of each of his selected agents, these qualiﬁcations constituting the rea
il

Part of the opinion is omitted.
If the power is given to A. & B. as partners,

either may act for the part
Gorden v. Buchanan, 13 Tenn. (5 Yerg.) 71 (1833); Deakin v. Un
nership.
If all the
derwood. 37 Minn. 98. 33 N. W. 318, 5 Am. St. Rep. 827 (1887).
joint agents consent. then one may act for
Robbins v. Horgan, 192 1\In:;s_
0 all.
443, '78 N. E. 503 (1906).
If the authority shows an intent that part of the agents shall act, then
joint execution is not necessary. Cedar Rapids & St. P. ‘R. Co. v. Stewart,
a

. 25

Iowa,

115 (1868).

When the power is of a public nature, a majority may act, if all deliberated
or had an opportunity to do so. Patterson v. Leavitt, 4 Conn. 50. 10 Am. Dec,
Especially in matters ministerial. In re Bal
98 (1821). citing Co. Litt. 181b.
The same rule applies to a committee of
timore Turnpike, 5 Bin. 481 (1813).
McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154
directors of a corporation.
Mass. 277, 28 N. E. 245, 13 L. R. A. 559 (1891).
It is enough if a meeting has
been held which all might have attended, and which a majority did attend,
and the act was decided upon by a majority vote. Despatch Line of Packets
v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203 (1841).
'
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a1a.»e2s,

1).

R.

24s,

1

ARMSTRONG.
at

v.

B.

1

1822.

5

GUTHRIE
(Court of King's Bench,

at

it

is

is,

son of the trust. Hence, the maxim applies, “Delegatus non delegate
Story on Contr. § 127.
potest."
\Ve are satisﬁed from the testimony that neither Campbell nor
They
Swanson concurred with Felts in the execution of this power.
were not personally present at the time, and are not satisfactorily shown
to have afterwards assented to what he did in the attempted execu
tion of their joint authority. The power was not, therefore, legally ex
ecuted, and the contract made by Felts, acting alone, conferred no lien
in favor of the complainants upon the proceeds of the various collateral
securities placed by Dryer in the hands of Lehman, Durr & Co.
\Ve see nothing in the record authorizing us to infer that any other
person or persons had authority from the deceased either to make or
to ratify the contract attempted to be made between Felts and the com
plainants, as stated in the bill.
in our judgment, free from error.
The decree of the chancellor
and
affirmed.

E. o. L.

343.)

on
Assumpsit
policy of insur
ance. Plea, general issue. At the trial at the last assizes for North
umberland before Bayley,
question arose as to the execution of
In order to prove this,
the policy by the defendant.
power of attor
ney signed by the defendant was produced, b'y which he constituted
ﬁfteen persons, there named, “his true and lawful attorneys, jointly
and separately for him, and in his name, to sign and underwrite all such
policies of insurance, as they his said attorneys or any of them should
The policy was executed for
jointly and separately think proper.”
the defendant, by four of the persons named in the power of attor
suﬂicient execution of the‘ pow
ney. The leamed judge thought this
verdict.
er. but reserved the point. The plaintiff having obtained
nonsuit. This was
Williams moved to enter
naked authority.
In Viner’s Abridgment. title Au
and must be construed strictly.
laid down thus: “If
letter of attorney to make
thority, B. Pl.
livery of seisin conjunctim et divisim be made to three and two of
not good, for this
not
them make livery. the third being absent,
And Com. Dig. Attorney, C.
exactly
conjunctim nor divisim.”
stated, “If
charter
to the same effect. And in Co. Litt. 181b,
of feoﬁment be made, and letter of attorney to four, or three, jointly
or severally to deliver seizin, two cannot make livery, because
neither by the four or three jointly, nor any of them severally.” _ Here,
neither executed
to ﬁfteen jointly or severally, and
the power
by the whole jointly, nor by one of them severally. The latter words,
“or any of them,” only apply to the persons who are to exercise the
discretion, but they have no reference to the authority itself.
a
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is

it
is

is

is

it

a

it
is
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a
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against the defendant as underwriter
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The law undoubtedly
as stated by Mr. Williams,
ABBOTT, C.
VVhenever a
but we are not disposed to extend the rule further.
case exactly similar to those cited shall occur, the Court will feel itself
bound by them. But in this case we ought to look at the whole instru
is.
no doubt what the meaning of
ment: and
we do so, there
Here,
power
given to ﬁfteen persons jointly and severally to ex
ecute such policies as they or any of them shall jointly’ or severally
think proper. The true construction of this
as
seems to me, that
the power
given to all or_ any of them to sign such policies, as all or
The argument is, that the latter
any of them should think proper.
words only apply to the persons who are to exercise the discretion.
That would have been quite correct,
those had been different from
But they are the same; these
the persons entrusted with the power.
latter words, therefore, control the meaning of the former, and the
verdict
right.
Rule refused.
\

(Supreme Court of the United States, 1831. -

Pet. 319,

8

COURTNEY.‘

v.

5

CLARKE’S LESSEE

L. Ed.

140.)

if

*

*

it
is

is

is,
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is,
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a
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a
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large number of persons in possession of
Ejectment against
large
tract of land in Kentucky.
Plaintiff claimed under demise from James
B. Clarke, and some of the defendants on
deed of relinquishment by
Carey L. Clarke, as attorney in fact of ]ames B. Clarke and wife.
STORY, I.‘ [After holding that the power of attorney gave no au
But
this objection were
thority to make such
release:]
another, which, though apparently of
not insuperable, there
tech
It
nical nature,
fatal to the relinquishment.
that the deedﬂis not
executed in the names of Clarke and his wife, but by the attorney, in
not, then, the deed of the principals, but the deed
his own name.
“I, the said Carey L. Clarke, attor
of the attorney. The language
ney as aforesaid,” &c. “do hereby relinquish,” &c.
and the attesting
“In witness whereof the said Carey L. Clarke, attorney as
clause
aforesaid, haslhereunto subscribed his hand and seal, this 25th day of
November, in the year of our Lord 1800.
Carey L. Clarke, [L. S.]”
The act does not therefore purport to be the act of the principals,
but of the attorney. It
his deed, and his seal, and not theirs. This
may savour of reﬁnement, since
apparent that the party intended

(1

3

5

&

9

9

1

4An act done under an authority must be done in pursuance of that au
thority. Clinan v. Cooke,
Sch. v. Lef. 32,
Rev. Rep,
It an agent
(1802).
ﬁlling up a blank note exceeds his authority, the note is not void in toto,
but only for the excess amount.
Johnson v. Blasdale,
Miss.
Smedes &
As to separable and inseparable contracts, cf.
M.) 17, 40 Am. Dec. 85 (1843).
N. w. Ry. Co., 49 Wis. 57,
Gano v. o.
N. W. 45 (1ss0), and Choteau v.
5

Allen, 70 Mo. 290 (1879).
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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of his principals.

815

But

the law looks not

to the intent alone, but to the fact whether that intent has been executed
in such a manner as to possess

a legal validity.“

.

[Omitting quotation from Combes’ Case, ante, p. 3081']
Such is the language of the report, and it has been quoted at large,
because it has been much commented on at the bar; and it points out
a clear distinction between acts done in pais, and solemn instruments
or deeds, as to the mode of their execution by an attorney. It has been
supposed that the doctrine of Lord Holt in Parker v. Kett, l Salk. 95,
and better reported in 2 Mod. R. 466, intimated a different opinion.
But correctly considered it is not so. Lord Holt expressly admits
(468), that the doctrine in Combes’ Case, that he who acts under another
ought to act in his name, is good law beyond dispute: and the case
there was distinguishable;
for it was the case of a subdeputy steward,
However
appointed to receive asurrender, which was an act in pais
this may be, it is certain that Combes’ Case has never been departed
from, and has often been acted upon as good law. In Froutin v. Small,
2 Ld. Raym. l4l8,.where a lease was made between M. F. “attorney of
]. F.” of the one part, and the defendant of the other part, of certain
premises for seven years, in a suit for rent by M. F., it was held that
the lease was void for the very reason assigned in Combes’ Case.
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert (4 Bac. Abridg. Leases and Terms for years,
I, lO, 140) has expounded the reasons of the doctrine with great clear
ness and force; and it was fully recognized in White v. Cuyler, 6 T.
If it were necessary it
Rep. 176, and VVilks v. Back, 2 East. 142.
4
might easily be traced back to an earlier period than Combes’ Case.
Bac. Abridge. Leases and Terms for years, I, 10, 140, 141; Com. Dig.
Attorney, C. 14; Moore, 70. In America, it has been repeatedly the
subject of adjudication, and has received a judicial sanction. The cases
of Bogart v. De Bussy. 6 Johns. 94, Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14,
and Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126, are directly in point.
It appears to us, then, upon the grounds of these authorities, that the
deed of relinquishment to the state was inoperative; and consequently
the court erred in refusing the instruction prayed by the plaintiff, that
it did not bind him; and in directing the jury, that if the execution of it
was proved, it was a bar to the recovery of the land described therein.
* * * Reversed.
I

of the early cases is given in Townsend v. Corning,
While courts will interpret the words in n deed so as
to effectuate the intent of the parties appearing from the whole instrument,
yet the words must be th'ere to interpret: The court cannot supply these. nor
Cadcll v. Allen. 99 N. C. 542, 6
may they he supplied by evidence aliunde.
That it is absurd to give a seal the effect of changing the
S. E. 399 (1888).
parties liable on a contract was pointed out in Eckhart V. Reldel, 16 Tex.
6An interesting

23 Wend.

62 (1856).

435

review

(1840).
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WILEY
(Supreme

v.

i

SHANK.

Court of Indiana,

1837.

A

4

I

(Part 2

I

Blackt_

420?)

contract by which two persons by name, describing themselves
of a certain school district, agree that the “trustees” shall
pay a teacher a certain sum for his services, and which is executed
by those persons in their own names, is binding upon them individ
ually." * * *
as trustees

_

PRATT
(Supreme

v.

Court of Minnesota,

BEAUPRE.
1868.

13

Minn.

187

[Gi‘l. 177].)

MCMILLAN, J. This action is brought by the plaintiff to recover
damages for an alleged breach of a contract to transport and deliver
certain flour. The contract is in the following words:
,
“St. Paul, May 6, 1863.
“We, Temple & Beaupre, of St. Paul, Ramsey county, Minnesota,
for the consideration of $25 to us in hand paid, the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged, have bargained, agreed, and contracted with
B. F. Pratt, of St. Peter, to receive at his millsin. St. Peter, county
of Nicollet, state aforesaid, one thousand and four htmdred barrels
(1,400) of ﬂour, and transport the same and deliver to Capt. M. P.
Small, commissary of subsistence for the United States, on the levee
in St. Paul, at such time as he, the said Small, shall direct, for the
sum of 25 cents for each barrel so transported and delivered in good
order.
Temple & Beaupre,
[Signed]
“‘A'gents Steamer Flora.

“B. F. Pratt.”
The words, “agents steamer Flora,” attached to the signature of
The rule is, that when
Temple & Beaupre, are descriptio personarum.
words which may be either descriptive of the person, or indicative
of the character in which a person contracts, are amxed to the name
of a contracting party, prima facie they are descriptive of the person
only; but the fact that they were not intended by the parties as de
scriptive of the person, but were understood as determining the char
acter in which the party contracted may be shown by extrinsic evi
but the burden of proof rests upon the party seeking to change
the prima facie character of the contract.
And when a party who thus
seeks to change the prima facie character of the contract, seeks to do
so on the ground of agency in making the contract, the fact of his
agency must be established, for if he acted a's an agent without au
thority he is personally liable.
On the trial of this cause the only evidence was the deposition on
the part of the ‘plaintiff.
The defendant offered no evidence. There
dence,

7

Part of the case is omitted.
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is no evidence to establish the fact of the agency of Temple & Beaupre.
In the absence of evidence to prove that fact, those portions of the
deposition of the plaintiff indicated by the letters A, B, C, respectively,
although under other circumstances they might be competent as evi
dence tending to show that the plaintiff contracted with them as agents,
are not material.
They were therefore properly stricken out. This
determines the only point raised by the appellant’s counsel.
The judgment below is aﬁirmed.

-ii

FRAMBACH
(Supreme Court of Colorado,

v;

1905.

FRANK.
33 Colo. 529, 81 Pac.

241.)

Action on a contract signed by the agent, Frambach, by which he,
acting f_o_§_l1_i_mself and for the Cripple Creek Beam Milling Company,
agrees to certain terms about the purchase of a mill, and, in case of
purchase, to the issue to Frank of a one-fourth interest in the mill.
Frambach purchased the mill for the company, and on this action
by Frank judgment was rendered for plaintiff for $13,000.
GODDARD, J. We think it satisfactorily appears from the evidence
that the appellant was the authorized agent of the company, and acted
as such agent in the purchase of the mill.
The question to be deter
is
whether
this
therefore,
by its terms, imposes a
agreement,
mined,
personal obligation upon the appellant to pay the amount agreed to be
In
paid the appellee, notwithstanding the property was so purchased.
other words, does the language used in the agreement, when construed
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, ex vi termini, bind the
appellant, or does it obligate the company only to ‘pay to the appellee
l
the consideration mentioned?
It is well settled that an agent may bind his principal by a written
contract not under seal without executing the same in the name of
the principal, if, from the whole instrument, it may be gathered that
In such case,
he either acts as agent or intends to bind his principal.
he
the
instrument
in
his
own
name
will not be
executes
although he
personally bound unless the language shows a clear intent to the con
trary; and the presumption is that an apparent agent intends to bind
his principal, and not himself. In Story on Agency (9th Ed.) § 160a,
the rule in respect to written contracts not under seal is stated as fol
lows: “It is very clear from the authorities that it is not indispensa
ble, in order to bind the principal, that such a contract should be exe
It will be suffi
cuted in the name and as the act of the principal.
cient if, upon the whole instrument, it can be gathered from the terms
thereof that the party describes himself and acts as agent, and in
In gen
tends thereby to bind the principal, and not to bind himself.”
eral when a person acts and contracts avowedly as the agent of an
other, who is known as the principal, his acts and contracts, within

»
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1;

the scope of his authority, are considered the acts and contracts of
the principal and involve no personal liability on the part of the agent.
1 Am. 8: Eng. Ency. Law (Zd Ed.) 1119; \Vhitney v. VVyman, 101
U. S. 392, 25 L. Ed. 1050; Smith v. Alexander, 31 Mo. 193; Rathbon
v. Budlong,
Hall v. Huntoon, 17 Vt. 244, 44 Am. Dec.
Johns.
332;
Clark
Marshall on Corps.
1860,
615a; Magill v. Hims
Conn. 465, 16 Am. Dec. 70.‘
dale,
appears from the face of the agreement under consideration that
was contemplated and understood by the appellant and appellee
that the former might act in one of two capacities in purchasing the
in his own behalf, or as agent of the Cripple Creek
mill—personally
Beam Milling Con1'pan}"—and only in the event he should act in the
representative capacity was the appellee entitled to the compensation
sued for. Eliminating that part of the agreement which refers to the
obligations of the appellant in the event that he should elect to purchase
the mill for himself, there remains
complete agreement in which
full disclosure of the name of his principal, and the fact that
there
appellant was acting as the agent of such ‘principal, thus showing the
capacity in which the promise was made, and who was intended to be
V
bound thereby.
.
We think, therefore, that, when tested by the foregoing rule, the
agreement clearly evidences the obligation of the company, and exon
erates the appellant from any personal liability thereunder, and the
court below erred in rendering judgment against him.
In this ‘view
of the instrument,
becomes unnecessary to notice the objection urged
against its validity, as the judgment must be reversed for the reasons
<
»
given.
Reversed.

I

it

8

When the agent signs in the name of his principal, the latter only is liable
on the contract.
To admit parol evidence to show
was intended to be the
agent’s contract would be to contradict the writing, which is not allowable.
Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 11 S. W. 165. 15 Am. St. Rep. 764 (1889).
Unless there are in the contract apt words to bind the agent. he will not
be liable on the contract. Jenkins v. Hutchinson,
13 Q. B. 744, 66 E. C. L.
743 (1849): Ogden v. Raymond. 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429 (1%);
John
son v. Welch, 42 W. Va. 18, 24 S. E. 585 (1896); the more so it he be a public
agent whose authority is publicly known, McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197, 91
Am. Dec. 468 (1866).
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CITY OF DETROIT

v.

JACKSON.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1843.

Error

319

1 Doug. 106.)

on certiorari from Vi/ayne circuit court. Upon an agreement
to arbitration a judgment upon the award for $2,204
had been entered against the city.
Among other errors it was assigned
that the submission to arbitration was not duly executed by the city.
* * * 2. It is contended that, admitting the au
F1-2LcH,].°
thority of Zina Pitcher to enter into the submission on behalf of the
plaintiffs in error, he has not so executed the agreement for submis
sion, as to bind his principals.
“The mayor, recorder, aldermen and
freemen of the city of Detroit, by Zina Pitcher, mayor of said city
and agent for ‘that purpose duly appointed,” is the description of the
contracting party in the body of the agreement; and the justice’s cer
tiﬁcate of its acknowledgment describes the party appearing before
But the agreement is signed “Zina
him in precisely th_e same words.
Pitcher, Mayor of Detroit,” without any other addition; and it is con
tended that a disclosure of the agency should have been made by an
addition to the signature,
as well as by description in the body of
'
the instrument.
It is perfectly competent for an agent, who has due authority to
contract on behalf of his principal, so to execute an instrument, as
Thus, in
to make himself personally responsible for his princi'pal.
529,
VVood,
7
17
Am.
Dec.
the
defendantidescribed
453,
Stone v.
Cow.
himself in the charter party on which the suit was brought, as agent
for J. & R. Raymond, but in fact agreed for himself, his executors
and administrators, to pay the freight therein mentioned, and was
In Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. 87, the
held to be bound personally.
contract was made between the defendant and “James Hillhouse, com
missioner of the school fund for the state of Connecticut, for and
in behalf of said state,” was under seal, and was signed “James Hill
house, Commissioner of the School Fund.” It was held that it was
not,the contract of the state. In Pentz v. Stanton, l0 \Vend. 271, 25
Am. Dec. 558, the plaintiff declared on a bill of exchange, drawn by,
The suit was against the principal,
and signed “H. T. \Vest, Agent.”
who was held not to be bound, his name not appearing on the bill.
Taft v. Brewster and others, was upon a bond, in which the defend
ants, by the name and description of “jacob Brewster, Thaddeus Loom
is and ]ose'ph Coats, trustees of the Baptist Society of the town of
Richﬁeld, acknowledged themselves to be held and ﬁrmly bound,” &c.
The same description was added to their signatures. It was held to
See, also,
be their individual bond, and not that of the Baptist Society.
White v. Skinner, 13 ]ohns. 307, 7 Am. Dec. 381; T ippets v. Walker,
4 Mass. 595.

for

9

a submission

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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In these and numerous other cases of the same class, the Court have
simply looked to the form of the instrument itself, in order to ascer
tain whether it is the contract of the principal, or of the agent per
sonally. If, by the terms of the agreement, a party describing himself
as agent, undertakes to do certain things, the mere addition of the
word agent, or indeed any other designation which he may add to his
Such addition
name, will not make it the contract of his principal.
will be regarded as mere description; and will not have the effect of
binding a third person, who is not, in form, made a party to the in
It is not enough that the person executing an instrument
strument.
have power as agent to bind a third person; he must, in fact, make it
the obligation of that person in terms, in order to bind him.
But in determining whether an instrument, executed by an agent,
contains the obligation of the principal, we are to look to the whole
instrument." The particular form of execution is not material, if it
be substantially done in the name of the principal.
Magill v. Hins
dale, 6 Conn. 464, 16 Am. Dec. 70; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 275,
25 Am. Dec. 558.
In this case, the plaintiﬁs in error are fully de
scribed in the body of the agreement for submission, as the contract
ing party. The submission is directly asserted to be theirs; the name
of the agent is given, as the instrument, through whom the act is done.
The agent does not purport to act for, or in any manner to bind him
On the contrary, the body of the instrument fully
self, personally.
shows, that he is the mere agent, and that the submission is the sub
mission of the plaintiifs in error.
It is in the precise form given in
Spencer v. Field, 10 \Vend. 87, as the proper form of drawing an in
It
strument, to be executed by an agent, so as to bind his principal.
is signed “Zina Pitcher, Mayor of Detroit.” Were there nothing in
the body of the instrument, which clearly showed who was the con
But
tracting party,\it would not certainly bind the plaintiifs in error.
No part
here, the capacity in which Pitcher acted, is fully explained.
of the instrument shows that he makes any contract individually; but
the whole of it shows that he acts as the agent for the plaintiffs in er
ror, and to have added or preﬁxed their name to his signature, would
have been but to repeat, in the same instrument, what already suﬁ'icient
ly appeared.

It is true there are cases which appear to establish the doctrine, that
the name of the principal must be signed to an instrument executed
by an agent._ But in the case of New England Marine Insurance Co.
1° The rigid rule as to deeds should not be extended to mercantile
transac
In the
tions. New England Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, 8 Pick. 56 (1829).
case of instruments not under seal the courts will look to the instrument to
learn what the intention is. Andrews v. Estes, 11 Me. 267, 26 Am. Dec. 521
This has been well expressed in Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392,
(1834).
395, 25 L. Ed. 1050 (1879), approved in Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v.
Moore, 183 U. S. 642, 22 Sup. Ct. 240, 46 L. Ed. 366 (1902):
A dismiminating review of the eases is given in Forsyth v. Day, 41 Me.
382 (1856), ante, p. 88, and a still more extensive one may be found in Shuey
v. Adair, 18 Wash. 188, 51 Pac. 388, 39 L. R. A. 473, 63 Am. St. Rep. 879 (1897).

I

Ch. 3)

EXECUTION

or

THE

auraonrrr

321

v. De VVolf, 8 Pick. 56, Parker, C. _I., in delivering the opinion of the
Court, remarks, that “the authoritiescited to maintain this position,
are of deeds only; instruments under seal."
N0 doubt this is the rule
in regard to sealed instruments.
Not only must the principal’s name be
signed to them, but his seal must be aﬁixed also. White v. Cuyler,
6 T. R. 176; Wilkes v. Back, 2 East, 142; Simonds v. Catlin, 2 Caines,
66; Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126; Combe's Case, 9
Co. 76b; F rontin v. Small, 2 Ld. Raym. 1418; Fowler v. Shearer, 7
Mass. 14; Stinchﬁeld v. Little, 1 Greenl. 231, 10 Am. Dec. 65. Where,

*

A. (2r>.En.)—21

I

Go1>n.Pn.&

*

principals.

*

it,

however, the instrument is not under seal, a different rule prevails.
In such cases, it is enough if the contract is made in the name of the
principal, and as his contract, through the agent, and the signature of
the agent is made to the instrument purporting to charge his principal.
In New England Marine Insurance Co. v. De Wolf, before cited, the
declaration was upon a guaranty endorsed on the back of a note, giv
en for a premium on insurance, as follows:
“By authority of ]. De
Wolf, junior, in a letter dated September 24, 1824, I hereby guaranty
Isaac C1ap.”
It
his payment of the premium or policy No. 10,079.
was heldthat the defendant was bound as guarantor of the notes;
Clap, the agent, having authority to sign for his principal, and his in
tention to do so, being evident from the warranty itself.
A familiar instance of the manner of executing a contract by an
They are, upon their face,
agent, is found in the case of bank bills.
the promises of the corporation by which they were issued; but they
are signed by the president and cashier, with an abbreviation showing
only the capacity in which they sign. It has never been contended,
that, because these agents did not add to their signatures the name
of the corporation, they were personally bound, and not the corpora
tion. Even where a check was drawn by the cashier of a bank, and
it appeared doubtful whether it was an oﬁicial or a private act, parol
evidence has been admitted to show that it was an otﬁcial act, for the
purpose of making the bank responsible. Mechanics’ Bank v. Bank of
Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326, 5 L. Ed. 100; Story on Agency, 268, note.
We entertain no doubt as to what is the proper construction of the
agreement for submission in this case. We think the plaintiffs in er
ror must be regarded as one of the contracting parties, although their
without adding the name of his
agent has signed his own name to
.
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HIGGINS
(Court

of Exchequer,

v.

(Part

2

SEN IOR."

1811.

8 Mees. &

W.

834.)
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Special assumpsit for compensation for the non-delivery of iron.
Defendant claimed he contracted only as agent.
PARKE, B. The question in this case, which was argued before us
(PARKE, ALDERSON, GURNEY, and ROLFE, BB.) in the course of the last
term, may be stated to be, whether in an action on an agreement in
writing, purporting on the face of it to be made by the defendant, and
subscribed by him, for the sale and delivery by him of goods above the
value of £10, it is competent for the defendant to discharge himself, on
an issue on the plea of non assumpsit, by proving that the agreement
was really made by him by the authority of and as agent for a third
person, and that the plaintiff knew those facts, at the time when the
agreement was made and signed. Upon consideration, we think that it
was not; and that the rule for a new trial must be discharged.
There is no doubt, that where such an agreement is made, it is com
petent to show that one or both of the contracting parties were agents
for other persons, and acted as such agents in making the-contract, so
as to give the beneﬁt of the contract on the one hand to (Garrett v.
Handley, 4 B. & Cr. 664; Bateman v. Phillips, 15 East, 272), and
charge with liability on the other (Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East,
62, post, p. 677), the unnamed principals; and this, whether the agree
ment be or be not required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds:
It does
and this evidence in no way contradicts the written agreement.
not deny that it is binding on those whom, on the face of
purports
to bind; but shows that
also binds another, by reason that the act
of the agent, in signing the agreement, in pursuance of his authority,
in law the act of the principal.
But, on the other hand, to allow evidence to be given that the party
who appears on the face of the instrument to be personally a con
not such, would be to allow parol evidence to con
tracting party,
And this view
tradict the written agreement; which cannot be done.
of the law accords with the decisions, not merely as to bills of exchange
C.
M. 371
Tyr. 320; Lefevre v. Lloyd,
(Sowerby v. Butcher,
Marsh. 318) signed by
Taunt. 749;
person, without stating his
agency on the face of the bill; but as to other written contracts, name
Ad.
Ell. 486,
Nev.
A. 677,
ly, the cases of jones v. Littledale,
VV. 440.
and Magee v. Atkinson,
M.
true that the case of

‘

J

11 Accord: Darrow v. Horne Produce
Co. (C. C.) 57 Fed. 463 (1893), in
which Baker. J., quotes at large from leading authorities; Weston v. Mc
Millan, 42 Wis. 567 (1877); So. Pac. Co. v. Von Schmidt Dredge Co., 118 Cal.
In Schenck
22 Mo. 397 (1856).
368. 50 Pac. 650 (1897); Higgins v. Dellinger.
Eq. 44, 19 Atl. 881 (1890), the doctrine
v. Spring Lake Beach Imp. Co., 47 N.
is denied, but this seems to conﬂict with Borcherling v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq.
150 (1883), and Smith v. Felter, 63 N. J. Law, 30, 42 Atl. 1053 (1899).
Gonn.Pa.& A. (2D En.)
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Jones v. Littledale might be supported on the ground that the agent
really intended to contract as principal; but Lord Denman, in deliver
ing the judgment of the court, lays down this a.s a general proposi
tion, “that if the agent contracts in such a form as to make himself
personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal
were or were not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself
from that responsibility.”
And this is also laid down in Story on
Agency, § 269.
Magee v. Atkinson is direct authority, and cannot be
distinguished from this ca.se.
The case of \'Vilson v. Hart, 7 Taunt. 295, 1 Moore, 45, which was
cited on the other side, is clearly distinguishable.
The contract in writ
with another persdn named Read, appearing
ing was, on the face of
to be the principal buyer; but there being evidence that the defendant
fraudulently put forward Read as the buyer, whom he knew to be in
solvent, in order to pay
debt from Read to himself with the goods pur
was held,
chased, and having subsequently got possession of them,
Taunt. 274, and other cases, that
on the principle of Hill v. Perrott,
observed by Mr. Smith, in the
the defendant was liable; and as
very able work to which we are referred, (Leading Cases, vol.
p.
had
125,) that decision turned altogether upon the fraud, and
not,
would have been an authority for the admission of parol evi
dence to charge the defendant not to discharge Read.
Rule discharged.

BARBRE

v.

(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1896.

GOODALE.
28 Or. 465, 38 Pac. 67, 43 Pac. 378.)

is

*

is

is

is

a

is

it

J."

*

].

a

Action on contract for logs, executed under seal, by G. W. Hand
saker and
C. Goodale. After about three-fourths of the logs had
been delivered Goodale refused to take any more, and Barbre sues to
recover under the contract upon parol evidence that Handsaker was
Barbre’sagent, and had signed the contract in his name instead of Bar
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant
b'rE'§"'by consent of defendant.
appeals.
* The question
\VoLvER'roN,
here presented wheth
to
show by parol testimony that
contract executed
er
competent
the contract of the principal, where
by and in the name of an agent
the principal was known to the other contracting party at the date of
its execution.
There are two opinions touching the question among
American authorities,-—the one aﬂirming, and the other denying; but
the case
one of ﬁrst impression here, and we feel constrained to adopt
the rule which may seem the more compatible with the promotion of
justice, and‘ the exaction of honest and candid transactions between
The English authorities are agreed that parol evidence
individuals.
1!

Part of the Opinion is omitted.
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admissible to show that a written contract executed in the name of an
agent is the contract of the principal, whether he was known or un
known; and the American authorities are a unit so far as the rule is
applied to an unknown principal, but disagree where he was known
at the time the contract was executed or entered into by the parties.
All the authorities, both English and American, concur in holding that,
as applied to such contracts executed when the principal was unknown,
parol evidence which shows that the agent who made the contract in his
own name was acting for the principal does not contradict the writing,
but simply explains the transaction; for the effect is not to show that
the person appearing to be bound is not bound, but to show that some
other person is bound also.
And those authorities which deny the ap
plication of the rule where the principal was known do not assert or
maintain that such parol testimony tends to vary or contradict the writ
ten contract, but ﬁnd support upon the doctrine of estoppel; it being
maintained that a party thus dealing with an agent of a known prin
cipal elects to rely solely upon the agent’s responsibility, and is there
‘
fore estopped to proceed against the prinCip3.l.
The underlying principle, therefore, upon which the authorities seem
to diverge, is the presumption created by the execution of the contract
in the name of the agent, and the acceptance thereof by a party, where
the principal-is known.
Is this presumption conclusive, or is it dis
to reconcile the decisions,“
l/Vithout
attempting
putable?
VVe be
lieve the better rule to be that the presumption thus created is a dis
putable one, and that the intention of the party must be gathered from
his words, and the various circumstances which surround the trans
action, as its practical effect is to promote justice and fair dealing.
The principal may have recourse to the same doctrine to bind the party
thus entering into contract with his agent.
Parol evidence, however,
is not admissible to discharge the agent, as the party with whom he
has dealt has his election as to whether he will hold him or the prin
cipal responsible. This doctrine must be limited to simple contracts,
and may not be extended to negotiable instruments and specialties un
der seal, as they constitute an exception to the rule. As bearing upon
these deductions, see 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 392; Briggs v. Part
limit the operation of this rule to cases where the principal
undisclosed.
Ford v. Williams, 62 U. S. (21 How.) 287, 16 L. Ed. 36
(1858), post, p. 758, and others to contracts doubtful
upon their face, Arm
strong v. Andrews, 109 Mich. 537, 67 N. W. 567 (1896).
If the contract clearly
states who is liable’ parol evidence is not admissible to fasten liability on an
other.
Rowell v. Oleson. 32 Minn. 288, 20 N. W. 227 (1884); Vail v. North
western L. Ins. Co., 192 Ill. 567, 61 N. E. 651 (1901).
The rule can have no
application to a case in which the agent had no authority to contract for the
principal and has contracted in his own name. Estrella Vineyard Co. v. But
ler, 125 Cal. 232, 57 Pac. 980 (1899).
It is not essential that the agent sign the paper in the principal’s name,
though of course he should do so. It is enough if in the body of the paper it
appears that the note is the note of the principal. Haskell v. Cornish, 13 Cal.
45 (1859).
Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271, 25 Am. Dec. 558 (1833).
13 Some courts

was
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ridge, 64 N. Y. 362, 363, 21 Am. Rep. 617; Nicoll v. Burke, 78 N. Y.
583; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 380, 12
L. Ed. 465 ; Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 703, 18 L. Ed. 527; Stowell v.
Eldred, 39 Wis. 626; Chandler v. Coe, S4 N. H. 561; Ford v, WVil
liams, 21 How. 289, 16 L. Ed. 36; Hunter v. Giddings, 97 Mass. 41, 93
Am. Dec. 54; Trueman v. Loder, 11 Adol. & E. 589; Higgins v.
Senior, 8 Mees. & W. 843; Calder v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P. 486;
-Mechem, Ag. §§- 449, 698, 699.
an instrument is valid without a
seal, although executed under seal, it is to be treated as written evidence
of a simple contract; and the seal adds nothing, except, under our
statute, it is made primary evidence of a consideration.
Stowell v.
Eldred, supra; Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 45 Am. Rep. 314;
Rector, etc., v. Wood, 24 Or. 404, 34 Pac. 18, 41 Am. St. Rep. 860.
Now, looking to the contract which is the basis of the cause of ac
tion under consideration, we ﬁnd that it was executed in manner and
form as requested by the defendant, and to subserve a special purpose
peculiar to his own interest, with the €?SPI.'€$s avowal that it should be
treated as the contract of plaintiff, although executed in the name of
It is further disclosed that both the defendant
Handsaker, the agent.
ind "£113 plaintiﬁ afterwards so treated it; the plaintiff proceeding un
der
and in obedience with the terms and conditions thereof, in cut
ting, hauling, and banking the logs preparatory to delivery, and the
defendant by making payments to him from time to time, sometimes
This
ratiﬁ
directly, and sometimes through Handsaker, the agent.
cation, and constitutes
Aside
very signiﬁcant feature of the inquiry.
from this, the contract discloses upon its face that
part of the con
sideration for these logs moved directly from defendant to plaintiff.
Under these attendant circumstances, and others which might be
luded to, we think the court committed no error in admitting the tes
timony to show who were the real parties to the contract, as well as
to explain how the clause touching the $1,700 came to be placed therein.
The admission of the parol evidence touching this clause may be up
held as being explanatory of the consideration which in part supports
Afﬁrmed.
the contract.

*

*

*
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WEBSTER

(Supreme Court of Nebraska,

v.

2

‘

WRAY.

19 Neb. 558, 27 N.

1886.

(Part

W.

644,

56 Am.

Rep.

754.)

Action against E. D. VVebster on four contracts made by his son,
Thomas B., in his own name, in connection with the business of a
In
cattle ranch owned by defendant, but run in the name of his son.
17 Neb. 579, 24 N. W. 207, the judgment for plaintiff was aﬁirmed.
It now comes up on a rehearing.
.
* * * The point upon which the rehearing was al
COBB,
lowed, and upon which we think the case turns, is that while in the
case of contracts, generally, where one of the persons executing the
same executes it in his own name, without disclosing any one as his
principal or his own character as an agent, if in point of fact he was
acting as the agent of another party, such other party will be held
to be the real party to the contract, yet that this rule does not apply
to negotiable promissory notes.
This question was ably argued at the
bar, as well as by exhaustive briefs by counsel on either side. An ex
amination of the authorities cited by counsel, with others referred to
therein, led us all, at the consultation, to the conclusion that the above
proposition as to both its branches expresses the law correctly.
Being
about to enter upon a collation of authorities upon this point of the
non-liabilitylof an unnamed principal upon negotiable paper, my at
tention was attracted to a citation on page 284, 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst.,
This
to an article in l3 Alb. Law I. N0. 19, May 6, 1876, p. 323.
article I ﬁnd so exhaustive of the subject that I will content myself
by giving the conclusions of the writer, and the authorities by him
cited. Says our author: “But as to bills of exchange and promissory
notes, it has been long settled that he who takes negotiable paper con
tracts with him who, on its face, is a party thereto, and with no other
person. By Lords Abinger and Parke, Beckham v. Drake, 9 Mees. &
W. 92, 96; Byles, Bills, 37; Story, Bills, § 76; Edw. Bills, 80.”
Hence evidence is not admissible to charge any other person thereon
upon the grounds of his having been the copartner or principal of the
Metc. Cont. 108; Draper v. Massachusetts Steam
party named.
heating Co., 5 Allen, 340. The rule is general, if not universal, that
neither the legal liability of an unnamed principal to be sued, nor his
legal right to sue on a negotiable instrument, can be shown by parol
evidence (Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 334, per Metcalf, ].), even as be
tween the immediate parties to the transaction, and although an agency
is disclosed upon the face of the instrument, where the word “agent”
or something equivalent is added to the signature of the party signing
See cases below.
the instrument.

J.“

14 Part

of the opinion is omitted.

T

-

0

nxncorron or THE AUTHORITY

Ch. 3)

327

-

is

8

7

6

5

it

is

It

it,

The rule excluding all parol evidence to charge an unnamed prin
cipal as a party to negotiable paper is not placed upon the ground that
such evidence would contradict or alter the instrument;
but this ex
ception to the general rule which governs other parol (or unsealed)
agreements is derived from the nature of negotiable paper, which
being made for the purpose of being transferred from hand to hand,
and of giving to every successive holder as strong a claim upon the
maker as the original payee had, must indicate on its face who the
maker is; for any additional liability of the principal not expressed
in the form of such a note or bill would not be negotiable.“
Barlow v.
As between the unnamed prin
Congregational Soc., 8 Allen, 460.
cipal and a subsequent holder, the reason for the rule in question seems
but, as between the immediate par
perfectly clear and satisfactory;
For
ties to the transaction, does the reason for its application exist?
example: An agent purchases goods; discloses the name of his prin
cipal; and, having express authority, gives the‘ vendor a negotiable
promissory note for the price, signing it with his own name alone with
out any addition, or, let us say, with the addition of the word “agent,”
to his signature—in such a case it is held that the payee cannot recover
against the principal upon the instrument, because it is negotiable and
his name is not disclosed upon it. ‘But what material difference does
it make whether the instrument is negotiable, when it has not been
But it must be confessed that the weight of authority, if
negotiated?
not of reason, is in favor of the rule excluding all parol evidence, even
It is held that
as between the immediate parties to the transaction.
although -the party executing the instrument describes himself as
"agent,”_ yet, if the name of the principal is not disclosed upon the face
of
all evidence dehors the instrument, for the purpose of holding him
thereon,
to be excluded.
wholly immaterial, therefore, that the
in behalf of his principal; that the
agent had full authority to make
consideration was exclusively received for his beneﬁt; that the plaintiff
knew the agent’s principal, and accepted the note as the promise of the
VVilliams v. Robbins, 16 Gray, 77, 77 Am. Dec. 396; Slaw
principal.
Allen, 340, 81 Am. Dec. 750. See, also, Stackpole v.
son v. Loring,
Allen, 337;
Arnold, 11 Mass. 27,
Am. Dec. 150; Brown v. Parker,
Metc. 442; Bass v. O’Brien, 12
Bedford Com. Ins. Co. v. Covell,
4

a

‘courier without baggage,’ whose
15A negotiable instrument “is
Colo. 59 (1877),
nance is its passport," quoted in Ileaton v. Myers,
Sparks v. Dispatch Transp. Co., 101 Mo. 531, 15 S. W. 417, 12 L. R.
24 Am. St. Rep. 351 (1891), in which is an illuminating review of

counte
and in
A. 714,
the au

1

it_

a

7

a

thorities.
The distinction between such cases and cases in which the principal adopt
ed the agent’s name as his business soubﬂquet is discussed in Brown v. Par
Allen, 337 (1863). A recovery on the common counts of debt evidenced
ker,
by
bill of exchange was allowed in Thurston v. Mauro,
G. Greene (Iowa)
231 (1848), and in Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 44 (1862),
was held there
See, also, Chem. Nat. Bank v. City Bank, 156 Ill.
might be relief in equity.
Harper v. Tiﬂin Nat. Bank,
149, 40 N. E. 328 (1895) (recovery in assumpsit);
54 Ohio St. 425, 44 N. E. 97 (1896).
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Gray, 477 ; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271, 25 Am. Dec. 558 ; Thurs
ton v. Mauro, 1 G. Greene, 231; Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 45;
Anderton v. Shoup, 17 Ohio St. 125; Taber v. Cannon, 8 Metc. 456;
Eastern R. Co. v. Benedict, 5 Gray, S61, 66 Am. Dec.- 384; Bank of
America v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567, 66 Am. Dec. 390; De Witt v. Vi/alton,
9 N. Y. 571; Tucker Mfg. Co. v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass. 101.
No fault can be found with the opinion and decision of the court,
so far as the second and fourth causes of action are concerned; but in
regard to the ﬁr_st and thild causes of action, we fail to distinguish
between simple contracts in general and negotiable paper.
Upon reargument and reconsideration of the authorities, we reach
the conclusion that the district court erred in admitting
evidence.’
*
* The judgment of the district. court is therefore reversed, and
*
the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.

R

\

RICHMOND LOCOMOTIVE

MACHINE WORKS

&

v.

MORAGNE.

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

I

1898.

119

Ala.

80, 24 South.

834.)

Action on two notes signed, “I. M. Moragne, W. B. Beeson, G. W.
Wharton, Board of Business Managers.”
Defense, that defendants
were agents of the Etowah Alliance Manufacturing Company, an Ala
that plaintiﬂ‘ knew this, and so dealt with them in
and taking these notes for the price. Plaintiff
demurred, the demurrer was overruled, and plaintiff appeals.
McCLEI.LAN, ].
an agent, in the execution of a promissory note,
disclose his principal, make it appear on the face of the paper that it is
the contract of the principal, and sign it as agent, of course the prin
cipal is bound, the undertaking being within the agency; and the agent
is not.“ On the other hand, if a principal is not disclosed on the face
bama

corporation,

selling some machinery

If

16 The distinction between negotiable paper and other simple contracts
is
stated, and extensively illustrated, in Williams v. Robbins, 82 Mass. (16 Gray)
77, 77 Am. Dec. 396 (1860), and Bank of British North America v. Hooper,
71 Mass. (5 Gray) 567, 66 Am. Dec. 390 (1856).
To make liable on commercial
paper persons whose names do not appear upon it is alarming,
It is important
for ali- parties to know the security, and the parties liable, from the face ot
the bill. Fenn v. Harrison. 37 R. 761 (1799); Wheeled Scraper Co. v. Mc
Millen, 71 Nob. 686, 99 N. W. 512 (1904); Sydnor v. Hurd, 8 Tex. 98 (1852).
Ct. Carpenter v. Farnsworth. 106 Mass. 561, 8 Am. Rep. 360 (1871), in which
the words “2Etna Mills" printed in the margin of a check was held enough
to make the check the obligation
of the Etna Mills, and not of the agent
who signed the check “I. D. Farnsworth, Treasurer," with Cisco Nat. Bank
v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 310, 34 N. E. 908, 36 Am. St. Rep. 705 (1893), in which it
was held that the appearance of “Ridgewood Ice Co." in the margin of a note
was not a fact carrying any presumption that the note was, or was intended
to be, one of that company.
Indorsement
on negotiable paper payable to a corporation
by the proper
agents in their own names has often been held to be the indorsement of the
company.
Lay v. Austin, 25 Fla. 933, 7 South. 143 (1889). And so with drafts
u
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of the paper, and the party signing describes himself as agent, trustee,
or the like, without more, it is the obligation alone of the party whose
name is set to the paper, the superadded word or words being mere
descriptio personze, to be disregarded as surplusage; and evidence can
not be received to show that he was in fact the agent or trustee or the
like of an undisclosed principal, cestui que trust, or the like, and that
the obligation was that of such other person. And, again, if the paper
discloses the names of two parties either of whom may be the obligor,
and it is doubtful from the whole instrument which of the two is in
tended to be bound, and the signer describes himself as agent, or as
acting in other representative capacity, parol evidence is admissible
to show that it is the obligation of the party named in, but not signing,
the paper."
These propositions are not only settled by the great weight of au
thority in other jurisdictions, but they have been several times de
clared and reafﬁrmed by this court, and never departed from, as a
critical examination of the cases relied on by the appellees themselves
will demonstrate. Lazarus v. Shearer, 2 Ala. 718; Baker v. Gregory,
28 Ala. 550, 65 Am. Dec. 366 ;- Drake v. F lewellen, 33 Ala. 106; May
v. Hewitt, Id. 161; Ware v. Morgan, 67 Ala. 461; Collins v. Ham
mock, 59 Ala. 448. In all these cases, where parol evidence was let in,
the names of two or more possible obligors appear on the face of the
instrument in such way as to_ render it doubtful from the paper itself
which of them was intended to be bound, the question being thus
This is not true of the
brought within the category last above stated.
instrument now before us. The only possible obligors upon it are those
whose names are signed to it. The only other name upon the paper
The name of no other possible obligor being dis
is that of the payee.
closed, the words, “Board of Business Managers," following the signa
tures of the defendants, it being in no wise indicated of what or of
whom they are business managers, are merely descriptive of the per
sons of the signers, and to be wholly disregarded as surplusage. Thus
drawn by the agent. Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189 (1875). The ditterence
between a maker of paper and the indorser or the drawer of a bill of ex
change is emphasized in Collins v. Buckeye State Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 215,
The acceptor of a bill, however, is treated like the
93 Am. Dec. 614 (1867).
Robinson v. Kanawha Valley Bank,
maker of a note, and not like an indorser.
44 Ohio St. 441, 8 N. E. 583, 58 Am. Rep. 829 (1886); Slawson v. Loring, 5
Allen, 340, 81 Am. Dec. 750 (1862).
17 When the names of both principal and agent appear in the instrument.
and the contract, though in the name of the agent, discloses a reference to
the business of the principal, so that the instrument as it stands is Consistent
with either view, ot its being the engagement of the principal, or that of the
agent, see Smith v. Alexander, 31 Mo. 193 (1860).
As to when parol evidence
may, and when it may not, be admitted, see the elaborate note in 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1045 to N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. Martindale, 75 Kan. 142, 88 Pac. 559, 121
St. Rep. 362, 12 Ann. Cas. 677 (1907); also Knippenberg
39 Mont. 11, 101 Pac. 159 (1909).
Ct. Merchants’ Bank of Macon v. Central Bank of Georgia,
Am. Dec. 665 (1846).

Am.

Min. Co.,

v.

Greenwood

1 Ga. 418,
"

44
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the case is brought within the second category above stated,

and the de
fendants should not have been allowed to plead or prove that it was
the intention of the parties to the note to bind the Etowah Alliance
Manufacturing Company, of which they were the board of business
.
managers, and not themselves individually.
The rulings of the trial court were not in line with these views, and
its judgment must be reversed. The cause is remanded.

(Supreme

v.

Court of Michigan,
1893A.

\/VINEGAR."
$355

KEIDAN

430,

5'4

N. W.

901,

20

L. R.

)Mich.

18

Accord: Brown

v.

Parker,

7

is

;

is

;'

is

is

a

a

is

S.

I

MCGRATH, ].1" Plaintiﬁ’ had judgment upon the following promis
sory note: “$336.96-100. Grand Rapids, Mich., Dec. 22, 1887. Nine
promise to pay to the order of Geo. Keidan three
ty days after date,
hundred thirty-six and 96-100 dollars at the Old National Bank of
Grand Rapids, Mich., value received, with interest at the rate of eight
V\/inegar, Ag-t.”
per cent. per annum until paid. W.
Defendant, with his plea, ﬁled an affidavit setting forth “that the
attached to the declaration in said cause, and
note,
copy of which
served u'pon said deponent, with
not
copy of said declaration,
and he denies the
the note of this deponent, defendant as aforesaid;
same and the execution thereof, and says that he, said defendant,
not indebted to said plaintiﬁ upon said note, nor for any part there
of, nor
he indebted to said plaintiﬁ in any sum whatever, nor in any
manner whatever.”
Upon the trial defendant offered to show that in 1884, before plain
tiff had any dealings with defendant, plaintiﬂ was informed that de~
fendant was carrying on business as the agent of Maggie G. Winegar,
that business relations were
and was not doing business for himself
then established between plaintiﬁ and said Maggie G. Winegar; that
said business relations continued from the early part of 1884 to and
including the year 1887, and embraced many transactions between
plaintiﬁ’ and Maggie G. \/Vinegar; that many instruments were made
between the parties, which were signed exactly as the note sued upon
signed, and that this form of execution had come to be recognized
and adopted between the parties as binding Maggie G. Vi/inegar; that
during that time no business was transacted by the defendant in his
individual capacity, and all the business done was that of his prin
cipal, and known and understood to be such by plaintiff; that the
said note was given and accepted as the obligation of Maggie G. VV ine
gar that the note was given for duebills and goods furnished by plain
Allen (Mass)

Robson, 70 Ga. 595 (1883).
19 Part of the opinion is omitted.

’

337 (1863);

and cf. Rawlings v.
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tit? to Maggie G. Winegar, and such duebills and goods were by plain
tiff charged to said Maggie G. Winegar on the books of plaintiff ; that
the taking of these notes did not in the least change the character of
the indebtedness; and that defendant never received any beneﬁt or
consideration for said note. The court refused to admit the testimony,
and directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
The clear weight of authority is that the promise in the present
case is prima facie the promise of VVilliam S. W'inegar, and, as be
tween one of the original ‘parties and a third party, the addition of
the word “agent" is not sufﬁcient to put such third party upon inquiry.
The question here, however, is whether, a_s_ between
immedigte
Qarﬂes to the instrument, pa_rol evidence
admissible to show the real
character of the transaction.
In his excellent work on Agency, Mr. Mechem lays down the fol
lowing general rules, which we think are sustained by reason and the
weight of authority: “(1) Where the paper, on its face, is the under
taking of the agent only, no reference being made on its face to rep
resentative capacity, and where the paper, on its face, is unmistakably
the principal’s, parol evidence will not be received, in the one case
to exonerate, and in the other to charge, the agent.
(2) But where the
‘paper bears on its face some reference to a principal, or some appel
lation indicating representative character, while it is undoubtedly true
that the mere addition of the word ‘agent,’ ‘trustee,’ ‘treasurer,’ and
the like, or the mere recital in the body of the instrument that the per
son signing is such agent, treasurer, or trustee of a principal named
or unnamed, is, as has been seen, to be regarded, prima facie, as de
scriptio personae, merely, and not as characterizing the act as one done
in a representative capacity; and while it is true, as a general rule,
that parol evidence is not admissible to exonerate an agent from a
contract into which he has personally entered, yet it is believed that
the preponderance of authority will warrant the statement of the rule
that—First, between the immediate parties to a bill or note, ‘parol evi
dence is admissible to show (:1) that, by a course of dealing between the
parties, that form of execution has come to be the recognized and
adopted form by which the obligation of the principal is entered into;
or (b) that the instrument was, to the knowledge of the parties, in
_tended to be the obligation of the principal, and not of the agent, and
that it was given and accepted as such; (c) that an instrument which
is so ambiguous upon its face as to render it uncertain who was in
tended to be bound was known to be intended to be the obligation of
Mechem, Ag. § 443, and cases cited. See, also, 1 Amer.
the principal.”

Q

& Eng. Enc. Law, 390, 391.
_
In Metcalf v. Vi/illiams, 104 U. S. 93, 26 L. Ed. 665, Mr. justice
“The ordinary rule, undoubtedly, is that if a person
Bradley says:
merely adds to the signature of his name the word ‘agent,’ ‘trustee,’
or ‘treasurer,’ without disclosing his principal, he is personally bound.
It does not
The appendix is regarded as a mere descriptio personae.

\
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of itself make third persons chargeable with notice of any representa
tive relation of the signer. But if he be in fact a mere agent, trustee,
or oﬁicer of some principal, and is in the habit of expressing in that
way his representative character in his dealings with a particular party,
who recognizes him in that character, it would be contrary to justice
and truth to construe the documents thus made and used as his per
sonal obligation, contrary to the intent of the parties.”
In Kean v. Davis, 21 N. I. Law, 683, 47 Am. Dec. 182, Chief Jus
tice Green says: “The question is not, what is the true construction
of the language of the contracting party? VV hose language is it? And
the evidence is not adduced to discharge the agent from a personal
liability which he has assumed, but to prove that in fact he never
incurred that liability; not to aid in the construction of the instru
Now, it is true that the
ment, but to prove whose instrument it is.
construction of a written contract is a question of law, to be settled
But whether the con
by the court upon the terms of the instrument.
tract was in point of fact executed, when it was made, and by whom
it was made, are questions of fact, to be settled by a jury, and are
provable in many instances by parol, even though the proof conﬂicts
with the language of the instrument itself.”
In Hicks v. Hinde, 9 Barb. 528, where an agent drew a bill on his
principal for a debt due from the principal to the payee, adding the
word “agent” to his signature, and the payee knew that the drawer
was authorized by his principal to draw the bill as his agent, and it
was the understanding of all parties that the drawer signed only as
agent, and not with a view of binding himself, it was held that the
drawer was not personally liable on the bill.” * * *
As is so often said, it is the intent of the parties which is to be
The rule that rejects words added to the
carried out by the courts.
is
an
one.
Its reason is not so much that the
arbitrary
signature
words are not, or may not be, suggestive, but that they are but sug
gestive, and the instrument, as a whole, is not suﬁiciently complete
to point to other parentage. The very suggestiveness of these added
words has given rise to an irreconcilable confusion in the authorities
as to the legal effect of such an instrument.
Extrinsic evidence, there
fore, is admissible in such case, between the immediate parties, to ex
plain a suggestion contained on the face of the instrument, and to
carry out the contract actually entered into as suggested, but not fully
shown, by the note itself.
The presumption that persons dealing with negotiable instruments
take them on the credit of the parties whose names appear should not
be absolute in favor of the immediate payee, from whom the consid
in a suit between the parties: Hardy v. Pilcher, 57 Miss. 18.
v. Green
Rep. 432 (1879). See the extended review in Knlppenberg
wood Min. Co., 39 Mont. 11, 101 Pac. 159 (1909).
Elfect of Negotiable Instruments Law as to descrlptio pel‘SOnl1!. Haupt v.
Vint, 68 W. Va. 657, 70 S. E. 702, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 518, post, p. 584 (1911).
2° Accord,

34 Am.

I
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eration passed, who must be deemed to have known all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the inception of the note, and with such
In the case
knowledge accepted a note containing such a suggestion.
of Tilden v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 376, 5 N. W. 420, 38 Am. Rep. 197,
under a state of facts similar to those offered to be shown here, it
was held that defendants there were not liable.
VVe think that in the present case defendant was entitled to make
the showing offered. Under the general issue, defendant was entitled
to give in evidence any matter of defense going to the existence of
l Shinn, Pl. & Pr.
any promise having legal force, as against him.
§ 740.

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.
justices concurred.

LIEBSCHER
(Supreme

C01lI.‘t Of Wisconsin,
1889.
496, 17 Am.

ORTON,
note:

J.

74

KRAUS.

v.

Wls.

387,

43

St. Rep. 171.)

This action was brought on

“$637.40. Milwaukee, january lst,
we promise to pay to Leo Liebscher,
dred and thirty-seven dollars and forty
“San Pedro Mining

The other

the

N. W.

166, 5

L. R. A.

following promissory

1887.
Ninety days after date
or order, the sum of six hun
cents, value received.

is

it,

and Milling Company.
“F. Kraus, President.”
The plaintiﬂ’ demands judgment on this note against both the cor
poration and Frederick Kraus, as joint makers. The defendant Kraus
answered that he signed the note for the said San Pedro Mining
& Milling Company, as its president, and not otherwise, and that his
signature was placed upon said note for the purpose of showing who
executed the same on behalf of said company, and as a part of the
The
corporation signature to the note, and for no other purpose.
plaintiff oﬁ'ered to prove on the trial, substantially, that Kraus did
not sign the name of the company, but signed his own name as a joint
maker, intending to bind himself, and that this was according to the
understanding of the parties at the time. This offer was rejected,
and a verdict in favor of Kraus was directed by the court. This evi
dence is admissible only on the ground that there is an ambiguity in the
If, in the law, this signing imports that both
signatures to the note.
the company and Kraus are jointly bound, or that only the company is
bound, there is no ambiguity, and parol evidence to alter or vary this
But if, in the law, such signing imports only
effect is inadmissible.
that both are bound, or the company only is bound, according to the
and the intention or un—
facts and circumstances in explanation of
an ambiguity, and the evidence
derstanding of the parties, then there
was proper.
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The contention of the learned counsel of the appellant that this
signing imports that both are bound is inconsistent with the offer
of such evidence. The learned counsel of‘ the appellant has ex
pressed, in his brief, the true principle as follows: “As to the ques
tion of parol evidence, the rule of law is that such evidence cannot
be admitted to vary the terms of a contract, or to show contrary in
tention than that disclosed by the instrument, unless there is an am
This has been often decided to be the law by this court.
biguity.”
Foster v. Clifford, 44 Wis. 569, 28 Am. Rep. 603; Cooper v. Cleg
horn, 50 \2Vis. 113, 6 N. VV. 491; Hubbard v. Marshall, SO Wis. 322,
6 N. VV. 497; Gillmann v. Henry, 53 Wis. 470, 10 N. W. 692.
There appears fo be an inconsistency in cases where it is ﬁrst held
that such a note ipso facto binds the person who signed it with his
official name, and yet that parol evidence might be given to make it
I-leffner v. Brownell, 70 Iowa, 591, 31 N. W. 947.
This
certain.
case is mentioned as the only one in which it has been decided that
but there
such signing binds the person as well as the corporation;
would seem to be somewhat of an ambiguity in the opinion.
In
Bean v. Mining Co., 66 Cal. 451, 6 Pac. 86, 56 Am. Rep. 106, it seems
to have been decided that a similar note bound the company alone,
but that parol evidence was proper to explain it. No case is cited,
and I can ﬁnd none, where it has been decided squarely that such a
note bound both the company and the person whose name appears
below, with the name of his oﬁice or agency, or bound the company
alone, except the case of Chase v. Pattberg, 12 Daly, 171, where the
note was:
“We promise to pay,” etc. “[Signed] English S. M. Co.
H. Pattberg, Manager;” and it was decided that the company was
not bound, and that Pattberg was.
The authorities are generally the other way. In Draper v. Steam
“We promise to pay,” etc.
Heating Co., 5 Allen, 338,- the note was:
“[Signed] Massachusetts Steam-Heating
Company.
L. S. Ffuller,
In Castle v. Foundry Co., 72 Me. 167, it was:
Treasurer.”
“\/Ve
promise to pay,” etc., “at ofﬁce Belfast Foundry Company.
[Signed]
Belfast Foundry Company.
W. W. Castle, President.”
In Falk
v. Moebs, 127 U. S. 597, 8 Sup. Ct. 1319, 32 L. Ed. 266, it was: “\/Ve
promise to pay,” etc., “to the order of Geo. Moebs, Sec. & Treas., at,"
etc.
“[Signed] Peninsular Cigar Co. Geo. Moebs, Sec. & Treas.,”
and indorsed “Geo. Moebs, Sec. 8: Treas.”
These notes were held
to be unambiguous, and not explainable by parol evidence, and the notes
of the companies alone. Many other cases of similar signing are found
in the above cases and in the text-books.
See. also, Mechem, Ag. §
439; 1 Rand. Com. Paper, 188: 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 299—305; Gil
let v. Bank, 7 Ill. App. 499; Scanlan v. Keith. 102 Ill. 634, 40 Am.
Rep. 624; Latham v. Flour-Mills, 68 Tex. 127, 3 S. VV. 462; Story,
Ag. § 154; Pars. Notes & B. 312.

__.___--_.
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The question comes very near, if not quite, having been decided by
this court in Houghton v. Bank, 26 VV is. 663, 7 Am. Rep. 107, where
it is held that an indorsement on a note not belonging to the bank,
by “Geo. Buckley, Cas.,” he being cashier of the bank, bound the
bank and not himself.
In Bank v. Bank, 16 W'is. 120, it is held that
a note signed by “I. H. Sidmore, Cash.,” bound the bank alone.
In
Rockwell v. Bank, 13 VVis. 653, where the bank promises to pay in
the body of the note, and it is signed only by “D. D. Spencer, Cashier,"
it was held that the bank only was bound.
The principle of these authorities seems to be “thatiif the agent
sign the note with his own name alone, and there is nothing on the face
of the note to show that he was acting as agent, he will be personally
liable; but if his agency appears with his signature, then his principal
Here the corporation could not sign its own name,
only is bound.”
and it is not otherwise shown on the face of the note than that Kraus
signed the corporate name, and by adding the word “President” to his
own name he shows conclusively that as president of the corporation
he signed the note, and not otherwise.
Such is the natural and rea
sonable construction of these signatures, and so it would be generally
understood.
The affix, cashier, secretary, president, or agent, to the
name of the person suﬁiciently indicates and shows that such person
signed the bank or corporate name, and in that character and capacity
alone. The use of the word “by” or “per” or “pro” would not add to
the certainty of what is thus expressed. It is not common to use these
words in commercial business. It is 'sufﬁeiently understood that the
paper is signed by the oﬂicer or agent named, and for the corporation.
But it is useless to prolong this discussion. It is almost too plain for
The note was that of the corporation alone, signed by
argument.
Kraus as its president.
The circuit court properly rejected the offer of parol proof, and
correctly instructed the jury to ﬁnd a verdict in favor of Kraus. The
judgment of the circuit court .is aﬁirmed.“
91An instructive discussion is found in Guthrie v. Imbrie, 12 Or. 182, 6
The note sued on read: “$500. Portland,
Pac. 664. 53 Am. Rep. 331 (1885).
Oregon. July 8, 1875. For value received, we promise to pay to David Guthrie,
or order, ninety days after date, five hundred dollars in U. S. gold coin, with
[Signed] James Imbrie, Pres’t.
[Seal.] J. J. Imbrie, Sec. G. M.
out interest.
The seal was that of the Granger Market Company, a corporation.
Co.”
See, also. Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28. 30 N. E. 85, 15 L. R. A. 509. 32
Am. St. Rep. 430 (1892). and Reeve v. First Nat. Bank of Glasshoro. 54 N. J.
R. A. 143, 33 Am. St. Rep. 675 (1891). Heffner v.
Law, 208, 23 Atl. 853, 16
Brownell, 70 Iowa, 591, 31 N. W. 947 (1887), and Bean v. Pioneer Mining Co.,
66 Cal. 451, 6 Pac. 86, 56 Am. Rep. 106 (1885), represent opposite extremes as
On this the later Iowa ease of Mathews v.
to the eﬂect of such signatures.
Dubuque Mattress Co., 87 Iowa. 246. 54 N. W. 225, 19 L. B. A. 676 (1893), is
interesting.
See the dissenting opinion.
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TUCKER MFG. CO.

-

Judicial

(Supreme

v.

(Part 2

FAIRBANKS.

Court of Massachusetts,

1867.

98

Mass. 101.)

“Boston, March 23,
following bill of exchange:
$4,469.76. Two months after date pay to the order of Messrs.
1866.
Hiram Tucker & Co. four thousand four hundred and sixty-nine

Action on

.76/100

the

dollars,

value received, and charge the same

to the account
Co.
was
was

of David Fairbanks and Co., Agts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins.
To Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., So. Berwick, Me.” The draft
“accepted for the Treasurer, David Fairbanks, President,” and
indorsed, “Payable in Boston, Hiram Tucker & Co."
GRAY, J.” * * * 3. The question whether the defendants
liable upon the face of the bill requires more consideration.

are

The

difﬁculty is not in ascertaining the general principles which must
govern cases of this nature, but in applying them to the different
In order
forms and shades of expression in particular instruments.
to exempt an agent from liability upon an instrument executed by
him within the scope of his agency, he must not only name his prin
cipal, but he must express by some form of words that the writing is
the act of the principal, though done by the hand of the agent.
he expresses this, the principal is bound, and the agent is not.
But a
mere description of the general relation or office which the person sign
ing the paper holds to another person or to a corporation, without
indicating that the particular signature is made in the execution of the
ofﬁce and agency, is not sufficient to charge the principal or to exempt
the agent from personal liability.
Amid the great variety of lan
guage which may be used by merchants in haste or thoughtlessness,
ignorant or unmindful of legal rules, or not anticipating the importance
of holding one party rather than the other responsible, it must often
happen that cases fall very near the dividing line; and, in order to main
tain uniformity of decision, it is necessary for the court to refer to
the cases already adjudicated, especially within its own jurisdiction.
The authority which at ﬁrst. sight seems most strongly to support
the position of the defendants is that of Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461,
8 Am. ‘Dec. 146, in which a note signed “Joseph Talbot, Agent for
David Perry,” was held not to bind Talbot personally. That case has
since been recognized and followed in this Commonwealth.
_Tefts
v. York, 4 Cush. 372, 50 Am. Dec. 791; Page v. Vi/ight, 14 Allen,
182.
But the important and effective word in Ballou v. Talbot was not
the word “agent,” nor the name of the principal, but the connecting
word “for,” which might indeed indicate merely the relation which the
agent held to the principal; but which was equally apt to express the
fact that the act was done in behalf of the principal, in the same man
ner as if the words had been transposed thus: “For David Perry,

If

22

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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Joseph Talbot, Agent." See Deslandes v. Gregory, 2 El. & El. 602.
This is made manifest by considering that if the word “agent” had
been wholly omitted, and the form of the signature had been simply
“Joseph Talbot, for David Perry," or “For David Perry, Joseph
Talbot,” it would have been well executed as the contract of the prin
cipal, even if it had been under seal, and of course not less so in the
case of a simple contract.
Long v. Colburn,
Mass. 97, 6 Am. Dec.
160; Emerson v. Providence Hat Mfg. Co., 12 Mass. 237, 7 Am.
Dec. 66; Mussey v. Scott, 7 Cush. 215, 54 Am. Dec. 719; Met. Con.

ll

~

105, 110.

it

is_

On the other hand, in Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31, a note signed by
two persons, with the addition “Trustees of Union Religious Society,
Phelps” (who were a legal corporation), was held to bind the signers
and in Barker v. Mechanic Insurance Co., 3 Wend. 94,
personally;
20 Am. Dec. 664, a note signed “John Franklin, President of the
Mechanic Fire Insurance Company,” was held on demurrer not to
be the note of the company, although alleged to have been made
within the authority of the president and the scope of the legitimate
business of the corporation;
the court saying:
“In_ this case, there
an averment that the president was lawfully authorized;
but
does
not appear that he acted under that authority; the does not say that
he signs for the company; he describes himself as president of the

a

if

a

6,

a

it

a a

9 a

is

if

is

a

a

a

is

company, but to conclude the company by his acts he should have
contracted ‘in their name, or at least on their behalf.”
The variation
between the words “for” and “of” seems at ﬁrst view slight; but in
the connection in which they are used in signatures of this kind the
difference
substantial. “Agent of” or “president of"
corporation
named simply designates
personal relation of the individual to the
“Agent for”
corporation.
particular person or corporation may
designate either the general relation which the person signing holds
to another party, or that the particular act in question
done in
behalf of and as the very contract of that other; and the court,
manifestly the intention of the parties. may construe the
such
words in the la_tter sense.
But even “agent for” has been held under
some circumstances
mere descriptio persona: of -the agent, as in
De \Vitt v. VValton,
N. Y. 571, in which the name following these
words was not the proper name of the principal, but the name of
newspaper which the agent carried on in the principal’s behalf, and
note signed “David Hoyt. Agent for The Churchman,”
was held
to be the note of Hoyt and not of his principal: and in Shattuck v.
Eastman, 12 Allen, 369, in which
was held that
paper in the form
Lowell,
of
receipt, signed “Robert Eastman, .\gent for \Vard
Mass,”
executed under such circumstances as to amount to
con
tract, might be binding on the agent personally.”
In Fiske v. El

”

Mining Co.. 39
See extended discussion in Knlppenberg
v. Greenwood
Mont. 11, 101 Pac. 159 (1909).
That it is unreasonable to treat the words "agent," "president," “superin
Gonn.Pn.&

A. (20 En.)~—22
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dridge, 12 Gray, 474, in a careful review of the cases by Mr. Justice
Dewey, the New York decisions above mentioned whore quoted with
approval, and a note signed “John T. Eldridge, Trustee of Sullivan
Railroad,” was held to be the personal note of Eldridge.
In Haver
hill Insurance Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen, 130, a note signed “Cheever
Newhall, President of the Dorchester Avenue Railroad Company,”
was held to bind Newhall personally, although given by him to an
insurance company (as was expressed in the note itself) in considera
tion of a policy issued to the railroad corporation, which he was in
fact authorized to obtain and sign the note for.
See also Fullam v.
Vi/est Brookﬁeld, 9 Allen, 1: Morell v. Codding, 4 Allen, 403; Tan
ner v. Christian, 4 El. & Bl. 591; Parker v. Winslow, 7 El. & Bl.
942; Price v. Taylor, 5 H. & N. 540; Bottomley v. Fisher, 1 H. &
C. 211.“
It differs
This case is not distinguishable from those just stated.
from Ballou v. Talbot, in omitting the word “for” (the only evidence,
contained in the note there sued on, that it was made in behalf of the
principal), leaving the words “Agts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co.”
The cases of
as a mere description of the persons signing this bill.
Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335, Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy
tendent,”

“manager.”

as mere descriptive

terms

has often

been suggested.

Whatever may be the custom in England, in the United States men in sign
ing business instruments are not wont thus to designate their rank or call
ing, and when such terms are used it is highly artiﬁcial, and rarely, it ever,
in accord with the facts, to regard them as descriptive of the person. They
are always intended as descriptive ot the capacity in which he acts, and it
on the paper anything appears to show who this principal is it seems absurd
not to give effect to this evident intent.
See the extended discussion in Sec
ond Nat. Bank v. Midland Steel Co., 155 Ind. 581, 58 N. E. 833. 52 L. R. A.
307 (1900); Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535, 68 Am. Dec. 280 (1857); Gerber v.
Stuart, 1 Mont. 172 (1870).
The great weight of authority is, however, the
other way, though with much conﬂict, Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443. 2
For what Mr. Justice Lamar calls the
N. E. 123, 52 Am. Rep. 680 (1885).
“anarchy oi‘ the authorities,”
see the valuable review in Falk v. Moebs, 127
U. S. 597, 8 Sup. Ct. 1319, 32 L. Ed. 266 (1888).
- 2-i’,1‘1ie best mode of signature is “A. B.. by C. D., Agent."
“C. D., for A.
B.," though less formally correct, is equally available.
Lazarus v. Shearer,
2 Ala. 718 (1841) ; Exchange Bank v. Lewis County, 28 W. Va. 273 (1886), with
“A. B. [for C. D.],” however, has been held the note of
many illustrations.
A. B., otherwise the brackets seem to have no meaning. Early v. Wilkinson,
9 Grat. (50 Va.) 68 (1852), and “C. D., for A. B.,” has sometimes been held
to bind C. D., though this was overruled in Robertson v. Pope. 1 Mich. 503.
Exchange
44 Am. Dec. 267 (18-15). But “C. D., Agent for A. 13.," binds C. D.
Bank v. Lewis County, 28 W. Va. 273 (1886); Tannant v. Rocky Mt. Nat.
Bank, 1 Colo. 279. 9 Am. Rep. 156 (1871); De Witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571,
Seld. Notes, 253 (1851); Dawson v. Cotton, 26 Ala. 591 (1855); Peterson v.
Homan, 44 Minn. 166, 46 N. W. 303, 20 Am. St. Rep. 56; (1890).
“C. D. as
Agent for A. B." is generally held to bind A. B. Werner v. Wheeler, 142 App.
Div. 358. 127 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1911).
If the name of the principal is signed the execution will be good, even
though the agent's name is entirely omitted.
Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287
(1875); Brudlee v Boston Glass Mfg. Co., 16 Pick. 347 (1835); Western
Wheeled Scraper Co. v. McMillan, 71- Neb. 686, 99 N. W. 512 (1904).
Gor>o.Pa.& A. (20 En.)
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12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203, and Johnson v.
Smith, 21 Conn. 627, cannot avail the defendants against the later
decisions of this court.
See Fiske v. Eldridge, 12 Cray, 476; Bar
low v. Congregational Society in Lee, 8 Allen, 461, 462. The name
of the principal does notrappear in the body of the bill. The address
of the bill to the corporation and the request to them to charge the
amount to the account of the drawers have certainly no tendency to
show that the drawers are the same as the corporation, the drawees.
The fact that the bill was delivered to the plaintiffs by the insurance
company, as shown by the contemporaneous receipt, does not make
it the less the promise of the signers. The defendants must therefore
be held personally responsible as the drawers of the bill.
judgment for the plaintiffs.

Manufacturing Co.,
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CHAPTER IV
DELEGATION OF THE AUTHORITY

0

a

CATLIN

v.

(Nisl Prius in King's Bench,

'

BELL.
1815.

4 Camp. 183.)

This was an action of assumpsit for not accounting for goods deliv
ered by the plaintiﬁ to the defendant, to be sold on her'account.
The defendant is master of a ship trading from this country to the
West Indies, and the plaintiff entrusted to him a quantity of millinery
goods, which he undertook to sell for her there.
The ﬁrst defense was, that these goods had paid no duty on exporta
tion; and it was proved that the defendant's ship, in which they were
carried, cleared out at the custom-house in ballast. It was contended,
therefore, that the adventure was illegal, and that no action could arise
out of it.
You do nothing unless you show that it
LORD ELLENBQRQUGH.
formed part of the agreement between the parties to defraud govern
ment of the duties. This would contaminate the contract on which the
action is founded ;~ but it cannot be affected by the simple circumstance
of the ship clearing out in ballast.
It was then stated, that the defendant not being able to sell the goods
in the island to which they were destined, had sent them to the Carac
cas, in search of a market, where they had been destroyed by an earth
quake; but
Loan ELLENBOROUGH clearly held, that there being a special
conﬁdence reposed in the defendant with respect to the sale of the
goods, he had no right to hand them over to another person, and to
give them a new destination.‘
1 The same principle has often been applied to public agents and especially
to boards and oﬁlcers of cities and the state. Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485,
37 Am. Dee. 271 (1841); Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115, 30 Am. Rep.
23 Mich. 344, 9 Am. Rep. 80 (1871).
776 (1878); Gale v. Kalamazoo,

7
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HOWES.

Pleas of New York City and County, 1888. 15 Daly,
Supp. 717, reversing 1 N. Y. Supp. 435.)

43,

2

N. Y.

Action to recover commissions as a real estate broker. judgment for
plaintiff, aﬁirmed by the General Term. Defendant again appeals.
VAN HOESEN, J. The motion for a dismissal of the complaint ought

to have been granted. It appeared that the defendant never employed
the plaintiﬁ’s assignor, never knew of such employment until after the
exchange of the two pieces of property had been effected, and never
authorized or ratiﬁed such employment.
Of these facts, there cannot
The evidence adduced by the plaintiff showed that
be any question.
Rogers, the plaintiff's assignor, knew that Reuben W. Howes was_
acting as the agent for his son, John T. Howes, the defendant, in selling
the Tenth Avenue property; and that not until after the property had
been exchanged for the Haberman property, in Fourth avenue, did
Rogers ever have the slightest communication, directly or indirectly, with
There is no testimony to prove that the defendant was
the defendant.
Upon this state of facts,
previously aware of Rogers’ employment.

3

a

I

is,

the court should have granted the motion to dismiss the complaint.
Reuben W. Howes, who employed Rogers, was himself an agent to
sell, and, as such, he had no right or power to employ a subagent, or to
bind the defendant by an agreement that the subagent should receive
a commission. _ Atlee v. Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 42 Am. Rep. 385.
It was said by one of the justices of the city court that the testimony
established the fact that it was customary in New York to employ
That is true, but irrelevant; because the
brokers to sell property.
has one agent any authority to employ another?
No
question here
understand the rule to be that
proof on that subject was offered.
known usage of trade justiﬁes,
“except where necessity requires, or
the employment of subagents, an agent whose duties involve personal
trust and conﬁdence and the exercise of judgment and discretion, can
not, without authority from his principal, delegate to another the conﬁ
He may employ another to per
dence and discretion reposed in him.’
form mere mechanical acts, but nothing else.
Lewis v. Ingersoll,
Abb. Dec. 60. The jury probably regarded Reuben W. Howes as the
real owner of the property, and believed they were doing substantial
justice in requiring the nominal owner, who holds real estate in his

2

&

&

a

2The maxim, “delegatus non potest delegate," is based on the tact that
agency is generally
personal trust and conﬁdence which cannot he delegated;
for the principal employs the agent from his opinion of his personal skill
and integrity, and the latter has no right to turn his principal over to another
of whom he knows nothing.
Md. Line R. Co., 11 Gill
Wilson v. York
J.
Kent's Com.; Warner v. Martin, 11 How. 209, 13 L. Ed.
58 (1839). quoting
667 (1850).
The distinction between what may and what may not he delegated
by an agent is clearly stated and illustrated in Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis, 409,
83 N. W. 657, 50 L. R. A. 600, 81 Am. St. Rep. 849 (1900).
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But the testi
name, to pay the debt that the real owner contracted.
mony shows that Rogers knew that Reuben VV. Howes was dealing
in the character of an agent.
If he wished to hold the principal he
ought to have ascertained that Reuben had authority to employ a sub
agent, or else he should have required some instructions from, or had
some communication with, the defendant.
Hard cases ought not to
make bad law; and I am of opinion that it'wou1d be dangerous to per
mit one agent to employ another at the expense of the principal.
Upon a new trial, it may be shown that the principal knew that
Reuben \-V. Howes intended to employ, or had employed, a broker to
assist him, and that he approved of the employment.
Judgment re
versed, and new trial ordered, with costs to abide event.

._i_i
ELDRIDGE
(Supreme

Court of

v.

HOLWAY.

Illlnoi,

1857.

18

Ill.

445.)

it,

Forcible detainer before a justice. Plaintiff authorized one Cobb to
begin the action for him, and Cobb had one Kates serve written notice
and demand of possession on defendant. Evidence to prove this being
excluded, the jury found for the defendant.
SCATES, C. J. An attorney in fact of plaintiff employed an attorney
at law in this case, who served the written notice and demand of pos
session. The court excluded this evidence, on the ground that delegated
authority cannot be delegated.
This is true as a general principle, when properly applied to the
classes of cases where personal conﬁdence is reposed, and skill, judg
ment, etc., are involved. Story on Agency, §§ 12, 13, 14. It was, doubt
less, to obviate this literal application of the principle that the conven
tion, out of abundant caution, inserted clause 17 of section 8, art. 1,
in the Constitution of the United States, 3 Story, Com, Const. §§- 1236,
1237.
Some powers arise, by implication, as incidents to others, and
are essential to their exercise. So, in the performance of a general or
special agency, many acts are to be performed of an indifferent nature,
which may as well be done by one person as another, and- which an
agent might ﬁnd it extremely inconvenient to be compelled to perform
The maxim withholding the power of subdelegation of
personally.
authority only has place when there is an object, an end to be gained——
where the interest of the principal may be neglected or injured by sub
Vt/hen, from the nature of the act to be done, there can be
stitution.
no difference, the principle cannot apply.
Such is the case here. There is neither conﬁdence, skill, discretion
or judgment required to deliver a written notice, and make oath of
which could prevent the employment of any one by an agent.
The
service of declarations in ejectment, notices to take depositions, and
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of acts now done by attorney's clerks and others, would

the same rule contended for, and compel attorneys to do such

acts personally.
An attorney may serve such notice and demand, and we perceive no
reason why an agent, to bring suit, may not employ an attorney.
Agents, as such, cannot appear in courts for parties.
\Vhere agents
are not licensed as attorneys, they must employ attorneys to appear
for the client in the courts.
The act here falls strictly within a class which may be done by such
supposed subdelegation. It is rather the true and only mode of acting
out an agency where an attorney becomes necessary, than a subdelega—
tion of power.
Had the agency here been an attorneyship, it might present another
question——one involving a question of conﬁdence reposed, or skill and
could not be transferred.
But the agency does not
judgment—which
appear to be of that character.“
Judgmentreversed and cause remanded.

ji

I

NORWICH UNIVERSITY
(Supreme Court of Vermont,

v.

1874.

DENNY.
47 Vt. 13.)

Assumpsit on a subscription of $200 to induce the location of plain
Verdict for plaintiff.
tiﬂ' University at Norwich.
BARRETT, ]. The liability of the defendant for the sum claimed de
If
pended on the subscription of his name to the paper presented.
his name was put there by his authorization, then he is liable; if not by
his authorization, then he is not liable. \Vhatever authorization was
The question of fact in controversy in
given, he gave to, Dr. Nichols.
the jury tn'al was, whether the defendant gave such authorization to
That was determined by the jury upon legitimate evi
Dr. Nichols.
dence, with proper instructions by the court.
It is shown and agreed
that the defendant’s name was put there by the procurement of Dr. N.,
pretending to act in virtue of authority from the de fendant.
It is now insisted that Dr. N. could not delegate such authority, so
as to enable another to make a binding subscription of the defendant’s
It is matter of entire indifference
name. This cannot be maintained.
for any purpose or reason by what hand the name was written; pro
vided it was done by the procurement of Dr. N. under and in execu
tion of the authority given by the defendant to him. He might as well
do it by the ﬁngers of another person, as by the pen of another person.
He was not delegating any authority, but only performing an author
ized act by a servant, instead of doing it with his own hand. It was
lGr1nne1l

v. Buchanan,

1

Daly,

538.
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the act of his mind and will, and was an effectual doing by him of the
act he was authorized to do.
It differs entirely from cases in which the person is authorized to do
things requiring the exercise of that person’s judgment and discretion,
which can be exercised only by the person himself.
An arbitrator can
not delegate his function to another; but having heard and decided as
arbitrator, he can have another person draw up his award and put his
name to
instead of doing
himself.
So in this case, Dr. N. could
execute the authority conferred on him
the defendant, by procuring
another to use the pen under the direction of his own mind and will,
instead of using the pen himself.‘
Judgment aﬁirmed.

~_

of Chancery

of Tennessee,

1873.

Tenn.

'

BLAIR.‘

N. R. CO. v.
1

(Court

&

LOUISVILLE

Ch. 351.)

is

It

*

*

*

Bill to call to account and to hold defendant Blair and his sureties
on his bond for deﬁciencies in the accounts of the Nashville Agency
of plaintiff.
The business was large and varied, the freight bills dur
ing the period in question amounting to $863,834.01. Blair was sta
tion agent.
COOPER, Ch.“
has been left to be inferred from the
true,
large deﬁciency that there must haveibeen negligence. And this
but the negligence seems to have been at the Louisville office to which
was, made the regular returns.
the cashier, whose duty
that office
had been vigilant, and called the attention of their station agent to the
increasing deﬁciency, and he had failed to take the proper steps to pre
he would have been clearly guilty of neglect of duty.
vent
But
does appear that the defendant, Blair, was not expected to keep the
books and was not a book-keeper, and
also appears that the books
were kept, the freight bills received and handed out, the freights re
These, there
vceived from the collector and remitted by the cashier.
fore, were specially his duties. He was employed by the company and
not shown
although in the name of the agent.
reported to
that the station agent was expected to examine these accounts, unless
am of opinion,
his attention was called to them by the mother oﬁice.
is

I

It

it,

it

it

it,

it

If

4l\'e\vton

Carnall,

v. Bronson,

13

N.

Y.

687,

67

Am.

Dec. 89

-

_

(1854);

Weaver

v.

Ark. 198, 37 Am. Rep. 22 (1879) (where the agent was
mere
An insurance agent may delegate to another the more signing of
amnnuensis).
policy he has approved, Grady v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 60 Mo.
his name to
Cullinan v. Bowker,
116 (1875): but not the power to pass upon applications,
180 N. Y. 93, 72 N. E. 911 (1904).
5Accord: Fanset v. Garden Cy. St. Bank, 24 S. D. 2-18, 123 N. W. 686 (1909),
a

a

35

6

and cases cited.
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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consequently, that the complainants have failed to make out a case
against defendants on the bond.
But I am also clearly of opinion that the defendant, Blair, was not
bound for the faults of either the cashier or collector, unless he was
cognizant of them, or connected with them, of which there is no pre
tence in this case. These agents were employed and paid by the com
plainant, and were, as the testimony shows, absolutely necessary to the
discharge of the duties of the agency. In such a case, it is a matter
of no consequence whether the sub-agent was appointed on the recom
mendation of the chief agent, or appointed directly by him with the
In all cases of this sort, where the sub
sanction of the principal.
agency is required by the exigency of the business or is authorized by
the principal, the agent will not be responsible for the negligence or
misconduct of the sub-agent, if he has used reasonable diligence in his
choice as to the skill and ability of the sub-agent. Story on Agency,
§§ 201, 217a, 321. It is neither charged nor shown that the persons
employed as cashier and collector in this case were not good men, and
of unexceptionable character when employed; or, in other words, that
the defendant, Blair, knew that they were, for any reason, unﬁt for the
discharge of the duties to which they were assigned.
am of opinion, therefore, that the complainant has wholly failed to
make out any case against the defendants ; and order that the bill be
dismissed with costs.
Note.—This decision was, upon appeal, aﬂirmed.

I

BLOWERS

v.

SOUTHERN RY.

(Supreme Court or South Carolina, 1906.

74 S. C. 221, 54 S.

E.

368.)

Action by a mail messenger to recover for services in transferring
mail matter from one train to another for a period of six years. There
was evidence that he did the work under the supervision of the station
agent of defendant, who, when Irwin ceased doing the work, hired
another man to do it. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
JONES, J.‘ * * * An exception is taken to the following charge:
“I charge you, further, as a- matter of law, if the station agent was
authorized by any superior oﬂicer who had authority to make this
contract and he was carrying out the orders of his superior oﬂicer and
made a contract that would be within the scope of his authority, and
the railroad agent, if he is acting under the direction or by the author
ity of a superior ofﬁcer who had power and whose duty it was to attend
to these matters and make such contracts, if he acted under his orders
and direction, then the acts of the agent here would be acts of the su
'l

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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perior otﬁcer.” The speciﬁcations of error being: (1) That an agent
or oﬂicer to whom authority is delegated cannot delegate the authority
to another. (2) There was no evidence that any superior oﬂicer of de
fendant company was authorized to make a contract with plaintiff to
transfer the mail.
\/Ve are not sure from the record but that this charge was made at
the request of the defendant, and, if so, defendant cannot raise objec
tion thereto. But, assuming that the charge was not made at the re
quest of defendant, we see nothing in it prejudicial to defendant’s con
tention.
The principle delegatus non potest delegate does not apply
when there is express or implied authority in the general or superior
“Where an
agent to employ subagents in the work of the principal.
agent has power to employ a subagent, the acts of the subagent, or no
tice given in the transaction of the business, have the same effect as if
Bates v. American Company, 37
done or received by the principal.”
S. C. 101, 16 S. E. 883, 21 L. R. A. 340. The authority to employ sub
agents may be implied from the nature of the duties and powers com
1 Ency. Law, 981.
mitted to the general agent.

In this case the superior agent and the alleged subagent were both
engaged in the work of the principal in the matter of transportation,
and the subagent from the nature of his position and duties was under
the direction and supervision of the superior agent in the matter of
mail transportation when it became a part of the principal’s business.
Under suchicircumstances, if the subagent acts under the orders of a
superior ofﬁcer, his acts become the acts of the superior ofﬁcer and the
There was some evidence that the general super
principal as well.
intendent of transportation had control of the matter of mail transfer
of mail transfer clerks, as already
and in the direction and supervision
I
'
* * *
indicated.
unless the plaintiff within thirty days remits part of the
judgment, which the court found to be excessive.
Reversal,

DARLING
(Supreme

Judicial

v.

‘

STANWOOD.

Court of Massachusetts,

1867.

96 Mass.

[14

Allen]

504.)

Contract to recover a balance of account for money expended and
Verdict for
commissions charged in purchasing cotton for defendant.
plaintiff.
FOSTER, ].° \V hen the defendant employed the plaintiff to buy cot
ton on his account in the New Orleans market and to ship it to Boston,
he is presumed to have contemplated that the purchases would be made
in the ordinary course of such business at that port. Upon the question
8Part of the opinion is omitted.
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whether the plaintiﬁ is liable in damages for negligently or improper
ly executing such a commission, the evidence of the usages of the cot
ton trade were clearly admissible, especially as it appears that the de
fendant himself was well acquainted with them. The employment of a
broker to eﬁect the purchases was a justifiable delegation of authority
to a sub-agent, because this manner of transacting business was the
usual and known custom of the New Orleans market. The statement
that the seller of the cotton is understood to warrant that the cotton is
sound at the time of sale seems to have been a part of the narrative
given by the witnesses of the course of the business; and not an at
tempt to prove by custom a warranty in a case where none would be
implied by law.
A
In a business which requires or justiﬁes the delegation of an agent’s
authority to a sub-agent, who is not his own servant, the original agent
is not liable for the errors or misconduct of the sub-agent if he has
used due care in his selection. The instructions of the presiding judge
seem to have been conformable to law and well adapted to the case
*
*
disclosed by the bill of exceptions.
f“
Exceptions sustained on another question.
5

BRADSTREET
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

v.

1872.

EVERSON.
T2 Pa. 124, 13 Am. Rep. 665.)
\

Action to recover money collected by defendant's Memphis agent,
Verdict for plaintiﬁ‘, and defendant re
and by him misappropriated.
‘
moved the verdict to the supreme court upon error.
*
*
*
AGNEW, J.”
The next question is upon the nature of the
liability arising upon the receipt. It is in the following words: “J. M.
Pittsburg, June 2d,
Bradstreet & Son, Improved Mercantile Agency.
1865.
Received of Messrs. Everson, Preston & Co. four duplicate ac
for collection, versus VVatt C. Bradford, Memphis, Ten
ceptances
Bradstreet
nessee, amounting in all to $1,726.37.
[Signed] J. M.
& Son.”
_
It is argued, notwithstanding the express receipt “for collection,"
that the defendants did not undertake for themselves to collect, but
only to remit to a proper and responsible attorney, and made them
selves liable only for diligence in correspondence, and giving the neces
sary information to the plaintiffs; or in briefer terms, that the attorney
in Memphis was not their agent for the collection but that of the plain
tiﬁ‘s only. The current of decision, however, is otherwise as to attor
neys at law sending claims to correspondents for collection, and the
reasons for applying the same rule to collection agencies are even
They have their selected agents in every part of the coun
stronger.
9

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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try. From the nature of such ramiﬁed institutions we must conclude
that the public impression will be, that the agency invited customers
It
on the very ground of its facilities for making distant collections.
must be presumed from its business connections at remote points, and
its knowledge of the agents chosen, the agency intends to undertake the
performance of the service which the individual customer is unable to
There is good reason therefore to hold, that such
perform for himself.
an agency is liable for collections made by its own agents, when it
it
the collection by the express terms of the receipt.
undertaloes
does not so intend, it has it in its power to limit responsibility by the
\
terms of the receipt.
An example of this limited liability is found in the case of Bullitt v.
Baird [27 Leg. Int. 171], decided at Philadelphia in 1870; the only
case in this state upon the subject of such agencies.
There the receipt
read: “For collection according to our direction, and proceeds, when
received by us, to be paid over to King & Baird.” Across the face of
the receipt was printed, these words: “N. B. The owner of the within
mentioned taking all the risks of the mail, of losses by failure of agents
to remit, and also of losses by reason of insurrection or War.” The
limitation of the liability of Bullitt & Fairthorn, by Mr. Bullitt, him
self a good lawyer, is evidence of his belief that a greater liability
would arise without the restriction.
Recurring to the analogy of attorneys at law, the ﬁrst point to be
considered is the interpretation given by the courts to the terms 'of a
In our own state we have several decisions in
receipt “for collection.”
point. In Riddle v. Poorman, 3 Pen. & W. Z24, Riddle, an attorney in
Franklin county, gave a receipt in these words: “Lodged in my hands
a judgment-bill granted by Henry H. Morwitz to Henry Hoffman for
the sum of $1,200, due with interest since the 15th of May, 1811, which
is entered up in Bedford county, which I am to have recovered if it can
Riddle sent this bill to his brother, a practising
be accomplished.”
The money was made by the sheriff, but by the
lawyer in Bedford.
neglect of the Bedford Riddle was not received from the sheriff, who
became insolvent, and the money was thus lost. Hoffman sued the
Franklin county Riddle, on his receipt and recovered. On a writ of
error it was contended that the words of the receipt, “which I am to
have recovered if it can be accomplished,” imported only a limited un
dertaking to have it collected by another, and not to collect it himself.
But this court held that the receipt contained an express and positive
undertaking for the collection of the money, if practicable, and not
merely for the employment of another to that end; and that the de
fendant was bound by every principle of moral and legal obligation to
make good the collection of the judgment by the application of reason
able diligence, skill and attention.
The next case is Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts & S. 103, 37 Am. Dec.
This was the receipt: “Received of Mr. Thos. Cox, of Lancaster,
486.
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Pa., for collection, a note drawn in his favor by Mr. Dubbs, calling for
$497.65, payable three months after date.” The note was left with an
instruction to bring suit. The receipt was dated August 30th, 1837,
and Livingston died in January following without having brought suit.
Dubbs became insolvent.
It was held that Livingston was liable for
the collection, though only two terms intervened between the receipt
and his death..
Krause v. Dorrance, 10 Pa. 462, S1 Am. Dec. 496, was assumpsit
against twd attorneys for money collected and not paid by another
attorney to whom they sent the note for collection. The liability of the
original attorneys for the collection was admitted, but the point was
made and succeeded, that a demand before suit was necessary. Rogers,
]., says expressly they were liable for the acts of the agent whom they
employed, but being without fault themselves, a demand was necessary
before a resort to an action.
In Rhines v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192, S Am. Rep. 364, the receipt was:
“Received for collection of A. Rhines one note on Lukens & Beeson.
of Rochester, dated October 30th, 1857, for $365.” The liability of
Evans, the attorney, was conceded, and the question was on the Statute
of Limitations, and it was held the action was barred by the lapse of
seven years and ﬁve months from the date of the receipt.
These cases show the understanding of the bench and bar of this
state upon a receipt of claims for collection.
It imports an under
taking by the attorney himself to collect, and not merely that he re
ceives it for transmission to another for collection, for whose negli
He is therefore liable by the very
gence he is not to be responsible.
terms of his receipt for the negligence of the distant attorney, who is
his agent, and he cannot shift responsibility from himself upon his
client. There is no hardship in this, for it is in his power to limit his
responsibility by the terms of his receipt when he knows he must em
Bullitt v. Baird, supra.
ploy another to make the collection.
VVe ﬁnd cases in other states holding the same doctrine.
In Lewis
& Wallace v. Peck & Clark, 10 Ala. 142, both ﬁrms were attorneys.
The defendants gave their receipt to the plaintiﬁs for certain notes for
collection, and after collecting the money transmitted it to the payees
in the notes instead of the attorneys who had employed them, the
payees having however endorsed the notes: Held that Peck & Clark
were liable to their immediate principals, the plaintiffs, there being no
evidence that the payees had given them notice not to pay over to Lewis
& Wallace, the original attorneys. This is a direct recognition of the
liability of the collecting attorney to the transmitting attorney. The
case of Pollard v. Rowland, 2 Blackf. 22, is more directly in point.
Rowland received from_ Pollard claims for collection, and sent them to
Stephen, an attorney in another county.
Stephen obtained judgment,
and collected the money: Held that Rowland was accountable to Pol
lard for the acts of Stephen to the same extent that Stephen was, and
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could make no defense that Stephen could not; and that Rowland was
liable to Pollard for the money. Cummins v. McLain et al., 2 Pike,
402, was a case nearly similar to the Pennsylvania case of Krouse v.
Dorrance, supra. The attorney“ sent the claim to another attorney at
a distance, and was held liable, but for the omission of the plaintiff ‘to
make a demand, he failed to recover. The court say the attorney is
liable for the acts of the attorney he employs.
In a Mississippi case
two attorneys, Vi/ilkison and VVillison, received of plaintiff a claim for
collection, and brought suit and obtained judgment.
They dissolved
and VVillison took
partnership, \/Vilkison retiring from the practice;
another partner, Jennings, who received the money from the sheriff.
In a suit against \Vilkison as surviving partner of \Villison_ he was
held liable for the receipt of the money by Jennings.
\/Vilkinson v.
Griswold, 12 Smedes 8: M. 669.
In view of these reasons and authorities, we hold that a collecting
agency, such as the defendants have been found to be, receiving and
remitting a claim to their own attorney, who collects the money and
fails to pay it over, is liable for neglect.
'
Judgment affirmed.

SIMPSON
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

v.

\VALDBY.

1886.

63 Mich.

439. 30 N.

W.

199.)

Action against defendants, as bankers, for the proceeds of drafts
collected by defendant’s correspondent, the First National Bank of St.
The latter sent its own New York draft for the
Albans, Vermont.
Verdict, no cause of
money, but failed before the draft was paid.
,
action.
* * * The counsel for defendants contend here, as
MORSE,

J."

they did below, that in the case of collections, like this, where there
is no special agreement, the home bank is only responsible for the
use of ordinary care and prudence in the selection of the agencies
This is undoubtedly the
through which it attempts the collection.
purport and meaning of the instructions of the court below, taken
as a whole, to the jury.
The question is therefore directly before us, what'is the law of the
case when a person steps into a bank, in the ordinary course of busi
ness dealing, and intrusts to it the collection of a draft drawn upon
some person residing at a distance, in case the home bank. through
the failure or dishonesty of another bank, selected by itself, never
receives the money upon such drafts, though the same is paid by the
10 The liability of an attorney at law for collections made by a subuzent
is ably treated in the leading case of Cummins v. Heald, 24 Kan, 600, 36 Am.
Rep. 264 (1880), and of a collection agency in Hoover v. Wise. 91 U. S. 308,
28 L. Ed. 392 (1876).
11 Part: of the opinion is omitted.

_

_

__

__ 7

f__

-nil

Ch. 4)

DELEGATION

or

THE AUTHORITY

351

drawee?
In the absence of any agreement in regard to the matter,
who must bear the loss in case the home bank has not been at fault
in the selection of its agent or agents?
and, as it
There is a conﬂict of authority upon this proposition;
has never been settled in this state, we must be guided and governed
in our action by what seems to us the most correct view in justice and
on principle.
It is held in New York, Indiana, Ohio, and New jersey that the
home bank must be the loser, upon the principle that such bank under
lakes the collection of the draft or bill, and selects its agent or agents,
and must be responsible for their default or neglect, as it would be
for the default or neglect of its officers or clerks in the collection of
a home bill, or as a contractor would be bound to answer for any neg
ligence or default of his subcontractors or workmen in the perform
Allen v. Merchants’ Bank of New York, 22
ance of his contract.
\Vend. 215, 34 Am. Dec. 289; Reeves v. State Bank of Ohio, 8 Ohio
St. 460: Titus v. Mechanics’ Nat. Bank, 35 N. J. Law, 588; Ayrault
v. Paciﬁc Bank, 47 N. Y. 570, 7 Am. Rep. 489; Abbott v. Smith,
4 Ind. 452; Tyson v. State Bank, 6 Blackf. 225, 38 Am. Dec. 139.
In other states it is adjudged that the customer depositing the draft
for collection must be presumed to know, and contract upon the knowl
edge, that in the ordinary course of business the home bank must
employ correspondents or agents abroad to make the collection and
transmit the money collected.
The holder or maker of the draft,
having full notice of the usual course of business, must be held to
assent thereto. “He therefore authorizes the bank with whom he deals
to do the work of collection through another bank."
“The bank re
ceiving the paper becomes an agent of the depositor, with authority
to employ another bank to collect _it. The second bank becomes the
subagent of the customer of the ﬁrst, for the reason that the customer
authorizes the employment of such agent to make the collection."
If, therefore. there is no \vant of ordinary care and prudence in the
selection of the subagent, and no negligence or fault on the part of the
home bank, the customer must be the loser for the default or negli
Guelich v.
gence of such subagent who is regarded as his agent.
National St. Bank of Burlington, 56 Iowa, 434, 9 N. VV. 328, 41 Am.
St. Rep. 110; Dorchester & Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 1
Cush. 177; East Haddam Bank v. Scovil, 12 Conn. 303; Hyde v.
Planters’ Bank, 17 La. _560. 36 Am. Dec. 621; .7Etna Ins. Co. v. Alton
City Bank, 25 Ill. 243, 79 Am. Dec. 328; Stacy v. Dane Co. Bank,
12 \Vis. 702; Bowling v. Arthur, 34 Miss. 41; Citizens’ Bank v. How
ell, 8 Md. 530, 63 Am. Dec. 714; Bank of Washington v. Triplett,
Bank, 56 Mo.
1 Pet. 25, 7 L. Ed. 37; Daly v. Butchers’ & Drovers’
94, 17 Am. Rep. 663; jackson v. Union Bank, 6 Har. & I. 146; Bank
of Louisville v. First Nat. Bank of Knoxville, 8 Baxt. 101, 35 Am.
* * "‘
Rep. 691; Morse, Banking, 347-356.
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All admit that, if a person intrusts a home draft or bill to a bank
for collection, such bank is responsible to the customer for any negli
gence or default of its agents, oﬁicers, or employés. I cannot see why
any diﬁerent rule should prevail in the collection of a foreign bill. It
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is in every case that
haveiexamined sought to be maintained upon
the theory that the customer knows the bank must act through some
other person or persons at a distance, and therefore, impliedly, from
the very nature of the course of business, assents to the employment of
such persons, and makes them his agents.
This reasoning does not strike me as sound. If I leave an indorsed
note against persons in my own town for collection, and consequent
demand and protest, I know that some agent or employé of the bank
will do the work, or some part of
and
do not know or inquire
contract, however, with the bank that suitable agents
who will do it.
will be employed, and hold
The law
responsible for their acts.
authorizes me to do this. If
intrust the same bank with the collec
tion of
also know that they will employ some agent
foreign draft,
or correspondent abroad, of their selection, not mine, of whom
know
nothing, and with whom they are supposed to have business relations.
do not inquire whom they are to select.
presume, and have
right to presume, that they have business knowledge of such agent
or agents, which
do not and cannot possess, by the very course of
their dealings as bankers. In each case the bank holds itself out, for
consideration, to collect my paper, and
can make no difference
In each case
whether the compensation
great or small.
selects
have no part in or
its own agents in the premises. In each case
control over such selection. In each case there
no privity between
fail to perceive why, in the one case
the party selected and myself.
adopt the immediate party collecting or pro
more than the other,
cannot ﬁnd any good reason for mak
testing the bill as my agent.
foreign bill an exception
ing this particular case of the collection of
to the general rule of agency. The law in general “is clear that,
by the employment of under agents or servants for his own conven
ience, or to perform part of what he has contracted to do, the em
ployer becomes civilly responsible to those with whom he contracts
or deals in his business.”
judge Story, in his work on Agency, announces the doctrine thus:
held liable to
“It
general doctrine of law that the principal
civil suit, for the frauds, deceits, misrepresenta
third persons, in
tions, torts, negligence, and other malfeasances or misfeasances, or
omissions of duty of his agent in the course of his employment, al
though the principal did not authorize or justify, or, indeed, know of,
such misconduct.”
In no other case that
plication of law, without
agent of
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is

I

can recall
person presumed, by im
any agreement to do so, to adopt the sub
The carrieris
person with whom he deals as his own.
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also
responsible for the negligence of his agents and employés, as
the ship-owner and the contractor.
VVhy this distinction in the case
of
banker or bankers?
If in their case, why should
not also be
made in the case of collecting agents and attorneys?
But collecting
Pollard v.
agents and attorneys have been held to the general rule.
Rowland,
Blackf. 22; Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308, 23 L. Ed.
392; Bradstreet v. Everson, 72 Pa. 124, 13 Am. Rep. 665; Lewis
v. Peck, IO Ala. 142.
It has been said by some of the courts that the holding of banks
liable for the default and neglect of their correspondents in
case
like the present would render the collection of bills and drafts of
this nature extremely diﬁicult, and that
would tend very much to
destroy the facilities which at present exist, and subject the holders
o'f bills to inconvenience and expense, and probably, in many cases,
to serious loss.
But as long as banks and bankers or other persons
hold themselves out to collect such bills or drafts for
compensation,
or their advantage, they ought to be governed by the same rules of law
that apply to other persons, and,
they wish to avoid such responsi
is.very easy for them to accept such business only upon
bility,
a special agreement as to their duties and liabilities.
Failing to do this,
think they must, in taking such bills or drafts, be responsible, as
other business men are, for the misconduct of their selected agents at
*
home or abroad.“
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.

The leading case for this view is Exchange Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank,
Sup. Ct. 141, 28 L. Ed. 722 (1884).
Accord:
S. 276.
Streisstruth v.
Bank, 43 Minn. 50, 44 N. W. 797,
National German-American
L. R A. 363.
Power v. First Nat. Bank,
19 Am. St. Rep. 213 (1890)
Mont. 251, 12 Pac. 597
(1887). with exhaustive review of the cases.
When the agent bank expressly stipulates that it will assume no liability
for defaults oi.‘ its subagents,
can. of course, only be held for its own mis
conduct.
Cal. Nat. Bank v. Utah Nat. Bank, 190 Fed. 318. 111 C. C. A. 218
Farmers’ State Bank of Des Lacs v. Union Nat. Bank of Minot, 42
(1911).
N. D. 449. 173 N. W. 789 (1919). Equally if the agent bank expressly assumes
liability for the correspondent
must respond for defaults of its subagents.
Rawle, 384 (1834); Landa v. Traders’ Bank, 118
M991-\ﬂI11¢8’ Bank V- E8-I'D.
Mn. App. 356. 94 S. W. 770 (1906).
While in this view there is in law no privity between the principal and the
sulmgent, yet the principal has an equitable right to pursue his property, or
its proceeds, in the hands of the subagent, or of anyone who cannot estab
lish his right against the true owner, on the ground that he is
bona ﬂde
holder.
Naser v. First Nat. Bank; 116 N. Y. 492, 27 N. Y. St. Rep. 670, 22
N. E. 1077 (1889).
Gonn.Pn.& A. (2n En.)—23
a
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BANK OF ROCKY MOUNT
(Supreme Court of North Carolina,

1906.

(Part 2
v.

FLOYD.

142 N. C. 187, 55 S.

E.

95.)

Action by the plaintiff bank against Floyd, the Murchison Bank,
and others, to recover $1,059, the amount of a check drawn on the
Dunn Bank, deposited with plaintiff bank by Floyd for collection,
and applied at once to his account to be charged back if the check was
not paid.
Plaintiff sent the check to the Murchison Bank, and it
forwarded it to the Dunn Bank, which failed, and the proceeds were
judgment against the Murchi
never paid to the Murchison Bank.
son Bank.
* * * The ﬁrst question presented for our con
Common,
sideration is the duty of theplaintiﬁ and the Murchison Bank to the
owner in dealing with the check. VVhile there is a diversity of opin
ion and the decisions of the courts are not uniform upon the subject,
this court in Bank v. Bank, 75 N. C. 534, approved and adopted the
“It is well settled that when a note is de
following rule of conduct:
posited with a bank for collection, which is payable at another place,
the whole duty of the bank so receiving the note in the ﬁrst instance
is seasonably to transmit the same to a suitable bank or other agent
at the place of payment. And, as a part of the same doctrine, it is
well settled that, if the acceptor of a bill or promissory note has his
residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended
and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank that
it was to be transmitted to the place of residence of the promisor,"
In an opinion expressed with his
or, we may add, drawee or payor.
usual force and clearness. Bynum. ]., says: “This decision is conso
This case has been recognized as con
nant with notions of justice.”
trolling in this state, and we think is sustained by the weight of au
thority in other courts and the reason of the thing.
Mr. Morse, in his work on Banks & Banking (volume 1, § 235),
thus states the la\v: “VVhen the paper is payable in some other place
than that in which the bank is located, its duty is (1) to forward the
bill, or note, or check, in proper season to a subagent selected with
due care;
(2) to send to such agent any instructions bearing upon
and (3) to
its duty that may have been received from its depositor;
make inquiry with due diligence if notice of the arrival of the paper
does not come to it within such time as it might reasonably be ex
He further says: “If a bank fails to do its duty in the
pected.”
matter of collection with reasonable skill and care, it is liable for the
resulting to any party interested in the paper, whether his
damage
Section 252.
name appears on the paper or not."
It is conceded that there is much diversity of opinion and decision

I.“

13 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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the liability of the receiving bank for the default of its
subagent, and the courts of the several jurisdictions holding variant
views proceed upon entirely distinct and opposite constructions of
the implied powers conferred upon the bank ﬁrst receiving the col
lection.
“If a bank receive a paper for collection on a party at a dis
tant place, the agent it employs at the place of payment is the agent
of the owner and not of the bank; and, if the bank selects a compe
tent and reliable agent and gives proper instructions, its responsibility
ceases." Bank v. Bank, 71 Mo. App. 451. The two rules are stated
by Mr. Morse, and the cases classiﬁed, with a discussion of the rea
son upon which they rest.
1 Banks & Banking, §§ 272-287.
As we have seen, this court has adopted the Massachusetts rule,
which is based upon the following satisfactory reason: “The employ
ment of a subagent is justiﬁable, because this manner of conducting
business is the usual and known custom, and in a business which
requires or justiﬁes the delegation of an agent's authority to a sub
agent, who is not his own servant, the original agent is not liable for
the errors or misconduct of the subagent, if he has exercised due care
in the selection.” Measured by this standard, there can be no doubt
in regard to the conduct of the plaintiff bank in sending the check
to defendant Murchison Bank; its standing and ﬁtness to discharge
the duty being conceded.
His honor would have been justiﬁed in
so instructing the jury. Measured by the same rule, the Murchison
Bank would have been in the strict line of its duty in sending its
collection to its correspodnent in Dunn, but for the fact that the Dunn
Bank was the drawee of the check.
This brings us to the pivotal question in the case: Is the drawee
or payee of a bill, note, or check a suitable agent to which such paper
This question has never been decided
should be sent for collection?
by this court; hence we must seek for an answer upon the reason
of the thing, the general principles underlying the law of agency, and
By accepting the collection
adjudged cases in other jurisdictions.
from the plaintilfbank the Murchison National Bank became, in re
but, as the amount had been
spect to Floyd’s interest, his agent;
credited to him, the plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds.
In this
view of the case it is not material whether the Bank of Rocky Mount
was the proper party plaintiff, as. all of the persons interested were
before the court and their relative rights and duties presented for
adjustment.
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Bank v. Bank, supra, in an
“It was negligence to
swering the question presented here, says:
place a collection, which as a matter of business required prompt at
tention, in the hands of the debtor to collect from himself.
The evi
dence here discloses the impropriety of the transaction.
The defend
ant sent the check to Burr Oak, where it arrived on the 9th.
If it
had sent it to some one other than the debtor, it would undoubtedly

\
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have been paid, since the. bank continued to do business and meet its
obligations on they 9th and 10th.” Morse on Banks, § 236, says:
“The debtor cannot be the disinterested agent of the creditor to col
lect the debt, and it cannot be considered reasonable care to select an
agent known to be interested against the principal to put the latter
into the hands of his adversary.
Surely it is not due care in one
holding a promissory note for collection to send it to the debtor, trust
ing him to pay, delay, or destroy the evidence of debt as his conscience
If this would not be reasonable care and diligence, why
permits.
should the same conduct be held to be reasonable care and diligence
when applied to a bank P” citing Bank v. Packing & Prov. Co., 117
Ill. 100, 7 N. E. 601, 57 Am. Rep. 855. To the same effect are all of
the authorities to which we have been cited and which we ﬁnd in our
investigation.
The law is well stated in Ger. Nat. Bank v. Burns, 12 Colo. 539,
21 Pac. 714, 13 Am. St. Rep. 247, in which it is said:
“Even if we
can conceive of such anomaly as one bank acting as the agent of an
other to make a collection against itself, it must be apparent that
the selection of such an agent is not sanctioned by businesslike pru
How can the debtor be the proper agent of the
dence and discretion.
creditor in the very matter of collecting the debt? His interests are
If the debtor is embarrassed,
all adverse to those of his principal.
there is the temptation to delay. 3* * * The fact that the L. Bank
was a correspondent of the defendant to a limited extent does not
* * * As a matter of law such method of doing
alter the rule.
It violates every rule of diligence.” In
business cannot be upheld.
Bank v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 428, 2 Atl. 687, 58 Am. Rep. 728, it is
said:
“Such suitable agent must, from the nature of the case, be
some. one other than the party who is to make the payment.”
Auten.
Receiver, v. Bank, 67 Ark. 243, 54 S. W. 337, 47 L. R. A. 3292 l
Dan. Neg. Inst. 328.
In Farley Nat. Bank v. Pollock, 145 Ala. 321,
39 South. 612, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194, 117 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann.
Cas. 370, the same principle is announced, and in the note it is said:
“The American cases are almost unanimous in support of the doctrine
that it is negligence in a bank havinga draft or check for collection
to send it directly to the drawee.”
The annotator gives a long list of
authorities sustaining this proposition.
The defendant Murchison National Bank, however, insists that it
has shown that the custom or usage prevails by which a bank, hav
ing a check upon its own correspondent in good standing. may in
trust it with the collection. The same point has been frequently made
and almost uniformly met with the declaration that such custom, if
In this connection it is said by the Court
shown to exist, is invalid.
“It was said to be
of Appeals of Missouri, in Bank v. Bank, supra:
customary for banks to transmit collections to their correspondent,
even though such correspondent was the debtor. To this we answer
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that it is not a reasonable custom, and therefore must fail of recogni
tion by the courts.
We concede it may be, and perhaps is, in many
instances, the most convenient mode for the bank intrusted with the
But, if the bank adopts that mode, it takes upon itself
collection.
the risk of the consequences.”
In Min. S. & Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Minn. 136, 78
N. VV. 980, 44 L. R. A. 507, 77 Am. St. Rep. 609, the court says:
cannot agree with counsel that the usage and custom here relied
“‘vVe
upon as a defense to the claim that the defendant was negligent when
forwarding this check to the Mapleton Bank for presentation and
payment, as a general usage and custom will not justify negligence.
It may be admitted that such a course is frequently adopted, but it
must be at the risk of the sender, who transmits the evidence upon
which the right to demand payment depends to the party who is to
make the payment.
Such a usage and custom is opposed to the pol
the law, unreasonable, and invalid." In Farley Nat. Bank v.
icy
Pollock, supra, Simpson, ]., says: “A custom must be reasonable,
and the best-considered cases hold, not only that the bank or party
to pay the paper
not the proper person to whom the paper
who
custom to that effect
should be sent for collection, but also that
un
laid down in the notes, and
reasonable and bad.” The same rule
number of cases cited to sustain it. Morse on Banks,
236.“
No error.

2

&

to the drawee bank for collection:
as to transmission
Minne
Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Minn. 136. 78 N. W. 980,
Nat. Bank v. Good
44 L. R. A. 504. 77 Am. St. Rep. 609 (1899); Merchants’
man, 109 Pa. 422,
Atl. 687, 58 Am. Rep. 728 (1885); Am. Exch. Bank v.
Bank,
Metropolitan Nat.
71 Mo. App. 451 (1897). Cf. Wilson v. Cnrlinville
When the paper
Nat. Bank, 187 Ill. 222. 58 N. E. 250. 52 L. R. A. 632 (1900).
is sent by the agent to the debtor for collection in accordance with the in
structions of the principal, there is of course no liability it the debtor fails
to pay.
First Nat. Bank v. Citizens’ Sav. Bank. 123 Mich. 336, 82 N. W. 66,
14 Accord,
apolis Sash

L. R. A. 583 (1900).
collecting bank is not liable for the de
A leading case for the view that
subagent is Fabens v. Mercantile Bank. 23 Pick. 330, 34 Am.
faults of
Dec. 59 (1839). Guclich v. Nat. St. Bank, 56 Iowa, 434,
N. W. 328, 41 Am.
9

a

a

48

4,

'

Rep. 110 (1881).
When the ﬁrst agent is negligent, he of course is liable for any losses caus
ed thereby through the dcfault of the subagent.
Second Nat. Bank v. Mer
chants’ Nat. Bank, 111 Ky. 930, 65 S. W.
55 L. R. A. 273, 98 Am. St. Rep.
439

(1901).
52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 611, note, 18 states are counted for the Massachusetts
rule, and 13 states and the federal courts and England for the New York rule.
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SKINNER & CO.
(Queen's "

Bench

v.

(Part,

WEGUELIN EDDOWES

Division of the High ‘Court of Justice,
Ellis, 12.)

8:

CO.
1 Cababé

1882.

2

&

Action to recover £474 collected on insurance on a ship by defend
ant’s Paris agent, for plaintiff, and not paid over.
DAY, I. The doctrine has always been, that if I employ an agent to
do work for me,‘ and he employs a sub—agent, the agent remains re
On the facts I a.m clearly of opinion that the de
sponsible to me.
fendants are responsible to the plaintiffs for the money received by M.
.
Magniol.
Judgment accordingly.

ji__

HOAG
(Supreme Court of Michigan,

v.

GRAVES."

1890.

81 Mich.

628, 46 N.

W.

109.)

*

*

it,

a

a

a

*

a

it,

Assumpsit to recover half of $500, alleged to have been collected
by defendant through his agent, one Anthony.
Hoag was the owner
of the amount due on an insurance policy which had been issued on
Graves, in his interest, arranged
the life of one Sweet, then deceased.
with Anthony in New York to collect
and Hoag gave Anthony a
contract with Graves to give him half
power of attorney, and made
the amount collected, Graves bearing all costs of collection.
The fact that the company admitted
CI-IAMPLIN, C. I.“
letter from Anthony to Graves. Quite
liability was derived through
a correspondence passed between these parties, and Graves testiﬁes
that he showed all of the letters received by him from Anthony to
dozen such letters.
Hoag, and plaintiff testiﬁes that he saw perhaps
After several days’
Anthony collected on the 24th of June $500.
delay he retained from the amount $100 for his services, and for
draft for $400, payable to the order of Brice W. Hoag.
warded
He receipted to the insurance company for this money as the attorney
in fact of Brice VV. Hoag.
Graves handed the draft over to Hoag,
retained $250, and gave $150 to Graves.
who drew the money upon
On Iuly 15, 1887, Anthony collected the balance of $500 from the
insurance company, and signed the receipt for the full amount, as
follows: “Brice W. Hoag, Creditor of Myron W. Sweet. By D.

1

is

6

5

8

Commercial Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. 811 (1857); Waldman v.
15Aeeord:
South. 666, 24 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1890); Davis v.
Insurance Co., 91 Ala. 170,
King, 66 Conn. 465, 34 Atl. 107, 50 Am. St. Rep. 10-i (1805). When the agent
for the undertaking he will be liable for the acts
assumes full responsibility
of the subagents, even when the principal knew they would be employed and
Raney v. Weed,
N. Y. Super. Ct. 577 (1859); Barnard
consented thereto.
v. Coiiin. 141 Mass. 37.
N. E. 364, 55 Am. Rep. 443 (1886); Williams v.
Moore, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 402. 58 S. W. 953 (1900); Bossiter v. Trafalgar Life
Assur. Ass'n. 27 Beav. 377 (1859).
16 Part of the opinion
omitted.
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Edgar Anthony, Attorney in Fact.” He kept the whole of the second
$500, and the plaintiff claims that Anthony is the subagent of Graves,
and not his agent at all. And because the contract between Hoag
and Graves, of date ]une 1, 1887, recites that Graves has-in his hands
for collection a claim of $1,000 on certiﬁcate 3,977 of the National
Beneﬁt Society of New York, he is liable to him for $250 collected
by Anthony, and which Anthony has neglected and refused to pay
over.
After hearing all the testimony, the circuit judge charged the jury
as follows:
“The question presented in this case is one of those
interesting ones which arise in trial of cases, and which, by reason
of the endless combination of facts, there seems to be no end or limit
It seems to the court that the controlling question here was
to.
whether from the time of the making of the contract of June lst the
man Anthony was under the control of Mr. Graves or of Mr. Hoag;
and when that question is solved, it solves the case for that matter.
I cannot quite understand ho\v it would be possible that Mr. Graves
could be held responsible for the conduct and acts of’ Mr. Anthony
unless he had the power to control him, and, indeed, take the business
out of his hands if it became necessary. And it seems to the court
that by the power of attorney of January -29th the man Anthony,
under the circumstances, as they seem to have been disclosed by the
testimony, was the agent of Mr. Hoag; that at the time when the
contract of june 1st was made, it was understood between the par
ties as to what the situation was. If that contract had been intended
to have been construed. as takingthe authority of Mr. Hoag from
Mr. Anthony, and putting the control of Mr. Anthony into the hands
of Mr. Graves, it hardly seems to me that that kind of ‘a contract
would have been drawn.
It does not scem to me that the contract
goes far enough to do that, and, as I said before, if it does not do
that it does not quite seem to me that it could be said that it was
understood between the parties that Mr. Graves should be responsible
for the acts of Mr. Anthony. except in so far as the contract speci
he should be liable for his acts in whatever costs he might
ﬁes: that
make, and things of that kind: but for the misfeasance of Mr. An
does not seem to me that the contract goes far enough. With
thony.
seems to me that the duty
this in view,
upon the court to in
struct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.”
correct.
The legal prin
\Ve think the view of the circuit judge
well expressed b_v Mr. Mechem in his work on Agen
ciple involved
subagent for
cy, at section 197, as follows: “If an agent employs
his principal, and by his authority, expressed or implied, then the
the agent of the principal, and
directly responsible to
subagent
damage results from the con
the principal for his conduct, and
responsible in case he has
duct of such subagent, the agent only
the
not exercised due care in the selection of the subagent. But

1
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agent, having undertaken to transact the business of his principal,
employs a subagent on his own account to assist him in what he has
undertaken to do, he does so at his own risk, and there is no privity
between such subagent and the principal.
The subagent is therefore
the agent of the agent only, and is responsible to him for his con
duct, while the agent is responsible to the principal for the manner
in which the business has been done, whether by himself or his serv
ant or his agent.”
V
The written agreement cannot be contradicted by parol testimony,
but it must be construed in the light of the circumstances and situa
tion of the parties as they existed at the time it was executed.
The
circumstances were that Hoag had already made Anthony his attor
ney in fact to liquidate, settle, and adjust this claim against the in
surance company. He was at the time the contract of june 1st was
entered into the agent and attorney of Hoag, and there is no evidence
that he ever revoked his authority.
Anthony received the money of
the insurance company by virtue of his power of attorney from Hoag,
He did
and not by virtue of any authority he received from Graves.
not act, or claim to act, as the agent of Graves, or by virtue of any
authority received from him, and was in no sense a subagent of
The authority con
Graves, but was the immediate agent of Hoag.
ferred upon Anthony was to liquidate, settle, and adjust the claim,
and this authorized him to receive the money due upon the claim, and
thus liquidate it. Hoag recognized this authority in receiving without
question the draft as avails of the ﬁrst payment made upon the claim,
jand which was received after the "execution of the contract of June
lst. The relations between Hoag and Anthony had not changed when
Anthony, as the agent of Hoag, received the balance of the claim,
and gave a receipt in Hoag’s name, by himself as his attorney in fact,
in full liquidation of the whole claim.
The plaintiff’s cause of action, as stated in his declaration, is that
Graves collected $500 through his agent, and neglected and refused
There was no evidence showing or tending
to pay plaintiff his half.
to show that Anthony, who collected the money, was the agent of
Graves, but, on the contrary, it was conclusively shown that he was
Hoag’s agent, and it follows that the plaintiff entirely failed to make
his case.
The judgment is aﬂirmed. The other justices concurred.

PART III
EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES
RELATION
CHAPTER

OF THE

I

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
TO HIS CONSTITUENT

SECTION 1.—LOYALTY
LUM
(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

v.

McEWEN.
1894.

56

Minn.

278, 57

N. W.

662.)

Lum, in behalf of citizens of Brainerd, gave to Clark nominally, to
McEwen really, his note for $5,000, in order to induce McEwen to use
his inﬂuence to have his principals build a railroad to Brainerd.
Mc
Ewen would have done as he did without the note, and he had no in
ﬁuence in inducing his principals to build the road. Lum sues to have
the note adjudged null and void, and delivered up and canceled. On
the ground that the note was in circulation, was fair upon its face, and
that the contract was still executory, the court below decreed for
plaintiff.
Mrrci-II-:LL, I. It is only necessary to consider one of numerous
questions argued by counsel. The defendant McEwen was the super
intendent and general manager of the business of the Northern Mill
That company had a sawmill on Gull river, eight miles
Company.
from Brainerd, and also a logging railroad extending from Kilpatrick
lake, 25 miles from Bainerd, some distance out into the woods. The
mill company had under consideration a plan for remodeling its mill,
and extending its logging road to Gull river, where the mill was situ
At this juncture of aﬂairs, in consideration of McEwen’s agree
ated.
ment to use his inﬂuence and authority as superintendent and manager
of the mill company to secure the removal of its mill an_d the extension
of its road to Brainerd, the plaintiff executed the obligation in suit, by
which he promised to pay to defendant Clark $5,000 nine months after
date, on condition that within that time the mill company extended
its logging railroad to Brainerd, and built within the limits of that city
a sawmill of a speciﬁed capacity. This note was given for the beneﬁt
(331)
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of McEwen, but was made payable to Clark, in order to conceal Mc
Ewen’s connection with the matter.
That this contract was illegal and void on grounds of public policy
will not admit of a moment's doubt. Loyalty to his trust is the ﬁrst
Reliance upon an agent’s
duty which an agent owes to his" principal.
integrity, ﬁdelity, and capacity is the moving consideration in the crea
tion of all agencies; and the law condemns, as repugnant to public
The agent
policy, everything which tends to destroy that reliance.
cannot put himself in such relations that his own personal interests be
come antagonistic to those of his principal.
He will not be allowed to
serve two masters without the intelligent consent of both.
Actualinjury is not the principle the law proceeds on, in holding
such transactions void. Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and,
as a means of securing
the law will not permit him to place himself
in
position in which he may be tempted by his own private interests
to disregard those of his principal.‘ In the matter of determining the
policy of removing the mill and extending the road, McEwen, in the
discharge of his duties, whether merely that of making recommenda
tions, or of exercising authority to act, owed to his principal the exer
cise of his best judgment and ability, unintluenced by any antagonistic
personal interests of his own. His attempt to secure $5,000 to himself
was calculated to bias his mind in favor of the policy upon which the
payment of the money was conditioned, regardless of the interests of
not material that no actual injury to the com
the mill company.
pany resulted, or that the policy recommended may have been for its
best interest.
Courts will not inquire into these matters. It
enough
to know that the agent in fact placed himself in such relations that he
might be tempted by his own interests to disregard those of his prin
cipal.

it
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is
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T-he transaction was nothing more or less than the acceptance by the
bribe to perform his duties in the manner desired by the
agent of
contract
void.
This doctrine
Such
person who gave the bribe.
rests on such plain principles of law, as well as common business
unnecessary. The doctrine
honesty, that the citation of authorities
perhaps as clearly and concisely expressed as anywhere in Harring
B. Div. S49. The fact that the validity of such
ton v. Dock "Co.,
attempted to be sustained in courts of justice does not
transaction
speak well for the state of the public conscience on the subject of
loyalty to trusts in ‘business affairs.
This was an action by the maker of the instrument to have
sur
view
of
the
In
which
and
canceled.
he
bears
to
up
relation
rendered
the transaction, there may be some doubt whether courts should give

'(1863).

8

1

Fed. 351 (1881); Bedtord Goal Co. v. Parke Coun
Glover v. Ames (C. C.)
ty Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 390, 89 N. E. 412 (1909).
_
The rule applies to public agents. People v. Township Board, 11 Mich. 222
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him aﬁirmative relief.
But defendants do not raise the point, and \ve
only advert to it in order that this case may not be considered an au
thority on the question.
Order afﬁrmed.

‘ii

JANSEN
(Supreme Court of Nebraska,

1893.

v.

/

WILLIAMS.’

36 Neb. 869, 55 N. W. 279, 20

.1

L. R. A.

207.)

RYAN, C.“ This action was brought by the defendant in error to
recover. the sum of $100 retained as commission from the proceeds
of the sale of real property, effected by the plaintiffs in error. The
petition alleged the employment of plaintiffs in error to sell said real
property for the sum of $3,000, and that the plaintiff named in said
petition meantime reserved for himself the right to sell said property
if he met with an opportunity to do so before the same should be sold
by plaintiffs in error; that, soon after such employment, the plaintiff
below entered into negotiations with one E. T. Hartley for the sale of
said property, and was about to sell said property to said Hartley for
the sum of $3,300; that, during such negotiations with said Hartley,
plaintiffs in error. for the purpose of preventing the defendant in error
from making said sale, and wrongfully compelling the defendant in
error to pay plaintiffs in error a commission of $100, induced said
Hartley to abandon his negotiations with defendant in error, and agree
and
to pay to them, the plaintiffs in error, $3.000 for said property;
that thereupon plaintiffs in error represented to defendant in error that
they had sold said property for $3,000 to a good, responsible party,
and induced the defendant in error to execute a deed to Albert \V.
Jansen, one of the plaintiffs in error, and defendant in error executed
the same, believing that said grantee was another than the said plaintiff
in error, and thereby deceived and defrauded the defendant in error
to defendant in error’s damage in the sum of $100.
The answer admits the placing of said property in the hands of
plaintiffs in error for sale at $3,000. but alleged that said E. T. Hartley
was obtained by plaintiffs in error as an original purchaser. to whom
they sold the property without any knowledge of any previous nego
tiations with defendant in error. and that the deed was taken to said
Jansen only for the purpose of securing money advanced to said Hart
ley. and that the acts in connection with said transaction were in good
To this answer there was a reply in the nature of a general
faith.
denial. "' * "‘
lAccord: Norris v. Tnyioe. 49 Ill. 17. 95 Am.
V. Dupuy, 163 Ill. 417, 45 N. E. 29$ (1896).
8 Part of the opinion is omitted.

Dec. 568 (1868)

and Prince
_
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the request of the defendant in error the court instructed the jury
“An agent ought, as far as possible, to represent his prin
cipal ; and, to the best of his ability, he should endeavor to successfully
accomplish the object of his agency. It is also his duty to keep his
principal fully and promptly informed of all the material facts or cir
cumstances which come to his knowledge, and, since he is expected to
represent his principal, he cannot have a personal interest adverse to
the interest of his principal; and if he deals with the subject-matter of
the agency the proﬁts will, as a general rule, belong to the principal,
and not to the agent.
In all things he is required to act in entire good
faith towards his principal.
There are duties which the law imposes
upon an agent, without any express stipulations on the subject; and
one of these duties of an agent is to keep his principal informed of his
acts, and to inform him within a reasonable time of sales made, and
to give him a timely notice of all facts and circumstances which may
An
render it necessary for him to take measures for his security.
agent cannot act for his principal and for himself in the same transac
tion, by being both buyer and seller of property, and has no right to
act as the agent for others for the purchase of property without the
knowledge or consent of such owner, nor to take any advantage of the
conﬁdence which his position inspires to obtain the title in himself.
If you ﬁnd that the defendants were the agents of the plaintiff for the
sale of the property mentioned in the petition, and that in making the
sale they purposely kept from the plaintiff any of the material facts
touching said sale, for the purpose of subserving their own interest,
and intended to and did keep the plaintiﬁ in the dark as to such facts
until after the said sale was consummated, and deed executed by said
are not entitled to a commission
plaintiff, then I instruct you that they
A
for selling the same.”
_
In Stettnische v. Lamb, 18 Neb. 627, 26 N. W. 374, is this language:
“T he rule is well settled that a party will not be permitted to purchase
an interest in property, and hold it for his own beneﬁt, where he has
a duty to perform in relation thereto which is inconsistent with his
character as a purchaser on his own account.”
This statement was
sustained by several authorities cited, and of its correctness there can
be no doubt.
In the light of adjudged cases and of the text-books,
therefore, let us see what duty the plaintiffs in error had to perform
towards the defendant in error in respect of the real property which
Upon this subject
was the subject-matter of the agency between them.
the following language is found in Pom. Eq. Iur. § 959: “In dealings
without the intervention of his principal, if an agent for the purpose
of selling property for the principal purchases it himself, or an agent
for the purpose of buying property for the principal buys it from him
self, either directly or through the instrumentality of a third person,
It will always be set aside at the
the sale or purchase is voidable.
The amount of consideration, the absence of
option of the principal.

At
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advantage, or other similar features, are wholly immaterial.
Nothing will defeat the principal’s right of remedy except his own
conﬁrmation after full knowledge of all the facts.”
In Porter v. Woodruﬁ, 36 N. J. Eq., on page 179 et seq., the follow
ing language is found: “The general interests of justice, and the safety
of those who are compelled to repose conﬁdence in others, alike de
undue

F

I

is

is

a

it

it,

mand that the courts shall always inflexibly maintain that great and
salutary rule which declares that an agent employed to sell cannot
make himself the purchaser, nor, if employed to purchase, can he be
himself the seller. The moment he ceases to be the representative of
his employer, and places himself in a position towards his principal
where his interests may come in conflict with those of his principal, no
matter how fair his conduct may be in the particular transaction, that
moment he ceases to be that which his service requires, and his duty
to his principal demands. He is no longer the agent, but an umpire.
He ceases to be the champion of one of the contestants in the game of
bargain, and sets himself up as a judge to decide between his principal
and himself what is just and fair. The reason of the rule is apparent.
Owing to the selﬁshness and greed of our nature, there must, in the
great mass of the transactions of mankind, be a strong and almost in
eradicable antagonism between the interests of the seller and the buy
er; and universal experience has shown that the average man will not,
where his interests are brought in conﬂict with those of his employer,
look upon his employer's interest as more important, and entitled to
more protection, than his own.
In such cases the courts do not stop
to inquire whether the agent has obtained an advantage or not, or
whether his conduct has been fraudulent or not. When the fact is
established that he has attempted to assume two distinct and opposite
characters in the same transaction, in one of which he acted for him
self, and in the other pretended to act for another person, and to have
secured for each the same measure of advantage that would have been
obtained if each had been represented by a disinterested and loyal rep
resentative, they do not pause to speculate concerning the merits of the
transaction,-—whether the agent has been able so far to curb his nat
ural greed as to take no advantage,—but they at once pronounce the
transaction void because it is against public policy. The salutary ob
ject of the principle is not to compel restitution in case fraud has been
committed, or an unjust advantage gained, but to elevate the agent to
a position where he cannot be tempted to betray his principal.
Under
a less stringent rule, fraud might be committed, or unfair advantage
taken, and yet, owing to the imperfections of the best of human institu
tions, theinjured party be unable either to discover
or prove
in
such
manner as to entitle him to redress. To guard against this un
removed, and the prohibition against
certainty, all possible temptation
the agent acting in a dual character
made broad enough to cover all
his transactions.
The rights of the principal will not be changed, nor
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the capacities of the agent enlarged, by the fact that the agent is not
invested with a discretion, but simply acts under an authority to pur
chase a particular article at a speciﬁed price, or to sell a particular
article at the market price. No such distinction is recognized by the
adjudications, nor can it be established without removing an important
Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Younge & C. 326;
safeguard against fraud.
Conkey v. Bond, 34 Barb. 276, L36 N. Y. 427.”
In Ruckman v. Bergholz, 37 N. I. Law, 440, is found the following
“The judge, distinguishing this case from one where the
language:
price was left open to the negotiations of the agent, instructed the jury
that, though the plaintiff was interested in the purchase when it was
made, he might, nevertheless, recover his commissions as agent, not
withstanding the defendant was not aware of the existence of such in
terest.
In this there was error, for it is a fundamental rule that an
agent employed to sell cannot himself be a purchaser, unless he is
known to his principal to be such.
Dunl. Paley, Ag. 33; Story, Ag.
210;
and
other
cases
cited.
And
this
rule is not inapplicable, nor is
§
it relaxed, when the employment is to sell at a ﬁxed price, for it springs
from the prohibitory policy of the law, adopted to prevent the abuse of
conﬁdence, and to remove temptation to duplicity.
It requires a man
to put off the character of agent when he assumes that of principal."
Mechem, Ag., in section 455, states the rule as follows: “The agent
will not he permitted to serve two masters without the intelligent con
sent of both._ As is said by a learned judge, so careful is the law
guarding against the abuse of ﬁduciary relations that it will not permit
an agent to act for himself and his principal in the same transaction, as
to buy of himself, as agent, the property of his principal, or the like.
All such transactions are void, as it respects the principal, unless rati
ﬁed by him with a full knowledge of all the circumstances.
To re
VVhether he has
pudiate them. he need not show himself damniﬁed.
Actual injury is not the principle the law
been or not, is immaterial.
proceeds upon in holding such transactions void. Fidelity in the agent
the law will not per
is what is aimed at, and, as a means of securing
mit the agent to place himself in situation in which he might be tempt
ed by his own private interest to disregard that
Cit
his principal.”
ing People v. Township, 11 Mich. 222. “This doctrine to speak again
in the beautiful language of another, has its foundation, not so much
in the commission of actual fraud as in that profound knowledge of
the human heart which dictated that hallowed petition, ‘Lead us not
into temptation, but deliver us from evil,’ and that caused the an
”
nouncement of the infallible truth, ‘A man cannot serve two masters.’
These quotations we shall properly close with the language of Story,
210, quoted, with the approval of this court, in Englehart v.
Ag.
“In this connection, also seems
Plow Co., 21 Neb. 48, 31 N. W. 391
proper to state another rule in regard to the duties of agents, which
matters touching the agency,
that,
of general application, and that
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agents cannot act so as to bind their principals where they have an
adverse interest in themselves. This rule is founded upon the plain
and obvious considerations that the principal bargains in the employ
ment for the exercise of the disinterested skill, diligence, and zeal of
the agent for his own exclusive beneﬁt.
It is a conﬁdence necessarily
reposed in the agent, that he will act with a sole regard to the interests
of his principal, as far as he lawfully may; and even if impartiality
could possibly be presumed on the part of the agent, where his own
interests are concemed, that is not what the principal bargains for, and
in many cases
the very last thing which would advance his inter
If, then,
est.
seller were permitted, as an agent of another, to be
come the purchaser, his duty to his principal and his o\vn interest would
stand in direct opposition to each other, and thus
temptation, perhaps
in many cases too strong for resistance by men of ﬂexible morals, or
hackneyed in the common devices of worldly business, would be held
out, which would betray them into gross misconduct, and even into
crime.
to interpose
preventive check against such temptations
and seductions that
positive .prohibition has been found to be the
soundest policy, encouraged by the purest precepts of Christianity.”
unnecessary to quote further illustrations of the correctness of
the instructions given the jury at the request of the defendant in error.
The same principles announced in these instructions pervade all the
text works, and the decisions of the courts, which have to deal with
In none of them
the relations of principal and agent.
recognized
the right of the suppression of important facts, of which the principal
had
part of “the secrets of the real-estate
right to be informed, as
business,” as was claimed by plaintiff in error Murphy in his testi
mony. The evidence fully sustains the verdict which was rendered by
the jury. Indeed, a verdict different would probably, of necessity, have
been set aside, as has been shown by abundant citation of text writers
,and authorities.
The instructions clearly gave the law to the jury, were applicable to
the evidence, and the judgment of the district court must therefore be
The other commissioners concur.
aﬁirmed.
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HAVELOCK.
1 Camp.

527,

10

R. R.

744.)

was employed as master of defendant’s ship, the
During the time he contracted the ship in the govern
ment service in Egypt, the captain to receive ls. per ton per month and
the owner 40s. per ton per month.
The government paid both amounts
to the defendant, and the plaintiff sues to recover for money had and
Capt. Thompson

Lord Nelson.

received.

-_

Loan

Is it contended that a servant, who has en
ELLENBOROUC-H.
gaged to devote the whole of his time and attention to my concerns,
It would
may hire out his services, or a part of them, to another?
have been a different thing, if the owner had been suing for this mon
ey; but I am clearly of opinion that at all events the present plaintiff
has no right to it. Under this contract, he must have been taken from
superintending the defendant’s ship; and I do not know, how far it
might go, if such earnings could be recovered in a court of justice.
No man should be allowed to have an interest against his duty.
will assume, that the plaintiif obtained as high a freight as possible for
his owners, and that his services to government were meritorious;
still there would be no security in any department of life or of busi
ncss, if servants could legally let themselves out in whole or in part.
My opinion upon the subject is quite decisive: and if it be doubted,
beg that a. bill of exceptions may be tendered.‘

I

I

GATY

v.

SACK.‘

(Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri,

1885.

_
19 Mo.

App. 470.)

for obtaining a purchaser for de
L Action to recover commissions
The agent did not complete a sale, but defendant
fendant’s farm.
himself sold the farm to a purchaser, discovered by plaintiﬁ.
* * * III. It appears from the record that at
PHILIPS, P.
_T.°

be acting as agent for
known as “the Dyke
in
farm
interested
a
secretly
the farm he took the said purchaser out to see on
proposed that he go by to see his farm. Defendant
court excluded evidence offered by him tending
the time

plaintiff claimed to

defendant he was
farm.”
This was
the day defendant
complains that the
to show that the

authorize another azent to act to the prejudice of their
Adams Express Co. v. Treso. 35 Md. 47 (1872), approved in Clarke
v. Kelsey, 41 Neb. 766, 60 N. W. 138 (1894).
5Accord: Geiger v. Harris, 19 Mich. 209 (1869), in which the court found
that in moments of leisure,- or under circumstances when the agent cannot
be working for his principal, he may act tor another, it without prejudice to
his employer.
¢ Part of the opinion is omitted.
4 One agent cannot

principal.

1
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plaintiff concealed from him the fact of this secret interest. The con
tention of appellant is’, that‘ plaintiff’s interest, thus concealed, con
ﬁicted with his duty as agent for the sale of defendant’s land, and
In support of this posi
should be held to defeat plaintiff’s action.
tion we are referred to Story on Agency, § 210, and other like author
ities.

The rule invoked is “that in matters touching the agency, agents
cannot act so as to bind their principals where they have an adverse
This interest manifestly refers to the subject
interest in themselves.”
matter of th'e agency—the thing on which the agent undertakes to act
It has no application to the facts of
and deal with for the principal.
this case. It cannot be so extended as to make it apply to the instance
of a real estate agent having his own lands or any other lands for sale,
so long as he does not permit his interest in other like transactions to
interfere with his duty to his principal.
Otherwise a real estate agent
could only have on his list of lands for sale one farm at a time, or
would not be allowed to sell his own lands, without ﬁrst advising one
of his patrons of his purpose and interest in other tracts. Suppose
he did keep the fact of his interest in the Dyke farm concealed from
defendant, how did that fact concern the defendant, or in and of itself
affect his relation as agent for defendant’s land? Defendant does not
pretend, or at least he did not offer any proof to the effect, that he
would not have intrusted the sale of his land to plaintiff had he known
that he was secretly interested in the Dyke farm. * * "‘
_]'udg'ment for plaintiff afﬁrmed.

EVERHART
(Supreme

v.

SEARLE.

Court of Pennsylvania,

1872.

71 Pa.

256.1

Tnomrsorv, _C. ]'." The case before us is rather novel. It involves
a question whether the same person may be an agent in a private
transaction for both parties, without the consent of both, so as to en
title him to compensation from both or either. We hav_e the authority
of Holy VVrit for saying that “no man can serve two masters; for
either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to
All human experience sanctions the
the one and despise the other.”
undoubted truth and purity of this philosophy, and it is received as a
cardinal principle in every system of enlightened jurisprudence.
The plaintiff below was appointed by one A. S. Flagg, of Massachu
setts, agent to sell certain real estate, situate in Luzerne county, Penn
sylvania, and was to receive for his compensation all that he might
Two days after the date of this authority,
realize over $125 per acre.
'1 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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to wit, on the 17th day of January, 1870, he accepted from the plain
tiff in error the contract in writing uponwvhich this suit was brought,
promising to pay him $500 as therein set forth, “for his serv-ices in
assisting him to negotiate a sale and purchase, by him of fourteen of
eighteen shares, or all, if he can obtain them conveniently, of the
eighteen (shares) of a certain piece or parcel of land situate in Lacka
wanna township,” etc., composed of the same land he was appointed
to sell.
We need not spend time to argue, what is not susceptible of
controversy, that by the terms of the instrument he accepted employ
ment as agent to purchase the same land which he was employed as
It is true, the learned judge below, no doubt strongly
agent to sell.
impressed by the maxim "that the laborer is worthy of his hire,” en
deavored to make a distinction in the transaction between an under
taking as an agent, and the sale of a preference to the defendant as a
I ought to say, however, that this was hardly his interpreta
buyer.
tion of the writing, but rather the plaintiif’s explanation of his duty
under the contract.
But the plaintiff, as a witness on the stand, had
no right to construe the language of the written contract on which he
had brought his suit. There was nothing left out, and no ambiguity
in
and therefore not within the rule of oral explanation.
The in
terpretation was for the court on the terms of the instrument, and they
obviously stipulated for the plaintiff's services to assist the defendant
in negotiating for the shares mentioned, “or all,
he can obtain them
He was thus to be acting with the defendant, or by
conveniently.”
himself, for the defendant, just as the object in view might demand.
do not think, however, that
This was an agency “pure and simple.”
the result as to the plaintiif’s claim ought to be at all different from
what
likely to be, on the ground assumed by the learned court:
for even on that ground the agent bargained away what his ﬁrst em
This was bad faith towards
ployer had engaged, viz., his discretion.
him, and ex maleﬁcio non oritur contractus.
There was plausibility and seeming force
the argument that as
Flagg, the piaintiif’s principal in the sale, was not injured by the ar
rangement with the defendant, there was nothing wrong in making
This
that arrangement.
specious, but not sound.” The transaction
to be regarded as against the policy of the law, and not binding upon
right to object to it. “It matters not,"
said
party who has

elf

a

1

6

is

the agent of two principals is honest, “the utmost that can be expected
impartiality. But impartiality is exactly the qualiﬁcation which is
British Am. Assurance Co. v. Cooper.
inconsistent with agency."
Colo. App.
It is of the essence of the agent's contract that he
25. 40 Pac. 147 (1895).
will use his best skill and judgment to promote the interest of his employer.
Allen, 494. 79 Am. Dec. 756 (1861).
leading case,
Farnsworth v. Hemmer,
followed in Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348. 93 Am. Dec. 168 (1867), which dis
tinguished Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray, 398. 77 Am. Dec. 416 (1860), post, p. 518.
The agent cannot defend himself behind the double agency by setting up
Cottom v. Holiiday, 59 Ill. 176 (1871).
the illegality of the contract.

of him

Gono.Pn.&

A. (21) En.)
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(page 210, of Hare and VVallace's Notes, 1 Lead. Cases in Eq.), “that
there was no fraud meditated and no injury done; the rule is not in
tended to be remedial of actual wrong, but preventive of the possibility
of it.” This was said of “any one who acts representatively, or whose
oﬁice is to advise or operate, not for himself but for others.
The
principle is general, that a trustee, so far as the trust extends, can
never be a purchaser of the property embraced under the trusts with
out the assent of all the persons interested; and this principle applies
to executors, administrators, guardians, attorneys at law, general or
*
* * and to all persons, judicial or private, min
special agents,
isterial or counselling, who in any respect have a concern in’ the sale of
the property. of others; it extends to sales by public auction, and _to
judicial sales as well as private."
Id. 209. And for this innumerable
authorities, English or American, are cited.
To the same effect is
Campbell v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 2 Vi/hart. 55; Paley on
“It is a fundamental rule applicable to both sales and
Agency, 32.
purchases, that an agentiemployed to sell cannot make himself the
nor if employed to purchase can be himself the seller.
purchaser;
The expediency and justice of this rule are too obvious to require ex
For with whatever fairness he may deal between himself
planation.
and his employer, yet he is no longer that which his services require
and his principal supposes and retains him to be.” It is clear from
all the authorities, not only those referred to, but those cited in the
notes to Fox v. Mackreth and Port v. Same, 1 Lead. Cases in Eq. 172,
not here specially referred to, as also in numerous cases in our reports
from Lazarus and Others v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 54, that an agent to sell
cannot become an agent to buy. It is against the policy of the law that
such a principle should hold. Ex parte Bennett, 1O Vesey, 381. “The
ground on which the disqualiﬁcation rests,” it was said in 8 Tomlin’s
Brown. 72, “is no other than that principle which dictates that a person
cannot be both judge and party. No man can serve two masters. He
that is intrusted with the interests of others cannot be allowed to
make the business an object of interest tohimself, because, from a
frailty of nature, one who has the power will be too readily seized with
the inclination to use the opportunity for serving his own interest at
the expense of those for whom he is intrusted. The danger of tempta
tion from the facility and advantage for doing wrong which a particu
lar situation affords, does, out of the mere necessity, work a disqualiﬁ
cation.”
We regard the case of the plaintiff below within the principles of
these citations, although it doubtless appeared to him. as it did to his
able counsel and the learned court, that there was nothing of actual or
but the learned judge. we think,
meditated fraud in the transaction;
erred in refusing the defendant’s ﬁrst point, and in charging as set forth
in the several assignments of error. * * "‘
Judgment

reversed.
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LORD ALVERSTONE, C. ]." In this case an action was brought to
recover a sum of £50., which had been retained by the defendants
with the assent of the plaintiff as their remuneration for their serv
The main point
ices in negotiating the sale of the plaintiff's house.
defendants,
while act
the
that,
the
because
of the case is
suggestion
£20.
the
from
purchaser
received
as
the
had
plaintiff’s
agents,
ing
the
plain
when
that
was
discovered
by
and
because
a
secret
proﬁt,
-as_
tiff the defendants had paid over that £20. to the plaintiff, the plain
tiff is not entitled to recover back from the defendants the amount
I cannot see how that fact
retained by them by way of commission.
has anything to do with the matter. The £20. was recoverable by the
plaintiff from the defendants because it was a secret proﬁt made by
them, and came out of the sum which the purchaser would, it may
be assumed, have been willing to pay for the house, and it therefore
That the plaintiff was undoubtedly
rightly belonged to the plaintiff.
-entitled to the £20. seems to me to have no bearing on the question
whether the defendants were entitled to commission from the plaintiff.
It is said that the defendants ought not to be called upon to hand over
the £50. to the plaintiff because the plaintiff has had the beneﬁt of
their services.
The‘ principle of Salomons v. Pender, 3 H. & C. 639, seems to me
to govern the case, and it
my opinion, amply suﬁicient to do
In that case
was held that an agent who was himself interested
so.
in
contract to purchase property of his principal was not entitled
The principle there laid down
to any commission from the principal.
that, when
not in
person ’who purports to act as an agent
“I
have
been
as
to
to
his
acting
agent,
your
say
position
principal,
and
have done my duty by you,” he
not entitled to recover any
In Salomons v. Pender,
H.
C.
commission from that principal.
“It
true that
the defend
-639, 642, Bramwell, B., said:
But
be one) of the plaintiff’s services.
ant has had the beneﬁt (if
in a position to say, ‘\Vhat you have done has been
the defendant
volunteer, and does not come within the line of your duties
done as
as agent.’ ” And in the same case Martin, B., quoted the passage
210, where
said:
from Story on Agency, p. 262,
“In this con
seems proper to state another rule, in regard to the
nection, also,
of general application, and that is, that,
duties of agents, which
in matters touching the agency, agents cannot act so as to bind their
This
principals, where they have an adverse interest in themselves.
founded upon the plain and obvious consideration, that the prin
-rule
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cipal bargains, in the employment, for the exercise of the disinter
ested skill, diligence, and zeal of the agent, for his own exclusive
beneﬁt. It is a conﬁdence necessarily reposed in the agent, that he will
act with a sole regard to the interests of his principal, as far as he
lawfully may; and even if impartiality could possibly be presumed
on the part of an agent, where his own interests were concerned,
that is not what the principal bargains for; and in many cases, it
is the very last thing which would advance his interests.
The seller
of an estate must be presumed to be desirous of obtaining as high a
price as can fairly be obtained therefor; and the purchaser must equal
ly be presumed to desire to buy it for as low a price as he may.”
It seems to me that this case is only an instance of an agent who
has acted improperly being unable to recover his commission from his
It is impossible to say what the result might have been
principal.
if the agent in this case had acted honestly. It is clear that the pur
chaser was willing to give £20. more than the price which the plain
tiff received, and it may well be that he would have given more than
that. It is impossible to gauge in any way what the plaintiﬁ’ has lost
I think, therefore, that
by the improper conduct of the defendants.
the interest of the agents here was adverse to that of the principal.
A principal is entitled to have an honest agent, and it is only the hon
In my opinion, if an
est agent who is entitled to any commission.
agent directly or indirectly colludes with the other side, and so acts
in opposition to the interest of his principal. he is not entitled to any
commission.“ That is, I think, supported both by authority and on
principle; but if. as is suggested, there is no authority directly bear
ing on the question, I think that the sooner such an authority is made
the better. The result is that the county court judge was right, and
this appeal must be dismissed.
1
Vi/ills, ]., also rendered an opinion.
Appeal dismissed.
1° Accord: Canneli v. Smith. 142 Pa. 25. 21 Ati. 798. 12 L. R. A." 395 (1391).
The agent cannot recover for his services for two principals, even from one
who with full knowledge of the double agency promised to pay him, it it
appears that the other principal was ignorant 01' the situation.
Rice v. Wood,
113 Mass. 133. 10 Am. Rep. 459 (IR73).
And when one principal employs the
agent of another having adverse interests. the first principal cannot enforce
against the second the contract made through the agent. Bartram & Sons v.
Lloyd, 90 L. T. 357. 20 '1‘.
R. 281 (1004), reversing, on the question or rati
Nor can he have an action against the agent on
ﬁcation. 88 L. T. 286 (1903).
Ramspeck v. Pattillo, 104 Ga. 772. 30 S. E. 962, 42 L. R. A.
such it contract;
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St. Rep. 197 (1898).
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brought by a real estate broker to recover a commission

for his services in negotiating an exchange of land between the de
fendant and Fanny \/V. Cooper.
At the trial in the superior court, it appeared that the plaintiff was
a real estate broker, and was employed by the defendant to negotiate
the sale or exchange of certain real estate in Boston, and that through
his aid an exchange thereof was effected with Mrs. Cooper fo1' real
estate owned by her, which she in like manner had employed the plain
tiff to aid her in selling or exchanging, before his employment by the
defendant, and that he accordingly acted for both parties, and charged
a commission to both, and that he had commenced an action which
was still pending against Mrs. Cooper, to recover the commission
charged to her. The plaintiff never informed the defendant that he
was acting for Mrs. Cooper, and there was no evidence that the de
fendant knew the fact.
The plaintiff offered evidence of a custom
among the brokers of Boston to charge a commission to both parties
in cases like the present, and the defendant, for the purpose of testing
the validity of such custom, admitted that it could be proved to exist,
but claimed that, if proved, it was a bad custom, and invalid in law;
A verdict was accordingly returned for the
and L0rd,']., so ruled.
defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
BIGELOW, C. ]. The principle on which rests the well-settled doc
trine, that a man cannot become the purchaser of property for his
own use and beneﬁt which is intrusted to him to sell, is equally ap
plicable when the same person, without the authority or consent of
the parties interested, undertakes to act as the agent of both vendor
and purchaser.
The law does not allow a man to assume relations
so essentially inconsistent and repugnant to each other.
The duty
of an agent for a vendor is to sell the property at the highest price;
of the agent of the purchaser to buy it for the lowest. These duties
are so utterly irreconcilable and conflicting that they cannot be per
formed by the same person without great danger that the rights of
one principal will be sacriﬁced to promote the interests of the other,
or that neither of them will enjoy the beneﬁt of a discreet and faith
ful exercise of the trust reposed in the agent.
As it cannot be sup
posed that a vendor and purchaser would employ the same person to
act as their agent to buy and sell the same property, it is clear
that it operates as a surprise on both parties, and is a breach of the
trust and conﬁdence intended to be reposed in the agent by them
respectively, if his intent to act as agent of both in the same trans
action is concealed from them. It is of the essence of his contract
that he will use his best skill and judgment to promote the interest
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of his employer.

This he cannot do, where he acts for two persons
whose interests are essentially adverse.
He is therefore guilty of a
breach of his contract.
Nor is this all. He commits a fraud on his
principals in undertaking, without their assent or knowledge, to act as
their mutual agent, because he conceals from them an essential fact,
entirely within his own knowledge, which he was bound in the exer
cise of good faith to disclose to them. Story on Agency, § 31; Cope
land v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 198, 204; Pugsley v. Murray,
4 E. D. Smith, 245; Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray, 398, 77 Am. Dec.
416.

Such being the well-settled rule of law, it follows that the evidence
offered by the plaintiff was inadmissible.
A custom or usage to be
legal and valid must be reasonable and consistent with good morals
and sound policy, so that parties may be supposed to have made their
contracts with reference to it. If such a usage is shown to exist,
then it becomes the law by which the rights of the parties are to be
But the usage on which the plaintiff relied
regulated and governed.
was wanting in these essential elements.
It would be unreasonable,
because, if established, it would operate to prevent the faithful fulﬁll
ment of the contract of agency. It would be contrary to good mor
als and sound policy, because it would tend to sanction an unwar
rantable concealment of facts essential to a contract, and operate as
a fraud on parties who had a right to rely on the conﬁdence reposcd
.
in their agents. Exceptions overruled.

RUPP
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

SAMPSON.

Massachusetts,

1860.

16

Gray,

398,

77 Am. Dec. 416.)

Contract for “brokerage” on rattans imported in the ships Brothers
Rupp corresponded with one Clew, and got him to
and Merrimack.
come on and meet the defendants, whereupon Clew and defendants
Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants alleged ex
made a contract.
ceptions.
BIGELOW, C. ].u We can see nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff
which was fraudulent, or which operated to deceive the defendants
in making the agreement to pay him for his services. 'He made no
false representations to them. They knew the nature and value of
his services and the extent to which they were beneﬁcial to them. It
was wholly immaterial that he was also to receive compensation from
It might well be that the services of the plaintiff
the other party.
were of value to both parties, and that each might be willing to pay
according to the beneﬁt received by each. We know of no principle of
11 The statement

of facts is abridged.
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law, on which an agreement to pay for services rendered, honestly
entered into, can be avoided on the ground that another person, hav
ing interest wholly distinct and independent, has stipulated by a sep
arate contract to pay for the same services. Both contracts are valid;
and each agrees to make
they are made upon good consideration;
to receive from the bar
for
a
beneﬁt
he
expects
which
compensation
to
show that the commis
In
there
is
case,
the
nothing
present
gain.
sions which the plaintiff was to receive from both parties were exces
sive or unreasonable, or that they would together constitute an un
usual or extraordinary
compensation for the services rendered by
him.
On the contrary, the jury had found, under the instructions
given by the court, that the sum claimed of the defendants had been
earned and was due when this action was brought, notwithstanding
the contract with the other party for the payment of a like sum.
The claim of the plaintiff would have stood on a very different
It
ground if he had been employed as a broker to buy or sell goods.
would in such cases have ‘been a fraud for him to conceal his agency
for one from the other. The interests of buyer and seller are neces
sarily adverse, and it would operate as a surprise on the conﬁdence
of both parties, and essentially affect their respective interests, if one
person should without their knowledge act as the agent of both.
Farebrother v. Simmons. 5 B. & Ald. 333; Story on Agency. § 31. But
He was not an agent
the plaintiff did not act in any such capacity.
to buy or sell, but only_acted as a middleman to bring the parties
He
together, in order to enable them to make their own contracts.
stood entirely indifferent between them, and held no such relation
in consequence of his agency as to render his action adverse to the
This distinction was taken at the trial and
interests of either party.
carefully and accurately stated in the instructions given to the jury.
The evidence offered by the defendants as to the usages of trade
was rightly rejected, because it related to a class of contracts unlike
that which was in issue in the present case.
It was therefore irrele
vant. Exceptions overruled.
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HOPKINS.

(Kansas City Courts of Appeals, Missouri,
~
99 S. W. 11.)

1906.

122 Mo. App.

172,

J."

ELLISON,
Defendants engaged the plaintiffs, for a stated com
mission, to sell or exchange for them their stock of hardware and a
house and lot, all in the town of Brunswick. Plaintiffs charge that
they procured a purchaser for the property, and that defendants re
fused to pay them their commission, whereupon they instituted this ac
tion. They prevailed in the trial court.
Much of the matter urged by appellants against the judgment is out
side the issues made by their answer, and the theory upon which they
tried the case in the circuit court. The answer admits the employ
ment of plaintiffs, and that they procured a purchaser, and sets up but
one defense, and that is that plaintiffs accepted employment at their
hands when, without their knowledge or consent, plaintiffs were also
in the employment of such purchaser.
The law is that one cannot se
cretly act for one party while in the employ of the opposing party, and
that, if he does, he forfeits all right to compensation at the hands
of the party thus deceived and betrayed. The reason for this just
rule ceases, however, if there is no deception, and each of the oppos
ing parties are aware of the dual agency. “If, having full knowledge
of his relations to each, they see ﬁt mutually to conﬁde in him, there
can be no legal objection to such an employment, nor will either of
to escape responsibility
the principals be permitted afterwards
be
Mechem on' Agency, § 67;
cause of such double employment."
Stripling v. McGuire. 108 Mo. App. 594, 84 S. W. 164." The issue
in respect to the law thus stated was fully and fairly submitted to
the jury, and the verdict, being supported by the evidence we accept
* “" * Iudgment affirmed.
as conclusive.
I

Part of the opinion is omitted.
The distinctions between illegal and legal double agencies are discussed
at length in Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohlo St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528 (1891), which
ﬁnds no objection to recovery of commissions from both principals, where
both are fully advised, and consent to the double employment, though such
transactions are regarded with suspicion. In such case each principal gets
what he contracted for, and should pay for it. The rule forbidding double
agency is for the beneﬁt of the principals, and if they consent to it that is
Fryer v. Harker, 142 Iowa, 708, 121 N. W. 526. 23
an end to the ohjection.
L. R. A. (N. S.) 477 (1909); Nolte v. Hulbert. 37 Ohio St. 445 (1882); Wassell
However, it he ﬁnds the
v. Reardon. 11 Ark. 705. 44 Am. Dec. 245 (1851).
interests of his principals conﬂicting. he should at once take steps to conclude
the agency. Morey v. Laird. 108 Iowa. 670, 77 N. W. 835 (1899).
1!
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WILLIAMS.

(Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States, Eighth Circuit,
I 94, 20 C. C. A. 312, 36 U. S. App. 749.)

3

_
1896.
.

74

Fed.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.“

The law guards the ﬁduciary relations
to prevent the possibility of a conﬂict
between the duty and the personal interest of a trustee.
It demands
that the agent shall work with an eye single to the interest of his prin
It prohibits him from receiving any compensation but his
cipal.
commission, and forbids him from acting adversely to his principal,
either for himself or for others. It visits such a breach of duty, not
only with the loss of the proﬁts he gains, but with the loss of the
compensation which the faithful discharge of duty would have earned.
To permit the agent of a vendor to become interested, as the pur
chaser or as the agent of a purchaser, in the subject-matter of the
agency, inaugurates so dangerous a conﬂict between duty and self
interest, that the law wisely and peremptorily prohibits it. An agent
of a vendor, who speculates in the subject-matter of his agency, or
intentionally becomes interested in it as a purchaser, or as the agent
of a purchaser, violates his contract of agency, betrays his trust,
forfeits his commission as agent, and becomes indebted to his princi
pal for the proﬁts he gains by his breach of duty.“ VVarren v. Burt,
12 U. S. App. 591, 595, 7 C. C. A. 105, 107, 58 Fed. 101, 103; Gunn
v. Black, 19 U. S. App. 477, 485, 8 C. C. A. 534, 539, 60 Fed. 151,
156; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 554, 555, 11 L. Edi 1076;
Crump v. Ingersoll, 44 Minn. 84, 46 N. W. 141; I-legenmyer v.
Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. 785, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808; jacobus v.
with jealous

care.

It

seeks

Part of the opinion is omitted.
Porter v. Woodrutf, 36 N. J. Eq. 174 (1882) 1 U. S. v. Carter, 217
U. S. 286. 30 Sup. Ct. 515, 54 L. Ed. 769 (1910). Even though the agent is the
highest bidder, ahd the sale is public and free from fraud. he must account
Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold, 36 Neb.
to the principal for any proﬁts.
If the agent learns that more advantageous terms
801, 55 N. W. 236 (1893).
can be obtained than his principal supposes, it is his duty to notify his prin
cipal.
Snell v. Goodlander, 90 Minn. 533, 97 N. W. 421 (1903). If the agent
can secure more, it is his duty to do so, and if he attempt to keep it for him
self, his principal can compel him to account for. it. Tilleny v. Wolverton,
If the agent obtains any advantage by
46 Minn. 256, 48 N. W. 908 (1892).
double dealing the law will take it from him. Enneau v. Rieger, 105 Mn. 659.
16 S. W. 854 (1891); Bain v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285 (1874); Dutton v. Willner,
52 N. Y. 312 (1873).
The agent cannot enforce against n third party any agreement to give him
Sessions v. Payne, 113 Ga. 955, 39 S. E. 325 (1901).
secret proﬁts.
A leading ease is Turnbull v. Garden, 38 L. J. Ch. 331, 20 L. T. R. (N. S.) 218
L. R. 9 Q. B. 480,
(1869), approved and illustrated in Morison v. Thompson,
43 L J. Q. B. 215, 30 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 869, 22 Wkly. Rep. 859 (1874).
A cus
tom or usage for a broker to appropriate to himself the proﬁts of his agency
beyond his allowed commissions is not law, for it infringes 11 fundamental
principle of right and wrong. Robinson v. Mollett, 44 L. J. C. P. 362, L. R.
7 H. L. 802, 33 L. T. 544 (1874), reversing 20 W. R. 544, 26 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)
Tetley v. Shand, 25 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 658, 20
‘.107, L. R. 7 C. P. 84 (1.872);
W. R. 206 (1872).
14

15 Accord:

\
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Munn, 37 N. J. Eq. 48, 53; Moore v. Zabriskie, 18 N. ]. Eq. 51;
Perry, Trusts, § 919; Bank v. Tyrrell, 27 Beav. 273, 10 H. L. Cas.
26; Panama & S. P. Tel. Co. v. India Rubber, Gutta Pereha & Tele-_
graph W'orl<s Co., 10 Ch. App. 515, 526; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo.

it,

475, 482.
This is not the ﬁrst time this court has been called upon to an
nounce these principles, but the reckless disregard of them, which
characterizes the acts of some of the agents whose transactions are
portrayed to us, admonishes us that we cannot reiterate them too
often, nor enforce them too rigidly.
The court below placed the de
cree from which this appeal was taken upon these indisputable prin
ciples. This decree avoids a contract of agency, deprives the agent
of his stipulated compensation, and awards to the principal a recovery
of $160,827.43, on account of the gains which it ﬁnds the agent ob
tained by violating his contract of agency, and betraying his trust.
The agent, ]ohn McKinley, appealed from this decree, and his ap
First. Does the proof warrant the ﬁnd
peal presents two questions:
ing of the circuit court that the appellant was the agent of the ap
pellee, ]ohn M. VVillia.ms, to sell leases upon his lands, when he gained
And, second, if so, was the
the proﬁts with which he is charged?
highest market value, or the amount which he realized from the prop
erty which he thus obtained, the measure of his liability to his principal?
The appellee, VVilliams, alleged in the bill which he ﬁled in the
court below in this case that he was a resident of Chicago, Ill.; that
the appellant was a. resident of Duluth, Minn.; that the latter was
his agent to sell leases of certain mineral lands, which he owned in
Minnesota, under a written agreement made between them in August,
1891, to the effect that the appellant should sell and dispose of such
leases for the mutual interests of both parties to the contract, and
should receive one-ﬁfth of the revenues derived from these lands. He
also alleged that, to enable his agent to sell such leases to better ad
vantage, he made a formal lease of the land to the appellant, s0
that he could make an assignment of it in his own name, or could
sublet the lands with the \vritten consent of the appellee; that the
appellant thereupon sublet several tracts of these lands, and sold his
apparent interest in them, under the formal lease to him, for which
he received large amounts of money, promissory notes, and stocks
in corporations, which he refused to account for ‘or to turn over to
The prayer of the bill was that the appellant should
his principal.
account for, pay over, and assign to the appellee all the money and prop
erty which he had acquired from his dealings with these lands, and
that the original contract of agency should be canceled.
The appellant answered this bill. He alleged in his answer that
the formal lease, made at the same time as the contract of agency, was
he became liable to pay the rents re
an actual lease: that, under
served, and obtained the right to all the proﬁts he had realized by sell
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ing any part of his leasehold interest thereunder, or by subletting any
part of the land described therein. He also alleged that the appellee
knew of the proﬁts he was gaining at the times when he received
them;- that he, nevertheless, assented to the leases and contracts
through which he obtained them, and consented that he should retain
these proﬁts for his own beneﬁt. * * *
The court found that the appellant had not made out the extraor
dinary contract set forth in his answer, and affirmed the decree below
for appellee.
_

CONKEY
(Court of Appeals of New York,

1867.

v.

BOND."

36 N.

Y.

427, 3 Abb. Prue.

[N. 8.] 415.)

is

a

a

a

a

is
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Action to rescind a sale of stock in the Oswego Starch Company,
made by defendant to plaintiff, and to recover the price paid therefor,
and certain payments made by the plaintiff as a stockholder.
The opin
ion shows the essential facts.
Defendant appealed from order for
new trial. See 34 Barb. 276.
PORTER, J. The fact that the defendant volunteered his agency did
not absolve him from the duty of ﬁdelity, in the relation of trust
and confidence which he sought and assumed. The plaintiff was in
duced to purchase at an extravagant premium, stock of the value of
which he was ignorant, on the mistaken representations of the defend
ant, who professed to have none which he was willing to sell. This
assurance very naturally disarmed the vigilance of the respondent,
and he availed himself of the defendant’s offer by authorizing him to
~
buy at the price he named.
The defendant did not buy, but sent him a certiﬁcate for the amount
required, concealing the fact that he had not acted under the authori
ty, and that the stock transferred was his own.
There is no view of the facts in which the transaction can be up
held. He stood in a relation to his principal which disabled him from
concluding a contract with himself, without the knowledge or assent
of the party he assumed to represent. He undertook to act at once
He bought as agent and sold as owner.
as seller and as purchaser.
The ex parte bargain, thus concluded, proved advantageous to him and
It was the right of the latter to
very unfortunate for his principal.
on discovery of the breach of conﬁdence. It
not material
rescind
to inquire whether the defendant had any actual fraudulent purpose.
The making of
purchase from himself without authority from the
constructive fraud in view of the ﬁduciary relation
plaintiff was
In such
case, the law delivers
which existed between the parties.
presumptio juris et de jure, which
the agent from temptation by
unnecessary to state our
good intentions are unavailing to repel. It
16 Accord:

Salsbury

v. Ware,

183

Ill.

505, 56 N.

E.

149 (1900).
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views more fully on this question, as it is fully and ably discussed in
the opinion delivered by Judge Bacon in the court below, 34 Barb. 276.
and his conclusions are abundantly fortiﬁed by authority.
Gillett v.
Peppercorne, 3 Beav. 78; Story, Agency, § 214; Michoud v. Girod. 4
How. 555, 11 L. Ed. 1076; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 johns. Ch. 268, 270:
Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y. 262; N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Protection Ins.
Co., 14 N. Y. 91; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 347, 78 Am. Dec. 192.
The objection that this theory is inconsistent with that stated in the
The essential facts are al
complaint is not sustained by the record.
leged, and the appropriate relief is demanded. The fact that the com
plaint alleged other matters which the plaintiif failed to establish, im
pairs neither his right nor his remedy. Utile per inutile non vitiatur.
The order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed, with judg
'
ment absolute for the respondent. All concur.

-ii

'

RICH
(Supreme

Gourt of Pennsylvania,

v.

BLACK.

1896.

173

Pa.

92,

83

Atl.

880,

37

Wkly.

Notes Cas. 499.)

Defend
Bill for an account and a reconveyance of real estate.
ants were given the sale of the land at not less than $3,000 per acre.
Interlocutory decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
STERRETT, C. J. The rule of public policy which avoids,-at the in
stance of the cestui que trust, purchases made by agents for sale is
Courts of equity view such
practically absolute in its character.
transactions with jealous eye; and it is only under special circum
stances, amounting to a dissolution of the trust relation, when the
parties have dealt at arm’s length, that their validity is recognized.
Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 254.
And the reasons are obvious.
On the one hand, the relation which such agents bear is conﬁdential,
It affords peculiar fa
and disarms the vigilance of their principals.
cilities for obtaining exclusive information in respect of the property
intrusted to them for sale. Their employment implies that they have
superior advantages for making sales, and that they will use every
effort and means to obtain the highest price for the beneﬁt of their
On the other hand, their individual interest is to purchase
principals.
at the lowest price, and places them in a position which is inconsistent
with the faithful and proper discharge of the duties of the trust. The
opportunity will naturally lead to temptation, to abuse, and, as was
aptly said by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Davoue v. Fanning, supra, be
poisonous in its consequences.
~ The cestui que trust is not bound to prove,_nor is the court bound
to judge, that the trustee has made a bargain advantageous to himself.
The fact may be so, and yet the party not have it in his power distinctly
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and clearly to show it. “There may be fraud,” as Lord Hardwicke
observed, “and the party not able to prove it.” Thus an agent, by
virtue of his trust relation, may discover valuable minerals in the
land, and, locking the knowledge in his breast, take advantage of it in
how can the
making a contract with his cestui que trust. If he deny
trustee who has once
that
“T'he probability
court ﬁnd the fact?
and the cestui que
conceived such
purposewill never disclose
Ves. 627.
Ex parte Lacey,
trust will be effectually defrauded.”
So he may take advantage of his superior knowledge of the market
“It
and skill in manipulation to obtain results beneﬁcial to himself.
to guard against this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to remove
the trustee from temptation, that the rule does and will permit the
cestui que trust to come, at his own option, and without showing ac
tual injury, and insist upon having the experiment of another sale”
(Davoue v. Fanning, supra); or, as was held in our own case of
Swisshelm’s Appeal, 56 Pa. 475, 94 Am. Dec. 107, treat the purchase
as inoperative in respect of the land unsold by the trustee, and com
pel an account of the proceeds of sale made by him to innocent pur
chasers for value. “This
remedy that goes deep, and touches the
Davoue v. Fanning, supra; Leisenring v.
very root of the matter.”
Watts, 303, 30 Am. Dec. 322; Parshall’s Appeal, 65 Pa. 224;
Black,
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it

if
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it

is

it

is

a

it

is

it
is
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;

Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 Atl. 513, 20 Am. St. Rep. 931 Murphy
v. O’Shea,
La. T. 422. The cestui que trust must,
Jones
true, move within a reasonable time; but what shall amount to a
reasonable time will depend on circumstances, and lies in the discretion
In the absence of special circumstances which may
of the court.
lengthen or shorten the time, the analogy of the law
followed.
Mar
shall’s Estate, 138 Pa. St. 285, 22 Atl. 90.
These appellants misapprehend the rationale of this rule.
They
insist that because, as they claim, the sale was satisfactory to Mrs.
Rich, the rule has no application. Conceding that in the ﬁrst instance
was satisfactory, that fact would not take away her option to re
scind; for these appellants then and for
long time afterwards os
tensibly maintained towards her the character of agents for sale, and
willfully concealed the fact of their own interest. They maintain
their characters of inconsistency even now by claiming not only title
Roll, whom they
as purchasers, but commissions as agents for sale.
ﬁrst reported as the purchaser, confessedly knew nothing of it. The
more than doubtful, and,
alleged interest of Gillespie and Neeb
ever existed, was soon parted with.
To all practical intents and pur
poses, these agents were the real purchasers, without the knowledge of
Rosenberger’s Appeal, 26 Pa. 67.
However
their _cestui qiietriist.
Mrs. Rich may have felt in the first instance in regard to the sale,
not likely that
would have been satisfactory had she been fully
informed of the facts. \-Vhen she gave her agents
minimum price,
was manifestly intended as
guide to them in negotiating sale, and
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implied a j_u_st expectation on her part and an engagement on theirs
that they_wou1d._ma1<e an honest endeavor to obtain a higher price.
If Roll, Gillespie, and Neeb were really intending purchasers, the ob
vious course was that these agents for sale should take competitive
bids. They did not occupy the position of middlemen with equal duty
Their primary duty was to Mrs. Rich. But, so far as ap
to both.
pears, no bona ﬁde effort was made by them to perform this duty.
Instead, Mrs. Rich was asked to take less, and, when this was refused,
they hastened to avail themselves of the minimum price in their own
interest, and had already made large proﬁts before Mrs. Rich’s dis
covery of the facts. If they could realize proﬁts for themselves, they
That was
could and should have done so for their cestui que trust.
their employment, and that their undertaking;
and equity will treat
To sustain the pur
that.as done which ought to have been done.
chase made in these circumstances would work “actual injury” to Mrs.
Rich, tend to encourage breaches of trust, and violate a wise rule of
'
public policy.“
Having taken action in time, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief
Decree
which the decree of the court below is intended to secure.
affirmed, and appeal dismissed, with costs to be paid by appellants;
and it is ordered that the record be remitted to the court below for

further proceedings.
1'1It is not enough for the agent to tell the principal that he is personally
He must tell him every material fact—must make
interested in the purchase.
Dunne v. English. L. R. 18 Eq. I524, 31 L. T. 75 (1874);
a full disclosure.
Murphy v. 0’Shea. 2 Jones & La. 422, 8 Irish Law, Ree. 329 (1845); Molony
v. Kernnn. 2 Dr. 8: War. 38 (1842).
It matters not that the employment is to sell at a ﬁxed price. The agent
must put off the character of agent when he assumes that of the principal.
Ruckman v. Bergholz. 37 N. J. Law. 437 (1874). If’ the agent buys for less
than the goods are worth. he is accountable to the principal for the difference.
Pierce Co. v. Beers, 190 Mass. 199. 76 N. E. 603 (1906). The interests ot the
buyer and seller are conﬂicting, nnd the law will not allow the agent to act
for the seller and at the same time be the buyer. White v. Ward, 26 Ark.
It will not aid that he paid more than any one else would have
445 (1871).
paid. Pensonneau v. Blenkley, 14 Ill. 15 (1852); and that he bought under
cover of the name of‘ a third person, but for more than the property was then
worth, Robertson v. Chapman. 152 U. S. 673, 14 Sup. Ct. 741. 38 L. Ed. 592
14 Tex. 217 (1855).
Shannon v. Marmaduke,
But cf. Hutton v.
(1894):
Sherrard, 183 Mich. 356, 150 N. W. 135, L. R. A. 1915E. 976 (1914), action to
compel principal to convey to agent at minimum price the unsold lots, with
Tilleny v. Wolverton. 46 Minn. 256. 48 N. W. 908 (1891). where the agent
sought to buy at a price ﬁxed by the principal. See, also, 13 Mich. Law Rev,
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GOWER

v.

ANDREVV.

(Supreme Court of California, 1881.

(Part 3

~

59 Cal. 119. 43 Am. Rep. 242.)

Action to compel transfer of a lease, and application for injunction
pendente lite to restrain defendants from proceeding to recover the
premises.
MYRICK, ].“‘ This is an appeal from an order refusing to grant an
injunction.
The facts as presented by the pleadings and affidavits are
substantially as follows:
The plaintiffs were warehousemen, and as such occupied certain
premises as tenants of the defendant Hopkins. The defendant An
drew was their clerk or agent in and about the business, and had
access to their books and papers, and knowledge of the business_ and
their customers. The lease under which plaintiffs held the premises,
at a monthly rental of $400, was about to expire, viz., on the lst of
November, 1879. During some month or two prior to the expiration
of the lease, plaintiffs were negotiating with Hopkins for a renewal of
the lease at a reduced rental, but their minds had not met as to whether
there would be a renewal.
During the same time the defendant An
drew was, without the knowledge of plaintiffs, negotiating with Hop
kins for a lease of the premises to himself and the defendant Ross.
During such negotiations, defendant Andrew, without authority from
plaintiffs, told Hopkins that plaintiffs would probably give up the
warehouse, and if so hewould take it at $450 per month. Hopkins,
without receiving deﬁnite information from plaintiffs that they intend
ed to surrender the premises, but believing that such would be the
case, gave to the defendants, Andrew and Ross, ‘a lease of the premises
for four years from November lst, 1879, at a monthly rental of $450.
Andrew’s object in obtaining the lease was to enter into the business
of warehousing with Ross on their own account; and Andrew solicited
from some of the customers of plaintiffs at the warehouse their storage
business, stating that “he had become the lessee of the warehouse be
cause Gower & Gilman did not want it any longer.”
During all this
time Andrew was in the employ of plaintiffs.
As soon, however, as
they learned that he had taken the lease he was dismissed.
\Ve think the injunction should have been granted. The granting
or refusing to grant an injunction is very much within the discretion
of the court to which the application is made; and an appellate court
will not interfere unless a right clearly appears to exist. We think,
however. that the facts before us clearly show a case where plaintiffs
if they shall ﬁnally substantiate those facts, will be entitled to relief.
\Ve understand it to be the duty of the employé to devote his entire
acts, so far as his acts may affect the business of his employer, to the
interest and service of the employer; that he can engage in no business
18 The dissenting

opinion of Thornton,

J., is

omitted.
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detrimental to the business of the employer; and that he should in no
case be permitted to do for his own beneﬁt that which would have the
effect of destroying the business to sustain and carry on which his
services have been secured. An agent should not, any more than a
trustee, adopt a course‘ that will operate as an inducement to postpone
the principal’s interest to his own. An agent or sub—agent who uses the
information he has obtained in the course of his agency as a means of
buying for himself, will be compelled to convey to the principal.
Elliott v. Merryman, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 91.
It may be said that Andrew was not the agent of plaintiffs so far as
concerns the obtaining of a renewal of the lease; that he was not
it must, however, be
charged with the duty of obtaining a renewal;
said that he was, by virtue of his employment, charged with the duty
of furthering their interest, and with the duty of not using the in
formation obtained by him as their employé to their detriment.
It
seems to us that if Andrew desired to engage in the same business as
his employers, on his own account, a very plain and very proper course
was open to him, viz., to state to them all the facts, and ask them to
determine whether they desired a renewal.
By pursuing the course
which he did, he gave to Hopkins an inducement not only not to give
plaintiffs a renewal at a decreased rental, but also an inducement not
to renew at the then rental; and he compelled plaintiffs to have an un
known competitor who based his action upon knowledge acquired by
him while in their employ. We do not think that this is equity or good
conscience.
The order refusing the injunction is reversed."
19 Forlaw v. Augusta Naval Stores Co.. 124 Ga. 261, 52 S. E. 898 (19%).
The
disability extends to any clerks or agents or the agent.
To hold other
wise would be‘to open the doors to evasion and nnllification of the rule.
Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 350, 78 Am. Dec. 192 (1860): Burke v. Bours. 92

(‘nl. 108, 28 Pac. 57 (1891).
On second appeal, see 98 Cal. 171. 32 Pac. 980.
Also to any partnership or corporation in which the agent
post, p. 389 (1893).
is a party. Bedford Coal Co. v. Parke County Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 390, 89
N. E. 412 (1909).
If the agent sells to himself and resells at a proﬁt he must account to the
principal for this proﬁt. McNutt v. Dix, 83 Mich. 328. 47 N. W‘. 212, 10 L.
R. A. 660 (1890). A sale by the agent to himself is not void, but voidahle at
the option of the principal, and if he does not dissent no one else can object.
It he ratiﬁes the sale, it is valid even as to him. Eastern Bank v. Taylor, 41
If he does not, he may treat the agent as holding in trust
Ala. 93 (1867).
for his principal. Krutz v. Fisher. 8 Kan. 90 (1871), in which the agent bought
his principa1‘s lands at a tax sale. The mere fact that the principal has
failed to put the agent in funds to pay the taxes will not justify the agent in
procuring and holding the tax title.
Bowman v. Officer, 53 Iowa, 610, 6
N. W. 28 (15180). The agent may retain the amount paid for taxes and other
proper expenditures, but beyond this he holds for the principal. Barton v.
Moss, 32 Ill. 55 (1863).
The agent is equally incapacitated to become a pur
chaser ot his principal’s property at a mortgage sale. Adams v. Sayre. 70
Ala. 318 (1881); Kimball v. Ranney, 122 Mich. 160. 80 N. W. 992, 46 L. R. A.
403, 80 Am. St. Rep. 548 (1899), containing a review of the cases.
Gor>n.Ps.& A.(2o En.)—25
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MORGAN, ].*° This equitable action is brought for a reconveyance
of certain real estate which was conveyed to the defendant by the
plaintiff while defendant is alleged to have been plaintiff’s agent for
the sale of such real estate and failed to communicate to plaintiff that
he had received an offer for said land for a much larger sum than that
for which the plaintiff sold the same to the defendant. The substance
of the allegations of the complaint is that defendant took advantage of
the conﬁdence reposed in him by plaintiff as her agent and purchased
the land himself, under fraudulent concealment of facts, for a sum
much less than that which he could have sold it for, and much less than

is

*

is

is

is

* a

a

it

it,

the actual value of the land. In the complaint plaintiff offers to re
turn all money and the security received by her from the defendant
under such conveyance. The defendant by answer denies that he was
plaintiff's agent for the sale of such land, and denies that he was
and denies that
offered a larger sum for such land than he paid for
he fraudulently concealed any facts from plaintiff, and denies that the
Whether de
land was worth any more than he paid for the same.
fendant was plaintiff’s agent for the sale of her lands, and whether de
for
fendant had an offer for the land of $1,400 when he purchased
The
himself for $900, were the issues that were contested at the trial.
trial court found against the defendant on both these issues, and or
dered that
reconveyance be made upon restoration by plaintiff of all
that she had received under the sale. The defendant appeals from a
review of the
judgment rendered on such ﬁndings, and requests
*
entire record under section 5630, Rev. Codes 1899.
That he was in correspondence with her about the sale and value of
this land, and advised her concerning the same,
undisputed, and
shown by his own letters outside of Exhibit A. That he was her sole
also beyond dispute. That he
agent to care for her other property
alone looked after all her interests in Iamestown and vicinity
also
beyond question. Defendant was her agent as tocertain matters, and
as to those matters he had her conﬁdence, and as to those matters she
relied on his judgment.
Whether he was her authorized agent to sell
the land—thai is, whether he was such agent in respect to the sale of
the land that his contract for the sale of the land would bind her—
need not be determined.
VVe think that he was her agent in respect ‘to
the land, and, as such agent, he was under obligations to advise her
fully as to all facts within his knowledge bearing upon the value of
the land, and upon all matters in reference to the sale thereof.
De
fendant had been her agent for several years. We think the evidence
2°

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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in the record, outside of Exhibit A, is suﬂicient to show that he was
her agent to sell this land. That such agency to sell the land is not
shown by explicit writing is entirely immaterial in this kind of action.
It is not a case of enforcing a contract against a principal made by an
agent with a third person.
In a case like the one at bar the agency may be shown by parol, as
there is no statutory provision that requires an agency to negotiate for
a sale to be in writing.
It is the conﬁdential relation existing between
them, followed by concealment of facts, that is the gist of the cause of
action. He was her agent for speciﬁc purposes connected with this land
and with her other property.
By virtue of such agency he became ac
quainted with the value of the land, and knew that she knew nothing
of its va-lue, and that she was relying wholly upon him. It is the ex
istence of such conﬁdence. arising out of their business relations as
to _a speciﬁc agency, that gives rise to a duty on his part to disclose all
facts known to him in reference to the value of the land if he chose to
It is not claimed that he made false or fraudulent
buy it himself.
statements. It is claimed that he should have disclosed that he had an
offer of $1,400 for the land when he bought it for $900, and that this
was a fraudulent concealment. The relations existing between them,
as shown by the evidence referred to, was such as demanded frank
and full disclosures of all facts known to him bearing on the value of
the land before he could become a purchaser of the same, although
avowedly made for himself.
In Norris v. Tayloe, 49 Ill. l7, 95 Am. Dec. 568, it was said:
“VVhere a party accepts the position of an agent to take charge of the
lands of his principal, collect the rents and royalty, and pay taxes, a
ﬁduciary and conﬁdential relation is thereby created in regard to
everything relating to such lands, and in treating with his principal
for the property the agent is hound to make the fullest disclosures
of all matters connected therewith, within his knowledge. which it is
important for his principal to know in order to treat understandingly.”
In Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541, it was said: “It
is contended by appellant's counsel that the rule we apply, which holds
an agent to be a trustee for his principal, has no application to the case
at bar, because Davis was not an agent to obtain a renewal of the lease,
and was not charged with any duty in regard thereto; that his was
but a speciﬁc employment to engage amusements for the theater, and
that he was agent only within the scope of that employment;
that
,Hamlin, having a lease which would expire April 16, 1883, had no
right or interest in the property thereafter; and that Davis, in ne
gotiating the lease, did not deal with any property wherein Hamlin had
any interest, and that such property was not the subject-matter of
any trust between them. Although there was no right of renewal
of the lease in the tenant, he had a reasonable expectation of its re
newal which courts of equity have recognized as an interest of value,
secretly to interfere with which and disappoint, by an agent in the
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management of the lessee’s business, we regard as inconsistent with
the ﬁdelity which the agent owes to the business of his principal.
* * * In applying the rule, it is the nature of the relation which
is to be regarded, and not the designation of the one ﬁlling the re
lation.”
In Cook v. Berlin VVoolen Mills Co., 43 Wis. 433, the court said:
“But whatever may be the nature of the agency, a court of equity re
gards every purchase by an agent from his principal with jealous scru
tiny, to see that the agent takes no advantage from the conﬁdence of
his principal; with jealousy almost invincible, as judge Story calls it;
and there is a class of agents who are held to a very strict rule, a good
deal like the rule which courts of equity once generally applied to trus
When the nature of the agency
tees, and some few courts still apply.
has given the agent control in the management of the principal’s prop
erty, and peculiar opportunity of knowing its condition and value, a
purchase of it by the agent will be avoided at the suit of the principal,
unless the agent make it affirmatively appear that the transaction was
fair, and that he imparted to the principal all his information concern
ing the property, and acted throughout uberrima ﬁde.”
Pomeroy on Equity Iurisprudence (volume Z, § 959) lays down the
rule as follows: “Any unfairness, any underhanded dealing, any use
of knowledge not communicated to the principal, any lack of the per
fect good faith which equity requires, renders the transaction void
If, on
able, so that it will be set aside at the option of the principal.
the other hand, the agent imparted all his own knowledge concerning
the matter, and advised his principal with candor and disinterested
ness as though he himself were a stranger to the bargain, and paid a
fair price, and the principal on his side acted with full knowledge of
the subject-matter of the transaction and of the person with whom he
was dealing, and gave a full and free consent—if all these are affirma
tively proved, the presumption‘ is overcome and the transaction is
valid.”
See, also, Ingle v. Hartman, 37 Iowa, 274; Rubidoex v. Parks, 48
Cal. 215; Cottom v. Holliday, 59 Ill. 176; Jackson v. Pleasonton, 95
Va. 654, 29 S. E. 680; Andrews’ Am. Law, p. 813, and cases cited;
Mechem on Agency, § 466, and cases cited; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law, p. 1081, and cases cited; Wharton on Agency, § 235, and cases
cited; Ruckman v. Bergholz, 37 N. J. Law, 437; ]ansen v. Williams,
36 Neb. 869, 55 N. W. 279, 20 L. R. A. 207; Casey v. Casey, 14 Ill.
112; Stewart v. Gilruth, 8 S. D. 181, 65 N. VV. 1065.
A duty of full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge
bearing on the value of the land rested upon the defendant, and, unless
he made such disclosures before himself becoming a purchaser, the
conveyance becomes voidable upon plaintiff's election to so consider
it. * >8 *
'
The judgment is therefore aﬁirmed. All concur.
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BOURS.

1893.

98 Cal.

171,

32

Pac. 980.)

j.“

HARRISON,
When this action was here upon the last appeal (92
Cal. 108, 28 Pac. 57) the facts before the court were that Bours had
been employed by Faulkner, Bell & Co., who were agents of Arguello.
to make a sale of the land, and had reported to them a sale thereof
for the sum of $4,500, sending at the same time a form of a deed
to be executed by Arguello, without, however, inserting the amount
of the consideration or the name of the grantee; that Arguello ﬁlled
in the amount of the consideration, and executed the deed without in
that when Bours received the
serting the name of any grantee;
his
own
name
he
caused
to
be
inserted
therein as grantee, and
deed
sent his check for the amount of the purchase money to Faulkner,
Bell & Co., who accounted for the same to Arguello. The judgment
of the court below was reversed upon the grounds that Bours was
to be regarded as the agent of Arguello for making a sale of the land,
* * * The
and could not, as such agent make a sale to himself.
conditions under which the judgment of this court was then rendered
do not now exist. It now appears not only that Bours dealt openly
with Arguello in the sale, and that the transaction was fair and just,
and the consideration full and adequate, but it also appears that “the
sale was made with the full _knowledge and consent of Arguello."
These circumstances take the case out of the principles announced at
the former hearing, and show a complete defense to a recovery by
There is no inhibition upon a purchase by an agent
the plaintiffs.
from his principal, “where the facts are fully disclosed, and the agent
acts in good faith, taking no advantage of his situation.
The principal
may, if he sees ﬁt, deal with the agent as with any other person.”
Mechem, Ag. § 466; Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. 203.
The agent has the same right to deal directly with his principal as
The rule which prevents the agent from purchasing
has a stranger.
the property which he is authorized to sell for his principal is based
upon the maxim thatno man can serve two masters, and that an agent
shall not unite in his own person his individual with his representative
character, or place himself in a position where his personal interest
VVhen, however,
will be in conﬂict with his duty to his principal.
the agent deals with his principal “at arm's length, and after a full
disclosure of all that he knows with respect to the property” (Murphy
v. O’Shea. 2 Jones & La. T. 425), or when the principal ratiﬁes the
purchase from himself with full knowledge of the circumstances con
nected with the transaction, he can thereafter avoid the sale only
upon the same grounds as if the purchase had been made by a stranger.
The powers of an agent in dealing with the property of his principal
$1

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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are limited in the same manner as those of a trustee. -A trustee is
not forbidden to deal with the trust property when the beneﬁciary, with
a full knowledge of the motives of the trustee and of all other facts
concerning the transaction which might affect his own decision, and
without the use of any inﬂuence on the part of the trustee, permits
him to do so. Civil Code, § 2230.
The present case does not fall within the rule which is applicable
when an agent with a power of sale makes a sale to himself.
Bours
did not have any power of sale from Arguello, and did not in fact
make any sale to himself.
His relation to Arguello, resulting from
his original employment by Faulkner, Bell & Co., was rather that
of a broker than an agent for sale, and his subsequent proposition to
them that he _would himself purchase the land from Arguello at the
price of $4,500 placed him in the position of a purchaser dealing
Faulkner, Bell 8: Co. were the agents of
directly with the owner.
Arguello for the sale of the property, and the persons to whom
Bours, if he desired to purchase the same, would naturally make ap
He had had no direct correspondence with Arguello, and
plication.
his offer and information to Faulkner, Bell & Co. must be regarded
Although his previous relation
the same as if made to Arguello.
to Arguello, by virtue of having been employed to make_a sale of
the property, still left him charged with the duty of disclosing any
facts or circumstances affecting the property which might have come
to his knowledge while holding such ﬁduciary relation, yet the record
does not show that there was any concealment or silence on his part
which would make him guilty of constructive fraud.
When Bours wrote to Faulkner, Bell & Co., making the proposi
tion to purchase the property himself from Arguello for the sum of
$4,500 he was not acting as the agent of Arguello 2” in making a sale
of the premises to himself, but was making a direct proposition to
Arguello through Faulkner, Bell & Co., who were his agents for
Arguello had been previously informed of
the sale of the property.
all that Bours had done in attempting to eﬁ’ect the sale, and it is
The
not disputed that $4,500 was the full value of the property.
2! Accord:
New Era Co. v. Shannon, 44 Ill. App. 477 (1892), in which the
agent resigned in order to take advantage of his principal. The purchase
by a ﬁduciary of a trust property will always be scanned by a court of equity
Dennison
& Co. v.
with the mot searching and questioning suspicion.
Aldrich, 114 Mo. App. 700. 91 S. W. 1024 (1905); Neweomb v. Brooks, 16
W. Va. 32 (1879). The burden of establishing the utmost good faith is on the
agent.
Condit v. Blackwell. 22 N. J. Eq. 481 (1858). The necessity of the
rule is made clear in Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mills 00., 56 Wis. 643. 14 N. W.
If he has kept back any information that might have atfeeted the
808 (1883).
Prince v. Dupuy,
action of the principal, the transaction may be set aside.
But when the agent can establish his in
163 Ill. 417. 45 N. E. 298 (1896).
tegrity, ﬁdelity and fair and open dealing with the principal, even a gift
from the principal may be upheld. Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U. S. 663, 9 Sup.
And a lease
Ct. 420, 32" L. Ed. 747 (1889), aflirming (C. C.) 25 Fed. 7 (1885).
Lord Selsey v. Rhoades, 2 Sim.
to the agent is subject to the same principles.
.
8: St. 41, 1 Bligh, 1 (1824).
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ﬁndsthat, when Bouts was ﬁrst employed in behalf of “Ar
guello, he wrote to Faulkner, Bell & Co., “fully advising them of
the condition of the said property;” and that, after the receipt of
that letter, Arguello stated “that he agreed with Mr. Bours’ opinion
of the property ;” and that, after'Bours had endeavored to make a
sale of the property, he again wrote to Faulkner, Bell & Co., “advis
ing them therein' of what he had done ;” and that, as soon as he had
found a purchaser, he informed Faulkner, Bell & Co. thereof.
These
ﬁndings are not excepted to, and, as it is not claimed that there were
any facts or circumstances within the knowledge of Bours that he
failed to disclose, must be construed as equivalent to a ﬁnding that
he made a full disclosure of all the information he had respecting
the value or condition of the property.
As the sale from Arguello to Bours is to be regarded as made
upon a direct dealing between them for the purchase and sale of the
property, the rules governing the ratiﬁcation and conﬁrmation by a
The judgment
principal of the act of his agent have no application.
is affirmed.
court

NICHOL

8:

ALT

(Casesat Nisi Prius,

v.

MARTYN.

1799.

2 Esp.

732.)

a special action on the case, against the defendant, for
the
plaintiffs’ customers.
seducing
The plaintiffs were wholesale ironmongers, who carried on a very
extensive business: the defendant had been employed by (them as
their rider or traveler, to get orders in the course of their business:
and the foundation of the action was that the defendant, who ‘at the
time of bringing the action was in the same line of business with the
plaintiffs, had, during the time that he was in their employment, en
deavored to seduce the several country shopkeepers who were in the
habit of dealing with the plaintiffs to leave off dealing with them,
and to transfer their business to the defendant.
To prove the plaintiffs’ case, they called some of those country
Their evidence proved that the defendant on his last
shopkeepers.
coming to their shops as rider to the plaintiffs, and on their business,
had told them that he was himself going into the same business with
the plaintiffs after Christmas, and would then be obliged to them for
'
an order on ‘his own account.
It appeared, however, on the cross-examination of those witnesses,
that he took the orders regularly for the plaintiffs on that journey,
and that they were executed on the plaintiffs’ account, and that no
solicitation was used by the defendant for any order at that time,
which might have been supplied by the plaintiffs.
It was also admitted that in fact the time of the defendant’s en
gagement to serve the plaintiffs expired at the beginning of the year;
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so that, in truth, in the month of March he would have been com
pletely his own master.
Loni) KENYQN, Chief justice. The conduct of the defendant in this
case may‘ perhaps be accounted not handsome, but I cannot say that it
is contrary to law. The relation in which he stood to the plaintiffs,
as their servant, imposed on him a duty which is called of imperfect
obligation, but not such as can enable the plaintiffs to maintain an
action. A servant, while engaged in the service of his master, has no
right to do any act which may injure his trade, or undermine his
business; but every one has a right, if he can, to better his situation
in the world, and if he does it by means not contrary to law, though
the master may be eventually injured, it is damnum absque injuria.
There is nothing morally bad, or very improper, in fa servant, who
has it in contemplation at a future period to set up for himself, to
endeavor to conciliate the regard of his master's customers, and to
recommend himself to them, so as to procure some business from
them as well as others.
In the present case the defendant did not
solicit the present orders of the customers; on the contrary, he took
for the plaintiffs all those he could obtain. His request for business
for himself was prospective, and for a time when the relation of
master and servant between him and the plaintiffs would be at an end.
It was suggested, in the course of the cause, that the defendant
had seduced some of the servants of the plaintiffs to quit their serv
ice, and to enter into his when he went‘ into business.
Upon the point LORD KENYON said that seducing a servant,
and enticing him to leave his master while the master by the contract
had a right to his services, was certainly actionable; but that to in
duce a servant to leave his master's service at the expiration of the
time for which the servant had hired himself,” although the servant
had no intention at the time of quitting his master’s service, was not
the subject of an action.
_
The plaintiffs were nonsuited.
23 One ls entltled to seek other employment before he is on the street.
The
contrary would be a monstrous doctrine. Myers v. Roger J. Sullivan Co., 166
Mich. 193, 131 N. W. 521, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217 (1911).
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LEECH.

1838.

under

7 Watts,

a tax

deed

.

472.)

to his

father,

John Leech.

GIBSON, C. J.“ It is not denied that the defendant’s father had been
plaintiff's agent and curator of the land.
The father himself
testiﬁed that his agency had expired before the sale _; but that is not
To capacitate him as a purchaser on his own account, he
enough.
must have explicitly resigned his trust: The most open, ingenuous
and disinterested dealing is required of a conﬁdential agent while he
consents to act as such, and there must be an unambiguous relin
quishment of his agency before he can acquire a personal interest in
the subject of it. To leave a doubt of his position in this respect, is to
turn himself into a trustee. It is unnecessary to recur to authority
for a principle so familiar or so accordant with common honesty.“ The
agent was employed, in this instance, expressly to preserve the land
from being sold; and taking his agency to have been left unclosed by
the absence of an explicit renunciation of
neither Leisenring v. Black,
R.
VVatts, 303, 30 Am. Dec. 322, nor Riddle v. Murphy,
Serg.
230, presented
stronger case to restrain the agent from purchasing
for himself.
Within the three preceding years, he had been reim
bursed his expenses and paid for his services; but that was not
not pretended that there
dissolution of the previous relation, and
was any other evidence of it. On the contrary, the fact that he gave
cotenant of the plaintiff, as well as to
intelligence of the sale to
friend of the family, evinces a consciousness that his duties as
ﬁdu
therefore to be treated as hav
ciary were not entirely closed. He
trustee. But did the defendant purchase of him with no
ing been
Knowing, as he probably did, of the former existence of the
tice?
and he
agency, he would be bound to inquire into the duration of
would stand affected by it. *
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
*

*

it,

a

is

a

a

a

is

it

a

a

5

7

&

it,

the

'

'

Part of the opinion is omitted.
Cf.: Barton v. Moss. 32 Ill. 50 (1803). and Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U.
A mere formal surrender of the
S. 673. 14 Sup. Ct. 741, 38 L. Ed. 592 (1894).
was made merely to enable the agent
agency is not enough, particularly if
Fountain Coal Co. v.
to acquire an interest in the principal’s property.
Ph(‘lpR, 95 Ind. 271 (1884); Bowman v. Officer. 53 Iowa, 640,
N. W. 28 (1880),
in which the agent had not been put in funds to pay the taxes, and later bought
tax title; New Era C0. v. Shannon, 44 Ill. App. 477 (1892). However, when
the agency has really ceased, the disability no longer exists, McKinley v.
Irvine, 13 Ala. 681 (1848)
though even then the agent cannot be permitted for
his own advantage to undo, so far as he can. the business he has done for his
principal, Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Prince, 50 Minn. 53, 52 N. W. 131, 36 Am. St.
24

:

a

6

it

25

Rep. 626 (1892).

mwncrs

394

‘

(Court

of Appeals

AND

consaounucns on THE RELATION

SPALDING
of Kentucky,

v.

1889.

(Part

3

l

MATTINGLY.“
89

Ky.

83,

1 S.

Rep. 343, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 243.)

W.

488,

8

Ky. Law

,

B. F. Mattingly was surety on notes given by Spalding and Geo.
Mattingly to purchase cattle to feed.
To protect him, they gave B.
F. Mattingly a bill of sale of said cattle, and a power to sell them
to satisfy the notes.
They had hired one B. S. Mattingly to feed the
cattle for them, but failed to perform their agreement to erect feed
ing pens and furnish straw and hay, whereupon B. F. Mattingly sold
the cattle to B. S. Mattingly.
Spalding petitions in equity for relief
and appeals from judgment for Mattingly.
BENNETT, ]'.’" * * * The contention of appellant that appellee
B. S. Mattingly is liable to him for the value of said cattle at selling
time, and also for the slops, less his expenses (although appellee B.
F. Mattingly ‘may not be liable), because at the time he purchasal
the cattle from B. F. Mattingly he was acting as appellant’s agent in
slopping and attending to said cattle, cannot be sustained, for the
reason that the equitable rule which prevents an agent from dealing
with his principal’s property for his own beneﬁt, inconsistent. with
the interest of that of the principal, “applies only to agents who are
relied upon for counsel and direction, and whose employment is rather
a trust than a service. or both, and not to those who are employed
merely as instruments in the performance of an appointed service,”
such as an employé to render manual labor for the principal, without
,any trust power being delegated to him, to act on behalf of the prin
cipal, but only to render some appointed labor for him, for wages
then the employé may purchase the pi-incipal’s property as well as
any one not so situated. It would not be contended that a person
merely employed by the owner of a team of horses to feed and drive
them could not purchase them from any other person authorized to
Here, appellee B. S. Mattingly was only employed to straw,
sell them.
to said cattle at an agreed price ;' and appellee B. F.
and
attend
slop,
Mattingly, having the right under the circumstances to sell them.
B. S. Mattingly was under no equitable obligation not to buy them for
'
himself, upon fair terms.
After carefully considering the whole case, we are of the opinion
that there is no reversible error in the proceedings in the court be
low. The judgment is afhrmed.
29 Accord:
Curlett v. Newman. 30 W. Va. 182. 3 S. E. 578 (1887), in which
,
the court found the relations were not conﬁdential.
2‘! Part of the opinion is omitted.
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WILSON
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v.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1856.

Pa.

26
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Assumpsit by Thomas VVilson against Matthew C. \/Vilson for money
Plaintiff wrote him:
which defendant had received for plaintiff.
“I don’t say I must have
but
would like to haveat least $250 as
soon as you can scnd
or $300 would not come amiss. You can send
*
*
inclosed in
letter in $50’s or $100 notes on par banks.
folded up and sealed.” Defendant sent 18
Only be careful to send
letter care
bills of the denomination of $5, $10, and $20, and $100 in
fully folded and sealed. The letter never was received.
LEWIS, C.
The primary obligation of an agent,_whose authority
limited by instructions,
to adhere faithfully to those instructions,
in all cases to which they ought properly to apply. Story on Agency,
192.
He
in general bound to obey the orders of his principal ex
and, in order to
actly,
they be imperative and not discretionary;
make
the duty of
factor to obey an order,
not necessary that
should be given in the form of
command.
The expression of
wish by the consignor may fairly be presumed to be an order.
Story
359; Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 494, 10 L. Ed. 550.
on Contracts,
true that instructions may be disregarded in cases of extreme
necessity arising from unforeseen emergencies, or
performance be
comes impossible, or
breach of law or morals. Story
they require
on Agency,
194. These are, however, exceptional cases.
There may,
adjudications, found
perhaps, be others which have been sanctioned
ed on the principle that the departure complained of was not material.
as indicated in what has been said, and the
But the general rule
not brought _within any of the exceptions.
case before the court
loss has resulted
departure from instructions, where
To justify
from such deviation, the case must be brought within some of the
not suﬁicient that the deviation was
recognized exceptions."
the
that
party giving the instructions re
not material
appear
be shown affirmatively
that the
garded them as material, unless
This may be
diffi
deviation in no manner contributed to the loss.
case like the present; but the defendant voluntarily as
cult task, in

5

7

5 4

8:

8

Bank, 47 Mo. 181 (1870), in which the
28 Rechtscherd
v. Accommodation
agent “intended to act for the beneﬁt of the principal." Courcier v. Ritter,
Wash. C. C. 549 (1825); Pariente v. Lubbock, 20 Bcav.
Fed. Cas. No. 3,282.
G.
The presumption is that the principal knows his
588,
De G. M.
(1855).
own interests and objects better than does the agent. Hinton v. Ring, 111
Ill. App. 369 (1903); Hays v. Stone, Hill, 128 (18-15).
As to ratiﬁcation of the disobedience, see Walker v. Walker,
Heisk. 425
(1871).
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sumed it when he substituted his own plan for that prescribed by the
To force a man to perform an executory contract, after
plaintiff.
substituting for the consideration other terms than those provided
for in the bargain, is to deprive him of the right to manage his own
business in _his own way.
To do this on the ground that the de
parture is not material, when it is manifest that the party considered
it otherwise, is a violation of private right, which leads to uncertainty
and litigation without necessity or excuse. In Nesbit v. Burry, 25
Pa. 210, this court refused to compel a man to give up his oxen al
though he had sold them and received part of the purchase-money,
because it was a part of the contract that they were sold by weight,
and the weight was to be ascertained by “the scales at Mount Jack
son.”
The scales designated were so out of repair that the weight
could not be ascertained by them, and it was held that no others
could be substituted against his consent so as to divest his right of

____'

-._._-ii

1

propprty.
VVhether an action for damages could have been sustained was
not the question there; nor is it the question here.
As between
vendor and vendee, the right of property and the consequent risk
vests on delivery of the goods purchased to the designated carrier,
packed,~and directed according to usage or instructions.
But if a
different method of packing and directing, or a different carrier than
the one designated, be adopted by the vendor, he assumes the risk
in case of loss, unless it be shown that his deviation in no way con
VVhere the goods are stolen, how can this be
tributed to the loss.
In sending bank-notes by mail, it is manifest that while a
shown?
large package would attract the attention and care of honest agents
on 'the route, it might tempt the cupidity of dishonest ones.
The
party who proposes to take the risk of this method of remittance
has a right to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the various
methods of enclosing the notes; and if he directs the money to be
remitted in notes of $100 or $50, the debtor has no right to increase
the size of the package by remitting in notes of $10 and $5. There
was error in permitting the jury to ﬁnd that the departure from in
structions was immaterial.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
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COLE,
This cause was tried before the county court of Milwau
kee county, without a jury, and a judgment was rendered for the
The counsel for the respective parties have admitted by
respondents.
stipulation that the following facts were found by the county court:
and did business at
1. “That the respondents resided in Whitewater,
that point, and that the appellants were factors and commission mer
chants in the city of Milwaukee.”
2. “That the respondents on the 15th day of May, 1857, shipped a
quantity of wheat consigned to the appellants, that the appellants re
ceived the wheat on the same day and sold it to Montgomery & Cutler,
& Cutler,
and took in payment therefor, the check of Montgomery
dated on the 16th day of May, 1857, one day after the sale. And that
on the evening of the same day, the appellants forwarded to the re
spondents a statement of the amount of the sales, less their charges
and commissions, and forwarded in the same letter the amount of said
'
sale le'ss their commissions and charges."
3. “That the check of Montgomery
& Cutler was presented on the
day it bore date, to wit: on the 16th, and payment was refused, and
that Montgomery & Cutler on that day were insolvent, and that the
check has not been paid.”
4. “T hat by the usual course of business in Milwaukee, commission
merchants collected cash sales on the day after delivery.”
5. “That on the 16th day of May, the respondents shipped another
quantity of wheat to the appellants, which they received and sold for
cash, and returned to the respondents a statement of the sales, and it
is for the last sale that the suit is brought.”
6. f‘That up to the 16th of May, Montgomery
& Cutler were in
good credit.”
The appellants admit in their answer that the wheat was consigned to
them by the respondents to be sold for cash.
Upon this state of facts the question arises, who is to sustain the loss
of the Montgomery & Cutler check, the appellants _or respondents?
\\’e are most clearly of the opinion that it must be the former.
. We do not understand
the general proposition to be controverted,
that it is the ﬁrst duty of an agent or factor whose authority is limited
by instructions, to adhere faithfully to those instructions in all cases
to which they properly apply.
The express orders of the principal,
when they are clear, possible and proper, leave no discretion with the
a person employs
agent, but are absolutely imperative upon him.
another to act for him in any lawful business, he has an undoubted
right to limit and restrict the agent's authority as he thinks proper.
2}?

If

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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And if the agent violates hisduties and obligations to his principal,
whether by exceeding his authority, or positive misconduct, or by
negligence or omission in the proper functions of his agency, or in any
other manner, and any loss or damage results therefrom to the princi
pal, he is responsible therefor and must make full indemnity.
V

There are a few exceptions when an agent is held justiﬁed

1

in cases

of extreme necessity, arising from unforeseen emergencies in departing
from positive instructions.“ But these exceptions have no application

is

is

a

it
is

is

a

a

is

a

it
is

,

a

it

It

it,

to this case.
Here the appellants in effect concede that they received
Is there anything
the wheat, and were instructed to sell it for cash.
ambiguous about such an instruction? 31 In the common, ordinary,_ pop
ular acceptance of the language, was it not a clear, positive and un
qualiﬁed direction not to sell or pass title to the wheat without cash in
hand? When a country merchant forwards wheat to a factor in Mil
waukee to be sold for cash, does he expect that the grain will become
the property of another without the consideration being paid down?
A sale then for cash we suppose means that the money shall be paid
when the title to the property passes.
This is the common, populan
sense of_the language, and the appellants had no authority except to
dispose of _the wheat according to the strict orders of their consign
ors. And if they have assumed the power of departing from the in
structions, and aloss has occurred in consequence
of
they must
sustain
and not their principals.
appears to us, that to sanction
latitude of action in the factor beyond the rigid commands of the
principal would be most mischievous, and unsettle long established
principles of law.
But
said that in the absence of instructions or where the terms
of the instructions have
peculiar signiﬁcation at the market where
the article
to be sold, the usual and customary manner of sale
to
be the rule for the factor and the consignor and factor are both deem
view to such custom or usage.” . This
ed to have contracted with
may all be very true, and yet how does the proposition help the ap
pellants’ case?
VVe have already stated that in our judgment there was nothing pe
culiar or doubtful or ambiguous in the direction given by the respond
That in the popular and common sense
ents to sell the wheat for cash.
understood to be one where property
sale
of the language, such
an ingredient or condition of
sold for money in hand. And that
title
the
does
not pass to the purchaser
that
the
to
sale
property
cash

of attorney merely, but all
Moyses
may be considered.
3* Usage may govern when
10 C. B. 886, 70 E. C. L. 886

the directions, by correspondence or otherwise,
v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911).
the instructions are not clear. Boden v. French,

I

3° As to duty of agent in novel or unforeseen circumstances,
see Greenleat
\'. Moody, 13 Allen (Mass) 363 (1866).
31 Falsken v. Falls City State Bank, 71 Neb. 29, 98 N. W. 425 (1904).
Ac
cord: Boden v. French, 10 C. B. 886, 79 E. O. L. 886 (1851). Not the power

(1851).
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until‘the purchase money is paid. \/Ve are aware that cases can be
found which go to establish the doctrine that when a factor has re
ceived goods with direction to sell for cash, but which he does not sell
for cash, but on short time, according to the usage and custom of the
market, it has been held that such a sale was in compliance with the
orders of the principal.
See Clark v. Van Northwick, 1 Pick. 343.
Contra: Catlin v. Smith, 24 Vt. 85; Barksdale v. Brown et al., 1
Nott & McC. S17, 9 Am. Dec. 720; Douglass v. Leland, 1' Wend. 492.
\Ve doubt exceedingly the soundness and correctness of the rule
which

permits‘a

usage

or custom in any particular

business or trade

to qualify or vary the instructions to an agent, and allow him to show
that by the understanding of merchants a sale on credit was no viola
tion of an order to sell for cash.
But if it may be shown that terms in
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any particular business or trade, by usage have acquired a meaning
different from their ordinary acceptation, and that by such custom a
cash sale does not mean what the language imports, then it is obvious
that the evidence of such a custom should be most clear and satisfac
tory. Now, uge do not think the proof in this case would at all warrant
us in saying that a local usage existed in Milwaukee so “ancient, uni
form, notorious and reasonable” that the respondents and appellants
and that ac
must be presumed to have contracted with reference to
sold one day and
cash sale
when property
cording to this usage
the purchase money
collected the day after delivery, and we should
not be authorized from anything we can see in this case in supposing
such a custom to exist.
such a custom does obtain in Milwaukee and the
And manifestly
to excuse themselves from
seeming violation
appellants relied upon
sell for cash, then they should have estabished the cus
of orders
Since they did not show the ex
tom beyond all reasonable doubt.
custom, we must hold them to all the responsibility
istence of such
of violating the instructions of their principals, and they must lose the
Cutler, instead of the respond
amount of the check of Montgomery
aﬂirmed.
Iudgment
ents.

_____

.

MINNEAPOLIS TRUST CO.
'

(Court of Appeals of New York,
90 App. Div.

1905.
181 N.
361, 85 N. Y.

Y.

v.

MATHER.

205.

73 N.

Supp. 510.)

E.

987, reversing

Action on a note and for commissions. Counterclaim for conversion
Plaintiff loaned defendant $5,000, taking as security
of securities.
notes and mortgages aggregating $20,100.
These notes plaintiff was
to collect, but found such difficulty in doing so that defendant instruct
ed plaintiﬁ‘ to foreclose the mortgages as soon as possible, bid in the
property at about its present value and take judgment against the mak
Plaintiff foreclosed, but bid in
ers of the notes for any deﬁciency.
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the property for $24,434.90, the full sum due on the notes plus costs
of foreclosure, and thus released the makers of the notes from further
The property was thentworth only $20,000. . Defendant al
liability.
leged that this was a conversion of the securities and upon trial before
a referee she was awarded $17,250.05, the difference between the
amount due plaintiff and the value of these securities. Plaintiffs ap
peal from the afﬁrmance by the Appellate Division of the report of the
referee.
VVERNER,

*

*

*

But we fail to perceive how this ﬁnding
conclusion that the plaintiff‘was guilty of
It is true that the plaintiff was
converting the defendant’s securities.
the pledgee of these securities as well as the agent of the defendant.
It is equally true that the defendant was not notiﬁed of the foreclo
sure, and that the plaintiﬁf bid in the mortgaged lands in its own name.
There is, however, no ﬁnding that the plaintiff, in bidding in the prop
erty in its own name, was not acting for and on behalf of the defend
ant, and there is no signiﬁcance in the failure to notify her of the fore
closure, when the circumstances are considered. The mortgaged prop
The plaintitf’s place of business
erty was in the state of Minnesota.
was there, and it held an assignment of the mortgages. The defend
ant’s attorney had instructed the plaintiff to proceed to a foreclosure
The defendant lived in the state of New York, and could
and sale.
act much more conveniently and economically through her pledgee and
It was therefore quite natural and
agent than she could in person.
proper that the plaintiff should use its own name in acting for the dc
All this was entirely consistent with the plaintiffs duty as
fendant.
the agent and pledgee of the defendant.
It is obvious, however, that in departing from the defendant’s in
structions as to price the plaintiff was guilty of a breach of duty, and
rendered itself liable for any damages resulting from such breach.
Since there is neither evidence nor ﬁnding as to the ﬁnancial responsi
bility of either VVhitney, the mortgagor, or Van Dyke, his grantee,
who assumed payment of the mortgages, the most favorable view of
the case to which the defendant can be entitled is that, if the plaintiff
had obeyed instructions by bidding in the property at its actual value,
a deﬁciency judgment might have been collected from Whitney or Van
It would seem to follow as a logical corollary that the defend
Dyke.
ant’s right of recovery should be measured by what she may have lost
through the plaintiffs misconduct, for the law of damages is the law
In the absence of some arbitrarylegal rule, this
of compensation.
would naturally be the difference between the value of the land and the
amount bid for the same at the sale. That would seem to be the rule
applicable to this case unless the plaintiff’s breach of duty amounted
to a conversion. Vt’ e think it did not.
The true rule is very succinctly stated in Mechem on Agency (sec
]."""

of negligence justiﬁes
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Part of the opinion is omitted.
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tion 476), where the learned author says: “In many cases it becomes
difficult to determine whether the misconduct of the agent consists in
a mere breach of instructions, or amounts, in law, to a conversion, and
the distinction is sometimes exceedingly technical. "A distinction is
nevertheless to be made. Thus it has been held that if property be
delivered to an agent, with instructions to sell it at a certain price, and
he sells it for less than that price, he is not liable in trover as for_con
version.
Sarjeant v. Blunt, 16 ]ohns. 74; Dufresne v. Hutchinson, 3
Taunt. 117; Palmer v. Germain, 2 M. & W. 282. In such a case the
agent had a right to sell and deliver, and in that respect he did no more
than he was authorized to do. He disobeyed instructions as to price
only, and was liable for misconduct, but not for conversion of the
So, where an agent was authorized to deliver goods on re
property.
ceiving sufﬁcient security, but delivered them on inadequate security,
it was held that trover would not lie." Cairnes v. Bleecker, 12 Johns.
300.
The principle thus enunciated seems to be precisely applicable to
the case at bar. There can be no sound distinction between a case of
agency to sell at a speciﬁed price and one to buy within a price or lim
'
it named.
We think the cases cited by the learned Appellate Division and the
defendant are not in point. In Scott v. Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676, the in
structions were to sell wheat at a speciﬁed price on a‘ particular day,
and, if not so sold, to ship it to a designated consignee in the city of
New York. In Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522, 23 Am. Rep. 184,
the agent was instructed not to part with a note unless he got the
In Comley v. Dazian, 114 N. Y. 161, 21 N. E. 135, certain
money.
goods were not to be sold without the approval and consent of the
owners.
In Gilchrist v. Cunningham, 8 Wend. 641, the assignee of a
mortgage as collateral foreclosed the same without instructions, and
one of the defendants treated the property as his own.
In all of these
cases the breach of duty was held to be a conversion, because the act
done was wholly unauthorized and in deﬁance of the owner's rights.
That is the point of distinction between the two classes of cases above
referred to.
_
It is undoubtedly the duty of an agent to obey all the lawful in
structions of his principal, and the agent is clearl_v responsible for all
losses occasioned by his disobedience thereof .3‘ Vllhitney v. Merchants’
Union Express Co., 104 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Rep. 207; Blot v. Boiceau,
3 N. Y. 78, 51 Am. Dec. 345.
But it is equally clear that the rule of
damages as for conversion is not applicable to all cases where a prin
cipal may sustain loss through the negligence or disobedience of his
agent.
\Namsley v. Atlas Steamship Co., 168 N. Y. 533, 61 N. E.
896, 85 Am. St. Rep. 699; Industrial & General Trust v. Tod, 170
$4 As to trover for money received by the agent. see Salem Traction C0. v.
Anson, 41 Or. 562, 67 Pac. 1015, 69 Pac. 675 (1902); also post, pp. 412, 416.

Goor>.Pn.& A.(2n En.)—26

'

EFFECTS AND ‘CONSEQUENCES

402

N. Y.

or

THE RELATION

(Part

3

N. E. 285. The law upon this subject is well summed
]., in McMorris v. Simpson, 21 Wend. 610, 613, as
follows: “The most usual remedies of a principal against his agent
are the action ofassumpsit and a special action on the case, but there
can be no doubt that trover will sometimes be an appropriate remedy.
The action may be maintained whenever the agent has wrongfully con
verted the property of his principal to his own use, and the fact of
233, 63

up by Bronson,

conversion may be made out by showing either a demand and refusal,
or that the agent has, without necessity, sold or otherwise disposed of
When an agent wrongfully
the property contrary to his instructions.
refuses to surrender the goods of his principal, or wholly departs from
his authority in disposing of them, he makes the property his own,
But there must be some act on
and may be treated as a tort fcasor.
A mere omission of duty is not enough, although
the part of the agent.
the property may be lost in consequence of his neglect. Nor will trover
lie where the agent, though wanting in good faith, has acted within the
There must, I think, be an entire de
general scope of his powers.
parture from his authority before this action for a conversion of the
"
goods can be maintained.”
VVe think that it was error to hold the plaintiifas for a conversion,
and, as this view of the case will necessitate a new trial, it is unneces
sary to discuss other exceptions treated at length in the brief of the
*
appellant.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs
in all courts to abide the event.

-ii,

JEROME
(Court of Appeals

v.

QUEEN CITY CYCLE CO.

of New York, 1900.

163 N.

Y.

351, 57

N. E.

485.)

Action by Anthony Jerome against the Queen City Cycle Company.
From a judgment of the appellate division (48 N. Y. Supp. 1107) af
firming a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury, defendant appeals.
.
Reversed.
This action was brought to recover damages for an alleged wrong
ful discharge of the plaintiff, who had been employed by the defend
ant for the period of one year to act as superintendent of its bicycle
The defendant
factory at Lake View, about 20 miles from Buffalo.
admitted that it discharged the plaintiff before the expiration of the
term agreed upon, but alleged that the discharge was lawful on ac
count of tardiness, absence, and disobedience of orders. By a written
contract entered into by the parties on the 10th of October, 1895, the
defendant agreed to employ the plaintiff as superintendent of its fac
tory for one year from said date at a salary of $2,000. payable month
ly. The plaintiff agreed to “give his services” to the defendant, and
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to “devote his best efforts in the faithful and eﬁicient discharge of the
duties of superintendent,” during the period and for the compensation
*
* *
aforesaid.

if

a

it

it

7;

35

The statement of facts is abridged.

it

if

it,

VVhen the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for a nonsuit upon
the ground that it appeared affirmatively that the discharge was justi
ﬁed, and at the close of the evidence it moved for the direction of a
verdict in its favor upon the same ground, but each motion was denied.
and exception was taken. There was a verdict for the plaintiff.
The
judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the appellate division, with
out an opinion, and the defendant appealed to this court.”
VANN, ]. (after stating the facts).
The relation of master and
servant, which existed between the parties, cast certain duties upon
the plaintiff that he was bound to discharge, and the foremost was that
of obedience to all reasonable orders of the defendant not inconsistent
with the contract. Disobedience of such orders is a violation of law
which justiﬁes the rescission of the contract by the master and the dis
charge of the servant. Edgecomb v. Buckout, 'l46 N. Y. 332, 339, 40
N. E. 991, 28 L. R. A. 816; Lacy v. Getman, 119 N; Y. lO9, 115, 23
N. E. 452, 6 L. R.‘ A. 728; Forsyth v. McKinney, 56 Hun, 1, 8 N.
Y. Supp. 561; Harrington v. Bank, 1 Thomp. & C. 361; Tullis v.
Hassell, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 391; Spain v. Arnott, 2 Starkie, 256;
Callo v. Brounker, 4 Car. & P. 518: Amor v. Fearon, 9 Adol. & E.
S48; W'ood,- Mast. & S. 221, 225; Smith, Mast. & S. *139; 14 Am.
8: Eng. Enc. Law, 789; Chit. Cont. [10th Ed.] 628, 629.
After com
plaint had been made in regard to several absences without permission,
the plaintiff desired to be absent for an entire day to attend to private
business. He did not ask permission, but simply announced his inten
tion to his employer, stating the reason, and was informed that if he
absented himself that day for that purpose he would be discharged.
He was not told that he could not leave at all, but simply that he could
not leave on that particular day. This was, in effect, a command not
to leave his work on the (lay in question; but, notwithstanding, he did
and thus willfully disobeyed the order of his employer.
He
leave
was at once discharged, and,
said order was reasonable, under the
circumstances, the discharge was in accordance with law; but,
was unreasonable, the discharge was in violation of law.
The plaintiff claims that this was
question of fact for the jury,
in his favor, after afﬁrmance by the appellate
and as they answered
division, we cannot answer
in favor of the defendant.
As the judg
es of the court below do not appear to have been unanimous in their
decision, we have the right to read the record in order to see whether
there was any evidence which, according to any reasonable view, would
sustain the conclusion of the jury. Gannon v. McGuire, 160 N. Y. 476,
55 N. E.
Otten v. Railway Co., 150 N. Y. 395, 44 N. E. 1033. If
the undisputed facts, in connection with the testimony of the plaintiff,
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when supported by every inference that can properly be drawn there
from, do not warrant the verdict, a question of law arises, which we
facts, with the logical deductions there
can review.
Uncontradicted
from all pointing in the same direction, present a question of law for
the court, and not a question of fact for the jury. Griggs v. Day, 158
N. Y. 1, 10, -52 N. E. 692; Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N. Y. 353, 357, 55
N. E. 919; O’Brien v. Bridge Co., 161 N. Y. 539, 544, 56 N. E. 74.
The
The construction of the contract is for the court exclusively.
plaintiff expressly agreed “to give his services” to the defendant, and
to “devote his best eﬁorts in the faithful and efficient discharge of the
duties of superintendent.”
He impliedly agreed to devote his time to
the work of his employer during business hours, unless he was sick,
The defendant,
or some other emergency arose to justify his absence.
in making the‘ contract, did not abdicate its position as master, nor
waive control of its business. The plaintiff was, in law, a servant, al
though of a high grade, with full control and discretion as to hiring
and dismissing all the other servants. In other respects he was sub
ject to the reasonable orders of his master, for there was nothing in
the contract to relieve him from the duty of obedience required by
He had charge of an extensive manufactory, where 600 men
law.
were at work.
The defendant had the right to manage its own busi
ness, and to decide whether the services of the plaintiff were necessary
at the factory on the day in question.
It did so decide-, and he had
no power to overrule the decision, for that would make the master
and servant change places. He did not ask leave to go some other
day, and was not told that he could not go some other day, when the
situation of the business, in the master’s judgment, would permit it.
It was unreasonable for the plaintiff, when employed to superintend
extensive operations and many men, to take a day off at will, for a
private purpose, regardless of the condition of the business or the
wishes of his employer.
,There was no emergency to justify him in leaving important affairs,
which he had been hired to look after, for a whole day, in deﬁance of
orders.
The defendant had a right to the skill and services during
ordinary working hours which he had agreed to give, and for which it
was paying him. There was no occasion for taking counsel in order
to prevent one of the employés from calling him names, which were
not actionable upon their face, nor otherwise, so far as appears, because
he had the absolute power to discharge the obnoxious man at once.
It was not reasonable for him to abandon the work he had been em
ployed to do for such a triﬂing cause, which, as he admits, was pure
The excuse given by him to justify his disobedience of
ly personal.
orders presented no question of fact for the jury, for the law does
not permit a servant to defy his master unless serious injury threatens
Courts will not permit juries to guess
him, his family, or his estate.
or speculate, when, from the undisputed evidence, it is apparent that
the order of the master was reasonable, and that the servant was guil
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The inferences from the admitted facts all point
ty of insubordination.
one way.
Not that the
VVhat variant inferences are permissible?
plaintiff obeyed orders, for it is conceded that he did not; not that
he was in danger of serious injury, for he had a summary remedy in
his own hands, which he could resort to at once without leaving his
duties; not that it was necessary to at once start a slander suit to pro
tect his reputation, for no slanderous words had been spoken concern
ing him; not that he went to Buffalo as superintendent, to consult the
counsel of thecompany,
for he did not so claim upon the trial. He
went, as he stated, for personal reasons, to consult his own counsel up
on a subject which was neither important nor urgent.
\Vhen the contract is properly construed, we ﬁnd no evidence to war
rant the inference that the order of the master was unreasonable, or
the conduct of the servant justiﬁable.
He had been absent without
leave several times during a short period.
The master, by retaining
him after knowledge of these breaches of duty, did not prevent their
use as grounds of discharge when the offense was repeated.
Gray v.
Shepard, 147 N. Y. 177, 41 N. E. 500; Arkush v. Hanan, 60 Hun, 518,
15 N. Y. Supp. _2l9.
After ample warning, he persisted in disobedi
ence, and the master was not compelled to retain in its employment a
servant who willfully violated its lawful orders. The absence, consid
ering the nature of the business and the character of the duties, was
not within the contemplation of the contract and was inconsistent with
the object of the servant’s engagement, which was to advance the mas
tcr's interest. Whether it resulted in actual injury to the business of
the defendant is not the question, for it had that tendency, and would
naturally have that effect in a large factory, where something was lia
ble to occur at any moment which would require the presence of the
It was a violation of duty as matter of law, which jus
superintendent.
tiﬁed the master in discharging.
The action of the servant was not
the result of a mistake, for he was not told not to go, but was willful;
and, indeed, it seems as if, encouraged by previous litigation with two
different employers, he courted a discharge. The contract and the un
disputed evidence conclusively established the right of the master to
discharge, and the motion to direct a verdict for the defendant should
have been granted.
The judgment appealed from should therefore be reversed, but, as
further evidence may be given upon another trial, we do not dismiss
the complaint, but grant a new trial, with costs to abide event.”
Judgment reversed, etc.
English case, Turner

v. Mason, 14 M. & W. 112 (1845). hold
mother, who was supposed to be at death's
door, was not a justiﬂable cause for‘ the disobedience by a menial servant of
the master's command not to leave his house for the night. with Shaver v.
Ingham, 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162, 55 Am. Rep. 712 (1886), criticising the
English case. and holding that it is not every act of disobedience, even of a
menial servant. that will justify discharge.
As to servant's absence from
duty, see Weymer v. Belle Plaine Broom Co., 151 Iowa, 541, 132 N. W. 27,
36 Cf. a leading

ing that going to

see the servant's
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BRAY
(Supreme

was RELATION

v.

GUNN.

Court of Georgia,

1874.

53 Ga. 144.)

Bray sent to defendant for collection, in New York, exchange, a
draft on Bro\vn 8: Co. After some difficulty defendant on September
9 collected in Kimball currency, then at par, and informed plaintiff,
who, on September 12 acknowledged the letter. Kimball & Co. failed,
and on October 27 plaintiff demanded of defendant that he remit the
amount collected in New York exchange. Upon an action 0f'assufnp—.
sit defendant had verdict, and plaintiff appeals.
McCAY, I. If an agent, acting in good faith, disobey the instruc
tions of his principal, and promptly informs the principal of what he
has done, it is the duty of the principal. at the earliest opportunity, t_o
Silence in such a case is a ratiﬁ
repudiate the act if he disapprove.
cation. See the case of McLendon v. \Vilson & Callaway, 52 Ga. 41,
from T roup county. Taking this correspondence altogether, we think
the jury had a right to ﬁnd that the plaintiffs were satisﬁed with the
act of Gunn in taking the money in the Kimball funds, and that his
dissatisfaction is an after-thought in consequence of the failure of
Kimball. The evidence is convincing that if they had promptly noti
ﬁed Gunn of their dissatisfaction, he could have saved himself.
Both
the parties here were commercial men, and the rule is a fair and rea
sonable one that it is the duty of the principal promptly to answer the
letters of his agent, and if he do not do so he is presumed to acquiesce
in what the agent informs him he has done or proposes to do.
Judgment

affirmed.

FEILD
(Supreme Court of the United

v.

FARRINGTON.

States, 1869.

10

Wall.

141, 19

L. Ed.

923.)

Feild shipped cotton to Farrington & Co. with directions to sell
Next day he tele
it. Cotton was then worth 50 cents per pound.
Shortly after he saw Farring
graphed, “Do not sell till I see you.”
ton and secured an advance of $11,000, nearly the full value of the
cotton. The latter testified he expressed a wish to \vait to sell the
Feild testiﬁed he ordered them to sell
cotton for a better market.
in 10 days. Later they wrote him asking instructions, and he made
After repeated letters they sold at 30 cents, and now sue
no reply.
to recover $6,695, the difference between their advance and the net
proceeds of the cotton. On the trial Feild asked, among others, an
instruction that if the jury ﬁnd that Feild ordered a sale before the
price should _fall any lower, and they failed to sell, then plaintiffs
Ann.

Cas. 1913A, 451, and note (1911);
629, 70 N. W. 133 (1897).

Mich.

Milligun

v.

Sligh Furniture Co.,

111
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must account to Feild for what the cotton would have brought if
so sold.
Defendant brings error.
STRONG, ].‘" [After holding that Feild’s failure to reply to the let
ters amounted to a ratiﬁcation of the conduct of plaintiﬂsz] * * *
There is still another reason why the court should not have af
ﬁrmed the defendant’s ﬁrst proposition.
The plaintiffs had made
large advances on the cotton consigned to them, advances very near
ly, if not quite. equal to its value, and much more than its market
value at any time after their letter to the defendant was written.
They had, therefore, acquired a special property in the cotton, and
they held it for their own indemnity as well as for the beneﬁt of
Now, though it is true that factors are generally
the defendant.
bound to obey all orders of their principals respecting the time and
mode of sale, yet when they have made large advances or incurred
expenses on account of the consignment, the principal cannot by any
subsequent orders control their right to sell at such a time as in the
exercise of a sound discretion, and in accordance with the usage of
trade, they may deem best to secure indemnity to themselves, and
Of course they must act
to promote the interests of the consignor.
in good faith and with reasonable skill. This is the rule as laid down
in Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 4:/'9, 1O L. Ed. S50, in which it was
said that “where a consignment has been made generally without
any speciﬁc orders as to the time or mode of sale, and the factor
makes advances or incurs liabilities on the footing of such consign
ment, then the legal presumption is, that the factor is intended to
be clothed with the ordinary rights of factors to sell, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, at such time and in such mode as the usage
of trade and his general duty require, and to reimburse himself for
his advances and liabilities out of the proceeds of sale, and the con
signor has no right, by any subsequent orders given after advances
have been made or liabilities incurred by the factor, to suspend or
control this right of sale, except so far as respects the surplus of the
of such advances or
consignment not necessary to the reimbursement
i
liabilities.”
In view of this it is apparent that the jury had more to ﬁnd than
the fact that Feild gave instructions to sell the cotton before any
fall in the price, in order to justify a credit to him for the amount
the cotton would have brought if sold at the time the instructions
There was, therefore, no error in denying the defend
were given.
*
*
*
ant's ﬁrst prayer for instructions to the jury.
Reversed
for another error.
B’! '1‘he.statement
.

of facts is abridged and part of the opinion is omitted.
I
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SECTION 3.—EXERCISE OF CARE AND SKILL

RICHARDSON
(Supreme Judicial

v.

TAYLOR.“

Court of Mat-\sachusetts, 1883.

136 Mass.

143.)

Bill in equity against Iohn W., Charles H. and Wm. E. Taylor.
Plaintiff had been in partnership with the last two. He bought out
their interest, and retained John W. Taylor, their father and the for
mer book-keeper of the ﬁrm, as his book-keeper and his agent to look
over the partnership accounts and effect a settlement. The father er
roneously overlooked items due plaintiff amounting to $719.64.
PER CURIAM. VVithout considering whether the defendant ]ohn W.
Taylor is properly joined in this suit, we are of opinion that the
master’s report shows no ground upon which he can be held liable in
any form of action. He examined the books of the old ﬁmi, acting as
agent of all parties. The master ﬁnds that, in doing this, he acted hon
estly and in good faith. There is no evidence to show that he agreed
to guarantee the accuracy of the result of his examination, and there is
no evidence of false representations or of fraud or negligence by him
' l
which would render him liable to the plaintiff.
Decree affirmed.

iii

LAKE CITY FLOURING-MILL
(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

1884.

32

CO. v. McVEAN.

Minn.

301. 20 .\'.

W.

233.)

GILFILLAN, C. J.” Plaintiff was engaged in operating a ﬂour-mill at
Lake City. Defendant was a commission merchant and warehouse
man engaged in buying and selling grain at Maiden Rock, VVis
consin. In May and june, 1882, plaintiff delivered to defendant the
sum of $1,500, in consideration of which, and of a commission of three
cents a bushel for purchasing, defendant agreed to buy for said plain
tiff, with said money, good, sound wheat, none of it damp or musty, at
the market price at Maiden Rock, and store the wheat in his ware
house. and there deliver it to plaintiff on boat or barge. Of the wheat
purchased by defendant with said money, $606.15 in aggregate price,
though when he purchased it he believed it to be good, sound, and not
damp, was not good, sound wheat, but was damp, and by reason there
of became musty and wholly unﬁt for milling purposes. Plaintiff re
fused to receive this part of the wheat from defendant. but demanded
of him in lieu thereof wheat of the kind and character described in the
38 Accord: Page v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415 (1875): Bi-iere
347, 105 N. W. 817 (1905); Nepomuceno v. Heredia, 7 P.
89 Part of the opinion is omitted.

v.

I.

Taylor, 126
563 (1907).

Wis.
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agreement. With this demand he refused to comply, offering to de
liver that purchased by him as aforesaid. These are the facts found
by the court below. What degree of care and skill defendant bestowed
in purchasing the wheat is not stated.
The action is to recover the
* * *
~
$606.15.
The contract was one of employment.
It created the relation of
principal and agent. In the absence of express agreement, or a usage
of the business modifying them, the law attaches to the relation cer
tain rights, duties, and liabilities.
On the part of the agent he is to
obey the instructions of his principal, and to exercise in his employ
ment reasonable skill and ordinary diligence;
the degree of
that
skill ordinarily possessed and employed by persons of common capac
ity engaged in the same business, and the diligence which persons of
common prudence are accustomed to use about their own business
and affairs.
183. For
loss to his principal from neglect
Story, Ag.
of these duties he
liable. But he
not an insurer of success in the
business.“ He does not, by merely accepting the employment, guar
anty his principal against such incidental losses as may occur in the
“because,” says Mr. ]ustice Cooley, in
course of the employment:
Page v. VVells. 37 Mich. 415, “these are incident to all avocations, and
no one, by implication of law, ever undertakes to protect another
If the principal desires to hold his agent liable for
against them.”
such losses he must make his contract of employment accordingly.
We do not think the contract
this case established by the letters
suﬁicient to change the liability of the agent.
Order reversed, and new trial ordered.

2

a

4 ;-

&

I.

7

-"As to professional agents. such as lawyers, and architects, see Nepo
muceno v. Heredin,
P.
563 (1907); Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N. W.
62. 72 Am} St. Rep. 587 (1898).
The care, skill and diligence required of an agent is illustrated in every
The following cases illustrate the rule as to nzents em
sort of business.
ployed to collect and transmit moneu. Bur-ll v. Cbapin. 99 Mass. 594, 97 Am.
C0. v. Larned, 50 Kan. 776. 32
Dec. 58 (1868); to cell upon, credit, Frick
Pac. 383 (1893): to collect ordinary; debts. Richards v. N. H. Ins. Co., 43 N.
H. 263‘ (1861); to collect negotiable paper. Allen v. Suydam, 17 Wend. 368
(1837), reversed 20 Wend. 321, 32 Am. Dec. 555 (1838); First Nat. Bank v.
Fourth Nat. Bank. 77 N. Y. 320, 33 Am. Rep. 618 (1879); Wingate v. Mechan
ics’ Bank, 10 Pa. 104 (1848); to invest mono)/, Van Cott v. Hull, 11 App. Div.
89. 42 N. Y. Supp. 1060 (1896): Furher v. Barnes, 32 Minn. 105, 19 N. W.
728 (1884): Whitney v. Martine, 88 N. Y. 535 (1882); to cure for money and
property in Ma possession, Benson v. Ligizett, 78 Ind. 452 (1881); Clark v.
Norwood, 19 La. Ann. 116 (1867): to eﬁocr insurance. Shoenfeld v. Fleisher,
Strong v. High,
T3 Ill. 404 (1874)
Rob. (La) 103, 38 Am. Dec. 195 (1842);
lending case; to rent the principal’:
Thorne v. Deas,
Johns. S4 (1809).
property, Adams v. Robinson, 65 Ala. 586 (1880).
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ORR.
\

(Supreme Court of Alabama,

1832.

3 Stew. & P. 49, 23 Am. Dec. 319.)

I.“

The defendant in error placed in the hands of
of a judgment, rendered in
Orr, and took from him, a
Georgia,
receipt for the same, in the following words, viz.:
“]uly 31st, 1824. This day, received of Nathan Orr, a demand in
writing, against Allen Orr, for the sum of two hundred and sixty—ﬁve
dollars, damages, and a further sum of fourteen dollars thirty—seven
cents, costs.
I am to endeavor to collect said amount, and pay it over
to said Orr. If it cannot be collected, to make due return of the same,
to the said Orr.
Damages awarded on the 20th June, 1824.
“[Signed] R. C. Morrison.”
This receipt was the foundation of the action. The plaintiff below
charged the defendant. Morrison, with negligence, in not using the
necessary means, to collect the amount of the judgment placed in his
hands.
On the trial, the plaintiff proved the defendant was the administra
tor of Allen Orr; that the estate had been declared insolvent;
that
the claim had not been allowed by the County court, nor had it been
acted on; that he had demanded the money and record of the said
Morrison, the defendant.
The defendant proved, that he placed the exempliﬁcation of the
judgment in the hands of an attorney, for collection, in the lifetime of
Allen Orr; and that suit had been brought on it; and that it was
dismissed, in the year 1825, for want of testimony—the record not
having been authenticated in the manner prescribed by law. That the
attorney wrote to Georgia, for an exempliﬁcation. properly authenti
It was further proved, by the
cated, but never received an answer.
and,
plaintiﬁ‘, that the claim had never been ﬁled for an allowance;
that the settlement of the estate had been postponed, at the instance
of Morrison, from September, 1828, till October, 1829. The defend
ant’s attorney proved, that he had attended, for the purpose of laying
the claim before the judge of the County court, and having it acted
on; but was informed, by him, that the settlement had been post
poned and that he was drawn into an error by him, as to the time
when it would take place, and that it passed without his knowledge.
On this testimony, the judge on the trial, in the court below,
charged the jury, that they were bound, in the absence of testimony,
as to the fact, to infer that Morrison was to receive compensation for
his agency; and that he was therefore bound to a greater diligence;
that his not presenting the claim for an allowance, made him liable.
This charge was excepted to, and is now assigned for error.
L1Psc0MB,

the

C.

plaintiff in error,

an iexempliﬁcation
in his favor, against one Allen

41 The statement

of facts and part of the opinion are omitted.
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Morrison had been an attorney, whose business and employment
was the collection of debts, there is no doubt that the inference drawn
by the judge would have been correct. If one receives business, with
in the line of his profession, or occupation, and promises attention to
it—or, if he does not make an express promise, one would be implied
—the law would create a presumption, that he was to receive the
ordinary compensation, although not.a word had been said about
But,
seems to me, that the presumption rests en
compensation.
in the proper line of the business of the
tirely on the ground, that
not accustomed to such agencies
person so undertaking it: and,
compensation
for hire, that the law, so far from presuming that
mere naked agency, or
was
was to be received, would infer that
not an‘ ingredient, in the under
mandatory, in which compensation
one of those friendly oﬁices, that, in our relations with
taking.
society, daily occur, without either party ever thinking of compensa
'
tion.
This distinction
recognized by Chief justice Kent, in Thorne v.
If, then,
84.“
was
Deas,
voluntary and gratuitous
Johns.
non-feasance
agency, without reward, the agent was not liable for
,-he might perform his undertaking. or not, as suited his conven
true, by the civil law, he would be liable to the man
ience.
dator, for all damages that ensued from his failure to perform his
by
different rule prevails at common law:
but quite
promise;
the latter, such contracts are held to be of imperfect obligation, and
sufficient consideration.
not to be enforced at law, for \vant of
In
case, where one joint-owner of a ship, promised the other
joint-owner, to have an insurance effected, and failed to do so——on
suit was brought, and the promise was held to
the ship being lost,
be nudum pactum.
]ohns. 84.
It should, at any rate have been matter of proof, before the jury,
whether Morrison was to receive compensation or not.
But suppose the case should be viewed in another aspect: and that
compensation for his agency——are the facts
the agent was to receive
in this case, such as to render him liable? If such had been the terms
of his undertaking, he would only have been Held to the exercise of
ordinary care and attention, to the best of his skill, and not such as
was to conduct law
professional man, that is, one whose business
Bailment,
on
283
use.
28‘).
to
would
be
suits,
Story
expected
Orr must have known that Morrison was not an attorney at law,
and he had no right to expect, in him, that skill and knowledge so
law suit.
He certainly calculated that he
necessary to conducting
would employ an attorney at law to bring the suit, and take on himself
Morrison had neglected to employ
the whole conduct of it; and
Johns. S4 (1809). Der Kent, C. J. Alsa
v. Deas,
(1857), in which the court discusses
Adm’:-,
Ohio St.
the various conditions to he considered in, and the indeﬂniteness ot, deﬁni
tions of, negligence and gross negligence.
1

4

Thorne

8

42 See especially

Grant v. ,Ludl0ws’
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counsel, and undertaken the management of a suit himself, he would,
He
perhaps, have, by so doing, fallen short of ordinary diligence.
employed counsel, and suit was brought. * * *
VVe are therefore of opinion, that in any aspect, Morrison was not
liable-—that if he is to be considered as an agent, under‘. wages for
his services as agent, that no sufﬁcient negligence has been ﬁxed on
him, to make him liable for the debt ;“ and that there is much less
semblance of liability, if he is to be viewed, as we think he ought, on
this record, as a mandatory only.
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.

SECTION 4.—ACCOUNTING

Q

HALL

FOR MONEY

v.

_OR

PROPERTY

WOOD.

(Court of King’s Bench,

1601.

Owen, 121.)

In an action on the case for a trover, and conversion of £4-O. on not
guilty pleaded, it was found for the plaintiff.
How can an action lye‘ for a trover of money, if it be
VVALMESLEY.
not within a bag? for this writ supposeth a loss; and when the money
was lost. how doth it appear that the money found is the same money
that was lost?
There are many presidents in the King's Bench to prove
DAVIES.
that this action will well lye for corn and money, and I have been of
counsel in many of those cases.
If the money were lost in view of a third person,
NVARBURTON.
upon such trover the action will lye, for there it may be proved that
And WALMi£sLF.Y agreed. And note,
it was the money of the plaintiff.
that a president was shewn, tempore 40 & 41 Eliz. inter Holloway
and Higgs, which was thus; a master delivered to his servant 30 quar
ters of corns to be sold, and the servant sold them, and converted the
money, and the master brought his action on the case for the trover
and conversion against the servant. who pleaded, not guilty, and it was
found against him; and two things were moved in arrest of judgment;
ﬁrst, that the master was never possessed of the money, and therefore
could not lose it; secondly, because the money cannot be known, and
so non constat whether it was the money of the masters, or no. But
43 The agent is equally liable whether the omission of skill and diligence
is the result of innttontion. or incapacity, or of an intent to defraud.
Heine
mann v. Heard, 50 N. Y. 27 (1872).
The right of the agent to expenses and reimbursement depends upon whem.
er they were incurred in the exercise of ordinary diligence.
Brown v. Clayton,
12 Ga. 56-1 (1853).
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notwithstanding this case, judgment was given for the plaintiff, because
the possession of the servant was the possession of the master; and
when the servant converts this to his own use, by this the master loseth
the property, and is also a conversion in the servant.“

AMERICAN STAY CO.
Judicial Court ot'Massachusetts,

(Supreme

911, Ann.

v.

DELANEY.

1912.

211

Mass.

229,

97

N. E.

Cas. 191313, 509.)

Bill in equity by the American Stay Company against ]ohn S. De
laney to restrain defendant from using or disclosing certain trade se
crets relating to the manufacture of welts. In the Superior Court the
bill was dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Afﬁrmed.
BRALEY, ]. The motion to recommit having been addressed to the
judicial discretion of the trial court. and no exceptions having been
taken, the plaintiff's appeal from the interlocutory decrees denying the
motion, and conﬁrming the master’s report present no questions for
our decision. Bakshian v. Hassanoﬁ, 186 Mass. 255, 71 N. E. S55;
Crosier v. Kellogg. 210 Mass. 181, 96 N. E. 76; Lipsky v. Heller, 199
Mass. 310, 85 N. E. 453.
The bill, however, having been dismissed. its appeal from the ﬁnal
decree brings up for determination the question whether upon his
ﬁndings equitable relief should be granted. During the period covered

if

is

servant
135 Mass.

a bailee of his master’s
-16 Am. Rep. 433 (1883).

is not
1,

“The

Oidham,

a

is

it

It

is

It

it,

by the controversy the plaintiﬁ‘ was engaged in the manufacture and
sale of shoe and leather trimmings, which among other products includ
ed leather welting.
It is alleged, and the master reports, that by means
of special machinery, secret processes and formulas largely invented.
devised and discovered by its president, who is a successful inventor of
much experience, the company has been enabled to make with great
economy as to cost of production, and to put upon the market, a leather
welting of such superior quality, that it has gained a wide reputation,
and an.extensive and proﬁtable trade has been fostered and established.
The machines with one exception have not been patented, and if the
process becomes generally known other manufacturers probably will
and this branch of the plaintiffs business may be greatly im
adopt
.
paired in value, or wholly destroyed.
the proprietor in connection with his business
elementary that
invents, or discovers. and keeps secret, processes of manufacture,
which enable him to produce goods at a less cost, ‘or of more meri
torious quality than his competitors, his right to the invention or dis
not exclusive as against the public, or persons whose knowl
covery
has been lawfully obtained.
edge of
monopoly only while
he retains control, and can prevent publication.
Chadwick v. Covell,
property,

Hailgnrten

V.
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151 Mass. 190, 191, 23 N. E. 1068, 6 L. R. A. 839, 21 Am. St. Rep.
But if in
442; Gayler v. VVilder, 10 How. 477, 493, 13 L. Ed. 504.
not
expressly
violation of his contract of employment, where although
arts and
the
he
to
plaintiff’s
not
divulge
stipulated,
impiiedly agreed
unpatented inventions, the defendant either individualiy, or jointly
with others to whom they were improperly disclosed, undertook in the
production of welt to use and apply them, a court of equity while en
joining the continuance of such interference, and further disclosure,
will give relief by the assessment of damages for any injury already
inﬂicted.
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664; Cod
v.
Bispham, 36 N. I. Eq. 574; A. & VV. Thum Co. v. Tloczyn
dington
ski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. VV. 14-0, 38 L. R. A. 200, 68 Am. St. Rep.
469; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345, 354; Field v.
Ashley, 79 Mich. 231, 44 N. VV. 602; Williamson v. Torkingson, 2
Y. & C. Exch. 726; Lipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare, 393.
The defendant being of unusual ability developed great mechanical
skill while in the plaintiff's service, and with the understanding that
the plaintiff believing its undisclosed methods to have been very suc
cessful desired him not to impart any information of their existence,
gave valuable aid to the president in the development of his inventions,
He was not, however,
which became the property of the company.
employed to originate inventions for the plaintiﬁ"s beneﬁt, and while
he could not appropriate his employer's trade secrets in whatever form
they may have consisted, no obligation rested upon him to forego the
exercise of his inventive powers, even if they were incited because of
knowledge necessarily derived from the performance of his contractual
duties.
It was legitimate for him under these conditions to invent
and perfect improvements which were embodied in new machines of
greater capacity and eﬁiciency.
Hopedale Machine Co. v. Entwistle,
133 Mass. 443; American Circular Loom Co. v. \-Vilson, 198 Mass.
185, 84 N. E. 133, l26'Am. St, Rep. 409; Dice v. ]oliet Mfg. Co.,
Ill. App.‘ 109, 114; s. c., 105 Ill. 649; \Vestervelt v. National Pa
per & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 57 N. E. 552; Agawam \'Voolen Co.
v. Jordan, 7 Vi/all. 583, 19 L. Ed. 177; Solomons v. United States,
137 U. S. 342,
Sup. Ct. 88, 34- L. Ed. 667; Gill v. United States,
160 U. S. 426, l6 Sup. Ct. 322, 40 L. Ed. 480.
The plaintiPf’s inability to support any claim to inventions which were
the defendant’s individual property being manifest. the master states
that it seeks to enjoin him “from making welt by substantially its
process, or the use substantially of its machines," as speciﬁed and de
scribed in the eighth paragraph of the bill as amended. It was a ques
tion of fact, with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff, wheth
The master who
er these material allegations had been sustained.
took a view and carefully inspected the plaintiif’s factory and equip
ment, and the factory where the defendant’s machinery had been in
stalled and he proposed to make welt, and heard at great length the
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contentions of the parties, exonerated the defendant from having con
structed or used any machines, or taken over any process or formulas
in which, as against him, the plaintiff had an exclusive proprietary
A rehearsal of his elaborate comparison of their respective
right.
modes of manufacture, or of his conclusions, founded upon evidence
not reported, would not diminish the effect _of his report, which is an
unqualiﬁed negation of the plaintiff’s right to relief under the ﬁrst
and second prayers.
The further ﬁndings, that the averments of the ﬁfth paragraph, as
amended, charging the defendant with having in his possession draw
ings of the plaintiff’s special machinery, with notes and memoranda
of its secret formulas and processes, which he wrongly intended to use,
had not been sustained upon the evidence, disposes of the third prayer,
leaving the plaintiff only the fourth prayer, predicated on the tenth
It is there averred
paragraph as ampliﬁed by the ﬁnal amendment.
that, while receiving a large yearly salary, the defendant fraudulently
devoted an appreciable portion of his time to the advancement of his
own interests, by designing and constructing new and competing ma
The bare relation of master and servant, although, as we
chinery.
have said, it placed the defendant under an implied obligation not to
divulge or use its secrets, or duplicate and use its special machinery,
did not constitute him a ﬁduciary, w-ho could be compelled to account
in equity for wages or salary paid under the mistaken belief that his
services were uninterruptedly bestowed on the plaintiff.
Pratt v. Tuttle,
136 Mass. 233; Tateum v. Ross, 150 Mass. 440, 23 N. E. 230; Camp
bell v. Cook, 193 Mass. 251, 256, 79 N. E. 261.‘
But the master having found that during the last 18 months, while
fully and satisfactorily performing his duties as superintendent, he
devoted without the plaintiffs knowledge some portion of his working
hours to the construction and installation of his own machinery, the
bill may be retained for the assessment of whatever damages it has
suffered from breach of the contract.
\Vallace v. De Young, 98 Ill.
638, 38 Am. Rep. 108; Newburyport Institution for Savings v. Puffer,
201 Mass. 41, 47, 87 N. E. 562, and cases cited.
The defendant not
having taken any exceptions, or appealed from the decree of conﬁrma
tion, the amount assessed by the master should be accepted as the full
measure of compensation. The interlocutory decree must be affirmed,
but the ﬁnal decree should be modiﬁed by directing that the injunction
be dissolved, and the bill dismissed as to all the prayers for speciﬁc
relief, and that the plaintiff recover the sum of $250, with interest from
the date of ﬁling the bill, for which execution is to issue without costs,
and when so modiﬁed it is affirmed.“
Ordered accordingly.
45 Cf. Weymer v. Belle Plaine Broom Co., 151 Iowa, 541, 132 N. W. 27, Ann.
Cas. 1913A. 451 (1911), in which the servant sought extra pay. See. also, Mc
Gregor v. Harm, 19 N. D. 599, 125 N. W. 885, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 649 (1910), in
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SALEM TRACTION CO.
(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1902.

v.
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ANSON.“

41 Or. 562, 69 Pac. 675.)

Trover for $3,561.08 which the complaint alleged, and the lower
court found, defendant, as manager of plaintiffs street railway, had
_cqllected and not accounted for.
BEAN,_]'I‘"‘“*’ * * It is next contended that the plaintiff’s remedy
was by an action on contract, and not in trover, and hence'the com
plaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As
a general rule, the mere failure of an agent to pay over or account for
money collected for his principal will not sustain an action of conver
sion, because the agent is not bound to pay over the identical money
received, and the transactions create nothing more than the relation
of debtor and creditor between him and his principal. Royce v. Oakes,
20 R. I. 418, 39 Atl. 758, 39 L. R. A. 845 ;_ Hartman v. Hicks, 28 Misc.
Rep. 527, 59 N. Y. Supp. 529; Vandelle v. Rohan, 36 Misc. Rep. 239,
73 N. Y. Supp. Z85; Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250; Borland v.
Stokes, 120 Pa. 278, 14 Atl. 61. But where the principal is entitled to
receive, and the terms of the employment of the agent require him to
pay over, the identical money received, an action of trover will lie for
its conversion.
Jackson v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 24; Petit v. Bouju, 1
E. D.
Mo. 64; Bunger v. Roddy, 70 Ind. 26; Donohue,v. Henry,
Smith, 162; Farrand v. Hurlbut, 7 Minn. 477 (Gil. 383); Cotton v.
Sharpstein, 14 \Vis. 226, 80 Am. Dec. 774; Express Co. v. Piatt, 51

Minn. 568, 53 N. W. 877.
And such was the case here. The defendant was the agent and gen
eral manager of the plaintiff corporation, with power and authority
to collect the moneys due it for services rendered. All the money so
The title immediately vested in
collected belonged to his principal.
the plaintiff, and the defendant had no interest therein, and no au
He was bound by the
thority to make any use thereof whatever.
terms of his employment to pay the money over to the treasurer of
the plaintiff corporation, and could not even use it for the payment
of current expenses without the approval of his superior. The plain
tiff, as a matter of right, therefore, was entitled to the identical money
received by the defendant on its account, and any unlawful use or
which the servant was discharged for refusal to work over hours. As to trade
secrets, see Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier. 165 Cal. 95. 130 Pac. 1180. 44
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159. Ann. Cas. 191-IC. 628. and note (1913); Peabody v. Nor
folk. 98 Mass. 452. 96 Am. Dec. 664 (1868), cited and followed in Thum C0’.
v. Tloczynskl, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. W. 140, 88 L. R. A. 200, 68 Am. St. Rep.
469 (1897).
40 Accord:

Wells v. Collins, 74 Wis. 341, 43 N. W. 160, 5 L. R. A. 531 (1889),
the court found the relation he-tween agent and principal was not
one of debtor and creditor; Lance ‘\'. Butler. 135 N. C. 419, 47 S. E. 488
(1904), holding that the proceeds of sale by the agent are a trust fund.
4'1 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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misapplication thereof constituted a conversion, for which an action
of trover was an appropriate remedy. Mech. Cas. Ag. § 476; Henry
v. Sowles (C. C.) 28‘Fed. 521; Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis. 226,
80 Am. Dec. 774. * * "'

DIXON

v.

(Court of King's Bench,

Dixon

HAMOND.
1819.

2 B. &

Aid.

810.)

of Davidson brings assumpsit for
had and received.
Davidson was the surviving partner of
Flowerden, who owned a. ship, the Sidney, which he pledged to de
fendant as security for a loan.
Defendant was an insurance broker,
and effected an insurance on the ship as agent of Flowerden
and
Davidson. Verdict for plaintiffs and defendant moved for a new trial.
ABBOTT, C. I. If, in order to maintain this action, it were neces
sary to shew that the legal title to this ship was in the present plain
tiffs, there could be no doubt that the defendant would be entitled to
our judgment.
For it is clear that the ship never belonged to the
partnership at all. It was originally the property of Flowerden alone,
and by him the legal interest was ﬁrst transferred to Hart, and sub
He, however, in 1815
sequently vested in the present defendant.
receives an order to effect an insurance on the ship and freight on the
account, and he does effect
and accounts with the
partnership
lost, and he
After this, the ship
partnership for the premiums.
Then, in truth, the legal
receives the money from the underwriters.
title to the ship has nothing to do with this question. The right of
the plaintiffs to recover here depends on
settled rule of law, that
an agent shall not be allowed to dispute the title of his principal. and
that he shall not, after accounting with his principal, and receiving
the money in that capacity, afterwards say, that he did not do so, and
for the beneﬁt of his principal, but for .that of some
did not receive
other person." Here the defendant has received the money as agent
for the partnership, and he cannot now be permitted to say, that he
for the beneﬁt of Flowerden alone. All the rest of the
received
world, except the defendant, might dispute the legal title of the plain
tiffs to the ship, but he cannot do it. There is, therefore, no reason
for granting this rule.“
as assignee in bankruptcy
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it
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it,

money

48 Wood

"The

v. Blaney,

107 Cal.

291, 40 Pac. 428 (1895).

concurring opinions of Bayley and Hoiroyd are omitted.
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FELTON.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1859.

28 Mo. 601.)

The lat
NAPTON, J. This was a suit between principal and agent.
ter had collected a sum of money for the former under a power of at
torney, and this action was brought to recover it. The defence was,
that the money did not belong to the principal and this was offered
to be shown generally, and also by the production of a paper in pos
session of the plaintiffs.
The proof was excluded by the court and
this exclusion presents the only question in the case.
An agent has discharged his duty when he pays over to his prin
cipal the money he was authorized to collect. It is of no importance
to him whether his principal’s title to the money or ‘property be good
or bad. This is a matter which concerns third persons, who, if they
desire to protect their interests; can easily do so, either before or after
the termination of the controversy between the principal and agent.
This principle of'law is conceded, but it is said that the paper called
for in this case, and_which it was alleged would show that the money
collected by the defendant belonged to third persons, was admissible
to show that the money was not really collected under the power of
Of course
attorney, and was not collected as agents for the plaintiffs.
this could be shpwn, and if there had been any otter to show this,
there could be no doubt the evidence should have been admitted.
But
the mere fact that the money collected belongs to third persons has no
tendency to dis'prove the allegation that it was collected as money of
the principal,
especially where the only proof previously introduced
in the case was positive and unequivocal that the money was collected
under the power of attorney and as agent for the plaintiﬁs. If the
simple fact that the money does not really belong to the principal is
suﬁicient to rebut, or entitled to any weight in rebutting the positive
proof of agency, then such evidence must be legitimate in all cases
of this kind, and in every suit between principal and agent, the latter
can go into the question of the ownership of the property or money
which he has collected, upon the vague presumption that the money
or property was not obtained through the agency, simply because the
principal did not have any right to it. Such a course would defeat
all the rules of evidence, and practically annul the responsibility of
agents.

judgment aﬁirmed.

The other judges concur.
I

GODD.PB.& A.(2o En.)
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ELLIOTT.

v.

P.

1 Bos. &

3, 4 Rev.

Rep. 755.)

Assumpsit for money had and received from an insurance company
an illegal policy of insurance on a ship lost at sea.
BULLER, J. Is the man who has paid over money to another’s use
to dispute the legality of the original consideration?
Having once

u'pon

I

it

it,

is,

waived the legality, the money shall never come back into his hands
again. Can the, defendant then in conscience keep the money so paid?
For what purpose should he retain it? To whom is he to pay it over;
who is entitled to it but the plaintiff?
EYRE, C. J. The defendant is not like a stake-holder.
The ques
tion
whether he who has received money to another’s use on an
and that not even at the
illegal contract, can be allowed to retain
desire of those who paid
to him?
think he cannot.
The defendant took nothing by his motion.

BALDWIN BROS.
(Supreme

v.

Court of Vermont,

POTTER.

1874.

46 Vt.

402.)

plaintiff.
PIERPOINT, C.

,

a

General assumpsit. Defendant sold for plaintiff prize candy on com
He claimed this was “setting up
lottery” within the mean
mission.
Iudgment for
ing of the Vermont statute, and refused to account.

it
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\/Ve do not ﬁnd
necessary in this case to con
sider the question as to whether the contract for the sale of the prop
erty referred to, by the plaintiffs, to the several persons who purchased
were contracts made in violation of law, and therefore void, or not.
This action
not between the parties to those contracts; neither
If those contracts were
founded upon, or brought to enforce them.
illegal, the law will not aid either party in respect to them;
will not
allow the seller to sue for and recover the price of the property sold,
has been ‘paid, the purchaser cannot sue
has not been paid;
back. The facts in this case show that the purchas
for and recover
ers paid the money to the plaintiffs, not to the plaintiffs personally, but
to the defendant as the agent of the plaintiffs, authorized to receive
became the plaintiff’s money, and
it. VVhen the money was so paid,
was received by the defendant as such agent, the law, in con
when
promise on the part of the defendant to pay
sideration thereof, implies
this obligation that the
over to his principals, the plaintiffs;
brought to enforce; no illegality attaches to this con
present action
But the defendant insists that, inasmuch as the plaintiff could
tract.
not have enforced the contracts of sale as between himself and the
purchaser, therefore, as the purchaser has performed the contracts by
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can
paying the money to the plaintiffs through me, as their agent,
now set up the illegality of the contract of sale to defeat an action
as
brought to enforce a contract on my part to pay the money that
In other words, because my prin
agent receive, over to my principal.
cipal did not receive the money on a legal contract, I am at liberty to
steal the money, appropriate it to my own use, and set my principal at
deﬁance.
We think the law is well settled otherwise, and the fact that
the defendant acted as the agent of the plaintiffs in obtaining orders
for the goods, does not vary the -case. Tenant v. Elliott, 1 B. & P. 3 ;
Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 6 L. Ed. 468; Evans v. City of
‘
I
Trenton, 24 N. I. Law, 764.5“
We think the certiﬁcate granted by the county court was properly
granted. It has been urged in behalf of the defendant, that the zeal
with which he has defended this case shows that he intended no wrong;
but we think the man who receives money in a ﬁduciary capacity, and
refuses to pay it over, does not improve his condition by the tenacity
with which he holds on to it.
Judgment of the county court aﬁirmed.

I

;-_--_
BERNARD
(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1893.
Am.

v.

TAYLOR.

23 Or. 416. 31 Pac. 968, 18 L. R. A. 859, 37
St. Rep. 693.)

Action to recover $560 deposited with defendant as a wager on a
Judgment for ‘plaintiff.
Loan, C. ].51 * * * The next contention for the defendant is
that the alleged agreement was ‘corrupt, illegal, and criminal, in this:
that it was in advance “ﬁxed” that one of the parties should win, and
foot race.

that certain persons should lose their money. In other words, that the
agreement had in contemplation “a job race.” This, it is claimed, put
the plaintiff in pari delicto with the defendant, and, as a consequence,
he is entitled to the beneﬁt of the rule, potior est conditioni possiden
tis. The general rule is that the law will not interfere in favor of ei
ther party in pari delicto, but will leave them in the conditon in which

United States Express C0. v. Lucas, 36 Ind, 361 (1871).
Approved in Reed v. Dougan, 54 Ind. 306 (1876), and in Wilt v. Town of
Redkey, 29 Ind. App. 199, 64 N. E. 228 (1902).
Ct. Mexican Int. Banking C-0. v. Lichtenstein,
10 Utah, 338, 37 Pac. 574
(1894), in which the court held that an employment to sell lottery tickets cre
The employment was void. Both parties were prin
ates no agency at all.
clpals in a crime and the courts will not help to compel a division of the
i‘ -*Tv~1'-‘spoils. ﬁelber v. Schantz, 109 Mich. 669, 67 N. W. 913 (1396). And see 17
~»15'~1-»{»~Iev. Z19. Contra: Norton v. Blinn, 39 Ohio St. 145 (1883),
,__ -lain-11. Law
‘_
Q
mu; fl ,*4)
whicy
1‘
approval Baldwin v. Potter above.
I
_
I
icites with
"
/' 5! Part of the Opinion is omitted.
5°

'w-\_o*\DIa ‘-1
'l'od4~;(|qa§u6
u>

:14. ».|.;..,o._,

ufah vi»-1 §oﬂO‘>v0
5-|K'u~.\~.\Gs»-l'~
=~¢f*4ka

"f‘;r“

~4

Ch. 1)

DUTIES on REPRESENTATIVE

T0 CONSTITUENT

421

There is no doubt,
they are found, from motives of public policy.
where money has been paid on an illegal contract, which has been ex
ecuted, and both parties are in pari delicto, the courts will not compel
the return of the money so paid. But the cases show that an impor
tant distinction is made between executory and executed illegal con
tracts. While the contract is executory, the law will neither enforce it
nor award damages; but, if it is already executed, nothing paid or de
livered can be recovered back. So that, while the contract is execu
tory, the party paying the money or putting up the property may re
scind the contract and recover back his money. This arises out of a
distinction between an action in aﬂirmance of an illegal contract and
one in disaﬂirmance of it. In the former, such an action cannot be
maintained, but in the latter an action may be maintained for money
had and received. The reason is that the plaintiFf’s claim is not to en
force, but to repudiate, an illegal agreement. Whart. Cont. § 354.
In
such case, there is a locus penitentiae.
The wrong is not consummated,
and the contract may be rescinded by either party.
In Edgar v. Fowler, 3 East, 225, Lord Ellenborough said: “In ille
gal transactions, the money has always been sto'pped while it is in
transitu to the person entitled to receive it.” As Lord justice Mellish
said: “To hold that the plaintiﬁ is entitled to recover does not carry
out the illegal transaction, but the effect is to put everybody in the
same situation as they were before the illegal transaction was deter
If money is paid
mined upon, and before the parties took any steps.
or goods delivered for an illegal purpose, the person ,who has so paid
the money or delivered the goods may recover them back before the
illegal purpose is carried out; but if he waits till the illegal purpose is
carried out, or if he seeks to enforce the illegal transaction, in neither
can he maintain an action. The law will not allow that to be done.”
Taylor v. Bowers, 1 Q. B. Div. 291. In Hastelow v. jackson, 8 Barn.
& C. 221, which was an action by one of the parties to a wager on the
event of a boxing match, commenced against the stakeholder after the
battle had been fought, Littledale,']., said: “If two persons enter into
an illegal contract, and money is paid upon it by one to the other, that
may be recovered back before the execution of the contract, but not
afterwards.” Smith v. Bickmore, 4 Taunt. 474; Tappenden v. Ran
dall, 2 Bos. & P. 467; Lowry v. Bourdieu, 2 Doug. 452; Munt v.
Stokes, 4 Term R. 561; Insurance Co. v. Kip, 8 Cow. 20; Merritt v.
Millard, *43 N. Y. 208; White v. Bank, 22 Pick. 181; O’Bryan v.
Fitzpatrick, 48 Ark. 490, 3 S. VV. 527. “And this rule,” says Mr. ]us
tice Woods, “is applied in the great majority of the cases, even when
the parties to an illegal contract are in ‘pari delicto, because the ques
tion which of two parties is the more blamable is often difﬁcult-of solu
tion; and quite immaterial.”
Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 60, 26
L. Ed. 347. The object of the law is to protect the public and not the
This is upon the principle that it best comports with public
parties.
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policy to arrest the illegal transaction before it is consummated. Stacy
v. Foss, 19 Me. 335, 36 Am. Dec. 755.”
It only remains to apply these principles to the facts. These show
that the plaintiff was cognizant that the race had been ﬁxed in ad
vance ; that one of the parties should win, and that certain other per
sons should lose their money; that it was a bogus race, and the ar
rangement based upon it corrupt, and designed to cheat and defraud
the other parties; but at the same time they show that he repented, and
repudiated the transaction before it was consummated, by demanding
the return of his money the evening of the day before the race, and on
the day of the race, but before it was to come otf, and that the defend
ant refused to pay it back, and that he afterwards forbade the defend
ant to pay said money to any other person than himself.
He availed
himself of the opportunity which the law affords a person to withdraw
from the illegal contract before it has been executed. He repented be
fore the meditated wrong was consummated, and twice demanded to
withdraw his money, and thereby rescinded the contract.
To allow
the plaintiff to recover does not aid or carry out the corrupt and ille
gal transaction, but the effect is to put the parties in the same condi
tion as they were before it was determined upon.
By allowing the
party to withdraw, the contemplated wrong is arrested, and not con
summated. This the law encourages, and no obstacle should be thrown
in the way of his repentance. Hence, if the plaintiff retreated before
the bet had been decided, his money ought to have been returned to
him; and, in default of this, he is entitled to recover.
There was no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.

HANCOCK

v.

GOMEZ.

(Supreme Court of New York,

1871.

58 Barb.

490.)

Plaintiff sent to defendants an order for $l76.331,4, on Sale & Co.,
owners of the bark Reindeer, for wages due one Hanson as mate of
said bark. ‘Defendants collected the amount. Later a woman claim
ing to be the widow of Hanson, but furnishing no proofs, demanded
the money, and defendants paid it back to Sale & Co., who paid it to
her. Verdict directed for defendants.
,
52 Until the illegal contract is executed both parties are given an opportuni
Seeing the error of his way, the law ex
ty for repentance and rescission.
tends to him a helping hand by aiding him to recover back anything of value
with which he may have parted. Wassermann v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 49 Pac.
566, 38 L. R. A. 176, 59 Am. St. Rep. 209 (1897); Munns v. Donovan Com. Co.,
117 Iowa, 516, 91 N. W. 789 (1902); Smith v. Blachley, 188 Pa. 550, 41 Atl.
619, 68 Am. St. Rep. 887 (1898).
Neither party can recover it it is necessary
for him to set up the illegal transaction.
Cf. Clarke & C0. v. Brown, 77 Ga.
G06, 4 Am. St. Rep. 98 (1886). and Mexican Int. Banking Co. v. Lichtenstein,
10 Utah, 338, 37 Pac. 574. (1894).
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CARDOZO, J. The money foi which this action was brought was
collected by Gomez, Wallis & Co., by authority of, and as agents for,
the plaintiff,,and they acknowledged that they had so collected
both
by their accounts rendered, and by their letter to the plaintiff of Octo
ber
1862. Having so received the money, they had no right to return
to Sale
Co. They cannot dispute the title of the principal, by set
ting up an adverse title in stranger. Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb.
140; Ross v. Curtiss, 31 N. Y. 606."
The ruling below was therefore erroneous, and the judgment should
be reversed and
new trial ordered; costs to abide the event.

Court of Oregon,

FIRST NATIONAL BANK.

1905.~ 47 Or. 361, 82 Pac.
8

(Supreme

v.

Ann. Cns.

8,
2

MOSS MERCANTILE CO.

L. R. A. [N. S.]

657,

569.)

§

&
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Suit in equity to restrain the prosecution of an action at law brought
by defendantagainst William Miller to recover back money collected
by him as attorney on
judgment in an action by Helmick against Por
ter.
Neither knew plaintiff had, or claimed, an interest in the judg
ment.
Helmick assigned to defendant bank, which notiﬁed Miller to
Miller collected, but
collect and remit, less his fees for collection.
while preparing to remit yielded to plaintiff's demand for the money,
on the supposition that the bank was acting for plaintiff. Defendant
thereupon sued Miller, and plaintiff seeks to restrain this suit.
5‘
BEAN,
[After holding that there was no theory on which plain
*
Now, under the
tiff could maintain this suit in equityz]
was
facts as here claimed by the defendant, Miller's relationship to
that of mere agent or attorney to collect and remit the amount due on
the Helmick judgment; and while the general rule is- that an agent
who receives money for his principal
estopped to deny the title, and
must return or account for the money to him for whom he received
this rule does not prevent an agent, when sued by his principal, from
title ‘paramount
showing that he has been divested of ‘the property by
to that of his principal, or that he has paid over the money or prop
title.
Clark
Skyles, Agency,
431;
erty to one holding such
Mechem, Agency,
525; Peck
Lewis, 19 Ala.
Clark v. VVallace
219; Peyser v. Wilcox, 64 How. Prac. 525; Sims v. Brown,
Thomp.
s. c., affirmed 64 N. Y. 660.
The rule in such case
C.
practically
the same as that governing the relation of bailor and bailee, and surren
paramount title
good defense. Western Transportation
dering to
Co. v. Barber, S6 N. Y. 544; Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 46 Am.

i

53 The agent will be protected in paying back the money it it was paid to
him by the third person for the principal through fraud or mistake.
Needles
v. Fuson, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 369, 68 S. W. 644 (1902).
54 Part of the opinion ls omitted.
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Dec. 145.“
Miller is therefore not estopped by reason of his rela
tionship to the defendant bank to set up and prove in the action brought
by it against him, if he can, that the money in fact belonged to the
plaintiff, and that he paid it over on demand prior to the commencement
of such action.
The point in controversy is whether the money collected by him
If it was the property
belonged to the defendant or to the plaintiff.
of the bank, Miller is liable to
but
belonged to the plaintiff,
and he paid
over upon demand, such payment will be
complete
defense to the law action.
These are questions properly triable at
law, and according to the procedure applicable thereto.
We are of
no equity in plaintiff’s proceeding
the opinion, therefore, that there
The decree reversed, and the complaint dismissed.

iii

MASSACHUSETTS LIFE INS. CO.
(Superior

Court of City of .New York,
49 N.

32 N.

1870.

Y.

v.

CARPENTER.

Y. Super. Ct.

734,

aﬂirmed

668.)

Action for balance of account alleged to be -due from defendant
Defense, that the moneys were. embezzled by
of plaintiffs.

as agent

is

it

I

].

a

clerk.
SPENCER,
have examined critically the ﬁndings of fact and
law made by the referee in this case, and conclude they are fully sup
ported by the evidence, and that the judgment in this action should
be affirmed.
This fact clearly appears from the evidence, and does
not seem to be contested, “That the defendant mixed the money and
funds of the plaintiffs with moneys and funds of his own and of
third parties, at the oﬁice and the bank, and that the money em
bezzled by 'the clerk was taken from these moneys and funds, which
impossible to determine
were so mixed and commingled that
to whom the money embezzled actually belonged at the time."
This
action on the part of defendant made him liable to account to the
6

8:

B.
S. 225, 34 L. J. Q. B. 137, 11 Jur. N. S. 425, 12 L.
Biddle v. Bond,
R. 561 (1865).
may be culpable for the
After notice of the claim of the third person
agent to pay the money to the principal. Hunt v. Manicre.
N. R. 181, 34
Beav. 157, 34 L. J. Ch. 142. 11 Jur. N. S. 28, 73. 11 L. T. 723. 13 W. R. 363
In such case he should interplead his principal and the third person
(1864).
if he can, or take indemnity from one party and deliver to him who indemni
Thomp.
C.
ﬁes him. Sims v. Brown, 64 N. Y. 660 (1876). affirmed
(1875).
Trover will not lie because the agent holds the property in dispute until the
rights of the claimants are determined.
Fletcher v. Fletcher,
N. H. 452.
In Wando Phosphate Co. v. Parker, 93 Ga. 414, 21
28 Am. Dec. 359 (1835).
is held that the agent is not guilty of conversion if he de
S. E. 53 (1893),
livers the property to his principal promptly and before suit is brought by
the third person, even though he had notice of the third person's claim.
55
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plaintiﬁs for their moneys received
by him, even admitting that a
'
A
loss had occurred.“
By the act of defendant the identity of plaintiffs’ moneys was lost,
and the loss should fall upon the defendant, as Story justly remarks,
“as a sort of penalty” for the agent’s negligence in not keeping his
principa.l’s money separate from his own and that of others.
When
he chose to mingle these funds of the plaintiff with his own, etc.,
he made the same substantially his own, and incurred the liability
and duty of answering to the plaintiffs for the full amount of the
A loss of a part of these joint and ' mixed funds must be sus
same.
tained wholly by the defendant."
The judgment should be aﬁirmed, with costs.

.-ii

-

VEIL

&

PETRAY

v.

MITCHEL’S ADM’RS.

(Circuit Court of the United States, Third Circuit,
Fed. Cas. No. 16,908.)

1821.

4 Wash.

O.

0.

105,

The special verdict stated, that in the lifetime of Abner Mitchel, the
intestate, the plaintiffs sent to him, for sale, two bills of exchange on
France, with instructions to remit them the proceeds. The intestate
sold the bills, and remitted to the plaintiﬁs the proceeds of one oﬁ
them, except $6C, which he had in bank notes of the South Carolina
banks.
For the other bill he took the check of the purchaser, pay
Before the check came to maturity,
able some days after the sale.
Mitchel died, leaving in his possession the check, and the South Car
olina notes amounting to $60; all of which came to the hands of the
defendants, who received payment of the check when the same be
56 The agent does not, in general. insure the money or property intrusted to
Louisville 8: N. R. Co. v. Burlington, 131 Ala. 620, ' 31 South. 592

his care.

(1902).
5'1 Illinois

Linen Co. v. Hough, 91 Ill. 63 (1878); Yate v. Arden, Fed. Cas.
A leading case is Lnpton v. White, 15
5 Cranch, C. C. 526 (1838).
Sec. also. Lord (‘hed
'Ves_ 432. 10 R. R. 94 (1808). per Eldon. Lord Chancellor.
worth v. Edwards, 8 Ves. 46. 6 R. R. 212 (1802). and Clarke v. Tipping, 9 Beav.
Every presumption will be against such an agent. Gray v, Haig,
284 (1846).
20 Beav. 219 (1854).
As to liability of agent to pay interest, see Miller v. Clark, 5 Lans. (N. Y.)
No. 18.126,

388 (1871).
The agent is not chargeable with interest if he merely suffers the money
Rogers v. Boehm, 2 Esp. 704 (179R), per Ld.
to remain dead in his hands.
Kenyon. He is chargeable, however, ii’ he deposits his principal's money in
his own general bank account and draws out and uses it. Biodgctt's Est.
v. Converse‘s Est. 60 Vt. 410, 15 Atl. 109 (1888).
Cf. V\’illinms v, Storrs, 6
Johns. Ch. 353, 10 Am. Dec. 340 (1822). per Kent, Ch. And 0 he is it he keeps
Bischoﬂsheim
v. Baltzer (C. C.) 21 Fed.
it against his principal‘s interest.
531 (1884), and when he has tailed for a long time to account, or has con
Hauxhurst v. Hovey, 26 Vt. 544 (1854).
tracted to pay interest.
Set-on’. While the agent sued for anaccounting has a right of set-oi! for
sums justly due him in the agency, he may not set oi! antecedent debts, out
side the agency. Tag-g v. Bowman, 108 Pa, 273, 56 Am. Rep. 204 (1835); Id..
99 Pa. 376 (1882).
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came due.
On anothef account, the plaintiﬁs were indebted to the
The intestate died insolvent, and
intestate, in a balance of $344.82.
the question reserved for the opinion of the court is, whether the
plaintiﬂs are entitled to recover the amount‘ of the check, and the
notes for $60, after deducting what is due to the intestate.
WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice.
The cases upon this subject are uni
form, in laying down the rule, that where the principal can trace his
property into the hands of his agent or factor, whether it be the iden
tical article which ﬁrst came to the hands of the factor, or other
property purchased for the principal by the factor with the proceeds;
he may follow
either into the hands of the factor, or of his legal
he should become insolvent or
representatives, or of his assigns
bankrupt.“ The factor
trustee for the principal, so long as
he retains the property, or its representative in his hands; and his
or legal representatives take
assignees,
subject to the same trust,
which they cannot defeat by turning
into money; unless indeed,
they should pay
away in their representative character, before no
in this point of view only, that notice
tice of the claim.
neces
sary. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Bush]

482.)

J.

HARDIN,
The appellee brought this action to recover of the
appellants $1,215.83, for money received to the plaintiﬁ"s use, as the
proceeds of the sales of one hundred barrels of ﬂour consigned by
the plaintiff at Paducah, Kentucky, to the defendants, in two parcels
of ﬁfty barrels each, and received by them for sale as commission
merchants at Memphis, Tennessee; the ﬁrst consignment being re
ceived Ianuary 17, 1868, and the last Ianuary 29, 1868, and both

3

2

58 All that is required is that the property or money shall have some ear
mark or other appropriate identity. Whitley v. Foy, 59 N. C. 34, 78 Am. Dec.
N. E. 452, 16 Abb. N. O.
236 (1860); Baker v. N. Y. Nat. Bank. 100 N. Y. 31,
v. Perkins, Fed. Cas. N0. 13972,
458, 53 Am. Rep. 150 (1885); Thompson

5

&

2

&

Mason, 232 (1823), per Story, J.
Accord: Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400 (1742). But money deposited in bank
Co., Agt.," can be followed and recovered.
Its idon~
in theqname of "W.
tity is not lost. Baker v. N. Y. Nat. Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, N. E. 452, 16 Abb_ N,
C. 458, 53 Am. Rep. 150 (1885); Id. 16 Abb. N. C. 458 (1885).
It is not nec
essary to trace the identical coin or bills. Pearce v. Dill, 149 Ind. 136, 48
N, E. 788 (1897). Cf. with the above Fahnestock v. Bailey, 60 Ky, (3 LIetc,)
48, 77 Am. Dec. 161 (1860), in which the property of the principal was bona
ﬁde sold and the money paid out before notice of the principal’s claim, and
M. Ry. C0. v. Felrath, 67 Ala. 189 (1880), pointing out that money has
Mobile
See the discriminating discussion
in Beatty v. McOleod,_ 11
no earmarks.
La. Ann. 76 (1856).A third person hona ﬁde taking property from the agent can get no better
title than the agent;had or was authorized to transfer. Stevenson v. Kyle,
V
42 W. Va, 229, 24 S. E. S86, 57 Am, St. Rep. 854 (1896).
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parcels sold yielding together the amount claimed in the petition.
It appears that the proceeds of sales of the ﬂour as received were
deposited by the defendants to their own credit in the Gayoso Sav
ings Institution, a bank of recognized responsibility in Memphis;
and on the 23d of January, 1868, they received from that bank, in
payment of their own check on their deposits, a draft of the bank
for $580.25 on the banking ﬁrm of Duncan, Sherman & Co., of New
York; and on the 4th of February, 1868, they in like manner ob
tained the draft of the bank on Duncan, Sherman & Co. for $635.57.
These drafts were both made payable tothe plaintiff’s order, and duly
transmitted to and received by him; and it appears that on receipt
of the ﬁrst draft the plaintiff forwarded it to New York for present
ment and payment, but that it was duly protested for nonpayment
on the 5th of February, 1868, and returned to and received by the
plaintiff at Paducah on the day of his receipt of the second draft;
and therefore both drafts were remitted by him to the defendants,
with notice that he would look to them for payment of the proceeds
of the ﬂour.
,
Admitting the receipt and sales of the ﬂour, the defendants by
their answer relied on their transmission to the plaintiff of said drafts
of the Gayoso Saving Institution as a performance of their under
taking as factors, and a bar to the action.
A trial of the cause by the court resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff for $1,215.83, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
whether, conced
The only material question to be determined
ing the right of the appellants to remit the proceeds of the sales as
received to the appellee by bank exchange according to what appears
to have been the custom of commission merchants at Memphis, the
act of depositing the money in the bank to their own credit, thus
beyond the control of the appellee, and creating
liability
placing
therefor of the‘ bank to themselves, did not change the character of
their responsibility to the appellee, from that which the law devolved
on them as agents to that of his debtors for the funds so deposited.
appears from the evidence the appellants deposited the money
was placed to their general credit
in the bank as their own, and
with the bank with other money previously deposited and subject to
neither alleged nor proved that this disposition
their drafts; and
of the proceeds of the appellee’s property was authorized by the
terms of the appellants’ agency, or any special direction of their
a trustee oriagent makes an
general rule that
principal.
investment or deposit of funds
his hands as such
unauthorized
common account with
banker,
together with his own money in
conversion of the funds, and
disposition will be treated as
such
devolves on him any loss which may be sustained by the banker's
1270; Story on Agency,
insolvency (Story’s Equity jurisprudence,
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and no sufficient reason
shown in this case for exempting
from the operation of this rule.
Nor did the acceptance of the ﬁrst draft sent to the appellee on
Duncan, Sherman
Co., which was protested and returned, without
laches on the part of the appellee, extinguish the pre-existing liabil
Marsh. 62; Story on
ity of the appellants. Hager v. Boswell,
Bills of Exchange,
109.
The second draft remitted to the appellee, not having been accept
ed, was properly returned by him with the previous one, which had
208)

NOAKES."
1791.

for goods sold and delivered,

Assumpsit
ceived.

'

Peake, 98,

3

v.

1

WARWICKE

(Court of King’s Bench at Nisi Prius,

.

is

a

proved fruitless as
payment.
Wherefore the judgment
afﬁrmed.

R. R.

653.)

and money had and re

The plaintiff was
living at Sherbourne

.

it

It

I

it

a

a

hop merchant, and the defendant his customer,
in Dorsetshire.
The plaintiff sold him hops,
and also sold hops to several other persons in that neighbourhood;
and requested the defendant (as his friend) to receive the money due
to him from his other customers, and remit him by the post
bill
for those sums, and also the money due to him from the defendant
A bill was accordingly remitted, but the letter got into bad
himself.
hands, and the bill was received by some third person at the banker's
was drawn.
on whom
LORD KENYON. Had no directions been given about the mode of
remittance, still this being done in the usual way of transacting busi
should have held the defendant clearly dis
ness of this nature,
was so de
charged from the money he had received as agent.
and as the
termined in the Court of Chancery forty years since:
plaintiff in this case directed the defendant to remit the whole money
was remitted at the peril of the plaintiff.
in this way,
The plaintiff was nonsuited.

a

a

59 To make the principal liable for losses on bank failures the agent must
separate account.
Webster v. Pierce,
deposit the money of his principal in
It an agent has funds for several principals the safer
35 Ill. 158'(1864).
separate account for each one. Bank of Northern Liber
mode is to open
ties v. Jones. 42 Pa. 636 (1862).
60 Accord:
Kerr v. Cotton. 23 Tex. 411 (1859). In the absence of instruc
tions as to the mode of remittance the agent may properly conform to the
usage in such cases. Potter v. Morland, 57 Mass. (3 Oush.) 384 (1853).
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JANNEY.

Court of Illinois,

1847.

9

Ill.

193.)

Suit by defendant in error for money collected for him by plaintiff
in error, and not paid over.
.
THOMAS, J." * * * The plaintiffs’ allegations were, that they
had placed a demand due them in the hands of the defendant for col-‘
lection; and that he had received the money on that demand, and
The testimony corresponded with,
appropriated it to his own use.
and fully sustainedthese allegations.
It consisted of the defendant's admissions in writing, of his recep
tion of the plaintiffs’ demand for collection; of his recepit of money
shown by parol evidence to have been collected thereon; and of a
transcript from a justice’s docket, showing the institution of a suit be
fore such justice on said demand, and the proceedings thereon, to their
termination in the execution on which the money was eventually col
lected, and paid over to defendant, and oral testimony explanatory of
the documentary.
It was, consequently, properly adjudged admissible,
both upon the grounds of its relevancy and its competency. It proved
everything alleged by the plaintiffs, and was therefore properly held
suﬁicient to entitle them to a recovery.
Nor is this result varied by the fact that the commencement of the
plaintiffs’ suit was not preceded by a demand of payment from the de
fendant.“ The doctrine contained in the instructions of the Circuit
Court on this point is undoubtedly correct. A person is entitled to
money collected for him by another so soon as received by the latter,
and good faith on the part of the collector demands its immediate pay
ment by him; but nevertheless, he is ordinarily not subjected to suit
for his failure or omission to make such payment, until after demand
therefor has been made of him. Tinkham v. Heyworth, 31 Ill. 519.
As a general rule in such cases, it may be presumed that payment
has been delayed by reason of the want of safe and convenient means
of transmission, or of some other good and suﬁicient cause, and that
61

Part of the opinion is omitted.

and refusal constitutes evidence of conversion.
When the con
version ean be shown in some other way no demand need he made. Nadine‘
See, also, Wiley v. Logan, 96
v_ Howe, 23 Ind. App. 690. 55 N. E. 1032 (1900).
N. O. 358 (1886), in which it is said: "A demand previous to bringing an ac
tion tor money collected by an agent, is to enable the latter to pay it over
without incurring the cost of suit, for the principal must seek him and not
he the principal. Potter v. Sturges. 12 N. C. 79 (1826); Moore v. Hyman, 3-1
N. C. 38 (1851): Hyman v. Gray, 49 N. C. 155 (1856); Kivett v. Massey. 63
N. C, 24-0 (1869).
But a demand is not required where the agency is denied,
or a claim set up exceeding the amount collected, or the agent's responsibil
ity is disputed in the answer.
Waddell v. Swann, 91 N. C. 108 (1884), and
cases cited in the opinion."
The situation of the parties and of the contract of agency may determine
whether demand before suit is necessary.
Clark v. Moody, 17 Mass. 145
6! Demand

(1821).
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of the money, still considering himself as entitled to no
more than enough reasonably to compensate him for his services in
time
will pay
over on demand. But, where so long
collecting
has elapsed since the collection of the money, as to rebut any such
presumption in favor of the collector, he may well be considered as
to his own use, and then, neither law nor reason
having appropriated
requires that before he can be‘ sued for his non-feasance, he should be
requested to do what his conduct sufficiently indicates his determina
tion not to do.
peculiar claims
The circumstances of the case at bar establish for
to exemption from the operation of the general rule referred to, as
regulating the liabilities of collectors. The defendant had been so
long the recipient of the plaintiffs’ money without accounting to them
or being called upon by them to do so, that when, at length,
for
from him by suit, he claimed that time
endeavored
to collect
they
had absolved him from his liability; that the Statute of Limitations
had afforded the privilege of
repose, not to be disturbed by having
The Court
ohtruded upon him this outlawed claim of his employers.
to the jury to say whether there had
might, therefore, well submit
not been such an appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiffs’ mon
ey to his own use as to deprive him of the right to a demand of pay
ment before the commencement of proceedings against him for its
legal coercion. ,And well might the jury respond aﬁirmatively to that
proposition, and say, as by their verdict they did say, that there had
been so unreasonable and vexatious
delay of payment, on the part
of the defendant, as to entitle the plaintiffs to recover not only the
amount collected by the defendant for their use (after deducting
therefrom
reasonable compensation for his services), but also interest
thereon.
This view of the subject
fully sustained by authority, so far as the
previous demand
right to commence suit without
concerned.
Rich. 133; Richards
Hawley v. Sage, 15 Conn. 52; Estes v. Stokes,
N. H. 541.
v. Killam, 10 Mass. 244; Graves v. Ticknor,
The right to
recovery of interest in such cases as the jury found
the case at bar to be,
expressly given by our statute.
Rev. St. c.
Upon this question of interest. see. also, the case of Pease v.
54,
Caines, 266.”
Barber,
Aﬂirmed.
_
*

*
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68 As to running of statute of limitations in favor of the agent, see Teasley
v, Bradley, 110 Ga.-497, 35 S. E. 782. 78 Am. St. Rep. 113 (1900); Burdick v.
Garrick, L. R.
Ch. App. Gas. 233'. 39 L. J. Ch. 369, 18 W. R. 387 (1870):
Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462 (1869). There must be failure after demand
Only then will the statute begin to run. Auld v. Butcher, 22
to account.
Kan. 400 (1879). So when the agent has been guilty of fraud the statute runs
from thetime the fraud was. or by the use of reasonable diligence might have
been, discovered.
Faust v. Hosford. 119 Town. 97. 93 N. W. 58 (1903); M¢
Pa. 189, 49 Am. Dec. 503 (1848).
Dowell v. Potter,
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BANK OF WHEELING.“

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1851.

17

Pa.

322.)

Action by Bank of Wheeling against Clark & Co. for the amount
a bill of exchange, purchased by the latter, for the former and lost
by reason of an error of Clark & Co. in informing the bank of the
party to whom the bill was sent.
On judgment for plaintiff defend
of

ant brings error.

J.“

LEw1s,
It is an agent’s imperative duty to give his principal
timely notice of every fact or circumstance which may make it nec
essary for him to take measures for his security.
Paley, 38; Devall
v. Burbridge, 4 VVatts_& S. 306.
And if, by his neglect to do this,
the principal has suffered a loss, he is entitled to be indemniﬁed by
In a case of this
the agent. Brown v. Arrott, 6 \Vatts & S. 416.
kind Mr. Justice Kennedy considers it just and reasonable that the
agent “should be held responsible for any loss that has happened,
which possibly might have been avoided, had he only performed his
duty to the principal as his agent.” And where goods or funds are
placed by the agent in the hands of a sub-agent, and the former is
guilty of gross negligence (in withholding information), the same care
ful and considerate judge was of opinion that it “would not be going
too far to hold that the agent, by his conduct, had impliedly agreed
to be answerable for any loss that should arise from the default of
his sub-agent.” Brown v. Arrow, 6 WVatts & S. 421.
these principles be correct in the case of an ordinary agent for
the sale of goods, their application to an agency like the one before
and New
us (for purchasing and remitting drafts on Philadelphia
York, on account of a bank in the interior) is demanded by the true
interests of trade, and the urgent necessities of ﬁnancial credit. And
if a measure of liability so stringent as that just indicated be appro
priate, where there is only a nonfeasance, how just and necessary is
In the use of that
its application to an act of positive malfeasance.
term, as applicable to the conduct of the defendants, we are far from
imputing to them an intention to deceive or otherwise to wrong the
But it was their duty to give information immediately and
plaintiff.
accurately, of the destination of the bill of exchange which had been
purchased with the funds of the plaintiff; and the statement that
it had been sent to E. W. Clark & Co. of Philadelphia (when in fact
it had been forwarded to ]0hn T. Smith & Co. of New York), was
such a misrepresentation of a material fact as fully authorized the
plaintiff to consider the funds still in the hands of the defendants;
or in other words, to hold them liable for all loss occasioned by the

If

“Followed in Moore v. Thompson. 9 Phila. 164, 30 Leg. Int, 4 (1873) in
which the agent was held liable for losses due to the agent's failure to give
the principal notice of attachment proceedings.
65 The statement of facts and part of the opinion are omitted.
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default of John T. Smith & Co. Until the plaintiff was advised of
the remittance of the draft to Smith & Co., the insolvency and de
fault of the latter stood at the risk of the agent, whose gross neglect
and positive misstatement of the facts had deprived the bank of aR
power to protect its own interest. * "‘ *
Judgment affirmed.

SECTION

5.—TO

GIVE NOTICE

MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA
(Supreme

Court~of

Nebraska,

1903.

68

v.

COLMAN.

Neb. 660, 94 N. W. 814.)

AMES, C.“ This cause is resubmitted after the allowance of a mo
tion for rehearing. A statement of the facts will be found in the for
mer decision, published in 64 Neb. 162, 89 N. W. 641. The employ
ment in which the deceased was engaged at the time of his death was
not prohibited by the contract of insurance, but it was stipulated that,
if he should engage therein, he should forfeit his beneﬁciary interest,
unless he should ﬁle with the head clerk of the order a written waiver
of any liability by it for loss by death as a direct result of such occu
He did not ﬁle such a document, but the clerk of the local
pation.
camp, through an assistant, continued to collect the monthly assess
ments or dues, and to remit them to the head clerk, with full knowl
edge of the circumstances, for a period of three months, and until the
death of the insured.
Correctly speaking, the question is not wheth
er the association, by this conduct of its agent, waived a forfeiture, ' but
*
* *
whether it waived the waiver required of theiinsured.
The certiﬁcate held by Colman was not void, but voidable.
It was
optional with him to continue it in force by ﬁling a written waiver, and
it was optional with the association so to continue it without such waiv
er.
He was not delinquent of dues or assessments, or otherwise liable
to suspension. The association acted through its agents, and, being a
It demanded, received,
corporation, it could not act by other means.
and retained his assessments with full knowledge of all the circum
It cannot be supposed that it intended
stances until after his death.
The knowledge of
to take and keep his money without consideration.
its agent, authorized to make the collection, was the knowledge of the
company of all the circumstances under which the payments were
made.
This is not the same as saying that the agent waived the for
It was waived by the association by taking and retaining the
feiture.
money of the insured with notice of all the facts within the knowledge
of its agent. It is the duty of an agent to communicate to his princi
pal all the facts concerning the service in which he is engaged that
60

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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come to his knowledge in,the course of his employment, and this duty,
in a subsequent action between his principal and a third person, he
with exceptions not necessary to be here noted, conclusively presumed
to have performed.
This
the foundation of the doctrine, necessary
to the public safety, that notice to an agent
notice to his principal.
Mechem on Agency, pars. 719, 720; Bradley, ]., in Re Distilled Spir
*
*
its, 11 Wall. 367, 20 L. Ed. 167."
It recommended that the former decision of this court be adhered
to, and the judgment of the district court affirmed.
DUFFIE, C., concurs.
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion,
PER CURIAM.
ordered that the former decision of this court be adhered to, and the
i
judgment of the district court affirmed.

a

67 Accord: Pringle v. Mod. Woodmen of Am., 76 Neb. 384, 107 N. VV. 756.
113 N. W. 231 (1906); The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 367, 20 L. Ed. 167 (1870);
post, p. 753. For the agent to tail to communicate the facts in order to take
advantage for himself is
fraud upon his principaL Snell V. Goodlander, 90
Minn. 533. 97 N. W. 421 (1903).
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SECTION 1.——COMPENSATION

LOCKWOOD

v.

ROBBINS.

(Supreme Court of Judicature of Indiana, 1890.
‘-n

MITCHELL, I.‘ Leon Robbins ﬁled
six months’ work and labor against the
deceased.

*

*

*

The material facts

125

a claim
estate

Ind.

398,

25

N. E. 455.)

for three years and
of Alonzo Lockwood.

in a special verdict were that the
father or other guardian,
plaintiff,
entered the decedent's
service in 1876, and continued therein until
March, 1880, during which time he performed service for the latter
at his instance and request, of the value, after deducting board, cloth
The
ing, washing, and mending furnished by the decedent of $80.
services were not performed under any contract between the plaintiﬁ
and decedent, nor between the latter and any other person authorized
Upon the facts found, the court very
to contract for the plaintiff.
It does not appear that
properly entered judgment for the plaintiﬂ.
the plaintiff was taken into the decedent's family and cared for and
On the contrary, he entered his service
treated as a member thereof.
and performed labor at the decedent's instance and request, and, al
though there was no special contract for remuneration, the law raises
an implied obligation to pay what the services were reasonably worth.
Gerard v. Dill, 96 Ind. 476. Where one is taken into the family of an
other, and is regarded and treated in every respect as a member of the
household, then, even though there may be no ties of blood, there is
no implied obligation to pay for services rendered on the one hand,
nor for board furnished on the other. Brown v. Yaryan, 74 Ind. 305,
and cases cited; Marquess v. La. Baw, 82 Ind. 550; Wright v. Mc—
Larinan, 92 Ind. 103. The present
however, not such a case.”
The judgment
aﬂirmed, with costs.
as returned

1

is

is,

a minor about 12 years old, without

Part of the opinion is omitted.

2

See, also, Weston v. Davis, 24 Me. 374 (1844), and Succession of Krekeler,
La. Ann. 726, 11 South. 35 (1892).
As to compensation of an attorney at law for services volunteered in hope
of future employment, In re Mumt0rd's Estate, 173 Cal. 511, 160 Pac. 667
Gonn.Pn.& A. (20 En.)
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(Supreme
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,

FLOYD.

v.
1857.

29 Pa.

184, 72 Am.

Dec. 620.)

is

is

(1916);

to

a

volunteer

architect

for sketches, Scott v. Maier,

23 N. W. 218, 56 Am. Rep. 402 (1885).
In Martin v. Roberts (C. C.) 36 Fed.
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ARMSTRONG, I.
Nathan Floyd, who was plaintiff below, brought
suit against W. W. Wallace, for three years_and three months’ serv
ices as clerk at Iron City Furnace.
He declared in assumpsit in the
common counts and on a quantum meruit.
The pleas were non as
sumpsit, payment, etc. The cause was arbitrated, and an award ﬁled
in favour of plaintiff for $299.14, from which he appealed, and on a
trial in court obtained a verdict for $650.
The deferrdant, Wallace,
moved for a new trial, and on the 17th of March, 1854, after argu
ment, by consent of counsel, on payment of the amount of the award,
with interest and costs, the verdict was set aside as to the residue of
plaintiif’s claim, and defendant let into a defence as to the value of
plaintifs services.
The cause again came on for trial, and in the course of
the de
fendant, Wallace, alleged and proved
special contract at $300 per an
num. And prayed the court to instruct the jury:
That
the jury believe that the plaintiff engaged to serve the de
fendant at
ﬁxed salary per year, he cannot recover more than the
amount agreed upon.
That
defendant made
ﬁxed sum, and continued
bargain at
till he left without
bound by
special bargain to raise his salary, he
his original contract; the presumption being, that he continued under
the same contract.
To these points the court answered:
“We decline to charge as requested in the foregoing points. \Vhen
was on terms that the defendant might
the verdict was set aside,
the
take defence as to the value of the plaintiif’s services. That
The jury will determine from the whole evidence
sue in this case.
what was the value of the plaintiif’s services.”
very true, ascontcnded for, that courts in granting new trials,
have
right to make terms. The terms usually made are such as re
late to the payment of costs, the compliance with rules of court, or
But
with some stipulation not affecting the merits of the controversy.
contract, or shut
to make terms which would change the nature of
might be an exercise of pow
out the evidence necessary to support
er not calculated in
very high degree to promote the interests of the
new trial
When, however, the terms on which
granted,
parties.
56

Mich.

554,

a

217 (1888), Simonton, J., thus stated
the rule: "In the transactions of commerce time is money. In business there
is no place for sentiment. No services are gratuitous, not expressly declared
compensation is always
‘In the ordinary course of commercial agencies
so.
understood to belong to the agent, in consideration of the duties and respon
"
sibilities which he assumes, and the labor and services which he performs.’
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are spread on the face of the record, their meaning is not to be gath
ered from any latent intention that may have existed, but from the im
It is admitted by the argument of the coun
port of the language used.
sel for the defendant in error, that the points submitted on the part of
Wallace, as abstract propositions, are correct, but it denies their appli
cation to this case.
Helinsists that according to the terms of the or
der granting a new trial, the issue was “as to the value of the plaintiff's
services.”
That the question was not how ‘much Wallace agreed to
give, or Floyd proposed to take, but simply how much the services
were worth independent of the contract.
And the error of the court
was in thinking with the claimant’s counsel. The terms of the order
did not restrict or prescribe the mode or kind of proof by which the
value of the services was to be ascertained. I know of no standard of
value that could be more satisfactory than that which the parties ﬁx
for themselves; and where there is a special contract, ﬁxing the terms
and conditions on which one party shall serve another, in the absence
If tenant holds
of proof rescinding or altering
conclusive.
over without notice to quit, or new contract, the terms and conditions
of his old lease will govern. So,
man agree to serve another for
a month or year, at
stipulated sum per month or year, and silently
continues longer in the service,
will be on the old terms.‘ If there
was
was the duty of Floyd to give notice
special contract existing,
to his employer
he wished to alter or enlarge its terms; and
would
then have been incumbent on Wallace to accede to the demand or ter
minate the service. The court said in answer to the defendant’s offer,
as to the value of plaintiﬁ"s services, and not as to the
“The inquiry
contract price; and, so far as the evidence may tend to show their
From this the jury might very readily suppose
value,
admitted.”
that the “contract price” was excluded, and that
was only the other
evidence in the cause from which they could ﬁx the value. If no con
But
tract was proved, this might be correct.
there was
special
would control;
alleged, not changed or rescinded,
agreement, as
with other evidence to enhance the value.
was error to mingle
and
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.

I.

8

$MeCormick & Bro. v. Bush, 47 Tex. 191 (1877); Hamilton v. Frothing
ham, 59 Mich. 253, 26 N. W. 486 (1886).
Usage and custom cannot prevail
Bower v. Jones,
against the stipulations of the agency contract.
Bing. 65,
21 E. C. L. 447 (1831); Ayllon v. Archbishop of Manila, 40 P.
23 (1919).
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COLLINS, J.‘ On the pleadings and a stipulation entered into be
tween the parties judgment was ordered in favor of defendant in this
action, and this appeal is from an order denying plaintiff's motion for
a new trial.
The facts appearing from the pleadings and stipulation
are that in January, 1898, defendant was the owner of all of the stock
shares of a newspaper corporation, which shares were and are of the
At that time plaintiff and defendant entered
par value of $100 each.
into a verbal agreement, by the terms of which the former was to forth
with be elected president and general manager of said corporation for
the full term of three years, and for said period of time was to have
full power and authority to manage, transact, and carry on the busi
As com
ness of the corporation in the publication of its newspaper.
pensation for his services, plaintiff was to be paid by defendant $200
per week; $100 thereof in cash, payable weekly, and $100 thereof in
stock shares of said corporation at the aforesaid par value, also payable
weekly. The plaintiff was, as agreed upon, elected president and gen
eral manager of the corporation, and at once entered upon'the per
formance of his duties, and continued to perform them, until he was
He was paid the money
discharged by defendant in March, 1899.
This bal
compensation as agreed upon, except the sum of $128.52;
ance defendant refused to pay, and he also refused to turn over or
transfer to plaintiff any part of the stock shares. This action was
brought upon the contract for the purpose of recovering the alleged
damages, namely, the amount of money which he would have earned
if he had rendered services for three years, less the sum paid him,
and the par value in money of the stock shares which he would have
been entitled to.
_
Counsel for both parties concede that the agreement, wholly resting
in parol, and according to its terms not to be performed within one
year, was within the provisions of the statute of frauds (Gen. St. 1894,
§ 4209), and that an action to enforce it cannot be maintained. They
differ as to what remedy is available to plaintiff, who has not been
paid in full for his services if the agreed value of such services is to
control; counsel for defendant contending that in the present form of
action he is not entitled to recover at all. It is further contended by
defendant’s counsel that the agreement for compensation in stock
shares was in fact one for the sale of chattels of the value of more
than $50, and therefore void under the provisions of section 4210, no
requirement of that section having been complied with, and the court
below seems to have been of that opinion.
1. Taking the facts as alleged in the complaint and as stipulated for
4'1'he

concurring

opinion of Lewis,

J'., is! omitted.
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of this motion, we regard the plaintiffs right to recover
for services actually performed at the rate ﬁxed by the oral agreement,
he not being in fault for failure to complete the term of three years,
as settled and disposed of by former decisions of this court, and they
the purposes

is

a

a

is

if

is

3.

is

is

it,

seem to be in accord with decisions in England and in the states, where
agreements within the statute are simply declared nonenforceable, not
absolutely void. It was held in Manufacturing Co. v. La Du, 36 Minn.
473, 31 N.
938, when considering a like nonenforceable agreement,
that, while such a contract could not be enforced by action, it was not
void, “and, in so far as it had been voluntarily executed, the terms
thereof might be referred to and considered in determining the measure
of compensation which ought justly to be allowed to the defendant.”
And in Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 43 N. W. 484, it was said that
“an oral agreement for services, not to be performed within one year,
is not wholly void, though no action can be maintained on it. It will
control the rights of the parties with respect to what they have done
under it.”
The same rule has been followed in cases where parties
have entered into possession and occupied premises under parol leases
for terms exceeding one year, which by Gen. St. 1894, § 4215, are de-.
clared absolutely void.
Evans v. Lumber Co., 30 Minn. S15, 16 N.
W. 404; Finch v. Moore, 50 Minn. 116, 52 N. VV. 384; Steele v. As
sociation, 57 Minn. 18, 58 N. W. 685. The doctrine adopted by these
decisions is undoubtedly that, while no action can be maintained on
an oral agreement for services not to be performed within one year,
such agreement controls the rights and remedies of the parties with
respect to what has been done, and ﬁxes the value of services rendered
under
when the person rendering such services
discharged after
part performance, without fault on his part. We are compelled to ad
based
mit that the reasoning on which the doctrine
not satisfac
tory, and has often been criticized as illogical, because, although the
statute denounces such agreements and deprives them of all legal va
lidity, the doctrine itself validates them to some extent, andmeasures
some of the rights o-f the parties by them.
[Omitting a question as to payment in stock shares.]
The parol agreement, in itself and as such, was and
nonem
If plaintiff had declined to enter upon the
forceable under the statute.
defend
performance of his duties as manager of the corporation, or
ant had refused to allow him to render any services, no action whatever
Both would have been
could have been maintained by either party.
limited to
remediless. So plaintitf’s right
recovery for services ac
He cannot recover
tually rendered up to the time of his discharge.
anything by way of damages for his loss of employment thereafter.
new trial granted.‘
Judgrnent reversed, and
_

&

1

1

5See Shumate v. Farlow, 125 Ind. 359, 25 N. E. 432 (1890), in which an
oral agreement was made on November 10 to work for defendant for nine
next. Defendant refused to provide plaintiff with any
months from March
Aid. 722 (1818), Lord Ellenborough
work.
In Bracegirdle v. Ileald, Barn.
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MARSTON, C.
We have been unable to discover any error in
this case. The conversation that took place between Brace and one of
the plaintiffs was clearly admissible in evidence.
was the commence
ment and
part of the conversation or negotiations which led to the
employment of the defendant in error.
had
tendency to show that
a ﬁxed amount, was to be paid, and was admissible in any view of the
case.
On the other hand the defendants below denied that any sum
was agreed upon, but that they were to pay him what they thought he
was worth to them.
This could not mean that they could, after the
services had been performed, ﬁx the compensation at such sum as they
pleased. Parties may make such an agreement, but we think this lan
If no agreement as to com
guage does not warrant any such view.
pensation was made, then the law would imply that they should pay
what his services werereasonably worth,‘ and the court so instructed
the jury. There was no error
the court permitting the jury to take
to their room the computation made by the plaintiff’s attorney.
was
but an aid to the jury in estimating the amount due the plaintiff,
they found his theory of the case to be correct. They were in no way
bound by
and they could not consider
as evidence or be misled
paper was but in accord
thereby. To permit the jury to take such
ance with long, well settled practice, and was unobjectionable.
The judgment must be afﬁrmed with costs.
.
The other Justices concurred.
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contract for
year-’s
refused to extend the time one minute, but in England
service is not within the statute of frauds it the period is to begin next day
Ashanti Explorers,
after the agreement is made. Smith v. Gold Coast
Ltd., [1903]
K. B. 285, 538. As to employment for two years, subject to six
K. B. 1056,
months’ notice by either party, see Hanan v. Ehrlich, [1911]
Ann. Cas. 1912B. 730.
[1912] A. C. 39, 106 L. T. (N, S.)'
As to the amount of recovery for services performed under such an oral
agreement see Galvin v. Prentice, 45 N. Y. 162,
Am. Rep. 58 (1871).
Contra:
Spinney v. Hill, supra.
_
promise. however, is implied only when there is no express agree
Such
ment as to the amount of the compensation. Weston v. Davis, 24 Me. 374
210 (1904).
(1811); Co-Tiangeo v. To-Jamco,
P.
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DOWNER.

(Supreme Court of Vermont,

1849.

21 Vt. 419.)

Book account for services by plaintiff as attorney for defendant in
sundry suits. Defendant claimed plaintiﬁ’s charges were unreason
ably high.
POLAND, J.‘ * * * From the report of the auditors in this case
we think it is apparent, that they allowed the p1aintiﬁ”s charges, as
they were presented before them, solely upon the ground, that they
were charged according to his usual and customary rule of charging
for his professional services, without reference‘ to their being reason
able, or that they had been acquiesced in or assented to by the defend
This, then, presents the question, as to what should be the rule
ant.
of compensation for the services of an attorney, who is employed by a
client to manage a suit, without any special agreement as to the amount
of his charges for such service.
In England, and in some,of the neighboring states, such questions
cannot well arise, because the bills of‘attorneys for services for their
clients are always settled by a taxation, to be made by a master, or
prothonotary, of the court; and, in actions to recover for their serv
But in this state we have
ices, the amount is ﬁxed by such taxation.
no such practice; and attorneys are ‘left, in common with every other
class of citizens, who bring suits to recover the price of their labor, to
commence their suits and have not only their right but amount of re
covery determined by a jury, or by auditors, according to their choice
of actions. What rule, then, should govern the triers, in ﬁxing the
amount of damages to be awarded to a plaintiﬁ in such a case? In all
other cases of employment, or hiring, where no stipulation is made as
to price, the law implies a promise, or agreement, on the part of the
employer, to pay the person employed such sum, as his services are rea
sonably worth, or as he reasonably deserves to have; and'on the pur
chase of goods, without express stipulation as to price, the purchaser
is only bound to pay what the goods are reasonably worth.
'
We are not able to ﬁnd any reason, or authority, to distinguish the
rule in relation to the employment of lawyers from that which obtains
in every other employment for service. It must of course be more dif
ﬁcult, often,_to determine what the sum should be, for service, the
value of which depends much upon professional skill and learning,
than in the case of mere mechanical or physical labor; but after.all
we think the same principles must govern both, and that in this case
the auditors should have examined the plaintiiT’s charges, and allowed
him what he reasonably deserved, with a proper reference to the na
ture of the business performed by him for the defendant, and his own
'1Part

of the opinion ls omitted.
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standing in his profession for learning and skillfulness, whereby the
value of -his services was enhanced to_the defendant.
For the purpose of aiding in the deterrnination of the value of the
plaintitf’s services, we think it was proper for the auditors to receive
evidence of the usual prices charged and received for similar services
to those rendered by the plaintiff for the defendant by other men of
the same profession with the plaintiff, in the same vicinity, and in the
same courts; and that the evidence offered by the defendant for that
purpose, and which was rejected by the auditors, should have been re
ceived. Suchlevidence could not, from the nature of the case, furnish
an exact and certain rule to determine the amount of the plaintiff's
charges; as other cases, precisely like those of the defendant, might
not be frequent, and other attorneys of precisely equal professional
reputation and skill with the plaintiff might not be found in the vicin
ity ; but we think such evidence would afford an approximation to the
true rule to govern the plaintiff's charges. In all ordinary cases, in de
termining the value of services, evidence is received of what is com
monly and usually charged by other persons for the like services; and
in determining the value of goods, evidence is received of what sim
ilar articles are bought and sold for, in order to ascertain their value in
market; 5 and in our opinion the price of a lawyer's professional labor
must be ascertained and determined by the same rule. It would be
wholly unjust, to require a person employing a lawyer to manage a
suit, (where of course it could not be known to either party, how long
it would continue in court, or the amount of professional labor, which
would be required to carry it through,) to stipulate as to the amount of
his charges. or else be compelled to pay such charges, as the lawyer
* * *
should see ﬁt to make against him.
case
recommitted.
Iudgment reversed and

HARRISON
(Circuit Court 01" Ohio,

First Circuit,

v.

GOTLEIB.

19548.

Dec. 109.)

3 Ohio

Cir. Ct.

191,

2 Ohio

Cir.

C. I.’ * * * The action was brought by Gotleib against
Harrison to recover what he claimed was the value of services ren
dered by him in effecting a lease by Harrison of certain real estate .to
Isaac Failer Sons; and his employment was denied by Harrison, or
that any services were rendered for which the latter was liable to pay.
It is conceded that the evidence tends to show this state of facts,
there being no great controversy as to any one point.
Gotleib was
SMITH,

8Too_my v, Dunphy, 86 Cal. 639, 25 Pac. 130 (1890).
9 Pnrt of the opinion is omitted.
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not a real estate broker, and had never been engaged in that busi
He was on intimate terms with Isaac Failer Sons, a ﬁrm doing
business at the foot of Main street, and made his headquarters at
their store.
He knew of their desire to purchase or lease property
for their business higher up in the city, and on a casual walk with
some of the members of the ﬁrm, he noticed a piece of property on
Vine street, owned by Mr. Harrison. After this, apparently of his_
own motion, he sought the acquaintance of Mr. Harrison (they being
strangers to each other), and spoke to him of this property, and told
him he had friends who were looking for a location, and that this
might suit them. Harrison asked who they were, and on being told,_
said: “Bring your friends to see me.” No price for the property was
spoken of, and no terms as to rental or purchase.
Gotleib does not claim that anything else of a material character
took place at that time, or that he told Harrison that he was a broker,
or that he would expect any commission or compensation if an ar
rangement was entered into between the parties, or that anything
else was said or done to advise Harrison thereof, or to show that he
had any idea that he (Gotleib) expected compensation.
Gotleib told Failer Sons what he had done, and they called upon
Harrison, and their negotiations resulted after some time, in ‘the erec
tion by the latter of a storehouse upon this lot, and a lease of it to
them for several years at a large rent. Gotleib, so far as Harrison
knew, had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations, and nothing
further passed between them on the subject till, as Gotleib says, just
before the completion of the arrangement (Harrison says after it), he
notiﬁed the latter that he would expect pay. Gotleib seems to have
encouraged Failer Sons to make the lease, but was not employed by
them to aid in the matter, and received no compensation therefor
from them.
There being no claim of an express employment of'Gotleib, was
there an implied contract that he was to be paid for his services by
ness.

Harrison?

‘

is,

Blackstone, in vol. 2, 443, says: “Implied contracts are such as rea
.son and justice dictate, and which therefore the law presumes that
every man undertakes to perform ;” and the questionwhether a lia
bility is incurred by one person to compensate another for services ren
dered to him, in the absence of an express contract,
in a multitude
of cases, to be determined solely by the acts of the parties themselves,
their relations to each other, and the peculiar circumstances which
surrounded them at the time. For there can be no question, but that
person may render valuable services to another, with his knowl
edge and consent, and yet no obligation to pay .therefor will arise, for
the reason that neither of the parties intended
or
the person ren
dering the service did intend to make
charge therefor, yet the cir
person of ordinary judgment
cumstances may have been such that
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a
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be made, and the party

a charge would

the service did not, in fact, so believe.

.

cited and relied upon by the defendant in error,
we think, sustain this doctrine.
The case of Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. S13, 20 Am. Rep. 347, is one,
the syllabus of which is this: “In an action to recover the value of
one—half of a party wall erected by plaintiff, partly on his estate, and
partly on that of the defendant, the jury may, in the absence of an
express agreement as to payment on the defendant’s part, infer a
promise to pay, if the plaintiﬂ‘ undertook-and completed the wall with
the expectation that the defendant would pay him for
and the
defendant had reason to know, that the plaintiff was so acting with
that expectation, and allowed him so to act without objection.”
And
said, “that
in the decision
to
be
the
a
law,
that
conceded
promise to pay for the party wall, would not be inferred from the
fact (alone) that the plaintiﬂ‘, with the defendant's knowledge, built
and that the defendant used it.”
And in Wald’s Pollock on. Contracts, page
the law
stated con
“If A., with B.’s knowledge, but without any express
cisely thus:
rule expect to be paid
request, does work for B. such as people as
for,
B. accepts the work or its result, and
there are no special
circumstances to show that A. meant to do the work for nothing,
or that B. honestly believed that such was his intention, there
no
worth.
difficulty in inferring a promise by B. to pay what A.’s labor
And this
pure inference of fact, the question being, whether B.’s
conduct has been such that
reasonable man in A.’s position would
understand from
that A. meant to treat the work as
done to
his express order.
The doing of the work with B.’s knowledge,
the proposal of
contract, and B.’s conduct
the acceptance.”
Ac
was
cepting this as the law, the question
given substantially to the
jury by the court?
An examination of the charge of the court leads us to the conclu
was not. While in one part of
sion that
there
statement that
the services were rendered by Gotleib voluntarily,
as
matter of
accommodation, or
matter of kindness, to any person, or for Failer
Sons, he could not recover, yet no stress
laid upon this, and in sev
eral places where the court seems to recapitulate, and to give the law
which
to govern the jury, in substance
charged that all that
was necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover, was that service should
have been rendered to Harrison, and that he had the beneﬁt of
and knew that the service was rendered for him. All this might have
been so, and Harrison not be liable at all.
There are cases occurring
continually, where one person renders valuable service for another,
and the latter knows
and avails himself of
and yet
not bound
to pay for it.
the services are such as people ordinarily expect
to be paid for, and there are no special circumstances to show that
‘
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they were not in a particular instance, a promise to pay may fairly
be inferred.
But we think, that under the circumstances disclosed in this case,
where there was so little evidence on which a jury could properly ﬁnd
that services had been rendered by Gotleib to Harrison, the former in
tending to charge, and the latter to pay therefor, or to show a state
of fact that would give rise to such a presumption, or that the service
was really rendered for Harrison’s beneﬁt and not for the beneﬁt of
his own friends, that the defendant was entitled, on proper request
therefor, to have the rule with the proper limitations which we have
tried to state, given to the jury. This was attempted by the counsel
for the defendant, but~it was, as appears by the bill of exceptions,
by asking a series of charges to be given as a whole, and it contained
the statement that to entitle the plaintiff to a recovery he should have
shown that he was a real estate broker, and that Harrison knew it.
This was not good law—for others than professional brokers may, in

a

it,

proper cases, be entitled to compensation for services rendered in
In strict
matters of this kind, and that without an express contract.
ness, therefore, the court was justiﬁed in refusing to give the charge
as a whole, though the other parts of it may have been entirely sound.
But we think the statement of the law as given by the court to the
jury, was, under the circumstances shown, misleading and erroneous,
in making the right’ of Gotleib to recover, to depend alone upon the
question whether he rendered the services for Harrison and that the
latter knew it. They should further have been instructed, that if the
service rendered by Gotleib, was such as people usually charge for (in
this case a question of fact and not of law) and there was nothing dis
closed which would show that Gotleib had not the intention of charg
or that Harrison might well believe that he was not to
ing for
promise on the
pay for such service, that they might properly infer
part of Harrison to pay.“ This was not done, and for this reason we
think the judgment should be reversed.

ELSEE
(Court

of King's Bench,

1793.

v.

GATWARD.
5

O

Term B.

143,

101 Eng.

Repr.

82.)

the case.
The ﬁrst count in the declaration
that the plaintiffs on the 29th of August 1791 were about to
warehouse &c. and to rebuild and repair certain parts of a
build
dwelling house and stables &c. and were desirous of having the ware
house completely tiled and covered in, and the front of the dwelling
house rebuilt, on or before the ﬁrst of November then next, and also
of having the bricklayers’ and carpenters’ works of the warehouse

This was an action upon

1°

Accord: McLfney v. Gomprecht,

7

a

stated

Misc. Rep. 169. 27 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1894).
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completely ﬁnished on or before the ﬁrst of December, and the whole
of the remaining repairs ﬁnished on or before the 25th December
then next, and thereupon the plaintiffs on the 29th of August 1791 at
the special instance and request of the defendant, who was a builder,
and had full notice of -the premises, retained and employed the de
fendant to do and perform all and singular the bricklayers’ and|car
penters’ works which should be requisite on the occasion aforesaid
within the several times herein before mentioned for the completion
thereof respectively; and although the defendant afterwards accepted
of such retainer and employment upon the terms aforesaid, and could
and ought to have completed all such bricklayers’ and carpenters’
works within the said respective times, yet the defendant contriving to
injure the plaintiffs &c. did not, nor would, completely tile or otherwise
cover in the said warehouse &c. on or before the said ﬁrst of Novem
ber, nor did nor would ﬁnish the bricklayers’ and carpenters’ works
of the warehouse on or before the said lst day of December, and the
whole of the remaining repairs on or before the said 25th of December
&c. but on the contrary permitted the said warehouse to continue un
tiled and uncovered &c. in consequence of which said neglect of the de
fendant the walls of the said premises were greatly sapped and rotted,
and the ceilings damaged and spoiled, and the plaintiffs were obliged to
continue tenants of another warehouse and stables &c. and were there
The second count stated that the
by put to additional expence &c.
plaintiffs on the 29th of August 1791 being possessed of divers old
materials of buildings, retained and employed the defendant at his
instance and request to do and perform certain bricklayers’ and car
penters’ works upon divers buildings and premises of them the plain
tiffs, and to use and apply in and about those works all such parts of
the old materials as were ﬁt and proper for that purpose, and that
although divers parts of the said old materials were ﬁt and proper to
have been used and applied in and about the said works, yet the de
fendant, contriving to injure the plaintiffs in this behalf, and to en
hance the expence of the bricklayers’ and carpenters’ works, did not
nor would use and apply in and about the saidworks such parts of
the old materials as were ﬁt &c. but refused so to do, and wrongfully
and injuriously used and applied in and about the same works other
new and expensive materials in the stead of such old materials as were
ﬁt and proper for the same purposes; whereby the plaintiffs were put
to an unnecessary expence &c. and the old materials became wholly
There was a-third count in trover for the old materials.
useless &c.
The defendant demurred to the two ﬁrst counts; alleging for causes
that, notwithstanding the whole of the supposed causes of _action in
those counts were in the nature of a nonfeazance, and consisted in the
of certain matters and things in those counts men
non-performance
been
omitted to be (lone by the defendant, it was not
as
tioned
having
stated in either of those counts, nor did it thereby appear that the de
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fendant by any promise, undertaking, contract or agreement was bound
to the performance of those several matters or things &c. That, al
though the several supposed causes of action in those counts were
founded upon implied contracts in law, no sufﬁcient ground or consid
That
eration to raise or support such implied contracts was stated.
was
there
that
those
counts
in
was
not
nor
did
it
stated,
there
appear,
which
the
defendant,
or
of
the
contract
on
the
part
upon
promise
any
breaches in those counts could operate. And that those counts did not
contain any cause of action against the defendant &c. The parties
went to trial, when a verdict was given for the defendant on the count
in trover, and conditional damages assessed for the plaintiffs on the
two counts demurred to.
_
Loan KENYON, C. ]. If this had been an action of assumpsit, it
it would
could not have been supported for want of a consideration;
have been nudum pactum. And if both the counts be not good, the
Now I do not think that the ﬁrst
defendant is entitled to judgment.
count in the declaration is good in law. It states that the defendant,
who is a carpenter; was retained by the plaintiffs to build and to re
pair certain houses; but it is not stated that he was to receive any
consideration, or that he entered upon his work. No consideration re
sults from his situation as a carpenter, nor from the undertaking;
nor
is he bound to perform all the work that is tendered to him; and there
fore the amount of this
that the defendant has merely told a false
hood, and has not performed his promise; but for his non-performance
of
no action can be supported.
This
warranted by Lord Holt’s
opinion in Coggs v. Bernard,
Ld. Raym. 919, where recognizing the
case in 11 H.
33, he said—-“There the action was brought against a
carpenter, for that he had undertaken to build the plaintiff a house with
time, and had not done
in such
and
was adjudged the action
think
would not lie.” And on this opinion
may safely rely, especial
as the justice of the case will not be altered by the form of the ac
tion; for
case, there
no technical
assumpsit will not lie in such
tort. In that case
reasoning that will support such an action as for
Powell,
said—“An action will not lie for not doing the thing for want
the bailee will take the goods into
of a sufﬁcientconsideration;
but
his‘ custody, he shall be answerable for them; for the taking of the
his own act.” Lord Holt there put several
goods into his custody
cases to establish this position, which will reconcile the cases now cited
In Brown v. Dixon,
T. R. 274, the de
on the part of the plaintiffs.
the
dog into his possession. This case
fendant had received
very.
distinguishable from those of common carriers and porters, from whose
situations certain duties result; they are bound by law to carry goods
recompence; but no such
delivered to them, and are by law entitled to
not bound, as
carpenter; he
duty results from the situation of
brought to him.
such, to perform all the work that
appears to me,
therefore, that the ﬁrst count cannot be supported, there being no con
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sideration expressly stated, nor any consideration resulting from the
defendant's employment as a carpenter;
though, had the~ defendant
performed the work, he might have recovered a satisfaction on a quan
tum meruit.
Upon the authority of Coggs v. Bernard, and the cases
there noticed, not contradicted by any other decision,’ I think that the
ﬁrst count for nonfeazance is bad, but that the second count may be
It is there stated that the defendant entered upon his em
supported.
ployment, and that he did not do that which he ought to have perform
ed according to his retainer. In that count it is stated that he under
took to use the old materials, that in fact he did not use those, but sub
stituted new ones in their stead, thereby enhancing the expence to the
plaintiffs. This comes within the case mentioned by Lord Holt in
Coggs v. Bernard, speaking of the same case in the year-books, “but
there the question is put to the Court, what if he had built the house
unskillfully; and it was agreed in that case an action would have lain :”
for though the defendant could not have been compelled to build this
house, and to use the old materials, yet having entered upon the con
tract, he was bound to perform it; and not having performed it in the
manner proposed, an action lies against him.“

TIMBERLAKE
(Supreme

Court of Mississippi,

v.

THAYER.

Miss. 279, 14 South. 446, 24

1893.

L. R. A.

2321)

"Attachment against Vandiver and Trotter, makers, and Timber
lake, indorser, of a promissory note.
Case dismissed by plaintiff as
to Vandiver and Trotter. Defendant claimed release by reason of a
contract that plaintiff was to accept services from Vandiver in pay
ment of the note.
The trial court instructed the jury that if Vandiver
made an entire contract for services, but abandoned the service with
out the fault or consent of Thayer before the expiration of a year,
then Vandiver was entitled to nothing for the service actually ren
dered. From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
COOPER, J.“ If we were authorized to make the law, instead of
announcing it as it is already made, we would unhesitatingly hold
that one contracting to render personal service to another for a speci
ﬁed time could, upon breach of the contract by himself, recover from
that other for the value of the service rendered by him, and received
by that other, subject to a diminution of his demand to the extent
of the damage ﬂowing from his breach of contract. In Britton v.
Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713, Judge Parker demonstrates,
in an admirable and powerful opinion, the equity of such a rule; and
The opinions of Ashhurst and Grose.
1: Part of the opinion is omitted.
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it was held in that case that such was the rule of the common 1a\v.
The courts of some of the states have followed or been inﬂuenced by
that opinion, and have overturned or mitigated the rigorous rule of
the common law. Pixler v. Nichols, 8 Iowa, 106, 74 Am. Dec. 298;
Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79, 58 Am. Dec. 618; Riggs v. Horde, 25 Tex.
Supp. 456, 78 Am. Dec. 584; Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98; Par
But
cell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209, 7 N. W. 529, 38 Am. Rep. 366.
Lawson, Cont.
the decided "weight of authority is to the contrary.“
13 Accord: Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 13 Am. Dec. 425 (1824), a leading
case for the prevailing rule; Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528 (1837); Miller v.
Goddard, 34 Me. 102. 56 Am. Dec. 638 (1852); Nelichka v. Esterly, 29 Minn.
The rule has been vigorously assailed, especially
146, 12 N. W. 457 (1882),
in the leading case of Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834).
In approving this case, Cobb, .. in Parcell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209, 7 N. W.
529. 38 Am. Rep. 366 (1881) says:
“There is an important question presented in this case, one upon which it
cannot be claimed that the authorities, either as expressed in the opinions of
courts or the treatises of text writers, are agreed. Until the last ﬁfty years it
was quite generally held to be the law both in England and in America, that
where a person, having agreed to work for another for a deﬁnite period of
time, voluntarily leaves such service without any fault on the part of the em
ployer, and without his consent, before the expiration of the term, he cannot
The rea
recover in any form of action for the services actually rendered.
soning upon which the decisions holding this view were generally sustained
is well expressed by Morton, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in Olm
‘The plaintiﬁ cannot
stead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528, in the following language:
recover on his express contract, because he has not executed it on his part,
He cannot re
and the performance is a condition precedent to the payment.
cover on a quantum merult for the labor performed, because an express con
tract always excludes an implied one in relation to the same matter.’
“But in the case of Brltton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713, de
cided in 1834, a marked departure was taken from the former line of deci
In that case, one quite parallel to the case at bar, it was held that
sions.
‘where a contract is made of such a character a party actually receives labor
or materials, and thereby derives a beneﬁt and advantage over and above the
damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other par
ty, the labor actually done. and the value received, furnish a new considera
tion, and the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the rea
sonable worth of such excess.’ And again: ‘In fact we think the technical
reasoning, that the performance of the whole labor is a condition precedent,
and the right to recover anything dependent upon it, that the contract being
entire there can be no apportionment,
and there being an express contract,
no other can be implied, even upon the subsequent performance of service. is
not properly applicable to this species of contract, where a beneﬁcial serv~
ice has been actually performed;
for we have abundant reason to believe
that the general understanding of the community is that the hired laborer
shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually performed, though
he do not continue the entire term contracted for, and such contracts must be
presumed to be made with reference to that understanding, unless an express
stipulation shows the contrary.
Where a beneﬁcial service has been perform
ed and received, therefore. llllder contracts
of this kind, the mutual agree
ments cannot be considered as going to the whole of the consideration.
so
as to make them mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other, without
a speciﬁc proviso to that eﬁ‘ect.' ”
Allen v. McKlbben, 5 Mich. 449 (1858); Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan.

J
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No recovery can be had if the contract of employment expressly stipulates
forfeiture for wrongful abandonment by the agent. Harmon v. Salmon
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Carr. § 470, note 4, and authorities there cited» And it was decided
at an early day in this state that an entire contract of this character
could not be apportioned, and that, under the circumstances named, no
recovery could be had by the party guilty of the breach of contract;
that he could not recover on the special contract, because he himself
had not performed
nor upon
quantum meruit, because of the ex
istence of the special contract. Wooten v. Read,
Smedes
M. 585.
In Hariston v. Sale, Smedes
M. 634, and Robinson v. Sanders, 24
Miss. 391,
was held that an 0verseer’s contract with his employer,
deﬁnite time, was not an entire contract, and re
though made for
coveries were allowed on the common counts. The cases relied on to
support the rule announced in these decisions were Byrd v. Boyd,
McCord, 246, 17 Am. Dec. 740; Eaken v. Harrison,
McCord, 249:
McCord, 26. Of these the leading case
McClure v. Pyatt,
Byrd
v. Boyd; the others simply follow it. In Byrd v. Boyd'the court evi
dently legislates the exception into the law, and so, in effect, declared;

it
is

a

it
is

for, after referring to the rule of the common law, the court proceeds
to say, “There is, however,
third class of cases for which
nec
essary to provide,” and then declares that these cases for which
necessary for the court “to provide” are “those where the employer
reaps the full beneﬁt of the services which have been rendered, but
some circumstance occurs which renders his discharging the overseer
necessary and justiﬁable; and that, perhaps, not immediately connected
with the contract, as in the present case.”
Iudgment reversed for an error in the instructions below.

I

Fails Mfg.
26

Mich. 90

If

Co.. 35 Me. 447, 58 Am. Dec. 718 (1853);
(1872).

‘

Richardson v. Wochler,

his undertaking he will not be entitled to commis
his principal afterwards contracts with the third party.
Scovilie v.
Trustees of Schools. 65 Ill. 523 (1872): Warren v. Rendrock Powdcr'Co., 56
N. Y. Supp. 842'(1890). On the other hand. if the contract pro
Hun. 849,
the agent may recover the installments
vides for payment in installments,
already earned. notwithstanding his refusal to complete the service. Taylnr
v. Laird,
H.
N. 266; Cunningham v. Morrell, 10 Johns. 203.
Am. Dec.
And by the better rule, if the agent have
332 (1813).
suiiicient excuse for
sickness,
complete
the service. as
failure to
he can recover what his services
are worth to the principal, deducting any damages sustained by the termina
Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197. 75 Am. Dec. 388 (1859);
tion of the relation.
Patrick v. Putnam, 27 Vt. 759 (1855); Patterson v. Gage, 23 Vt. 558, 56 Am.
A mere temporary absence, particularly for cause. may not
Dec. 96 (1851).
amount to an abandonment.
Thrift v. Payne, 71 Ill. 408 (1874). The death
of the agent before the completion of the services is regarded as an act of
is fair to assume, as an implied term of the contract, the par
God which
ties intended should excuse nonperformance.
The contract is broken and
recovery may be had in quantum meruit not in excess_ot the contract price.
for the work performed, subject to deductions for any damage the princi
pal suffered because the agent was unable to complete the service. Clark v.
Gilbert. 26 N. Y. 279, 8-i Am. Dec. 189 (1863); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197.
an aaent abandons
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75 Am. 'Dec. 388 (1859).
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KELLOGG.“

(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Fourth District,
636, 94 S. W. 389.)

1906.

42

Tex.

Civ.

App.

He tele
Hahl sold 1,000 acres of land for Kellogg at $29,500.
graphed, “Sold your land twenty-two thousand to you." Kellogg un
derstood this to mean $22,000, plus the agent’s commission of $1,000,
VV hen he learned the true price he sued Hahl for $7,500.
and accepted.
NEILL, ].“ * * * It is hardly necessary to state the law ap
It has been known and
plicable to the facts disclosed by this record.
the
It is written in the
all
throughout
mankind
ages.
recognized by
Ten Commandments, on the Twelve Tables, in the laws of every
Nor is it necessary to state
nation, and in the heart of every man.
that the relation of principal and agent is ﬁduciary, requiring the
most perfect loyalty and the utmost good faith, the strictest integrity,
Per
and the fairest dealing on the part of the agent to his principal.
ry on Trusts, § 206; Bigel. on Fraud, 295; Kerr on Fraud, 152, 182;
Therefore,
\/Vhart. Ag. 244, Z45; Mech. Ag. §§ 465, 469, 470, 643.
from the principles of law and equity applicable to the facts in this
case, it follows that the court did not err, as is urged in plaintiff in
error’s assignments, in rendering judgment in favor of plaintiff against
Hahl for $6,500.
This disposes of the assignments of error of the
plaintiff in.error.
.By defendant in error’s cross-assignments

&

9

§§

§

is

it,
is

it is contended that the
court erred in not rendering judgment in his favor of $7,500, for the
reason that Hahl, as an agent, was guilty of such fraud, gross mis
conduct, and bad faith to his principal as to deprive him of the right
to compensation for his services. Upon the question presented by this
assignment, the trial judge expressed doubt, not as to the facts, but
as to the law, upon which he deemed the authorities conﬂicting and
The rule upon this
resolved the doubt in favor of the defendant.
that, where an agent
question, as we understand
guilty of such
misconduct as amounts to treachery, or has wholly failed to recognize
the duties and responsibilities imposed upon him by his situation, he
Mechem on Agency,
should receive no compensation whatever.
333, 334; Brannan v. Strauss, 75 Ill. 234;
619; Story on Agency,
Kan. 320;
Myers v. VValker, 31 Ill. 354; Sumner v. Reicheniker,
St. L. R. Co. v. Pattison, 15 Ind. 70; Vennum v. Greg
Cleveland

Accord: Humphrey v. Eddy Transp. Co., 107 Mich. 163. 65 N. W, 13
For gross negligence or misconduct the agent may not merely lose
his commissions but be liable to his principal for damages sustained thereby,
or for interest on money in the agent's hands and not reported to the princi
pal. Sidway v. Am. Mtg. Co., 222 Ill. 270, 78 N. E. 561 (1906), affirming 119
Ill. App. 502 (1905); Porter v. Silvers, 35 Ind. 295 (1871); Schleifenbaum v.
Illegal agencies, see ante,
81 Conn. 623, 71 Atl. 899 (1909).
14

(1895).

16 Part

.

4
,

Rund'j)ag1en,
pp.

of the opinion is omitted.
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ory, 21 Iowa, 328; Sea v. Carpenter, 16 Ohio, 412; Libhart v. Wood,
1 \Vatts & S. 265, 37 Am. Dec. 461;
Segar v. Parrish, 20 Grat. 672;
Neilson v. Bowman, 29 Grat. 732; Jackson v. Pleasanton, 101 Va.
282, 43 S. E. 574; Iansen v. Williams, 36 Neb. 869, 55 N. W. 279,
20 L. R. A. 207; Peterson v. Mayer, 46 Minn. 468, 49 N. W. 245,
13 L. R. A. 72; Lahr v. Kraemer, 91 Minn. 26, 97 N. W. 419.
“To
this extent,” says Mechem on Agency, “the law is well settled." And,
after an extensive examination of the authorities, the writer has been
unable to ﬁnd or recall an exception to the principle as stated.
\Vherefore, we conclude that the defendant was not, under the facts
in this case, entitled to retain $1,000 as commission for the sale; and
that the judgment should have been for that sum in addition to the
$6,500. Therefore, the judgment will be amended by adding that sum
to the amount rendered by the trial court, thus making the judgment
in favor of plaintiff against the defendant Hahl $7,500, and as so
amended the judgment is aﬁirmed.

i_.,_,
IAMES

v.

PARSONS, RICH

(Supreme Court of Kansas,

1904.

70

Kan.

& CO.
156, 78 Pac. 438.)

Plaintiff in error, james, on March 11, 1901, was
by the defendants in error Parsons, Rich 8: Co., to work for
them as a traveling salesman until the 1st day of October of the same
year at a monthly salary of $85 ; the same to be due and payable on the
He did so work until the 3d day of
1st day of each calendar month.
May, 1901, when, without adequate cause or excuse, he was discharged
from his employment by the defendants. Estimated at the rate he was
to receive by the terms of the contract, he had earned up to this time
$53.66, but this sum included the balance due up to the 1st of May, and
the amount earned during the ﬁrst three days of May, but not as yet
due. On the 4th day of May the plaintiff commenced his action in the
district court of Saline county to recover of the defendants upon two
causes of 'action—the ﬁrst for the $53.66 salary, and the second for
$425, the amount of the salary that would be due him under the con
tract for the ﬁve months from May lst to October 1st, and also for the
further sum of $1,000, the amount which he alleged he had been damag
ed because of the ‘plaintiff's breach of the contract in discharging him.
A demurrer to the second cause of action was sustained, and that cause
of action was dismissed by the plaintiff without prejudice. judgment
was rendered upon the ﬁrst cause of action for the amount prayed for,
$53.66, which judgment was subsequently satisﬁed in full by the de
This action. was commenced before a justice of the peace
fendants.
of Cloud county on August 26, 1902, to recover under the contract
the salary due to the plaintiff for the ﬁve months from May 1, to Oc
tober 1, 1901, less $140, which he alleged he had been able to earn dur
CUNNINGHAM,

engaged
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ing that time in other employment. As a defense the defendants plead
proceedings and recovery had in the Saline county dis
trict court, and claimed that those proceedings and that recovery was a
bar to recovery in this action. The district court so held, and adjudged
This ruling is assigned as
the plaintiff to pay the costs of his action.
error here.
It involves the consideration of the rights of one hired for a deﬁnite
time at a deﬁnite wage or salary, and discharged from service without
The authorities
adequate excuse before the expiration of such period.
are quite uniform as to the rules which govern in such a case. The
discharged servant has the o‘ption of two remedies: First, He may
take the employer at his word, treat the contract as terminated, and sue
as upon quantum meruit for the‘ value of all services rendered, regard
less of whether the same is due by the terms of the contract or not, and
regardless of the amount he was to receive under the terms of the con
tract. This is permitted upon the theory that there is no contract, both
parties having elected to rescind it. Second. The discharged servant
may stand upon the terms of his contract, and insist upon his rights
thereunder. Those rights are that he recover all wages due by its terms,
and as they become due, and also such damages as he may be able to
show have or will result to him from its breach. Both of these ele
ments of damage are based upon the contract.
VVood’s Law of Master
8: Servant, 244; 20 Am. & En. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.)
36; Keedy v.
Long,
L. R. A. 759, note, and cases cited. He cannot, however, have
both of these remedies, either simultaneously or by successive actions.
barred from pursuing the other.
Having elected to pursue either, he
quite evident he cannot at one time claim relief on the theory of no
Now, how was
contract, and at another claim under the contract.
here? In the Saline county action the plaintiff, while ostensibly count-_
ing upon the contract, and in both causes of action seeking to recover
under its terms and for its breach, was really in the ﬁrst cause of ac
tion seeking to recover not only the wages for April, which were due
and recoverable under the contract, but those for the three days in
May, which were not due under the contract, and which were recovera
ble only on the theory that there was no contract
that
he was seek
ing to recover and did recover for those three days upon 9, quantum
meruit, and not under the terms of the contract. This was an election
on his part that he would treat the defendants upon their own ground,
no contract existed; and, having so elected, he could not
and as
thereafter shift his ground, and pursue them upon the theory of an
existing contract, as he attempted to do in the case subsequently brought
in Cloud county. He
bound by his ﬁrst election. The principle must
apply with the same certainty when the value of but three days’ work
was recovered for, the same as though
much longer time was involved,
The plaintiff here insists that the Saline county action was brought
upon the contract, and involved only wages due under the terms of
the contract, and therefore, having dismissed that cause of action, which
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claimed for wages for the balance of the time after May lst, under the
terms of the contract he could subsequently maintain an action for such
wages. This would be true if his assum'ption rthat his ﬁrst cause of ac
tion was entirely for wages then due was correct, but it is not. His ac
tion in Saline county for wages due for the three days in May was not
under the contract, for by the contract such wages were not due, and
could not have been recovered, until the lst day of June. His recov
He probably re
ery for these three days was upon quantum meruit.
covered for those days only the amount that would have become clue
him under the contract, but, he recovered it before it was due.
He
might have recovered more if he had shown that his services were worth
more, as he was suing and recovering, not under the contract, but on the
Again, we doubt the right of the plaintiff
theory of quantum meruit.
to recover in this action, even upon his own theory that the Saline coun
ty action was based upon the contract, for in that case he recovered a
portion of the May wages. In this case he is seeking to recover the
balance of the May wages; that is he is splitting up his cause of action.
This would not be pemutted.“
The judgment of the district court will be aﬂirmed. All the Justices
Concurring.

CUTTER
(Supreme Judicial

v.

GILLETTE.

Court of Massachusetts,

1895.

163 Mass. 95, 39 N.

E.

1010.)

Action by one Cutter against one Gillette to recover damages for
breach of contract. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Ex
ceptions overruled.
Defendant agreed to employ plaintiff for a ~term of ﬁve years, but
discharged him after three months of service. At the trial in the su
perior court before Robert R. Bishop, ]., it appeared that plaintiﬂ‘ sold
his carriage manufacturing business to defendant, and, after being dis
charged, undertook to carry on the business of carriage repairing on
his own account, but was unable to do so. On cross-examination plain
tiff was asked if he was able to get credit to carry on the business, the
defendant’s counsel stating that he put the question for the purpose
of showing that plaintiffs personal reputation was such that he could
not get credit. The question was excluded, and defendant excepted.
BARKER, ]. The evidence offered and excluded upon the cross
16 As to the right or the agent to compensation when he is discharged, see
Glover v. Henderson, 120 M0. 367, 25 S. W. 175, 41 Am. St. Rep. 695 (1894);
Sheahan v. National S. S. Co., 87 Eed. 167. 30 C. C. A. 593, ante, p. 196.
Accord: Royal Remedy C0. v. Gregory Grocer Co., 90 Mo. App. 53 (1901);
Strong v. West. 110 Ga. 382, 35 S. E. 693 (1900).
Cf. Milligan v. Owen. 123 Iowa, 285, 98 N. W. 792 (1904) in which the prin
cipal gave the agent no deﬁnite assurance for the continuance of the agency
The burden of showing that the agency was revoked before the expiration
Hollingsworth v. Young Coun
of a reasonable time rests on the defendant.
ty, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 590, 91 S. W. 1094 (1905).
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examination of the plaintiff was, in effect, that his personal reputation
as to credit among dealers was so poor that he could not get credit to
carry on the business in ‘which he attempted to work after his wrong
ful discharge from the defendant’s service. Assuining that the de
fendant was entitled to show that the plaintiff might have earned
more money than he did between the time of his discharge and the time
of trial, evidence of the plaintiffs poor reputation for credit among
dealers did not tend to show that he could have succeeded in the busi
ness, and it was rightly excluded/as
it might have had a tendency to
If it did not have that effect,
prejudice the jury against the plaintiff.
its only tendency would seem to be to enhance the plaintiffs damages.
VVe do not see how the defendant was harmed by the exclusion of the
evidence.
The exception to the refusal to instruct the jury to the effect that if
the plaintiff, after his discharge, began to do business on his own ac
count, he could not recover damages relating to the period of time after
he so entered into business, was waived at the argument.
The remaining question is whether or not the jury should have been
allowed to assess damages for the period of time subsequent to the trial.
The plaintiff was hired for ﬁve years from April 25, 1892, and was
He brought suit on No
discharged about the middle of July, 1892.
vember 10, 1892, and the verdict was rendered on March 14, 1894.
The verdict assessed at the sum of $3,180.95 the plaintiff's whole dam
ages for breach of the contract for hiringjand stated that of the amount
The defendant con
was the damage to the time of trial.
$1,392.95
cedes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for an entire
breach, so far as such damages can be ascertained, but contends that, as
the trial occurred before the expiration of the contract period, it was
impossible for the jury’ to ascertain or assess the damage for the unex
pired portion of the contract period subsequent to the time of trial.
In support of this contention the defendant cites the cases of Coleburn
v. VVoodworth, 31 Barb. 381 ; Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Litchen
stien v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 12 S. W. 975; and Gordon v. Brewster,
7 \'Vis. 355—in which cases it seems to have been held that, if the suit
is begun before the expiration of the contract period, damages can only
He asserts that in the case of How
be allowed to the time of the trial.
ard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, in which full damages were given, the writ
was brought after the expiration of the contract period. On the other
hand, it has been held in Vermont that, if there has been such a breach
as to authorize the plaintiff to treat it as entirely putting an end to the
contract, he may recover damages for an entire nonfulﬁllment, and is
not limited to what he has actually sustained at the time of his bringing
suit or the time of trial. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582. And in Maine,
in an action for breach of a contract for hiring, brought before the ex
piration of the contra-ct ‘period, it was held that the just recompense for
the actual injury sustained by the illegal discharge was the stipulated
wages, less whatever sum the plaintiff actually earned, or might have
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earned by the use of reasonable diligence. Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me.
64.
See King v.
Such would seem to be the rule in Pennsylvania.
Steiren, 44 Pa. St, 99; Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. St. 168. And
the defendant concedes that such is the rule in England.
\Ve do not go into an exhaustive consideration of the decisions upon
the question, as we consider it to have been settled in favor of the rul
ing given at the trial, by our decisions. Paige v. Barrett, 151 Mass. 67,
23 N. E. 725; Blair v. Laﬂen, 127 Mass. 522; Dennis v. Maxwell, 10
Allen, 138; ljewett v. Brooks, 134 Mass. 505. See, also, Parker v.
Russell, 133 Mass. 74; Amos v. Oakley, 131 Mass. 413; Warner v.
Bacon, 8 Gray, 397, 408; Drummond v. Crane, 159 Mass. 577, S81,
35 N. E. 90.
The plaintiFf’s cause of action accrued when he was
wrongfully discharged. His suit is not for wages, but for damages for
the breach of his contract by the defendant.
For this breach he can
have but one action. In estimating his damages the jury have the right
to consider the wages which he would have earned under the contract,
the probability whether his life and that of the defendant would con
tinue to the end of the contract period, whether the plaintiﬁ’s working
ability would continue, and any other uncertainties growing out of the
terms of the contract, as well as the likelihood that the plaintiff would
be able to earn money in other work during the time.
But it is not the
law that damages, which may be larger or smaller because of such un
certainties, are not recoverable. The same kind of diﬁiculty is encoun
tered in the assessment of damages for personal injuries.
All the
elements which bear upon the matters involved in the prognostication
are to be considered by the jury, and from the evidence in each case
they are to form an opinion upon which all can agree, and to which, un
The liability
less it is set aside by the court, the parties must submit.
to have the damages which he inﬂicts by breaking his contract so as
sessed is one which the defendant must be taken to have understood
when he wrongfully discharged the plaintiff, and, if he did not wish to
be subjected to
he should have kept his agreement.
Exceptions overruled.

McMULLAN

v.

DICKINSON CO.

1895.
60 Minn. 156, 62 N. W.
-109, 51 Am. St. Rep. 511.)

(Supreme Court of Minnesota,

120. 27

L. R. A.

it

a

].

CANTY,
On the 25th of February, 1892, the plaintiff entered into
written agreement with the defendant corporation, whereby
agreed
to employ him as its assistant manager, from and after that date, as
long as he should own in his own name 50 shares of the capital stock
of said corporation, fully paid up, and the business of said corporation
shall be continued, not exceeding the term of the existence of said cor
poration, and pay him for such services the sum of $1,500 per annum,
payable monthly during that time, and whereby he agreed to perform

\
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said services during that time. He has ever since owned, as provided,
of said stock, and performed said services ever since that
time until the 28th of October, 1893, when he was discharged and dis
missed by the defendant without cause.
He alleges these facts in his
complaint in this action, and also alleges that he has been ever since he
was so dismissed, and is now, ready and willing to perform said serv
ices as so agreed upon, and that there is now due him the sum of $125
for each of the months of March and April, 1894, and prays judgment
for the sum of $250. The defendant in its answer, for a second de
fense, alleges that on March 2, 1894, plaintiff commenced a similar ac
tion to this for the recovery of the sum of $512, for the period of time
from his said discharge to the lst of March, 1894, alleging the same
facts and the same breach, and that on April 16, 1894, he recovered
judgment in that action against this defendant for that sum and costs,
the 50 shares

and this is pleaded in bar of the present action. The plaintiff demurred
to this defense, and from an order sustaining the demurrer the de
fendant appeals.
The plaintiff brought each action for installments of wages claimed
to be due, on the theory of constructive service. The doctrine of con
structive service was ﬁrst laid down by Lord Ellenborough in Gandell
v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375, and this case was followed in England and
this country for a long time (VVood, Mast. & Serv. 254), and is still
upheld by several courts (Isaacs v. Davies, 68 Ga. 169; Armﬁeld v.
Nash, 31 Miss. 361 ; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8).
It has been repudiated by the courts of England (Goodman v. Pocock,
15 Adol. & E. [N. S.] 574; VVood, Mast. 8: Serv. 254), and by many of
the courts in this country (Id.; and notes to Decamp v. Hewitt, 11
Rob. [La.] 290, 43 Am. Dec. 204), as unsound and inconsistent with
itself. as it assumes that the discharged servant has since his discharge
remained ready, willing, and able to perform the services for which
he was hired, while sound principles require him to seek employment
elsewhere, and thereby mitigate the damages caused by his discharge.
His remedy is for damages for breach of the contract, and not for
wages for its perf0rmance.- But the courts, which deny his right to re
cover wages as for constructive service, have denied him any remedy
except one for damages, which, if seemingly more logical in theory, is
most absurd in its practical results. These courts give him no remedy
except the one which is given for the recovery of loss of proﬁts,for
the breach-of other contracts, and hold that the contract is entire,
even though the wages are payable in installments, and that he ex
hausts his remedy by an action for a part of such damages, no matter
how long the contract would have run if it had not been broken.
See
James v. Allen Co., 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N. E. 246, 58 Am. Rep. 821;
Moody v. Lcverich, 4 Daly, 401; Colburn v. VVoodworth, 31 Barb.
381; Booge v. Railroad Co., 33 Mo. 212, 82 Am. Dec. 160.
No one action to recover all the damages for such a breach of such
a contract can furnish any adequate remedy, or do anything like sub
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stantial justice between the parties. By its charter the life of this cor
poration is thirty years. If the action is commenced immediately aft
er the breach, how can prospective damages be assessed for this thirty
years, or for even one year? To presume that the discharged servant
will not be able for a large part of that time to obtain other employ
ment, and award him large damages, might be grossly unjust to the
defendant.
Again, the servant is entitled to actual indemnity, not to
such speculative indemnity as must necessarily be given by awarding
him prospective damages. His contract was not a speculative one, and
the law should not make it such.
That men can and do ﬁnd employ
ment is the general rule, and enforced idleness the exception.
It
should not be presumed in advance that the exception will occur.
This is not in conﬂict with the rule that, in‘ an action for retrospective
damages for such a breach, the burden is on the defendant to show
that the discharged servant could have found employment.
In that
case, as in others, reasonable diligence will be presumed.
\Vhen it ap
pears that he has not found employment or been employed, there is no
presumption that it was his fault, and, under such circumstances, it
will be presumed that the exceptional has happened. But to presume
that the exceptional will happen is very different.
In an action for
such a breach of a contract for services, prospective damages beyond
the day of trial are too contingent and uncertain, and cannot be as
2 Suth. Dam. 471; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Vi/is. 355; Fowler
sessed.
& Proutt v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Wright v. Falkner, 37 Ala. 274;
'
Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 385.
Then. if the discharged servant can have but one action, it is neces
sary for him to starve and wait as long as possible before commencing
it. If he waits longer than six years after the breach, the statute of
limitations will have run, and he will lose his whole claim.
If he
brings his action within the six years, he will lose his claim for the
balance of the time after the day of trial. Under this rule, the measure
of damages for the breach of a 30 year contract is no greater than for
the breach of a 6 or 7 year contract.
Such a remedy is a travesty on
Although the servant has stipulated for a weekly, monthly,
justice.
or quarterly income, it assumes that he can live for years without any
income, after which time he will cease to live or need income. The fal
lacy lies in assuming that, on the breach of the contract, loss of wages
is analogous to loss of proﬁts, and that the same rule of damages ap
plies, while in fact the cases are wholly dissimilar, and there is scarcely
a parallel between them.
In the one case the liability is absolute: in
the other it is contingent.
If the rule of damages were the same, then.
in the case of the breach of the contract for service, the discharged
servant should be allowed only the amount which the stipulated wages
exceed the market value of the service to be performed, without regard
to whether he could obtain other employment or not. lf the stipulated
wages did not exceed the market value of the service, he would be en
titled to only nominal damages; and in no case could his failure to
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ﬁnd other employmentvary the measure of damages. Clearly, this is
not the rule. In the one case the liability is a contingent liability for
loss of wages; in the other case it is an absolute liability for loss of
Such contingent liability cannot be ascertained in advance of
proﬁts.
the happening of the contingency, and that is why prospective damages
for loss of wages are too contingent and are too speculative and un
certain to be allowed, while retrospective damages for such loss are of
the most certain character. iOn the other hand, if damages for loss of
proﬁts are too speculative and uncertain to be allowed, they are equal
ly so, whether prospective or retrospective. “The pecuniary advantages
which would have been realized but for the defendant’s act must
be ascertained without the aid which their actual existence would
afford.
The plaintiff's right to recover for such a loss depends on his
proving with suﬂicient certainty that such advantages would have re
sulted, and, therefore, that the act complained of prevented them.”
1
'
Suth. Dam. (lst Ed.) 107.
It is our opinion that the servant wrongfully discharged is entitled to
indemnity for loss of wages, and for the full measure of this indemnity
the master is clearly liable.
This liability accrues by installments on,
successive contingencies. ‘Each contingency consists in the failure of
the servant without his fault to earn, during the installment period
named in the contract, the amount of wages which he would have
earned if the contract had been performed, and the master is liable for
This rule of damages is not consistent with the doc
the deﬁciency.
trine of constructive service, but it is the rule which has usually been
Under that doc
applied by the courts which adopted that doctrine.
trine the master should be held liable to the discharged servant for
wages as if earned, while in fact he is held only for indemnity for loss
of wages. The ﬁction of constructive service is false and illogical, but
the measure of damages given under that ﬁction is correct and logi
cal." It is simply a case of a wrong reason given for a correct rule.
Instead of rejecting the false reason and retaining the correct rule,
many courts have rejected both the rule and the reason. In our opin
ion, this rule of damages should be retained; but the true ground on
which it is based is not that of constructive service, but the liability of
the master to indemnify the discharged servant, not to pay him wages,
and this indemnity accrues by installments.
The original breach is not
17 Accord:
Smith v. Cashie & Chowan R. & L. Co., 142 N. C. 26, 54 S. E. 788,
L. R. A. (N. S.) 439 (1906).
The injustice of the rulc generally followed, and the inconsistency of the
doctrine of constructive service as set forth in the principal case. are generally
recognized.
Nevertheless the weight of authority is against any recognition
of constructive service, even as a measure of damages. See the full discus
sions in Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. 501, 22 L. R. A. 74, 44 Am.
St. Rep. 273 (1893); Howard .v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285 (1875),
and especially in James v. Allen County, 44 Ohio St. 226. 6 N. E. 246. 58 Am.
Rea 821 (1887)- See. also, extended note in 51 Am. st. Rep. 515; Derosia v.
Ferland. 83 Vt. 374, 76 Atl. 153, 28 L R. A. (N. S.) 577, 138 Am. St. Rep.
5
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total, but the failure to pay the successive installments constitutes suc
cessive breaches.
Since the days of Lord Ellenborough this class of
cases has been in some courts an exception to the rule that there can
be but one action for damages for the breach of a contract, and there
are strong reasons why it should be an exception.
Because the dis
charged servant may, if he so elects, bring successive actions for the
installments of indemnity as they accrue, it does not follow that he
cannot elect to consider the breach total, and bring one action for all
his damages, and recover all of the same accruing up to the time of
trial.
Fowler & Proutt v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Strauss v. Meertief,
64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8.
But the wrongdoer can have no such
election.
He should not be allowed to take advantage of his own
wrong, and, for the purpose of preventing the use of any adequate
remedy and defeating any adequate recovery, to insist that his own
breach is total.
The order appealed from should be affirmed. So ordered.

-GILLETT
(Supreme

J."

v.

Court of Kansas,

CORUM.
1871.

7

Kan.

156.)

here on error from the district court
This
county, this being its second visit to this tribunal.
On the ﬁrst trial in the court below, judgment was
5 Kan. 608.
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, (defendant in error here,) which
was by this court reversed for error in the instructions.
On a sec
ond trial, the plaintiff again obtained judgment, which judgment is
now sought to be reversed, also on account of alleged errors in the
instructions.
The action was brought to recover for "services alleged
to have been performed by Corum. as the agent of Gillett, in the sale
of a tract of land. These facts appear from the testimony without
controversy:
(1) That plaintiff at one time was authorized by defend
ant to act as his agent in selling the land, and promised compensation
if he accomplished a sale; (2) that he had some negotiations with a
man named Dunlap, concerning the sale of said land during the con
tinuance of such authority; (3) that said Dunlap afterwards purchased
from defendant, personally, said land, at a price not less than that for
which plaintiff was authorized to sell; and (4) that intermediate the
ﬁrst suggestion by plaintiff to Dunlap of a sale of this land, and the
ﬁnal consummation of the sale by defendant, Dunlap was absent in
the southern part of the state, for a few days, looking at land there.
There is a dispute in the testimony as to whether plaintiff's authority as
agent was revoked prior to the sale; whether negotiations between
plaintiff and ‘Dunlap were broken off, and negotiations afterwards
BREWER,
of Leavenworth

18 Part

case comes

of the opinion is omitted.
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commenced anew between Dunlap and defendant directly; and also
as to what part, if any, plaintiff had in furthering the sale after Dun
lap’s return.
1. \Vith this statement of the case let us examine the alleged er
rors.
Our attention is called to three: First, the court refused to
give the eighth instruction asked by defendant, which reads as fol
lows: “If Corum was authorized by Gillett to sell the land or ﬁnd
a purchaser at a certain price, and Dunlap had not, at or before the
time he went south, proposed to take the land at that price, or at a
price which was afterwards accepted, and such a proposal was not
pending when he went south, and if before his return, or before ne
gotiations were renewed, Corum’s authority had been revoked or had
expired, and Dunlap afterwards went directly to Gillett and made a
bargain and purchased the land from him, Corum is not entitled to
recover."
_
The court had just given, at the instance of the defendant, these
'
two instructions:
“(6) If there was no proposition pending between Corum and Dun
lap when Dunlap went south, ‘and if. before Dunlap returned Gillett
revoked the authority of Corum to sell, or such authority had expired,
and if afterwards Dunlap negotiated with Gillett himself and pur
chased the land from him, Corum is not entitled to recover.
“(7) Unless Corum, while his authority continued unrevoked or
unexpired, had effected a bargain or sale, or had found a purchaser
in a condition and ready and willing to take the land on the terms
upon which Gillett had authorized Corum to sell, he, Corum, cannot
recover.”
These two instructions gave the law to the jury in as favorable
light for the defendant as he could ask; and in so far as the eighth
instruction restates what is said in the sixth and seventh, it is open
to this objection, that the court is not hound to repeat what it has
once said.
It restates the law given in the sixth and seventh, but it
narrows the essential statement so far as to render it justly objec
It reads: “If Dunlap had not proposed.” \Vould not a
tionable.
proposition from Corum and an acceptance by Dunlap have been suf
This instruction in effect tells the jury that unless Dunlap
ﬁcient?
proposed to buy before Corum’s authority was revoked, the latter
It excludes everything but a proposition ‘from
could recover nothing.
\’Ve think the court had fully stated the law, and properly
Dunlap.
refused the eighth instruction.
,
2. The court instructed the jury as follows:
“lf the plaintiff was
agent of the defendant, as he claims, and in pursuance of the author
ity given him found a purchaser of the premises, and put the pur
chaser and defendant in communication with reference to the land,
and negotiations were thereby set on foot between them which led
to a bargain and sale of the premises. the defendant could not, by
taking the negotiations out of the hands of the plaintiﬂ, and complet
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ing the sale in person, defeat the plaintiff's right to compensation."
If the law were not as stated, the
\\-'e fail to see any error in this.
An
occupation of a real estate agent would be precarious indeed.
He looks around and ﬁnds a
agent is employed to sell real estate.
purchaser, one who is able and ready and willing to buy. He brings
the parties together and starts negotiations which result in a sale.
Can the principal after this discharge the agent, consummate the sale
himself, and refuse the agent compensation?
VVe think not.
That.
He ﬁnds one.
which the agent is employed for, is to ﬁnd a purchaser.
The principal gets the beneﬁt of his labor and must pay for it. Hed
Law, 334: Ludlow v. Carmzin, 2 Hilt. 107,
den v. Shepherd, 29 N.
The case cited by counsel for plaintiff in error (McGavock v. Wood
lief, 20 How. 221, 15 L. Ed. 884) is not in" point. There the agent
had brought a supposed purchaser to his principal; the terms named
had been accepted; a contract reciting those terms signed. But, when
they came to the execution of the deeds and the payment of the con
sideration, the supposed purchaser was unable to pay, and the at-'
The agent found a party who was willing
tempted sale fell through.
to buy, but not able nor ready. He therefore found no purchaser, and
* * *
was entitled to no conimission.“
Judgment

for plaintiff

afﬁi-med.

iii

ATTRILL
(Court

of Appeals

v.

PATTERSON.

of Maryland,

1881.

58 Md.

226.)

Attrill owned a controlling interest in the Crescent City Gas Light
Company of New Orleans, and desired to make some arrangement to
buy the works of the old Company, the New Orleans Gas Light Com
pany. He offered Patterson $50,000 if hewould go to New Orleans
and effect some compromise of the conﬂicting claims of the two com
panies. The efforts _failed and Patterson advised suit. Attrill ﬁnally
brought suit and was completely successful, in consequence of which
he was able to amalgamate the new with the old company on favorable
19 Accord: Warren Chemical & Mfg. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N.
E. 908. 16 Am. St. Rep. 788 (1890); Grogan v. Smith, 7 T. L. R. 132, 2 Eng.
The third party must be willing to contract on the
Rul. Cas. 533 (1890).
speciﬁed terms or the agent has not earned his commissions.
Alta Investment
See, also La Force v. Wash
Co. v. Worden. 25 Colo. 215, 53 Pac. 1047 (1898).
ington University, 106 M0. App. 517, 81 S. W. 209 (190-1), in which the agency
was for a deﬁnite period and the agent sought commissions for a sale made
As to commissions after discharge. see Merriman v.
after its expiration.
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co., 96 Wis. 600. 71 N. W. 1050 (1897); as to
those earned. but not due, see Dihhle v. Dimick. 143 N. Y. 5-19. 38 N. E. 724
(1894), afiirming 4 Misc. Rep. 190. 23 N. Y. Supp. 680 (1893): Singer Mfg. Co.
v. Brewer. 78 Ark. 202, 93 S. W. 755 (1906); Wheeler 8: Wilson Mfg. Co. v.
Gallivan, 10 Neb. 313, 4 N. W. 1061 (1880).
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terms. Patterson demanded his $50,000, but was refused and brought
suit. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
* * * It may be laid down, as a general rule, that
IRVING,
an agent’s authority to act for a principal, is always revocable at the
will of the principal; and may at any time be put an end to by with
drawing the authority; unless the authority be coupled with an in
terest; or has been conferred on the agent for a valuable compensa
tion moving from him to the principal.
1 Parsons on Contracts, 69;
\Vharton on Agency, 95, and notes; Story on Agency, §§ 463 and 464;
Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589; Simpson v. Lamb,
84 E. C. L., 603; Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266; Hartley’s
Appeal, 53 Pa. 212, 91 Am. Dec. 207; Creager v. Link, 7 Md. 259.
Vl/hat constitutes an authority coupled with an interest, the decisions
withoutexception, are agreed about. In Hunt v. Rousmanier already
cited, Chief Justice Marshall says, it “is an interest in the thing itself
on which the power is to be exercised, and not an interest in that which
is to be produced by the exercise of the power.”
In Blackstone v. But
termore, 53 Pa. 266, the same rule is laid down in almost the same
terms, and that is now the doctrine of all the text books.
There is a class of cases, where, if the agent has done something
in virtue of his authority, and incurred expense before the agency
is ,revoked, he will be entitled to be reimbursed.
For example, if the
negotiations of a broker employed to sell property be broken off by
the principal, after he has gone to trouble and expense in the matter,
he will be entitled to recover for what he has done, on a quantum
meruit.
Story on Agency, § 329; \Vharton on Agency, § 322. This
case having been assimilated to the case of a broker to sell real or per
sonal estate, or negotiate a loan, it is necessary to lay down the general
rule applying to such agents.
The rule is, that the broker is not enti
tled to his commissions till the work, is complete; but, if after the
sale is virtually effected, the principal takes the matter into hisown
hands, and revokes the agency, he cannot escape the payment of com
missions. In such cases, and there are many of them in the books, the
broker is regarded as having earned his commission or compensation,
by being the procuring cause of the transactionbeing consummated.
Ewell’s Evans on Agency, § 453; Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42. In
Keener v. Harrod & Brooke, 2 Md. 71, 56 Am. Dec. 706, judge Tuck,
speaking for this court, expounds the principle controlling such cases
thus: “VVe understand the rule to be this, (in the absence of evidence
of usage,) that the mere fact of the agent having introduced the pur
chaser to the seller, or disclosed the names by which they came togeth
er to treat, will not entitle to compensation; but, if it appears that such
introduction or disclosure was the foundation on which the negotiation
was begun, conducted, and the sale made, the parties cannot afterward,
by agreement between themselves, withdraw the matter from the agent's

J.”

20
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hands, so as to deprive the agent of his commissions.” *1 This case, and
all others are in harmony with
establishes the rule that the agent
must be the procuring cause of the transaction, whatever
being
consummated. It
matter of proof. The fact that the agent brought
the parties together, might raise
the transaction was
presumption,
consummated in
short time thereafter, that he was the procuring
cause; but that could be rebutted, as was done in Earp v. Cummins,
S4 Pa. 396, 93 Am. Dec. 718, where the purchaser (who the court
said,
anybody knew, must know) testified he “was not inﬂuenced at
all in making the purchase, by the agent.” There, the negotiations,
which were ﬁrst begun, because of some publications by the agent, who
sued for commissions, were broken off.
Several months afterwards,
other pa-rties, the purchaser was induced to renew
by the inﬂuence
the treaty, and bought the property.
The court of ﬁnal resort said the
plaintiff was improperly allowed to recover commissions, and judg
ment was reversed.
Applying these principles to the case in hand, we cannot see how
Patterson can be regarded as having contributed, in any proper legal
can hardly
sense, to the production of the result ﬁnally attained.
of
terms
was
the
dictation
to
conquered
compromise.
betermed
or captured foe. But Patterson insists that, because he advised the
suit, he
entitled to his compensation; for the “compromise,” effect
ed at the termination of the suit, “was
good one.” The institution
of the suit did not bring the compromise. Had the bare institution of
suit brought the compromise, Patterson’s claim would be better found
ed.
It was, however, nothing less than the judgment of the court of
last resort, after tedious and costly litigation that rendered the old
An essential condition,
company helpless, that brought consolidation.
He did
then, in the original contract, was not fulﬁlled by the agent
not procure the compromise.
All the parties best able to speak on the subject, as in Earp v. Cum
about; and they were not
mins, say he did nothing towards bringing
The
inﬂuenced, in the slightest degree, by anything he had done.
original contract, as we have said, did not give Patterson unlimited
powers, to settle the matter by any means whatever, including costly
litigation, so that he should be entitled to his contingent fee, no matter
Reversed.
how the result was brought about.” '

a

21 Vining v. Lippincott (Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 758 (1916), in which some terms
of the contract were slightly modiﬁed by the principal.
It is enough however it the agent procure customers able and willing to
perform, even though the principal cannot. or does not, contract with such
customer. Kelly v. Phelps, 57 Wis, 425, 15 N. W. 385 (1883).
22 Accord: Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441
(1881); Kelly v. Marshall. 172 Pa. 396, 33 Atl. 690 (1896); and Lumley V.
Nicholson, 34 Wkly. Rep. 716 (1886), in which the principal actually did after
ward contract with parties introduced to him by the agent.
customer for his principal does not
The fact that an agent has procured
Gilbert v. Quinlan, 59 Hun,
mortgage the business of such customer forever.
N. Y. Supp. 671 (1891); Curtis v. Nixon, 24 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 706
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et al.

of New York, Appellate Division, 1906.
101 N. Y. Supp. 984.)

116

App.

Div.

490,

Trial Term, New York County.
Action -by William Sigmon, against Julius Goldstone and others.
From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
HOUGHTON, I. The plaintiff entered into an agreement in writing
Appeal from

with the defendants, who are copartners, to serve them in the capacity
of designer, pattern cutter, and foreman for the term of 21 months at
a stipulated weekly salary.
The plaintiff continued in the employ of
the defendantsfor a little over l2 months, when, as he claims, the de
fendants wrongfully discharged him. He brings this action for dam
The defense is breach of the contract
ages for such breach of hiring.
on the part of plaintiff, and that he voluntarily quit defendants’ service.
The record discloses that for some weeks prior to the alleged discharge
considerable friction existed between the plaintiff and the defendants,
and, instead of permitting him to do the work for which he was hired,
they compelled him to sit during working hours in a dark room unem
ployed. This the plaintiff protested against, and consulted a lawyer,
who waited upon the defendants at their place of business, and he
and the plaintiff had an interview with one of the partners with respect
The plaintiff testiﬁes that at the
to such alleged improper treatment.
close of this interview such partner told both himself and the lawyer
to get out of defendants’ place of business. Thereupon the lawy'er told
plaintiff to come with him and both departed. On the same day plain
tiff, through his attorney, by letter, notiﬁed the defendants that he ten
dered his services according to the contract. No offer to take the plain
tiff back was made. The attorney who represented the plaintiff at the
interview with defendants was sworn as a witness, and the learned
trial court seems to have been led into the granting of a motion for
nonsuit because the attorney would not swear positively that the com
mand to get out of defendants’ place of business was addressed specif
The attorney did testify _that the command “to
ically to the plaintiff.
The
get out of here” was addressed to both himself and the plaintiff.
plaintiff, however, testiﬁed that the language was “both of you get
out.” In view of the testimony of the. plaintiff that the defendants had
endeavored to induce him to abandon his contract for a small money
consideration, and the friction that existed, and the apparent anger
on the part of defendants that the plaintiff had consulted an attorney,
we think it was clearly a question for the jury to say whether the com
mand to get out of defendants’ place of business was addressed to the
.
plaintiff as well as to his attorney.
No precise words are necessary to constitute a discharge.
Anv
language by which an employé is notiﬁed that his services'are no long
er required is sufficient to operate as such. Arnold v. Adams, 27 App.

1
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Martin, 29 App. Div. 418, 51
N. Y. 328, 48 N. E. 512.

154

Whether the defendants did, or meant to, discharge plaintiff, or wheth
er their language and conduct was such as to reasonably lead plaintiff
to believe that he was discharged, was for the jury to determine from
all the facts and circumstances.
By the contract in question the de
fendants retained in their hands $5 per week of plaintiff’s wages as a
There’ had been an
guaranty of faithful performance on his part.
adjustment of this deposit, but at the time of the alleged discharge
there remained in the hands of the defendants the sum of $70. Even
if the plaintiff was not in fact discharged, as the record now appears,
he would be entitled to recover this sum which he seeks by the second
cause of action alleged in his complaint.
A servant may abandon his
service because of a breach of any of the express or implied provisions
of his contract without liability for damages, as where the master as
saults him or refuses to pay his wages as agreed, or requires him to
perform services not contemplated by his contract of hiring, or does
any act, or is guilty of any negligence prejudicial to the morals, reason
able comfort, safety, health, or reputation of the servant, which is in
violation of the provisions of the contract of hiring, express or implied.
Wood, Law of Master & Servant (Zd Ed.) § 148. The contract be
tween plaintiff and defendants was that he should serve in the capaci
ty of designer and cutter and foreman of defendants’ manufacturing
establishment at a salary comparatively large. In order thereafter to
command this salary or a higher one, plaintiff must continue to be
skillful and to enjoy a reputation for skill. It was one of the implied
covenants of plaintiff's contract that he should be permitted to labor
in the manner speciﬁed. It was a breach of this covenant for the de
fendants, without cause, to prohibit the plaintiff from doing any work
and to shut him up in a dark room doing nothing, notwithstanding they
This breach on the part of de
continued to pay his weekly salary.
fendants entitled the plaintiff, prima facie, to recover the $70 in their
hands, irrespective of whether or not he had any further action for
breach of contract because of a wrongful discharge.
A nonsuit was therefore improper, not only on the ground that it
was a question for the jury as to whether or not plaintiff had been
discharged, but because plaintiff showed that there had been a breach
on the part of defendants sufﬁcient to relieve him from damages un
der his contract of hiring, whether he was discharged or not.
Upon both issues the plaintiff showed sufficient facts to put the de
fendants to their proofs, and the judgment must therefore be reversed,
and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
All concur.
GODD.PB.& A. (20 En.)—30
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Action for damages for breach of contract of employment. Under
the contract plaintiff for some time acted as salesman for defendants,
but after a time they notiﬁed him they would continue to pay his sal
ary, but would not require him to perform any duties. Plaintiff then
went into business onmhis own account, and brought this action.
A. L. SMITH, M. R.“ This is an action tried before my brother
Kennedy with a special jury. The matter has given rise to some com
plication, chieﬂy, as it appears to me, because the learned judge left
the construction of an agreement to the jury. There was no term of
art and no question of custom, the meaning or the existence of which
might properly be left to the jury. It was for the judge at the trial
to construe the written agreement, arid we have now to say what con
struction should be put upon it. I do not say that the meaning of the
document is clear, btlt I have arrived at the conclusion that the result
the trial was not right.
The action is‘ by man who was in the em
was not brought for wages, be
ployment of the defendants, and
cause
clear that the defendants were always ready and willing to
pay all that was due under the contract. The real question which the
plaintiff thought to raise, and which was raised, was whether beyond
the question of remuneration there was
further obligation on the
masters that, during'tl1e period over which the contract was to extend,
they should ﬁnd continuous, or at least some, employment for the plain
an action in which
tiff. In my opinion such an action
unique—that
shewn that the master
willing to pay the wages of his servant,
not given employment.
but
sued for damages because the servant
In Turner v. Goldsmith, [1891]
Q. B. 544, the wages were to be paid
in the form of commission, and that irnpliedly created
contract to
different, being to
ﬁnd employment for the servant. This contract
certain rate per year.
employ for wages which are to be paid at
contract by the mas
do not think this can be read otherwise than as
ter to retain the servant, and during the time covered by the retainer
contract.
within the province of
to pay him wages under such
the master to say that he will go on paying the wages, but that he
under no obligation to provide work.
said to arise out of the undertaking to
The obligation suggested
the
as their representative salesman.
plaintiff
and
It
employ
engage
the salesman
not given employment which allows him
said that
not kept in practice, and he will not be so
to go on the market his hand
salesman at the end of the term.
o read in an obligation of
efficient
that sort would be to convert the retainer at ﬁxed wages into
contract
The statement of facts is rewritten.
Gono.Pn.&

A. (21) En.)

1
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to keep the servant in the service of his employer in such a manner as
to enable the former to become au fait at his work. In my opinion, no
such obligation arose under this contract, and it is a mistake to stretch
the words of the contract so as to include in what is a mere retainer an
obligation to employ the plaintiff continuously for the term of his serv
I asked whether the employment must be de die in diem, and the
ice.
answer was that this was not necessary, but I could not gather what,
short of this, was the suggested obligation.
It seems to me that the
only argument open to the plaintiff was that his employment should be
continuous, and I cannot ﬁnd that obligation in the contract.
I think therefore, that the case should not have been left to the jury,
and that we ought to direct that judgment be entered for defendants.“

SECTION 2.—REIMBURSEMENT AND INDEMNITY
ADAMSON
(Court of Common Pleas, 1827.

v.

JARVIS.
4 Bing.

66, 13

E. C. L.

408.)

I.”

A motion has been made in arrest of judgment after
BEST, C.
verdict. The plaintiff relies on the second count, on which only his ver
dict and judgment are to be entered.
Stripped of the technical language with which it is encumbered, the
case stated on the second count is this: that the defendant having prop
erty of great value in his possession, represented -to the plaintiff that
and followed this repre
he had authority to dispose of such property;
sentation by a request, that the plaintiff would sell the property for him,
the defendant. The plaintiff, believing the representation of the defend
ant as to his right to the property, and not knowing, either at the time
the representation was made, or at any time after, that it was not his,
24 Vaughan Williams, L. J., agreed. as did Stirling, L. J., though he felt that
there was force in plaintiffs argument that “employ” was a term implying
service by plaintiff, and a correlative duty on the employers to give him the
opportunity of doing this. The case is really not one of master and servant,
but it is so treated by the court. Does it matter?
In Northey v. Trcvillion, 7 Com. Cas. 201 (1902), it is said that the dis
tinction is very ﬁne between the two leading English eases of Rhodes v.
Forwood. [1876] 1 App. Cas. 256, and Turner v. Goldsmith, [1891] 1 Q. B. 544.
See White v. Lumiere North American Co., 79 Vt. 206, 64 Atl. 1121 (1906), and
elaborate note in 6 L. R. A. (NI S.) 807. In Stirling v. Maitland. 5 B. & S. 840
(1864), a third person sued an insurance company for transferring its business
and so ending a contract of employment on which plaintiff relied for ﬁnan
cial reimbursement.
The court laid down the broader principle “that, if a
party enters into an arrangement which can take effect only by the continu
ance of a certain existing state of circumstances, there is an implied engage
ment on his part that he shall do nothing of his own motion to put an end tr.‘
that state of circumstances, under which alone the arrangement can be oper
ative."
25 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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as the agent of the defendant, sold the property; and after paying such
sums out of the proceeds as he was bound to pay, and making such de
ductions as he had a right to make, and which the defendant appears to
have allowed, paid the residue to the defendant.
The defendant, who had induced the plaintiif to make this sale by
his false representation and request to sell, and who, after the sale,
continued to assert his right to sell, and conﬁrmed the agency of the
plaintiff by accepting from him the residue of the proceeds of the sale,
had no right to dispose of this property.
The consequence has been,
that the plaintiff, supposing, from the defendant’s false representations,
he had an authority which he had not, and acting as the defendant’s
agent, has rendered himself liable to an action at the suit of the true
ownernof the goods, and has been obliged to pay damages and costs,
whilst the defendant, the sole cause of the sale, quietly keeps the fruits
of it in his pocket.
It has been stated at the bar that this case is to be governed by the
every
principles that regulate all laws of principal and agent :—agreed:
man who employs another to do an act which the employer appears to
have a right to authorize him to do, undertakes to indemnify him for all
such acts as would be lawful if the employer had the authority he pre
terids to have. A contrary doctrine would create great alarm.
'
Auctioneers, brokers, factors, and agents, do not take regular indem
nities. These would be indeed surprised, if, having sold goods for a
man and paid him the proceeds, and having suffered afterwards in an
action at the suit of the true owners, they were to ﬁnd themselves wrong
doers, and could not recover compensation from him who had induced
them to do the wrong.
It was certainly decided in Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 T. R. 186, that
one wrong-doer could not sue another for contribution;
Lord Kenyon,
however, said, “that the decision would not affect cases of indemnity,
where one man employed another to do acts, not unlawful in themselves,
for the purpose of asserting ,a right.” This is the only decided case
on the subject that is intelligible.
There is a case of VValton v. Hanbury et al., 2 Vern. 592, but it is
so imperfectly stated, that it is impossible to get at the principle of the
.
judgment.
The case of Philips v. Biggs, Hardr. 164, was never decided; but the
Court of Chancery seemed to consider the case of two sheriffs of Mid
cllcsex, where one had paid the damages in an action for ‘an escape, and
sued the other for contribution-, as like the case of two joint obligors.
From the inclination of the Court on this last case, and from the
concluding part of Lord Kenyon’s judgment in Merryweather v. Nix
on, and from reason, justice, and sound policy, the rule that wrong
doers cannot have redress or contribution against each other is conﬁned
to cases where the person seeking redress must be presumed to have
known that he was doing an unlawful act.
If a man buys the goods of another from a person who has no au
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thority to sell them, he is a wrong-doer to the person whose goods he
takes; yet he may recover compensation against the person who sold
the goods to him, although the person who sold them did not undertake
that he had a right to sell, and did not know that he had no right to sell.
That is proved by Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Salk. 210; Sanders v. Powel,
1 Lev. 129; Crosse v. Gardner, Carth. 90;
1 Roll. Abr. 91, 1, 5, and
many other cases.
These cases rest on this principle, that if a man, having the posses
sion of property which gives him the character of owner, afﬁrms that
he is owner, and thereby induces a man to buy, when in point of fact
the aﬁirmant is not the owner, he is liable to an action.
It has been said, that is because there is a breach of contract to rest
the action on, and that there is no contract in this case.
This is not
the true principle:
it is this: he who aﬁirms either rt-hat he does not
know to be true, or knows to be false, to another’s prejudice and his
own gain, is both in morality and law guilty of falsehood, and must
answer in damages.
But here is a contract:
the plaintiff is hired by defendant to sell,
which implies a warranty to indemnify against all the consequences that
‘
* * *
follow the sale.“
Rule discharged.

COVENTRY
(Supreme

Court of New York,

v.

1819.

BARTON.
17

Johns.

142, 8 Am. Dec. 376.)

it,

This was an action of assumpsit, tried at the Columbia circuit, in
November, 1818, before Mr. Justice Yates.
The defendant was, in 1812, overseer of highways, and the plain
tiff was assessed to work on the highways within the defendant’s dis
trict, and when working with others, on the road, under the direction
of the defendant, they came to a turnpike gate placed at the intersec
The
tion of the Rensselaer road with the Farmer's turnpike road.
commissioner of highways, who was also present, ordered the defendant
to set his men to work and take away the gate; upon which the de
fendant ordered the plaintiff, among others, to take the gate away, and,
accordingly, the plaintiff and others removed the gate; while the plain
tiff was at work at removing part of the fence to which the gate was
attached, the defendant directed him how to proceed, and said, “I will
bear thee out in it.” One of the witnesses testiﬁed that the defendant
ordered the plaintiff and the others to remove the gate, and said that
“he would see them out in
or that he would indemnify them.” Sev
Zﬂ In Hoggnn

v. Cahoon, 26 Utah, 444, 73 Pac. 512. 99 Am. St. Rep. S37 (1903),
that the agent acted in good faith for his principal under his
principal’s direction, on his representation that the transaction was lawful.
Erie R. Co., 37 N. Y. 297 (1867), affirming
See. also, Howe v. Buffalo, N. Y.
appeared

&

it

38

Barb.

124 (1862).
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eral actions of trespass were brought by the Farmer’s Turnpike Com
pany against the individuals engaged in removing the gate and fence,
and among others, the plaintiff, against whom a judgment was recov
ered in November, 1813, for $215.08 damages, the amount of which
judgment had been paid by the plaintiff ; and to recover that amount
the present suit was brought against the defendant, on his promise to
It was proved that the defendant was ‘pres
indemnify the plaintiff.
ent when the action brought by the turnpike company against the plain
'
tiff was tried, and that he knew of the suit.

On the evidence of the facts above stated, the judge ordered the
plaintiff to be nonsuited. A motion was made to set aside the nonsuit,
and for a new trial, which was submitted to the court without argu
-

ment.
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The plaintiff
SPENCER, C. ]., delivered the opinion of the court.
cannot pretend to claim on the ground of contribution, for it is well
In
settled that, as between trespassers, there can be no contribution.
such case, the law will not imply a promise. It is a general and well es
tablished principle, that, if the consideration be illegal, it will not up
hold an assumpsit; as in the case put in the books: The defendant, in
consideration of 20 shillings, assumed to pay 40 shillings if he did not
beat J. S. out of such a close.
The common law prohibits every thing
unjust, or contra bonos mores, and a contract contravening these prin
ciples is void. But if one person request another to enter into B.’s land,
and, in his name, to drive out the beasts, and impound them, and prom
ise to save him harmless, this is a good assumpsit, though the act is
In Allaire v. Ouland, 2
tortious.
VVinch. 49; 1 Com. on Con. 31.
]ohns. Cas. 54, where the plaintiff was the servant of the defendant, and
had been commanded by him to enter into the locus in quo, claiming
to be his own, and promising to indemnify the plain
and declaring
this had been true, the entry would have been
tiff, the court say,
lawful; the plaintiff, relying on the truth of the defendant’s declara
tions, did enter; the act on his part was therefore lawful, and a good
consideration for the promise. And where
promise was made to an
he would keep one B. (whom the defendant pre
innkeeper, that
commission of rebellion) for one night,
tended to have arrested on
in his inn, as
prisoner, he would save the plaintiff harmless, judg
ment was given for the plaintiff, who had been_ sued for
false im
The court say, that,
recovery had against him.
prisonment, and
whether B. was arrested lawfully or not, the illegality thereof did not
Vin. Abr. 299, pl. 27. But
the act di
appear to the plaintiff.
rected to be done appears to be unlawful, then the agreement will be
unlawful and void. Buller, N. P. 14-6.
true and just distinction
have no hesitation in saying, that
between promises of indemnity which are, and those which are not,
void; that
the act directed or agreed to be done,
known, at the
time, to be
trespass, an express promise to indemnify would be illegal
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and void; but if it was not known at the time to be a trespass, the
promise of indemnity is a good and valid promise. Cowp. 343.
I am strongly inclined to the opinion that the plaintiff has brought
himself within the latter distinction.
The question upon the argument
of the case of Farmer’s Turnpike v. Coventry, 10 johns. 389, turned
upon the right to erect this gate where it was put; the defendant's
counsel contending that the gate could not be set up within three miles,
at least, of the compact parts of the city of Hudson, as defined by a
\Ve decided against that construc
map conﬁrmed by the act of 1807.
tion; but there was, at least, color for the ground taken. Again, Har
dick, who was a commissioner of highways, directed the defendant to
set his men to work, and take the gate away, upon which the defendant
Here, then, is the case of the commissioner
ordered it to be done.
and overseer of highways both agreeing in considering the gate as. a
nuisance, and both directing it to be removed. The plaintiff was act
He perceived a gate standing directly
ing in a subordinate capacity.
across an old road, and his superiors, whom he had a right to think
well informed, pronouncing
in effect, to be
nuisance.
think the
conclusion inevitable, that the plaintiff did not know, at the time, that
the act he was doing was
trespass; and then the promise of indemnity

valid.”

.

a

There must be
new trial, with costs to abide the event of the suit.
New trial granted.

v.

FOURTH NAT. BANK.”

(City Court of New York, Trial Term,

1889.

9

BACON

N. Y. Supp. 435.)
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MCADAM, C.
The fees paid to the attorneys in Boston were ex
pended under -circumstances from which the law implies
request to
pay for them on the part of the plaintiﬁi.
Legal advice and services
may be as necessary to protect the ‘property as the aid of
physician
or surgeon
to protect life.
Neither may prove serviceable in some
cases, in others extremely so, depending in
measure on results. Pru
all cases wherein property or life
dence requires their employment
would be negligence not to employ professional aid
imperiled.
in cases requiring it. The result does not determine the propriety of
The condition of things at the time must decide that.
the employment.
party who acts according to the best lights that can be obtained
not negligent, but discreet.
at the moment
elementary that an
&

B7 See Guirney v. St. Paul, Minn.
Man. Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 496, 46 N. W.
78, 19 Am. St. Rep. 256 (1890), as to servant’s lack of notice of the risk.
28 Accord: Carson v. Ely, 28 Mo. 378 (1859), where the condition
of the

7

goods demanded immediate expenditure by the agent to preserve them. Prop
er incidental charges and expenses for warehouse room, duties, freight, sal
vage, repairs, journeys, and other acts, to preserve the property, and to en
able the agent to accomplish the objects of the principal are to be paid by
W. Va. 585, 609 (1874).
him. Rutfner v. Hewitt,

I
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agent is not ‘permitted to reap any of the proﬁts of his agency prop
erly belonging to his principal ; so, on the other hand, he is entitled to
be indemniﬁed against all losses which have been innocently sustained
by him on the same account. Story, Ag. §§ 339, 340; Ewell’s Evans,
Ag. 473; Howe v. Railroad Co., 38 Barb. 124. The naked depositary
ought neither to be injured nor beneﬁted in any respect by the trust
undertaken by him. In an emergency he has an implied authority to
incur expenses on behalf of the owner for the preservation of the prop
erty. Edw. Bailm. § 66.
It is a familiar rule that an agent has the duty of taking such steps
as are reasonably necessary for the protection of his principal’s in
terests, and for the preservation of his ‘principals property, and that,
having made outlays for that purpose, he is entitled to reimburse
ments at the hands of his principal.
Story, Ag. § 335; Vi/hart. Ag. §
314.
The reason of the rule is that a request on the part of the prin
cipal is inferred where the advances are made in the regular course
of business, or even on the spur of some pressing urgency not pro
vided for by any rule, since the employer may fairly be taken to have
authorized the employed to make the expenditure under any circum
stances that a ‘prudent man would conceive necessary for the safe
'
guard of his interest. Smith, Merc. Law, § 169. In Harter v. Blanch
ard, 64 Barb. 617, the rule was applied to the case of a horse which,
while in the bailee’s possession, had his leg broken; and it was held
that the bailee had, from the nature of the case, an implied authority
to contract in behalf of the bailor with a competent farrier for the care
of the animal. Indeed, this just rule of implied authority and indemnity
pervades the law of principal and agent, and of bailments as well.
The expenditure made by the Maverick National Bank was the proper
exercise by it of the discretion conferred by the nature of the trans
action. ‘It was reasonable in amount, the services rendered were neces
sary, and there is no principle of justice that requires that it should
lose the amount so ‘paid.
The expenditure was to protect the plain
tiff’s interest in the property; was made for his sole beneﬁt, at a place
far distant from his residence, and impliedly at his request. The ex
penditure, being a proper one, was legally authorized, and is a good
counterclaim against the plaintiff; and, the cause of action for the
balance of his demand having been legally discharged by payment into
court, it follows ‘that there must be judgment for the defendant, with
costs from the time of such payment.
Dakin v. Dunning, 7 Hill, 30,
42 Am. Dec. 33 ; Becker v. Boon, 61 N. Y. 332."
29 An agent who is sued on his principal’s account need not let judgment
go against him. He may defend and appeal the case, and the principal must
reimburse him for all proper charges.
First Nat. Bank v. Tenncy. 43 Ill.
App. 544 (1892); Selz v. Guthman, 62 Ill, App. 624 (1896), in which a sheriff
was sued for levying on goods pointed out to him by his principal; Shearer
v. Guardian Trust Co., 136 M0. App. 229, 116 S. W’. 456 (1909), in which an
agent was sued on breach of 21 warranty. Neither need he wait to be sued,
but he may pay damages Without suit and recover of his principal to the
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Plaintiff, a blacksmith, at the request of defendant, a farmer, pur
No price was ﬁxed by Ross, but he refused
chased f_or him a mill.
he
take
the
mill
because
feared. it was too small. Clifton had pur
to
mill
in
his
own
and
name, and was obliged to pay for
the
chased
now sues defendant to recover the ‘price. Judgment for defendant and
plaintiff appealed.
RIDDICK; ].3° [After stating the factsz] The question for us to
determine
whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury
that
no price was agreed upon for the mill they must ﬁnd for de
fendant. To constitute
sale
not necessary that the parties agree
on
ﬁxed by the parties, the law implies that
no price
price, for,
This
said to
shall be what the thing sold
reasonably worth.
be elementary law.
Benj. Sales (Bennett’s Ed.) 90, note; Taft v.
Travis, 136 Mass. 95. But,
true, he
the testimony of Clifton
for him; and
did not sell the mill to Ross, but purchased
is‘a
general rule of law that all reasonable and necessary outlays and ad
the course of his em'ploy
vances paid by an agent for his principal
313, 314; Mechem.
ment must be repaid by the latter. Whart. Ag.
481, 13 Sup. Ct. 950, 37 L. Ed.
Ag. 543; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.
A request to undertake an agency or employment, the proper
819.
execution of which involves the expenditure of money on the part of
the agent, operates not only as an implied request on the part of the
principal to incur such expenditure, but also as
promise to repay it.
Mechem, Ag; 544.
If, without being induced by fraud or misrepre
sentation on the part of Clifton, Ross requested Clifton to purchase
mill, and Clifton, in the execution of such an undertaking, or as
result of
was compelled to pay for the mill, then_R0ss
liable for
the same be reasonable, and this whether thefe
such expenditure,
was any price agreed upon or not. In the absence of any agreement
case,
or direction about the price to be paid, Clifton would, in such
ordinarily have the right to pay the fair market price for such mill,
and to recover the same from Ross.“
Judgment reversed.

2

9

a

Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis. 612 (1875).
As to
extent of the actual liability.
suit, see Powell v. Trustees of Village ot Newhurgh, 19
costs of defending
Johns. (N. Y.) 284 (1822).
'
3° Part of the opinion is omitted.
31 Accord:
Greene v. Goddard,
Metc. (Mass) 212 (1815), in which the
agent was allowed to recover expenses incurred by reason of the failure of
the drawee of bills drawn by the agent for the principal. See Irions v. Cook,
33 N. C. 203 (1850), in which the third person refused to lease to the principal,
and the agent took the lease_fn his own name and paid the interest, and
Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 497, 13 Sup. Ct. 950, 37 L. Ed. 819 (1893).
As to recovery after terminationot the agency of money expended during
the agency, see ante, D. 212 ﬂ.; also, U. S. v. Jarvis,
Ware (Dav. 274) 278, Fed.
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BURBY
(Common

v.

ROOME.

Pleas of New York City and County,
N. Y. Supp. 250.)

1894.

7

Misc.

Rep.

From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
GIEGERICH, ]. The plaintiﬁ"s assignor, one Schell, was tlie owner

of certain premises in this city, and the defendant, Roome, was his
Schell
agent to collect the rents of, and to care for, such property.
had sent the following letter of instructions to the defendant, who
Mr.
does not deny having received it: “New York, ]une 7, 1892.
Roome—Dear
Sir: Concerning my house, 131 West 25th street,
have made arrangements with Mantel, 32 Carmine St., to keep the
roof in repair for one year, and with O’Brien & Ryder, plumbers, 154
Spring street, to attend to the plumbing work, tank, and engine for
* * * In case you need the services of any of these
one year.
people at any time, to do any of the above‘ work, please send for them,
and they will do the work.
Edward P. Schell.”
[Signed]
In january, 1893, the pipes, water-closets, etc., upon the premises
were frozen up, and the services of a plumber were required.
One
Young was called in by the defendant’s brother-in-law (who is admit
ted to have had authority to act for him in the matter) to do the work
of repairing. Young’s bill for his services amounted to $119.99, which
defendant, after some delay, paid.
Upon accounting to Schell for
rents received, he retained this amount, for the recovery of which this
The answer was a general denial, and set up a
action was brought.
counterclaim for said last-mentioned sum paid by him to Young for
such services. The justice rendered judgment in favor of the plain
tiff for thelfull amount claimed, and the defendant has brought this
appeal.
In speaking of an agent’s right to recover his disbursements, made
for the benefit of his principal, Story, in his work on Agency (7th
Ed. § 336, p. 412), says: “But this liability of the plaintiff proceeds
upon the ground that the advances, expenses, and disbursements have
been properly incurred, and reasonably and in good -faith paid, with
* * * However, if the
out any default on the part of the agent.
and ofﬁciously, and without authority, made
agent has voluntarily
advances or payments, the principal will not be bound to any reim
bursement thereof, for it will be imputed to the fault or negligence
or unskillfulness of the agent.”
As laid down in Fowler v. Bank, 67 N. Y. 138, 145, 146, the rule
is that: “An agent is entitled to be indemniﬁed against all damages

I

~

Cas. No. 15,468 (1846), supra. p. 225. allowing the agent to recover for
fice rent and furnishings; Meyer v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 156 Mo. App. 170,
S. W. 5 (1911). citing Glover v. Henderson,
120 Mo. 367, 25 S. W’. 175,
Am. St. Rep. 695; Royal Remedy Co. v. Gregory Grocer Co., 90 Mo. App.
Davis v. Barr, 12 N.,Y. St. Rep. 111; Mechem’s Agency, § 620.

of
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he may

of his agency, without fault on his part."
Heller (Super. N. Y.) 5 N. Y. Supp. 913.

be subjected, in the course
See, also, Monnet

Under

v.

rules, the agent in the present case is not entitled to
recover.
Having acted in direct disobedience of his principal’s in
structions, he incurred the expenses clearly “without authority."
The judgment should be aﬁirmed, with costs.
these

ii.

SECTION 3.—THE AGENT’S LIEN

BYERS

v.

DANLEY.

(Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1871.

27

Ark.

77.)

_

Suit in equity by Danley against Byers and others to quiet and per
From a
fect title, and for the possession and rents of certain lands.
decree giving Danley possession an appeal is taken. One Smith, as
agent of Northrop, purchased and ‘paid for the lands. Northrup failed
After
to“ pay Smith his compensation, expenses and reimbursement.
a long time Smith took possession of the land and paid taxes on it for
12 years, when he quitclaimed to Danley, who knew all the facts.
He
held the lands for ﬁve years and paid taxes until the commencement of
this suit. Byers and the other defendants claimed under deeds from
These deeds plaintiff claimed
the original grantor and his assignees.
were fraudulent.
* * * It being evident, from the above agree
BENNETT, J.”
ment and authorities, that Smith can have no trust declared in his
favor, it may be asked, inasmuch as he was the agent for Northrop
and advanced the money to make the purchase, what equities he had
for such advances, or what remedy had he against Northrop or the
lands purchased?
\

Beckman v. Wilson, 61 Cal. 335 (1882), in which an agent in
charge of property rebuilt, after a ﬁre; St. L., A. & T. H. R. Co. V. Thomas,
85 Ill. 464 (1877). in which an agent defended taking his principal’s money
on the ground that it had been turned over under compulsion to another
employé.
Money paid on 0.
Ross v. Clark, 18 Colo. 90, 31 Pac. 497 (1893).
contract known by the agent to he illegal, see Thompson Bros. v. Cummings,
68 Ga. 124 (1881); Samuels v. Oliver, 130 Ill. 73. 22 N. E. 499 (1889); recov
ery for expenses caused by the agent’s negligence, Veltum v. Koehler, 85 Minn.
125, 88 N. W. 432 (1901).
88 Part of the opinion is omitted.
32 Accord:
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First, if N0rthr0'p was a non-resident of Arkansas, as alleged in the
bill, he could have made out his account against him, attached it to the
proper affidavit, under the statute, attached the lands and had them
Here
See Gould's Digest, 163, §§ 1, 2, 3, etc.
sold to ‘pay the debt.
would have been a complete remedy at law.
Second, Smith could have sent his account to Illinois and there
brought assumpsit for money paid for Northrop, at his request, and
Northrop, not being insolvent, he in this way had another complete
‘
remedy at law.
,
Independent of these personal remedies, agents have, for the pay
ment of their commissions, advances, disbursements and responsibili
ties, in the course of their agency, an established right, which in many
cases becomes more important and effectual than any other means of
remedial redress; that is to say, an agents’ lien. Story, in his work on
Agenc)" 433, deﬁnes this lien “to be a right in one man to retain that
which is in his ‘possession, belonging to another, until certain demands
of him, the person in possession, are satisﬁed. It is a qualiﬁed right
therefore, which may be exercised over the property of another per
son.”
These liens of agents, like all liens, arise by operation of law. Chief
Justice Gibbs, in 'Wilson v. Heather, 5 Taunt. 642, said: “The right
of lien does not arise out of any contract whatsoever, but out of a
right to hold property, until the party claiming the lien has been paid
for the operation he performs.”
Thus we see, if Smith was an agent of Northrop and, in carrying
out the objects of his agency, he advanced money or incurred expenses
for his principal, he had a lien and only a lien upon the title papers
and the land for his commissions, services, expenses and advances,
which grew out of this relation and was incident to Northrop’s indebt
edness to him. The extent of this was but a mere right to retain them
until his demands were satisﬁed,-and inrthis case, the property being
real estate, he could retain it until the rents and proﬁts had discharged
the lien. In case of a mortgagee who ejects his mortgagor, he can
only hold the lands until the rents and proﬁts pay his debts or dis
charge his lien. So, if a mortgagor voluntarily surrenders the posses
sion, no absolute estate passes to the mortgagee by virtue "of his pos
session, but simply a right to retain the same for certain purposes nor
is it any adverse holding so as to ripen into a title, except upon mere
presumption of payment. 2 Hilliard on Mortgages, 16.
It cannot be contended that an agents’ lien stands upon higher ground
than that of a mortgage created by the solemn act of the parties.
Then Smith, having no title, could not convey a greater one to Dan
ley, the appellee, and having merely a lien which could not exist for
a moment without possession, it could not be transferred,
and the
effort of Smith to release the same to appellee, and delivering him the
possession, as alleged in the bill, destroyed the lien and the appellee
took nothing by his release.
Story on Agency, §§ 360, 367.
Hence,
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appellee can have no title or right of possession to the lands in con
troversy by reason of Smith's lien.“ * * *
Cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the bill for want of
equity.

UNDERHILL
(Supreme

v.

JORDAN.

Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department,
72 App. Div. 71. 76 N. Y. Supp. 266.)

1902.

Action for an accounting by Edward C. Underhill against Nina Jor
dan and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
'
Reversed.
.
The complaint in this action avers that the plaintiff, from about the
30th day of April, 1886, to on or about the 11th day of May, 1901,
acted as the agent, factor, and manager of the defendants under au
thority of a written power of attorney; that plaintiff, under such power
of attorney, had the entire management of the property of said de
fendants, the corpus of which originally amounted to $87,766, and that
by his judicious handling of the same it increased to the sum of $93,
266; that during the time that plaintiff has been so employed he has
all of which he has
received and collected the sum of $159,109.42,
turned over to the defendants, exce'pt the sum of $7,955.42, which he
now has in his possession, and upon,which he claims a lien for his
services and expenses paid in the management of said agency; that
plaintiff believes that the reasonable value of his said services is $7,
955.42; that he is ready, willing, and able to account for and pay over
to said defendants so much of said sum as the court shall decide, in
that no
case it shall decide he is not entitled to the whole thereof;
agreed price has ever been ﬁxed upon with defendants for his said serv
ices, and that he has necessarily expended in the management of said
property the sum of $5,592, for which he has had no recompense; that
defendants during all the times aforesaid had been, and now are, rp
siding in Europe, and that he fears that, if he should not claim a lien
upon the amount retained for his services and expenses, and should
pay over the same to the defendants, they would remove the same out
of the jurisdiction of this court, and that said defendants could only be
served with process in a foreign jurisdiction.
Wherefore plaintiff de
mands judgment for $13,547.98, and that plaintiff's lien upon the said
sum of $7,955.42 for the amount of the value of said services and dis
“Accord: Cranston v. Philadelphia Ins. Co., 5 Bin. 538 (1813); Chicker
lng V. Hosmer, 12 Mass. 183 (1815).
An agreement to give credit, or any contract inconsistent with a lien, is a
waiver of‘ it. Stoddard Woolen Manufactory v. Huntley. 8 N. H. 441, 31
Am. Dec. 198 (1837); Hall v. Jackson, 20 Pick. 194 (1838).
Cf. Welker v.
Appleman, 44 Ind. App. 699, 90 N. E. 35 (1909), in which the contract was
found not to be inconsistent.
One of the earliest cases recognizing an agent's
lien (in this case a factor's) is Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252 (1755), cited in
Newhall v. Dunlap, 14 Me. 180, 31 Am. Dec. 45 (1841).
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bursements be deﬁned and enforced against such sum; that plaintiff
have judgment against said defendants for whatever sum he may be
entitled to above said sum of $7,955.42; and that the defendants be
restrained from interfering with said last-mentioned sum until the de
termination of this action; and for such other and further relief as to
the court shall seem just and equitable. The defendants demurred to
the complaint upon the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer the court below sus
tained, and from the judgment entered therein dismissing the com
plaint this appeal is taken.
* * \'Ve are also of opinion that suﬂicient facts
*
HATCH,
are alleged in this complaint to establish a lien in favor of the plaintiff
u‘pon the fund in question, at least to the extent of his claim for ex
penses and disbursements paid out by the plaintiff in its management.
In Muller v. Pondir, 55 N. Y. 325, 14 Am. Rep. 259, it was said by
Judge Allen: “An agent may have a lien on the property of his prin
cipal for moneys advanced or liabilities incurred in his behalf; and,
if moneys have been advanced or liabilities incurred upon the faith of
the solvency of the principal, and he becomes insolvent while the pro
ceeds and fruit of such advances or liability are in the possession of
the agent, or within his reach, and before they have come to the actual
possession of the ‘principal, within every principle of equity the agent
has a lien upon the same for his protection and indemnity.
If neces
sary to his protection, the plaintiff would have been permitted to re
pudiate theagency, and assume that position which would b_est protect
himself from loss by reason of the insolvency of his ‘principal/’
The evident reason why the lien is given is that by the expenditure
made and liabilities assumed the agent has beneﬁted the principal,
and ‘protected the fund, or at least, improved the principal’s condition.
As the irresponsibility of the principal would defeat the right of the
agent in securing reimbursement, equity raises out of such situation
for his protection a lien upon the fund.
It must follow, therefore,
that whenever a condition exists which would cause loss to the agent
if he parted with the funds in his hands, equity will interpose so far
as to protect the agent’s right in the premises, and raise out of the
The complaint avers that the de
condition a lien upon the fund.
fendants are residents of England, and that, if he parts with the pos
session of the money, it will be removed beyond the jurisdiction of
In such case the same reasons exist for
the court and its process.
supporting a lien upon the fund as would exist in the case of insolven
It seems clear, therefore, that this complaint states a perfectly
cy.
good cause of action for equitable interposition.
It follows that both the ﬁnal and interlocutory judgments should
be reversed, with costs to the plaintiff in this court and in the court
below, and leave given to the defendants to answer within 20 days,
upon the payment of such costs.

J.”
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SECTION 4.—DEFENSES OF MASTER
SERVANT RULE

FELLOw'

PRIESTLEY

,

(Court

of Exchequer,
.

1837.

3 M. &

W.

v.

FOWLER.

1. 7

Cas. 102.)

L.

J.

(N. S.) Ex. 42, 19 Eng. Rul.

_

Case. The declaration stated that the plaintiff was a servant of the
defendant in his trade of a butcher; that the defendant had desired and
directed the plaintiff, so being his servant, to go with and take certain
goods of the defendant’s, in a certain van of the defendant then used
by him, and conducted by another of his servants, in carrying goods for
hire upon a certain journey; that the plaintiff, in pursuance of such
desire and direction, accordingly commenced and was proceeding and
being carried and ‘conveyed by the said van, with the said goods; and
it became the duty of the defendant, on that occasion, to use due and
proper care that the said van should be in a proper state of repair, that
it should not be overloaded, and that the plaintiff should be safely and
nevertheless, the defendant did not use
securely carried thereby;
proper care that the van should be in a sufficient state of repair, or that
it should not be overloaded, or that the plaintiff should be safely and
of the neglect of all and
securely carried thereby, in consequence
each of which duties the van gave way and broke down, and the
plaintiff was thrown with violence to the ground, and his thigh was
'
thereby fractured, &c. Plea, not guilty.
At the trial before Park, ]., at the Lincolnshire Summer Assizes,
1836, the plaintiff, having given evidence to show that the injury arose
from the overloading of the van, and that it was so loaded with the
In the following
defendant’s knowledge, had a verdict for £100.
Michaelmas Term, Adams, Serjt., obtained a rule to show cause why
the judgmentcshould not be arrested, on the ground that the defendant
was not liable in law, under the circumstances stated in the declaration.
LORD ABINC-ER, C. B. This was a motion in arrest of judgment,
after verdict for the plaintiff, upon the insufﬁciency of the declaration.
It has been objected to this
[His Lordship stated the declaration.]
declaration, that it contains no premises from which the duty of the
defendant, as therein alleged, can be inferred in law; or, in other
words, that from the mere relation of master and servant no contract,
and therefore no duty, can be implied on the part of the master to
cause the servant to be safely and securely carried, or to make the
master liable for damage to the servant, arising from any vice or im
perfection, unknown, to the master, in the carriage, or in the mode
of loading and conducting it. For, as the declaration contains no
charge that the defendant knew any of the defects mentioned, the court
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is not called upon to decide how‘ far such knowledge on his part of a
defect unknown to the servant, would make him liable.
It is admitted that there is no precedent for the present action by a
servant against a master. We are therefore to decide the question upon
general principles, and in doing so we are at liberty to look at the con
sequences of a decision the one way or the other.
If the master be liable to the servant in this action, the principle of
that liability will be found to carry us to an alarming extent. He who
is responsible by his general duty, or by the terms of his contract, for
all the consequences of negligence in a matter in which he is ‘the
principal, is responsible for the negligence of all his inferior agents.
If the owner of the carriage is therefore responsible for the suﬁiciency
of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for the negligence of
his coach-maker, or his harness—maker, or his coachman. The footman,
therefore, who rides behind the carriage, may have an action against
his master for a defect in the carriage, owing to the negligence of the
coach-maker, or for a defect in the harness arising from the negligence
of the harness-maker, or for drunkenness. neglect, or want of skill
in the coachman; nor is there any reason why the principle should
not,'if applicable in this class of cases, extend to many others. The
master, for example, would be liable to the servant for the negligence
of the chambermaid, for putting him into a damp bed; for that of the
upholsterer, for sending in a crazy bedstead, whereby he was made to
fall down while asleep and injure himself; for the negligence of the
cook, in not properly cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen:
of the butcher, in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious
to the health; of the _builder, for a defect in the foundation of the
house, whereby it fell, and injured both the master and the servant
by the ruins.
The inconvenience, not to say the absurdity of these consequences,
affords a suﬁicient argument against the application of this principle to
But, in truth, the mere relation of the master and
the present case.
the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master
to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected
to do of himself.
He is, no doubt, bound to provide for the safety
of his servant in the course of his employment, to the best of his
The servant is not bound to risk
judgment, information, and belief.
master,
in
of
the
service
his
and may, if he thinks ﬁt. de
safety
his
cline any service in which he reasonably apprehends injury to himself:
and in most of the cases in which danger may be incurred, if not in
all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent
of it as the master. In that sort of employment, especially, which is
described in the declaration in this case, the plaintiff must have known
as well as his master, and probably better, whether the van was suffi
cient, whether it was overloaded, and whether it w'as likely to carry him
In fact, to allow this sort of action to prevail would be an
safely.
encouragement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution which
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he is in duty bound to exercise on the behalf of his master, to protect
him against the misconduct or negligence of others who serve him,
and which diligence and caution, while they protect the master, are a
much better security against any injury the servant may sustain by
the negligence of others engaged under the same master, than any
recourse against his master for damages could possibly afford.” _
\\'e are therefore of opinion that the judgment ought to be arrested.
Rule absolute.

-ii

FARWELL

v.

BOSTON

Court of Massachusetts.

(Supreme Judicial

at

1842.

w. R. co.

'13‘;

4 Metc. 49, 38 Am. _Dec. 339.)

Action of trespass upon the case. * * "'
The case was submitted to the court on the following facts
by the parties:

agreed

-

“The plaintiff was employed by the defendants, in 1835, as an en
gineer, and went at ﬁrst with the merchandise cars, and afterwards
with the passenger cars, and so continued till October 30, 1837, at
the wages of $2 per day; that being the usual wages paid to engine
men, which are higher than the wages paid to a machinist, in which
»
capacity the plaintiif formerly was employed.
“On the 30th of October, 1837, the plaintiﬁ, then being in the em
ployment of the defendants, as such engineman, and running the pas
senger train, ran his engine off at a switch on the road, which had
been left in a wrong condition (as alleged by the plaintiﬂ‘, and, for
the purposes of this trial, admitted by the defendants), by one Whit
comb, another servant of the defendants, who had been long in their
employment, as a switchman or tender, and had the care of switches
on the road, and was a careful and trustworthy servant, in his gen
eral character, and as such servant was well known to the plaintiff.
By which running oﬁ, the plaintiff sustained the injury complained of
in his declaration.
86 The English cases have followed the rule of Priestley v. Fowler, which
was not strictly a fellow servant case, even more broadly than have American
courts. In this they have doubtless been inﬂuenced by the Farwell Case, post.
481, more than by Priestley v. Fowler.
Indeed the'Far\veli Case is the lead
doctrine, both in England and in the United
ing case for the fellow-servant
States. As such it is printed in tuil in 149 Rev. Rep. 262. being taken from
3 Macq. 316. where it is reported as a note to the leading case of Bartonshill
(foal Co. v. Reid. 3 Macq. 266. 1 Paterson, Sc. App. Cas. 785. In that case the
House of Lords held that the rule. enunciated for England in Hutchinson
v. York. etc. Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 343, applied also to Scotland.
The extreme to
which the doctrine was carried in England is seen in Wilson v. Merry, L. R. 1
H. L.,Sc. App. Cas. 326. 19 Eng. Rul. 132 (1868). The Hutchinson Case un
dertakes to point out the distinction between the liability of the master to
third persons under the rule of respondent superior and his liability to one of
his servants for injuries due to acts of other servants.
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“The said Farwell (the plaintiff) and Whitcomb were both appointed
by the superintendent of the road, who was in the habit of passing over
the same very frequently in the cars, and often rode on the engine.
“If the court shall be of opinion that, as matter of law, the defend
ants are not liable to the plaintiﬂ, he being a servant of the corpora
tion, and in their employment, for the injury he may have received
from the negligence of said Whitcomb, another servant of the cor
poration, .and in their employment, then the plaintiff shall become
nonsuit; but if the court shall be of opinion, as matter of law, that
the defendants may be liable in this case, then the case shall be sub
mitted to a jury upon the facts which may be proved in the case, the
defendants alleging negligence on the part of the plaintiff.”
SHAW, C. ]."" This is an action of new impression in our courts,
It presents a case
and involves a principle of great importance.
where two persons are in the service and employment of one company,
whose business it is to construct and maintain a railroad, and to em
ploy their trains of cars to carry persons and merchandize for hire.
They are appointed and employed by the same company to perform
separate duties and services. all tending to the accomplishment of
one and the same purpose—that of the safe and rapid transmission
of the trains; and they are paid for their respective services according
to the nature of their respective duties. and the labor and skill required
The question is whether, for damages
for their proper performance.
sustained by one of the persons so employed, by means of the care
lessness and negligence of another, the party injured has a remedy
It is an argument against such an
against the common employer.
action, though certainly not a decisive one, that no such action has
before been maintained.
It is laid down by Blackstone that if a servant, by his negligence,
does any damage to a stranger. the master shall be answerable for his
But the damage must be_ done while he is actually employed
neglect.
in the master’s service; otherwise, the servant shall answer for his
1 Bl. Com. 431; McManus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106.
own misbehavior.
This rule is obviously founded on the great principle of social duty,
that every man, in the management of his own affairs, whether by
himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not to
injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sustains dam
If done by a servant, in the course of
age, he shall answer for it.
his employment, and acting within the scope of his authority, it is
considered, in contemplation of law, so far the act of the master, that
But this presupposes that the
the latter shall be answerable civiliter.
parties stand to each other in the relation of strangers, between whom
there is no privity; and the action, in such case, is an action sounding
in tort. The form is trespass on the case, for the consequential dam
87

Part of the statement of facts is omitted.
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The maxim respondeat superior is adopted in that case, from
age.
general considerations of policy and security.
But this does not apply to the case of a servant bringing his action
against his own employer to recover damages for an injury arising
in the course of that employment, where all such risks and perils as
the employer and the servant respectively intend to assume and bear
may be regulated by the express or implied contract between them,
and which, in contemplation of law, must be presumed to be thus
regulated.
The same view seems to have been taken by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff in the argument; and it was conceded, that the claim could
not be placed on the principle indicated by the maxim respondeat su
perior, which binds the master to indemnify a stranger for the damage
caused by the careless, negligent or unskillful act of his servant in
The claim, therefore, is placed, and must
the conduct of his affairs.
be maintained, if maintained at all, on the ground of contract.
As
there is no express contract between the parties, applicable to this
point, it is placed on the footing of an implied contract of indemnity,
It would be an
arising out of the relation of master and servant.
implied promise, arising from the duty of the master to be responsible
to each person employed by him, in the conduct of every branch of
business, where two or more persons are employed, to pay for all
damage occasioned by the negligence of every other person employed
If such a duty were established by law—like
in the same service.
that of a common carrier, to stand to all losses of goods not caused by
the act of God or of a public enemy—or that of an innkeeper, to be
responsible, in like manner, for the baggage of his guests: it would
be a rule of frequent and familiar occurrence, and its existence and
application. with all its qualiﬁcations and_restrictions, would be set
tled by judicial precedents. But we are of opinion that no such rule
has been established, and the authorities, as far as they go, are op
Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & VV. 1 ; Murray v.
posed to the principle.
South Carolina Railroad Co., 1 McMul. (S. C.) 385, 36 Am. Dec. 268.
The general rule, resulting from considerations as well of justice as
of policy, is that he who engages in the employment of another for
the performance of speciﬁed duties and services. for compensation,
takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident
to the performance of such services, and in legal presumption the
And we are not aware of any
compensation is adjusted accordingly.
principle which should except the perils arising from the carelessness
and negligence of those who are in the same employment.
These are
perils which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he
can as effectually guard, as the master. They are perils incident to
the service, and which can be as distinctly foreseen and provided for
in the rate of compensation as any others. To say that the master
shall be responsible because the damage is caused by his agents, is
assuming the very point which remains to be proved.
They are his
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agents to some extent, and for some purposes; but whether he is re
sponsible, in a particular case, for their negligence, is not decided by
the single fact that they are, for some purposes, his agents.
It seems
to be now well settled, whatever might have been thought formerly,
that underwriters cannot excuse themselves from payment of a loss
by one of the perils insured against. on the ground that the loss was
caused by the negligence or unskillfulness of the officers or crew of
the vessel, in the performance of their various duties as navigators,
although employed and paid by the owners, and, in the navigation of
the vessel. their agents.
Copeland v. New England Marine Ins. Co.,
I am aware that
2 Metc. (Mass.) 440, 443, and cases there cited.
the maritime law has its own rules and analogies, and that we cannot
always safely rely upon them in applying them to other branches
of law. But the rule in question seems to be a good authority for the
point that persons are not to be responsible, in all cases, for the neg
ligence of those employed by them.
If we look from considerations of justice to those of policy, they
In considering the rights
will strongly lead to the same conclusion.
and obligations arising out of particular relations, it is competent for
courts of justice to regard considerations of policy and general con
venience, and to draw from them such rules as will, in their practical
application, best promote the safety and security of all parties con
cerned. This is, in truth, the basis on which implied promises are
raised, being duties legally inferred from a consideration of what is
best adapted to promote the beneﬁt of all persons concerned, under
To take the well-known and familiar cases al
given circumstances.
A common carrier, without regard to actual fault or
ready cited:
neglect in himself or his servants, is made liable for all losses of
goods conﬁded to him for carriage, except those caused by the act of
God or of a public enemy, because he can best guard them against all
minor dangers, and because, in case of actual loss, it would be ex
tremely difﬁcult for the owner to adduce proof of embezzlement, or
other actual fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, although it
The risk is therefore
may have been the real cause of the loss.
thrown upon the carrier, and he receives, in the form of payment for
the carriage, a premium for the risk which he thus assumes.
So of
He can best secure the attendance of honest and
an innkeeper:
faithful servants, and guard his house against thieves; whereas, if
he were responsible only upon proof of actual negligence, he might
connive at the presence of dishonest inmates and retainers, and even
participate in the embezzlement of the property of the guests, during
the hours’ of their necessary sleep, and yet it would be difficult, and
often impossible to prove these facts.
The liability of passenger carriers is founded on similar considera
tions. They are held to the strictest responsibility for care, vigilance
and skill, on the part of themselves and all persons employed by
them, and they are paid accordingly.
The rule is founded on the ex
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pediency of throwing the risk upon those who can best guard against
it.’ Story on Bailments, § 590 et seq.
We are of opinion that these considerations apply strongly to the
\Vhere several persons are employed in the conduct
case in question.
of one common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each de
pends much on the care and skill with which each other shall perform
his appropriate duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others,
can give notice of any misconduct, incapacity or neglect of duty, and
leave the service, if the common employer will not take such precau
tions, and employ such agents as the safety of the whole party may
By these means, the safety of each will be much more ef
require.
fectually secured, than could be done by a resort to the common em
ployer for indemnity in case of loss by the negligence of each "other.
Regarding it in this light, it is the ordinary case of one sustaining
an injury in the course of his own employment, in which he must
bear the loss himself, or seek his remedy, if he have any, against the
See Vl/interbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109;
actual wrongdoer.
Milligan v. \/Vedge, 12 Adol. & El. 737.
In applying these principles to the present case, it appears that the
plaintiff was employed by the'defendants as an engineer, at the rate
of wages usually paid in that employment, being a higher rate than
It was a voluntary
the plaintiff had before received as a machinist.
undertaking on his part, with a full knowledge of the risks incident
to the employment; and the loss was sustained by means of an ordi
nary casualty, caused by the negligence of another servant of the
Under these circumstances, the loss must be deemed to
company.
be the result of a pure accident, like those to which all men, in all
employments, and at all times, are more or less exposed; and like
similar losses from accidental causes, it must rest where it ﬁrst fell,
unless the plaintiff has a remedy against, the person actually in default,

of which we give no opinion.

It

pressed in theargument, that although this might
depart
ment of duty, where each can exert some inﬂuence over the conduct
of the other, and thus to some extent provide for his own security!
yet that it could not apply where two or more are employed in different
departments of duty, at a distance from each other, and where one
can in no degree control or inﬂuence the conduct of another.
But
we think this is founded upon a supposed distinction, on which it would
be extremely diﬁicult to establish a practical rule.
When the object
to be accomplished is one and the same, when the employers are the
same, and the several persons employed derive their authority and
their compensation from the same source, it would be extremely dith
cult to distinguish what constitutes one department and what a dis
tinct department of duty.
It would vary with the circumstances of
If it were made to depend upon the neamess or distance
every case.
of the persons from each other, the question would immediately arise:
was strongly

be so, where two or more servants are employed in the same
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How near or how distant must they be, to be in the same or different
departments? 'In a blacksmith’s shop, persons working in the saine
building, at different ﬁres, may be quite independent of each other,
In a ropewalk, several may be at
though only a few feet distant.
work on the same piece of cordage, at the same time, at many hundred
feet distant from each other, and beyond the reach of sight and voice,
and yet acting together.
Besides, it appears to us, that the argument rests upon an assumed
principle of responsibility which does not exist. The master, in the
case supposed, is not exempt from liability, because theservant has
better means of providing for his safety, when he is employed in im
mediate connection with those from whose negligence he might suffer ;
but because the implied contract of the master does not extend to in
F
demnify the servant against the negligence of any one but himself;
and he is not liable in tort, as for the negligence of his servant, be
cause the person suffering does not stand towards him in the relation
of a stranger, but is one whose rights are regulated by contract ex
The exemption of the master, therefore, from lia
press or implied.
bility for the negligence of a fellow servant, does not depend exclu
sively upon the consideration, that the servant has better means to
Hence the sep
provide for his _own safety, but upon other grounds.
aration of the employment into different departments cannot create
that liability, when it does not arise from express o'r implied contract,
or from a responsibility created by law to third persons, and strangers,
for the negligence of a servant.
A case may be put for the purpose of illustrating this distinction.
Suppose the road had been owned by one set of proprietors whose
duty it was tc. keep it in repair and have it at all times ready and in
ﬁt condition for the running of engines and cars, taking a toll, and
that the engines and cars were owned by another set of proprietors,
paying toll to the proprietors of the road, and receiving compensation
from passengers for their carriage; and suppose the engineer to suffer
a loss from the negligence of the switch tender.
VVe are inclined to
the opinion that the engineer might have a remedy against the railroad
and, if so, it must be on the ground, that as between the
corporation;
engineer employed by the proprietors of the engines and cars, and
the switch tender employed by the corporation, the engineer would be
a stranger, between whom and the corporation there could be no privity
of contract; and not because the engineer would have no means of
controlling the conduct of the switch tender. The responsibility which
one is under for the negligence of his servant, in the conduct of his
business, towards third persons, is founded on another and distinct
principle from that of implied contract, and stands on its own reasons
of policy. The same reasons of policy, we think, limit this responsi
bility to the case of strangers. for whose security alone it is established.
Like considerations of policy and general expediency forbid the ex
tension _of the principle, so far as to warrant a servant in maintaining
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for an indemnity which we think was
not contemplated in the nature and terms of the employment, and
which,-if established, would not conduce to the general good.
In coming to the conclusion that the plaintiii, in the present case,
is not entitled to recover, considering it as in some measure a nice
question, we would add a caution against any hasty conclusion as to
the application of this rule to a case not fully within the same prin
ciple. It may be varied and modiﬁed by circumstances not appearing
in the present case, in which it appears, that no willful wrong or
actual negligence was imputed to the corporation, and where suitable
means were furnished and suitable persons employed to accomplish
the object in view. \Ve are far from intending to say that there are
no implied warranties and undertakings arising out of the relation of
master and servant. \Vhether, for instance, the employer would be
responsible to an engineer for a loss arising from a defective or ill
constructed steam engine; whether this would depend upon an implied
warranty of its goodness and sufficiency, or upon the fact of willful
misconduct, or gross negligence on the part of the employer, if a natural
person, or of the superintendent or immediate representative and
managing agent, in case of an incorporated company—are questions
In the present case, the claim of the
on which we give no opinion.
plaintiff is not put on the ground that the defendants did not furnish a
suﬁicient engine, a proper railroad track, a well-constructed switch,
and a person of suitable skill and experience to attend it; the gravamen
of the complaint is that that person was chargeable with negligence in
not changing the switch, in the particular instance, by means of which
the accident occurred, by which the plaintiff sustained a severe loss.
'It ought, perhaps, to be stated, in justice to the person to whom this
negligence is imputed, that the fact is strenuously denied by the de
fendants, and has not been tried by the jury.
By consent of the
parties, this fact was assumed without trial, in order to take the opinion
of the whole court upon the question of law, whether, if such was
Upon
the fact. the defendants, under the circumstances, were liable.
this question,*supposing the accident to have occurred, and the loss to
have been caused, by the negligence of the person employed to attend
to and change the switch, in his not doing so in the particular case,
the court are of opinion that it is a loss for which the defendants are
not liable, and that the action cannot be maintained.“
'
Plaintiﬁ‘ nonsuit.
an action against his employer

38 The very great ability with which Chliet Justice Shnw discussed the prin
ciples involved made this case overshadow the one fellow-servant ease that
was earlier in point of time. Murray v. S. C. R. Co., 1 MeMul. (S. C.) 385, 36
That ease was decided without a precedent,
Am. Dee. 268, decided in 1841.
for the case of Priestley v. Fowler, supra, though decided four years earlier,
So extraordinary was the inﬂuenee of
was not brought to the court's attention.
these eases that they have been universally followed by the courts of England
and of the United States, and it has been said that no principle is more ﬁrmly
rule.
But it it
in our law than that of the follow-servant
established
pleased the judges it did not satisfy the people, as is shown, ﬁrst, by the
u
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WORCESTER R. CO.

Court of Errors of Connecticut,

1867.

34 Conn.

474.)‘

Action on the case by the administratrix of Daniel Burke, deceased,
for injury caused by the negligence of defendants.
One of the de
fenses was that the injury was due to the act of a fellow servant of
Burke.
It appears that at the time of the accident 'defendant railway
had a practice of transferring coal from vessels to its cars by means
of a hoisting engine and tubs. The company had an arrangement
with its weighmaster, one O’Neil, by which he employed the necessary
shovelers, of whom Burke was one.
The injury was caused by the
backing of empty cars to the turn-out to be ﬁlled. The brakeman in
charge failed to give warning signals, and Burke was caught between
two cars and fatally injured.
Verdict for $2,000, and defendant moved
for a new trial for error in the charge.
McCuRnY, J.” The principle relied upon by the defendants, that
a master is not liable to a servant for an injury to him occasioned by
the misconduct or negligence of a fellow servant, has been so often
recognized, both in this country and in England, that it must now be
considered as settled law.
Two reasons are usually assigned for the
rule; (1) That the employed must be supposed to have contracted with
reference to the perils of the business, including those which may
arise from the character and conduct of his fellow employees; and (2)
that public policy requires that each servant should be influenced by
its operation to be not only careful of his own doings, but as watchful
Farwell v. Boston & Worces
as possible over the acts of his associates.
ter R. R. Co., 4 Metc. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339.
The justness of this reasoning has been questioned by high judicial
Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 435. How
authority.
multitude of cases attacking the rule that at once sprang up in every court.
and. second. by the legislation. now nearly universal, by which the rule was
ﬁrst restricted and then almost wiped out. The judges were logicians. but not
prophets. for at the very moment the rule was being admitted to the law indus
Bed
trial conditions were arising that made it in its full scope intolerable.
ford Quarries Co. v. Bough. 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529. 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418
Public policy. so far from being the basis oi’ the rule, has within
(1907).
the last two or three decades, especially during the last one. nearly driven it
out. See the later cases. showing how the courts at once began to restrict its
Shohoney
operation. and the legislatures ﬁnally largely abolished the rule.
v. Quincy. 0. & K. G. R. Co.. 231 Mo. 131. 143, 132 S. W. 1059. Ann. Cas. 1912A.
“The act not only turned a new leaf in the book of the law of the
1143 (1910).
land. but as with a consuming torch burned to ashes a wealth of ease learning,
with its reﬁnements in definitions of ‘fellow servants,’ etc." See page 143.
See, also. Zcizler v. Danbury & N. R. (*o., 52 Conn. 543. 2 Atl. 462 (1885): St.
L., A. & '1‘. R. Co. v. Welch. 72 Tex. 298. 10 S. W. 529. 2 L. R. A. 839 (1888):
C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Ross. 112 U. S. 377. 383, 5 Sup. Ct. 184. 28 L. Ed.
787 (1884): Bedford Quarries C0. v, Bough. supra.
It has often been recog
nized that the rule is an exception ingrafted h_v the courts on the ordinary
application
of respondent superior.
C.-& N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda, 93 IlL
V
302. 311, 34 Am. Rep. 168 (1879).
89 The statement ot facts ls rewritten.
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ever plausible may be the theory, it is very doubtful whether, in fact,
a spinner in a factory or a ﬁreman on a railroad ever made an exam
ination into the condition of the machinery, the mode of conducting the
business, or the character and habits of the operatives, for the purpose
of ascertaining the extent of his risk, as an element in calculating the
proper amount of his wages. A passenger in a railroad car may well
be presumed to have a vivid consciousness of his risk, but it has
never been understood that he contracts with reference to it when he
Again, a principal is re
buys his ticket, so as to be his own insurer.
sponsible to an employee for his own negligence; why should he not
be liab‘-2 for that of his agent, over whom the employee has no control,
and of whom he may have no knowledge?
With respect to considerations of policy, it is by no means certain
that the public interest would not be best subserved by holding the su
perior, with his higher intelligence, his surer means of information,
and his power of selecting, directing, and discharging subordinates,
to the strictest accountability for their misconduct in his service, who
ever may be the sufferer from it.
But accepting the law as established, and as assented to by the par
ties, we are led to inquire whether the defendants have not had the ben
eﬁt of it in the charge of the court. "The defendants, outside of their
regular business, had engaged in discharging coal from the holds of
O’Neil, an employee in their ordinary business, was acting
vessels.
under a special contract with them to raise and drop the coal. He
The defendants requested the court to charge that
employed Burke.
if Burke was employed in the same general business as O’Neil, and the
company had the control of him (Burke), and could discharge him
when they chose, he was to be considered as their servant, and they
were not liable.
The charge was substantially as proposed. The court said: “If
Burke was an employee of the railroad company, the plaintiff cannot
recover. I leave it to you upon all the evidence as a question of fact
to say whether Burke was so in the employ of O'Neil as an independ
ent contractor, or in the employ of the company in their business. Had
the company the control of him? Could they discharge him without
If they could, or O’Neil
breaking their special contract with O’Neil?
was their agent in employing him, then he was in their employ, and
the plaintiff cannot recover.”
It is difficult to see wherein the charge
differed from that which was requested by the defendants, or wherein
they could have been injured.
It was conceded by the counsel for the plaintiff that, if the relation
of master and servant existed between the company and Burke, the
action would not lie. The real question was one of fact, whether that
relation existed; and even if on this motion we could inquire into
the weight of the evidence, we should have no doubt of its sufficiency
to sustain the verdict. In discharging the coal O’Neil was working un
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der a particular agreement, in a business entirely distinct from his reg
In this respect
ular employment, and for a separate compensation.
he was an independent contractor.
He alone employed, paid, control
The pay of O’Neil- did not depend
led, and could discharge Burke.
O'Neil was paid by the ton; Burke may
upon the wages of Burke.
have been hired by the day or the job.
Burke was unknown to the
company, and his name did not appear on their rolls. He was con
sidered and treated by all parties as in the employment of O'Neil, and
not of the company. He was neither in law nor in fact the servant of
the defendants.
In the case of Kelly v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 1 Kernan (N. Y.)
432, Judge Selden, a very eminent jurist, says, speaking of a contract:
“The clause in question clearly gave the corporation no power to con
trol the contractor in the choice of his servants. That he might make
his own selection of workmen will not be denied. This right of selec
tion lies at the foundation of the responsibility of a master or prin
cipal for the acts of his servant or agent. As a general rule no one can
be held responsible as principal who has not the right to choose .the
agent from whose acts the injury ﬂows.” See, also, Corbin ‘v. Ameri
can Mills. 27 Conn. 274, 71 Am. Dec. 63. In 1 Reclﬁeld’s Law of Rail
ways, 506 (Ed. of 1867), the general principle is laid down that one is
liable for the act of his servant, but not for that of a contractor or the
A long list of authorities is there collected,
‘servant of a contractor.
See, also, American
hearing upon the question involved in this case.
Cases,
Notes,
with
Hare
and
Wallace's
648.
It will be noticed
Leading
that in most of the cases the question has not turned so much upon the
legal principles as on their application to the facts of the particular
This is especially true in the case of \Viggett v. Fox, 36 Eng.
case.
Law & Eq. R. 486, so much relied upon by the defendants.
A new trial is not advised. In this opinion the other judges concurred.

UNION PAC. R. CO.
(Supreme Court of Nebraska,

1894.

v.

ERICKSON.

41 Neb. 1, 59 N.

W.

347. 29

L. R. A.

137.)

Action by Lars Erickson against the Union Paciﬁc Railway Compa
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
IRVINE, C. Erickson was employed by the railway company as a
section hand, and was engaged in his work repairing the roadbed of the

ny.

railroad near Fremont, when a fast passenger train approached, and he
As the train passed him, a large piece of
stepped aside to let it pass.
coal fell from the tender of the locomotive, struck the ground near
him, and broke into smaller pieces, one of which ﬂew towards him,_
striking him, and causing a fracture of the leg. He brought this ac
tion against the railroad company alleging as negligence that the piece
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of coal had

been negligently allowed to fall from the tender while the
train was running at a high rate of speed; that the coal had been neg
ligently loaded and negligently permitted to remain on the tender in a
position rendering it liable to fall and to be cast off by the motion of the
The railway company answered, among other things denying
train.
any negligence upon its part, and alleging contributory negligence on
the part of Erickson.
There was a verdict and judgment for Erickson

for $1,625.
[Omitting

a

a

is

It

a

is

is

it,

The
a discussion of whether negligence was shownz]
next proposition is that Erickson was a fellow servant of whoever was
guilty of negligence, and that the company is therefore not liable. Up
on this subject elaborate briefs have been ﬁled upon either side, re
Vi/e shall not here under
viewing nearly all the American authorities.
take such a review.
\Ve are aware of the hopeless conflict existing.
In fact, a study of the question must convince anyone that shortly after
the introduction of railways the law entered upon a slow but marked
period of transition upon the subject of fellow servants. No deﬁnite
result has yet been reached. Probably the leading case both in America
and in England applying the doctrine of fellow servants to all the
employés of a common master is that of Farwell v. Railroad Corp., 4
Metc. (Mass.) 49. All the cases holding that broad doctrine seem to be
based directly or indirectly upon the authority or the reasoning of
Chief justice Shaw in that case. It was decided in 1842 before the
railway system of the country was developed, before the existence
of other large corporations employing vast numbers of men engaged
in the pursuit of one general object, but performing different func
tions, and engaged in many distinct departments. This state of affairs
was then just arising, and the vast change of conditions in the rela
tions of master and servant was then only beginning to appear. The
extent of that change, and the consequences
of applying old rules to
new conditions could not then be foreseen.
In that case, as in all others upon the subject, the reasons for the
rule exempting masters from liability to servants for injuries produced
by the negligence of their fellow servants are stated as twofold: First,
that such injuries must be presumed to be within the contemplation of
the parties when they made their contract;
and, secondly, that public
policy requires the enforcement of such a rule, upon the theory that,
made closely observant of the acts of
each servant
by enforcing
his fellow servants, and that the scrutiny of one another naturally tends
The ﬁrst reason given, where the rule
to efficiency and care.
sought
to be applied without discrimination to all servants of
common mas
ter, has already been completely set aside and disregarded, even by
those courts in America most inclined to conservatism upon the subject.
everywhere conce(led—First, that inasmuch as
corporation can
only act through agents, and all agents are servants, the logical ap
plication of the rule would discharge
corporation entirely from lia
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bility to its servants; and this gives rise to a corollary that where the
negligence is that of a vice principal, whose acts must be taken as
those of the master, the rule does not apply. The recognition of this
exception was necessary to preserve another rule, that, while a servant
assumes the dangers incident to his employment, he does not assume
dangers caused by the negligence of , his master. There is as much rea
son for holding that a servant in entering an employment contracts with
a view to possible negligence of the master, as to hold that he contracts
with a view to possible negligence of the man who works beside him

To illustrate by reference to railways,
and upon the same footing.
which probably afford as great a variety of grades in employment as
any occupation, can it be logically said that a section man in the matters
within the scope of his employment is less liable to err than a conduc
tor, superintendent, or general manager with reference to his own du
ties? To the writer's mind, when the ﬁrst distinction was drawn be
tween grades of servants, the force of the general rule, so far as it was
based upon contract, was destroyed.
As to the second reason—that founded upon public policy—there is
much force in the observation of Mr. justice Field in Railway Co. v.
Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184: “It may be doubted whether the
exemption has the effect thus claimed for it. We have never known
parties more willing to subject themselves to dangers of life and limb
because, if losing the one or suffering in the other, damages could be
recovered by their representatives or themselves for the loss or injury.
The dread of personal injury has always proved sufficient to bring into
Still, we concede
exercise the vigilance and activity of the servant.”
that there may be some force to the rule so far as grounded upon
public policy, and conﬁned to servants who are, in the language of the
supreme court of Illinois, “consociated by means of their daily duties,
or co-operating in the same department of duty and in the same line of
Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302. Beyond this line
employment.”
we can see no force in it. When the authorities are examined", it is
found that they range themselves in two general classes, those follow
ing the opinion of Chief justice Shaw, and those distinguishing be
tween grades of employment and employés in distinct departments of
service.
The principal objection urged to the latter class is that, by adopting
such distinction, the courts overthrow a general rule of easy application,
and adopt one not susceptible of precise application, and uncertain in
Possibly this objection is well taken. If so, we can only
its results.
Per
say that it accords with the general spirit of the common law.
haps the main distinction between the civil law and the common law is
that the civil law is based upon well-deﬁned logical rules readily sus
ceptible of ascertainment, while the common law is founded upon broad
er general principles, to be applied to the diversity of human affairs in
such a manner as to favor individual liberty and to conform themselves
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When the law of fellow servants was ﬁrst an
to changed conditions.
nounced, business enterprises were comparatively small and simple.
The servants of one master were not numerous; they were all engaged
Now things have
in the pursuit of a simple and common undertaking.
changed. Large enterprises are conducted by persons or corporations
employing vast numbers of servants, divided into classes, each pursuing
a different portion of the work, and each practically independent of
the other. The old reasons do not apply to the new conditions.
VVe are not prepared in this case to propose any set rule for always
determining when two employés are fellow servants within the meaning
of the rule, and when they are not, nor are we required for present
purposes so to do. Erickson was a section man. He was employed,
with several others, to keep the roadbed and the track in repair. The
ﬁreman was employed to ﬁre the engine, and perform certain duties in
connection with the operation of trains.
Some one was employed
at Grand Island to load the tenders with coal. \Vith either the ﬁreman
or this third person Erickson had nothing in common except that he
drew his pay from a common source, and that, in a broad sense, they
were all carrying out parts of a vast transportation business. Erick
son had no_control over either of the others, no opportunity_of judging
of their competency, no supervision of their speciﬁc acts. and only by
adopting the broadest rule as announced by Chief ]'ustice Sha\v could
we hold them to be fellow servants. This rule we are not prepared to
adopt.
\/Ve hold, on the contrary, that employment in the service of a com
mon master is not alone suﬁicient to constitute two men fellow serv
ants within the rule exempting the master from liability to one for in
juries caused by the negligence of the other, and that to make the rule
applicable there must be some consociation in the same department of
For the purposes of this case we are
duty or line of employment.
content to follow the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Garrahy v. Rail
road Co., 25 Fed. 258, where, in the light of quite recent decisions and
of the mature judgment of the supreme court of the United States in
Railway Co. v. Ross, supra, he held that persons occupying such re
lations were not fellow servants within the meaning of the rule.
The other errors discussed in the briefs relate to the giving and re
If we are right in the conclusions reached on
fusal of instructions.
the branches of the case already discussed, there was no error in the
instructions, as those given and refused, so far as they are complained
of, simply relate to those questions. Judgment affirmed.
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NORTH CHICAGO ROLLING MILL CO.
(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1885.

114

Ill.

(Part

3

JOHNSON.

v.

57,’ 29 N.

E.

186.)

Action on the case by Lars F. Johnson against the North Chicago
Plaintiff obtained judg
Rolling Mill Company for personal injuries.

it

a
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it,
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it
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it

a

a

it

a

it

it,

ment, which was aﬁirmed by the appellate court.
Defendant appeals.
'
Affirmed.
SCHOLFIELD, C. J. Appellant was possessed of a rolling mill, and
other works connected with
and of adjoining yards, upon which were
railway tracks used for the movement of cars belongingto appellant
did business, under the management
and tb other parties with whom
and control of employés of appellant. Appellee was in the employ of
common laborer, and had been, for about one month,
appellant as
engaged in removing rails from its mill and placing them upon cars,
was within the line of his duty to unload bricks from cars,
though
and, in general, to perform any common labor required of him in and
about the mill.
He was under the immediate charge and control of
He and
one Clute, assistant foreman of the rail-mill.
number of co
laborers were directed by Clute to unload the bricks from
car stand
ing on one of appellant’s tracks near the rolling mill, which they were
proceeding to do, when, before they had quite ﬁnished the work, a
train of cars was backed down the track on which the car they were
unloading was standing, and against that car with such violence as to
in motion, and thereby to knock appellee down and
suddenly put
break his leg, and otherwise seriously injure him. The train causing
this injury was under the immediate charge and control of one Crow
ley, appellant's yardmaster, and neither Clute had any charge or con
trol of the men operating the train nor Crowley any charge or control
of appellee and the other men engaged in unloading the bricks.
Appellant claims that the injury was caused, primarily, by a defec
tive link coupling the cars somewhere near the middle of the train,
was being backed or
which breaking, the train parted, and as
pushed, with the engine in the rear, that part in advance beyond this
break could not thereafter be controlled by the engine; and, second
arily, by a defective brake—wheel on the extreme advancing car, where
by
was impossible to check the momentum of the cars, the grade
descending from the point at which the break occurred to the car from
which the bricks were being unloaded.
Crowley had caused the car
was, and shortly before the injury
load of bricks to be placed where
but, ﬁnding that
was not yet unloaded,
had sent men to remove
had countermanded that order, and directed that certain coal—cars be
brought and backed in, and these composed the train causing the in
signal to stop the train when he saw
jury. He claims to have given
was likely to hit the brick-car, and also that when he saw, after
that
wards, that the train had not stopped, he cried out to the men unloading
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the brick to look out, etc
It is not claimed that any bell was rung or
whistle sounded to give warning of the approach of this train, and it
is quite evident that no cries or words of warning reached the ears of
appellee, and of some of the other laborers.
[Omitting objections as to showing of negligence and comparative
negligencez]
Objection is also urged that the court erred in refusing
to give the seventh in the series of instructions asked by the appellant.
It reads as follows: “If the jury believe, from the evidence, that plain
tiff’s usual employment at and before the time of the injury was to
load and unload cars in the defendant's yard, and that it was the usual
duty of those having control of the train in question to move cars in
said yard before and after being unloaded, and that the plaintiff, and
those having control of said train, while engaged in their respective
employments, could observe how each did their work, then the said
plaintiff ‘and the persons having control of said engine were coem
ployés."
This falls short of an accurate statement of what is essential
to constitute a coemployé, within the ruling in Railway Co. v. Moranda,
93 Ill. 302, Railroad Co. v. May, 108 Ill. 288, and Railroad Co. v. Gcary,
110 Ill. 383.
That ruling requires that the servants of the same mas
ter, to be coemployés, so as to exempt the master from liability on ac
count of injuries sustained by one resulting from the negligence of the
other, shall be directly co-operating with each other in a particular
business, i. e., the same line of employment, or that their usual duties
shall bring them into habitual association, so that they may exercise
i
a mutual in_fluepce_ upon each other promo_tive_ of proper caution.’ The
itﬁiié fhat the relations between the servants must be such that each,
as to the other, by the exercise of ordinary caution, can either prevent
or remedy the negligent acts of the other, or protect himself against
and, of course, where there is no right or no op
its consequences;‘°
portunity of supervision, or where there is no independent will, and
no right or opportunity to take measures to avoid the negligent acts
of another without disobedience to the orders of his immediate su
How can the laborer be
perior, the doctrine can have no application.
proﬁted by a knowledge of the usual manner of doing work in another
department, if he is unable, in any reasonable way, while engaged in
40 The “consoeiation
ot duties" rule of Illinois is akin to, but not identical
with, the “same department" rule oi a few states. Servants in different de
partments ot the master's service may be associated in their work so as to be
The doctrine has been often assailed in Illinois, but was
fellow servants.
elaborately upheld in C. & N. W. R. C0. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302, 34 Am. Rep.
168 (1879), and this is the most important case for a study or this rule.
It
is there based on Chief’ Justice Shaw’s statement in the Farwell Case, “The
rule is rounded on the expediency of throwing the risk upon those who can best
guard against it." 93 Ill. 314, ff. See, also, Ryan v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 60
Ill. 171, 14 Am. Rep. 32 (1871), engine driver and worker in carpenter shop;
C. & A. R. C0. v. Hoyt, 122 Ill. 369. 12 N. E. 225 (1887) an engine driver and
car inspector; Pagels v. Meyer, 193 Ill. 172, 61 N. E. 1111 (1901), a sawyer and
his helper; Illinois Steel Co. v. Ziemkowski, 220 Ill. 324, 77 N. E. 190, 4 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1161 (1906), a steel blower and a common workman.
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the proper discharge of his duties, and without disobedience to his
immediate superiors, to inﬂuence the conduct of the laborers in that
The instruction was properly refused.
department?
Perceiving no S‘l1ﬁ'lCl€I1t ground upon which to reverse the judgment
below, it is affirmed.

KOERNER
(Supreme

Court of Missouri,

v. ST.

LOUIS CAR CO.

209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481, 17 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 292.)

1907.

[Action for damages for personal injuries to plaintiff, a car painter,
caused by the negligence of a switching crew, whereby the scaffold on
which the plaintiff was working was knocked down and he was severe
Appeal from peremptory instruction to ﬁnd for defendant.]_
ly injured.
* * * Vt/ere the plaintiff and the switchman,
GANTT, C. J.“
whose alleged negligence in pulling out the car to which the unﬁnished
car on which plaintiff was working was attached, without warning to
the plaintiff, and thereby causing plaintiff's injuries, fellow servants so
as to exempt the defendant from said negligent act? \/Ve all agree that
the rule which exempts the master from liability to one servant for
the negligent act of a fellow servant prevails in this state; but we
think it must be conceded that the broad and sweeping rule announced
in Farwell v. Railroad, 4 Metc. (Mass) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339, has not
met the approval of this court in many cases.
As said by Iudge Black
in Parker v. Railroad, 109 Mo., loc. cit. 407, 19 S. VV. 1127 (18 L. R.
A. 802): “That rule had but little more than been approved when
courts and Legislatures began a process of cutting it down, because of
the gross injustice which it worked out in its application to the great
enterprises of the day.” On the other hand, what is known as the
“department rule” has not been adopted in this state in all of the broad
ness for which many of its advocates have contended.
Much of the
difﬁculty has arisen from the inability of the courts to determine at
all times whether the employment was a common service, and the em
‘
ployés fellow servants, within the meaning of the rule itself.
We are aware that it is insisted that the courts ought to be able to
so express the rule that all cases can be weighed and gauged by it. But
we are of the opinion, after long consideration, that, unsatisfactory
as it might seem, the rule itself must remain general, and its application
speciﬁc, as the cases arise. The subject was given great consideration
in Parker v. R. R., 109 Mo. 362, 19 S. W. 1119, 18 L. R. A. 802. In
that case, contrary to the views of the present writer, this court re
fused to hold that a railroad locomotive engineer and a track walker
in the service of the same company were fellow servants within the
rule exempting masters from liability for injuries received through
41

Parts or the opinion are omitted.
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the negligence of a fellow servant. Afterwards, when the same ques
tion arose in Schlereth v. Ry. Co., 115 Mo. 87, 21 S. VV. 1110, this
court in banc, through Burgess, ]., approved the opinion of Judge Mac
Farlane in division, in which he said:
“The importance of having
the rules of law ﬁrmly established, especially those under which prop
erty rights are held, or the business and wages of large classes of citi
zens are made to depend, is fully recognized;
and we therefore hold,
in accordance with the late rulings of this court, that the husband
of the plaintiff (the track walker) was not a fellow servant of the neg
ligent engineer within the rule of exemption.
Sullivan v. R. R., 97
Mo. 113, 10 S. W. 852.”
In the last-cited case it was ruled that a track walker on a railroad
is not a fellow servant of the locomotive engineer or ﬁreman of a pas
In Condon v. R. R., 78 Mo. 567, it was ruled that a car
senger train.
repairer at a station and a trainman were not fellow servants within
the meaning of the rule. And in Hall v. R. R., 74 Mo. 298, it was held
that a section foreman and a switchman were not fellow servants. In
Dixon v. R. R., 109 Mo. 413, 19 S. W. 412, 18 L. R. A. 792, a quarry
laborer under orders of a foreman who had control of the quarry, and
represented the company there, was not a fellow servant with the
All of these cases were cited with ap
trainmen on a passenger train.
proval, and followed by this court in banc, in Lanning v. R. R., 196
Mo. 647, 94 S. W. 491. In this last-mentioned case it appeared that
the plaintiff was a workman, engaged as a part of a crew emptying. cars
of coal into bins at a coal chute, and was injured by the negligence of
an engineer in backing some cars up an incline, and causing them to
The crew in which plain
strike the car on which plaintiff was working.
tiff worked had its own foreman, from whom he took his directions,
and the engineer worked under the general supervision of the yard
master, and it was held that the plaintiff and the engineer were not
fellow servants; this court-saying: “We think that the workmen so
distantly related to each other in the service of a common master as
plaintiff and Gahagan were, were not fellow servants within the mean
ing of the rule which exempts a master from liability for injuries in
ﬂicted by a fellow servant upon a fellow servant. In our opinion, the
reason of the rule forbids its application to the facts in this case.”
When we look for the underlying principle upon which all of these
cases rest, as exceptions to the general rule announced in Far\vell’s
Case, it will perhaps be found as well stated in the separate opinion
of Judge Black. in Parker v. R. R., 109 Mo., loc. cit. 409, 19 S. W. 1127
(18 L. R. A. 802), as anywhere. As the rule prevailed in that case. it
will bear repeating here: “Now, it being conceded, as it must be, that
the master is liable to third persons for the negligent acts of his serv
ants, it is difficult to see how public policy has much to do with the
question as to who shall be deemed fellow servants within the meaning
GODD.PR.& A.(2u En.)—32
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of the rule of exemption. The liability being admitted in case a third
person is injured, but denied in case a servant is injured by another
servant, the denial in the latter case must stand on some peculiar rela
tion between master and servant.
This peculiar relation cannot be
simply the fact that the servants are in a position where one may be
injured by the negligence of another; for third persons often occupy
The real and
the same position, as where they become passengers.
only point of distinction, it seems to us, arises out of the fact that serv
ants are so associated and related in the performance of their work
that they can observe and inﬂuence each other’s conduct and report
any delinquency to a correcting power. To say a clerk, engaged in an
oﬂice making out pay rolls for a railroad company, is a fellow servant,
within the rule of exemption, with those engaged in operating trains,
is out of all reason. Guided by the real reason for the rule, it seems to
us it should be applied, and applied only, in those cases where the serv
ant injured and the one inﬂicting the injuries are so associated and re-‘
lated in their work that they can observe and have an inﬂuence over
each other’s conduct and can report delinquencies to a common cor
recting power or head. In short, they should be fellow servants in fact,
and not simply in dialectic theory.
If in separate and distinct depart
ments, so that the circumstances just stated do not, and cannot exist,
then they are not fellow servants within any just or fair meaning of
the rule. This conclusion. though not in strict accord with the majority
of the adjudged cases, is, it is believed, within the true and only reason
for the rule, and has the support of many cases, some of which go
much further than has been indicated.”
Now, in the case at bar we have seen that the plaintiff belonged to
a gang of painters who were working under a general paint foreman,
Mehlin, who had authority to hire and discharge them and to direct
their work.
This foreman had no power or authority over the switch
ing crew, to which the switchman, Hensler, belonged, but the latter
worked under the directions of the general superintendent of the
whole works, who, when he desired a car taken out of the yards or
sheds to be shipped, sent his switching crew with the motor for that
purpose. -The plant, as the evidence all shows. was a very large one,
and a very large number of workmen were employed therein.
The
plaintiff was employed in the construction of cars, while the switching
crew were engaged in an entirely different branch of the work, to wit,
the transportation or movement of the cars. In a word, these painters
were not so associated or related with the switching crew that they
were required to observe and report any delinquencies on their part,
and, unless we are to disregard the decisions which we have cited, es
pecially the Lanning Case, the conclusion cannot be escaped that the
plaintiff and the switching crew were not fellow servants within the
Gonn.Pn.&

A.(2o En.)

Ch. 2)

norms

or-‘

CONSTITUENT 'ro REPRESENTATIVE

~

499

meaning of the exception which we have just noted to the general .rule
exempting masters for the negligence of their servants.
But it is said that, while those cases may have been properly decided,
they were all rendered in railway cases, and the doctrine should not be
extended to any other class of masters, and we are cited to a sentence
in the opinion of judge Black in the Parker Case, in which he says:
“Thus the persons engaged in and about machine shops, foundries,
and the like, are often strictly fellow servants, though under and sub
ject to the orders of different foremen.”
But this view ignores the
other remarks of the learned judge in the beginning of that paragraph,
where he says that the general rule had been cut down by the courts
“because of the gross injustice which it worked out in its application
to the great enterprises of the day.”
We agree that servants of a
common master, working under different foremen, may be brought into
such consociation and relation to each other that they would still be
held to be fellow servants within the meaning and modiﬁcation of the
general rule which was announced by Iudge Black in Parker's Case;
but we are unwilling to say that the underlying reason of the decisions
in the cases we have cited would restrict the rule to railroads alone.
The reason of the law is the life of the law, and, where a master is
operating a great enterprise which calls for various departments in the
execution of his work, whether it be a railroad, or, as in this case,
immense carworks for the manufacture and construction of cars, re
quiring various and distinct branches of labor, he is equally within
~
the rule.
_
The same reason which applied to the owner of a railway must be
held applicable to other large manufacturing plants of business. But
we are cited to the decision of this court in Grattis v. Ry., 153 Mo. 380,
SS S. \/V. 108, 48 L. R. A. 399, 77 Am. St. Rep. 721, in which the de~
partmental doctrine is strongly criticised by Iudge Marshall, in which
decision the majority of this court, including the writer hereof, con
curred; but a careful examination of that case will show that the
ﬁnal conclusion was that the engineer and ﬁreman on the train in that
case were fellow servants, and that the negligence of the engineer was
the sole cause of the injury to the ﬁreman, and that the master was
It is true that Judge
not liable for the negligence of the engineer.
Marshall makes an extended review of the cases on this subject, but
In Z Lewis’
none of the cases which we have cited were overruled.
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 486, it is aptly said : “The maxim
of stare decisis applies only to decisions on points arising and decided
in causes.
It has been held not to extend to reasoning, illustrations,
The precedent includes the conclusions
and references in opinions.
only upon questions which the case contains, and which are decided.
‘T he members of a court,’ says Downey, C. ]., ‘often agree in a decision,
but differ decidedly as to the reasons or principles by which their minds
It is therefore the conclusion
have been led to a common conclusion.
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only, and not the process by which it has been reached, which is the
decision of the court, and which has the force of precedent in other
”
cases.’

So viewed, the decision in the Grattis Case did not overturn any of
the decisions which we have cited for the purpose of showing what
the views of this court have been as to who are and who are not fellow
In our opinion, the plaintiff was not a fellow
servants in this state.
servant with the switchman, whose negligent act, the evidence tend
ed to show, was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and, if the court
sustained the demurrer to the evidence on the ground that the switch
man and plaintiff were fellow servants, as is asserted by plaintiff, then
it committed reversible error. * * *
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new
trial in accordance with the views herein expressed.“

~‘
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DONNELLY

v.

CUDAHY PACKING CO.

(Supreme Court or Kansas,

1904.

68

Kan.

653. 75 Pac.

1017.)

Action by Patrick ]. Donnelly against the Cudahy Packing Company.
Iudgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
GREENE, I. The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages
for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained through the negli
The plaintiff was what is commonly known as
gence of the defendant.
a “meat trucker" in the packing house of defendant at Kansas City,
Kan. His duties were to remove meat from the different floors of the
building to other ﬂoors. This was done by means of a truck, which was
wheeled into an elevator and carried either up or down as desired. On
the day plaintiff sustained his injuries the elevator was in charge of a
meat trucker, and while plaintiff was being carried on thefelevator it
dropped, causing the injuries of which he complained. The substantial
allegations of negligence were as follows: Th;;t by reason of the fact
that said elevator had been carelessly and negligently abandoned by the
regular operator in charge thereof, and was in charge of an inefficient
and incompetent \vorkman, who did not know how to operate the same,
but let it fall with plaintiff, and of whose incompetency the defendant
42 Compare the Conﬂicting opinions of the judges in the elaborately consid
ered case of Parker v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 109 Mo. 362, 19 S. W. 1119, 18
LI R. A. 802 (1891), and in Relyea v. K. 0., etc., R. Co., 112 M0. 86. 20 S. W.
480, 18 L. R. A. S17 (1892).
The rationale of the consociation rule is well
discussed in Louisville Ry. Co. v. Hibbitt, 139 Ky. 43, 129 S. W. 319, 139 Am.
St. Rep. 461 (1910), involving the question whether the motormen of two
street cars are fellow servants.
Cf. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nuckol‘s
Adm., 91 Va. 193, 21 S. E. 342 (1895), abandoning the departmental rule of
earlier Virginia cases, and applying to engineman and track repairer.
Cf‘.
Howard V. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. (C. C.) 26 Fed. S37 (1886).
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knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, or by
reason of the defective condition of said elevator in that the same was
not provided with suitable or proper safety appliances to prevent the
same from falling to the bottom, as was known or should have been
known to the defendant, such elevator was suddenly precipitated to the
bottom of such elevator shaft while plaintiff was in the same, and by
Defendant’s answer was a general de
reason whereof he was injured.
nial and contributory negligence. When the plaintiffhad rested his
cause the court sustained a demurrer to the evidence, and rendered judg
ment for costs in favor of defendant. To this order and judgment and
the overruling of a motion for a new trial the plaintiﬂ excepted and
prosecutes error.
The evidence failed to prove that the elevator was not properly con
structed; that it was in a defective condition, or wanting in any of the
At the time plaintiff received
appliances necessary to properly control
meat trucker, was running the elevator,
his injuries, Patrick Rady,
and, according to his own testimony, he did not understand how to op
erate
with safety. He testiﬁed, in substance, that all the experience
or knowledge he had was derived from operating the elevator from 10
to 15 minutes
day for two or three weeks previous, and what Elbert,
the regular elevator man, had taught him; that he had not been taught
reverse lever, which, when properly used, would stop the
the use of
elevator when going too fast. On the occasion of'plaintiff’s injuries El
bert had called Rady to run the elevator while he went on the top to
oil its bearings.
Vi/hile the elevator was going down,
became un
manageable and dropped several feet, inflicting injuries to plaintiff,
which injuries appear to have been occasioned by the negligence of El
bert in.turning the elevator over to an incompetent person.
The controlling question in this case
were the plaintiff and Elbert
fellow servants? If they were‘, in the absence of any evidence that the
defendant had not exercised reasonable care in the employment of
suitable and competent person to run the elevator, he cannot recover.
\/Vhether two or more persons employed by the same master are fellow
not
servants
question of law exclusively, nor
question
entirely
of fact. When the facts are undisputed, or are fairly proved,
be
comes a question of law. In the present case, for the purpose of decid
ing this question,‘the facts which the evidence fairly tends to establish
will be accepted as proved. Therefore whether the plaintiff and the
other employé mentioned were fellow servants
question of law ex
clusively. The facts proved that the defendant was a meat packer, op
erating in
building seven stories high.
Rady and plaintiff were
meat truckers.
was their duty to load trucks with meat, wheel them
to this elevator, which carried them to the floor desired. Plaintiff knew
the elevator was used expressly for this purpose.
was his custom
to load
truck with meat, wheel
to the elevator, call to the operator,
and direct him to the ﬂoor upon which he desired to deposit the meat.
The plaintiff knew the elevator was operated by an employé of defend
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ant, and that, if such employé was guilty of negligence in operating the
him.
elevator while he was in
such negligence might result in injury
That,
From'the authorities the following rule may be deduced:
whenever coemplo_vés under the control of one master are engaged in
the discharge of duties directed to one common end, such duties being
so closely related that each employé must know he
exposed to the
risk of being injured by the negligence of another, they are fellow serv
ants, and each assumes the risk to which he
thus exposed. Northern
349, 14 Sup. Ct. 983, 38 L. Ed.
Paciﬁc Railroad v. Hambly, 154 U.
1009; Naylor v. New York Cent.
H. R. R. C0. (C. C.) 33 Fed. 801;
Bier v. The ]eﬁ'crsonville, Madison
Indianapolis Railroad Company,
132 Ind. 78, 31 N. E. 471
Railway Company v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289,
15 S. VV. 831, 16
VV. 266, 11 L. R. A: 773; Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa.
477; Quincy Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34,
N. W. 240; Fiﬁeld
v. Northern Railroad, 42 N. H. 225; McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N.
Law, 117; Ewan v. Lippincott, 47 N.
Law, 192, 54 Am. Rep. 148;
Valtez v. O.
A. R. R. Co. v. Murphy,
M. Ry. Co., 85 Ill. 500; C.
53 Ill. 336,
Am. Rep. 48. Plaintiff and the operator of the elevator
were engaged in one common pursuit——that of curing and packing meat.
different line of employment, but were in the same
Each worked in
general business, and so closely related that the negligence of one was
liable to inﬂict injury to the other.“ Therefore he must be held to have
L. R. A. (N.

Eastern Bridge C0. v. Miller, Adm’x, 71 Kan. 13, 80 Pac.
(1905), is a full discussion of the consocintion, de
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partmental, and common employment rules emphasizing the insurmountable
of serv
diﬁicultles encountered in applying any hard and fast classiﬁcation
ants ot the same master. A similar discussion is to be found in Railway Co.
v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289, 15 S..W. 831, 16 S. W. 266, 11 L. R. A. 773 (1891), in
which the court says: “The true reason on which the rule is based, as shown
person who voluntarily engages in
by the great weight of authority, is that
the service of another presumably assumes all the risks ordinarily incident to
view to such risks.
Randall
that service, and ﬁxes his compensation with
Sup. Ct. 322; Wood, Mast.
S.
326; Underh.
v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 485,
Torts, p. 52: Farwell v. Railway Co.,
Metc. (l\-lass.) 49.
See note
to sec
tion 72, McKinney, Fel. Serv., where the authorities are cited; Campbell v.
Atl. 489; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall, 553. If this he
Railroad Co. (Pa.)
the principle underlying the rule,.it would seem that the question which
for-ms
test in any case is one of risks; and that, where one servant is shown
to have been injured by another the question is not whether the two serv
in any technical sense of the.term, but whether
anrs were fellow-servants
the injury was within the risk ordinarily incident to the service undertaken.
‘The negligence of
fellow workman engaged upon
common work is com.
monly accounted among the risks undertaken, but it is only a subordinate
Lawler v. Railroad Co., 16 Am. Rep. 498. ‘A fellow servant,’ says
instance.’
the court in McAdams v. Burnes, 30 N. .1‘. Law, 117, ‘is one who serves and is
Common employment is service of such kind
controlled by the same master.
that, in the exercise of ordinary sagacity, all who engage in it may be able to
foresee when accepting it that through the carelessness of fellow servants it
Or, as more fully expressed by Wil
may probably expose them to injury.‘
liams, J., in the case of Baird v. ‘Pettit, 70 Pa. St. 477, 482: ‘Servants, it is
said, are engaged in
common employment where each of them is occupied in
‘service of such a kind that all the others, in the exercise of ordinary sagacity,
ought to be able to foresee, when accepting their employment, that it may prob
nbly expose them to the risk of injury in case he is negligent.
That this is
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assumed the risk of the negligence of his coemployé who ran the ele
vator.
It is contended that at common law it is the duty of an employer
to secure suitable and competent servants; that the defendant was
guilty of actionable negligence in permitting Rady, an incompetent
person, to run the elevator. The evidence does not support this con
tention. There is no evidence tending to show that defendant put Ra
or that
dy in charge of the elevator, or knew that he was running
he was incompetent.
The defendant employed Elbert to run the ele
vator, and
not denied that he was fully competent to perform
this duty.
was the negligence of Elbert in permitting Rady, an in
competent person, to undertake to run the elevator, that resulted in in
If Elbert had been acting as vice principal when he
jury to plaintiff.
turned the elevator over to Rady, under the evidence showing Rady's
no conten
incompetency the defendant might be held liable. There
tion of this kind.
For the reasons here suggested the demurrer was properly sustained.
The judgment of the court below
afﬁrmed.
All the Justices con
curring.
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the proper test is evident from the reason assigned for the exemption of mas
ters from liability to their servants, viz. that the servant takes the risk into
risk which he
account when ﬁxing his wages. He cannot take into account
has no reason to anticipate. and he does take into account the risks which the
Judge
average experience of his fellows has led him as
class to anticipate.’
Dillon after discussing this subject in an article published in 24 Am. Law Rev.
‘The real inquiry is, was the injury caused by another serv
190, concludes:
If so, the mere
ant one of the ordinary risks of the particular employment?
grade, whether higher, lower, or coordinate, or the department of the faulty
servant, is of no consequence. It is a condition of the contract of service that
the servant takes upon himself the risk of accidents in the common course of
the business, all open and palpable risks, including the negligence of all fellow
The true inquiry in each
servants of whatever grade, in the same employment.
case is, was the accident one of the normal and natural risks in the ordinary
If so, then there is no common-law liability on the part
course of business?
of the employer; if not, there is such liability; and the inquiry, except as
This is the ﬁnal
bears on the above, is not one of grades or departments.
form the doctrine has assumed, and it is the correct one. It is plain, intelligi
It is founded upon just principles, viz. that it is precisely
ble. and practical.
commensurate with the master's personal duties.’ "
Morgan v. Vale of Neath Ry. Co.,
the English rule.
Best
S.
Such
570 (1864).
Accord: New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323. 20 Sup, Gt.
85, 44 L. Ed. 181 (1899). reviewing the authorities and particularly earlier
cases in the United States Supreme Court.
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On demurrer.
Trespass on the case.
This action was brought by Malvina Brodcur against the Valley
Falls Company to recover damages for the death of the plaintiﬂF’s hus
The de
band, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant.
ceased was killed by a barrel which was thrown out of a door by one
of the defendant’s employés. The defendant is a corporation engaged
in the manufacture of cotton goods in the town of Lincoln, state of
Rhode Island, where it has its manufactory and a large number of
It has, under the officers of the corporation, a general
employés.
superintendent, who has immediate control and direction of all the
employés. It has also overseers of the different rooms or departments,
such as the slashing room, weave room, spinning room, machine shop.
blacksmith shop, boiler room, etc.; all under the direction and con
trol of the general superintendent, who takes his direction from the
officers of the corporation.
The deceasedwas employed as second
hand, that
second foreman under the regular foreman of the ma
chine shop department, and took his orders from his immediate fore
man or the general superintendent.
His duties were, in common with
others employed in the machine shop department, to assist in keeping
defendant’s machinery in the several rooms or departments in proper
to
repair or condition, and, in case of any breakage ofxmachinery.
oversee and assist in its repair, under the direction of his immediate
foreman or the general superintendent.
In the performance of these
duties he was brought at different times into all the different rooms or
departments of defendant’s mills. On the 2d day of April, 1884, the
deceased was crossing an open court or yard from the machine shop
to the cast iron room, so called, he being then and there engaged about
his work in the machine shop, at defendant’s mill, and while passing
across said yard was struck upon his head by an empty barrel, which
was thrown from the fourth story of the building in which the ma
situated by the overseer of the slashing and dressing
chine shop
room, and thereby fatally injured.
Said deceased was not subject to
the orders of the overseer of said slashing room; but
was his dutv,
in case said overseer should report to him that any of the machinery
in his department was out of repair or broken, to oversee the repair
of the same, subject to the orders of his immediate foreman and gen
On the Zd day of April, 1884, the de
eral superintendent, aforesaid.
ceased was not employed or at work in said slashing room or depart
ment, but was employed and at work in the machine shop, which
feet under the slashing room
situated on the ground ﬂoor, and
The said overseer of said slashing room was not, on said
aforesaid.
The
day, at work in the machine shop, or with said Eli Brodeur.
barrel was thrown without proper precautions.
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STINESS, I. The question raised by this demurrer is whether the
and the foreman of the slashing room were fellow servants,
within the meaning of the rule which exempts the master from liabili
ty to his servant for an injury received through the negligence of a
fellow servant in the course of their common service. The plaintiff
contends that they were not, because they were not employed in the
same department.
The cases cited by the plaintiff, excepting those in
Illinois, are plainly distinguishable from the case at bar. Thus in Rail
road Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184, it was held that an
engineer was not a fellow servant with a conductor in charge, and to
whom the company had given the right to command the movements
of the train and to control the persons employed on
upon the ground
that the conductor should be treated, being so in fact, as the personal
was respon
representative of the corporation, for whose negligence
sible to subordinate servants. In Moon’s Adm’r v. Railroad Co., 78
Va. 745, the company was building a railroad, and the construction,
at the place of injury, was in charge of
section master, who was
held not to be
fellow servant with
train hand, the company hav
was~also held
ing delegated to an agent
duty incumbent upon it.
conductor, having control and direction, was not
that
fellow serv
ant with the train hand, but his superior.
In Ford v. Railroad Co.,
110 Mass. 240, the company was held liable for not providing
prop
er engine, and in Davis v. Railroad Co., 55 Vt. 84, for
defective
road bed. These cases stand upon very different considerations from
The duty of the master to furnish suitable ma
the one before us.
chinery and appliances, and to keep the same in repair,
unquestioned.
also well settled that, when
servant duties
master delegates to
which belong to himself, the servant will occupy the place of the mas
ter, not that of fellow servant with other employés, and the master
will remain as responsible for the negligence of this servant as
he
were personally guilty of
himself.
Mulvey v. Locomotive NVorks,
l4 R.
In the present case the deceased was not under the over
204.
seer of the slashing room, nor did the latter stand in the place of the
principal with reference to the deceased.
But the decisive question in this case
whether the circumstances
used in law.
The
set forth amount to fellow service, as the term
They
cases in Illinois are directly in favor of the plaintiffs contention.
proceed upon the distinct ground that to constitute workmen, under
the same master, fellow servants. they must directly co—operate with
each other, or, by their usual duties, be brought into such habitual as
sociation as to have the power of inﬂuencing each other to the exer
cise of constant caution, by example, advice, encouragement, and by
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Moranda, 93
reporting delinquencies.
Ill. 302, the court reviews and aﬁirms its position at length.
re
marks, however:
“Although the distinction taken by this court be
e., those employed in the
tween these two classes of coservants,"
and disconnected
same department, and those employed in separate
a is
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branches of‘ the business, “has not the sanction of the courts of Eng
land, nor that of most of the courts of last resort in this country, we
But
think, on principle, it is a distinction which ought to be taken.”
this distinction has not been overlooked in the adjudications upon this
'
'
subject.
In the early case of Farwell v. Railroad Corp., 4 Metc. 49, the con
sideration of a distinction between these two classes of -servants was
pressed upon the court. _ Upon this point, Shaw, C.
says, in the
opinion of the court: “When the object to be accomplished
one and
the same, when the employers are the same, and the several persons
employed derive their authority and their compensation from the same
source,
would be extremely diﬂicult to distinguish what constitutes
one department, and what
It would
distinct department of duty.
If were made to de
vary with the circumstances of every case.
pend upon the nearness or distance of the persons from each other, the
question would immediately arise, how near or how distant must they
be to be in the same or different departments?
In
blacksn1ith’s shop,
persons working in the same building, at different ﬁres, may be quite
few feet distant. In
independent of each other, though only
rope
walk, several may be at work on the same piece of cordage, at the
same time, at many hundred feet distant from each other, and beyond
Besides,
the reach of sight and voice, and yet acting together.
ap
pears to us that the argument rests upon an assumed principle of re
sponsibility which does not exist. The master, in the case supposed,
not exempt from liability because the servant has better means of
providing for his safety, when he
employed in immediate connection
with those from whose negligence he might suffer, but because the im
plied contract of the master does not extend to indemnify the servant
not liable
against the negligence of any one but himself; and he
in tort, as for the negligence of his servant, because the person suﬁ‘er
ing does not stand towards him in the relation of
stranger, but
one whose rights are regulated by contract, express or implied.”
The reasons here set forth are
strong answer to the position taken
in the Illinois cases.
They show an obvious impracticability
trying
to gauge the liability of an employé, in a complex business, by the in
of its different branches, or by the intercommunication of
dependence
Not only would
those employed.
be almost impossible, in many
cases, to separate the work into distinct departments, and to discern
their dividing lines, but incidental duties, changing the -relations of
workmen to each other, would vary also the master’s liability.
He
would thus be liable for the negligence of
servant at one time or
\Vitl1out
place, and not at another.
personal supervision of all his
help in all their work, he could not know when he was responsible
and when he was not. Moreover, such
rule would govern the lia
bility of a master when the groundwork upon which the rule
found
For,
the test of liability be that of the separate
ed did not exist.
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and independent duties of the servants, they may nevertheless be so
near each other as to be able to exert a mutual inﬂuence to caution;
or, if it be that of association, they may still be in the same depart
ment, but unable, from their duties or position, to exert such inﬂuence.
But, aside from these considerations, we do not think the rule is cor
rect in principle.
The principle upon which the determination of Far
well v. Railroad Corp. proceeded is the same that has been generally
followed in England and in this country, namely, that the rights and
liabilities of both master and servant are those which grow out of their
contract relation. The master impliedly agrees to use due care for the
safety of his servant, in providing suitable places and appliances for
work; and, as is universally conceded, the servant agrees to assume
the ordinary risks of his employment.
The most common risks of service spring from the negligence of
fellow servants. When one works with others, he knows that his safe
ty depends on the exercise of care by those around him, as their safe
ty depends also upon his own caution. No man can enter into an em
Negligence, therefore, among
ployment without a thought of this.
workmen, is a breach of the duty which each owes to the others, and
not a breach of the master's duty, if he has, exercised the care that is
For his own negligence the master must answer;
required of him.
but for that of others, which is a risk incident to every employment,
he has not agreed to be responsible, but, on the contrary, the servant
The contract rela
has impliedly agreed to assume it upon himself.
tion, therefore, puts them outside of the rule which makes a master
liable to a stranger for the negligence of his agent, for respondeat
superior is based upon considerations of public policy which are not
called for in the relation between master and servant. The cases‘ cit
ed by the defendant abundantly illustrate and support the generally
recognized doctrine that servants _under the same master, in a common
service, are fellow servants, although they may be engaged in different
departments of labor.
But the plaintiff further contends, even in this view of the case, it
is only the ordinary risks which can be reasonably foreseen and taken
into account that the servant assumes; and consequently, since the
deceased could not foresee such an act of carelessness as the throw
ing of the barrel, it is not within the risks assumed. We have already
said that the ordinary risks include the carelessness of others. This
rule is distinctly recognized in Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553, one
of the cases cited by the plaintiff upon this point. The court say: “The
employé, in entering the service of the principal, is presumed to take
among which are
upon himself the risks incident to the undertaking;
In that case a boy
to be counted the negligence of fellow servants."
of tender years was sent by a superior, whose orders he was required
to obey, to adjust a belt in a dangerous place, outside of his regular du
ties, in ignorance of the danger.
There is a wide rliﬂerence in the
application of the rule in such a case and in the case at bar. The
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argument of the plaintiff here, if followed, would abrogate the rule;
for the careless acts of another are just the ones that cannot be fore
seen.
If they could be, it would be because they were a part of the
ordinary way of doing things, and, therefore, presumably not negli
They are nevertheless a part of the ordinary risks.
gent.
We think the plaintiﬁ"s claim that the deceased and the overseer of
the slashing room are not to be regarded as fellow servants is unten
able, and that the demurrer to the declaration must be sustained.

ii

LOUISVILLE
(Supreme

Court of Tennessee,
746, 108 Am.

& N. R. CO. v.

DILLARD.

1904.
114 Tenn. 240, 86 S. W. 313, 69 L. B. A.
St. Rep. 694, 4 Ann. Cas. 1028.)

NEIL, J. This action was brought in the circuit court_ of Sumner
county to recover damages for an injury inﬂicted upon the foot of the
defendant in error in a collision that occurred in November, 1902, at
Hendersonville, on the line of the plaintiff in error, between a freight
train and a passenger train. There were verdict and judgment in the
court below, and the railway company, after motion for a new trial
had been overruled, appealed and assigned errors.
'
The defendant in error was a brakeman on the freight train. The
declaration contained counts on the negligence of the train dispatcher,
the negligence of the conductor of the freight train, and the negligence
of the conductor of the passenger train. To the last-mentioned count
—-the third—there was a demurrer ﬁled, raising the question that the
conductor on the ‘passenger train stood in the relation of fellow serv
ant to the train crew of the freight train, and hence to the defendant
in error, the brakeman on that train, and therefore the company would
not be liable to him for an injury caused by the negligence of such pas
This demurrer was overruled by the circuit court
senger conductor.
judge, and his action on this matter forms the subject of the ﬁrst
assignment of error, which we shall now proceed to consider.
The ﬁrst assignment of error raises the question whether the con
ductor on the passenger train was the fellow servant of the brakeman
on the freight train, or whether such conductor stood in the relation of
vice principal to the brakeman.
In our latest case upon the subject (Railroad v. Edwards, 111 Tenn.
31, 76 S. W. 897) it is said: “The mere superiority in dignity, grade,
or compensation, in favor of one servant of a common principal over
other servants, is not a mark by which to distinguish whether or not the
* * * The most general test is that, in
former is a vice principal.
order to be a vice principal, a servant must so far stand in the place of
his master as to be charged in the particular matter with the perform
ance of a duty towards the inferior which, under the law, the master
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owes to such servant, as furnishing tools (Guthrie v. Railroad, 11 Lea,
Am. Rep. 286) or machinery and appliances (Railroad v. Lahr,
86 Tenn. 335, 341, 6 S. VV. 663), or giving orders with res'pect to work
to be done by the subordinate (Railroad v. Hanclman, 13 Lea, 423, 429).
A test frequently stated in our cases is the authority to give orders, as
a vice principal, to the subordinate servant, in directing him when,
* *
*
where, and how to work.
Some illustrations of the fore
going are seen in the following cases: Railroad v. Bowler, 9 Heisk.
866; Railroad v. Northington, 91 Tenn. 56, 17 S. W. 880, 16 L. R.
A. 268; Railroad v. Lawson, 101 Tenn. 408, 409, 47 S. W. 489. In
these cases a section boss was held to stand as a vice principal to the
section hands under him because he had power to order them with re
spect to their work, and also because it was his duty to see that they
had pro‘per tools with which to work.
In Railroad v. Collins, 85 Tenn.
227, 1 S. W. 883, and Railroad v. Martin, 87 Tenn. 398, 10 S. W. 772,
3 L. R. A. 282, it was held that the engineer was the vice principal
of
the brakeman on a train, when, in the absence of the conductor, he had
power to give the brakeman orders in respect to his work, but other
wise not; and in Railroad v. Wright, 100 Tenn. 56, 42 S. W. 1065, it
was held that the conductor stands as vice principal to all of the train
force, because they are all under his orders.”
To same eﬁect, Railroad
v. Spence, 93 Tenn. 173, 23 S. W. 211, 42 Am. St. Rep. 907.
The conductor of the passenger train in question, however, had no
power to give orders to the brakeman on the freight train. This ground
for adjudging the relation of vice principal and of servant thereunder
did not, therefore, exist.
Was the conductor of the passenger train charged with any of the
‘personal duties of the master towards the brakeman on the freight
train? \Vas he charged with the duty of furnishing tools and applianc
There is nothing to show that he was
es or a safe place to work?
Y
charged with such duties.
_
Was the passenger conductor in charge of, or engaged in, a separate
In this state the departmental
department of the master’s business?
doctrine is recognized in railway cases. The grounds on which it rests
are thus stated in Coal Creek Mining Company v. Davis, 90 Tenn. 711,
719, 720, 18 S. W. 387, 389: “The doctrine rests upon the theory that
the vast extent of the business of railway companies has held to the
division of their business into separate and distinct departments; that
by reason of this division a servant in one branch or de‘partment has no
sort of association or connection with one in another department; that
this absence of association gives the servant no opportunity of observ
ing the character of a servant in another department of labor, and no
opportunity to guard against the negligence of such servant. The want
This rule has
of consociation is the idea underlying this limitation.
not been extended by us beyond railroad corporations, and we are not
disposed to extend it further than to the class of employments to which
it has been heretofore limited.”
372, 47
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Under this doctrine it has been held that a track repairer was in a
different department from, and hence not the fellow servant of, the
crew of a train running upon the track (Haynes v. Railroad Co., 3 Cold.
222); for the same reason, that a section foreman was not the fellow
servant of the train crew (Railroad v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347, 361); that
a watchman was not the fellow servant of an engineer (Railroad v.
Robertson, 9 Heisk. 276) ; a telegraph operator at a way station not the
fellow servant of. the conductor of ,a train (Railroad Co. v. De Ar
mond, 86 Tenn. 73, 5 S. W’. 600, 6 Am. St. Re‘p. 816); a" car inspector
not the fellow servant of the crew_of a switch engine (Taylor v. Rail
road Co., 93 Tenn. 307, 27 S. W. 663); a depot agent not the fellow
servant of the conductor of a train (Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 106 Tenn,
438, 61 S. \/V. 771) ; a bridge crew not the fellow servant of the crew of
a freight train (Freeman v. Railroad, 107 Tenn. 340, 64 S. W. 1); and
an engineer not the fellow servant of a telegraph operator (Railroad
Co. v. Bentz, 108 Tenn. 670, 69 S. VV. 317, 58 L. R. A. 690, 91 Am. St.
Rep. 763).
VVe have no case holding that separate trains constitute separate and
distinct departments of railway service, nor do we think they can be so
The reason underlying the departmental doctrine
treated on principle.
resides in, as already stated, the need of consociation to enable coem
ployés to judge of the caution, diligence, and efficiency of each other,
in order that they may properly protect themselves against negligence.
In distinct de'pa'rtments of the service they are regarded as constantly
working apart from each other, without the opportunity of mutual ob
This reason, however, cannot be held to apply
servation and criticism.
to the crews of different trains running upon the tracks of the same
company. It does not appear that such crews are permanently attach
Moreover, even if not associated upon the
ed to any special trains.
same train, the crews of each train, in passing and repassing and in
mingling with each other in the handling of trafﬁc in the course of their
work, necessarily haye an opportunity of judging to some extent how
the various trains are managed by the people who man them. At best,
the amelioration of the dangers incident to a hazardous business cannot
be very great for the servants of a common master, even when they
work in the same department, where the number of such coemployés is
great, as very often happens in the railway business, and in other kinds
of business.
_
If the conductor of the passenger train in question had no control
over the brakeman on the freight train, or was not charged with any
duty of the master towards him, as in the furnishing of tools and ap
pliances or a safe place to work, or was not in a different department
of the master’s service (and we have seen that he had no such powers
and bore no such relation), which are the only exceptions our cases
recognize as taking coemployés out of the class of fellow servants, then
the said conductor and brakeman were fellow servants, and the master
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was not liable for the injuries inﬂicted upon one by the negligence of the
other. This conclusion seems inevitable, on princi'ple.
The weight of authority likewise supports this conclusion. Baltimore
& O. R. C0. v. Andrews, 17 L. R. A. 191, 50 Fed. 728, 1 C. C. A. 636;
Kerlin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (C. C. A.) SO Fed. 186~188; St. Louis,
etc., R. Co. v. Needham, 63 Fed. 107, 112, 11 C. C. A. 56, 25 L. R. A.
837; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mase, 63 Fed. 114, 11 C. C. A. 63; Mc
Master v. I. C. R. Co., 65 Miss. 264, 268, 4 South. S9. 7 Am. St. Rep.
654, 657; Pittsburgh, Ft. VV. 81 C. R. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio St. 197.
There are other cases holding a contrary view. Madden’s Adm’r v. R.
Co., 28 W. Va. 617, 618, 57 Am. Rep. 695, 696, 697; Daniel's Adm’r v.
Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 36 W. Va. 397, 411, 414, 417, 419, 15 S. E.
162, 32 Am. St. Rep. 870, 882, 885, 888, 889, 16 L. R. A. 383, 387, 389,
390; L. & N. R. Co. v. Edmonds’ Adm'x (Ky.) 64 S. W. 727.
[Omitting the discussion of these cases :] And it was well said by
Brewer, ]., in Howard v. Denver, etc., Ry. C0. (C. C.) 26 Fed. 837, 842
—a collision case: “It will not do to say that, because Ryan’s engine
was in the way and collided with decedent’s train, the track was not
clear, and therefore the master had failed in his duty of providing a
safe place for the employé to work in and upon. The negligent use by
one employé of perfectly safe machinery will seldom be adjudged a
breach of the master’s duty of providing a safe place for other em
ployés. Such a construction would make any negligent misplacement
of a switch, any negligent collision of trains, even any negligent drop
ping of tools about a factory, a breach of the duty of providing a safe
The true idea is that the place and the instruments must in
place.
themselves be safe, for this is what the master’s duty fairly compels,
and not that the master must see that no negligent handling by an em
ployé of the machinery shall create danger. Neither can it be said that
Both
Ryan and decedent were engaged in a different class of work.
were employed in the movements of the trains—the same kind of serv
True, they were on different trains. and at the time of the acci
ice.
dent had no opportunity of noticing the conduct of eachother until too
But being engaged in the same kind of
late to prevent the collision.
service, and on the same division, they must naturally have often been
thrown into contact and had ample opportunities for mutual supervi
sion. To subdivide beyond the class of the service, into the place of
work, would carry the exception beyond well-recognized limits.
It
would make the train men on one train not fellow servants with those
on another; the carpenters and machinists in one room strangers in
service to those of another; one gang of sectionmen not cocmployés
with another—and all because at the time their places of work happen
ed to be different.”
To admit the qualiﬁcation into the law of master and servant sought
to be introduced in this case, making the conductor of one train the vice
‘principal of employés upon another train, thereby declaring each train
to constitute a separate department of the service, would practically
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break down the whole law of fellow servants as previously understood
in this state. The law as it exists in this state is not unfair either to the
master or the servant. While, on the one hand, it seems, on a casual
view, that it is a hardship upon the servant to deny him relief for an
injury inﬂicted upon him by the negligence of a fellow servant in whose
selection he had no voice, yet it seems equally hard to make the mas
ter liable to one of his servants for the negligence of another servant
when he (the master) has exercised due -care in selecting such servant.
VV hat more could he do? It is impossible thathe should supervise and
control every act of his servants. Yet if he is made liable to each of
his servants for every act of all of his servants in the course of the
employment—and there may be and there often are thousands of them
—the law then places upon him a duty which every one knows that no
one can discharge.
The true and just view is that expressed in our cases-—that, after
the master has exercised due care in the selection of his servants, the
danger arising from the negligence of a fellow servant is a danger
which one going into the service voluntarily assumes, and it is a risk
for which it is presumed he is satisfactorily compensated by the larger
wages he can earn in the service than in other employments. In this
state we have already narrowed the ﬁeld covered by the law of fellow
servants by withdrawing from it cases wherein one servant of the mas
ter is set over other servants, with power to command them in their
work,'and by the introduction of the departmental doctrine as con
strued and applied in our previous cases, and have added cases arising
under these to the master’s generally recognized duty of furnishing safe
tools and appliances, a safe place to work, and the selection of reason
ably competent servants. We deem it inexpedient to make any fur
ther extension than may follow from a natural and reasonable develop
rnent of the princi'ples already adjudged.
We do not think the case
now put before us lies within the path of that development.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the circuit judge committed error
in not sustaining the demurrer to the third count of the declaration, and
the ﬁrst assignment is sustained.
Other assignments of error are disposed of in a memorandum opin
ion ﬁled with the record, and need not be further referred to here.“
Reverse and remand.

“Cf.

Northern Paciﬁc R. V. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349. 14 Sup. Ct. 9%, 33 L,
1009 (1894). day laborer and section boss.
See Ashworth v. Stanwix, 3
8.: E1. 701 (1861), in which a. partner of the master was a colaborer. but
not a fellow servant. of plaintiff, Kelly, Adm'r, v. New Haven Steamboat Co.
74 Conn. 343; 50 Atl. S71, 57 L. R. .A. 494, 92 Am. St. Rep. 220 (1902), and
McGrory v. Ultima Thule, etc., Ry. Co., 90 Ark. 210, 118 S. W. 710. 23 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 301, 1?-4 Am. St. Rep. 24 (1€)O'.')1.in which at vice principal sued for
Ed.
El.

injuries due to negligence of his subordinate.
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STATE.
105 N.

Y.

159, 11 N.

E.

371.)

This is an appeal" by the defendant from an award of $1,200 to the
respondent, made on the 10th of September, 1885, by the board of
claims of the state of New York for an injury to the person of re
spondent while employed on the state boat, on the Champlain Canal,
in Ft. Edward, in May, 1883.
ANDREWS, I. We think the award in this case is in conﬂict with the
decisions of this court deﬁning the responsibility of employers for in
juries sustained by servants while engaged in performing the service
for which they were employed, resulting from the negligence of co
servants.
The master is sometimes responsible for the negligent act
of one servant causing injury to a coservant; but this liability, when
it exists, does not rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, but
solely upon the ground that in the particular case the coservant whose
act or neglect caused the injury was, by the appointment of the master,
charged with the performance of duties which the master was bound
to perform for the protection of his servants, a failure to perform
which, or a negligent performance of which, by a servant delegated to
perform them, is regarded in law the master's failure or negligence,
and not merely the failure or negligence of the coservant.
The liability of the master, when the negligence was not his per
sonal act or omission, but the immediate act or omission of a servant,
turns, as was said in Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. S21, upon the char
acter of the act, and this was but the enunciation of the established
doctrine in this state upon the subject.
the coservant whose act
caused the injury was at the time representing the master in doing
the master's duty, the master_is liable. If, on the other hand, he was
simply performing the work of a servant in his character as a servant
or employé merely, the master is not liable. The injury in the case
last supposed would, as between the master and the servant sustaining
the injury, be attributable solely to the immediate author, and not to the
master. In harmony with the general principle that the character of
the act is the decisive test, it has been repeatedly decided in this court
that the fact that the person whose negligence caused the injury was
a servant of a higher grade than the servant injured, or that the latter
was subject to the direction or control of the former, and was engaged
at the time in executing the orders of the former, does not take the
case out of the operation of the general rule, nor make the master liable.
Hofnagle v. New York Cent. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 608; McCosker v. Long
Island R. Co., 84 N. Y. 77; Allen, ]., in V\7right v. New York Cent.
R. Co., 25 N. Y. 565; Folger, 1., in Laning v. Same, 49 N. Y. 528.
These decisions are decisive against the claim of liability on the part
of the state for the injury sustained by the claimant. It is found that
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it resulted from the negligence of Wells, the captain of the state boat,
who at the time was engaged, with several hands employed on the
boat (including the claimant) in digging clay from a bank, and loading
it onto the boat. The negligence consisted in setting the claimant to
work under the bank after Wells had loosened the overhanging earth,
The case is within the
so that it fell upon and injured the plaintiff.
decisions above cited. VVells, although captain of the boat, with power
to direct those under him, was nevertheless a coservant within the
rule.
The manner of proceeding with the work was committed to
Wells.
It involved the exercise of such discretion and judgment only
as is committed to a foreman.
It is not claimed that Wells was in
competent for his position, and no question as to the suitableness of
It is the ordinary case of
appliances furnished by the state arises.
mismanagement by a coemployé of superior grade as to the manner
of prosecuting an ordinary work in which he, and other employés
acting under him, were at the time engaged. This was a rislg_inVc_i_d7e_nt
to the employment which the claimant assumed, and the injury not
beingione fof which the master, if an individual, would be liable, it is
not, therefore. one for which the state is liable under chapter 321 of
the Laws of 1870.
,The case of Chicago, M. 81 St. P. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377,
5' Sup. Ct. 184, cited in the opinion below, was decided by a bare ma
jority of the court, and is in conﬂict with the course of decision in
this state and elsewhere.
Slater v. jewett, 85 N. Y. 61; \/Vilson v.
Merry, L. R. 1 H. L. 326; Farwell v. Boston 8: W. R. Co., 4 i\letc. 49.
The award should be reversed and the case remitted to the board
of claims for a rehearing. All concur.“
,
45 Accord:
Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. Y. 1, 31 N. E. 969. 17 L. R. A.
228. 31 Am. St. Rep. 793 (1892); New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323,
20 Sup. Ct. 85. 44 L. Ed. 181 (1899); Hilton v. Fitchburg R. Co., 73 N. H. 116,
59 Atl. 625. 68 L. R. A. 428 (1904).
Cf. Illinois Steel Co. v. Ziemkowski, 220
Ill. 324, 331. 77 N. E. 190, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161 (1906).

The dual capacity doctrine is considered in Miller v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.,
W. 58. 32 Am. St. Rep. 673 (1891): in Cavanaugh v. Center
ville Block Coal 00., 131 Iowa. 700. 109 N. W.
7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907
(1906), and in (h-ist v. Wichita Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 72 Kan. 135,
S3 Pac. 199 (1905). in which a vice principal was performing common labor
with plaintiff. Cf. Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287, 27' A-m. Rep.
The leading case for the rule that the determining fact is the
510 (1877).
character of the act, not the rank of the employee performing the act, is
Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516, 37 Am. Rep. 521 (1880), with a dissenting
opinion by Earl, J., ably combating the doctrine.
It is generally considered
that the doctrine on the test of vice principalship of Chicago, M‘. & St. P. Ry.
\'. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184, 28 L. Ed. 787 (1884), is practically over
ruled in Baltimore & O. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed.
The ditilculty of ﬁnding any general test is pointed out in Grattis
772 (1893).
v. Kansas City, P. & G. Ry. Co., 153 Mo. 380, 55 S. W. 108, 48 L. R. A. 399,
'17 Am. St. Rep. 721 (1899), and in Ilarrison v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co., 79
Mich. 409, 44 N. W. 1034, 7 L. R. A. 623, 19 Am. St. Rep. 180 (1890)L
Gonn.Pa.& A. (20 En.)
109 Mo. 350, 19 S.
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ALBANY R. CO.
53 N.

Y.

549, 13 Am. Rep. 545.)

Verdict for plaintiff in an action to recover damages for the death
of the plaintiff’s intestate, alleged to have been caused by defendant’s
negligence. Appeal from order denying a motion for a new trial, and

is

6

&

it

].,

ordering judgment on the verdict.
CHURCH, C. ].
The plaintiff’s intestate was a ﬁreman upon a
freight train upon defendant’s road, which left Albany at an early
hour on a cold day. Some miles east of Albany eleven cars of another
freight train, a short distance in advance, became accidentally de
tached and ran back and collided with the train on which the de
The evidence
ceased was employed, by means of which he was killed.
tended to show that the forward train was deﬁcient in brakemen; that
but two were aboard, when there should have been three, which was
the usual number;
and that if a third brakeman had been there he
would have been stationed upon the eleven runaway cars, and with the
brakeman on them could have controlled their impetus and prevented
the accident. The company had at Albany an agent, called a head con
ductor, whose business it was to make up the morning trains, hire and
station the brakemen, and generally to prepare and dispatch these
‘
trains.
The general rule that the employer is not liable to one servant
or laborer for an injury resulting from the carelessness or negli
gence of another servant or colaborer, has been recently so fully
considered by this court in the two cases of Laning v. N. Y. C. R. Co.,
49 N. Y. 521, 10 Am. Rep. 417, and Brickner v. Same, 49 N. Y. 672,
that discussion is unnecessary except as far as ma_v be pertinent to
determine its application to the facts of this case.
This doctrine was
ﬁrst promulgated in England in 1837 (3 M. & W. 1), in South Caro
lina in 1841 (Murray v. South Carolina R. Co., 1 McMul. 385, 36 Am.
Dec. 268), and, in Massachusetts in 1842 (Farwell v. Boston & VV. R.
Co., 4 Metc. 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339), and has been adopted in this and
most of the other states in the Union. There has been a diversity of
reasons given for its adoption, which have led to some confusion
The reasons for the rule are well stated by Pratt,
in its application.
in the ﬁrst case in which
was applied in this State (Coon v.
Utica R. Co.,
Barb. [N. Y.] 231), and were in substance
Syracuse
that the rule respondeat superior does not itself spring directly from
principles of natural justice and equity, but has been established upon
principles of expediency and public policy for the protection of the
and that in view of the unjust consequences which may:
community;
ensue from its application for injuries by coservants, the same prim
ciples of public policy demand its limitation, and that while the gen
eral rule was demanded for the protection of the community, the ex
demanded for the protection of the employer, especially in
ception
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view bf the manner in which the principal business of the country is
now transacted.
This view evinces the ﬂexibility of the principles of the common
law, which are capable of adaptation to new or changed circumstances,
and enables courts to adjust the application of the principle not in
obedience to a supposed arbitrary rule, but with such limitations and
In applying
qualiﬁcations as best accord with reason and justice.
the rule we should be cautious not to violate the very principles upon
which it is founded.
Vl/hile shielding the employer from unjust and
burdensome liabilities, we should not withhold all redress from the
employed for remissness and carelessness in respect to duties which
fairly devolve upon the former as the principal, and over which the
In 5 M., H. & G. 352, the court very justly
latter have no control.
said: “Though we have said that a master is not generally responsible
to a servant for an injury occasioned by a fellow servant while they
are acting in one common service, yet this must be taken with the
qualiﬁcation that the master shall have taken due care not to expose
his servants to unreasonable risks.”
The master is liable if his own negligence or want of care produces
the injury, and this may be manifested by. employing unﬁt servants or
agents, or furnishing improper or unsafe machinery, implements, fa
cilities or materials for the use of the servant. Wright v. N. Y. C. R.
Co., 25 N. Y. 562; VVarner v. Erie R. Co., 39 N. Y. 468.
It was at
ﬁrst doubted by this court whether the exemption should not be lim
ited to injuries by servants whose employment was the same (Coon
v. Syr. & Utica R. Co., S N. Y. 492, per Gardiner, ].); but it has
since be_en repeatedly held that injuries by servants or agents, engaged
in the same general business or enterprise, are within the exemption.
Id. Hence the difﬁculty of applying the rule in actions against cor
porations whose whole business can only be transacted by agents who
In Vl/arner v. Erie R. Co., supra, the
are in some sense coservants.
court decided that a corporation was liable if negligence causing an
injury to a subordinate servant could be imputed to the directors, but
did not establish any deﬁnite rule on the subject.
The true rule, I
apprehend, is to hold the corporation liable for negligence or want of
proper care in respect to such acts and duties as it is required to per
form and discharge as master or principal, without regard to the rank
or title of the agent intrusted with their performance.
As to such
acts, the agent occupies the place of the corporation, and the latter
should be deemed present, and consequently liable for the manner in
If an agent employs unﬁt servants, his
which they are performed.
fault is that of the corporation, because it occurred in the performance
of the principal’s duty, although only an agent himself.
So in pro
viding machinery or materials, and in the general arrangement an_d
management of the business, he is in the discharge of the duty per
taining to the principal.
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In the case before us it was clearly the duty of the corporation, in
making up and dispatching the advance train, to supply it with suitable
machinery and suﬁicient help for the business and journey which it
was about to undertake; and if there was any want of care in. these
Rockefeller had the
respects, which caused the injury, it is liable.
general charge of this business, and within the principle decided in the
Laning Case, represented the corporation itself.
It is claimed by the counsel for the appellant, that the company
is not liable, because the agent had in fact employed a third brake
man to go upon this train, who by reason of oversleeping, failed to get
aboard in time, and hence, that the injury must be attributed to his
negligence, or, if attributable to the negligence of the general agent in
not supplying his place with another man, such negligence must be re
garded as committed while acting in the capacity of a mere coservant,
Neither of these positions is
within the doctrine of irresponsibility.
tenable. The hiring of a third brakeman was only one of the steps
proper to be taken to discharge the principal’s duty, which was to sup
ply with sufﬁcient help and machinery, and properly dispatch the train
in question, and this duty remained to be performed,’ although the
hired brakeman failed to wake up in time. or was sick, or failed to
appear for any other reason. It was negligent for the company to
start the train without sufficient help. The acts of Rockefeller cannot
be divided up, and a part of them regarded as those of the company,
and the other part as those of a coservant merely, for the obvious
reason that all his acts constituted but a single duty. His acts are in
divisible, and the attempt to create a distinction in their character
would involve a reﬁnement in favor of corporate immunity not war
As well might the company be relieved
ranted by reason or authority.
if the train was started without an engineer, or without brakes, or
with a defective engine. The same duty rested upon the company,
though every man employed had died or run away during the night, and
either by acts of commission or omission,
if negligent in discharging
whether in employing improper help, or not enough of
or in not
requiring their presence upon the train,
upon every just principle
the company relieved,
responsible for the consequences. Nor
The
though negligence may be imputed to the defaulting brakeman.
only effect of that circumstance would be to‘ make the negligence con
tributory with the brakeman, but would not affect the liability of the
unnecessary therefore to inquire whether the sleeping
company.
brakeman was so engaged in the common service as that the defendants
the injury was solely attributable
could be exempted from liability
to his neglect.
Assuming that the facts are as the jury must have found, the liability
clear. These heavy freight trains were dispatched
of the company
very heavy grade, and were
only ﬁve minutes apart, and traversed
‘liable, especially in cold weather, to precisely such accidents as did
occur, in which even collisions, with fatal results, were almost cer
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The principal protection in such cases is the prompt
tain to ensue.
and efficient application of the brakes, and the utmost care should be
exercised in providing a sufﬁcient number of reliable men to perform
'
this duty. If we were called upon to spell out a contract between the
parties, it would be implied that the company agreed to use proper
He was
care not to expose the deceased to risks of this character.
engaged upon another train in the discharge of his duty, and was not
only in no way connected with the broken train, but he could neither
know of nor provide against the defect.
No authority has been cited which would justify us in relieving the
defendant from this liability, nor have I been able to ﬁnd any. In
Hayes v. \/Vestern R. R. Corp., 3 Cush. 270, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts intimate, although it was unnecessary to decide, that
a railroad company is liable for an injury to an employee,
caused by
Mr. Redﬁeld, in a note in a
a deﬁciency of help upon another train.
recent edition of his work on Railways, expresses the opinion that cor
porations should be regarded as constructively present in all acts per
formed by their general agents. within the range of their employment:
and the tendency of judicial opinion, while it adheres to the general
rule of irresponsibility, is against extending it.
The judgment must be affirmed.“

SNOVV v.
(Supreme Judicial

Court

of

HOUSATONIC R. CO.

18_6-1. 8
l\Iassaelt71‘Lr(=)e)tts,

Allen,

441,

85 Am. Dec.

Tort to recover damages suffered by plaintiff, a switchman of the
VVestern Railroad Company, which had a right to use defendant’s tracks
at the place where the injury was received. The injury was caused
by a defective plank in a highway crossing over defendant’s road. In
uncoupling cars plaintiff caught his foot in a hole in the plank and it
was so crushed by the wheels of the train that it had to be amputated.
Directed verdict for defendant, and plaintiff alleged exceptions.
BIGELOW, C.
[After holding that it was difficult to see how the
But, in the next place,
fellow servant doctrine applied to this casez]
a decisive answer to this ground of defense is that it does not appear
that the defect in the road. which was the proximate cause of the ac
cident, was the result of any such negligence of a servant of the de

I."

46 Accord:
Keezan v. Western R. Corp., 8 N. Y. 176. 59 Am. Dee. 476 (1853):
v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.. 100 U. S. 213. 25 L. Ed. 612 (1879). noting that
rule has been carried further in England than by the
the fellow-servant
American courts (see Wilson v. Merry & Cunningham. L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. App.
Pas. 326, 19 Enz. R. C. 132 [1R68]).
Cf. eonﬁietinz opinions in Thoma
v. Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co.. 109 Mo. 187. 197. 211. 18 S. W. 980 (1892).
The duty of the
master is fully stated in Stearns & Culver Lumber Go. v. Fowler, 58 Fla. 362. '
50 South. 680 (1909).
47 The statement of facts is abridged.
"Rough
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fendants, that they would be excused from liability.
It was caused by
a want of repair in the superstructure or roadbed between the tracks
of the defendants’ road, where it crossed the highway. In other words,
the defendants neglected to keep a portion of their road, where it was
necessary for the plaintiff to go in the discharge of his duties, in a
suitable and safe condition; so that he could‘ not pass over it without
incurring the risk of injury. Now while it is true, on the one hand,
that a workman or servant, on entering into an employment, by im
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plication agrees that he will undertake the ordinary risks incident to the
service in which he is to be engaged, among which is the negligence of
other servants employed in similar services by the same master, it
also true, on the other hand, that the employer or master impliedly
contracts that he will use due care in engaging the services of those who
are reasonably ﬁt and competent for the performance of their re
spective duties in the common service, and will also take due precau
tion to adopt and use such machinery, apparatus, tools, appliances and
means as are suitable and proper for the prosecution of the business
in which his servants are engaged, with
reasonable degree of safety
Thus an owner of
steamboat
to life and security against injury.
would be liable to an engineer or workman in his employment for an
boiler which was clearly defective
injury occasioned by the use of
and insuﬂicient.
manufacturer would be subjected to
like lia
So
bility by the use of imperfect or badly constructed machinery. And
railroad would be responsible for
in like manner the proprietors of
accidents happening by tracks improperly laid, or switches which
were not constructed to operate with regularity and precision.
founded
an eminently
The distinction on which this rule of law
this: A workman or servant, on entering
wise and just one.
supposed to know and to assume the risks
upon any employment,
he
to work in conjunction with others,
naturally incident thereto;
that
the
carelessness
or negligence of one of his fellow
must
know
he_
servants may be productive of injury to himself; and besides this,
more material, as affecting his right to look to his employer
what
for damages for such injuries, he knows or ought to know that no
amount of care or diligence by his master or employer can by possi
due care and caution in his fellow servants,
bility prevent the want
been
reasonably ﬁt for the service in which
although they may have
most just and reasonable that con
certainly
are
It
engaged.
they
servant
or
workman
must have foreseen on enter
the
which
sequences
ing into. an employment, and which due care on the part of the em
ployer or master could in no way prevent, should not be visited on the
otherwise where injuries to servants or workmen
But
latter.
happen by reason of improper and defective machinery and appliances
work.
The use of these they could not
used in the prosecution of
that
the employer will adopt suitable
foresee. The legal implication
with
to
on his business. These he
which
means
carry
and
ipstmments
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can provide and maintain by the use of suitable care and oversight;
and if he fails to do so, he is guilty of a breach of duty under his con
tract, for the consequences of which he ought in justice and sound
reason to be responsible. Such we understand to be the rule of law,
and the principles on which it is founded, as now fully established by
Seaver v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 14 Gray, 466; Cay
authority.
zer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, Z74, 282, 69 Am. Dec. 317, and cases cited
in note.
The case at bar, if the plaintiff could be justly regarded as in the
employment of the defendants, clearly falls within that branch of the
rule under which the employer is held responsible for injuries caused
by the use of improper or defective means for the proper performance
of the work or duty to be rendered by those engaged in his service.
The place where the accident happened was intended to be used for
It was necessary for the person
the purpose of making up trains.
whose duty it was to unshackle the cars, or to fasten them together, to
pass and repass over the space covered with plank between the tracks
frequently and with rapidity, and with his attention in great degree di
verted from the surface over which he passed, and directed to the
special duty or service of ‘separating and uniting the cars, in order to
The existence of such a defect as the
prepare the trains for transit.
evidence disclosed at the trial, being of a nature to obstruct the plaintiff
in passing safely and rapidly over and between the tracks, and to hin
der him in the performance of the service in which he was engaged,
tended very strongely to’ show that the defendants had committed a
breach of the implied obligation which rested upon them to provide
a suitable place in which the plaintiff could perform
his duty safely,
in the exercise of due and reasonable care, and without incurring a risk
which did not come within the scope of his employment. The omis
sion of the defendants was analogous to a failure on their part to
have and maintain safe and suitable tracks, switches or turnouts, or
to construct and keep in repair stanch and sufﬁcient bridges.
For such
failure or omission they would be clearly liable in damages to a person
in their employment who might be injured thereby, according to the
principles and authorities already referred to. As the case stood, there
fore, at the trial, there was evidence offered by the plaintiff which
tended very strongly to show that the defendants had been guilty of
negligence and a breach of duty, which would render them liable to the
‘
plaintiff in this action.
It is urged by the counsel for the defendants that. the omission to
repair the defect which occasioned the injury was the result of the
negligence of the person whose duty it was to see that the planks across
the highway were kept in a safe and proper condition, and that the
accident was therefore caused by the carelessness of a fellow servant.
But his argument leaves out of sight the real ground on which the
If the argument is well founded, then
liability of the defendants rests.
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it would follow that, as a corporation can act only by agents or serv
for every species of injury
ants, it would escape all responsibility
caused by defective machinery and apparatus, or badly constructed
So an indi
tracks, or insufﬁcient bridges and other similar causes.
vidual could a_vail himself of a similar immunity, if he conducted his
business exclusively by agents or servants. But the rule of law does
The liability of the master or
not lead to any such absurd result.
employer in such cases is founded, as has been already said, on the
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implied obligation of his contract with those whom he employs in his
This requires him to use due care in supplying and main
service.
taining suitable instrumentalities for the performance of the work or
duty which he requires of them, and renders him liable for damages
occasioned by a neglect or omission to fulﬁll this obligation, whether it
arises from his own want of care, or that of his agents to whom he
intrusts the duty. But it does not extend so far as to require of him
that he should be responsible for the negligence of his servants, if of
competent skill and experience, in using or managing the means and ap
pliances placed in their hands in the course of their employment, if
they are neither defective nor insufficient.
whether there was anything in the
The.only remaining question
acts or conduct of the plaintiff, at the time he received the alleged in
jury, which showed awant of due care on his part, sufﬁcient to defeat
his right to recover damages, and to warrant the court in withholding
the case from the consideration of the jury. VVe think
very clear
that there was not. There
class of cases involving the question of
the exercise of proper care on the part of a plaintiff, in which
not only,the right, but the duty, of the court to decide as
matter of law
that the plaintiff has failed to maintain his action, and to direct
ver
dict for the defendant. These are cases where, upon the uncontradict
ed evidence,
want of due
appears that the plaintiff was guilty of
care, and thus fails in proving an essential legal clement in his case. In
such an aspect of the evidence,
the duty of the court to pronounce
on its legal effect.
not impossible, to lay down
certainly difficult,
any general rule which shall be of easy application to every case which
may arise. It may be said generally, however, that where the admitted
or uncontroverted facts of case show that the acts and conduct of
plaintiff, at the time of an alleged injury, and contributing to produce
it. are such as to indicate, according to the common experience and
observation of mankind, a want'of due and reasonable care, adapted
to the circumstances in which he
placed, he does not show any legal
the duty of the court in such
cause of action. and
state of the
verdict for the defendant.
proof to direct
Of this character are all the cases heretofore decided in this court,
In Lucas v. New Bedford
where such course has been pursued.
Taunton Railroad,
Gray. 64, 66 Am. Dec. 406. the plaintiff was in
train after the locomotive had begun
jured while attempting to leave

\
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to move it. AI similar state of facts was proved in Gavett v. Man
chester & Lawrence Railroad, 16 Gray, 501, 77 Am. Dec. 422.
In
Todd v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad Co., 3 Allen, 18, 80 Am.
Dec. 49; Id., 7 Allen, 207, 83 Am. ’Dec. 679, a passenger was injured
in consequence of having protruded his arm outside of the window of
the car while the train was in rapid motion.
In Gahagan v. Boston
& Lowell Railroad Co., 1 Allen, 187, 79 Am. Dec. 724, a traveller on
the highway undertook to pass between cars in motion, propelled by
an engine, having no sufficient reason for making so hazardous an at
tempt. In all these cases the conduct of the plaintiffs was inconsistent
with that degree of common care and prudence which men ordinarily
adopt when placed in similar circumstances.
But the case at bar falls within a different category. The plain
tiff, when the accident occurred, was in the performance of a duty or
service which required him to step between the cars and the engine
of a train, for the purpose of uncoupling them by drawing the bolt
which held them together. This, it appears, could not be done when
the train was standing entirely still, but it was necessary for the en
gine to move so as to loosen the bolt suﬁiciently to enable him to with
draw it from its socket, and he was engaged in performing that service
in the usual and ordinary mode, when he was thrown down by reason of
the defect in the road. A case of this sort is not within common ob
servation and experience, and cannot be judged of by the ordinary rule
or standard applicable to persons who are only passengers or travellers,
and who are engaged in no special or particular service. If, for exam
ple, a passenger should meet with an injury in attempting to pass
from one car to another while the train was going at a high rate of
speed, his act would be deemed by every one an imprudent one, and
so manifestly wanting in proper care that he could not recover dam
ages from the railroad company, although some negligence or want
of due care on their part might have contributed to the injury. But if
a conductor of a train, whose duty it is to pass from one car to anoth
er, should while doing so meet with a similar accident from a similar
cause, it could not be properly said that he was guilty of negligence
in passing from car to car while the train was in motion. That he was
required to do so by the nature of the service in which he was en
gaged; and the question of negligence would depend on other con
siderations, growing out of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
So, in the case at bar, if the plaintiff had been a traveller or by
stander, and without any sufficient reason or excuse had gone between
the car and engine when they were in motion, and had there received
an injury, it would be too clear to admit of question, that the conse
quences of any accident which happened to him would fall exclusive
ly upon himself. But as the plaintiff was in the discharge of his duty
in placing himself in a perilous position—a duty of the performance of
which was known to and sanctioned by the defendanfs—the fact that
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has no tendency to prove that he was negli
The question of due ,care in such case depends on
gent or careless.
the manner in which the plaintiﬁ’ performed the duty incumbent on
him; whether he acted with due skill and caution, and conducted him
self in the usual and ordinary way in which similar acts are done by
persons engaged in like employment; and‘ on other considerations of
a like character, which do not fall within the range of ordinary ob
servation and experience.
The question of negligence was therefore
a proper subject of evidence, and should have been submitted with
proper instructions to the jury for their determination.
Nor do we think that it was any the less a question of fact to be de
cided by the jury, because it appeared that the plaintiff had previous
knowledge of the defect in the road which caused the accident. Reed
v. Northﬁeld, 13 Pick, 98, 23 Am. Dec. 662; Smith v. Lowell, 6 Allen,
40.
This certainly was a circumstance to be taken into consideration,
but by no means a decisive one.
If the service to be performed by
the plaintiff was of a character to require that his exclusive attention
should be ﬁxed upon
and that he should act with rapidity and
could hardly be expected that he should always bear in
promptness,
mind the existence of the defect, or be prepared at all times to avoid it.
may be suggested that the plaintiff ought not to recover, because
the performance of his duties after he was aware of
he continued
the existence of the defect in the road. There may be cases where a
servant would be wanting in due care by incurring the risk of injury
in the use of defective or imperfect machinery or apparatus, after
he knew
But we do not think this
might cause him bodily harm.
one of that class.
His continuance in the employment did not
case
necessarily and inevitably expose him to danger.“
On the whole case, as presented to us. we are of opinion that the
new trial granted.
verdict for the defendants should be set aside, and

Court of New Hampshire.
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Action by Ralph H. Goodale against Iohn
York.
Verdict for
plaintiff, and the case was transferred from the superior court on de
fendant’s exception to the denial of his motion for
directed verdict.

a

Overruled.
The evidence tended to prove the following facts: The plaintiff was
16 years old at the time of his injury, and was not so quick of compre
hension as the ordinary boy of that age.
He was employed to run

a

3,

48 Cf.
Buzzell v. Laconia Mtg. Co., 48 Me. 113, 77 Am. Dec. 212 (1861),
holding allegations defective which did not negative knowledge and diligence
of. plaintiff, and Jensen v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 72 Minn. 175, 75 N. W.
71 Am. St. Rep. 475 (1898), in which
cause of action was stated.
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matching machine in the defendant’s box factory, began work on Satur
On Saturday he had
day, and was injured on the following Monday.
no trouble with the machine. On Monday shavings collected about an
The ﬁrst
open gear on the machine and interfered with its operation.
time they collected the defendant brushed them away, and told the
plaintiff to keep them cleared ; but he did not call the the boy's atten
tion to the gear, nor did he tell him how to remove the shavings, or
warn him of the danger of his arm being drawn into the gear in case his
shirt sleeve came in contact with it while the shavings were being brush
ed away.
A little later the shavings again collected, and the plaintiff
brushed them away with his hand. 'An hour later they again interfered
with the operation of the machine. The plaintiff attempted to remove
them in the same way, when his shirt sleeve caught in the gear and
drew his arm into
thus causing the injuries complained of.
The
plaintiff’s work at the machine absorlfed his attention, and when he was
he could not see the gear. Vl/hen he was brushing away
engaged with
the shavings the gear was plainly visible.
He worked on the same ma
chine for two weeks about a year prior to his injury, and at that time
the gear was inclosed.
'
The defendant says the plaintiff cannot recover (1) be
YOUNG,
cause he assumed the risk of his injury; and (2) because he was guilty
of contributory negligence.
Servants assume the risk of the dan'gers incident to those condi
tions of their master’s instrumentalities only in respect to which he
Labatt, M.
will be necessary,
owes them no duty.
S.
therefore, to determine whether the law imposed any duty in res'pect
to the gear upon the defendant, in order to decide whether the plain
tiff assumed the risk of his injury. The test to decide that question
to inquire whether (1) the plaintiff or (2) the defendant appreciated
the risk of the plaintiff’s arm being drawn into the gear
his shirt
sleeve happened to come in contact with
and (3) whether the ordi
machine
he employed such
nary man would use such
gear on such
boy to operate it. Bennett v. Company, 74 N. H. 400. 68 Atl. 460.
If the defendant was, and the plaintiff was not, in fault for not appre
was an abnormal one,
was the defendant’s
ciating that risk, and
duty to use ordinary care to enable the plaintiff to avoid being injured
by it. Boyce v. Iohnson, 72 N. H. 41, 54 Atl. 707.
The defendant does not question but that
can be found the risk was
an abnormal one, and that he appreciated
but he contends that
must
be held that the plaintiff also appreciated it; so the question for the
can be found, but whether
not whether
court
must be held, that
the plaintiff appreciated the risk of his arm being drawn into the gear.
will not be necessary to consider whether the ‘plaintiff knew the gear
conceded,
was uncovered; for,
that
does not necessarily follow
that he appreciated the risk of his injury. The test to decide that ques
to inquire, not whether he knew the gear to be open, but wheth
tion
er he appreciated the risk of his arm being caught in it. Disalets v.
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Company, 74 N. H. 440, 69 Atl. 263. It cannot be said as a matter of
law that a boy no older than the plaintiff, with no more knowledge of
the situation or capacity to appreciate its dangersﬂthan he is shown to
have had, would realize the risk he ran of his arm being drawn into the
from the
gear if his shirt sleeve happened to come in contact with
man familiar
mere fact that he knew the gear to be uncovered, even
with such gears would have realized it. Demars v. Company, 67 N. H.
There
no other evidence which tends to prove
404, 406, 40 Atl. 902.
that the plaintiff appreciated the risk of his injury. The fact that he
worked on the machine for two weeks at another time has no such
tendency, for at that time the danger of which he complains did not
exist.
cannot be held, therefore, that the plaintiff assumed the risk
of his injury.
Neither can
be held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
must be so held
based
negligence. The defendant's contention that
on the proposition that the plaintiff knew the gear to be uncovered. But
were conceded that he knew that fact, and fully appreciated the
could not be said from those facts
risk incident to working near
do
alone that he was guilty of contributory negligence. Negligence
in
not accustomed to do, not what he
ing what the ordinary man
the habit
doing, and that the great majority of men work for oth
ers, and that there are known dangers incident to every employment, are
In other words, although
both matters of common knowledge.
true that servants who are injured by the condition of their masters’
instrumentalities cannot recover when
a‘ppears ‘they knew of and ap
preciated the risks which produced their injuries, the reason they can
not because the fact of their appreciation of the risks
not recover
conclusively establishes their fault, but because of the doctrine of as
sumed risk. Carr v. Electric Co., 70 N. H. 308, 48 Atl. 286.
can be said as
Unless
matter of law that the danger of- being
drawn into the gear was so apparent that no prudent man would have
undertaken to brush the shavings away with his hands, the plaintiff
cannot be held to be guilty of contributory negligence; and
ob
vious that
cannot be said that the ordinary man would not have at
he had no more knowledge of the situation and
tempted such an act,
no more capacity to comprehend its dangers than the plaintiff
shown
to have had. Boyce v. ]ohnson, 72 N. H. 41, 54 Atl. 707.
Exception overruled. All concurred.
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WEST YELLOW PINE CO.

(Court of Appeals of Georgia,

1907.

2 Ga. App. 295, 58 S.

E.

529.)

POWELL, ]. This case comes to us upon the sustaining of a demur
rer to the plaintiff’s petition. The allegations of the petition as amend
ed are that the ‘plaintiff was employed as a servant of the defendant in
loading cars with heavy lumber. He was unskilled and inexperienced
in his work, and unfamiliar with the use of the appliances furnished.
This fact was known to the defendant. Pieces of timber called “jump
ers" were furnished, with which the lumber was to be slided and load
ed. The plaintiff called the attention of the defendant’s superintendent
in charge of the work to the fact that‘ these “jumpers” did not appear
to be of sufficient size and strength to withstand the strain upon them,
and also told him that he (the plaintiff) was unfamiliar with the char
acter of the work and the sufficiency of the appliances. The superin
tendent told him that he (the superintendent) knew his business; that
the “jumpers” were properly adjusted and were all right and perfectly
safe; that there was no danger, and ordered plaintiff to go ahead with
the work.
Relying upon these assurances, plaintiff continued in the
work. As a matter of fact the “jumpers” proved to~be too short, and
under the strain gave way; and as a result a piece of timber fell upon
plaintiff and injured him.
1. The servant’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of the dangerous
condition of an instrumentality fu'rnished him by his master, becomes
an important matter of investigation, from two distinct phases of the
case, when he has been injured through that instrumentality
and at
for the injury. First, it may be
tem'pts to hold the masterrcsponsible
considered in relation to his assumption of the risk, a matter included
by implication in the contract of employment; and then in relation to
the question of his contributory
These two aspects are
negligence.
sometimes confounded, but they are distinct. Every student of the law
of master and servant recognizes the correctness of Labatt’s statement
(M. & S. § 1): “The doctrines which deﬁne the extent of a servant’s
right to recover damages for personal injuries received in the course of
his employment represent, broadly speaking, the results of a compro
mise between the principle that a servant agrees to assume all the risks
incident to the work undertaken by him, and the principle that a mas
ter is answerable for the consequences of any negligent acts which may
be committed by himself or his agents.
In the last analysis, therefore,
every problem in the law of em'ployet"s liability consists essentially in
the determination of the question whether the facts under review shall
be controlled by the one or by the other of these principles.”
As a part of the compromise referred to, the law reads into every
contract of employment a prima facie agreement on the servant’s part
that he assumes all the known risks of the employment so far as
(his
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mental and physical development considered) they are within his ca
pacity to comprehend, and also that he will use a corresponding due
care and diligence to become informed of and to understand such oth
This ele
er risks as are not immediately known and comprehended.
ment of assumption of risk may, therefore, in a suit by the servant
against the master for personal injuries, be considered as a matter of
contract, whereby, if it be applicable under the particular facts of the
case, the master escapes civil responsibility, notwithstanding he would
otherwise be liable, just as in a suit ex delicto against a carrier for a
breach of its public duty to safely carry goods a special contract of
Thus the
carriage may be shown by the carrier to limit his liability.
servant's knowledge of a defect in an instrumentality furnished by the
master is a relevant matter of investigation, as tending to show that as
to such defect he has assumed the risk; but it is also relevant upon the
the other phase of the case, that which relates to his contributory negli
Since no plaintiff can recover for an injury of which his own
gence.
negligence is the proximate cause, or which he could have avoided by
the exercise of ordinary care, it frequently becomes a matter of de
fense to the master that the servant's exposure of himself to a known
danger amounted to a failure to exercise due care, or amounted to con
tributory negligence. Thus, by viewing the element of the servant’s
knowledge in separate aspects, we shall the better be able to see the
particular effect to be given to the insertion into the case of the new
elements of a direct order of the master and of his assurances that the
work may be safely done with the instrumentalities furnished.
2. Now, since the assumption of risk is a contractual result, it may
be varied as any other term of the contract might be.
For instance, it
would be competent for the master and the servant to make an express
agreement that the servant should not assume any of the risks of the
employment, and such a contract would be enforced by the court. That
which otherwise would be implicit yields to that which has become ex
plicit to the contrary. Not only may terms which the law would ordi
narily imply into a contract be varied by express agreement to the con
the original impli
trary, but, also, where the circumstances warrant
cation may cease, and new and distinct terms may be implied.
Even
express terms may sometimes be subsequently varied by implication.
Our Civil Code of 1895 (section 3642) u'pon the subject of mutual tem
porary disregard of contract
an express recognition of this principle.
So, .although primarily the servant contracts to assume the risks of the
character we have been discussing, still, pending the course of the em
ployment, transactions may occur between the master and servant
wherefrom the law will imply
quasi new agreement as to this mat
ter, and will hold that the master has implicitly agreed to release the
servant from his promise to assume the risk.
To make the speciﬁc
application, the servant, recognizing that the risk
on himself, says to
the master: “This instrumentality furnished by you to me
unsafe."
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The master replies: “Use it. It is safe." Or: “Use it temporarily,
The servant obeys the order
and I will repair it and make it safe.”

\
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and is injured.
In the ﬁrst,
What effect will the law give to such transactions?
where the master says, “It'is safe,” the law will construe these words
as such a warranty that a breach of it will release the servant from the
assumption of the risk. In the other case, where the master says, “Use
it; I will repair it and make it safe”—the law implies an agreement on
the master’s part that the temporary use pending the time necessary to
get the repairing done shall be at his risk, and not at that of the servant,
who has complained of the instrumentality;
]ust here the quotation
from Cooley on Torts (Zd Ed.) § 559, reproduced with approval in the
case of Cheeney v. Ocean Steamship Co., 92 Ga. 731, 19 S. E. 35, 44
Am. St. Rep. 113, is directly in point: “If the servant, having a right
to abandon the service because it is dangerous, refrains from doing so
in consequence of assurances that the danger shall be removed, the
duty to remove the danger is manifest and imperative, and the master
is not in the exercise of ordinary care unless or until he makes his as
surances good. Moreover, the assurances remove all ground for the
argument that the servant, by continuing the employment, engages to
assume its risks.
So far as the particular peril is concerned, the im
plication of law is rebutted by the giving and accepting of the assur
ance; for nothing is plajner or more reasonable than that the parties
may and should, where practicable, come to an understanding between
themselves regarding matters of this nature.”
See, also, Labatt, M. &
S. § 260.
3. Viewed from the standpoint of the servant’s contributory
negli
gence, the master’s direct command to use the instrumentality, and his
assurance that it is safe, stand in this relation to the servant’s right to
recover.
The law recognizes that, under normal circumstances, the
knowledge and means of knowledge possessed by the servant are in
ferior to those possessed by the master; and the former is, as a gen
eral rule, justiﬁed in relying upon any ex'press statement made by the
latter in respect to the extent of the danger of the employment, and, in
view of this disparity of information, an assurance of safety, or a spe
ciﬁc order, may be regarded as having had the eﬁect of lulling the serv
ant into a feeling of security, and as having given him good reason for
relaxing that vigilance for his own safety which he otherwise would
have exercised, and it is therefore usually a question for the jury wheth
er such command and such assurance do not operate to relieve the
servant from the imputation of contributory negligence or failure to use
Labatt, M. & S.
due care, which otherwise would be imputed to him.
§§ 407, 440, 451. “The servant does not stand on the same footing with
the master. His primary duty is obedience, and
when in the dis
damaged through the neglect of the mas
charge of that duty, he
ter,
Patterson v. Pitts
but meet that he should be recompensed.”
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burg & C. R. Co., 76 Pa. 389, 18 Am. Rep. 412. “A prudent man has a
right, within reasonable limits, to rely upon the ability and skill of the
agent in whose charge the common master has placed him, and is not
bound at his peril to set his own judgment above that of his superior.”
See Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181 ; Shortel v. St. joscph, 104
Mo. 114, 16 S. W. 397, 24 Am. St. Rep. 317; Harrison v. Denver, etc.,
R. Co., 7 Utah, 523, 27 Pac. 728; Kain v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 375; Con
nolly v. Poillon, 41 Barb. 366.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of McKee v. Tour
tellotte, 167 Mass. 69, 44 N. E. 1071, 48 L. R. A. 542, expresses the
idea thus: “When we say that a man appreciates a danger, we mean
that he forms a judgment as to the future, and that his judgment is
right. But, if against this judgment is set the judgment of a superior—
one, too, who from the nature of the callings of the two men, and of
the superior’s duty, seems likely to make the more accurate forecast
and if to this is added a command to go on with his work and to run
the risk, it becomes a complex question of the particular circumstances
whether the inferior is not justiﬁed, as a prudent man, in surrendering
his own o'pinion and obeying the command. The nature and the degree
and the
of the danger, the extent of the plaintiff's appreciation of
exigency of the work all enter into consideration, and no universal rule
can be laid down.”
In the footnote to the case just cited, as
re
produced in 48 L. R. A. 543,
lengthy citation of ‘authorities support
This court, in the cases of Southern Cotton Oil
ing this proposition.
Ga. App. 259, 58 S. E. 249, and the Supreme Court
Co. v. Gladman,
in Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills, 127 Ga. 609, 56
E. 839, have recent
as tending to re
order
master
discussed the effect of
of
the
direct
lieve the servant from the exercise of that degree of caution which
would lawfully be expected of him in the absence of such
command.
Of course, the servant
only the more excusable for relying upon such
an order when
accompanied by an assurance of safety.
actionable negligence for the master to order his servant to
work with an unsafe instrumentality.
An assurance of safety, coupled
with the order, not only aggravates the master's negligence, but also re
lieves the servant from the assumption of the risk. The assurance of
safety likewise makes the question of the servant's contributory negli
gence one for solution by the jury, unless the danger be so obvious that
to undertake to encounter
amounts to plain rashness. The master's
command and assurance of safety to the servant prevents the former
escaping liability on the theory that the latter has assumed the risk.
for the jury to say whether the servant’s conduct in continuing
to work in the light of his knowledge of the danger, even after the as
surance of safety
given due weight, was or was not negligence: for
person who has failed to exercise ordinary care to protect himself can
maxim of the law applicable to all suits predi
not recover. This
I-‘.n.)—34
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upon negligence, and is wholly independent of the question as to
who has assumed the risk as a matter of contract. This is a jury ques
tion which the court did not have the power to determine on demurrer.“
Judgment reversed.

cated

ii.

DI BARI
(Supreme

Judicial
S9,

v.

I. W. BISHOP CO.”

Court of Massachusetts, 1908. 199 Mass.
17 L. R. A. [N. S.] 773, 127 Am. St. Rep. 497.)

254,

85

N. E.

Action by Maria Michela Di Bari against the I. W’. Bishop Company
for death of plaintiffs husband from\fall of one of the poles being
erected by defendant, for whom deceased was working.
There was a
verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepted. Exceptions overruled.
As this case ﬁnally went to the jury there were two
l\/IORTON, I.
First, whether the plaintiff's intestate
questions for them to consider:
was in the exercise of due care or had assumed the risk; and, second

it,

ly, whether the defendant or its superintendent was negligent in not
providing some man to do the work and, if they were, whether such
negligence was the cause of the death of the plaintiffs intestate.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff and the case is here on exceptions
by the defendant to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict in its
favor, and to the 'instructions which the court gave in regard to the
~
second question.
It could not have been ruled as matter of law that plaintiffs intes
tate was not in the exercise of due care or that he assumed the risk.
There was testimony tending to show that he had only been in this
country about two months, that he did not speak or understand Eng
lish, that he had worked as a laborer in shoveling and picking; and
that he went to work on the job the day before he was killed, having
There is nothing
previously had no experience in that kind of work;
to show that he was not doing in the usual way the work which he
was set to do. And there was evidence warranting the jury in ﬁnding
that if any warning was given by the superintendent the deceased fail
ed to understand
and that from want of experience he did not ap
preciate the danger of the poles falling and therefore did not assume

&

3,

_

3

49 See Rush v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Kan. 129, 12 Pac. 582 (1687). in
which the master gave no assurance he would make the instrumcntalities
safer; Wonder v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 32 Md. 411,
Am. Rep. 14-3 (1870).
in which the rule is limited to due care by the master. There is no war
ranty by the master. Tarrant v. Webb, 18 O. B. 797, 25 L. J. C. P. N. S. 261
(1856); Patton v. Texas & P. Ry. 00., 179 U. S. 658, 21 Sup. Ct. 275, 45 L.
Ed. 361 (1901). And his liability does not extend to cases where instrumen
talities were used for p111'P0$98 for which they were not designed. Eelch v.
Allen, 98 Mass. 572 (1868).
50 Accord:
Jensen v. Great Northern Ry. 00., 72 Minn. 175, 75 N. W.
71
Am. St. Rep. 475 (1898), careless fellow servant; Hilts v. Chicago
G. T. Ry.,
Cf. Hilton v. Fitch
55 Mich. 437, 21 N. W. 878 (1885), drunken engineer.
burg R. Co., 73 N. H. 116, 59 Atl. 625, 68 L R. A. 428 (1904).
_
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the risk.
There was also evidence warranting them in ﬁnding that
his failure to avoid the danger may have been due to confusion on his
part resulting from the imminence of the peril and his want of experi
ence.
The fact that the others escaped and that he might perhaps
have done so if he had been less confused or had moved more quick
ly was a matter for the consideration of the jury in passing upon the
It could not be ruled as matter of law that
question of his due care.
he was wanting in due care because in a moment of sudden peril he
failed to use the best means of escape.
Olsen v. Andrews, 168 Mass.

N. E.

261, 47

We

90.

error in the instructions in regard to the matter of al
leged negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to supply a
suﬁicient number of workmen for the erection of the pole in safety.
Such negligence stands on the same footing as negligence in furnish
ing suitable appliances. In a sense workmen are appliances. If a mas
ter knowingly employs servants who are incompetent by reason of their
habits or otherwise he is liable for an injury occasioned to a fellow
servant by their incompetency just as he would be liable for an injury
caused by a defective machine. Gilman v. Eastern R. R. Co., 13 Al
len, 433, 90 Am. Dec. 210; McPhee v. Scully, 163 Mass. 216, 39 N.
E. 1007. And on principle we do not see why a master should not
also be held liable for injuries resulting from his negligence in failing
to furnish a suitable number of servants to do the work required of
them. There was evidence warranting the jury in ﬁnding that a sulfi
cient number of men was not furnished by the defendant to enable
those engaged in erecting the pole to do the work in safety, and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiif’s
intestate.
Exceptions overruled.
see no

SIEGEL, COOPER & CO

v.

TRCKA.

1905.
218 Ill.
75 N. E. 1053, 2 L. R
S.] 647, 109 Am. St. Rep. 302.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois,

559,

A. [N.

RICKS, C. I.“ This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate
Court for the First District afﬁrming a judgment of the superior court
of Cook county in favor of appellee for $1,500 for injuries received
by appellee on October 25, 1901, while in the employ of appellant, and
while riding upon an elevator in the building occupied by it.
The appellee, at the time of his injury, was 14 years of age, and had
The appellant
been in the employ of appellant about two months.
conducted a department store in Chicago, occupying an eight-story
building, in which elevators were maintained and operated for the
use of the employés in ascending and descending to and from the
51 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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various ﬂoors in the discharge of their duties. Appellee was engaged
in the window-shade department on the seventh floor, and in the per
formance of his duties was required to use the elevators of the build
On the day in question, and in the performance of his duties
ing.
he got upon the elevator in question at the fourth ﬂoor to ascend to
the seventh.
The ﬁrst count of the declaration charges that this ele
vator “was negligently and carelessly constructed and maintained, in
that at the entrance on the fourth story of said building to the shaft
through which said elevator ran, there was a doorway through the
wall or partition (said wall or partition being of the thickness of, to
wit, ten inches,) about seven feet in height and about ﬁve feet in
width, and the door or doors at said entrance, leading to said eleva
tor shaft, were negligently, carelessly and without due regard to the
safety of persons using said elevatorpplaced on the side of said door
way most remote from the platform of the elevator car as it passed
through the shaft in going from the fourth to the upper stories of
the building.
Said door or doors were thereby so separated from the
elevator car that an open space of, to wit, ten inches, intervened be
tween the outer edge of the platform of the car and the adjoining
ﬂo_or, which open space, when the car arrived on a level with the ﬂoor
of the fourth story, was of the height of, to wit, seven feet, and the
“breadth of, to wit, ﬁve feet, and depth of, to wit, 10 inches, the top
of said doorway being closed by a solid wood or iron casing of the
width of the doorway and the thickness of the wall or partition, by
reason whereof a passenger on said elevator, without any fault on his
part, might sustain great and serious injury, all of which things the
defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care might have
known.
On said day, after the plaintiff had executed the defendant's
instructions, it became necessary and proper for him, in returning
from the fourth story to the seventh story of the building, to take the
elevator at the fourth story for the purpose of ascending to the sev
\/Vhen the elevator, in ascending, arrived at the fourth
enth story.
ﬂoor the plaintiff entered
and was received therein by the defend
ant’s agent who was operating
for the purpose of being transported
While the elevator was ascending from the
to the seventh floor.
fourth floor, and before
reached the top of the said doorway, and
while he was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safe
ty, another passenger, also an employé in said store, who was riding
on said car, negligently, carelessly, wrongfully, and wantonly seized
the plaintiff, who was without fault or negligence, and pushed, pulled,
and threw him upon the ﬂoor of the car, causing his right foot and
part of his right leg to extend over and beyond the platform of the
car and to extend into the said open space.
By reason of the negligent
and careless conduct of the defendant in operating and maintaining
the elevator with the entrance and door so constructed, said right foot
and part of the right leg struck against the upper casing of the door
way with great violence and were caught therein as the elevator was
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ascending from the fourth floor, and said right foot was crushed, and
pulled and scraped from the right leg and foot, and the mus
cles and tendons thereof were lacerated, torn, and injured, and he be
came sick, sore, lame, and disordered,” etc.
Three additional counts
were ﬁled, each differing but slightly from the ﬁrst, and the defendant
pleaded the general issue.
Appellant complains that the court refused to direct a verdict in
its behalf at the close of all the evidence. We have examined the evi
dence with care, and are satisﬁed that there is ample evidence in the
record tending to show that appellant was guilty of negligence. It is
conceded that appellee was but 14 years of age, and had worked in
the store but about two months, and that his work had nothing to do
with the elevator in question, except that he was, in the discharge of
his duties, required, occasionally, to ride on it while being operated
In view of appellee’s age,
by the man regularly in charge thereof.
and the rules of law governing the questions of contributory -negli
gence and assumption of. risk in case of minors, it was proper that
these questions should be submitted to the jury for its determination.
In support of appellant’s contention with reference to this motion,
many questions are argued and much space consumed, cases from this
court upon the subject of assumed risk, fellow servant, and contribu
tory negligence being printed in the brief in extenso. Such of these
as seem to require notice or consideration will be briefly considered.
It is ﬁrst contended that appellant is not liable in this action be
cause the proximate cause of the injury was the negligent act of the
If, however,
boy who threw appellee upon the floor of the elevator.
appellant was guilty of the negligence charged in the declaration, and
without which the injury in question would not have occurred, then it
would make no difference, as to its liability, that some act or agency
of some other person or thing also contributed to bring about the re
sult for which damages are claimed. Both or either of the contribut
ing agencies were liable for the injury occasioned by their negligence,
appellee being without fault and not held to have assumed the risk in
volved in the improper construction.
In the case of McGregor W.
Reid, Murdoch & Co., 178 Ill. 464, 53 N. E. 323, 69 Am. St. Rep. 332,
which also grew out of an elevator accident, we said (page 470 of
178 Ill., page 325 of 53 N. E. [69 Am. St. Rep. 332]):
“Appellee
insists that the pulling out of the cable ends from their fastenings was
the proximate cause of the injury, and that no recovery can be had
for what is supposed to be the remote cause of the accident, the de
But this position is clearly un
fective condition of the safety device.
tenable. The two causes operated together, and neither, alone, would
have caused the elevator to fall, and if the pulling out of the cables
was attributed to an accident or to the negligence of a third person,
and still the elevator would not have fallen without the negligence of
appellee, appellee would be liable, for both causes, operating proxi
mately at the same time, caused the injury.” And in St. Louis Bridge
the ﬂesh
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Co. v. Miller, 138 Ill. 465, 28 N. E. 1091, which grew out of an in
jury occasioned by the combination of negligence from two different
sources, we also said (page 476 of 138 Ill., page 1093 of 28 N. E.):
“In legal contemplation the c‘ase is one where the injury was inﬂicted
by the co-operating negligence of the bridge company and the persons
in charge of the mules, and the rule is well settled that a person con
tributing to a tort, whether his fellow contributors are/men, natural
or other forces or things, is responsible for the whole, the same as
though he had done all without help.” Andto the same effect is the
case of Village of Carterville v. Cook, 129 Ill. 152, 22 N. E. 14, 4 L.
R. A. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 248, in which it is stated: "VVhere a
party is injured by the concurring negligence of two different parties,
each and both are liable, and they may be sued jointly or separately.”
This latter case appellant argues has no application to the case at bar,
but in principle we see no difference, so far as relates to that phase
of the case with reference to liability for damage occasioned by two
Armour v. Golkowska, 202 Ill. 144, 66 N. E.
contributing causes.
'
*
* *
1037, is‘also in point.
\Ve ﬁnd no material errors to have been committed in the trial of
this case, and the judgment of the Appellate Court is afﬁrmed.”
Iudgment affirmed.

QUINCY MINING CO.
(Supreme
_]'.

Kitts sued
injury alleged to have

COOLEY,
an

Court of Michigan,

1879.

42

v.

KITTS.

Mich.

W. 240.)

34, 3 N.

the mining company to recover damages for
been suffered by himself through the com
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miner.
pany’s negligence, while in its employ as
ap
called
pears from the evidence that what in the declaration
bridge,
over the chasm where the accident occurred, consisted merely of two
timbers laid side by side, one of which broke and fell with the plaintiff
as he was passing over.
The timbers were of pine, and had been in
place some ﬁve years. The evidence tended to show that they dis
sound originally, ﬁve
covered no weakness when put in, and that,
years was not time sufficient to cause dangerous decay or weakness.
The only evidence of any effort to examine the broken timber after
fell among others where
the accident showed that
could not be
distinguished, and the occasion of the breaking was, therefore, wholly
Other persons, including the plaintiff himself, had cross
unexplained.
ed upon these timbers with safety on the same day.
was suggested, rather than urged, on the part of the defence, that
the timber may have been weakened by
rock falling
fragment of

3

52 Accord:
Kleinfelt v.
H. Somers Coal Co., 156 Mich. 473. 121 N. W.
118, 132 Am. St. Rep. 532 (1909); Farrell v. Eastern Mach. Co., 77 Conn. 484,
v. Stewart,
59 Atl. 611, ‘38 L. R. A. 239, 107 Am. St. Rep. 45 (1905); Strlngham
N. E. 575 (1885).
100 N. Y. 516,
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upon it from above, and an inference to this effect might be drawn
from the proofs. On the other hand the effort of the plaintiff seems
to have been directed to satisfying the jury that the timber must have
been weak originally, or become weakened from some unexplained
cause, and that from want of proper supervision the defect had never
been discovered.
Aneffort was made to bring home the want of prop
er supervision to one VVagner, who was said to be charged with the
duty, and who, though he had casually examined the timbers some
times, had never applied some of the most simple and usual tests, such
as striking with a hammer, and piercing with a sharp instrument.
Wagner was what is called a timberman in the mine. The timberman
put in and looked after such bridges or passages; and \/Vagner was
sometimes called captain, as he had some authority over the other
timbermen, and might direct them as to their work.
He, however, as
well as the others, was under the general supervision and control of
Capt. Cliff, who had the entire charge of the underground work.
No
claim _was made that either Cliff or Wagner was incompetent, or that
the company had been negligent in the employment of incompetent
persons, and the principal reliance of the plaintiff seemed to be on
such inferences of negligence on the part of \Vagner as might be drawn
from the evidence.
The circuit judge was requested to instruct the jury that even if
they found that Wagner was negligent, yet this negligence was the
negligence of a fellow-servant of the plaintiff, and of this the plaintiff
took the risk.
This was refused, on the ground, as would seem, that
in respect to the supervision of this bridge or passage way Wagner
was charged with the responsibility of the company, and his neglect
was the neglect of his principal.
As between the company and any
third person the extent of the authority and responsibility of \~Vagner
would have been immaterial;
but when a servant demands from his
master compensation for an injury received in his service, it is neces
The mere
sary that he trace some distinct fault to the master himself.
fact of such injury is no evidence of such fault; neither is the mere
fact that it resulted from the carelessness of some other person in the
same employment.
The servant assumes all theusual risks of his em
ployment, and among these is the risk that fellow servants will some
times be careless and that injuries will result.
All that can be' re
quired of the master in that regard is that his servants shall be pru
dently chosen, and that they shall not be retained in his service after
the unﬁtness or negligence has been discovered and has been com
municated to him.
This duty of due care in the employment and retention of competent
servants is one the master cannot relieve himself of by any delegation,
and if it becomes necessary to entrust its performance to a general
manager, foreman or superintendent, such officer, whatever he may be
called, must stand in the place of his principal, and the latter must
assume the risks of his negligence. The same is true of the general
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of his business; if there is negligence in this, the master
for
whether the supervision be by the master in per

supervision

is responsible

son or by some manager, superintendent or foreman to whom he dele
In other words, while the servant assumes the risk of the
it.
negligence of fellow servants, he does not assume the risk of negli
gence in the master himself, or in any one to whom the master may
see ﬁt to entrust his supeqintending authority.
Albro‘ v. Agawam
Law, ll7;
Canal Co.,
Cush. 75; McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N.
Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 9;‘ Hard v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 32
Vt. 473. ,But \l\/agner did not stand in respect to this company in
He was no superintendent or manager; he was
any such position.
fellow servant of the plaintiff.
The duties of the two
nothing but
were different,
true, but so commonly must the duties of fellow
servants be. He had one thing to do, and the plaintiff another, but
neither stood in the master’s place in respect to the other; and
be true, as the plaintiff claimed, that \Vagner had special authority and
was charged with special duty in respect to
particular passage way,
this cannot vary the legal aspects of the case.
In any such business
there must be division of employments among servants; one looks
after one thing and another after another; but this each understands
when he enters the service. He knows that his fellow servants are
.to be charged with duties and responsibilities of differing natures and
differing grades, and he also knows that one of the necessary risks
of the employment
that any one of them may be negligent and cause
him injury. This risk he assumes.
immaterial that the negligent
servant was in
position of greater responsibility than himself, or in
different line of employment, so long-as both were in the same gen
eral business, so that the negligence of the one might contribute to the
danger of the other. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. ]ones, 86 Pa. St. 432
Law, 117.
McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N.
If, therefore,
had appeared that \Vagner was negligent, as the
But we
plaintiff claimed, the action must nevertheless have failed.
look in vain in the record for any evidence that \\/agner was negli
may be guessed or surmised that there was negligence some
gent.
where, and one juror may guess that
was in the want of careful selec
tion of timber; another, that
was in the want of subsequent inspec
tion, or in the want of care to prevent rocks falling on the bridge; but
the case affords no safe ground for anything beyond conjecture;
and
the master can be held liable under the circumstances which the
record discloses, on mere guesses or inferences respecting the exist
ence of fault somewhere, the rule that an employé assumes the ordinary
risks of his employment will be wholly done away with.
too late
at this day to enter upon any discussion or defence of that rule.
has been too often enforced in this state, and
too salutary in its
effects upon the care and diligence of those engaged in employments
where these qualities are especially requisite, to be now disturbed or
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questioned. Davis v. Detroit,- etc., R. Co., 20 Mich. 105 ; Wonder v.
Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 32 Md. 417.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial or

dered.”

SLATER
(Court ot Appeals 0! New York,

v.

JEWETT.

1881.

85 N.

Y.

61, 39 Am. Rep. 627.)
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FOLGER, C. ]. This action is brought by the plaintiffs, as adminis
trators, to recover damages for the, death of Adelbert D. Slater, their
intestate. The cause of his death was the collision of two engines, each
drawing a train on the Erie Railway operated by the defendant -as
receiver.
It is claimed that the collision happened from negligence,
chargeable to the defendant, though not proceeding immediately from
him. The intestate was in the service of the defendant as a ﬁreman
on one of the engines that came together. The immediate negligence
that caused the accident and the death was that of the conductor on
the train meeting that on which the intestate was serving, co-operating
with that of a telegraphic operator at Salamanca, a station on the
defendant’s road; the latter having omitted to give to the engineer the
orders received from the train dispatcher as to the place where the
two trains should meet, which his instructions required him to do, and
having reported a performance of his duty, and the former having
signed the engineer’s name, without his knowledge, to an acknowledg
ment and receipt of order, and then having failed to communicate the
order to him, in consequence of which the engineer went on with his
train, instead of waiting at the station designated until the other train
came up.
The complaint avers that it was the duty of the defendant to em
and skillful men, and to make proper
ploy competent, trustworthy,
regulations for the running of his trains, so as to insure the safety of
persons operating the same, and to provide, as far as practicable,
against accident and injury to‘ them in their employment, and in the
performance of their service for him. This averment correctly states
the duty of the defendant, unless it overstates
when
sets his duty
at so high
mark as that of an insurer of the safety of his servants.
The measure of the master’s duty to his servant
reasonable care,
having relation to the parties, to the business in which they are en
gaged, and the exigencies which require vigilance and attention, and
conforming to the circumstances in which
to be exerted.
We

7

&

7

58 Accord:
Adams v. Iron Cliffs 00., 78 Mlch. 271, 288, 44 N. W. 270, 18
Am. St. Rep. 441 (1890).
Of. Hunn.v. Michigan Central R. Co., 78 Mich. 513,
L. R. A. 500 (1889). As to the use by the servant of common.
44 N. VV. 502.
ordinary tools. see 0’Hara v. Brown Hoisting Mach. Co.. 1'71 Fed. 394, 96 C.
C. A. 350 (1909): Ringer v. St. Louis
St. F. IR. Co.. 85 Kan. 167. 116 Pac.
212. 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1014 (1911); Stork v. Chas. Stolper Cooper-age Co., 127
Wis. 318, 106 N. W. 841,
Ann. Cas. 339 (1906).
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agree that the defendant was bound to do all else that the averment
puts upon him, unless it is road as making him a guarantor of the safety
The complaint avers that the defendant failed to
of his servants
employ proper and competent persons “to manage and run his trains,
and proper and suitable persons to give orders and information in re
spect thereto and properly‘ to communicate the same to engineers and
conductors of trains, and that he failed to make and enforce proper
and.reasonable rules and regulations for the running of his trains.
The proofs of the plaintiffs did not seek to introduce into the case
any other element of lack of duty in the defendant than’ these thus
averred. And we think that the case is clear upon the proofs that the
defendant made no failure of duty, unless it was in the enforcement
of'the rules and regulations made by him for the running of his trains.
we think
Vi/hether he failed in that
question of law properly
brought up by some of the exceptions taken at circuit by the defendant.
not to be questioned that the telegraph operator and the conductor
of the train were negligent, and that, from their careless omission of
duty and disobedience of rules. the accident resulted. The rules that
had been given to them for their guidance had been prepared with
great care, were minute. explicit and plain, and exceedingly well de
vised for safety. They had been in operation for several years before
the disaster, and no accident had ever taken place in the use of them.
The train-dispatcher, who concededly. was in the place of the defend
ant. had strictly observed these rules in this instance, and had received
all the assurance needful and required by them, that they had been
observed by all concerned.
Some contention was made on the argument, that there, was no proof
was not an exceptional and unprecedented thing to interfere, as
that
was done in this instance, with the moving of the two trains. and that
no cause was shown for an interference with them. The case shows
was the usage of the defendant and his predecessor, the
clearly that
Erie Railway Company, to govern and direct the -movement of trains
in this instance. The
by such order, and that there was reason for
order given was
special one, by reason of delay; but by special
not to be understood unusual and unprovided for. For nine years
these rules had been in operation, and the witness who testiﬁes to that
so applies his words as to plainly indicate that they had been in use in
giving like directions to engineers and conductors on like occasions
of delay. The proof shows that the time card
the general order,
and
comes from the superintendent.
An order varying
on
special
occasion comes from the train dispatcher.
The special order
as
much provided for by the general regulations as the general time card
or other general rules.
the conductor’s duty to obey the special
order, which supersedes, for the particular train, the general order.
station, having been received, there:
A special order to stop at
no
until further direction.
that
to
station
The rules
go beyond
right
proven and set forth in the case recognize the usage to stop and move
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trains by special order varying for the nonce the general time caru.
Indeed, as we may take judicial notice of the way in which banks and
like public institutions do business (Agawam Bank v. Strever, 18 N.
Y. 502), so may we that the great railways of the land are managed, in
the every-day practical running of them, by overlooking ofﬁcers at
distant places, who use the telegraph wires to keep all the while in
formed where trains are, and to direct their movements from hour to
hour.
.
W'e have presented to us in this case, then, general regulations well
calculated to insure safety in the running of the trains; a usage well
understood, and provided for in these general regulations, to vary
some particulars of these general _rules on special occasions by special
orders; speciﬁc, well-devised and promulgated rules for the mode
of doing so with safety; an occasion arising for the giving of a special
order to these two trains; a complete observance of all these regula
tions, by an officer who was in the stead of the defendant; an assurance
to him that they had been observed by others; and the use by him, to
bring his special order to the mind of the agents in charge of the
trains, of the customary means that had been safe and eﬁicient for a
series of years.
We need not say that there was no fault in the
higher oﬁicers of the defendant, for it is the law of the case, given to
the jury by the trial court, that there was not. The personal failure
of duty was in the telegraph operator and the conductor.
[Omitting discussion of whether this was a case of fellow servants rl
There is more plausibility in the position, that the act that was to be
done on this occasion was so essentially one for the master to do in
his duty to his servants, that whatever subordinate was taken by him
to do
came to be the master in doing it.
urged, and with rea
son, that clearly arranging and promulgating the general time-table of
the duty and the act of the master of it; that when
great railway
there
variation from the general time-table, for
special occasion
and purpose,
as much the duty and act of the master, and he
as much required to perform it: that
the duty and act of the
master to see and know that his general time-table
brought to the
knowledge of his servants who are to square their actions to it; that
his duty and act as to
the same
variation from
which
but
and that, therefore, whoever he uses to bring
special time-table;
those time—tables to the notice of his servants, he puts that person in
his place to do an act in his stead, inasmuch as the responsibility
done and done effectually;
upon him to see and know that
and
in person, he chooses to do
that if, instead of doing
through an
he, the master, and he, the master,
agent, that agent, pro hac vice,
negligent act therein of that agent whereby
responsible for
harmed.
fellow servant of him
The rule has been laid down in repeated cases in this court, in tenns
Flike v. R.
A. R. R. Co.. 53
so broad as to come close to this case.
Am. Rep. 545 Fuller v. jewett, 80 N. Y. 46, 36 Am.
N._Y. 549,
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Rep. 575; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516, 37 Am. Rep. 521. At
tentive consideration, however, will perceive a distinction between the
That the master hasthe right, as regards his servants, to vary
cases.
from the time-table that he has set, cannot be doubted. It is at times
a necessity so to do, and a necessity so frequent as to fall within the
occurrences that a railway servant is bound to expect in the course of
his employment.
Even as regards the public and passengers, a rail-.
has
a
manager
right, when needs press, to vary from his general
way
All that can then be required from him, by the public and
"time-table.
passengers, is that when he makes the variation he act under it with
reasonable care and diligence (Sears v. East. R. R. Co., 14 Allen
'[Mass.] 433, 92 Am. Dec. 780; Gordon v. M. & L. R. R. Co., 52'
N. H. _596, 13 Am. Rep; 97); that is to say, due care and diligence
in giving notice of the change, and in running the train upon the
changed time. A servant cannot ask for or expect more than this.
In Rose v. Boston & Albany R. R., 58 N. Y. 217, while recognizing the
rules as laid down in Flike’s Case, supra, it was said:
“It may be
conceded that it is the duty of railroad corporations to prescribe, either
by means of time-tables or by other suitable means, regulations for
running their trains with a view to their safety; but it is obvious that
obedience to these regulations must be intrusted to the employés hav
ing charge of the trains; such obedience is matter of executive detail,
which, in the nature of things, no corporation or any general agent of
it can personally oversee, and as to which employés must be relied
upon.”
These views seem applicable to this case.
The argument for the
plaintiffs’ position, as we have stated it above, breaks just at the part
where to be successful. it ought to be the strongest. It is not true that.
on an occasion like this, it is the duty of themaster, or a part of this
contract, to see to
as with
personal sight and touch, that notice
of
temporary and special interference with
general time-table_
comes to the intelligent apprehension of all those whom
to govern
in the running of approaching trains.
utterly impracticable so
to do, and a brakeman or
ﬁreman on
train knows that
is, as well
as any person connected with the business.
He knows that trains will
often and unexpectedly require to be stopped and started by tele
graphic orders from .distant points, and that such -orders must, from
the nature of the case, be given through servants skilled in receiving
and transmitting them. If there
due care and diligence in choosing
competent persons for that duty,
negligence by them in the per
risk of the employment that the coemployé takes
formance of
when he enters the service.
Such
variation, and the giving notice
of
not like the supply of suitable and safe machinery, or of com
the act of an hour or of an
petent and skilled fellow workmen.
instant, which for any useful effect to be got from
must be done at
the instant, and that, too, from a distance.
from its nature
and need. looked for as such. Of necessity
must be done through
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the best means of communication that experience, the safe and suc
cessful use-of years, has demonstrated it to be prudent to employ.
The act of supplying machinery or fellow servants is one for which
time may be taken and deliberation had, and it may be learned before
hazard is run whether the effort at supply has been well made and is
So, in Flike’s Case, supra, it was easy to know before the
suﬁicient.
train was started that the brakeman detailed for duty. had failed to be
at his place.
And in Fuller’s Case, supra, that the engine sent to the
shop for repairs was still faulty, before it was put on the road again.
Hence it was not one of the risks of the service that the ﬁreman, in
one of those cases, and the engineer, in the other, took upon himself
that the brakeman did oversleep, or that the boiler did explode. From
the nature of things, communication,
on these special occasions of
which we are speaking, must be had through intermediate agents, with
no or but little opportunity of testing their immediate ﬁdelity or ac
Would it do to lay down a rule that, when the master has
curacy.
chosen those agents with due care and diligence as to their skill and
competency, he must further take the responsibility to his other serv
ants that the agents thus selected will never lapse into carelessness?
The alternative is that he must in person put into the hands of each
conductor and each engine driver the general time-table and every
or abandon the mode of supervising and directing
deviation from
the movement of his trains by means of telegraphic communication.
The reasonable rule in such case hath this extent, and no more,
that he must ﬁrst choose his agents with due care for their possession
of skill and competency, and that then he must use the best means of
communication according to prescribed general rules and regulations
devised from the best experience in such business, and
among those
means
the service of
fellow servant. competent for his place, his
risk of the employment that his fellows take
possible carelessness
when entering into the service. The liability of the master to his serv
ant arises from his duty to him or his contract with him. Expressed
to supply the servant with
in general terms, that duty or contract
suitable and safe machinery and appliances, with competent and skill
ful coworkers, and to make and promulgate suﬁicient rules and regu
lations for the conduct of the business in its ordinary run and for any
not
extraordinary occasions that may be reasonably anticipated.
seriously contested but that all these things were done by the defendant.
We think that
misconception of the case, _to hold that the order
change of the rules of the road, as es
of the train dispatcher was
The train dispatcher
tablished and promulgated by the superintendent.
acted in exact accord with the general rules and regulations which
foresaw and with minuteness provided for such an occasion as this,
as much and as fully, so far as we can see from the case, as for the
The order of
ordinary running of trains on the general time card.
carrying out of those rules, and an
the train dispatcher was but
case for which they
application of certain provisions of them to
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were made, and the arising of which had been foreseen as probable.
In what other way could they be carried out in the detail of them, but
through the service of servants previously chosen and assigned to
their parts? And can it with propriety be said that the parts of that
detail are acts of the master, that he must do himself, or be liable for
The liability of the master is then made to
their negligent doing?
depend upon the character of the act in the performance or nonper
formance of which the injury arises. If the act is one pertaining to
the duty which the master owes to his servants. he is responsible to
them for the manner of the performance of it. If it is one which per
tains only to the duty of an operative, the employé performing it is
a mere servant, and the master, although liable to strangers, is not
liable to a fellow servant for the improper performance of it. Crispin
v. Babbitt, supra.
The query then is, in the case before us: Is it the duty of the
master to give personal notice to every operative of a train of a special
deviation from an established general time—table, or is his duty done
when he has beforehand provided rules, minute, explicit and eﬁicient.
and made them known to his servants, which, if observed and followed
by all concerned, will bring such personal notice to every one entitled
to it? We think that in the circumstances of this case the latter
clause of the query propounds the true rule, and should be answered
It is the duty of the master to provide rules and regu
affirmatively.
He has done so here. One of
lations for the running of the trains.
them is that by telegraphic message, sent at any time through operators
at the ends of the wires, to the conductor and engineer of a train, that
train may be stopped at a station, or hurried forward to another, or
made to go out of general order. These rules with that provision are
made known to all servants. If. when the intestate entered the em
ployment of the defendant, these rules had been read to him and his
especial attention called to this one, and he had agreed to serve under
would not he have taken the risk of the carelessness of the operators
out?
and conductor in carrying
_
Is this case any different in substance from that? Really, by en
tering the employment with these rules in force he did in effect agree
The bargain between him and
that special orders might be so sent.
the defendant was not only that special orders might be given inter
fering with the general time~table, but that they might be given in
this feature of the case that distinguished
this way.
from some
of those that we have cited. The case was not given to the jury on
this theory. It was, in the words of the learned counsel for the plain
tiff, submitted to them on the theory that “the act of the operator was
the act of the master.”
This we think was an error that calls for reversal of the judgment
All concur, except DANFORTH and Fmcn, ]_I., dis
new trial.
and
senting.
_Tudgnient reversed.
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221, 40 Eng.

Law

& Eq. 491.)

This was an action, brought in the Passage Court of Liverpool,
under Lord Campbell's Act, 9 8: 10 Vict. c.
by an administratrix,
93, which provides for compensation to the families of persons killed
by accident.
_'
_
The declaration stated that the intestate was a servant of the de
fendant, employed by him in his business as a sugar reﬁner, on the
terms that the defendant would take due and ordinary care that the
intestate should be exposed to no extraordinary risk in the course of
his said service; but that the defendant wrongfully exposed him to
extraordinary risk in the said employ, so that, through the carelessness
of the defendant, a sugar mould fell upon the intestate while he4 was
engaged in the said service and caused his death.
Pleas-—First, not guilty; second, a denial that the intestate was
employed on the terms stated.
At the trial, the plaintiff’s counsel stated the case thus: That the
defendant was a sugar reﬁner, and had employed the intestate as a
laborer; that it was part of the intestate’s duty to ﬁll the sugar moulds
and hoist them up to higher ﬂoors in the warehouse by means of
machinery; that the usual mode of attaching the molds to the machine
was by placing them in a sort of net bag, and which effectually pre
vented any accident; that this was the mode adopted by the defendant
until, from motives of economy, he substituted a kind of clip, which
laid hold of the rim of the mould; that the deceased, on the occasion
in question, had himself ﬁlled the mould, and fastened it to the clip,
but that, when it was being raised, the clip, by some jerk, slipped off
The learned judge,
the mould, which fell on his head and killed him.
on this statement, nonsuited the plaintiff, but gave him leave to move
'
to set the nonsuit aside.
PoLLoox, C. B. The deceased not only contributed to the accident
which caused his death, but did the act which directly caused it. It is
impossible to speculate as to the cause, but it is consistent with the
evidence that it’ was his own carelessness in fastening the clip.
At
all events, his o\vn act was the proximate cause of the occurrence,
and it is impossible to hold that to be a ground of action.
BRAMWELL, B. There is nothing legally wrongful in the use by
an employer of works or machinery more or less dangerous to his
workmen or less safe than others that might be adopted. It may be
inhuman so to carry on his works as to expose his workmen to peril
of their lives but it does not create a right of action for an injury
which it may occasion when, as in this case, the workman has known
all the facts and is as well acquainted as the master with the nature
of the machinery and voluntarily uses it. That was not so in the case
cited from the House of Lords, in which the workman had nothing to
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do with the stone the fall of which was the proximate case of the
Here, on the contrary, the workman’s own act was the
occurrence.
\/‘Vhether, therefore, on the principle that the party
proximate cause.
contributed to or was the proximate cause of the injury, or upon the
principle that a servant cannot sustain an action against a master for
the mere negligence of a servant, this action cannot be sustained.“
CHANNELL, B. concurs.
Rule refused.
_
54 Accord: Hayden
v. Smithville Mtg. Co., 29 Conn. 548 (1861), emphasizing
the need of knowledge by the employee: Ladd v.
Bedford R. Co., 119
. v. Smithson, 45 Mich.
Mass. 413, 20 Am. Rep. 331 (1876); Michigan C. R. légv
212, 7 N. W. 791 (1881).
In MeGorty v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 69
Conn. 638, 38 Atl. 359, 61 Am. St. Rep. 62 (1897), the court stated the rule
thus: “Employers have a right to decide how their work shall be performed,
and may employ men to work with dangerous implements, and in unsafe plac
es, without incurring liability for injuries sustained by workmen who knew
or ought to have known the hazards of the service which they have chosen
to enter.”
Many cases limit this broad statement; e. g., Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 50 Ohio
St. 565, 85 N. E. 55, 40 Am. St. Rep. 686 (1893): “The detectiveness of the
lift, and the company‘s knowledge of it, would not, however, alone constitute
actionable negligence. The character of the machine and the employer's knowl
edge being established. it still remains a question of fact whether, under all
the circumstances. :1 cnse of actionable negligence has been made out. That
which caused the danger may have been 11-remediable, and it is no violation
of duty by an employer to put one in his employ at the operation oi! a danger
ous machine. if the employé is fully informed as to its character, and volun
tarily accepts the employment. Whenever force is applied to machinery there
is more or less danger to those operating it; so that the duty o't the employer
towards his employé is not to furnish a perfectly safe machine, but one as
safe as can be provided in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence. Wheth
er the employer is negligent in this regard does not depend solely upon the
tact that the machine is known by him 'to be a dangerous appliance, but
whether, with such knowledge, he neglected to do what a person of ordinary
care could and would have done under such circumstances.”
Some cases repudiate the doctrine that the master is excused in the use of
dangerous machinery merely because the servant knew the danger and as
sumed the risk. See Jarrell v. Blackbird Block Coal Co., 154 Mo. App. 552,
136 S. W. 754 (1911), in which the court says: “The rule now may be con
sidered as ﬁrmly established that risks which do not belong to the employ
ment when conducted by the master with reasonable care are not natural
risks of such employment, and, where caused by the negligence of the master,
they are not assumed by the servant for the simple reason that the servant
could not, it he would, give the master a right to be negligent, and the law will
not imply :1 contract the parties could not establish by express agreement.
In
Jewell v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Works, 132 S. W., loc. cit. 709 (1910) the
Supreme Court quote with approval the following excerpt from the opinion
in Mathis v. Stockyards Co., 185 Mo., loc. cit.’ $47, 84 S. W. 70 (1904); ‘And
it the servant knows. or by the exercise of ordinary care could know, that
the appliances furnished are not altogether or reasonably safe, the servant
is not obliged to refuse to use the appliances or to quit the service of the
master it he reasonably believes that by the exercise of proper care and cau
tion he can safely use the appliances, notwithstanding they are not reasonably
safe. And if he does use them, and exercises such care and caution, and is
inillred. the servant does not waive his right to compensation for injuries re
ceived in consequence unless guilty of contributory negligence;
but. if the
appliance is so obviously dangerous that it cannot safely be used with care
and caution, or, as it is sometimes said, if the danger of using it is patent;
or such as to threaten immediate injury, then the servant is guilty of con
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PITTSBURGH COAL DOCK CO.

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin,

1908.

134

Wis.

259,

114 N.

W,

437,

14

L. R. A.

[N. S.] 952.)

Action by John Polaski against the Pittsburgh Coal Dock Company.
From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and

it

it

it,

remanded.
_
The defendant maintained a coal dock at the city of Superior, about
900 feet in length and 300 feet in width, in the center whereof were
three longitudinal railroad tracks for the loading and moving of rail
road cars, upon which cars were frequently in motion, usually moved
by attaching a hook to them and gripping unto a moving cable be
side each track. It was necessary and customary for the workmen on
the dock to pass frequently across these tracks, which were in a de
The plaintiff was a common laborer,
pression about four feet deep.
and had, with six other men, just completed the loading of a car on
one of these tracks, when the gang were ordered by the foreman to
cross the tracks to the other side of the dock.
One after another
they jumped down, and started across in front of this car, which plain
tiff’s testimony tends to show was stationary, with nothing to indicate
that it was about to be moved. As plaintiff passed in front of
some
what diagonally across the track, having seen
stationary as he started,
was put in motion, and overtook him just as he reached the furthest
or west rail of the track, knocked him down, and passed over one of
his legs.
There was evidence that no rule had been promulgated by
the defendant in any wise tending to guard against the running down
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if

tributory negligence
he uses it. and the master is not liable, notwithstand
ing his prior failure of duty.’ That is wholesome doctrine, and means that.
where the risk
created by the negligence of the master, there is no room
in the case for the application of the rule of assumed risk." And see the dis
senting opinions in Myers v. Chicago, St. P. M.
O. Ry. Co., 95 Fed. 406, 37
C. C. A. 137 (1899), emphasizing the great necessities of laboring men in many
cases. driving them to accept dangers of employment from which they should
a

be relieved when they are unnecessary.
Other cases hold that. where
statute has changed the common-law rule, it
cannot be waived by agreement of the parties.
Simpson v. New York Rubber
Co.. 80 Hun, 415. 30 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1894).
On the effect of the English
Employers’ Liability Act of 1880 on this, see Yarmouth v. France, L. R. 19
Q. B. D. 647, 17 Eng. R. C, 217 (1887), commenting on the decision in the
leading case of Thomas v. Quartormaine,
R. 18 Q. B. D. 685 (1887).
And the same care by the master requisite in the ﬁrst instance must still
be exercised to keep conditions safe for the servant.
Shanny v. Androscoggin
Mills, 66 Me. 420 (1876). He has
continuing duty, Campbell v. Jones, 60
Wash. 265, 110 Pac. 1083, 20 A. L. R. 671 (1910), requiring careful and vigi
lant inspection, Paine v. Eastern Ry. Co., 91 Wis. 340, 64 N. W. 1005 (1895).
But cf Knudsen v. La Crosse Stone Co., 145 Wis. 394, 130 N. W. 519, 33 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 223 (1911), with
dissenting opinion.
The difference between keeping conditions safe and failure in the ﬁrst in
stance to make them safe is the point in ("-hicago
A. R. O0. v. Maroney,
170 Ill. 520. 48 N. E. 953, 62 Am. St. Rep. 396 (1897); Williams v. Birming
ham Battery
Metal Co. [1899]
Q. B. 338.
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these cars; that the gripman who had charge of mov
ing them was accustomed indiscriminately to fasten on either the front
or back end; that under some circumstances there would be a man.
on top of the cars to set the brakes, at other times not; that the grip
man’s habit was irregular, that sometimes he looked in front of the
car or shouted warning of its approach, and sometimes he did not, and
that in the present instance he had fastened his grip to the rear end
of the car, had not looked in front, and gave no warning. * * *
In a business conducted by
DODGE,
(after stating the facts).
many employés performing work independently of each other, and in
which the work of one becomes periodically dangerous to another, it
is the duty of the master to provide reasonable precautions against
such danger, and amongst these is promulgating rules and regulations
for thegiving of warning to the persons likely to be endangered when
such dangerous acts are about to be performed.
Promer v. Milwau
kee L. S. & VV. R. Co., 90 Wis. 215, 63 N. W. 90, 48 Am. St. Rep.
905; Portance v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 101 \Vis. 574, 77 N. VV.
875, 70 Am. St. Rep. 932; -Bain v. Northern Paciﬁc R. Co., 120 VVis.
412, 98 N. \/V. 241; Labatt, Mast. & Serv. § 210.
Other illustrative
cases are Hartvig v. N. P. L. Co., 19 Or. 522, 25 Pac. 358; Inland
Steel Co. v. Smith_ (Ind. App.) 75 N. E. 852; Ford v. Railway Co.,
124 N. Y. 493, 26 N. E. 1101, 12 L. R. A. 454; Dowd v. Railway Co.,
In some instances the danger is so ob
170 N. Y. 459, 63 N. E. 541.
vious and imminent, and the making of regulations so easy that their
absence might be considered negligence as a matter of law.
In other
cases of more doubt it becomes a question for the jury whether the
omission of them is a failure of that due care which the employer owes
his employés to guard them from injury.
In the present case, we have no doubt that as cars were likely at any
moment to be set in motion by some employés, and other employés,
whose work was wholly independent, except that it promoted the gen
eral operation of the dock, were likely at any moment to be upon the
tracks, engrossed with their work so that an injury to them from a
silently moving car was within imminent probability, it might well be
thought by reasonable men that the duty of ordinary care required
that some precaution, either by warning or lookout, be exercised.
It
is also obvious that those precautions were entirely easy and feasible.
A look-out might be stationed on the forward end of the car, a bell or
other signal sounded or given, but more easy and natural still would
have been the precaution that the gripman should uniformly attach
the moving apparatus to the front end and thus be in a position where
he could see the track ahead of him. The evidence tended to prove that
absolutely no instructions or regulations requiring any precautions
whatever had ever been promulgated, and such is the negligence charg

I.“
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Part of the statement of facts is omitted.
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ed by the complaint.“ We deem it clear that a jury might properly
decide that such omission constituted a want of due care on the part of
the employer, nor can we doubt that they might reach the conclusion
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the plain
tiff, who was in a place required by his duty and by the command of
his superior.
Hence we must conclude that a prima facie case of neg
ligence and liability was made out.
It is claimed by the respondent that plaintiff assumed the risks of
doing the business as it was ordinarily done. But there was evidence
tending to establish that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the absence
of a rule requiring warning; also, that warnings were frequently giv
en voluntarily by the gripman or others, and that never, within the ob
servation of plaintiff, had a car been set'in motion withou_t either the
presence of the gripman before it or of a look-out on top or a shouted
warning to men on the track. There can be no assumption of the risk
from a negligent method of doing business of which plaintiff has no
knowledge.
Again, it is urged that plaintiff was guilty of speciﬁc acts
ofcontributory negligence, in that he jumped onto the track immediate
ly in front of the car. But there was evidence tending to prove that
the car was stationary at that time, that the gripman‘ was not in a po
sition to be seen by him, and, since he had never known a car to be
moved without some warning, that he had no reason to expect that this
one would be. Upon such a state of facts, of course, contributory
negligence could not be predicated as matter of law; especially, too,
when he had been given an order from his superior, who presumably
knew whether there was peril, to enter upon and hasten across the track.
We are convinced that the case should have gone to the jury. Judg
ment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
\

GOODES

v.

BOSTON & ALBANY R. CO.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

1894.

162 Mass. 287, 38 N.

E.

500.)

Action by Edward Goodes, administrator, against the Boston &
Albany Railroad Company, to recover damages for the death of his
Exceptions
Defendant excepts.
intestate.
judgment for plaintiff.
'

sustained.
MORTON,

J. One entering the employment of another assumes the
obvious risks arising from the nature of the employment, from the
manner in which the business is carried on, and from the condition of
the ways, works, and machinery, if he is of sufficient capacity to un
As to enforcement of the rules. see Merrill v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
Utah, 264, 81 Pac. 85. 110 Am, St. Rep. 695 (1905); Rutledge v. Missouri
Whether rules
Pac. Ry. Co., 123 M0. 121, 24 S. W. 1053. 27 S. W. 327 (1894).
are always necessary, is considered in Moore Lime C0. v. Richardson's Adm’r,
95 Va. 326, 28 S. E. 334, 64 Am. St. Rep. 785 (1891).
_
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derstand and appreciate them. It is not necessary to inquire whether
this doctrine rests upon contract or upon the inherent reasonableness
and justice of the rule itself, as applied to the relations of master and
servant. It has been long and well settled at common law, and it is
not contended by the plaintiff that it does not apply to cases arising un
der the “Employers’ Liability Act," so called. VVe think that this case
comes within it. The plaintiff’s intestate was in the service of the de
fendant as a brakeman. At the time of the accident which resulted in
his death he had been in the defendant’s employ three months, less a
few days. Before entering the employment of the defendant he had
worked several months on another railroad as a brakeman.
He was
strong, active, healthy, of good eyesight and hearing, knew his busi
It appeared from uncontra
ness, and was competent and intelligent.
dicted testimony that in the course of his employment he had been
frequently, by day and by night, over and by the switch where he was
It further appeared, also by uncontradicted testimony,
knocked off.
that the switch was in the same place, and was the same in all re
spects as when he entered the defendant’s employment, and that there
had been no change in the adjacent tracks.‘ The condition of things
was perfectly obvious, and there was nothing in the nature of a trap
or a hidden defect, and at the time of the injury he was engaged in
service growingout of the nature of his employment, and with which
he was familiar, and which he had been accustomed to do. Under such
circumstances he must be held to have assumed the’ risk of injury from
the proximity of the switch to the track, and the rulings asked for by
the defendant to that effect should have been given.
Lovejoy v. Rail
road, 125 Mass. 79; Fisk v. Railroad Co., 158 Mass. 278, 33 N. E.
510; O’Maley v. Light Co., 158 Mass. 135, 32 N. E. 1119; Kleinest
v. Kunhardt, 160 Mass. 230, 35 N. E. 458; Goldthwait v. Railway
Co., 160 Mass. 554, 36 N. E. 486: Coombs v. Railroad Co., 156 Mass.
200, 30 N. E. 1140; Thain v. Railroad Co. (Mass.) 37 N. E. 309;
Feely v. Cordage Co., Id. 368; Randall v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 478.
189, 7 Sup. Ct. 1166.
3 Sup. Ct. 322; Tuttle v. Railway,
122 U.
As the case stands, we ﬁnd nothing in the exceptions calling for in
structions on the question whether the emergency was such that the
plaintiff’s intestate fairly could be said to have voluntarily assumed
the risk.
As already observed. the accident happened in the ordinary
course of his employment, and while he was engaged in the perform
ance of duties to which he was accustomed, and under circumstances
which were not unusual. The testimony that was objected to was right
ly admitted. It all bore upon the question of whether or not the plain
intestate was in the exercise of due care.
Exceptions sustained."
tiFf’_s
5'1 In Mureh

v. Thomas Wilson's Sons & Co., 168 Mass. 408. 47 N. E. 111
is said by Knowlton. J.: “The employé impliedly agrees to assume
all the obvious risks of the business in which he contracts to work. Among
these are the open, manifest dangers attendant upon the use of the ways,
works, and machinery of a permanent character that are plainly intended to
(1897)
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BENZING

v.

STEINWAY

(Court of Appeals of New York,

1886.

101 N.

549

et al.

Y.

547,

5 N.

E.

449.)

Appeal from a judgment of general term of the court of common
a judg
pleas in and for the city and county of New York, afﬁrming
V
ment of the trial term, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.
RUGER, C. ]. The evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
accident, and the prior use of the platform occasioning the same, is
quite meager and unsatisfactory;
but, standing unexplained, was quite
sufficient to carry the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence to
He was unexpectedly called from his work, in another part
the jury.
of the factory, to assist in putting up girders to support a roof in
course of erection over the boiler room. This duty was not in the line
of his general employment, and his evidence shows that he had no pre
vious knowledge of the status of the work, or of the appliances used in
A platform, consisting of ﬁve pine boards painted
its prosecution.
red, and being one inch thick, fastened together by two hardwood cleats
attached to the boards with screws, and forming a ﬂooring about four
-feet six inches wide (the length is not shown), was placed in such a
position as to be supported by the wall on one side, and an iron beam
be retained as a part of the plant to which the contract for service relates.
It has often been held that an employer owes his employé no duty to change a
business in these particulars in order to make it safer, even though in some
parts his ways and works would not be deemed reasonably safe and proper
if he was starting a new establishment to do the same kind of work under an
arrangement with employés to serve in a business afterwards to be estab
lished.”
The same judge elaborately discusses the principle of assumption
of risk in Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 155 Mass. 155, 29 N, E.
464, 31»Am. St. Rep. 537 (1891).
The rationale of the rule of assumed risk has been variously stated. A sen
sible view is found in Moore v. St. Louis Wire Mill Co., 55 Mo. App. 491, 495
A different reason for the rule isqfound in Stager v. '1‘roy Laundry
(1893).
Co., 38 Or. 480, 63 Pac. 645. 53 L. R. A. 459 (1901): “A servant is understood
to assume the ordinary risks incident to the particular service in which he
voluntarily engages, to the extent those risks are known to him at the time
of his employment, or should be readily discernible to a person of his age
and capacity in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence.
Where the em
ployment is obviously dangerous and_hazardous,
and conducted in a way
fully known to the servant at the outset. he assumes the risk incident to the
conduct in that way or manner. although a safer method was known or could
have been adopted.”
Shear. & R. Neg. (5th Ed.) 5 185. See, also, Harrison v.
Central R. (‘o.. 31 N. J. I.-aw 293 (1865); Chicago & G. E. Ry. Co. v. Harney,
28 Ind. 28, 92 Am. Dec. 282 (1867\: Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Ross, 112 U. S.
377. 383. 5 Sup. Ct. 184. 28 L. Ed. 787 (1884), and Michigan Cent. R. C0. v.
Leahey, 10 Mich. 193 (1862).
The meaning of the term has been thus stated in Dutfey v. Consolidated
Block Coal Co.. 147 Iowa, 225. 124 N. W._609. 30 L, R. A. (N. S.) 1067 (1910):
“The term ‘assumption of risk’ has come to be used in 9, twofold sense.
It
is often said that an employé assumes the ordinary risk that is incident to
his employment. This form of assumption of risk is often pleaded by defend
ants in personal injury cases, although it is quite unnecessary to do so.
Assumption of risk in its true sense has reference to those risks arising out
of the negligence of the master when such negligence is known to the em
ployé, and the danger therefrom appreciated by him.”
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on the other, and extending over a vault about 11
feet deep.
It was raining on the day of the accident, and when the
plaintiff appeared in the yard, about on a level with the platform, he
was ordered by the foreman to get upon it for the purpose of aiding
other servants of the defendant who were then present and ready to
The plaintiff
proceed in the work of placing the girders in position.
asked the foreman if it was safe, and was informed by him that it was.
It is quite evident that the plaintiff had no opportunity to inspect
the platform, for the purpose of discovering defects in its material or
structure, before going upon it; and even if he had made such exam
ination, it is quite doubtful whether he could have discovered them
on account of the painted surface, and the difﬁculty of inspecting its
lower side as it was then situated. He advanced upon it to the side
where his services were needed, when the board upon which he stood
broke, and precipitated him into the vault below, and a serious injury
resulted. This statement of the case does not show, as matter of law,
that the plaintiff was chargeable with negligence in obeying the orders
of his superior.
The complaint was not, however, dismissed at the
circuit for that reason, but upon the ground that the evidence did not
show the platform to have been furnished by the defendants for the
use to which it was put, and that it appeared to be an instrumentality
adopted by a fellow servant without the knowledge or consent of the
employer. The neglect, if any, was said to be that of a coservant, for
which the master was held not to be liable. The general term seems
to have taken a similar view of the case, and therefore aﬁirmed the
In this we think those courts erred, and that a new trial
judgment.
should be granted.
It has been repeatedly held that the risks of the service which a
servant assumes in entering upon the employment of a master are
those only which occur after the due performance by the employer
of those duties which the law enjoins upon him, and that the negli
gence of the master, co-operating with that of a servant in producing
injury to a coservant, renders the master liable. Stringham v. Stew
art, 100 N. Y. 516, 3 N. E. 575, and cases cited. It was said by Chief
_]'udge Church in Flike v. Boston & A. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549, that the
true rule “is to hold the corporation liable for negligence in respect
to such acts and duties as it is required to perform as master, with
out regard to the rank or title of the agent intrusted with their per
formance. As to such acts. the agent occupies the place of the corpo
ration, and the latter is liable for the manner in which they are per
formed.”
Judge Rapallo states the rule, in Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N.
Y. 521, to be that it depends ‘-‘upon the character of the act in the
performance of which the injury arises, without regard to the rank
of the employé performing it. If it is one pertaining to the duty the
master owes to his servants, he is responsible to them for the manner
of its performance.”
The rule is unqualiﬁed that a master is bound
to use all reasonable care, diligence, and caution in providing for the
3 feet therefrom
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safety of those in his employ and furnishing, for their use in his work,
safe, sound, and suitable tools, implements,“ appliances, and machinery
in the prosecution thereof and keeping the same in repair.
This is
the master’s duty, and he cannot exempt himself from liability for its
omission by delegating its performance to another; or, having cquired
work to be done. by omitting precautions and inquiries as to the time
and manner of its performance.
Laning v. New York, Cent. R. R.,
49 N. Y. 521; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517; Slater v. Iewett,
85 N. Y. 61; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Min. Co., 99 N. Y. 368; S. C.
2 N. E. Rep. 24.
The master is chargeable, ordinarily, with knowl
edge of the means necessary to be employed in performing his work;
and when their procurement and selection is delegated to a servant,
he stands in the place of the master in discharging those duties, and the
servant’s neglect in that ofﬁce is chargeable to the employer as an omis
sion of duty enjoined upon him. Ellis v. New York Cent. R. Co., 95
N. Y. 546; Slater v. ]ewett, 85 N. Y. 61. Ignorance by the master
of defects in the instrumentalities used by his servants in performing
his work is no defense to an action by the employé who has been in
jured by them when, by the exercise of proper care and inspection,
the master could have discovered and remedied the defects, or avoid
ed the danger incident therefrom.
The evidence in the case fails to disclose the previous history of the
structure used as a platform, but it appears that it was already manu
factured, and had lain, for some time previous to the accident, over
the boiler in the boiler room.
It was apparently made of sound lum
ber, and upon a casual examination would seem to have been safe for
however,
the purpose for which it was used.
An examinationof
after the accident, disclosed that the broken wood had
knot of about
two inches in diameter near its center, which must have impaired its
The under part of the board was un
safety for use as
platform.
painted, and the existence of the knot was presumably open to discov
casual inspection of the platform, before
was placed
ery upon
in position.
We think that
was within the province of the jury, up
on the evidence appearing in the record, to pass upon the question of
the defendant’s negligence in using the structure described for
plat
was error to dismiss the
form in the work prosecuted, and that
Feltham v. England, L. R.
complaint.
Q. B. 36; Coughtry v. Globe
\Voolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124; Manning v. Hogan, 78 N. Y. 615.”
The judgment of the court below should be reversed, and new trial
All concur.
ordered, with costs to abide the event.
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58 Cf. Goudie v. Foster, 202 Mass. 226, 88 N. E. 663 (1909), in which
serv
laundry sued for injuries due to a slippery ﬂoor.
ant who had worked in
The conﬂicting rules of assumed risk of the servant and absolute duty of the
master are fully discussed in Bethlehem Iron Co. v. YVeiss, 100 Fed. 45. 40
Allen (Mass) 441,
O. C. A, 270 (1900).
See, a150, Snow v. Housatonic R. Co.,
85.Am. Dec. 720 (1864), a loading ease, and Jones v. Mfg.
Investment Co.,
92 Me. 565, 43 Atl. 512. 69 Am. St. Rep. 535 (1809).
As to what dangers
servant is presumed to risk, see Hough v. Texas
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1906. 7"! Ark. 367, 92 S. W, 244, 4
[N. S.] 837. 7 Ann. Cas. 430.)

Court of Arkansas,

L. R. A.
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This is an appeal by a railroad company from a judg
ment against it for damages for an injury to one of its employés while
he was acting under the orders of a foreman in charge of the work up
on which -plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury. The plain
tiff and three or four other workmen were on the top of a wooden
The heavy
structure erected as a support for an iron rock crusher.
iron part of the rock crusher was lifted into position by _means of a
“traveler” with a crane attached, worked by a steam engine. In plac
ing the top of the rock_ crusher in position the workmen had also to
use a “bent.”
This “bent” consisted of two upright pieces and a cross
piece some 10 or 15 feet long, connecting these two uprights, all of
heavy timbers securely nailed and fastened together. The bottom of
these two uprights or legs of the bent were fastened to the top of the
wooden structure, on which the rock crusher rested. After the bent
had served its purpose the foreman ordered it removed.
When this
order was given some one suggested that- a rope be‘ used, so that it
could be lowered gradually.
But the foreman said that it was unnec
essary to use a rope, and ordered the bent to be pushed over and
thrown down. As it was pushed over, the top of the upright or leg
of the bent next to where the plaintiff was at work caught on a bolt
As the other side of the bent had
projecting from the “traveler.”
was pushed or fell forward; the side
nothing to stop or control
next to plaintiff catching on the projecting bolt caused the bottom of
the leg on that side to kick or ﬂy back.
struck plaintiff, knocked
him to the ground, and caused him serious injury, on account of which
he recovered judgment for damages, and the main question
wheth
er the facts support the judgment.
The liability of the master for injuries to servants rests primarily
on the broad principle of law that where there
fault there
liabili
no fault there
no liability.
Bevens on Neg
ty, but where there
In this case we may say that, as the foreman having
ligence, 734.
charge of the work for the defendant stood in its place as its repre
sentative,
he by negligence while acting as foreman caused the in
jury, the plaintiff can recover compensation therefor from the defend
ant, unless the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, or un
risk assumed by plaintiff.
less the injury resulted from
The defend
ant not only denies that
was guilty of negligence, but
set up both
Pac. Ry. Co., 100 U. S. 213, 25 L. Ed. 612 (1879). per Harlan, J., and Ford v.
Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 240. 14 Am. Rep. 598 (1872).
“Extraordinary
risks” are considered in Boer v. Baird Machine 00.. 84 Conn. 269, 79 Atl. 673
(1911).
59 The statement

of facts and part of the opinion

are omitted.
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But, though the defenses of contributory negligence and assumed
risk are separate and distinct, yet
frequently happens that they are
both available in the same case and under the same state of facts. For
instance, as we have stated,
servant assumes all the risks ordinarily
it
is

is

incident to the service in which he
employed, and
also true that
for an injury caused by his own negligence. Now
may turn out that the injury of which the servant complains was not
only due to one of the ordinary risks which the servant assumed, but
that
was also caused in part
his own negligence. In dealing with
such
is, so far as results are concerned, immaterial whether
case
be disposed of by the courts on the ground of assumed risk or con
tributory negligence, for either of them make out
good defense.
For this reason the distinction between these two defenses
not
brought out in the reported cases;
being often unnecessary
WEl}éS so.
to
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contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk by plaintiff as
of course,
distinction
defenses to the action in this case._ There
between the defense of assumed risk and that of contributory negli
The defense of contributory negligence rests on some fault
gence.
maintainable
or omission of duty on the part of the plaintiff, and
when, though the defendant has been guilty of negligence, yet the
direct or proximate cause of the injury
the negligence of the plain-'
tiff, but for which the injury would not have happened.
applies
when the plaintiff
asking damages for an injury which would not
have happened but for his own carelessness.
On the other hand, the
defense of assumed risk
said to rest on contract, which
generally
term which the
implied from the circumstances of the case;
being
law imports into the contract, when nothing
said to the contrary,
that the servant will assume the ordinary risks of the service for which
he
paid.
The defense of assumed risk comes within the principle expressed
This defense does not im
by the maxim “Volenti non ﬁt injuria.”
pliedly admit negligence on the part of the defendant and defeat the
right of action therefor, as the defense of contributory
negligence
does; for, where the injury was the result of
risk assumed by the
servant, no right of action arises in his favor at all, as the master owes
no legal duty to the servant to protect him against dangers the risk
of which he assumed as
part of his contract of service. Narramore
v. Cleveland R. R. Co., 96 Fed. 298, 37 C. C. A. 499, 48 L. R. A.
68.
In other words, the defense of assumed risk rests on the fact that
the servant voluntarily, or at least without physical coercion, exposed
Having done
himself to the danger and thus assumed the risk thereof.
this of his own accord, he has no right,
an injury results, to call on
another to compensate him therefor, whether he was guilty of care
lessness or not.
Smith v. Baker, 1891 Appeal Cases (Eng); opinion
Bowen in Thomas v. Quartermaine,
18 Q. B. Div. (Eng.)
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We have thought it well to point out the distinction between them
to avoid any confusion of the law in its application to the facts of this
In the application of the doctrine of assumption of risks a dis
case.
tinction must be also made between those cases where the injury is due
to one of the ordinary risks of the service, and when it is due to some
altered condition of the service, caused by the negligence of the master.
The servant is presumed to know the ord.inary risks. It is his duty to
inform himself of them, and if he negligently fails to do so he will
still be held to have assumed them. The decision in the recent case
of Grayson-McLeod Co. v. Carter (Ark.) 88 S. W. 597, rests on that
But the servant
ground, as do many other cases found in the Reports.
is not presumed to know of risks and dangers caused by the negligence
of the master after he enters the service, which change the conditions
of the service. If he is injured by such negligence he cannot be said
to have assumed the risk, in the absence of knowledge on his part
that ‘there was such a danger; for, as we have before stated, the doc
trine of assumed risk rests on consent, but, if the injury was caused
in part by his own negligence, he may be guilty of contributory neg
On the other hand, if he realizes the danger and still elects
ligence.
then, although he acts with the
to go ahead and expose himself to
greatest care, he may,
injured, be held to have assumed the risk.
Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513, 30 N. E. 366: Lloyd v. Hanes, 126
N. C. 359, 35
E. 611 Smith v. Baker, [1891] 16 A. C. 325.
Now the injury in this case did not result from one of the ordinary
risks of the employment which
servant of full age and experience
must be presumed to have known, whether he did so or not. But, as
the jury found,
was brought about during the course of his service
by the negligence of the foreman, who had charge of the work and
in that respect represented the defendant.
Where the condition of
the service
thus altered, and the servant
brought face to face with
a danger of that kind not ordinarily incident to the work, then, as be
fore stated, new questions are presented. The plea of the master that
the servant assumed the risk
met in such
case by the answer that
the danger arose from the master’s own negligence, which
not one
of the risks assumed by the servant. This being so, the master, to
make good his defense of assumed risk, must go further and show
that the servant voluntarily subjected himself to the new danger with
full knowledge and appreciation thereof;
for such risk constitutes
an addition to those ordinarily incident to the service, and there
no presumption that he had knowledge of
or assumed it.
This question was thoroughly considered and discussed by the judg
es of the House of Lords of England in the case of Smith v. Baker.
[1891] 16 A. C. 325. In that case the plaintiff was with other workmen
of defendant engaged in drilling holes in rock for the purpose of blast
movable crane op
ing. Another set of workmen were, by means of
steam engine, moving the stones that had been blasted.
erated by
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These stones were often without notice swung over the heads of plain
He was aware of the danger, but
and was afterwards injured by a
In discussing the question as to whether
stone dropping upon him.
the plaintiff assumed the risk by continuing at work under those cir
cumstances, the judges called attention to the fact that the maxim up
on which the rule of assumption of risks was based was not “Scienti
A majority of them
non ﬁt injuria,” but “Volenti non ﬁt injuria.”
therefore concluded that the mere fact that the servant remained at
work after discovering the danger to which he was exposed did not
authorize the court to say as a matter of law that he consented to as
sume the risk.
They held that whether he did so or not was under the
'
facts of that case a question for the jury.
The justness of this decision has been recognized by some of the
American courts.
Maloney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513, 30 N. E. 366;
Lloyd v. Hanes, 126 N. C. 359, 35 S. E. 611. But, though this deci
sion of the highest English court seems to be logically sound, yet the
law in this country, as settled by numerous decisions, is to some extent
different.
Thetrule here seems to be that one who, knowing and ap
preciating the danger, enters upon a perilous work, even though he
In other words,
does so by order of his superior, must bear the risk.
even though he may perform the work unwillingly under orders from
his superior, yet if there was no physical compulsion, and if he knew
and appreciated the danger thereof, he will in law be treated as having
elected to bear the risk, and cannot hold the employer liable if injury
results. Telephone Co. v. Woughter, 56 Ark. 206, 19 S. W. 575; Fer
ren v. Old Colony R. R., 143 Mass. 197, 9 N. E. 608; Burgess v.
Davis Sulphur Ore Co., 165 Mass. 71, 42 N. E. 501; Stiller v. Bohn
Mfg. Co., 80 Minn. 1, 82 N. 1/V. 981; Mundle v. Hill Mfg. Co., 86
Me. 400, 30 Atl. 16; Fickett v. Fibre Co., 91 Me. 269, 39 Atl. 996;
Texas & Paciﬁc R. R. Co. v. Swearingen, 196 U. S. 57, 25 Sup. Ct.
191 U. S. 64, 24
164, 49 L. Ed. 382; C. Ok. R. R. Co. v. McDade,
Paciﬁc Ry. Co. v. Archibald,
Sup. Ct. 24, 48 L. Ed. 96; Texas
.
170 U. S. 665, 18 Sup. Ct. 777, 42 L. Ed. 1188.
»But plaintiff in this case exposed himself to the danger in obedience
A's the danger was brought about by
to an order of the foreman.
can be said, as
the negligence of the foreman, before
matter of
law, that plaintiff assumed the risk thereof by the mere fact that he
went ahead with his work,
must be clearly shown that when he did
so he knew and appreciated the danger to which he exposed himself
But, as plaintiff was busily engaged in work
by doing the work.
which required his attention, we think
was open for the jury to say
that he did not know of or fully appreciate the danger, and that there
fore he did not, by continuing at work, assume the risk of injury to
which he was exposed by the carelessness of the foreman.
Taking
would probably have been safe to
into consideration the fact that
have pushed the “bent” over without the use of
rope to control
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tiff and those working with him.
continued at work without-protest,
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but for the fact that there was a nut projecting from the traveler
which was liable to catch one side of the bent, that this danger es
caped the attention of the foreman whose duty it was to guard against
and that plaintiff’s attention was distracted more or less by his
work, we think
exceedingly probable that he not only did not assume
the risk caused by the act of the foreman in ordering the bent pushed
over without
but that he was not even
rope attached to control
aware of the danger until too late to escape.
He knew, of course, that
the order had been given to push the _“bent” over without the use of
was open for the jury to ﬁnd that he did not
rope; but we think
know and appreciate the danger to him that this order involved, and
that therefore he did not, by remaining at work, assume the risk.
56 Ark. 211, 19
W. 575; Lloyd v.
Telephone C0. v. VVougl1ter,
Hanes, 126 N. C. 359, 35 S. E. 611; Maloney v. Dore, 155" Mass.
513, 30 N. E. 366; Burgess v. Davis Sulphur Ore Co., 165 Mass. 71,
42 N. E. 501; Mundle v. Hill Mfg. Co., 86 Me. 400, 30 Atl. 16;
Stiller v. Bohn Mfg. Co., 80 Minn.
82 N. W. 981; Nofsinger v.
Goldman, 122 Cal. 609, S5 Pac. 425; Fickett v. Fibre Co., 91 Me.
269, 39 Atl. 996; Shearman
Redﬁeld on Neg.
214.
The next question
whether or not plaintiff was guilty of con
tributory negligence. Now in this case, as we have before stated, the
plaintiff, when injured, was acting in obedience to an order of the
foreman in charge of the work, who represented the defendant com
pany. The order of the foreman to push the “bent” over carried with
an implied assurance that the act could be done with reasonable safe
the duty of the master or his representative to use due
ty; for
care, and not to order the servant to perform an act that he knows to
be unnecessarily dangerous.
The servant has the right to rely upon
the judgment of the master, unless the danger
so obvious that no
under like circumstances.
For this rea
prudent man would incur
son We do not think that, because the plaintiff and the foreman under
whom he was working were both in
position to have discovered the
danger that caused this injury,
one was
necessarily follows that,
true that they were both held
negligent, both were negligent.
to the exercise of ordinary care only; but what
ordinary care may
vary with the circumstances and with the duty required, and the duty
required of these men and the circumstances under which they acted
were different.
The plaintiff was actually engaged in work under the
direction of the foreman. Vi/hen the “bent” was ordered pushed over,
was
itbecame necessary for him to unfasten the brace by which
held in position and to draw the nails by which the end of the leg of
the brace was fastened to the structure on which
rested. This re
quired him to look down, instead of upwards.
He completed this
work just as the “bent” began to fall. Up to that time his attention
was necessarily directed to his work.
But the foreman was doing no
He ‘was directing the labor of the plaintiff and others.
labor himself.
In order to do this he was standing on the side of the hill,
few yards
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away from the structure, where he could overlook and direct the
w'ork. It was his duty, before ordering the “bent” thrown down, to
ascertain that the execution of his order involved no unnecessary dan
ger to the men engaged in the work.
VVhen we consider that’ the plaintiff had the right to rely upon the
performance of thjs duty by the foreman, and that plaintiff's atten
tion was more or less required by the work he was doing, it seems
very clear under the facts of this case that the jury were justiﬁed
in ﬁnding that the foreman was guilty of negligence, but that the
plaintiff was not. The objection to the fourth instruction or para
graph of charge, on the ground that it permitted the jury to make such
The question of whether
a ﬁnding, must therefore be overruled.
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was, we think, proper
ly submitted, _and the ﬁnding of the jury must stand; for it cannot
be said, under the facts of this case, that the danger was so obvious
Southwestern Tele
that no prudent man would have incurred it.
phone Co. v. Woughter, 56 Ark. 206, 19 S. W. 575 ; Sneda v. Libera,
*
* *
65 Minn. 337, 68 N. \/V. 36.

The evidence is suﬁicient to sustain
fore

the

judgment,

and it is there

afﬁrmed.°°

HAYES
(Supreme

v.

MICHIGAN CENTRAL R. CO.

Court of the United States, 1884.
L. Ed. 410.)

111

U. S.

228, 4 Sup. Ct. 369, 28

An ordinance of the city of Chicago required defendant’s tracks to
be fenced opposite a city park.

The plaintiff was a boy between eight and nine years of age, bright
and well-grown, but deaf and dumb. His parents were laboring peo
ple, living, at the time of the accident, about four blocks west of
Lake park. Across the street from where they lived was a vacant
On Sun
lot where children in the neighborhood frequently played.
day afternoon, March 17, 1878, St. Patrick's day, the plaintiff, in
charge of a brother about two years older, went to this vacant lot, with
60 The rule to be applied when the fault oi! the servant, either by acts of
commission or omission, directly contributed to his injury, is well stated by
Van Devanter. J., in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Dewees, 153 Fed. 56. 82 C.
C. A. 190 (1907).
Ct. with an action in which another servant sued for dam
ages arising on the same facts, St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v, Bishard. 147 Fed.
The distinction between contributory negligence and
496, 78 C. C. A. 62 (1906).
assumed risk baed on the maxim “volenti non ﬁt injuria" is discussed in
Miner v. Conn. River R. Co.. 153 Mass. 399, 26 N. E. 994 (1891). As to wheth
er a servant is a “volunteer,” within the application of the above maxim, see
the leading English case of Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co., L. R. 7 Ex.
A servant having no option but to incur the
130, 19 Eng. R. C. 42 (1872).
Tozeland v. Guardians 0! the Poor of the Vi'est Ham
risk is not “voiens."
Union, [1906] 1 K. B. 538, in which a pauper was working under direction of
the guardians of the poor.
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the permission of his father, to play. While playing there a proces
sion celebrating the day passed by, and the plaintiff, with other boys-,
but without the observation of his brother, followed the procession to
Michigan avenue at Twelfth street, just south of Lake _park. He and
his companions then returned north to the park, in which they stopped
A witness, going north along and on the west side of the
to play.
tracks, when at a point a considerable distance north of the end of the
broken fence, saw a freight train of the defendant coming north;
turning round towards it he saw the.plaintiﬁ? on the tracks south of
him, but north of the end of the fence; he also saw a colored boy on
the ladder on the side of one of the cars of the train, motioning as if
he wanted the plaintiff to come along. The plaintiff started to run
north beside the train, and as he did so turned and fell, one or more
wheels of the car passing over his arm. There were four tracks at
The
this point, and the train was on the third track from the park.
plaintilfhad his hands reached out towards the car, as he ran, as if
he was reaching after*it, and seemed to the witness to be drawn around
by the draught of the train, and fall on his back. Amputation of the
left arm at the shoulder was rendered necessary, and constituted the
injury for which damages were claimed in this suit. Yevdt-07 dnlruf
IVIATTHEWS,
further argued that the direction
fence could not
of the court below was right, because the \vant of
In the sense of an
reasonably be alleged as the cause of the injury.
efﬁcient cause, causa causans, this
no doubt strictly true; but that
not the sense in which the law uses the term in this connection. The
causa sine qua non,—a cause which,
had not
question is, was
existed, the injury would not have taken place,—an occasional cause;
and that
question of fact, unless the causal connection
evidently
Milwaukee
not proximate.
St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469.
The rule laid down by Willes, ]., in Daniel v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., L.
R.
C. P. 216, 222, and approved by the exchequer chamber (L. R.
H. L. 45), was this:
C. P. 591), and by the house of lords (L. R.
“It
necessary for the plaintiff to establish by evidence circumstances
from which
reasonable probability
may fairly be inferred that there
that the accident resulted from the want of some precaution which the
defendants might and ought to have resorted to;” and in the case of
\/Villiams v. Great VVestern Ry. Co., L. R.
Exch. 157, where that rule
was said (page 162):
case similar to the present,
was applied to
“There are many supposable circumstances under which the aocident
may have happened, and which would connect the accident with the
neglect. If the child was merely wandering about, and he had met with
stile, he would probably have been turned back; and one, at least,
-to warn people
required,
of the objects for which
gate or stile
before them, and tomake them pause before reaching
of what
dan
railroad."
gerous place like
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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The evidence of the circumstances, showing negligence on the part
the defendant, which may have been the legal cause of the injury
to the plaintiff, according to the rule established in Railroad Co. v.
Stout, 17 \Vall. 657, and Randall v. B. & O. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, S.
C. 3 Su'p.~Ct. 322, should have been submitted to the jury; and for the
error of the circuit court in directing a verdict for the defendant, the
judgment is reversed and a new trial awarded."
of

UNION PACIFIC RY. CO.

v.

CALLAGHAN.

1893.
56 Fed. 988. 6 O. C. A.
S. 91, 16 SUD. Ct. 493, 40 L. Ed. 028.)

(Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States,
205, aiﬁrmed

161~U.

a

is

ll,

4

6! As to an unusual, unexpected accident, see Doyle v. Chicago,
L. IL A. 420 (1889).
C. Ry. Co., 77 Iowa, 607, 42 N. W. 555,
63 Part of the statement of facts is omitted.
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At law. Action by James Callaghan against the Union Paciﬁc Rail
judgment was given for plain
way Company for personal injuries.
Affirmed.
tiff. Defendant brings error.
,
On the 18th day of August, 1890, a repair train operated- by the
Union Paciﬁc Railway Company, the plaintiff in error, hereafter called
the defendant, fell through a defective bridge, and James Callaghan,
the defendant in error, hereafter called the plaintiff, who was riding
He sued the defendant for negligence in the op
was injured.
upon
jury,
eration of this train, and recovered judgment upon the verdict of
to reverse this judgment that this writ of error was sued out.
and
The train was running from the city of Trinidad to the town of Trin
chera, in the state of Colorado.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge“ (afterstating the facts). Under the de
377,
cision of the supreme court in Railroad Co. v. Ross, 112 U.
must be held that, so far as this plaintiff was
Sup. Ct. Rep. 184,
concerned, the conductor of this train was the defendant's vice prin
cipal, and that the railway company was liable for any damage to the
plaintiff caused by his negligence;
master
serv
also well settled that
liable for an injury to
caused by his own negligence and the concurrent negli
ant which
700,
fellow servant. Railway Co. v. Cummings, 106 U.
gence of
702,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Harriman v. Railway Co., 45 Ohio St.
32, 12 N. E. Rep. 451; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; Grif
ﬁn v. Railroad Co., 148 Mass. 143, 145, 19 N. E. Rep. 166; Cayzer v.
Booth v. Rail
Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass. 57
road Co., 73 N. Y. 38; Cone v. Railroad Co., 81 N. Y. 206.
But in every such case the negligence of the master must be the
on the plaintiff to
proximate cause of the injury, and the burden
as
the immediate
such
acts
of
on
his
constitute
part
carelessness
prove
cause of the accident.
No act contributes to an injury, in the legal
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acceptation of that term, unless it is a proximate cause of that injury
—unless it is near to it in the order of causation. Jacobus v. Railway
Co., 20 Minn. 125, 134 (Gil. 110).
The court below carefully instructed the jury that the plaintiff could
recover only in case they found (1) that the conductor failed to ex
ercise ordinary care in refusing to permit the train to stop when sig
naled at Adair, or in'failing to stop it before it entered upon the bridge,
and (2) that this negligence was the cause of the injury; but that, in
case they found both of these issues against the defendant, they might
The contention of the defendant is
render a verdict for the plaintiff.
that it conclusively appears from the evidence that the accident was not
the natural and probable consequence of the negligence of the conduc
tor, but that the subsequent carelessness of the engineer, who failed to
see the danger signal on the track or the damage to the bridge, and
failed to -stop his train before he drove upon
was an independent in
tervening cause which the conductor could not have anticipated, and
from which the accident in reality resulted. They urge that the con
direction to the engi
ductor’s order to proceed at Adair was only
neer to proceed slowly and carefully, to stop before passing any bridg
es or trestles, so that a. man could be sent out to examine them, and
generally to proceed carefully according to the rules of the company;
and they insist that the conductor could not have anticipated that the
breach of his duty, violate the rule in evi
engineer would commit
dence, and dash upon the bridge without stopping to examine it. This
argument
persuasive, and worthy of consideration.
In Railway Co. v. Elliott, 55 Fed. Rep. 949, we had occasion to con
sider the rule of law here invoked, and there said: “An injury that
ac
the natural and probable consequence of an act of negligence
tionable. But an injury that could not have been foreseen or reason
not ac
ably anticipated as the probable result of the negligence
not the natural consequence of the
tionable; nor
an injury that
but
negligence complained of, and that would not have resulted from
for the interposition of some new independent cause that could not have
been anticipated.”
so clear that the accident
The questions in this case then are, was
could not have been reasonably anticipated from the conduct0r’s viola
so clear that the accident was the result of
tion of the rule, or was
cause independent of the conductor’s negligence, and subsequently in
tervening, that ‘the ‘court should have withdrawn these questions from
was the province of the jury to determine these ques
the jury? for
If there was evidence in the case from
tions
they were doubtful.
which reasonable men might fairly conclude that the negligence of this
conductor was the proximate cause of the injury, the court properly
submitted these questions to the decison of the jury.
In Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 474, 476, Mr. Iustice Strong,
“The true rule
who delivered the opinion of the court, said:
that
the proximate cause of an injury
ordinarily
what
question for
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the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. * * *
In the nature of things, there is in every transaction a succession of
events more or less dependent upon those preceding, and it is the prov
ince of a jury to look at this succession of events or facts, and ascertain
whether they are naturally and probably connected with each other by a
continuous sequence, or are dissevered by new and independent agen
cies; and this must be determined_ in view of the circumstances exist
ing at,the time.
must also be borne in mind that the
In considering these questions
not always nor generally the act or omission near
proximate cause
est in time or place to the effect
produces. In the sequence of events
there are often many remote or incidental causes nearer in point of
time and place to the effect than the moving cause, and yet subordinate
defect
not produced by it. Thus
to and often themselves inﬂuenced
in the construction of
boiler of an engine may long exist without
harm, and yet ﬁnally be the proximate cause of an explosion, to which
the negligence of an engineer, the climate, and many other incidental
Cases illustrating
causes nearer by years to the effect may contribute.
this proposition are Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, supra; Insurance Co. v.
Boon, 95 U. S. 117, 130; Lynch v. Nurdin,
Q. B. 29; Illidge v. Good
win,
Car.
P. 190, 192; Clark v. Chambers,
Q. B. Div. 327 Pastene
v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87.
usually the result of many causes, some proximate,
Again, an effect
The rule by which the former are to be separated from
others remote.
the latter
admitted by all to be diﬁicult of application, and the best
that can be done
to carefully apply
to the circumstances of each
case as
arises.
Bearing in mind the rules and consideration to which we have thus
brieﬂy adverted, let us now consider whether or not reasonable men
might fairly conclude under all the facts and circumstances of this
case that the negligence of this conductor was the proximate cause of
the disaster.
The train came into Adair at
o’clock in the morning,
at
Extraordinary storms and ﬂoods had
speed of 15 miles an hour.
caused the destruction of bridges and parts of the roadbed from Trini
The force of men upon this train had found and
dad to Trinchera.
The con
repaired two dangerous bridges during the night before.
ductor and engineer knew the dangerous condition of the road, and
had been moving over
during the night behind two pedestrians. who
carried lanterns. The defective bridge was three miles south ‘of Adair.
and between that place and the next station. The foreman of the sec
tion, who was aware of the defect and danger, signaled the train to
of the danger ahead,
stop, so that he might tell the men in charge of
the engineer slackened his s‘peed to four miles an hour, when the con
ductor ordered him to go on; he increased his speed; the conductor
did not countermand his order; the engineer continued to obey
ran
fell. The conductor must have known where
upon the bridge, and

/
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that bridge was. What, then, was the natural and probable consequence
of running by the station where the section foreman was waiting to
give information, and upon such a bridge, without inquiry or examina
tion, after the disastrous ﬂoods and washouts, of which he was aware?
It was disaster, destruction of property, and of life. It seems to us that
these were the results the conductor might reasonably have anticipated
from his acts. They were the results he ought to have anticipated, the
results that a reasonably prudent man would have anticipated. Indeed,
the managers of the defendant corporation who established its rules
did anticipate these very results as the natural and probable consequence
of such a course of action. It was because they anticipated them that
they prohibited this course of action, and enacted the rule that conduc
tors should make inquiries at all stopping places, and take no risk; and
that trains should be brought to a stop, and a man sent out to examine
each bridge and trestle before passing over it in cases of such storms
and ﬂoods as this in question.
But it is urged that the negligence of the conductor was not in fact
the proximate cause of the accident, but that it resulted from an inde
pendent intervening cause, viz. the failure of the engineer to see the
danger signal, and to stop the train himself at the bridge. There are
several answers to this proposition:
First. We are unable to say from this evidence that the negligence
of the engineer was an independent cause. It may have been dependent
upon the negligence of the conductor; it may have been induced or caus
ed by the latter.
The conductor directed the movements of this train.
The duty of the engineer was to obey his orders. W'hen he undertook
to stop at the signal of the section foreman, that the conductor might
make inquiries that he was required to make by the rule as to the road
before them, the engineer was ordered to proceed. He had been run
ning his train 15 miles an hour, but had slackened its speed to 4 miles
an hour when he received this order.
He may have inferred, and
probably did infer, that the conductor had in some way learned that
there was no more danger ahead; that the rule in evidence no longer
applied to this train; and hence that there was no need to stop to in
quire, and that he could safely rush on at the speed that he had been
and thus the action of the conductor may have lulled him
making;
~
into the fatal security that induced his carelessness.
Second. The negligence of the engineer was not an intervening cause
that interrupted or turned aside the natural sequence of events, or
prevented the natural and probable effect of the conductor's negligence.
It simply failed to interpose the engineer’s care to ‘prevent this prob
able result, and left the natural sequence of events to ﬂow on undis
turbed to the fatal eﬂect. It may be true that, if the engineer had seen
and obeyed the danger signal on the track, or had seen the damage to
the bridge, and had stopped the train, the accident would not have hap
pened ; but his failure was but the concurring or succeeding negligence

~i
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a servant, which pennitted the conductor’s breach of duty to work
out undisturbed the disastrous result of which it was the primary and
efﬁcient cause.
Moreover, we are unwilling to say that this conductor
ought not to have anticipated the negligence of the engineer. He had
ordered him to assist him in his own breach of duty, in disobeying the
rule of the company requiring him to stop at Adair, and inquire; and
we are unable to say but that he ought to have foreseen that this order
would be taken by the engineer as a communication that the rule in
evidence was no longer applicable to their train. However this may be,
the negligence of this engineer did not so break the sequence of events
between the negligence of the conductor and the1 accident as toj relieve
the defendant.
The independent intervening cause that will prevent a recovery on
account of the act or omission of a wrongdoer must be a cause which
interrupts the natural sequence of events, turns aside their course,
prevents the natural and probable result of the original act or omis
sion, and produces a different result, that could not have been reason
The concurrent or succeeding negligence of a fellow
ably anticipated.
servant or a third person_which does not break the sequence of events
is not such a cause, and constitutes no defense for the original wrong
doer, although, in the absence of the concurrent or succeeding negli
Martin v. Iron \Vorks,
gence, the accident would not have happened.
31 Minn. 407, 410, 18 ‘N. VV. Rep. 109; Burrows v. Coke Co., L. R. S
Exch. 67; Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 420.
\Ve have now stated the reasons which have led us to the conclusion
that the court below submitted the questions at issue to the jury under
For the same reasons we are of the opinion that
proper instructions.
there was no error in its refusal of the defendant’s requests.
It is claimed in the argument that the negligence of the conductor
was not properly pleaded, but the complaint states “that the said ac
cident resulted and was caused entirely by the negligence, carelessness,
and recklessness of the said officers of the said company, together with
the conductor and engineer in charge of the train on which plaintiff was
riding,” and no objection was made to the introduction of any of the
In view of these facts, we
evidence on which the verdict was based.
think the pleading is now sufﬁcient, and the judgment below is afﬁrmed,
1
with costs.“
,

Min

Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Holloway, 114 Fed. 458. 52 C. C. A. 260
aﬁirmed in 191 U. S. 33-1, 24 Sup. Ct. 102, 48 L. Ed. 207 (1903). the neg
ligence of the master was only one otthe proximate causes of the accident.
Cf. Teis v. Smuggler Mining Co., 158 Fed. 260, 85 C. C. A. 478, 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1593 (1907).
(1902).
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198 Pa. 112, 47
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82 Am. St. Rep. 792.)

Atl.

875, 52

L. R. A.

Spees against Boggs & Buhl. judgment for plain
appeal. Reversed.
FELL, J. The plaintiff, while in theemploy of the defendants, was
injured while "riding in a passenger elevator provided for the use of
employés in their store. The elevator did“ not fall. It appeared from
the undisputed testimony that nothing connected with it broke or
was out of repair.
For some reason, wholly unexplained, the boy in
charge of the elevator failed to stop it at the ﬁrst ﬂoor, and it passed,
without any slackening of its speed, to the basement of the building,
where it struck the floor with considerable force. The elevator was in
spected regularly once a week, and it had been inspected a few hours
before the accident, and found to be in good condition. It was in good
condition immediately after the accident. The plaintiff produced tes
timony to show that the elevator had failed to stop or had slipped at
other times, but was unable to ﬁx a time which was within a year of
the accident, and the slipping at other times was not shown to have re
sulted from defective construction or from want of repair.
The only
prior time when there had been trouble with the elevator which was
ﬁxed with any degree of certainty was a year before.
The boy in
charge was then cautioned by the manager of the store, and there had
been no further diﬁiculty in the management of the elevator until the
happening of the accident in which the plaintiff was injured.
After
the accident a device which acted automatically to check the speed of
the elevator if it became too great was so adjusted that the safety
clutches would be thrown out six inches or a foot higher in the eleva
tor shaft. The boy in charge of the elevator was 18 years of age. He
had been fully instructed in his duties, and had operated the elevator
three months. No question as to his competency was raised.
The safety device was intended to operate automatically in case of
excessive speed of the elevator resulting from the breaking of the
It was not intended to check the
machinery or its failure to operate.
usual speed of, the elevator as it descended from ﬂoor to ﬂoor of the
building, and that was the only speed in the case. The elevator did
not stop at the ﬁrst ﬂoor, but went on down to the basement,‘with the
The adjustment of the
same or possibly a slightly increased speed.
device after the accident to cause it to act under a less degree of speed
may have been a wise precaution against the neglect of the operator,
but it was not evidence of defective original construction or of want of
proper inspection.
Under the facts developed at the trial, a verdict cannot be sustained
against the defendants without making them insurers of the safety of
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their employés. The learned judge stated that there was no direct tes
timony that the elevator was in any way defective, but he placed on
the defendants the burden of relieving themselves of the imputation of
negligence by explaining the cause of the accident, and he made them
responsible for the negligence of the boy who operated the elevator
by instructing the jury that he and the plaintiff were not co-employés.
In both of these rulings there was error. Even in exceptional cases,
where the conditions are so obviously dangerous as to give rise to an
inference of _ negligence, the burden thrown on the defendant is not
that of satisfactorily accounting for the accident, but that of showing
that he used due care. In such cases negligence is not presumed, but
the circumstances are held to be evidence from which the jury may
infer negligence. Stearns v. Spinning Co., 184 Pa. St. 519, 39 Atl. 292,
39 L. R. A. 842; East End Oil O0. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 190
Pa. St. 350, 42 Atl. 707.
The gist of the action was negligence, and the plaintiff, in order to
recover, was required to prove it. The mere happening of the accident
did not raise a presumption that the machinery was unsafe or defective.
Except in the case of a carrier, the rule is uniform that, where recov
ery is sought on the ground of negligence of the defendant, the bur
den of proof is on the plaintiﬁ‘, and in an action against an employer
some speciﬁc act of negligence must be shown. Railroad Co. v. Hughes,
119 Pa. St. 301, 13 Atl. 286; Pawling v. Hoskins, 132 Pa. St. 617, l9
Atl. 301; Mixter v. Coal Co., 152 Pa. St. 395, 25 Atl. 587; Wojciec
howski v. Reﬁning Co., 177 Pa. St. 57, 35 Atl. 596; Higgins v. Fan
ning, 195 Pa. St. 599, 46 Atl. 102. In Mixter v. Coal Co., supra, it
was said:
“The plaintiff was an employé of the defendant company,‘
and was claiming to recover damages of his employer for personal in
We have many
juries received in the course of his employment.
times held in such cases that the mere fact of the accident is not enough
to establish negligence.”
The plaintiff and the elevator boy were fellow servants. within the
The former was em
rule that exempts the employer from liability.
ployed to work in the tailoring department of a dry-goods store, and
the latter to run an elevator which was set apart for the use of em
ployés in going to and from their work, and in going from one ﬂoor of
the building‘ to another, as their duties required.
They were employed
by the same person, were under the same general control, and were
They come clearly within the deﬁ
engaged in the same general work.
nition of fellow servants given in Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. St. 432,
and repeated in Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. St. 246; Railroad Co.
v. Bell, 112 Pa. St. 400, 4 Atl. 50; Duffy v. Oliver, 131 Pa. St. 203,
“The question arises, who are fellow
18 Atl. 872; and other cases:
servants in contemplation of law? To constitute such, they need not
at the time be engaged in the same particular work. 'It is sufficient if
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they are in_ the employ of the same master, engaged in the same com
mon work, and performing duties and services for the same general
purpose.”
The judgment is reversed.“
\.

‘ALABAMA

&

v. RY. co.

v.

GROOME.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. 1910. 97 Miss. 201, 52 South. 703, 30 L. R. A.
[N. S-] 855, Ann. C-8s. 1912C, 1129.)
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Action by D. H. Groome against the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway
From a judgment for plaintiff, de
Company for personal injuries.
fendant appeals.
Aﬁirmed.
SMITH,
Appellee, an employé of appellant, in the discharge of
his duty as such, stepped off of
train of cars of appellant upon
plat
form extending over
side and main track of the
ditch, and between
railroad.
VVhen he stepped upon the plank walk,
gave way with
him, and threw him against the moving cars, resulting in the injury
complained of. Appellant himself made no special examination of the
cause of the giving way of the plank walk, but stated that
must have
been rotten, or broken, or not nailed.
One witness stated that the
plank and sill, or sleeper, on which same rested, were not nailed, and
that that was the cause of the giving way. Another witness testiﬁed
that the platform did not exactly “cover the hole
was intended to
cover,” and that
was not much of
rested
platform; that part of
on the ground, and part of
did not rest on anything.
The bridge
builder and inspector of appellant testiﬁes that the platform was care
fully constructed out of sound timber, well nailed down, and inspected
daily, and that no defect was discoverable therein; that the giving
way of the platform was caused by the breaking of one of the sills,
“close examination, but
piece of 2x6 timber; that he did not make
was
sound piece of timber—it had not been there very long."
From
taken.
judgment awarding damages to appellee, this appeal
as fol
The allegation of negligence contained in the declaration
lows: “Plaintiff stepped from the switchboard of defendant’s en
gine to the plank walk of said trestle for the purpose of switching cars
for the company at the point, and on account either of the rotten con
was not nailed, which cover
dition of the plank walk, or the fact that
“Therefore your plaintiff avers
ed the trestle, same gave way,” etc.
that on account of the willful, gross, and careless negligence of said
company in failing to keep the trestle and ways and means and appli
ances thereto belonging in proper repair, and operating its trains at

~‘
a

8

55 See Carnegie Steel Co. v. Byers, 149 Fed. 667, 82 C. G. A. 115,
L. R. A.
case from which a
(N. S.) 677 (1906), holding that the plaintiff must make
jury might reasonably find negligence. The case was reversed after a second
trial. 159 Fed. 347, 86 C. C. A. 347, 16 L, R. A. (N. S.) 214 (1908).
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such rates of speed in said city,” etc. One of the instructions granted
appellee, the granting of which is assigned as error, is as follows:
"The court instructs the jury, for plaintiff, that the law in this case
presumes that plaintiff's injury resulted from a negligent failure of
defendant company to furnish a safe and secure platform at the place
where plaintiff was hurt. The burden is upon defendant to rebut this
presumption by evidence that it exercised reasonable care to build
and maintain said platform in a safe condition for the use of its em
ployés. The jury is the sole judge of the weight of evidence; and if
the jury do not believe, from the evidence, that defendant exercised
reasonable care to maintain said platform in a safe and secure condi
tion, then they will ﬁnd verdict for plaintiff.”
This instruction is based upon the maxim, “Res ipsa loquitur" (the
thing speaks for itself). The rationale of this doctrine is that, in “some
cases, the very nature of the accident, of itself, and through the pre
It is applicable
sumption it carries, supplies the requisite proof.”
“where, under the circumstances shown, the accident presumably would
Its essential im
not have happened if due care had been exercised.”
port is that, on the facts proved, the plaintiff has made out a prima
Labatt, Master and
facie case, without direct proof of negligence.
Servant, vol. 2, § 834.
There seems to be considerable conflict, and
some, confusion, among the decisions of various courts relative to the
application of this maxim as between master and servant. VVithout
attempting to review the same, we deem it sufficient to say that we
think the true rule is that the maxim does apply as between master and
servant (Railroad v. Hicks, 91 Miss. 352, 46 South. 3893, subject
to such modiﬁcation as necessarily results from the subsidiary rules
governing this relationship, such as assumption of risk, the fellow
servant rule, etc. In the case at bar none of these subsidiary rules in
terfere with the application of the maxim, for the reason that the ac
cident was caused by a defect in the walk, or platform, furnished by
the master to the servant upon which to work.
The duties of the mas
ter relative to furnishing the servant a safe place in which to work can
not ordinarily be delegated to fellow servants, and the risk relative
thereto is not such as is ordinarily assumed by the servant.
See ex
haustive review of authorities contained in notes to Fitzgerald v.
Southern Ry. Co., 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337, and Byers v. Carnegie Steel
Co.. 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 214.
The form of the instruction, however, has given us considerable
It presses the maxim to the full limit of its application, and
difficulty.
in a large number of cases would probably constitute reversible error.
Generally the fact as to whether the accident would have ordinarily
happened, had due care been exercised by the defendant, should be
left to the determination of the jury. In this case, however, that fact
is manifest, and it was unnecessary to submit same to the jury.
The
presumption of negligence, therefore, arose as a matter of law, and
was sufficient -to make out a prima facie case for appellee, and to re
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Potera v.
quire appellant to meet -the prima facie case thus made.
The burden of proof, however,
City of Brookhaven, 49 South. 617.
was on appellee throughout the trial, and never shifted to appellant,
except in the sense that such burden is said to shift from the plaintiff
By
to defendant when the former has made out a prima facie case.
instruction the jury were charged that the burden is upon the de
‘this
fendant to rebut this presumption by evidence, etc. ; and it is argued‘
that thereby the burden of proof, with all which that term ordinarily
But, as we have just stated,
implies, was shifted to the defendant.
when appellee, by the aid of the presumption of negligence arising
under the maxim, had made out a prima facie case, it thereupon de~
volved upon defendant to meet, or rebut, this prima facie case by
evidence that it exercised reasonable care. This was all that the in
struction was intended to mean, and when taken in connection with
other instructions, which charged the jury that the burden_ of proof
was upon the appellee, and that he must prove the material allegations
of the declaration by a preponderance of the evidence, it could not
have misled the jury.
As was said by the California court in Cody v. Market St. Ry. Co.,
148 Cal. 93, 82 Pac. 667:
“The term ‘burden,’ or ‘burden of proof,’
is frequently used to signify simply the burden of meeting a prima
facie case, rather than the burdenof producing a preponderance of
evidence, and as used in the instruction in question imported nothing
more.”
See, also, note to Cleveland v. Hadley, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
527, wherein the annotator, after an extensive review of the authori
“An instruction which merely informs the
ties, says, at page 531:
jury, in a case to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable,
that the burden of proof is upon the defendant, without explaining
or qualifying the phrase ‘burden of proof,’ is doubtless objectionable
from a technical point of view; but the courts are loath to base a re
versal upon
unless
goes further and intimates that the burden
upon the defendant to disprove negligence by a preponderance of evi
dence.”
But
said that when
plaintiff has sought by his declaration, as
in the case at bar, to recover because of speciﬁc acts of negligence,
-and in no count has charged negligence generally, the doctrine of res
true that
ipsa loquitur cannot be availed of.
plaintiff must re
cover upon the case made by his declaration; but
does not follow
therefrom that, when he alleges speciﬁc acts of negligence, the maxim
has no application.
In such case the maxim applies, and the presump
tion of negligence arises; but
limited to
presumption of the
negligence charged in the declaration, which presumption the defend
ant
called on to rebut by evidence that due care was exercised with
reference to the matter complained of. Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall,
119 Ga. 837, 47
E. 329.“
&

1'6 Many cases hold the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no apllcutlon
to
Chicago
cases of master and servant.
N. W. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 132 Fed.
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The broad language of this instruction was necessarily limited, and
any error therein cured, by instruction No. 4, granted appellant, which
is as follows:
“The court instructs the jury that they must not con
sider any evidence on the subject of any alleged negligence, except
the negligence speciﬁcally charged in the declaration.”
The court below committed no error with reference to the other
matters complained of, and its judgment is therefore aﬁirmed.

PATTON
(Supreme

v.

TEXAS

Court of the United States,
45 L. Ed.

&

1901.

PAC. RY. CO.
179

U. S. 658. 21 Sup. Ct. 275.

361.)

In Error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to review a decision affirming a judgment on a verdict

directed by the judge in an action against a railroad company for
personal injuries. Aﬁinned.
Plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, brought his action against the
defendant to recover for injuries sustained while in its employ as
'
* * *
ﬁreman.
The facts were that plaintiff was a ﬁreman on a passenger train of
the defendant, running from El Paso to Toyah and return.
Some three
or four hours after one of those trips had been made, and while the
engine of which he was ﬁreman was being moved in the railroad yards
at El Paso, plaintiff attempted to step off the engine, and in doing so
the step turned, and he fell so far under the engine that the wheels
passed over his right foot, crushing it so that amputation became
necessary. Plaintiff alleged that the step turned because the nut which
held it was not securely fastened; that the omission to have it so fast
ened was negligence on the part of the company, for which it was liable.
Mr. Justice BREWER" delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs contention is that the trial court erred in directing a
verdict for the defendant, and in failing to leave the question of neg
* * *
ligence to the jury.
VVhile it would needlessly prolong this opinion to quote all the tes
The
timony, it is proper that its salient features should be noticed.
single negligence charged is in the failure to have the engine step secure
ly fastened. That step, a shovcl~shaped piece of iron, is ﬁrmly ﬁxed to
a rod of iron about 1 inch in diameter and 18 inches in length, which
passes up through the iron casting at the rear of the engine, about 6
593, 67 C. C. A. 421 (1904).
And cf. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Byers, 149 Fed. 667,
82 C. C. A. 115,'8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 677 (1906), with the well-reasoned
decision
of the same case after a second trial, in 159 Fed. 3-17, S6 C. C. A. 347, 16 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 214 (1908). The rationale of the rule is stated in Klebe v. Par
ker Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480, 105 S. W. 1057. 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 140 (1907).
6'! Part or the statement of facts and part ot the opinion are omitted.
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or 8 inches thick. A shoulder to this rod ﬁts underneath the casting,
and the part passing through above has threads on the upper end upon
which a nut is screwed ﬁrmly down on the casting, fastening the rod
so that it will not move.
That the step, rod, and nut were in them
That the nut was
selves all that could be required is not disputed.
properly screwed on at El Paso,"before the engine started on its trip,
is shown; the plaintiff, who assisted there, testifying to the fact. The
engineer testiﬁed that he used the step both on the trip to Toyah and
the return trip to El Paso, and found it secure; and there is nothing
to contradict this evidence.
The engineer in his report of needed work
both at Toyah and on his return at El Paso did not mention the step.
He certainly supposed it secure.
Competent inspectors were provided
by the company both at El Paso and Toyah, and neither of them de
All
tected any failure in the secure fastening of the step by the nut.
of the witnesses, except the superintendent and foreman of defend
ant, testiﬁed that if the nut had been securely fastened at El Paso it
would not have worked loose in making the trip from El Paso to Toyah
and return by the ordinary jar and running of the engine; that it
might be loosened by the step striking something. The superintendent
and foreman testiﬁed from an experience of twenty years with engines
that it might work loose on such trip, but that it was impossible to
tell whether it would or not.
.
It was the duty of the ﬁreman to clean the cab and all that portion
of the engine above theirunning board, and to keep the oil cans and
lubricators ﬁlled with oil. It was not necessary for him to attend to
this work until eight hours after the engine arrived at El Paso, though
it was more convenient to do so while the engine was hot and the oil
warm, as it would take less time than when the engine was cooled off.
After the engine reached El Paso the ﬁreman and the engineer would
get off, and it would be taken charge of by the yardmen, who would
detach it from the train, take it to the yard, coal and sand
and do all
in the round
things necessary except the matter of repair, then place
house, where
would be cleaned by» employees other than the ﬁreman,
in all its parts beneath the running board, and inspected
the ma
chinist, and repaired; and after that, the ﬁreman would have ample
time for all the duties imposed upon him before the engine started on
another trip. All this the plaintiff knew, and simply took the time he
did for his work for his own convenience. On this particular day he
did not commence work until three or four hours after the arrival of
the train at El Paso. Prior to that time the engine had been coaled up,
the coal being placed in the tender back of the engine. Some of the
foot to 18 inches in length and from
to
pieces of coal were from
inches in width, and very heavy, and one of them falling off might’
strike the step. The engine had not at the time of the accident reached
the round house for inspection and repair, and this the plaintiff knew.
From this outline
appears that the master provided perfectly suit
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that they were
able appliances, and appliances in good condition;
properly secured when the engine started on its trip; and that it is
impossible to tell from the testimony how the step was loosened. It
may have been from the ordinary working of the engine, the pos
sibility of which was testiﬁed to by the superintendent, who.-had had
It may have been because the step
long experience with engines.
struck something on its trip, which striking might produce that result
according to the testimony of other experts, who denied that the
ordinary working of the engine would loosen it. \Ve say this notwith
standing the testimony of the plaintiff that the step did not hit anything
on the trip, for the step was on the right side of the engine, the side
occupied by the engineer, and therefore a striking might have occurred
without the knowledge of the plaintiff, whose work did not call him to
that side of the engine. It may have resulted from the dropping on
the step of some of the large lumps of coal which were thrown into
the tender after reaching El Paso. \/Ve are not insensible of the mat
ter to which the plaintiff calls especial attention, to wit, a conﬂict be
tween the testimony given by Alexander Mitchell, the round—house fore
man at Toyah, at the ﬁrst trial, and that given by him at the last. At
the ﬁrst trial he testiﬁed that the step was not taken off at Toyah.
In
the last that it was. He also testified that, though taken off, it was
securely fastened before the train left. The inference, of course, sought
to be drawn is that the testimony of_ this witness is unreliable; that it
is to be believed that he unscrewed the nut, but not to be believed that
he screwed it up tightly; and therefore another. possibility of the
cause of the loosening of the step is introduced into this case.
But
giving full weight to this suggestion, it still appears that it is a mere
matter of conjecture as to how the step became loose.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that the plaintiff, who
knew that the engine was to be taken to the round house at El Paso,
and inspected and repaired before he was called upon to perfom1 any
duties upon
for his own convenience, before such inspection and
repair, went on the engine and attempted to discharge his duties of
he, knowing that there was to be an inspection and
cleaning, etc.
repair, and that he had ample time thereafter to do his work, pre
ferred not to wait for such inspection and repair, but to take the chances
as to the condition of the engine, he ought not to hold the company re
defect which would undoubtedly have been disclosed by
sponsible for
the inspection, and then repaired.
Upon these facts we make these observationsz,
First, That while, in the case of a passenger the fact of an accident
carries with
presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier,
a presumption which, in the absence of some explanation or proof to
the contrary,
suﬁﬂcient to sustain
verdict against him, for there
breach of his contract to carry safely (Stokes v. Salton
prima facie
stall, 13 Pet. 181, 10 L. Ed. 115; New Jersey R.
Transp. Co. v.
a
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Gleeson v. Virginia Midland
458, 463, 11 S'up. Ct. 859), a
different rule obtains as to an employee. The fact of accident carries
with it no presumption of negligence on the part of the employer; and
it is an aﬂirmative fact for the injured employee to establish that the
employer has been guilty of negligence. Texas & P. R. C0. v. Barrett,
166 U. S. 617, 41 L. Ed. 1136, 17 Sup. Ct. 707.
Second. That in the latter case it is not sufficient for the employee
the
to show that the employer may have been guilty of negligence;
evidence must point to the fact that he was. And where the testimony
leaves the matter uncertain and shows that any one of half a dozen.
things may have brought about the injury, for some of which the em
ployer is responsible and for some of which he is not, it is not for the
jury to guess between these half a dozen causes and ﬁnd that the neg
ligence of the employer was the real cause, when there is no satisfactory
If the employee is
foundation in the testimony for tha_t conclusion.
unable to adduce sufficient evidence to show negligence on the part of
the employer, it is only one of the many cases in which the plaintiff
and no mere sympathy for the unfortunate
fails in his testimony;
victim of an accident justiﬁes any departure from settled rules of proof
resting upon all plaintiffs.
Third. That while the employer is bound to provide a safe place
and safe machinery in which and _with which the employee is to work,
and while this is a positive duty resting upon him, and one which he
may not avoid by turning it over to some employee, it is also true that
there is no guaranty by the employer that place and machinery shall
be absolutely safe. Hough v. Texas 8: P. R. Co., 100 U. S. 213, 218,
25 L. Ed. 612, 615; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368,
386, 37 L. Ed. 772, 780, 13 Sup. Ct. 914; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v.
Mackey, 157 U. S. 72, 87, 39 L. Ed. 624, 630, 15 Sup. Ct. 491; Texas
8: P. R. Co. v. Archibald, 170 U. S. 665, 669, 42 L. Ed. 1188, 1190,
18 Sup. Ct. 777.
He is bound to take reasonable care and make rea
sonable effort; and the greater the risk which attends the work to be
done and the machinery to be used, the more imperative is the obliga
tion resting upon him. Reasonable care becomes, then, a demand of
higher supremacy; and yet, in all cases it is a question of the reason
ableness of the _care; reasonableness depending upon the danger at
tending the place or the machinery.
The rule in respect to machinery, which is the same as that in respect
to place, was thus accurately stated by Mr. Justice Lamar, for this
court, in Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 570, 34
L. Ed. 235, 241, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044: “Neither individuals nor corpora
tions are bound, as employers, to insure the absolute safety of machin
ery or mechanical appliances which they provide for the use of their
Nor are they bound to supply the best and safest or new
employees.
est of those appliances for the purpose of securing the safety of those

Pollard,
R. Co.,

22 \/Vall. 341, 22

140

U.

S. 435,

L. Ed. 877;
35 L. Ed.

443,

Ch. 2)

norms or cossrrrunur.

TO REPRESE.\'TATIVB

oz-1co

who are thus employed. They are, however, bound to use all reason
able -care and prudence for the‘safety of those in their service, by pro
viding them with machinery reasonably safe and suitable for the use of
the latter. If the employer or master fails in this duty of precaution
and care, he is responsible for any injury which may happen through
a defect of machinery which was, or ought to have been, known to him,
and was unknown to the employee or servant.”
Tested by these rules we do not feel justiﬁed in disturbing the judg
ment, approved as it was by the trial judge and the several judges of
the circuit court of appeals. Admittedly, the step, the rod, the nut,
were suitable and in good condition.
the inspectors at
Admittedly,
El Paso and Toyah were competent. Admittedly, when the engine
started on its trip from El Paso the step was securely fastened, the
plaintiff himself being a witness thereto. The engineer used it in safety
up to the time of the engine’s return to El Paso. The plaintiff was not
there called upon to have anything to do with the engine until after it
had been inspected and repaired. He chose, for his own convenience,
to go upon the engine and do his work prior to such inspection.
No
one can say from the testimony how it happened that the step became
loose. Under those circumstances it would be trifling with the rights
of parties for a jury to ﬁnd that the plaintiff had proved that the
injury was caused by the negligence of the employer.
The judgment is affirmed.

HARE
(Supreme

Judicial Court of Maine,
450,

v.

McINTIRE.

82 Me. 240, 19
1890.
17 Am. St. Rep. 476.)

Atl.

453,

8

L. R. A.

This was an action to recover damages of the defendant which the
plaintiff claimed he had sustained by reason of a blast ﬁred by the de
fendant in a granite quarry, of which the defendant gave the plaintiff
no notice. The plaintiff was a stonecutter employed in the sheds, and
the defendant was a ledge man in charge of the blasting.
Vmom, J. [After ﬁnding the statute did not apply :] Can the action
be maintained at common law?
Some of the elementary writers seem inclined to the opinion that one
servant is not liable to a fellow servant for_ negligence. \Vhart. Neg.
To maintain his action, the plain
§- 245; Wood, ‘Mast. & Serv. § 325.
tiff must prove some contract or obligation from which, in legal con
templation, arises a duty, the breach whereof is alleged against the
defendant, or facts establishing such a relation between himself and
the defendant that such a duty will thence result, together with a
Broom, Com. Law, 670.
breach thereof.
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There is no subsisting contract between fellow servants, and neither
receives any compensation from the other. Neither is a party to, or
has any interest or privity in, the other’s contract with their common
master. Their separate, independent contracts with him are only ma
terial as showing that they are, individually, rightfully on the premises,
and engaged in the performance of their service there. The action can
not, therefore, be founded on any contract, but, if at all, on the de
fendant’s misfeasance, which, even if it could be deemed a breach of
his contract with his master, would not for that reason exempt him
from liability to others injured thereby, provided such misfeasance
was a violation of a duty springing from the relation between them.
And we are of opinion that where two or more persons are engaged in
the same general business of a common employer, in which their mutual
safety depends somewhat upon the care exercised by them, respectively,
each owes to the other a duty, resulting from their relation of fellow
servants, to exercise such care in the prosecution of their work as men
of ordinary prudence usually use in like circumstances, and he who
fails in that respect is responsible for a resulting personal injury to his
fellow servant. Such a liability would necessarily have a salutary in
'
ﬂuence in inducing care on their part.
Thus, where
The great weight of authority lies in this direction.
the plaintiff sued a railroad company to recover damages for the death
of her husband, one of its employes, killed by the negligence of one of
the defendant’s engine drivers, Barons Pollock and Huddleston, while
they exempted the company because the death was caused by a fellow
servant, said: “It is clear that an action would well lie against the
driver of the engine, by whose negligent act the death was occasioned."
A like dictum was
Swainson v. Railway Co., 3 Exch. Div. 341, 343.
made by Baron Alderson in Wiggett v. Fox, 11 Exch. 832, 839, and
by Baron Bramwell in Degg v. Railway Co., 1 Hurlj & N. 773, 780.
And it has been directly adjudicated in \Vright v. Roxburgh, 2 Ct.
Sess. Cas. (3d Ser.) 748; Hinds v. Harbou, 58 Ind. 121; Hinds v.
Overacker, 66 Ind. 547; Griffiths v. Wolfram, 22 Minn. 185; and in
Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, which last case expressly overrules
A_lbro v. Iaquith, 4 Gray, 99. The contrary doctrine “is not only desti
tute of sense,” says the eminent author of Thompson on Negligence,
“but it involves the monstrous conclusion that one servant owes no
2
duty of exercising care to avoid injuring his fellow servants.”
Thomp. Neg. 1062. See, also, Add. Torts, § 245; Shear. & R. Neg. §
144.

Facts. In September, 1882, the defendant, a quarryman of 12 years’
experience, was engaged in opening a new place in the quarry, by blast
ing off the outside layer of soft stone so as to uncover those ﬁt for use
which lay beneath, in sheets about two feet thick.
He sunk his ﬁrst
hole 15 inches deep in the front edge of the top layer, and charged it
with “a little more than half a pound of powder."
Next north was a

\
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table rock 6 or 7 feet high. ‘South, southeast, and southwest of this
place of blasting were 2 tiers of long, narrow sheds, extending easterly
and westerly, 7 or 8 feet high, divided into bands, where quarried rocks
were shaped and dressed. These sheds had narrow doors in each end
for ingress and egress, with 2 sets of doors on their north and south
sides—the lower ones 2% feet wide, and so constructed as to be taken
out, and the upper ones 31/; feet wide, hung at their upper edges by
hinges, and were opened by being swung upward.
The plaintiff was a quarryman and stonecutter. He had cut stone
there in May and ]une, and, after working July and August in the crew
of one who then had charge of blasting, he returned to cutting again
in September, when he was engaged in the extreme west end of shed
No. 3, 265 feet south of the place of blasting.
The north side doors,
towards the blast, were closed to keep out the north wind, while the
upper south door was open, and the lower one closed. \/Vhen the blast
exploded, a piece of rock weighing about 10 pounds came through the
north wall of the shed, above the closed upper door, and hit the plain
tilf’s back, while in a stooping attitude, and thence out of the south
open door to an iron rail, where it broke.
The injury caused by this rock is the foundation of the action, and
the particular complaint is that no notice was given to the plaintiff
previous’ to the ﬁring of the blast.
A careful examination of the mass of evidence reported satisﬁes us
that the general notice usually given when a small blast is to take place
was seasonably given, to wit, a cry of “Fire!” three times made, with
short intervals of time between them, before applying the ﬁre, and that
It also
the explosion did not take place for several minutes thereafter.
appears that when heavy blasts, which seldom occur, with 25 to 50
pounds of powder, are made, the custom is to send word to the several
sheds.
Frequently, when light blasts are ﬁred, many workmen, on hear
ing the alarm, go into the sheds for protection, and those already in
remain; and hence has grown up a sort of careless feeling of security
on their part.
_
s
The plaintiff and some others in the same shed testify that they heard
for, perhaps, by reason of the din of their ham
no alarm—accounted
mers, and the fact that the doors on the side next to the blast were
closed.
Still others in the same direction, and much further away,
distinctly heard it.
But we think the plaintiff mistook his form of remedy, and that
the real fault of the defendant was not in failing to give sufficient
notice, but in not sufficiently covering the blast.
It is absurd to say
that rocks from a blast properly covered will ﬂy as did those which
rained down upon shed 3, one of which went through its board wall.
The gross carelessness of such omission appears upon its face—-res ipsa
But there is no such claim in the declaration, and evidence
loquitur.
Neither is there any allegation, in
thereof was therefore excluded.
I
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terms, of negligence on the part of the defendant, or due care on the
We are of opinion, therefore, that this action is
part of the plaintiff.
not maintainable.”
Plaintiffs nonsuit.
08 In addition to ‘Osborne v. Morgan, cited in the principal case, see Durkin
v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, 33 Atl. 237, 29 L. IL A. 808, 50 Am. St.
'
Rep. 801 (1895).
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SECTION 1.—IN CONTRACT

ANDERSON
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

1896.

v.

TIMBERLAKE.

114

Rep.

Ala.

377,

22

'

South. 431, 62 Am. St.

I

The
Action on the common counts by Timberlake against Anderson.
latter was in fact a mere agent of the North Alabama Lumber Com
pany running their “Crow Creek Mill.” Timberlake furnished money
to pay the hands, and goods and merchandise for the mill. The com
pany was bankrupt and plaintiff testiﬁed that he gave credit solely to
There was much evidence contra.
Anderson.
BRICKELL, C. I.‘ The legal presumption is, when a known agent
deals or contracts within the scope of his authority, that credit is
extended to the principal, and not to the agent; and that the dealing
is the act, or the contract is the engagement, of the principal alone,
This pre
as if he were personally present and acting or contracting.
sumption prevails in the absence of evidence that credit was given
to the agent exclusively, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
If the contract or promise is in
seeking to charge him personally.
writing, its construction and effect are, ordinarily, questions of law
for the decision of the court. But when the contract or promise is
verbal, the question whether the credit was given to the agent in ex
clusion of zthe credit of the principal is a question of fact, for the
determination of the jury, to be ascertained from a consideration of
Mechem, Ag. § 558;
all the circumstances attending the transaction.
I Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (Zd Ed.) 1119, 1120; VVhitney v. Wyman,
In 1 Am. Lead. Cas. (5th Ed.) 764,
101 U. S. 392, 25 L. Ed. 1050.
speaking in reference to verbal contracts made by or through an agent,
“Vi/hen the relation of principal and agent exists
it is said that:
in reference to a contract, and is known to the other party to exist,
and the principal is disclosed at the time as such, the contract is
the contract of the principal. and the agent is not bound, unless credit
has been given to him expressly and exclusively, and it was clearly
1Part

is omitted.
A.(2b En.)—'37

oi‘ the opinion
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his intention to assume a personal responsibility? but if credit was
given to him exclusively, and he intended to give his own personal
engagement, he will be bound; and this, upon sufficient evidence, is
a question for the jury, on all the circumstances of the case.”
In
the recent case of Humes v. Furnace Co., 98 Ala. 461, 13 South. 368,
it was said by Coleman, ].: “To hold an agent personally liable in
cases in which he discloses his principal, and that the services to be
rendered are for the sole beneﬁt of the principal, and the contract
is within the scope of his authority, it must be shown that the credit
was given exclusively to the agent, and that the agent was informed
of that fact.”
Applying this well-settled principle, the instructions to the jury,
given at the instance of the plaintiff, numbered 1, 2, and 4, are essen
They proceed, manifestly, on the theory that the
tially erroneous.
principal, the North Alabama Lumber & Manufacturing Company,
and the defendant, as agent, were or could be bound, jointly or sev
erally, by the same contract or engagement, or that the promise of the
one could be collateral to the promise of the other, while the true
inquiry—an inquiry to be solved by the jury upon a consideration of
the course of dealing between the parties, and all the attending facts
and circumstances»-—was
whether any credit was given to the principal,
or whether it was given exclusively to the defendant, and it was his
The fact that the
intention to become the sole debtor to the plaintiff.
defendant, at the commencement of the transaction from which the
account originated, may have directed the accounts, as created, to be
charged to him, or to himself and Kilpatrick, to which so much of
prominence is given by the instructions, is far from being decisive that
he intended to become the sole debtor, or a debtor jointly with Kil
patrick, to the exclusion of all liability on the part of the North Ala
Nor is it decisive that
bama Lumber & Manufacturing Company.
the plaintiff did not extend any credit whatever to that company. The
purpose of the direction may have been only to separate and distin
guish the accounts the defendant was creating as agent from the in
dividual dealings he was having, or might have, with the plaintiff,
As a fact, the direction is for the consideration of the jury, to be
taken in connection with all other facts and circumstances attending
the dealings between the parties, in ascertaining whether exclusive
credit was extended to the defendant, and whether, with knowledge
* * *
of that fact, he intended to assume individual responsibility.
Reversed and remanded.
Zln Tiller v. Spradley, 39 Ga. 35 (1869). Warner, IL, quotes the rule as
stated by Ch. Kent:
“It is a general rule, standing on strong foundations,
and pervading every system of jurisprudence,
that where an agent is duly
constituted and names his principal, and contracts in his name, the principal
is responsible, and not the agent." 2 Kent’s Conn. 630.
_
Gonn.Pn.&

A. (2n En.)
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PITCHER.

(Supreme Court of Missouri, 1850.

13 Mo. 191.)
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Assumpsit to recover $200, which it was alleged Hovey agreed to
pay if plaintiff, as sheriff, would add this to the $300 reward he was
about to offer for the apprehension and delivery of an escaped pris
oner wanted on a charge of murder.
Plea the general issue, and
judgment for plaintiff.
NAPTON, I.”
The principal and most important objection to the
judgment in this case arises from the instructions which the court
The defendant introduced proof to
gave on the subject of agency.
show that he made no contract with Pitcher, in relation _to the reward
offered by the latter for the apprehension and delivery of Harper,
and also some evidence to show that, if he made any,
was in the
character of an agent for Meredith.
The Circuit Court gave two
instructions on this subject, one at the instance of plaintiff, and the
other asked by the defendant. The latter was correct, the former not.
does not follow, because
person discloses himself to be an agent,
therefore not person
and gives the name of his principal, that he
ally liable. The person with whom he
dealing may be unwilling to
trust the principal, and yet willing to contract with the agent, upon
his personal responsibility:
and
then becomes a question of fact,
to be determined by the circumstances of the case, .whether the credit
was given to the agent or not. The conversation and acts of the par
ties, at the time of the contract, must necessarily be evidence, indeed,
in the absence of any written agreement, the only evidence of what
the contract was.
These are the res gestae—the contract itself.
The
admission of such testimony does not impair, to_the slightest extent,
that well settled rule that
party cannot- make evidence for himself;
This rule
that his declarations in his own favor are not admissible.
understood to be conﬁned to declarations and acts ex post facto,
may be allowed the phrase—-made in the absence of the party con
tracted with and after the transaction has passed away.
given at the plaintiff’s instance
certainly
_ The second instruction
obscure; but
understand
calculated to mislead.
aright,
The premises laid down in the ﬁrst branch of the instruction are fol
conclusion, which seems to have no bearing upon the case,
lowed by
and so far might be regarded as harmless, but
second sequence
drawn from them in the concluding paragraph, which not only makes
the meaning of the entire instructions very obscure, but
in itself
Had the jury been told that the defendant’s declarations
erroneous.
that he was agent, and was authorized to offer
reward, were not
suﬂicient of themselves to authorize
verdict in his favor, no objec
tion could have been made to the proposition.
For these facts may
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have existed, and yet the plaintiff may not have thought proper to
give Meredith credit, and may have preferred contracting with the
defendant. There was evidence to warrant this hypothesis and coun
But the instruction
ter evidence which the jury were to determine.
proceeds to direct the jury that from such declarations alone, unsup
It was
ported by other eyidence, they must not ﬁnd Hovey an agent.
immaterial whether Hovey was agent or not; that is, whether he
was an authorized agent or not. The controversy was not between
him and his supposed principal, but between him andia third party,
claiming to have contracted with him upon his individual responsi
bility, and the material question was, Did the parties so contract or
was the contract made with Hovey as the agent of Meredith? The
instruction concludes with a distinct and independent proposition:
“And unless the jury believe from other evidence than the said dec
larations of_ Hovey that he offered the reward as such agent, they
must ﬁnd for plaintiff.” This last clause was certainly calculated to
mislead.
Hovey’s declarations to Pitcher or Pitcher’s agent. Heard,
were undoubtedly evidence of the understanding between them, as
well as what was said by Pitcher or Heard.
To enable the jury to
ascertain the intent of both parties, it was proper for them to know
all that passed between them at the time of the supposed contract.‘
Declarations made by Hovey at other times and to other persons would
of course be inadmissible. * * * Reversed and remanded.

iii

SMOUT
(Court of Exchequer,

1842.

12

v.

ILBERY.

L.

J.

Exch.

357, 10 Mees. 8: W. 1.)

4

it

is,

Debt for goods sold and delivered, and on an account stated.
Ver
dict for plaintiff, and defendant obtained a rule to show cause why a
new trial should not be had.
This case was argued at the Sittings after last
ALDERSON, B.‘
Hilary Term, before my brothers Gurney, Rolfe, and myself. The
The defendant was the widow of a Mr.
facts were shortly these.
Ilbery, who died abroad; and the plaintiff, during the husband’s life
time, had supplied, and after his death had continued to supply, goods
The husband left England for
for the use of the family in England.
China in March. 1839, and died on the 14th day of October, in that
year. The news of his death ﬁrst arrived in England on the 13th
day of March, 1840; and the only question now remaining for the
whether the defendant was liable for the
decision of the Court
was pos
goods supplied after her_husband’s death, and before
sible that the knowledge of that fact could be communicated to her.
There was no doubtithat such knowledge was communicated -to her
Part or the opinion is omitted.
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it was possible; and that the defendant had paid into Court
suﬁicient to cover all the goods supplied to the family by the plaintiff
'
subsequently to the 13th March, 1840.
We took time to consider this question, and to examine the authori
ties on this subject, which is one of some difficulty.
The point, how
far an agent is personally liable who, having in fact no authority, pro
fesses to bind his principal, has on various occasions been discussed.
There is no doubt that in the case of a fraudulent misrepresentation
of his authority, with an intention to deceive, the agent would be per
But independently of this, which is perfectly free
sonally responsible.
from doubt, there seem to be still two other classes of cases, in which
an agent who without actual authority makes a contract in the name
of his principal, is personally liable, even where no proof of such
fraudulent intention can be given. First, where he has no authority.
and knows
but nevertheless makes the contract as having such au
In that case, on the plainest principles of justice, he
liable.
thority.
For he induces the other party to enter into the contract on what
fact peculiarly within his own
amounts to
misrepresentation of
and
but just, that he who does so should be consid
knowledge;
ered as holding himself out as one having competent authority to
contract, and as guarantying the consequences arising -from any want
But there
of such authority.
third class, in which the Courts
have held, that where
party making the contract as agent bona ﬁde
believes that such authority
vested in him, but has in fact no such
still personally liable. .In these cases,
true, the
authority, he
not actuated by any fraudulent motives; nor has he made
agent
But still his liability
any statement which he knows tobe untrue.
depends on the same principles as before.
wrong, differing
only in degree, but not in its essence, from the former case, to state
as true what the individual
making such statement does not know
to be true, even though he does not know
to be false, but believes,
without sufficient grounds, that the statement will ultimately turn out
And
to be correct.
that wrong produces injury to
third person,
who
wholly ignorant of the grounds on which such belief of the
founded, and who has relied on the correctness of
supposed agent
his assertion,
equally just that he who makes such assertion should
be personally liable for its consequences.‘
On examination of the authorities, we are satisﬁedthat all the cases
in which the agent has been held personally responsible, will be_ found
to arrange themselves under one or other of these three classes.
In all
will be found, that he has either been guilty of some fraud,
of them
has made some statement which he knew to be false, or has stated as
true what he did not know to be true, omitting at the same time to give
such information to the other contracting party, as would enable him
a
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5111 Collen v. Wright,
El.
Bl. 647 (1857),
was denied that any wrong
was necessary, and in this it has been followed.
Halbot v. Lens, [1901]
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under which he pro
‘

.
posed to act.
Of the ﬁrst, it is not necessary to cite any instance. Polhill v. Wal
ter, 3 B. & Ad. 114, is an instance of the second; and the cases where

never had any authority to contract at all, but believed that
he had, as when he acted on a forged warrant of attorney, which he
thought to be genuine, and the like, are instances of the third class.
To these may be added those cited by Mr. Iustice Story, in his book
on Agency, p. 226, note 3. * * *
The present case seems to us to be distinguishable from all these
authorities.
Here the agent had in fact full authority originally to
contract and did contract in the name of the principal.
There is no
ground for saying, that in representing her authority as continuing,
she did-any wrong whatever.
There wa's no mala ﬁdes on her part
no want of due diligence in acquiring knowledge of the revocation—
and
no omission to state any fact within her knowledge relating to
The continuance of the
the revocation itself was by the act of God.
life of the principal was, under these circumstances,
fact equally
within the knowledge of both contracting parties. If, then, the true
principle derivable from the cases is, ‘that there must be some wrong
or omission of right on the part of the agent, in order to make him
contract made in the name of his principal,
personally liable on
will follow that the agent
not responsible in such
case as the
We were, in the
present. And to this conclusion we have come.
course of the argument, pressed with the diﬁiculty, that
the -de
fendant,be not personally liable, there
no one liable on this contract
Cr. 167,
Man.
B.
Ry. 282, has dc
at all; for Blades v.,Free_.
cided, that in such
case the executors of the husband are not liable.
be so,
affords to us
This may be so: but we do not think that
sufﬁcient ground for holding the defendant liable. In the ordinary
contract in her husband’s lifetime, for
case of
wife who mades
not liable, the same consequence follows.
In that
which the husband
case, as here, no one
liable upon the contract so made.
Rule absolute accordingly.
&

4

it

it

is

is

a

a

a

if

a

9

&

is

if

a

is

a

it

a

it,

the agent

ELLIS.

(Supreme Court of Judicature ‘or New York, 1802.
Dec. 144.)

Johns. Cas.

70,
.

2

v.

3

DUSENBURY

Am.

a

In error on certiorari from
judgment for plain
]ustice’s Court.
tiff on note signed by Dusenbury “for Peter Sharpe.”
PER CURIAM. There can be no question but that Dusenbury signed
the note, without having any authority for that purpose.
The letter
of attorney could not bind the principal beyond the plain import of
it. An authority to collect debts cannot, ‘by any possible construction,
a

~i
be an authority

to give notes.

I
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The only question, then,
whether Dusenbury was not personally
On this point we are of opinion
responsible, as for his own note.
that
person, under pretence of authority from another, executes
bound; and the name of the person for whom
note in his name, he
The party who
he assumed to act will be rejected, as surplusage.
accepts of a note, under such mistake or imposition, ought to have
the same remedy against the attorney, who imposes on him, as he
would have had against the pretended principal,
he had been really
bound.
judgment of afﬁrmance.

iii,

HALL
(Supreme

et al. v.

Court of California,

CRANDALL
1866.

29 Cal.

ettal.
89 A-m. Dec.

567.

64.)
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a

Action on
promissory note made for the Auburn Turnpike Com
pany by its president, the defendant.
* But upon this head
sufﬁcient to say
SANDERSON, J.“ *
that the present action
founded strictly upon the note itself, and
not upon the wrong done to the plaintiffs by the defendants in exe
the de
without authority; and we are of the opinion that
cuting
personal
fendants have, by their action in the premises, incurred
liability at common law, such liability does not arise from any obli
In all
gation created by -the note itself, but from the wrong done.
an action to recover the
such cases, the remedy against the agent
any has been paid him. or the value of the work or labor,
money,
any has been performed for him, under the supposed contract, or
special damages resulting to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants’
an
wrong
undertaking to act for_another without authority.
contract, employ terms which
legal effect,
agent in executing
con
charge himself, he may be sued upon the_instrument itself as
This
so because by the use of such terms, he has
tracting party.
the instrument does not contain
But
made the contract his own.
such terms, or in other words contains language which in legal effect
bind the principal only. the agent cannot be sued on the instrument
not his. If then the
itself for the obvious reason that the contract
not binding upon the principal because theagent had no au
contract
and
not binding on the agent because
does not
thority to make
wholly void.
contain apt words to charge him personally,
some conﬂict of authority, but the better
Upon thispoint there
with those cases which hold the rule to
reason, in our judgment,
be as above stated.
264-a, and marginal
Story on Agency (Sth Ed.)
notes, where the authorities are collected;
Parsons on Contracts,
54 to 58; Abbey v. Chase,
Cush. 54. See, also, Sayre v. Nichols,
6
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6Part of the opinion is omitted.
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7 Cal. 538, 68 Am. Dec. 280; Davidson v. Dallas, 8 Cal. 227 ; Haskell
v. Cornish, 13 Cal. 47; Shaver v. Ocean Min. Co., 21 Cal. 45, which
will be found to bear in some degree upon the question. Those cases,
which hold that the agent may be sued upon the contract itself, treat
all matter which the contract contains in relation to the principal as
in effect, to make
new contract for the parties
surplusage, which
concerned instead of construing the one which they themselves have
made.

HAUPT
(Supreme Court of Appeals

v.
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*

*

*
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The contract in the present case
not binding upon the supposed
principal (the company) because the supposed agents (the defend
as we held in Hall v. Auburn Tum
ants) had no authority to make
not binding upon the de
pike Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75.
fendants, because
does not contain apt words to charge them.
From the terms employed, the contract
manifestly the contract of
the company and not the defendants.
clear upon inspection of
the
that the defendants intended to bind the company
instrument
and not themselves, and that the plaintiffs so understood it.
This
action therefore being ex directo against the defendants on the note
itself, cannot, in our judgment, be sustained atcommon law for rea
sons which have been already stated.’
Upon the question whether
case which will charge the defendants at com
the plaintiff can make
mon law, we intimate no opinion.
judgment dismissing the case affirmed.

VINT.

-

or West Virginia, 1911.
68 W. Va. 657. 70 S. E.
L. R. A. [N. S.] 518.)
t

702. 34

against Vint, maker of the note,
indorser on the note, and
De
Ran, by whom the indorsement was made.
judgment for plaintiff,
and defendant Lumber Company brings error.
*
POFFENBARGER, I.‘
Both the declaration and the proof
show that the De Ran Lumber Company
corporation.
sued
no proof of authority in
‘as such, and there
De Ran,‘ its man
ager, by whom the indorsement was made, or any other person. to
by an accommodation indorsement, guaranty, or suretyship,
bind
nor evidence sufﬁcient to establish an original promise bv the cor
As
general rule. corporations cannot lend their credit
poration.
note,

_]'.
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it

I.
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is
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I.

a

Action by Haupt, payee of
Ran Lumber Company,

the De

6

;

'lAeeord: Jefts v. York, 10 (Tush. 392 (1852), per Shaw, 0. J. Though no
one is liable on the contract, the agent may however be liable in ease for
misrepresenting his authority. McCormick v. Seeberger. 73 Ill. App. 87 (1898)
Am. Rep. 240 (1870); Duncan v. Niles,
Bartlett v. Tucker. 104 Mass. 336.
32 Ill. 532, 83 Am. Dec. 293 (1863); Simpson v. Garland. 76 Me. 203 (1884).
See extensive annotation of this case in
BPart of the opinion is omitted.
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 518.
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in the form of accommodation indorsements, suretyships, and guar
anties. To ﬁx such
liability upon
corporation,
necessary to
establish, not only authority in the officer or agent to execute the
paper, but also power in the corporation to bind itself in that way.
This rule
universally applied to banking, insurance, railroad, plank
road, and other transportation companies, manufacturing
companies,
and building and loan associations.
would be useless to consume
space here in citing the decisions declaring and applying this law.
A.
E. Enc. L. 788; Mora
They are collated in 10 Cyc. 1109;
761; Clark, Corp.
389, 423; Cook, Corp.
184, p.
wetz, Corp.
486.
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I.

De Ran, by whom the indorsement was made, has been
becomes necessary to determine, for the purposes
defendant,
of
new trial, whether his lack of authority to bind his principal
has been held that
person
makes him personally liable. Though
note or other contract with
who has signed the name of another to
liable thereon as promisor or covenantor (Edings v.
out authority
Brown,
Rich. 255; Dusenbury v. Ellis,
Am.
]ohns. Cas. 70,
Dec. 144), reason and the weight of authority are to the contrary,
but only
and make him liable, not on the instrument, as
party to
warrantor of the signature, against whom assumpsit, sounding in
as
wrongdoer, making him liable in trespass on
damages, lies, or as
Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461,
the case for fraud and deceit.
Am. Dec. 146; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117; Dung v. Parker, 52
575;
A.
E. Enc. L. 1128;
N. Y. 499: Clark
Skyles, Agency,
31 Cyc. 1614, 1615,,saying:
“As to the ground upon which the liability
of an agent contracting for another without authority rests, the au
thorities in the several states differ widely, nor
easy to reconcile
In some jurisdictions, par
the various decisions in the same state.
held that an action may be main
ticularly in the earlier cases,
tained against the agent as principal upon the contract itself, although
contains no apt words to bind him personally, but only to hind the
principal, upon.the theory that the contract must have been intended
not the principal, then the agent.
to bind some one;
By the great
weight of recent authority, however. this theory has been emphatically
now generally held, more logically, that the agent
repudiated, and
contains apt words to~binrl
cannot be held upon the contract unless
him personally, in the absence of which the only remedy
by an action
for the breach of his implied warranty or an action for deceit
the
circumstances warrant the latter remedy.”
Reversed and re
made
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Court of Illinois,

83 111. 208.)

1876.
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SCHOLFIELD,
Two questions are presented by this record for
our determination:
First—Does the covenant in the lease to pay rent purport to be the
covenant of the defendants, individually?
Second—If the defendants did not, in fact, bind
legally organized
corporation by the terms of the lease, are they, themselves, liable to an
action of covenant upon it?
As to the ﬁrst point, we think
clear the covenants in the lease, on
behalf of the lessee, do not purport to be the covenants of the de
fendants, individually.
N. W. Distilling Co. v. Brant, 69 Ill. 658, 18
Am. Rep. 631. The case
not analogous to Powers v. Briggs et al..
79 Ill. 493, 22 Am. Re'p. 175, and other cases of like tenor cited by
the counsel for the plaintiﬂf.
The evidence shows that “The Chicago Literary Association” was
was the lessee, and
organized as
corporation, de facto, at least.
its associates, successors and assigns, are all the covenants that
by
relate to the payment of rent, taxes, rates, care and repair of the prem
And, at the
ises, and surrender of possession, etc., to be performed.
recited, the party of the ﬁrst part, the
conclusion of the lease,
plaintiff, signs in his own proper person, and the ‘party of the second
“The Chicago Literary Association,”- signs “through its
part, which
thus seen, the entire phraseology of the instrument ex
trustees.” It
pressly excludes the idea of an intentional personal liability, and
such as
appropriate and ordinarily used to express corporate lia
bility.
no doubt that “the signature of an
Upon the second point there
agent amounts to an aﬁirmation that he has authority to do the par
ticular act, or, at all events, that he, bona ﬁde, believes himself to have
264.
But the question here
that authority.”
Story on Agency,
not whether these defendants may be held liable to the plaintiff in
action, but whether they are liable in this form
ac
proper form
tion-—i. e., covenant upon the lease.
_
264a, says: “It seems clear
Story, in the work just quoted from,
that in no case can an agent be sued on the very instrument itself, as
contracting party, unless there are a‘pt words therein so to charge
him. Thus,
person acting as agent for another should,‘ without
deed in the
authority or exceeding his authority, make and execute
name of his principal, and not in his own name, the agent would not
would not bind the principal.”
be liable thereon, although
But he
further says, where there are apt words, which may charge him per
sonally, and yet he signs the same, in his own name, as agent of an
different aspect, and he
other, the question may be presented under
gives this example: “If an agent should, without due authority, make

_
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_
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note, saying in
promise to pay," etc., and sign
case
C. D., by A. B., his agent, or ‘A. B., agent of C. D.,’ in such
may the words as to the agency be rejected, and the agent be held per
”
“Upon this point,”
sonally answerable as the promisor of the note?
The
he says, “the authorities do not seem to be entirely agreed.”
Am.
substance,
Contracts
will be found in Chitty on
same, in
Ed.)
(11th
Am. Dec. 111;
See, also, Stetson v. Patten,
314.
Greenl. 358,
Ballou v. Talbott, 16 Mass. 461,
Am. Dec. 146; Delius v, Cawthorn,
13 N. C. 90;
Cush. 56, 57; Moor v. ‘Wilson, 26
Abbey v. Chase,
N. H. 332; American Leading Cases (5th Ed.) Notes to Rathbon v.
a promissory

6 8

Z

ll

a

a

if

is

it

e

is

is

of

a

is

a

is

'

It

is

it

is

a

it,

.

-

a

it

Budlong, 767, side p. 636.
The question under consideration was not before the court in \-Vheel
er v. Reed, 36 Ill. 81, nor in Mann et al. v. Richardson, 66 Ill. 481, and
what was there said affecting
was by way of argument merely, and,
so far as intended to announce
principle, must be understood as
restricted to cases where there are apt words in the instrument to
charge the agent personally, by rejecting the words descriptive of his
agency as surplusage.
In Duncan v. Niles, 32 Ill. 532, 83 Am. Dec. 293, the court quoted
with approval, however, this language from the opinion of the court
in Abbey v. Chase, supra, and predicated the decision upon
and
upon other cases of like tenor: “\-Vlien one who has no authority to
act as another’s agent assumes so to act, and makes either
deed or
not personally liable on
simple contract in the name of the other, he
the covenants in the deed, or on the promise in the simple contract,
contain apt words to bind him personally.
unless
The only remedy
an action on the case_ for falsely
against him in this Common“ ealth,
assuming authority to act as agent.”
true, in that case the agent sought to be held personally re
public corporation, and
sponsible assumed to act as the agent of
there
distinction between the measure of liability imposed upon
public and private agents; but the authorities referred to and relied
the remedy
upon apply, so far as the form
concerned, as well to
private as to public agents.
VV regard what
correct statement
quoted from Story, supra, as
of the result of the authorities, and think
not inconsistent with
anything that has been heretofore decided by this court.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the undertaking to perform the covenants in
the lease of the party‘of the second part assumes to be that of “The
Chicago Literary Association” alone, and there are no apt words from
which an individual undertaking can be implied,’
we shall reject the
9Accord,

see

v. Tuttle, 36 Utah,

the case 01’ Roberts

(1909).

614,

105

Pac.

916

7

:

7

In some cases, particularly early American cases, the agent is held on the
contract with the thiru person as though it were his personal contract.
Gil
Port. 454, 31 Am. Dee. 715 (1838)
laspie v. Wesson,
Byars v. Doores’ Adnrr,
20 Mo. 284 (1855); Meech v. Smith.
Wend. 315 (1831).
This is sometimes
Jlwtiﬂed on the srmmd that by striking out or the contract the parts which

/
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“The Chicago Literary Association” wherever it occurs, _we must
hold that the defendants cannot be held individually responsible in
the present action on the lease, and affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
name

THILMANY

v.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, 1899.

IOWA PAPER BAG CO.
108

Iowa,

357, 79 N.

W.

et al.

261, 75 Am.

St. Rep.

259.)

Action to recover the price of a car load of paper shipped by plain
tiff to the Bag Company. ‘Daggett as vice president of a bank had
written plaintiff a letter of guaranty on the strength of which the
paper had been shipped. The Bag Company was insolvent, and it had
been decided in a previous action that a national bank could not make
such a guaranty, and therefore was not liable. Plaintiff now seeks to
make Daggett personally liable.
* * * VVe now turn to the main point in the
DEEMER,
case, and ﬁrst to the pfoposition that defendant Daggett is liable be
cause of the form of the guaranty.
It is signed, “Iowa National Bank,
by William Daggett, V. P.” Clearly, this is an obligation of the com
pany; and the form of the signature just as clearly indicates that Dag
To
gett signed it in a representative capacity, and not as an individual.
hold that the contract binds Daggett personally, we must eliminate the
preposition “by,” and hold that the initials “V. P.” are “descriptio
This we, cannot do, as it is not our province to make con
personae."
tracts for parties. The use of the pronouns “we” and “our” in the
letter of guaranty is of no signiﬁcance.
They are often used in re
There is no
ferring to a corporation as a collection of individuals.
question in our minds but that all the parties to this contract regarded

J.“

the agent had no authority to put there the remainder clearly binds the agent.
Weare v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196 (1862).
An interesting discussion of this theory
is found in Simmonds v. Long, 80 Kan. 155, 101 Pac. 1070, 23 L. It. A. (N. S.)
Many cases make no distinction between an action against the
553 (1909).
agent on the unauthorized contract made for the principal and an action bas
Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311,
ed on the implied warranty of authority.
47 Am. Rep. 718 (1882).
In others liability of the agent when apt words to
bind him are not used must be in case, for his fraud or misrepresentation.
In such a case, in the absence of misrepresentation, there is no liability. Og
den v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429 (1853); Pcople’s Nut. Bank of
Boston v. Dixwell, 217 Mass. 436, 105 N. E. -135, Ann. Oas. 1915D, 722 (1913).
And others, though recognizing that the liability really rests upon the latter,
still refuse to set aside a judgment against the agent because it was based
upon a breach of the wrong contract.
Such an error is not prejudicial to the
agent’s rights, and is immaterial.
Oliver v. Morawetz, 97 Wis. 332, 72 N. W.

877 (1897).

Still others, particularly the English courts, are inclined to deny relief
against the agent if the action is brought on the contract itself, when it con
tains no apt words to bind him. Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 13 Q. B. 744, 13
Jur. 763, 18 L. J. Q. B. 274. 66 E. C. L. 744 (1849). The agent may be liable
in another form of action, but not upon the contract itself. Simpson V. Gar
land. 76 Me. 203 (1884).
10 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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it as the obligation of the bank, and not of the defendant Daggett in
his individual capacity; and, as this is the proper legal construction of
the instrument, nothing further need be said on the ﬁrst proposition
urged by appellant’s counsel.
2. As to the second proposition, the rule has been broadly stated
over and over again that when an agent contracts in excess of his au
thority, or acts without authority, or assumes to have authority when
he has none, or for any reason fails to bind his principal," he is him
self bound. Winter v. Hite, 3 Iowa, 142; Allen v. Pegram, 16 Iowa,
163; Andrews v. Tedford, 37 Iowa, 314; Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa,
W. 911, 52 Am. Rep. 436. That this is the general rule
220, 19
must be conceded, and, as applied to the facts of the cited cases, it is
But, like nearly every other general rule, it is subject to ex
correct.
ceptions, some of which we will notice.
First,
That,
as an
The reasons generally given for the rule are:
agent assumes to represent a principal, he cannot be heard to say that
he had no authority, or that there was in fact no principal to be bound;
for, if he assumes to represent another, he impliedly warrants that
there is such another, and that he has authority to represent him. If,
then, there is no principal, or the agent has no authority to act for him,
Second, The law
an action will lie for deceit or misrepresentation.
one, and, if the
intended
to
some
that
the
contract
was
bind
assumes
This
principal is not bound, the contract must be that of the agent.
last rule is generally a'pplied to executed contracts, and an action will
lie for beneﬁts received by the agent.
Some cases go to the extent of
rejecting all parts of the contract relating to the obligation of the prin
As il
cipal, and then treat it as the personal contract of the agent.
lustrating this rule, see Byars v. Doores, 20 Mo. 284; VVoodes v. Den
nett, 9 N. H. 55; Terwilliger v. Murphy, 104 Ind. 32, 3 N. E. 404. A
rule is that the agent impliedly warrants his au
third reason for
the
thority to act for his principal, and, if he has no such power, an action
lies for breach of warranty.
Now, it is apparent that if the party with whom the agent contracts
has ‘notice of the facts relating to the authority of the agent, and is as
fully advised as to his authority as the agent himself, there can be no
And so the text writers have generally stated this as
action for deceit.
an exception to the general rule. Mechem on Agency, at sections 545
and 546, thus states the law:
,
“Sec. 545. * * * Of course, if the other party knew, or by the
exercise of reasonable care might have discovered, the want of au
thority, he cannot recover. This implied warranty by the agent of his
authority must ordinarily be limited to its existence as a matter of
fact, and not be held to include a warranty of its adequacy or suiti
ciency inpoint of law.
“Sec. 546. VVhere Agent Disc_loses All the Facts Relating to His
the agent, acting in good faith, fully
Authority. \Nhere,,however,
discloses to the other party at the time all the facts and circumstances

\
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touching the authority under which he assumes to act, so that the other
party, from such information or otherwise, is fully informed as to the
It is
existence and extent of his authority, he cannot be held liable.
material, in these cases, that the party claiming a want of authority in
the agent should be ignorant of the truth touching the agency. If he
has full knowledge of the facts, or of such facts as are sufﬁcient to put
him upon inquiry, and he fails to avail himself of such knowledge, or
of the means of knowledge reasonably accessible to him, he cannot say
that he was misled, simply on the ground that the other assumed to
act as agent without authority.
Of course, if the agent conceals or
misrepresents material facts, to the detriment of the other party, he
cannot claim exemption.”
Iudge Story, in his valuable work on Agency (section 265), says:
“This doctrine, however, as to the liability of the agent whereihe con
tracts in_the name and for the beneﬁt of the principal, without having
due authority, is founded u'pon the supposition that the want of author
ity is unknown to the other party, or, if known, that the agent under
takes to guaranty a ratiﬁcation of the act by the principal.
But circum
stances may arise in which the agent would not or might not be held
to be personally liable, if he acted without authority, if that want of
authority was known to both parties or unknown to both parties.”
Abundant authorities are cited by each author in support of the_se
The same thought is equally applicable to the third rea
propositions.
son above given for the general rule. And it may be further said that
the implied warranty of the agent does not relate to the ‘power of the
He simply covenants
principal to enter into the particular contract.
that he has authority to act for his principal, not that the act of the
Hence it has been justly said that the
principal is legal and binding.
contract must be one which the law would enforce against the prin
cipal, if it had been authorized by him, else the anomaly would exist
of giving a right of action against an assumed agent for an unauthor
ized representation of his power to make the contract, when a breach
of the contract itself, if it had been authorized, would have furnished
no ground of action against the principal.
Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan.
406, 31 Am. Rep. 194; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467; Mechem, Ag.
V
§ 548; Snow v. Hix, 54 Vt. 478.
the
In the case now under ‘consideration
defendant Daggett made no
representations as to his authority, save that contained in the letter‘ it
self. He is guilty of no actionable deceit, unless it be found in the fact
that he signed the letter of guaranty as vice president, and thus rep
He had this au
resented that he had authority to represent his bank.
for no question
thority, if any officer of a national bank has
made
as to his authority to represent the bank in the making of any contract
not, then, based upon any
The action
authorized to execute.
misrepresentation as to his authority, but upon the invalidity of the
contract itself as between plaintiff and the bank. There was no action
able deceit, for the plaintiff
presumed to know as much about the
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as we have said,
powers of national banks as the defendant. There
no implied warranty by an agent that his principal has authority to
rule, that
make the contract. As
question of law, of which each
In the case against the bank we held
party has equal knowledge.
that the national banks have no authority to enter into such contracts,
con
and as the plaintiff has no right of action against the bank upon
tract of guaranty, such as the one in suit, no recovery should be per
for this would hold every agent to warran
mitted against the agent
of the legality of his principal’s contracts. As we have seen, this
The second reason sometimes given
not the obligation of the agent.
for the general rule of liability of the agent does not appear to us to
new contract
made
be sound.
By the application of this principle
for the parties. An engagement
created which the parties did not
intend to assume, and the decided weight of authority
against such
See Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 567, 89 Am. Dec. 64; Ogden v.
rule.
Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429; Duncan v. Niles, 32 Ill.
532, 83 Am. Dec. 293; Stetson v. Patten,
Greenl. 358, 11 Am. Dec.
111; Abbey v. Chase;
Cush. 56; \Vhite v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117;
l\-IcCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 199, 91 Am. Dec. 468.
We should be slo\v to adopt any rule which would bind
party who
did not by the terms of his contract agree to become responsible.
In
deed, the question seems to be put at rest, so far as this court
con
cerned, in VVillett v. Young, 82 Iowa, 292, 47 N. VV. 990,
L. R. A.
The rules herein announced are not in conﬂict with any of the
115.
previous decisions of this court. The case of \Vinter v. I-lite, supra,
related to the contract of an executrix, and
there said that such
cases should not be confounded with those of agency.
In the case of
Andrews v. Tedford, supra, the question was left undecided. Allen v.
Pegram was an action against an agent who assumed to act for
prin
cipal that had no existence; and so was Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220,
19 N. \V. 911, 52 Am. Rep. 436.
These cases come clearly within the
general rule ﬁrst announced. In other cases cited by a'ppellant’s coun
sel the agent was held liable because of the form of his signature.
They have no application to the question before us.“
VVe do not think that Daggett, the agent,
personally liable, under
the facts disclosed in this case, and the judgment
affirmed.
11 See especially Baltzen v. Nicolay. 53 N. Y. 467 (1873), in which the con
tract was unentorceable as coming under the statute of frauds; Bloodgood

\

6

a

8

4

7

7

v. Short, 50 Misc. Rep. 286, 98 N. Y. Supp. 775 (1906). in which the agent lack
ed the necessary written power of attorney to sell land: and Beattie v. Ld.
Ebury, L. R. Ch. Cas. 777, 41 L. J. Ch. 804, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 398, 20 Wkly.
H. L. 102. 44 ‘L. J. Ch. 20, 30 L. T. Rep.
Rep. 94 (1872), affirmed in L. R.
581, 22 Wkly. Rep. 897 (1874), distinguishing the leading case ot Collen v.
Wright.
Eq. & B. 647,
Jur. N. S. 357, 27 L. J. Q. B. 215. Wkly. Rep. 123,
92 E. 0. L. 647 (1857).
In the latter case Oockburn. O. J., dissenting, vig
orously criticises the invention ot
contract or implied warranty of au
thority. The doctrine is uphold in Anderson v. Adams. 43 Or. 621, 74 Pac.
215 (1903), and especially in the leading case of Farmers’ Co-op. Trust Co.
v. Floyd. 47 Ohio St. 525) 26 N. E. 110, 12 L. R. A. 346, 21 Am. St. Rep. S46
(1890), and in Peepies v. Perry, 18 Ga. App. 369, 89 S. E. 461 (1916).
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Assumpsit for a dinner furnished on the order of the defendants to
celebrate the Whig victory at the election of 1840. Defendants Davis
and Eichbaum opposed the‘ proposal in the meeting, but a majority
voted for it. Verdict directed for plaintiff.
GInsoN, C. ]. This case is unique, but really resolvable on prin
It seemed, at ﬁrst, to resemble the case of a committee sued
ciple.
for-the price of'meats and wines furnished on its order to a club;
but though the defendants acted in obedience to a constituency, it was,
unlike a club, which is a permanent body, an intactible and irresponsible
one.
The plaintiff, being examined without objection, testiﬁed that
he furnished the dinner on the order of the \/Vhig party, ‘but that it
was to the committee he looked for payment. It is probable that nei
ther he nor they spent a thought on the subject; but it is not, there
fore, to be concluded that he agreed to give the dimmer for nothing;
and the responsibilities of the parties concerned are to be determined
on the ordinary principles of the law of contracts. The facts are, that
the defendants and others, being a committee constituted by a popu
lar meeting to order and manage a dinner, contracted with the plain
tiff to furnish
and directed the secretary of the meeting to report
the proceeding to the Tippecanoe Club, an aﬂiliated society, for its
application.
will not be pretended that nobody was responsible to the
Now
plaintiff for the order; and,
the defendants were not, who else was?
Were they to be viewed as the agents of
club, we would have some
thing palpable to deal with. The question would be, whether they had
become personally liable by having exceeded their authority, or wheth
er they had not contracted on the credit of their constituents.
But a
club
deﬁnite association, organized for indeﬁnite existence:
not
an ephemeral meeting, for
particular occasion, to be lost in the
crowd at its dissolution.
It would be unreasonable to presume that
the plaintiff agreed to trust to
responsibility so desperate, or furnish
a dinner on the credit of
meeting which had vanished into nothing.
It was already defunct; and we are not to imagine that the plaintiff
consented to look to
body which had lost its individuality by the dis
persion of its members in the general mass.
But the question would
not depend on the law of partnership, even were, such
meeting to be
treated as a club; for though Lord Eldon, in Beaumont v. Meredith,
Vez.
Beat. 180, and Lord Abinger, in Flemyng v. Hector,
Mee
son
Welsb. 179, seemed to have thought that
member of
club
partner, the notion was exploded by Chief Justice Tyndal, in the
last trial of Todd v. Emly, cited in ‘Wordsworth on ]oint Stock Com
panies, 183.
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Neither is it determinable on the law of principal and agent; for
there was no principal.
At ﬁrst, I thought the credit might have been
given to the primary meetings on the authority of those cases in which
ofﬁcers have been held liable to have contracted on the credit of the
but the certainty of payment, in those instances, was
government;
so great as to make the moral responsibility of the government the
Not so the moral responsibility of a populace,
preferable security.
In a case like
which is inﬁnitely weakened by being inﬁnitely divided.
this, the usual presumption of credit is inverted; and, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the.vendor is supposed to have relied on
V/hat we have
the responsibility of the persons who gave the order.
to do, then, is to determine how far each of-the defendants was
a
party to
tavern, each
When several dine together at
liable for the reck
take
oning.
Collyer on Partn. 25, note w. But
they are liable
jointly and not severally; for though only one should order, those
who approve of
become parties, except where credit
given to one,
in exclusion to those who happen to be his guests.
This principle
deducible from Delauney v. Strickland,
Did the
Stark. R. 366.
defendants, then, all concur in the order_given for the dinner in ques
tion? If they did not, the plaintiifcannot recover.
It
not disputed that they were present when the measure was
deﬁnitely adopted; but
proved that Davis and Eichbaumiopposed
while
was under consideration.
VVhat then? They at last submit
In Braith
ted to the majority, and made the resolution their own.
waite v. Skoﬁeld,
B.
C. 401,
member of
committee who was
resolution to have certain work done, was
present at the adoption of
held liable to the tradesmen. Every member present assents before
hand to whatever the majority may do, and becomes
party to acts
done,
may be, directly against his will.“ If he would escape re
sponsibility for them, he ought to protest, and throw up his member
ship on the spot; and there was no evidence that any of the defend
ants did so. On the contrary, they all remained till the meeting was
true, that Mr. Davis afterwards
dissolved, and the order given.
desired the plaintiff to give the matter up; but the dinner was in prepa
ration, and
was too late to retract. Of what importance, then
the
disputed fact of his having partook of the repast with the rest? Had
he done so, his ﬁnal accession would. according to Delauney v. Strick

'

‘
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1

2

6

a

a

a

a

a

12 Accord:
Frendendall v. Taylor, 23 Wis. 538, 99 Am. Dec. 203 (1868),
in which
committee of the State Fireman’s Association
contracted for
well, or tank, for
state tournament: Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. 493, 39 Am. Rep.
818 (1855), in which members of 0. masonic lodge were sued on a contract
masonic temple; Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220. 19 N. W. 911. 52 Am.
for
Rep. 436 (1881), in which a committee of
Good Templars Lodge signed a
lease for lodge rooms: Winona Lumber Co. v. Chui-ch.
S. D. 498. 62 N. W.
Baxter,
L. R.
107 11895); Kelner v.
O. P. 174, 12 Jur. N. S. 1016, 36 L. J.
C. P. 94, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 313, 15 W. R. 278 (1866).
Cf. Hellman v. Pullin,
El. 254 (1884).
Cab.
Gom>.Pa.& A. (2n ED.)—38
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land, have made him liable despite of other considerations;
but\he
had become irrevocably liable by the order of the committee, given
in his presence, and apparently with his approbation.
The defendants have not pleaded the non-joinder of the other mem
bers in abatement; and the evidence showed such a joint liability of
those who have been sued, as warranted the direction.
Judgment af
ﬁrmed.

_ji_

I

conpmo

_

(Supreme

Court of Nebraska,

v.

MUNSON.

52 Neb. 580, 72 N. W. 846, 66 Am. St.
Rep. 524.)

1897.

is

if

is

is
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a

it,

IRVINE, C.“ Munson sued Codding, alleging that he had sold and
conveyed to him certain land for the price of $10,000, that $9,750
thereof had been paid, and praying judgment for the remaining $250.
The answer was ~a general denial. The plaintiff recovered, and the de
fendant brings the case here by petition in error.
The evidence discloses that there were held several open meetings
of citizens of York for the purpose of securing the location there of
an institution for the care of orphans, under the patronage of the Wo
man’s Home Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopai Church.
It was understood that a gift of about $10,000 would be necessary
to accomplish the purpose. Both plaintiff and defendant attended the
It was determined that
meetings, and contributed to the undertaking.
the donations should be in the form of negotiable promissory notes,
A
made to the order of a trustee to be designated for that purpose.
committee appointed at one of the meetings, under power possessed
or assumed by
designated the defendant, Codding, as trustee. It
would seem that the institution was formally located at York, but,
instead of giving the notes or their proceeds to the society, the land
of plaintiff was purchased, and conveyed to “Anson B. Codding, trus
tee,” he in turn conveying to the missionary society.
Codding in
number of subscription notes to Munson,
dorsed without recourse
and these notes, together with other items accepted by Munson, made
not con
up the sum of $9,750, which Munson admits receiving.
tended that the price‘ was other than claimed, or that the remainder
The only question
was paid.
as to Codding‘s personal liability
therefor.
So far as has been stated, the evidence
quite clear and
free from conﬂict. As to the extent of Codding’s authority,
he pos
sessed any, and the nature of the transactions between him or other
citizens of York on the one side and Munson on the other with refer
ence to the purchase, the evidence
exceedingly vague, and leaves
is

_~
1BI’art oi the opinion is omitted.
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much to inference, if not to conjecture.
Still it is upon the last ques
V
'
tion that the case must be made chieﬂy to turn.
It is the general rule that one who assumes to act as agent for a
principal who has no legal status or existence renders himself indi
vidually liable on contracts so made.
Learn v. Upstill, 52 Neb. 271,
72 N. \V. 213.
This doctrine receives its most frequent application in
cases like the present, where a person or committee incurs obligations
as the result of instructions given by a body gathered together infor
mally for a special purpose, and possessing n0 deﬁnite membership or
continued power of existence. The rule is founded upon a presump
tion of fact, and is not the expression of any positive or rigid legal
The presumption referred to is that the parties to a con
principle.
tract contemplate the creation of a legal obligation capable of enforce
ment, and that,, therefore, it is understood that the obligation shall rest
on the individuals who actively participate in the making of the con
tract, because of the difficulty in all cases—the impossibility in many——
of ﬁxing it upon the persons taking part in ‘or submitting to the action
If, however, the person with whom the
of the evanescent assemblage.
contract is made expressly agrees to look to another source for the
performance of its obligations, or if the circumstances be such as to
disclose an intention not to charge the agent, as where the other agrees
to accept the proceeds of a particular fund, there is no longer reason
to indulge the presumption, and it may be rebutted by proof of such
This qualiﬁcation of the general rule is clearly indicated in
facts.
Learn v. Upstill, and is recognized by nearly all the cases discussing
the general subject.
See cases cited by ]udge Norval in Learn v.
Upstill; also Heath v. Goslin, 80 Mo. 310, 50 Am. Rep. SOS; Button
v. Winslow, 53 Vt. 430; Comfort v. Graham, 87 Iowa, 295, S4 N.

W.

242.

Applying

\

.

principles to the case at bar, the evidence would
raise prima facie the presumption upon which the general rule is
based.
On the other hand, it was sufﬁcient to justify the inference that
the plaintiff did not look to defendant personally, but was to receive
The instructions
merely the subscription notes, or their proceeds.
and submitted to
should have stated the law as we have indicated
the jury the issues bearing thereon. Instead thereof, the court charged
“If you ﬁnd from the evidence that Codding was in this
as follows:
transaction only agent and trustee for the Mothers’ Jewels Home,
and that all his transactions as such agent and trustee have been per
This
formed in good faith, then you should ﬁnd for the defendant.”
made Codding’s release from liability de
was erroneous, because
pend upon his acting as agent for the home, and his performing his
was not claimed that he was agent for the home,
duty in good faith.
This principal having no legal status,
but for the citizens of York.
have
been
should
that Codding was liable unless the
instruction
the
agreement was that Munson was to look solely to the subscriptions.
The error was prejudicial to the defendant, because there was no evi

It

it

it,
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dence of an agency such as the instruction submitted,“ and a verdict
for plaintiff was therefore required without regard to that phase of the
evidence which, if properly submitted, might have induced a. diﬁerent
* * *
ﬁnding.
V
Reversed and remanded.

MURPHY

.

v.

HELMRICH.

(Supreme Court of California, 1884.

66 Cal. 69, 4 Pac. 958.)

Action to recover the difference between the contract and market
price of one hundred shares ‘of gas stock which plaintiff claims to
have sold to defendants.
* * * The defendants, by their answer to the
MCKEE,
complaint in the action, speciﬁcally denied the_avem1ents of the com
plaint, and set up that they acted in the transaction “solely as brokers
and agents for others,” and the only questions at issue were:
(1)
Did the defendants buy the stock as charged in the complaint?
(2)
Did they buy for themselves or as agents for another?
The evidence shows that there was a complete verbal contract of
sale, which was followed by written admissions of the contract, signed
These they signed by their own names, and not
by the defendants.
In
as agents for any other person whom they named as principal.
thus signing them they bound themselves as principals, even if they
were acting for another, unless it was so understood and intended be
tween them and their vendor. But their memoranda did not disclose
the name of any principal, and there was no evidence given tending
to prove that there was any other known person for whom they act
ed and intended to bind.
VVhere an agent does not attempt in an in
strument to bind his principal, and in\terms imposes the obligation
on himself, the rule is that he incurs by such act a personal liability,
even although he described himself as agent.
Dayton v. Vi/arne, 43
N. ]. Law, 659. This personal liability they assumed; for, while
vaguely intimating that there was somebody for whom they were act
ing, they guarantied the plaintiff, as their vendor, that he would be
paid the $95.50 per share for the stock which they agreed to buy from
him, and afterwards directed him to sell it and they would make good
any deﬁciency. He accordingly sold the stock in open market and ac
counted to them. Under those circumstances they are not relievable
from responsibility on the ground of agency for some unknown person.

J.“

of showing that the principal is non-existent, or a sham, is
the party suing the agent. If there is a responsible principal, the agent
who has acted for him, of course. is not liable.
Fulton v. Sewall, 116 App.
Div. 744, 102 N. Y. Supp. 109 (1907).
16 Part of the opinion is omitted.
Accord: Little Rock Furniture Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 111 Ark. 575, 164 S. W. 289, 51 L. It. A. (N. S.) 406, Ann. Cas.
1916A, 848 (1914).
_
14 The burden

on
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"If a person,” says Chancellor Kent, “would excuse himself from
responsibility on the ground of agency, he must show that he disclosed
his principal at the time of making the contract, and that he acted on
his behalf so as to enable the party with whom he deals to have re
course to the principal in case the agent had authority to,bind him.”
“The agent becomes personally liable when the principal is not known,
or when there is no responsible principal, or where the agent becomes
liable by an undertaking in his own name, or when he exceeds
his pow
'
er.” 2 Kent, Comm. 630, 631.“
And such is the English law: “A man has a right to the character,
credit, and substance of the person with whom he contracts. If, there
fore, he enters into a contract with an agent who does not give his
principal’s name, the presumption is that he is invited to give credit
to the agent; still more if the agent does not disclose his principal’s
Anson, Cont. 345. See, also, Benj. Sales, 235, 52, 53.
existence."
We ﬁnd 110' error in the record. Judgment and order affirmed.

COCHRAN
(Supreme

Court of South

v.

RICE.

Dakota, 1010. 26 S. D. 393, 128 N. W. 583. Ann.
Cas. 191315, 570.)

Plaintiff owned certain hay, and a granary containing wheat, all
of the value of $912. Defendant was managing agent of the VVestern
Land & Investment Company, which owned 40 acres adjoining the
Rice employed one Stevens to plow this ﬁeld. Stevens sent
granary.
his two boys to do the plowing, andthey set ﬁre to stubble in the
ﬁeld. The ﬁre spread and burned plaintiﬁ"s hay and granary.
Plain
tiff recovered judgment and defendant appeals.
SMITH, J.“ [After holding that Stevens was not an independent
* * * Appellant's contention that he cannot be held
contractorz]
liable because he acted only as agent of the corporation cannot be sus
tained. His own evidence afﬁrmatively shows that his agency was not
disclosed to Stevens, nor is it shown that Stevens had any knowledge
of the facts. Having assumed to act as principal, no reason is appar
ent why he should not be held to have assumed the responsibilities of
a principal toward third persons for the act of a servant or employé.
In 31 Cyc. 1555, the rule is very clearly and concisely stated: “An

I

16 The agent may so contract

as to make both himself and his print.-lpal lla
hle by adding his personal responsibility
to that ot the principal. Dockarty
v. Tillotson, 64 Neb. 432, 89 l\'. W. 1050 (1902).
In general, in such cases,
the third person may pursue either, or both, until he recovers the contract
Knapp v. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284 (1884). As to election, and what consti
price.
tutcs. sec post, p. 678 8.; also, Am. Alkali C0. v. Kurtz (C. C.) 134 Fed. 663
There can he but one recovery.
Rounsaville v. Insurance Co., 138 N.
(1905).
C. 191, 50 S. E. 619 (1905).
17 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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who enters into a contract in his own name withoutdisclosing
identity of his principal renders himself personally liable, even
though the third person knows that he is acting as agent, unless it af
ﬁrmatively appears that it was the mutual intention of the parties to
the contract that the agent should not be bound.
VVith stronger rea-I
son, an agent who, without disclosing his agency,enters into contractu
al relations in his own name with one who is unaware of the agency,
binds himself and becomes subject to all liabilities, express and im
plied, created by the contract and transaction, in like manner as if he
were the real principal, although in contracting he may have intended
to act solely for his principal.
If the agent. would avoid personal lia
bility on a contract entered into by him in behalf ‘of his principal, he
must disclose not only the fact that he is acting in a representative ca
pacity, but also the identity of his principal, although, if the other
party has actual knowledge of the principal’s identity, it would have
the same effect to relieve the agent as a disclosure by the latter.
The disclosure of the principal’s identity need not be made at the in
ception of the transaction; it is sufﬁcient if it is made before liability
is incurred on either side; but a disclosure made after liability is in
curred comes too late to relieve the agent from liability.”
31 Cyc. 1560,
says: “While an agent is not liable to third persons for injury result
ing frohi his omission to perform a duty owed to the principal alone,
he is liable to them for injury resulting from his misfeasance or
malfeasance, meaning by those terms the breach of duty owed to
third persons generally, independent of the particular duties imposed
by his agency.
[According/ly, an agent may be held liable in damages
to third persons for conversion, fraud, and deceit, and even for neg
In an action against an agent for misfeasance or malfeasance,
ligence.
it is no defense that he acted as agent or by the authority or direc
tion of another, for no one can lawfully authorize the commission of
~
a tort.”
Appellant also contends that the evidence fails to show that the act
of Stevens in starting the ﬁre was done as a necessary part of the
services rendered‘ under his employment.
This question was fully
and fairly submitted to the jury under instructions decidedly favora
ble to the defendant, upon evidence disclosing all the surrounding con
ditions, and their verdict cannot be disturbed upon appeal.
A full and careful consideration of the entire record before us dis
closes no reversible error.
The order and judgment of the trial court are affirmed.
agent
the
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WEIL.

Court of New York, Appellate Term,
N. Y. Supp. 477.)

1900.

30 Misc.

Rep. 441, 62

MACLEAN, ]. Upon evidence ample therefor the learned justice
below determined that the plaintiff had rendered work, labor, and
services and furnished material upon certain premises under an agree
ment with the defendant, who testiﬁed that he had informed the plain
tiff that he was not the owner, but the attorney for the owner, of the
Inasmuch as the defendant did not disclose the name of
premises.
his principal, his contention against personal liability was ineffectual.
Argersinger v. MacNaughton, 114 N. Y. 535, 21 N. E. 1022, 11 Am.
St. Rep. 687; Nelson v. Andrews, 19 Misc. Rep. 623, 44 N. Y. Supp.
384.“
Judgment

-

affirmed, with costs.

HOLT

All

v.

concur.

ROSS.“

,-(Commission of Appeals of the State of New York, 1873.
Rep. 615, amrming 59 Barb. 554.)

54

N. Y.

472, 13 Am.

Action to recover back the amount paid by plaintiff to the Mer
chants’ Union Express Company of which Ross was president, upon a
draft upon a forged indorsement by the payee. The draft was drawn
upon Holt by a creditor and was payable to one T. D. Ford. It fell
into the hands of a stranger, who forged the indorsement of T. D.
Ford, and the draft so indorsed was cashed by the Express Company.
Plaintiff, supposing the indorsement genuine, paid the Express Com
pany, and afterwards was compelled to pay a second time to the credi
The Express Company claimed to have acted merely as agent
tor.
in the collection.
Hornn v. Hughes (D. C.) 129 Fed. 248 (1903), aﬂirmed 129 Fed.
64 C. O. A. 581 (1904); Wlnsor v. Griggs, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 210 (1849).
Neely v. State. 60 Ark. 66, 28 S. W. 800. 27 L. R. A. 503, 46 Am. St. Rep.
148 (1894). in which a minor bought whisky “for two sick teachers."
The
15 Accord:

1005.

court held this a sale to the minor, and therefore illegal.
19 Approved in McClure v. Cent. Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, 58 N. E. 777, 53
L. R. A. 153 (1900), but cl’. Alexander 8: Edgar Lumber O0. v. McGeehan. 12/1
See, also, Forrest V. McCarthy, 30 Misc. Rep.
Vvis. 325, 102 N. W. 571 (1905).
125, 61 N. Y. Supp. 853 (1899), in which the plaintiffs testimony clearly show
ed she consciously dealt with defendant as the representative of his princi
pal, and that she had had previous dealings ot the same sort. Worthington
v. Cowlcs, 112 Mass. 30 (1873).
The tact that one is a factor or broker would not relieve him from the
necessity of disclosing his principal, if he would escape personal liability.
Hamlin v. Abel]. 120 Mo. 188. 25 S. W. 516 (1894); Argersinger v. MacNaugh
ton, 114 N. Y. 535, 21 N. E. 1022, 11 Am. St. Rep. 687 (1889).
And the same
Meyer v. Redmond, 141 App. Div. 123, 125
thing is true of an auctioneer.
N. Y.‘ Supp. 1052 (1910); Mills v. I-limt, 20 Wend. 431 (1838).
Cf. next case
over
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EARL, C. The Express Company, when it presented the draft to
the plaintiffs for payment and received payment, did not disclose its
agency; therefore it is liable, as if actually principal in the transac
tion. It was so decided in Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill, 287.
It was not sufficient that the defendant acted as agent; to shield itself
from liability it should have disclosed its agency. Such is the- rule as
to all agents.‘ To shield themselves from liability for their acts they
must give the names of their principals.
Such is the rule in reference
to the transfer of negotiable paper.
If the transferrer be only an
agent, if he did not at the time disclose the name of his principal, and
the bill or note proves to be a forgery, he is personally liable for the
consideration received. Gurney v. Wormsley, 4 Ell. & B. 133; Mor
rison v. Currie, 4 Duer, 79; 2 Pars. Notes,’ 38.
It matters_not that the general business of the express company was
to act as agent for others. It could have owned this draft and have
collected it as principal.
Knowledge in plaintiffs that defendant might
have acted as agent was not enough; and it was not the duty of the
plaintiffs to inquire, before paying, whether the defendant was acting
as principal or agent.
It was the duty of defendant, if it desired to
be protected as agent, to have given notice of its agency.
The drawees
of a draft are supposed to know the signature of the drawer, but are
not supposed to have the same knowledge of the signature of an in
By acceptance and payment the drawees do not admit or
dorser.
Canal
guarantee the genuineness of the indorsement by the payee.
Bank v. Bank of Albany, supra; 1 Pars. Notes, 322; Id. 590.
This is therefore a clear case for aiﬁrmance."

MERCER
(Supreme

001111; Of

Michigan,

v.

1905.

LEIHY.
139

Mich.

_
447,

102

N. W. 972.)

,

"
Assumpsit by Mercer against Leihy.
_
HOOKER,
Coombs stole some horses. and brought them to
defendants’ auction rooms, where they were sold at auction to the
plaintiﬁ‘,-who
afterward sued the auctioneers to recover the money
paid, and a judgment of no cause of action was rendered by the cir
cuit judge before whom the case was tried without a jury. Plaintiff
appealed, and alleges error upon the ﬁnding of fact that the auctioneer
sufficiently disclosed his principal to relieve the defendants, his em

j.“

*
*
*
ployers, from liability.
_
The rule is well established that an auctioneer who does not dis
close his principal is presumed to contract upon his own behalf, ex
that he
cept where he expressly contracts upon the understanding
will not do so. On the other hand, if he discloses the fact of agency
20

The dlssonting opinion of Reynolds,
of the opinion is omitted.

0., is omitted.

,

21 Part

__

___

é
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and his principal, the law presumes that he does not contract upon
his own behalf, but for the principal.
The question here seems to
be whether anything less than a disclosure of the n'ame of the prin
cipal is sufﬁcient, and a number of authorities are cited which use
language to the effect that a disclosure of the name of the principal
is essential. Many of these are cases where there is nothing to indi
cate that there was an agency; others that the principal was not pres
ent, and no clue to his identity could be found in the facts stated; while
there are others which show that there was an absent principal, yet
the language used makes such indeﬁnite reference to him as not to
afford an opportunity to immediately ascertain who he is.
Such is the case of Neely v. State, an Arkansas case reported in
60 Ark. 66, 28 S; W. 800, 27 L. R. A. 503, 46 Am. St. Rep. 148, where
a minor bought intoxicating liquor, which he said was for two teachers
at a neighboring college, without naming or otherwise identifying them.
Raymond v. Proprietors of Crown & Eagle Mills, 2 Metc. (Mass.)
where the court held that it was not error to submit
319, is another
case
the question of the suﬁiciency of the disclosure to the jury, where an
agent stated that goods which he was buying were for the C. & E.
Mills, the language being ambiguous. So in Cobbv. Knapp, 71 N. Y.
350, 27 Am. Re‘p. 51, the statement that the property was for the Bliss
In each of these cases except
'ville Distillery was held not conclusive.
the ﬁrst there is an implication that the facts shown might be found
suﬂicient, otherwise they should not have gone to the jury. They were
not so strong in favor of the agent as the case before us, because the op
portunity to ascertain was not immediately present; and in the case
last mentioned there was testimony not only that the plaintiff did not
know who were the proprietors of the distillery, but that the defendant
directed the property to be charged to him.
In Hanson v. Roberdean, Peake, N. P. 163, it is indicated, as it is
in many later authorities, that, where the auctioneer fully discloses
the fact of his agency and his principal, the presumption arises that
he is not contracting upon his own behalf, and that the law recog
nizes the transaction as one on behalf of the principal.
In 2 Kent,
Com. 630, 631, it is said-: “If a person would excuse himself from re
sponsibility on the ground of agency, he must show that he disclosed
his principal (not the name of his principal) at the time of making
the contract, and that he acted on his behalf.”
Other authorities quoted
from text-writers and other sources are found in Neely v. State, 60
Ark. 66, 28 S. \V. 800, 27 L. R. A. 504, 46 Am. St. Riep. 148. See.
also, Reinhardt on Agency, § 303.
We are of the o'pinion that the statement, frequently found, that
the agent, to avoid personal liability, must disclose the name of his
principal, is due to the fact that such is, in the nature of things, the
natural and ordinary, and many times the only convenient and practica
ble, way of identifying him. The important information to be given
to the purchaser is that the auctioneer is an agent, acting for a prin
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cipal whom he discloses, and it would seem that the accurate giving
name is not indispensable where other means of clear
ly pointing out and identifying him are adopted.
The testimony in this case indis'putably shows that the principal
was present, and in the presence of the plaintiﬁ" identiﬁed himself to
a degree suﬁicient to carry that question to a jury, or to the court,
where, as in this case, a jury has been waived.
It is equally certain
that the auctioneer disclosed the fact of agency, and it is inferable
that he designed to and did inform those present that he.was not
selling the ~property as his own, but for and on behalf of a man who
came from Ypsilanti, was present, and upon whom he called to appear
and make himself known.” \-Ve are of the opinion that the court did
not err in treating the question as one of fact, subject to decision by
him. Of course, we cannot review his ﬁnding upon the merits.
The judgment is afﬁrmed. '

of his principal’s

CARY
(Court

it,

PRATT,
‘plies

v.

‘WEBSTER.

of King's Bench,

1721.

1 Strange,

480.)

C. ]. \Vhere money is paid to the servant and he misap
party has his remedy against the master or servant at

the

A

it

is

it

is

it

a

of

if

it

it

a

'

election.
The defendant was
clerk of the South-Sea Company, and took
in the payments on the third subscription; the plaintiﬁ paid him £600.,
and he by mistake never entered
in‘ the book, but however paid
And the Chief Justice ruled, that no action
over to the company.
would lie against him. That
he had not paid
over the plaintiff
would have had his option, either to charge him or the company; as
in the common case
payment to
goldsmith’s servant, who does not
to the account of his master, the party has an election to go
carry
against either: he may charge the servant, because till the money
to his use; or he may pass by the
paid over the servant receives
servant and make his demand upon the master, because the payment to
the servant
made in conﬁdence of the credit given him by the master.

‘I

it

Z2 When the third party knows perfectly well of the agency
is not neo
essary for the agent to disclose it.
Warren V. Dickson, 27 Ill. 115 (1862).
“The agent need not say in so many words,
am acting merely as agent for
A., who is my principal.’ ” Brown v. Ames, 59 Minn. 476, 61 N. W. 448 (1894).
It the third party has the means of ascertaining the principal, and knows
that the agent is acting as agent. see De Remer v. Brown: 165
Y. 410, 59
N. E. 129 (1901): McClure v. Cent. Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, 58 N. E. 777, 53
L. R. A. 153 (1900); Oobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348, 27 Am. Rep. 51 (1877).
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HARRISON."

(Court of King's Bench,

1777,

2 Gowp.

565.)

p

Upon shewing cause why a new trial should not be granted in this
Lord Mansﬁeld read his report as follows:
This was an action for money had and received, brought by the
plaintiff against the defendant, to recover back a sum of £2,100. paid
him as due upon a policy of insurance, as agent for the insured, Messrs.
Ludlow and Shaw, resident at New York.
This sum the plaintiff
had paid, thinking the losspwas fair. Notice of the loss was given by
the defendant to' the plaintiff on the 20th of April. Part of the money
was paid at that time, and the remainder on the 6th of May following;
case,

on which day the defendant ‘passed the whole sum in his account with
Messrs. Ludlow and Shaw, and gave credit to them for it against a
sum of £3,000. in which they stood indebted to him. On the 17th of
May, notice was given by the plaintiff to the defendant that it was a
foul loss. At this time, nothing had happened to alter the situation of
the defendant, or to make it different from what it was on the 20th of
April. He had accepted no fresh bills, advanced no sum of money,
nor given any new credit to his principals; but affairs between them
and him remained precisely in the same situation as-on the 20th of
April. The question at the trial was, whether this action could be main
tained against the defendant. as agent of the insured; which depended
on this; whether the defendant’s having placed this money to the ac
count of his principals, in the manner before stated, was equivalent to
a ‘payment of it over.
In general the principle of law is clear; that if money be mispaid
to an agent expressly for the use of his principal, and the agent has
paid it over, he is not liable in an action by the person who mispaid
it: because it is just, that one man should not be a loser by the mis
take of another; and the person who made the mistake is not without
redress, but has his remedy over against the principal.
On the other
hand it is just, that as the agent ought not to lose, he should not be
And therefore, if after the payment so
a gainer by the mistake.
made to him, and before he has paid the money over to his principal,
the person corrects the mistake; the agent cannot afterwards pay it
over to his principal without making himself liable to the real owner
for the amount. But the present case turns upon this; that the agent
was precisely in the same situation at the time the mistake was dis
covered, as before. At the trial I inclined to think the plaintiff ought
*3 Accord:
Simmonds v. Long. 80 Kan. 155, 101 Pac. 1070. 23 L. R. A. (N.
Contra: Cabot v. Shaw,
S.) 553 (1909); Smith v. Binder, 75 Ill. 492 (1874).
148 Mass. 459, 20 N. E. 99 (1889).
There is no presumption that the agent has
paid the money over to the principal. He must prove it. Law v. Nu|In, 3
Ga. 90 (1847).
He must show that he actually parted with the money, or
something equivalent thereto.
L‘. S. Nat. Bank v. Nut. Park Bank, 59 Hun,
495, 13 N. Y. Supp. 411 (1891), atﬂrmed 129 1\'. Y. (‘A7, 29 .\'. E. 1028 (1891).
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but did not direct the jury; and they found for the de
to recover;
I am satisﬁed I mistook in leaving it open to the jury: For
fendant.
it is clearly a question of law, not a matter of fact: And in conscience
Therefore I should
the defendant is not entitled to retain the money.
have left it to the jury in this manner; if you are satisﬁed that the
money was paid by mistake, and the defendant’s situation not altered
by any new circumstance since, but that every thing remained in the
same state as it was on the 20th of April, you ought to ﬁnd for the
plaintiff.

Mr. Bearcroft and Mr. Davenport, who shewed cause, insisted that
the defendant had a right to retain the money in question.
Mr. \Vallace and Mr. Dunning. were in support of the rule; but
Lord Mansﬁeld, thought the case so clear, that his lordship stopped
Mr. Dunning, as being unnecessary to give himself any trouble.
I am very glad this motion has .been made:
LORD l\’lANSFIELD.
for I desire nothing so much as that all questions of mercantile law
should be fully settled and ascertained; and it is of much more con
The
sequence that they should be so, than which way the decision is.
jury were embarrassed on the question whether this was a payment
over. To many purposes, it would be. It is now argued, that this
If it were, it
is not a mere placing to account, but a making rest.
would not vary the case a straw.
I verily believe the jury were en
tangled in considering it as a payment over. rThere is no imputation
It is
upon a man who trusts to a misrepresentation of the insured.
greatly to his honour; but it makes it of consequence to him to know,
The whole question
how far his remedy goes if he is imposed u'pon.
at the trial was, whether the defendant, who was an agent, had paid
Now, the law is clear, that if an agent pay over
the money over.
which
has
been paid to him by mistake, he does no wrong:
money
must
the
call on the principal.
And in the case of Muil
plaintiff
and
man versus
, where it appeared that the money was paid over.
But, on the other hand, shall a man,
the plaintiff was nonsuited.
though innocent, gain by a mistake, or be in a better situation than
if the mistake had not happened? Certainly not. In this case, there
was no new credit, no acceptance of new bills, no fresh goods bought
or money advanced. In short, no alteration in the situation which
the defendant and his principals stood in towards each other on the
20th of April.
What then is the case? The defendant has trusted
Ludlow and Co. and given them credit. He traﬁicks to the country
where they live, and has agents there who know how to get the money
back.
The plaintiff is a stranger to them and never heard of their
names.
Is it conscientious then, that the defendant should keep money
which he has got by their misrepresentation, and should say, though
there is no alteration in my account with my principal, this is a hit,
I have got the money and I will keep it? If there had been any new
credit given, it would have been proper to have left it to the jury to
say, whether any prejudice had happened to the defendant by means

Ch. 3)

LIABILITY on REPRESENTATIVE

T0 THIRD ransom

605

of this payment: But here no prejudice at all is proved, and none
is to be inferred.
Under these circumstances I think (and Mr. Jus
tice Aston with whom I have talked the matter over is of the same
opinion) that the defendant has no defence in point of law, and in
point of equity and conscience he ought not to retain the money in
’
question.
Mr. Justice WILLES and Mr. Justice Asnnunsr were of the same
opinion.
PER CURIAM. Rule for a new trial absolute.

___-_i.
-

(Supreme
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v.

McLELAN."

Oourt of Judicature or New York,

1828.

1 Wend.

173.)
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SAVAGE, C.
This was an action to recover back money paid by
mistake. The defendant, as attorney for Mrs. Charity Wright, brought
The defendant in those actions vouched to
three actions of dower.
The suits were
warranty the ancestor of the Mowatts, the plaintiffs.
compromised by the payment of $1,000 to the defendant, as the attorney
of Mrs. Wright; on the receipt of which, Mrs. Vi/right executed
re
lease of her dower, and her children released their interest, and the
suits were withdrawn.
The defendant paid over to his client's orders
$800, and retained $200 for his costs and counsel fees, which
found
to be
moderate compensation.
Upon making this payment and set
tlement, the defendant took
receipt in full. Soon after the compro
mise,
conveyance was found from Wright and wife to Col. Burr, ex
ecuted about thirty years previous.
The money was paid by the
plaintiffs the 24th November, 1821, and this suit brought in 1827, to
recover from the defendant the $200 retained by him for his fees.
These facts are found by
special verdict in the court of common
pleas for the city of New York, on which that court gave judgment
for the defendant.
Two questions arise in this case:
Whether Mrs. Wright
liable
to refund the sum of $1000 thus received by her? and
so,
Is the
defendant liable to refund the $200 retained by him for his costs?
As the ﬁrst question
one upon which Mrs. Wright has not been
heard, and as that question, we are informed by counsel, will be dis
cussed in
suit now pending against Mrs. I/Vright,
shall consider
ﬁrst the latter question, assuming for the present argument the lia
bility of Mrs. Wright. In_ Buller v. Harrison,
Cowper, 566, Lord
Mansﬁeld says:
Mansﬁeld's
Lord
statement
of the law, see
[For
ante, p. 604.]

E.

O.

L.

424

(1861).

I

to the third person
to the agent in set
22 Pac. 84 (1889).

0

1

24 Accord:
Holland v. Russell,
Best & S. 424, 101
Payment to the principal relieves the agent of liability
even though afterward the principal returns the money
Bogart v. Crosby, 80 Cal. 195,
tlement. for his services.
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The case of Edwards v. Hodding, 5 Taunt. 815, was an action
against the defendant as agent and auctioneer for the deposit made
by the plaintiff, as purchaser of a freehold estate at auction. The de
fendant had paid over the deposit after notice that the purchaser was
dissatisﬁed with the title, and therefore the payment over did not pro
tect him.
In the case of Cox v. Prentice, 3‘Maule & Sel. 345, the
defendant, as ‘agent of his correspondent at Gibraltar, had sold the
plaintiffs a bar of silver, for which they paid more than the value,
from the mistake of the assay-master. Upon discovering the mistake,
the plaintiffs applied to the defendant for a return of the money, of
The defendant refused, on the ground
fering to return the silver.
that he had forwarded his account to his correspondent, in which he
had credited him with the full sum; it appeared, however, that the
account was still unsettled between them.
Lord Ellenborough states
the principle of the agent's liability where there is no change of cir
cumstances, and says, here it is admitted that no money has been paid
over by the defendant to his principal, nor has there been any other
He then,ar
thing done by him to create a change of circumstances.
the
the
of
the
case upon
gues
liability
principal.
Bayley, justice,
speaking of the case of Buller v. Harrison, says, “That case decides,
that if things remain in the same state as they did here, the action
will lie against the agent.” The same point has been so decided in
this court.
Hearsey v. Pruyn, 7 ]ohns. 182, and 7 Cowen, 460, La
In the latter case, Kneeland had received money
Farge v. Kneeland.
for Braham and Atwood, which the plaintiff was entitled to recover
from them; but the defendant had passed it to the credit of his prin
cipals, and that credit was passed to the credit of another account.
This we considered equivalentto a payment. It closed the account
between the agent and his principals, and therefore we held the agent
In this respect, that case differed from the cases of
was discharged.
In both these cases'the ac
Buller v. Harrison and Cox v. Prentice.
count remained open; no change of circumstances had taken place;
an erroneous credit had been given, which might be balanced by a
corresponding charge on the debit side of the account; no settlement
had taken place, nor any closing of the accounts between the parties.
In the case now under consideration, the money was honestly and
fairly received by the defendant as agent for his client, who, we now
'
The defendant disposed of the whole
assume, ought to pay it back.
to
the
of it according
directions of his client, paid her $500, paid
$300 to one Elias Baldwin, retained $200 to himself, and ﬁnally set
tled his accounts and concerns with his principal, by taking a receipt
in full. The $200 never passed out of his hands: and it seems to
be conceded, that if he had paid the whole sum to Mrs. Wright, and
she had paid him back $200 in other money,‘ this action could not
And is it possible that the rights of paities in this court
be sustained.
depend upon idle and unmeaning ceremonies? If the transaction was
what it purports, it was in reality a payment by the defendant to his

~

—

~~
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client, of the money in his hands, which he had received as her agent,
This closed the ac
and payment by her to her attorney of his costs.
count between them.
It is not toibe corrected by a charge in an open
account.
There is no foreign correspondent either,in America or at
Gibraltar, as in the cases above cited, of Buller v. Harrison and Cox
v. Prentice.
the plaintiffs recover here, the defendant must resort
to his action to recover his money.
This the plaintiffs can also do,
and indeed have done. And here, too, it is alleged, if the defendant
should be driven to his action against his client, his remedy is gone by
lapse of time. The plaintiffs do not sue till the statute of limitations
is closing upon them; and already more than six years have elapsed
since the settlement between the defendant and his client.
I am of opinion that the defendant is not liable, and that the judg
ment of the court below be affirmed.

If

ii

BURROUGH
_

(Court

of King’s Bench,

v.

SKINNER."

1770.

5

Burrow,

2639.)

it

it

it,

'The defendant was an auctioneer; and, in that character, had sold
\
to the plaintiff an interest in land. for which the plaintiff had paid him
a deposit of £50. but, upon an objection to the title, and the want of
disclosure of certain circumstances which ought to have been disclosed
at the time of the bidding, the plaintiff (the purchaser) declined going
'
and, in the opinion of the court, she had suffi
on with the contract:
cient reason for so doing.
She therefore required the auctioneer to
pay her back his deposit of £50. The auctioneer refused. VVhereupon,
the bidder brought this action against him, to recover it. The auc
tioneer paid £8. into court. The cause was tried: and the plaintiff ob
The auctioneer moved for a new trial; and had a
tained a verdict.
rule to shew cause..
But, upon shewing cause,
The Counr were clear, that the action lay against the auctioneer.
The money does not appear to have been paid over by him to his prin
cipal. But if it had been so, yet the objection appears to have been
He
made before it either was or ought to havebeen so paid over.
was a stake-holder, a mere depositary of the _i50. and ought not to
till such time as the sale should be ﬁnished and
have parted with
should appear in the event to whom
completed, and
properly be
lon2‘ed.

They also thought that-the auctioneer had acknowledged himself to
be liable to the

action. by paying money into court.
_
the rule ‘for shewing cause

J.

$5 Approved in Read v. Riddle. 48 N.
Law. 359,
v. Allen, 125 Mo. App. 636. 103 S. W. 138 (1907).

tin

7

a

They therefore unanimously discharged
why there should not be new trial.

Atl.

487

(1886);

Mar

\

1
1
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LADY WINDSOR’S CASE."

(Oourt of King's Bench, 1766.

4

Burrow,

1984.)

A motion having been made, on behalf of the plaintiff, to set aside a
non-suit—
On the last day of Easter Term last (1766), Mr. ]ustice Aston re
ported from Mr. Baron Perrot who tried the cause, That this was an
action for money had and received to the plaintiff’s" use; and that the
counsel for the plaintiff, who opened the cause at the trial, stated the
action to be brought with intention to try the right of Lady Windsor
to a quitrent of one shilling, and to another sum of six—pence for mises.
They stated, that the defendant was her receiver; and demanded them
of the plaintiff, as such. That the plaintiff paid the 1s. 6d. to the de
fendant; and took a receipt for them, by which, the defendant ac
knowledged to have received them for the use of Lady VVindsor.
That, in fact, these sums were not due to Lady Windsor; and that they
and conse
were therefore received without any good consideration;
quently, that this action well lay against the defendant into whose hands
they were paid. And they were prepared with, and would have called
evidence to the right.
But the judge (Mr. Baron Perrot) was of opinion, that under these
circumstances, the action did not lie against the defendant. That noth
ing could be more absurd than to make the collector or receiver of an
other person liable to an action for every payment that was voluntarily
made to him ; and to leave him to be defended, or deserted, by his prin
cipal, as such principal should think ﬁt. That it was (in his opinion)
yet still more absurd, as he did not see how a verdict given in this
cause could ever be received in evidence for or against the right which
might in a future cause come to be tried. That if this action lay in
such a case as this, it would lie against every attorney who, by his
client’s direction, should demand and receive money as due to his
client, -which the supposed debtor might 'z/oluntarily pay, and after
He thought that if the one shilling and
wards think ﬁt to dispute.
six-pence had been paid over to Lady Vi/indsor, the plaintiff might
26 Approved by Lord Kenyon, C. J., in Greenway v. Hurd, 4 T. R. 553 (1792).
In such cases the moment the money is in the agent's hands it is virtuallv in
Coleridge, .'I., in Bamford v. Shuttleworth,
the p1'in('ipn1'S hands.
11 Ad &
El. 926, 39 E. C. L. 488 (1840). There is no privity between the agent and
any
ﬁduciary
the third person, nor
relation.
Ellis v. Goulton, [1893] 1 Q. B.
The right of the principal cannot be tried in an action against the
350.
agent.
Shipherd v. Underwood, 55 Ill. 475 (1870).
The cause of action, if
any, is against the principal. Bailey v. Cornell, 66 Mich. 107, 33 N. W. 50
The contract is that of the principal, and not of the agent. Huffman
(1887).
v. Newnan, 55 Neb. 713, 76 N. W. 409 (1898). _
See especially the leading case of Colvin v. Holbrook,
2 N. Y. 126 (1847),
approved and followed in Fisher v. Meeker, 118 App. Div. 901, 103 N. Y.
Supp. 261 (1907), and Costigun v. Newland, 12 Barb. 456 (1852).
Where the principal has no right to the money, and could not recover it
from the agent, sec Winningham v. Fancher, 52 Mo. App. 458 (1893).
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easily prove it: and if it was not paid over, yet the payment to her re
ceiver was payment to her; and therefore the action ought to have
been brought against her.
THE COURT, on Thursday 12th June last, were unanimous, that upon
the facts stated in the report, the plaintiff ought not to recover against
the defendant, in this action; and that the action ought to have been
brought against Lady VVindsor herself, and not against her agent:
and therefore they discharged the rule for setting aside the iion-suit.
They thought, the principles upon which actions for money had and
received to the plaintiff's use are founded, did not apply to the cir
cumstances of the present case.
It is a liberal action founded upon
large principles of equity, where the defendant can not cons’cientiously
hold the money. The defence is any equity that will rebut the action.
This money was paid to the known agent of Lady W. He is liable
to her for it; whether he has actually paid it over to her, or not: he
received it for her. And Lord Mansﬁeld expresseda dissent to the
case of Jacob versus Allen, in 1 Salk. 27, and his approbation of Pond
versus Underwood, in 2 Ld. Raym. 1210, 1211, which is contrary to it.
He said, he kept clear of all payments to third persons, but where 'tis
to a known agent:
in which case, the action ought to be brought
against the principal, unless in special cases, (as under notice. or mala
ﬁde.) But they were unanimous, both upon principles and authorities,
that where a judge at nisi prius non-suits the plaintiff, and is mistaken;
the Court, upon motion, may set aside the non-suit.
Rule discharged.

ii

MOORE
(Supreme

v.

SHIELDS.

Court of Judicature of Indiana,

1889.

121

Ind.

~Pl

267.

23 N.

E.

89.)

Suit to recover aisum of money paid to defendant for a township
warrant or note, issued in violation of his official dutv, and without
any consideration, by a township trustee. Iudgment fof
MITCHELL, C. J." * * * There was evidence tending to prove
that the appellants were paid a comparatively large sum for negotiat

ing the township warrant in question. which was absolutely worthless.
They urged the plaintiff below to purchase, and recommended the
There was evidence tending
paper as good, within their knowledge.
to show that they knew the paper was irregularly issued, without any
consideration whatever; in short, that it was fraudulently issued. Un
der these circumstances they received the plaintiff’s money: the latter
paying it over to them in reliance upon the declaration made by them,
that they had purchased a number of similar warrants as an invest
ment, and that they regarded them as good as county or government
bonds. It is said that the appellants were merely agents or brokers to
27

Part of the opinion is omitted.
Goi)n.Pii.& A.(2i> Ei>.)—39
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sell the warrant; and that they are hence not liable, after. having paid
The conclusion does not follow.
over the money to their principal.
"Even an auctioneer or broker who sells property for one who has
no title, and pays over to his principal the proceeds, with no knowledge
of the defect of title or want of authority, is held liable for its con
version to the real owner.”
Hills v. Snell, 104 Mass. 173; Alexander
v. Swackhamer, 105 Ind. 81—86, 4 N. E. 433, 5 N. E. 908, 55 Am.
Rep. 180, and cases cited,
Much more is a broker liable who sells and obtains money for worth
less paper, which he knows has been fraudulently issued, in violation
of law, even though he may have paid the money over to his principal.
Where one person receives the money of another under such circum
stances, that, in equity,—in good conscience,——he ought not to retain
or otherwise dispose of
to the person from whom
except to return
was received, an action for money had and received will lie to re
_
cover
back. McFadden v. Wilson, 96 Ind. 253.
In an action for money had and received, there need be no privity
of contract proved, other than such as arises out of the fact that the de
fendant has received the plaintiff's money under circumstances which
make
against conscience that he should retain it. VValker v. Conant,
65 Mich. 194, 31 N. VV. 786: People v. Speir, 77 N. Y. 144;
Amer.
Eng. Cyclop. Law, 860. “If one man has obtained money from_an~
other through the medium of oppression, imposition, or deceit, such
in contemplation of law, received for the use of the injured
money
In such a case the law implies
promise on the part of him
party.”
who
in the wrong to,return the money to the lawful owner.
Mc
Wait, Act.
Ind. 413;
Def. 469-471."
Queen v. Bank,
The application of the principles above stated justify’ the judgment.
affirmed, with costs.
We have found no error. The judgment

3

it

4

1

28 Townson v. Wilson,
Campb. 396 (1808). Der Lord Ellenborough; Larkin
v. Hangood, 56 Vt. 597 (1884); Wallis v. Shelly (C. C.) 30 Fed. 747 (1887):
Bocchino v. Oook, 67 N. J. Law, 467. 51 Atl. 487 (1902); Frye v. Lockwood.
appeared that the principal was really conducting
Cow. 454 (1825), in which
the defense, though‘ the action was against the agent. See. also, O’Conner r.
Clopton, 60 Miss. 349 (1882), in which the agent was sued for usurious interest.
The agent is also liable when he receives the money without authority. and
the principal refuses to enter into the contract.
Simmonds v. Long, 80 Kan.
155. 101 Pac. 1070. 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 553 (1909): U. S. v. Pinover (D. C.)
Fed. 305 (1880), in which the agent received money in. good faith. but on a
forged indorsement.
When an act of bankruptcy has been committed by the
principal before the agent pays over money to him the agent will be liable
for the money. Ex parte Edwards, 13 Q. B. D. 747 (1884). Even if the agent
acts in good faith, he will be liable it his principal had no right to the money,
as where the principal intended to obtain representation to her deceased hus
band, and the agent received several debts and paid them over to her. When
the widow failed of appointment as legal representative. the agent was held
liable for the amounts. Sharland v. Mildon,
In these
Iflare, 469 (1846).
cases the third person may elect which to hold, the principal or the agent,
but an election to hold one is inconsistent with an intent to hold the other.
Eufaula Grocery O0. v. Mo. Nat. Bank, 118
The remedies are not concurrent.
Ala. 408, 24 South. 389 (1898).
Gonn.Pa.& A.(2o En.)
5
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CRONK.
of Justice.

[1895]

1 Q.

B. Div.

Judd & Co., being ﬁnancially embarrassed, put their business into
of trustees, by whom Cronk was appointed receiver. Owen
& Co. had printing done by Judd & Co., and were presented by the

the hands

manager with a bill which they claimed to be extortionate, but he re
fused to return to them the special blocks and type furnished by them
until they paid. Under this “duress of goods,”_ of which Cronk had
no knowledge, they gave the manager a check, which Cronk indorsed
and paid into his receivership account. Action to recover the excess
’

charges.
LOPES, L. J. The case is not a difficult one to decide when once
the facts are ascertained.
It is said that the defendant was a receiver,
not a mere servant. Upon the facts, it appears to me that he was an
agent, not a principal, and in my opinion the learned judge has come
to a right conclusion.
The next question is, Had the defendant any
knowledge that the money had been improperly obtained from the
plaintiﬂs? In my opinion, there is no evidence that, at the time when
the check was paid to Macintosh, the defendant knew anything of the
circumstances under which the payment was made.
The next ques
tion is, Did the defendant pay over the cheque to his principals before
he had any notice that it had been wrongly obtained from the plain
tiﬁs? The learned judge has come to the c0nclusion—and I think
rightly—that he did. I think the law is clearly settled that if an agent
has received for his principal money the payment of which has been
wrongfully obtained, and he pays it over to the principal before he has
any notice of the wrong, he is protected from any liability to the per
son who paid the money. But if, on the other hand, the agent, with
notice of the wrong, pays the money to his principal, he will neverthe
less be personally liable to the person who made the payment. Here
the defendant, being an agent, paid the cheque to the account of his
principals before he had had any notice that it had been improperly
He has complied with the requirements
obtained from the plaintiffs.
of the law, and, therefore, the action cannot be maintained against
him, and the decision of the learned judge was right.”
Appeal dismissed.
29 The opinions

J.

of Esher, M. B., and Rigby, L. J., are omitted.

Hauenstein

Law, 98, 62 Atl. 184 (1905): McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89
v. Ruh, 73 N.
(1853), in which the agent was paid a judgment to save the third person from

a levy in execution. and the judgment was afterward set aside.
The case
contains a discriminating discussion of what will and what will not protect
the agent.
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WILLIAMS

v.

EVERETT.

(Court of the King's Bench, 1811.

14 East,

(Part

3

1

'

582.)

ELLENBOROFGH, C. ].,“° delivered the judgment of the Court.
a case argued in this court, in the last Hilary and Easter
terms, on a motion to set aside a nonsuit, which took place at a trial
before me at the sittings at Guildhall after last Michaelmas term. The
action was for money had and received, brought by the plaintiff to re
cover £300.. being part of the amount of a bill of £1126. 2s., remitted
by one james Kelly from the Cape of Good Hope to the defendant's
house, in a letter dated Cape Town, 8th ]uly, 1809: in which Kelly
says, “I remit you by the \-Varley £1126. 25., which I particularly re
quest you will order to be paid to the following persons, who will pro
duce their letters of advice from me on the subject,” etc.
Amongst
the persons, he names the plaintiff VVilliams (wine merchant, Grace
church street), for £300. And he afterwards made another remittance
“I desire the
for £500. on the same terms. And then he adds:
amounts paid each person to be put on the back of their respective
bills,” etc. “and that every bill paid oﬁ‘ be cancelled.”
Nl/illiams by
his attorney, long before the bills became due, gave the defendant
Everett notice of a letter he had received from Kelly, ordering his debt
of £300. to be paid out of that remittance, and offered him an indemni
ty of a banking house if he would hand over the bill to him; but Ever
ett refused to indorse the bill away, or to act upon the letter; admit
ting, however, that he had received the letter directing the application
of the money in the manner already stated. The question at the trial
was, whether the plaintiﬂ” was entitled to receive from the defendants
the amount of hisdemand on Kelly for £300. out of the bill for £1126.
2s. which was admitted to have been received by the defendants when
*
* * The question which has been argued before
it became due.
us is, whether the defendants, by receiving this bill, did not accede to
the purposes for which it was professedly remitted to them by Kelly,
and bind themselves so to apply it; and whether, therefore, the amount
of such bill paid to them when due did not instantly become by opera
tion of law money had and received to the use of the several persons
mentioned in Kelly’s letter as the creditors in satisfaction of whose
bills it was to be applied, and of course, as to £300. of
money had
and received to the use of the plaintiff.
will be observed, that there
no assent on the part of the defendants to hold this money for the
purposes mentioned in the letter; but, on the contrary, an express re
fusal to the creditor so to do. If, in order to constitute
privity be
tween the plaintiﬂ’ and defendants as to the subject of this demand, an
L012»

a
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it,
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Part of the opinion is omitted.

\

a

Ch. 3)

LIABILITY or REPRESENTATXVE

TO

ramp

PERSON

613

assent express or implied be necessary, the assent can in this case Le
only an implied one, and that too implied against the express dissent
of the parties to be charged. By the act of receiving the bill, the de
fendants agree to hold it till paid, and its contents, when paid, for the
use of the ‘remitter.
It is entire to the remitter to give, and counter
mand, his own directions respecting the bill as often as he pleases, and
the persons to whom the bill is remitted may still hold the bill till re
ceived, and its amount when received, for the use of the remitter him
self, until by some engagement entered into by themselves
with the
person who is the object of the remittance, they have precluded them
selves from so doing, and have appropriated the remittance to the use
of such person. After such a circumstance, they cannot retract the
consent they may have once given, but are bound to hold it for the
If it be money had and received for the use
use of the appointee.
of the plaintiﬁ’ under the orders which accompanied the remittance,
it occurs as ﬁt to be asked, when did it become so? It could not be
so before the money was received on the bill becoming due: and at
that instant,‘ suppose the defendants had been robbed of the cash or
notes in which the bill in question had been paid, or they had been
burnt or lost by accident, who would have borne the loss thus occa
sioned? Surely the remitter Kelly, and not the plaintiff and his other
creditors. in whose favour he had directed the application of the
This ap
money according to their several proportions to be made.
to
for
in
all
cases
of
to
us
the
question:
speciﬁc
property
decide
pears
lost in the hands of an agent, where the agent is not himself respon
sible for the cause of the loss. the liability to bear the loss is the test
and consequence of being the proprietor, as the principal of such agent.
The case of De Bernales v. Fuller and Co., which has been urged in
argument on the part of the plaintiff, is clearly distinguishable‘from
the present by this circumstance, that the defendants in that case, i. e.
Fuller and Co., had antecedently received the bill, which was to be
paid at their house, from Newnham and Co-., the bankers of the.plain
tiff De Bernales, the holder, for the very purpose of receiving payment
for them, the Newnhams, of such bill: and having taken the bill for
this purpose, the Court thought that Fuller and Co. could not by them
selves or their clerk renounce this purpose, but must apply the money,
brought by Fuller's clerk speciﬁcally for the discharge of that bill then
lying at their house, to that very purpose and no other; and that they
were in effect to be regarded in that case as the plaintiff De Bernales’
agents, through the intervention of Newnham’s house, for the purpose
of that receipt, and .c0uld therefore hold and apply it to no other.
Here no agency for the plaintiff ever commenced, but was repudiated
by the defendants in the ﬁrst instance. \Ve are of opinion, therefore,
that upon no principle of law can the defendants be said to stand in
such privity in respect to the plaintiff, as that the £300. claimed by this
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action can be said to have been money had and received to the plain

tiif’s use: of course, therefore, the nonsuit must stand, and the rule
for setting it aside be discharged.“
is much confusion in the cases. In Hall v. Marston. 17 Mass. 575
is laid down as settled law that “if A. promises B. for a valuable
consideration to pay C., the latter may maintain assumpsit for the money.”
The court, perhaps properly, distinguishes the ease from Williams v. Everett,
supra, on the ground that in that case there was no promise to pay, but a
positive refusal of the agent to act. This was approved in Lawrence v. Fox.
20 N. Y. 268 (1859) (vigorous dissenting opinion by Comstock, J.), the court
holding that “the law operating on the act of the parties creates the duty,
establishes a privity, and implies the promise and obligation on which the
action is founded."
The application of the doctrine was strictly limited in
New York. Barlow v. Myers, 64 N. Y. 43, 21 Am. Rep. 582 (1876), with review
of cases; Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296 (1884), in which the promise was not
made to pay any deﬁnite parties, but only indeﬁnite creditors; and it may
be doubted if it applied to an agent receiving-,money from his principal for
a third person, but making no undertaking
to pay according to directions:
Seaman v. Whitney, 24 Wend. 260, 35 Am. Dec. 618 (1840), not disproved in
the later cases. See, also, Meyer v. Stitz, 9 N. Y. Supp. 805 (1890); Burton
v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246, 13 Pac. 398, 59 Am. Rep. 541 (1887).
In Massachusetts
the same limitations are to be noted, and it is ditiicult to reconcile later cases
Marston,
supra.
with Hall v.
Borden v. Boardman, 157 Mass. 410, 32 N. E.
469 (1892).
See also the early cases of Denny v. Lincoln, 5 Mass. 385 (1809),
and Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 272, 6 Am. Dec. 66 (1812).
In Maine the doctrine of Hall v. Marston, supra, has been given a very
Keene v. Sage, 75 Me. 138 (1883), which the New Jersey
broad application.
court has declined to follow; Nolan v. Manton, 46 N. J. Law, 231, 50 Am.
Rep. 403 (1884), following the earlier case of Sergeant v. Stryker, 16 N. J.
In the case of money received by the
Law. 464, 32 Am. Dec. 404 (1837).
agent from his principal for a third person it would seem that his duty is
to his principal alone. Colvin v. Holbrook, 2 N. Y. 126 (1848); Hall v. Lau
derdale, 46 N. Y. 70 (1871), until the agent promises to pay the third person,
Goodwin v. Bowden, 54 Me. 424 (1867), or enters into some engagement with
the third person to pay it over, Stevens v. Hill, 5 Esp. 247 (1805), Der Lord
Ellenborough,
Tiernan v. Jackson, 5 Pet 580, 599, 8 L. Ed. 234 (1831).
Un
til the agent has done some act recognizing the appropriation of the money
to the particular purposes speciﬁed, the money is at the risk of the principal
Tiernan v. Jackson. supra; Malcolm v. Scott, 5
and subject to his recall.
Exch. 601 (1850).
$1 There

(1822),

it

\
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SECTION 2.—IN TORT

BULKELEY
(Court of Exchequer,

The bill stated, that

v.

_

DUNBAR.”

1792.

1 Anstruthers,

37.)

Valentine, the agent in London for the
plaintiffs (merchants at Lincoln), having received bills from them,
to be by him indorsed on their account as required, was, by menaces,
compelled to endorse them to the defendants for a debt of his own.
The bill prayed a discovery of these matters, and that the notes might
be delivered up. The defendant, Dunbar, in his answer said, that he
had only acted as agent for the defendant Duff, and disclaimed having
anything in the notes; and therefore insisted on being struck out as a
party; and only examined as a witness. Exceptions to this, answer
were taken, and allowed.
By the COURT. When an agent commits a fraud, he is answerable
as principal, to the person injured, who is not to be sent round to seek
the party beneﬁted by the fraud.
If the money or notes had been
received bona ﬁde by the agent, and he had paid it over before action
brought, that would have been a good defense; but here there is a
direct charge of fraud, which must be answered. And this is not such
a criminal charge as will screen him from the discovery sought.
one

GARRETT

v.

(Supreme Court of‘ Washington,

SPARKS BROS.
1911.

61 Wash.

397, 112 Pac.

501.)

GosE, I. This is a suit to recover money alleged to have been ob
There
tained from the plaintiff through the fraud of the defendant.
was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
The defendant has ap
aled.
peThere is abundant evidence to support the judgment.
The testi
mony of the respondent shows that the appellant was acting as agent
for the Plantations Company for the sale of certain tracts of orchard
land; that the appellant represented to the respondent that the Plan
divided
tations Company owned a piece of land called “Plantations,”
into small tracts, free and clear of all incumbrances ; that the respond
ent, believing and relying upon the representations, paid the appellant
$1,000 on the purchase price of one of the tracts; that the representa
tions were false, and that the Plantations Company, as the appellant
32 Accord:
Campbell v. Hillman, 15 B. Mon. 508,
V. Bell, 120 Iowa, 618, 95 N. W. 170 (1903).

Riley

61 Am.

Dec. 195 (1854);

J
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well knew, did not own the land, but that it had only a contract of
purchase, which it later forfeited.
The appellant argues that the only issue is “the responsibility of
an agent to answer to a third person for the default of a disclosed
On the contrary, the issue is the liability of the appellant
principal."
to answer for its own fraud.
The appellant cites in support of its
contention Wilson v. V)/old, Z1 \Vash. 398, 58 Pac. 223, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 846; Nelson v. Title Trust Company, 52 \-Vash. 258, 100 Pac.
730, and Davis v. Lee, 52 Vl/ash. 330, 1OO Pac. 752, 132 Am. St. Rep.
973.
It is fundamental
They have no application to the present issue.
that a party, whether acting for himself or another, is liable in dam
The fact that the principal is also liable does
ages for his own fraud.
not relieve from responsibility the party who actually commits the
In‘ such cases, the liability of the principal can only rest upon
wrong.
the delict of its agent.
The party who has been wronged may elect to
’
.
sue either or both."
The judgment is afﬁrmed.

PEOPLE
(Supreme Court of Michigan,

v.

1894.

RICE.“
103 Mich.

350. 61 N.

W.

540.)

Rice was keeper of
Conviction for violation of local option law.
place where the sales were made and defendant Berry was his
'
bartender.
GRANT, J. [Omitting discussion of objections to certain charges.
as to which the majority of the court held against Grant, ]. :]
4. It is insisted that the court erred in not directing an acquittal of
the defendant Berry, the bartender, upon the ground that he was not
a keeper.
The charge in the information is that the respondents kept
a saloon where liquors of the prohibited kind were sold and furnished
Accessories in misdemeanors are unknown to the com
as a beverage.
mon 1a\v.
All who participate in the commission of the offense must
however, sought to limit this rule to
be charged as principals.
It
In Massa
acts which are malum in se and not malum prohibitum.
liable
held that the clerk or bartender
he acts in the
chusetts

if

is

is

it

is,

the

9

I.

a

a

33 Where intent is necessary, as in malicious prosecution or fraud, the agent
He will then be
principal. for in torts all are
must share the wrongdoing.
wrongdoer-s. and the rule of principal and aeent does not exist.
Carraher v.
Allen, 112 Iowa. 168, S3 N. W, 902 (1900); Weber v. Weber, 47 Mich. 569, 11
N. W. 389 (1882); Gutchess v. Whitney, 46 Barb. 139 (1866); Hecker v. De
Grott. 15 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 314 (1857). distinguishing between an agent as an
unconscious instrument and a knowing participant in
fraud: Wimple v.
Patterson (Tex. Civ. App.) 117 S. W. 1034 (1909). excusing the agent when he
honestly believes the representations made by him.
_
34The opinion of McGrath, C. J., is omitted.
Ct. Com. v. Egglestom 12$
539,
Mas. 408 (1880), State v. Marchant, 15 R.
Atl. 902' (1887), and State
v. Bughee, 22 Vt. 32 (18-1-9), where the servant received no compensation.
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absence of the principal, and is in charge of the place, but not when
Com. v. Churchill, 136 Mass. 148;
acting in his immediate presence.
Com. v. Galligan, 144 Mass. 171, 10 N. E. 788. In the latter case the
court say:
“The defendants could be jointly found guilty only by
proof that they jointly kept or maintained the nuisance charged. If
one was sole proprietor, and the other only kept or maintained the
nuisance as his servant, under his direct personal supervision, the lat
If, however, the servant, in carrying on
ter could not be convicted.
the business of his employer, and in the absence of his employer, was
authorized by him to make illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, and.made
such sales, both could be found guilty
maintaining the nuisance.”
In some cases
distinction
made between the charge of .unlawful
One of the propositions laid
selling and that of unlawful keeping.
down by Black as sustained by the authorities is: “If neither the prin
license, the agent or
cipal nor the agent, master nor servant, holds
servant
personally punishable for making the unlawful sale.” Black,
In VVakeman v. Chambers, 69 Iowa, 170, 28 N. \V.
Intox. Liq.
372.
498, a~ witness refused to answer as to his purchase of liquor, on the
The case
ground that the answer would tend to criminate himself.
was decided upon the provisions of the statute which in terms invited
those who obtained liquor in the saloon to give information under oath,
and the purchaser was therefore held not liable.
A similar principle appears to have controlled the decision in State
v. Main, 31 Conn. 574.
This statute provided
punishment for keep
house of prostitution, and
ing
separate punishment for persons re
siding therein. In State v. Dow, 21 Vt. 486, the respondent was held
license, although he
guilty of dealing in spirituous liquors without
did not sell himself, but had general charge of his employer's store,
in which liquors, among other things, were sold. See, also, State v.
Bugbee, 22 Vt. 32. In Stevens v. People, 67 Ill. 588, where the offense
common gaming house,
was held that
the
charged was keeping
respondent was present, and in any way or manner aided or abetted
or assisted in keeping, operating, and running such gaming room, he
was guilty, although he was not the actual owner ‘or proprietor there
saloon as bartender to sell, both in the presence
of. Employment in
and absence of the proprietor,
certainly aiding and assisting to main
tain such place.
\Nhile the authorities are not uniform, and some de
cisions are based upon the peculiar wording of the statute.
think the
better rule
that all so aiding and assisting are guilty as principals.
VVe see no good reason for making
distinction between offenses mal
um in se and those malum prohibitum.
Reversed on other grounds.
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CORRIGAN.
Kan.

2_1, 10

Pac. 99.)

Conviction for violation of a city ordinance against defendant as
general manager of the Kansas City & Wyandotte Street Railway
Defendant appealed.
Company.
JOHNSTON, J. [Omitting consideration of constitutional questionsz]
The appellant further contends that he cannot be held criminally
responsible for the failure ‘of the company to pay the license tax,
claiming that the ordinance did not impose the duty of paying such
tax upon any officer, servant, ‘or employé of the company. This con
tention has no ground upon which to rest.
A corporation can only
act through its agents, and by the agreed facts it is shown that the
appellant is the general manager of the company, and that he was
actually engaged in running cars and operating a street railway at
thetime charged, when the license tax provided by the ordinance was
unpaid. The ordinance makes it unlawful for any person or ﬁrm, as
well as a corporation, to engage in any of the occupations or classes
of business mentioned without procuring a license and paying the
tax; and provides, further, that whoever shall engage in such busi
ness in violation of such ordinance shall be convicted and punished.
It is immaterial whether the appellant was acting for himself or for
He was engaged in the business of operating a street
the company.
railway within the city while the tax was unpaid, and must therefore
suffer the penalty.“
The judgment of the district court will be aﬁirmed. All the justices
'
concurring.
$5 As to necessity of proving knowledge that employer has not paid license
tax, see City ot Ernporia v. Becker, 76 Kan. 181, 90 Pac. 798, 12 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 946 (1907).
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SMITH."

v.

(Court of King's Bench,

TO THIRD PERSON

1752.

1

Wilson,

328.)

jury ﬁnd a special verdict which in substance is
That upon the 22d of September 1749 Hughes was pos

the

declaration as his own property, and be
that day, that the plaintiff is assignee under the com
mission; that upon the 23d of September 1749, the defendant Smith,
who is servant and riding clerk to Mr. Garraway to whom the bank
rupt was considerably indebted, went to the bankrupt’s shop (to try to
get his master's money) and found it shut up, and that the bankrupt
delivered to Smith the goods in the declaration, who gave a receipt
for the same in the name of his master, and sold the same for his
sessed

the goods in the

came a bankrupt

a

is

is

is
a

I

it

is

of

it

is

is

if

is,

master's use.
It was objected that the action was improperly brought against the
serwnt Smith, who acted wholly in this matter for his master, and
that the conversion is found to be to the use of his master, which is
the _r_/ist of an action of trover; after two arguments at the bar, the
court gave judgment for the plaintiff.
whether the defendant
LEE, Chief _Iustice.
The point
not
he
so, no authority that he can derive from his
tort-feasor, for
master can excuse him from being liable in this action.
Hughes the bankrupt had no right tp deliver these goods to Smith;
the gist of trover
the detainer or disposal of goods (which are the
found that the defendant
property of another) wrongfully; and
himself disposed of them to his maste/s use, which his master could
conversion in Smithuthis
give him no authority to do; and this
disposal being his own tortious act: the act
selling the goods
the conversion, and whether to the use of himself, or another,
makes
am very well satisﬁed that this servant has done
no difference;
wrong, and that no authority that could be derived from his master
before, or after the fact, can excuse him.
The ﬁnding that the defendant disposed of the goods for his mas
l\IcPheters v. Page, 83 Me. 234. 22 Atl. 101, 23 Am. St. Rep. 772
Cf. Greenway v. Fisher,
C.
P. 190, 12 E. C. L. 118 (1824). Many
of the English cases of conversion by an agent involve the disposal of goods
bankrupt. which may account for the somewhat extreme application of
of
the doctrine of conversion against the agent. See Stephens v. Elwell,
M.
leading case. Many American cases refuse
S. 259. 16 Rev. Rep. 458 (1815).
to go so far, and criticise the extensive application of the action of trover
against an agent who has acted in good faith for his principal. See Rogers
v. Huie,
Cal. 571. 56 Am. Dec. 363 (1852); Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass.
For interesting discussions, see Lafayette Co.
Am. Rep. 491 (1869).
503.
Bank v. Metcalt’, 40 M0. App. 494 (1890); Lee v. Bayes, 18 C. B. 599,
Jur.
(N. S.) 1093, 25 L. J. C. P. 249, 86 E. C. L. 599 (1856); and Fowler v. Hol
L,
J. Q. B. 277, 27 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 168, 20 W. R.
lins, L. R.
Q. B. 616, 41
H. L. Cas. 757, 44 L. J. Q. B. 169, 33 L. T. Rep.
868 (1872), affirmed in L. R.
N. S. 73 (1874).
1

7

7

2

5

2

n

8:

4

a

&

36 Accord:

(1891).
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ter's use is only the conclusion of the jury, and does not bind the court,
the taking upon him to dispose of another’s property is the tortious
act, and the gist of this action.
Judgment for the plaintiff per totam
curiam.

-_..-i

H-EUGH

v.

(Superior

EARL OF ABERGAVENNY AND DELVES."
Courts of England and Ireland, 1874.

23 W.

R.

40.)

The bill in this suit stated that the plaintiff was owner of certain
land in Kent, abutting on that of the defendant, the earl of Aber
gavenny. and that some dispute having arisen between the plaintiff and
the said defendant as to a weir situate on the plaintiff’s land, the said
defendant and the defendant Delves, a land agent who professed to
act on his behalf had respectively threatened and still intended to en
ter forcibly on the plaintiffs land and to pull down and destroy the
weir.
The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants
from so doing.
The defendant Delves demurred to the bill for want of equity on
the ground that he had no interest. being a mere agent acting under
the instructions of the other defendant.
IESSEL, ;l\*I. R, said there could be no agency as between wrong
doers. \/Vant of interest was no defense to a charge of tort, though
The wrongdoer became
under the direction_0f another.
commit-ted
’
personally liable. The demurrer must be overruled.

ii.

DENNY
(Supreme

v.

MANHATTAN CO.

Court of New York,

18-16.

2 Denlo,

115.)
I

Case. for alleged violation of duty by defendants, as agents of the
Planters’ Bank of Tennessee, in refusing to permit a transfer to plain
tiffs on the transfer books of the Planters’ Bank, kept by them, of 281
shares of stock in that bank, alleged to belong to plaintiffs as trustees.
W'e entertain a pretty strong impression that the
PER CURIAM.
plaintiffs have failed to show a good title to the stock; but our deci
sion will be put upon another ground, concerning which we have had
If the plaintiffs have
no doubt from the moment the case was opened.
a cause of action against any one, it is not against the defendants,
The defendants were
but against the Planters' Bank of Tennessee.
not the agent of the plaintiffs and owed them no duty. They were the
agent of the Planters’ Bank; and for a neglect to discharge their
agency, they are answerable to their principal and to no one else.

If

37 Aeeo'rd:
Thorp v. Burling. 11 Johns. 285 (1814).
Ignorance ot‘ the trea
pass will not save the agent. lligginson v. York, 5 Muss. 341 (1809).

\
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the neglect of a known agent, the rule is
respondeat superior, and generally the action must be brought against
,
the principal.
judgment for defendants.

third persons are injured by

FELTUS

v.

SVVAN.”

(Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1884.

62 Miss.

415.)

Action for damages resulting from the neglect and refusal of de
fendant, as agent of the owner of a plantation, to keep open a drain, by
reason of which water was backed up on the land of plaintiﬁ. The
court below sustained a demurrer to the declaration.
CAMPBELL, C. ]. The appellee being a mere agent‘ was not liable
Story on’ Agency, §§
for an omission of duty except to his principal.
308, 309; Wharton on Agency, §§ 535, 536; Dunlap’s Paley’s Agen
'
cy. 396.
The proposed amendment would not have made the declaration
good, for whatever motive operated on the agent, the charge against
him was only that he had failed to do, and not that he had done any
thing maliciously, and for nonfeasance or omission to act at all the
agent is answerable only to his employer.
'

Aﬂirmedf

GREENBERG
(Supreme

v.

WHITCOMB LUMBER CO.'et

Court of Wisconsin.

1895.
439, 48 Am.

90

Wis.

225.

St. Rep. 911.)

63 N.

W.

93,

al.
28

L, R. A.

Action for damages for‘personal injury caused by a defective saw
in defendants’ sawmill.
Defendant Semple was manager of the mill.
The case came up on demurrers.
NEWMAN,
[After holding that the complaint states a cause
*
*
* Vl/hether the complaint states
of action as to the companyz]
a cause of action against the defendant Parlan Semple is more com
plex. He was the agent or servant of the Whitcomb Lumber Com
pany, charged with the oversight and management of its operations,
and with the duty of providing a safe machine for the work in which
The principle is well settled that the agent
the plaintiﬁ was engaged.
or servant is responsible to third persons only for injuries which are
occasioned by his misfeasance, and not for those occasioned by his
mere nonfeasance.
Some confusion has arisen in the cases, from a

J.”

I

.

v. Rochereau: 34 La. Ann. 1123. 44 Am. Rep. 456 (1882).
Ff. the cases following. And see Cohen v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bunk, 262 Pa. 76.
105 Atl. 43. 4 A. L. R. 518 (1918).
'
89 Part of the opinion is omitted.
B8 Accord‘:

‘Delaney
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failure to observe clearly the distinction between nonfeasance and
misfeasance.
These terms are very accurately deﬁned, and their ap
plication to questions of negligence pointed out, by Judge Metcalf in
“Nonfeasance,” says
Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 309, 63 Am. Dec. 741.
the learned judge, “is the omission of an act which a person ought to
do; misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might
lawfully do; malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought
r
not to do at all.”
The application of these deﬁnitions to the case at bar is not diﬁicult.
"It was Semple’s duty to have had this machine safe. His neglect to do
so was nonfeasance.
But that alone would not have harmed the plain
tiff, if he had not set him to work upon it. To set him to work upon
this defective and dangerous machine, knowing it to be dangerous,
was doing improperly an act which one might lawfully do in a proper
It was misfeasance. Both elements, nonfeasance and‘ mis
manner.
feasance,
entered into the act, or fact, which caused the plaintiff's
damages. But the nonfeasance alone could ‘not have produced it. The
misfeasance was the eﬁicient cause.
For this the defendant Semple is
Mechem, Ag. § 569 et seq.; 14 Am. &
responsible to the plaintiff.
Eng. Enc. Law. 873, and cases cited in note 4;‘-Wood, Mast. & Serv.
(Zd Ed.) 667; Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437.“
The complaint states but a single cause of action. It is the same
cause of action against both defendants, arising from the same acts of
negligence,—the master for the negligence of its servant; the servant
for his own misfeasance.
Both master and servant, being liable for
Wood,
the same acts of negligence, may be joined as defendants.
\Vright v. VVilcox, 19 VVend. 343, 32 Am. Dec.
Mast. 8: Serv. supra:
507: Phelps v. \Vait, 30 N. Y. 78.
The order appealed from by the Whitcomb Lumber Company is
aﬁirmed, and the order appealed from by the plaintiff is reversed.

BAIRD
(Supreme

Court

oi.’

Illinois,

1890.

v.
132

SHIPMAN.
Ill.

16. 23 N.

Am. st. Rep. 504.)

E.

as4.

1

L

R. A. 12s,

22

PER CURIAM.
The following opinion of the appellate court fully
presents the question arising upon this record:
“GARNE'r'r, P. ]. This is an appeal from a judgment for damages,
founded on the alleged negligence of appellants, by which the death
of Joseph Garnett, appellee's intestate, is said to have been caused.
The place where the injury happened was in a barn situated on prem
ises on Michigan avenue, in Chicago, belonging to Aaron C. Good
4°See the illuminating discussion

of Pobb, P. J.. in So. Ry. Co. v. Grizzle,

124 Ga. 735. 53 S. E. 244, 110 Am. St. Rep. 191 (1906); Ellis v. McNaughton,
76 Mich. 237, 42 N. W. 1113. 15 Am. St. Rep. 308 (1889)! Gamble v. Vanderbilt
Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. \V. 510, L. R. A. 1918C, 875, (1917).
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man, who was then, and for several years before had been a resident
of Hartford, Conn. Appellants were his agents for renting the prem
ises during the years 1884 and 1885, and during both years were
carrying on the real-estate business in Chicago. On the trial, evidence
was given

to show that they had in fact complete control
the residence and barn thereon, repairing the
same, in their discretion;
and there was no proof that in such matters
they received any directions from the owner. The property was rented
by appellants to Emma R. Wheeler and A. R. Tillman from April
1, 1884, to April 30, 1885, and to Emma R. V\/heeler from May 1,
1885, to April 30, 1886.
Both leases were in writing, and by the
terms of each lease the tenants covenanted to keep the premises in good
The tenant in the last lease rented the premises to Nellie ‘E.
repair.
Pierce. who occupied the same from April 28 to September, 1885.
The evidence tends to prove that when the lease was made to Emma
R. Wheeler the large carriage door to the barn was in a very insecure
condition, and that appellants, through one Warner, the manager of
their renting department, verbally agreed with Mrs. \\/heeler to put
Nothing was done to improve the
the premises in thorough repair.
condition of the door; and on June 12, 1885, while the deceased, an
expressman by occupation, was engaged in delivering a load of kin
dling in the barn‘for one of the parties living in the house, the door,
weighing about 400 pounds, fell from its fastenings, and injured him
to such an extent that he died the next day.
“Appellants make two points: -(1) That the verdict is clearly against
the weight of the evidence; (2) that they were the agents of the owner,
(Goodman,) and“ liable to him only for any negligence attributable to
them.
“There is nothing more than the ordinary conﬂict of evidence found
in such cases, presenting a question of fact for the jury; and the
ﬁnding must be respected by this court, in deference to the well-settled
rule.
“The other point is not so easily disposed of. An agent is liable
to his principal only for mere breach of his contract with his princi
pal; but he must have due regard to the rights and safety of third
If,
persons. He cannot in all cases ﬁnd shelter behind his principal.
in the course of his agency he is intrusted with the operation of a
dangerous machine, to guard himself from personal liability, he must
use proper care in its management and supervision, so that others, in
the use of ordinary care, will not suffer in life, limb, or property.
Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78. It is
Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358.
not his contract with the principal which exposes him to, or protects
him from, liability to third persons, but his common-law obligation to
That ob
so use that which he controls as not to injure another.
ligation is neither increased nor diminished by his entrance upon the
duties of agency; nor can its breach be excused by the plea that his
tending

of the premises, with

nrrecrs
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La. Ann.

3

1123,. 44
-

undertakes and enters upon the execu
tion of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care in the
manner of executing
so as not to cause any injury to third persons
which may be the natural consequence of his acts; and he cannot
escape this duty by abandoning its execution midway, and leaving
things in
dangerous condition. by reason of his having so left them
without proper safeguards.
Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39
,
Am. Rep. 437.
“A number of a'uthorities charged the agent, in such cases, on the
Mechem,
ground of misfeasance, as distinguished from nonfeasance.
in his work on Agency,
‘Some confusion has crept into
572, says:
certain cases from
failure to observe clearly the distinction between
not
nonfeasance and misfeasance.
As has been seen. the agent
liable to strangers for injuries sustained by them, because he did not
undertake the performance of some duty which he owed to his prin
nonfeasance.
cipal, and imposed upon him by his relation, which
Misfeasance may involve, also, to some extent, the idea of not doing,
as where the agent, while engaged in the performance of his under
was his duty to do under the
taking, does not do ‘something which
circumstances,—does not take that precaution, does not exercise that
care, which
All this
due regard for the rights of others requires.
not doing; but
not the not doing of that which
imposed
upon the agent merely-by virtue of his relation, but of that which
responsible individual, in common
imposed upon him by law, as
the same not doing which
with all other members of society.
To the same effect
constitutes actionable negligence in any relation.’
are Lottman v. Barnett, 62 l\Io. 159: Martin v. Benoist, 20 Mo. App.
263; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; Bell v. Iosselyn,
Gray, 309,
63 Am. Dec. 741.
Campbell v. Sugar Co., 62
“A case parallel to that now in hand
Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503, where agents of the Portland Sugar Com
pany had the charge and management of a wharf belonging to the
in re
company, and rented the same to tenants. agreeing to keep
pair. They allowcd the covering to become old, worn, and insecure,
The court held the
by means of which the plaintiff was injured.
agents were equally responsible to the injured person with their prin
is

is

it

is

,

i

3

is

It

a

is

it

is

a

it

is

is

a

§

a

it,

the agent once actually

cipals.

.

no longer be sustained,“

that the true doctrine

is

§

535, insists that the distinc
“Wharton, in his work on Negligence,
tion, in this class of cases, between nonfeasance and misfeasance can

that when an agent

whole distinction between nonfeasance and misteaanee is vigorous
and the basis of decision in such cases is put instead on the max
im sic utere tuo ut aliénum non ltmlas. in Lough \'. John Davis 8: Co., 30
Wash. 204. 70 Pac. 491. 59 L. R. A. 802, 94 Am. St. Rep. 848 (1902); Wells v.
Hansen, 97 Kan. 305, 154 Pac. 1033, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 230, L. R. A. 1916F, 566,
41 The

l_v attacked,

Q‘

..._____;

.___-
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is employed to work on a particular thing, and has surrendered the
thing in question into the principal’s hands, then the agent ceases to
be liable to third persons for hurt received by them from such thing,
though the hurt is remotely due to the agent's negligence, the rea
son being that the causal relation between the agent and the person
hurt is broken by the interposition of the principal as a distinct center
of legal responsibilities and duties, but that. even where there is no
such interrupting of causal connection, and the agent's negligence di
rectly injures a stranger, the agent having liberty of action in respect
to the injury, then such stranger can recover from the agent damages

for

the

injury.

The rule that the agent's
note (1916). with many detlnitions of misfeasance.
liability to third persons in tort depends on whether the wrong consists in a
nonfeasance or a Inisfeasance seems to go hack to Lord llolt's statement .in
Lane v. Cotton. 1 Ld. Raym. 646. 12 Mod. 488 (1701). that. “a scrvant or depu
ty quatenus such cannot be charzed for neglect. but the principal only shall
be charged for it: but for a misfeasance an action will lie against a servant
or deputy. but not quatenus deput_v or servant, but as a wrongdoer."
As has
been pointed out, not only was this a dissenting opinion, but this question
was not even involved in the case. nor was it involved in Stone v. Cartwright,
6 T. R. 411 (1795). which was cited as authority for it. .\'evertheless so weigh
ty was the word of Lord Holt, that his dictum in a dissenting opinion was
followed by Story on Agency, 5 308, and by zreat numbers of decisions. many
of which found it necessary to newly deﬁne misfeasance in order to fasten
liability on an agent for a wrong done to a third person, which ordinarily
would be called mere neglect. or nonteasance. Haynes‘ Adm’rs v. Cincinnati,
N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 145 Ky. 209, 140 S. W. 176. Ann. Pas. 1913B. 719 (1911).
(‘f. Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray. 309. 63 Am. Dec. 741 (1855); Osborne v. Morgan,
130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437 (1881). approved in Sticwel v. Barman. 63 Ark.
30, 37 S. W‘. 404 (1896); l-iagerty v. Montana
Ore Purchasing Co., 38 Mont.
(ii), 98 Pac. 643, 25 L. R. A. (.\'. S.) 358 (1908): Gas Co. v. Connor, 114 Md.
140, 157, 78 Atl. 725, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 809 (1910); Schlosser v. Railway Co.,
20 N. D. 406. 127 N. W. 502 (1910).
Others, by following the rule. and adhering to the ordinary meaning of non
feasance, arrive at decisions in conﬂict with these last. Delaney v.-Roch
ereau. 34 La. Ann. 112%, 44 Am. Rep, 456 (1882): Henshaw v. Noble, 7 Ohio
St. 226 (1857); Erwin v. Davenport. 9 Heisk. 44 (1871): Feltus v. Swan, su
pra: Drake v. Hagan. 108 Tenn. 265. 67 S. W. 470 (1902): Van Antwerp v.
Linton. 89 I-Inn, 417. 35 N. Y. Supp. 318 (1895). citing the dictum oi’ Andre\vs,
J., in Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y. 542. 23 N. E. 564 (1889).
Still others hold that the liability does not grow out of any privity of par
ties or of any relation oi’ agency. It does not rest in contract at all. but on
the common-law obligation of all to so use what they control as not to in
jure another, whether in the use of their own. or oi‘ the property of another
as agent. In this view the question is, was there a duty and has it been vio
Lough v. John Davis & (‘.o., supra; Ellis v. So. Ry. (‘o.. 72 S. C. 465.
lated?
52 S. E. 228, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378 (1905).
Note to Baird v. Shipman, supra.
in 22 Am. St. Rep. 512; note to Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchinson
Bldg. Co., 104
Ala. 611, 16 South. 620, 53 AIn. St. Rep. S8, in 28 L. R. A. 433 (1894); Parry v.
Smith, L. R. 4 C. I’. Div. 325, -18 L. J. C.-P. 731, 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 93, 27
W. R. 801 (1875).
According to all the cases the agent is not liable for injuries due to causes
outside the scope of his agency and of his acts under it. Kuhnert v. Angeli,
10 N. D. 59, 84 N. W, 579, 88 Am. St. Rep. 675 (1900).
But he is liable tor
acts of misfeasance in the performance of his agency.
Harriman v. Stowe,
57 Mo. 93. The principal is also liable.
The liability of the agent is primary,
that of the principal secondary. It the agent is innocent, so is the principal.
Bradley v. Rosenthai. 15-i Cal. 420, 97 Pac. 875. 129 Am. St. Rep. 171 (1908).
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“The rule, whether as stated by Mechem or Wharton, is sufficient
to charge appellants with damages, under the circumstances disclosed
in this record. They had the same control of the premises in ques
tion as the owner would have had if he had resided in Chicago, and
attended to his own leasing and repairing._ In that respect, appellants
remained in control of the premises until the door fell upon the de
ceased.
There was no interruption of the causal relation between
them and the injured man. They were, in fact, for the time being,
substituted in the place of the owner, so far as the control and man
The principle that makes
agement of the property was concerned.
an independent contractor, to whose control premises upon which he
is working are surrendered, liable for damages to strangers caused
by his negligence, although he is at the time doing the‘ work under
contract with the owner (Whart. Neg. § 440); would seem to be suFﬁ
cient to hold appellants. The owner of cattle, who places them in the
hands of an agister, is not liable for damages committed by them
while they are under control of the agister. It is the possession and
control of the cattle which ﬁx the liability; and the law imposes upon
the agister the duty to protect strangers from injury by them. Ward
v. Brown, 64 Ill.~ 307, 16 Am. Rep. 561; Ozburn v. Adams, 70 Ill.
291.

“When appellants rented the premises to Mrs. Wheeler in the dan
gerous condition shown by the evidence, they voluntarily set in mo
tion an agency which, in the ordinary and natural course of events,
would expose persons entering the barn to personal injury. Use of
the barn, for the purpose for which it was used when the deceased
came to his death, was one of its ordinary and appropriate uses, and
If the insecure
might, by ordinary foresight, have been anticipated.
condition of the door fastening had arisen after the letting to Mrs.
Wheeler, a different question would be presented; but, as it existed
before and at the time of the letting, the owner or persons in control
are chargeable with the consequences.
Gridley v. Bloomington, 68
Ill. 47; Tomle v. Hampton, 129 Ill. 379, 21 N. E. 800. ' Neither error
is well assigned, and the judgment is afﬁrmed.”
I
\/Ve fully concur in the legal proposition asserted in the foregoing
opinion, and deem it unnecessaiy to add to what is therein said in
‘
The judgment is afﬁrmed.
support of that proposition.

~
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145

Ky.

1913B, 719.)
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140 S. W. 176, Ann.

Cas.

CARROLL, ]. This action was brought to recover damages for the
death of E. L. Haynes, a ﬁreman on appellee’s
railway, and who
was killed in the state of Tennessee. The company and William Hud
son, the engineer in charge of the engine on which appellant was a
ﬁreman, were made defendants.
The negligence upon which the ac
tion was grounded is stated in the petition: [The court set forth the
petition on which the action was grounded and a summary of the
i

.
_
evidence.]
In short, the evidence showed this state of facts: That the company
directs the engineer what engine to take out, and it is the duty of the
engineer to inspect the engine, and see that it is equipped with all the
That
necessary implements and machinery and in good condition.
Hudson, the engineer, did this before starting out with this engine, and,
so far as he knew or could tell, the engine was in good condition when
That there were two steam gauges on this
he left Somerset with it.
engine, one on the engineer’s side and one on the ﬁreman’s side, and it
was the duty of both the engineer and ﬁreman to notice these steam
gauges, and sec that the proper amount of steam was kept up and a
suﬁicient quantity of water kept in the boiler.
That some time after
leaving Somerset a pane in the cab window blew out, or was shaken out,
leaving the space open, and the wind coming in this opening prevented
the lamp at\the steam gauge from being lighted on the engineer’s side.
That the ﬁreman knew of this condition, and was warned by the en
gineer to keep his eye on the steam gauge on his side. That there was
plenty of water in the boiler at the time the accident occurred, and two
steam gauges adjusted to blow oﬁ" steam at 180 pounds were popping
off steam. That immediately before the accident the engineer walked
across to the ﬁreman’s side of the engine to get a drink of water, and
discovered that the steam gauge on the ﬁreman’s side showed that
the engine was carrying 220 pounds of steam, whereupon he told the
ﬁreman that the engine had too much steam, and walked back to his
side of the cab. That just as he reached his side of the cab the ﬁre
man opened the ﬁre box door—for what purpose the evidence does
not disclose, but presumably to allow the engine to cool oif—and when
he opened the ﬁre boat door the explosion occurred, due to the “burning
out,” as it is called, of the crown sheet. That this accident could have
been caused by not enough water or too much steam; but, as uncontra
dicted evidence is that" the boiler was full of water, the explosion must
have been due to the excessive amount of steam the engine was carrying.
It is further shown that the engine, with the exception of the window
pane falling out, was in good working order during the whole trip,
until the explosion occurred.

I

\
'
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Under this state of facts, we think it plain that the court properly
There is
instructed the jury to return a verdict for the engineer.
absolutely no evidence of any negligence on the part of the engineer.
If it was his duty to inspect the engine before he took it out, for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not it was in good condition, he
If it was his duty to
testiﬁes without contradiction that he did this.
see that an excessive quantity of steam was not carried, this duty was
also enjoined on the ﬁreman; and, as the ﬁreman could see the steam
gauge on his side, and the engineer could not see the one on his side,
it is clear that as between the engineer and ﬁreman the engineer was
not negligent in this respect.. If the accident was due to negligence at
all, a question we do not express any opinion concerning, it was the
negligence of the company in sending out the engine with a defective
crown sheet, although the weight of the evidence tends to show that
the accident was caused by the excessive steam in "the boiler, and not
any defect in the crown sheet.
The record does not present, as insisted by counsel, any question of
misfeasance or nonfeasance on the part of the engineer. “Misfeasance
is the performance of an act, which might lawfully be done, in an im
proper manner, by which another person receives an injury," while
“nonfeasance is the nonperformance of some act which ought to be
B0uvier’s Law Dictionary.
If the accident had been
performed."
caused by either misfeasance or nonfeasance amounting to a breach
of duty on the part of the engineer, we would hold him liable. In some
jurisdictions the servant is not held accountable to third persons for
nonfeasance, but is for misfeasance; but‘ a contrary rule, and one
that is in accord with the weight of modern authority, prevails in this
state.
\/Ve do not recognize any distinction, so far as the accountability
of the servant is concerned, between acts of misfeasance and non
feasance.
Ward v. Pullman Co., 131 Ky. 142, 114 S. W. 754, Z5 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 343; C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Banks, 144 Ky. 137, 137 S. VV.
1066; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Coley, 121 Ky. 385, 89 S. VV. 234, 28
Ky. Law Rep. 336, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 370. If a servant performs in
an unlawful manner an act that results in injury to a third person, or
if a servant failsito observe a duty that he owes to third persons, and
injury results from his fault of commission or omission, he is liable in
There is no reason for making a distinction between acts of
damages.
commission and omission, when each involves a breach of duty. The
servant is not personally liable in either case because the breach of duty
was committed by him while acting in the capacity of servant, but re
sponsibility attaches to him as an individual wrongdoer, without respect
to the position in which he acts, or the relation he bears to some other
person. It is the fact that the servant is guilty of a wrongful or negli
gent act amounting to a breach of duty that he owes to the injured per
.
son that makes him liable.
It is not at all material whether his wrongful or negligent act is com
mitted in an aﬁirmative or willful manner, or results from mere
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nonattention to a duty that he owes to third persons, and that it is en
There are
tlrely within his power to perform or omit to-perform.
innumerable situations and conditions presented in the everyday affairs
of life that make it the duty of persons to so act as not to harm others,
and when any person, whatever his position or relation in life may be,
fails, from negligence, inattention, or willfulness, to perform the duty
imposed he will be liable. Ellis v. Southern Railway Co., 72 S. C. 465,
52 S. E. 228, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378.
For illustration, if it was the ex
clusive duty of the engineer under the circumstances shown by the rec
ord to observe and control the amount of steam carried, or th’e condi
tion of the water in the boiler, and the ﬁreman had no duty to perform
in respect to these matters, except as he might be directed by the engi
neer, we would say that the engineer was liable in this action, and this
without reference to whether the breach of duty committed by him in
this respect was one of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
But when it is sought to hold the servant liable because he works with
defective or unsafe machinery or implements furnished to him by
the master, and injury results, due to the defects, an entirely different
It is neither the province nor the duty of the
question is presented.
servant to dictate to the master the character of tools, implements, or
machinery that he shall be provided with. The servant has usually no
right of selection or voice in the kind or quality of machinery or im
plements he must work with. These things are furnished by the mas
ter, and if they are _defective or unsafe the liability attaches to the mas
ter, and not to the servant. It would be a most unreasonable doctrine
to hold a person responsible for defects in machinery that he was
merely employed to work with, under the direction of a superior, who
possessed the exclusive right to furnish the tools or machinery needed
by him in the performance of his duties. To hold the servant responsi
ble for the delinquency or wrongdoing of the master would be to put
upon him responsibilities that he did not as_sume- in accepting the em
ployment, and charge him with conduct that the conditions of employ
ment placed beyond his power of control.
We therefore think it is
clear that when, as in this case, a railroad company furnishes an engine
to an engineer, and directs him to take it out, that the engineer is not
personally liable in an action for damages, because injuries are occa
sioned by some defect in the engine.
Being of the opinion that the trial
court properly directed a verdict in favor of the engineer, the next
question is, Was it error to sustain the motion of counsel for the rail
way company to transfer the case to the federal court?“ * * *.
[The court held this not error.l
\Vherefore the judgment is afﬁrmed.
49 The rule of this case is the subject of full notes in 28 L. R. A. 433, 25
L. R, A. (N. S.) 343, and L. R. A. 191613‘, 570. With the principal case, com
pare Wells v. Hansen, 97 Kan. 305. 154 Pac. 1083. L. R. A. 1916F. 566. Ann.
Cas. 191-SD, 230 (1916); Hagerty v. Wilson, 38 Mont. 69, 98 Pac. 643, 25 L
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CONTRACT

CANTINE.

of Judicature of New York,

1813.

10

Johns.

387.)

Gunn
Assumpsit for money had and received, to the use of plaintiff.
was agent to collect money‘for Stephen Simmons and gave the con
tract to Cantine for collection.
Cantine collected and refused to ac
‘
"
.
count to Gunn.
CURIAM.
It
from
the case,\=__that the
PER
appears aﬁirmatively,
plaintiff had no beneﬁcial interest in the money collected. Ha was a
mere attorney employed by Simmons to collect this debt; and\ there
was no express promise by the defendant to pay the money
to the plaintiff.
collhfted
The letter of attorney was revocable at pleasure; and the law vlkill
not raise any assumpsit to the plaintiff from the facts in this case.‘
This is, by no means, so strong a case as that of Pigott v. Thompson,‘
3 Bos. & Pull. 147, and yet in that case the agent was not permitted
The defendant is entitled to judgment.
to sue in his own name.
Judgment for the defendant.

l

R. A. (N. S.).356 (1908): Emery & Co, v. American Refrigerator Transit Co.,
193 Iowa, 93, 184 N. W. 750, 20 A. L. R. 86, with discussion of many cases.
Jomr Lranrtrrr or l\iAs'rt-JR AND Ssnvuzr for the negligence of the servant,
see Sohumpert v. Southern R3-'.. 65 S. C. 332, 43 S. E. 813. 95 Am. St. Rep.
802 (1903).
And compare Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. (Mass) 592, 52 Am. Dec.
745 (1850), contra.
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THATCHER
(Circuit Court of the United States,

v.

631

WINSLOW}

1828.

5 Mason,

58, Fed.

Cas. No. 13,863.)

Assumpsit on certain notes made by Lewis Rousmaniere, payable
to the defendant [Andrew VVinslow], or his order, at the Merchants’
Bank in Newport.
The declaration contained various counts against
theidefendant, as indorsee, in favour of the plaintiff [David Thatcher]
Plea, the general issue.
as indorser.
At the trial, the defence turned principally upon the point of for
Another
gery of the defendant’s name, as indorser, by Rousmaniere.
point was made, viz., that the plaintiff was not the owner of the notes
in question, but that they belonged to the Merchants’ Bank at New
port, by which bank they were originally discounted ;' and that the
notes, since the death of Rousrnaniere (who committed suicide), had
been delivered to the plaintiff by the Merchants’ Bank for the purpose
of suing the same in his own name in the circuit court; and that
plaintiff had no interest whatsoever therein. A witness, called for
the plaintiff, upon his cross-examination,
fully established the latter
point.
STORY, Circuit Justice.
the facts stated by the witness on this
last point are not denied, I think the cause is at an end.
Unless
the plaintiff is a real holder of the note, and has some interest in
he cannot maintain an action as indorsee against the defendant.
that the Merchants’ Bank
the real holder, and
Here the proof
the plaintiff
take
not ‘to be com
merely an agent for the bank.
mere agent to maintain an action on a negotiable note in
petent for
be with the consent of his principal.
He must
his hands, although
be the owner of the note, or have some substantial interest therein.
note
Prima facie indeed the possession of such
evidence of the
holder for
valuable consideration, and unless the
party’s being
note has been previously stolen, or received by him under suspicious
circumstances, he
not bound to prove by other evidence, that he
admitted or proved aliunde, that
such
bona ﬁde holder. But
not competent
he
but
mere agent, and holds the note as such, he
in his own name.
to recover
See Gunn v. Cantine,
judgment upon
Mass. 491.
10 _lohns. 387: Gilmore v. Pope,
The plaintiff discontinued his suit.
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Yerg. (Te-nn.) 29. 26 Am. Dec. 214 (1833); Orr
Accord: Cooke v. Dickens.
McLean, 243, Fed. Cas. No. 10,589 (1847). in which an agent sued in
v. Lacy,
his own name on note indorsed in blank and put into his hands for collection.
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SARGENT
(Court of King’s Bench, 1820.

3 Barn.

v.
&

on

T1-II-I Iti3}IJA'1‘ION

(Part

3

MORRIS.
Aid.

277, 22 R. R. 382, 5 E. C.

L.

166.)

Declaration stated, that the defendant was the owner» of a vessel ly
ing in the river Gaudalquiver, and bound to London; and the plaintiff,
at the special instance and request of the defendant, caused to be ship
ped on board the vessel certain goods, to be taken care of, and safel_v
and securely conveyed by the defendant within the vessel, under the
deck thereof, to‘ London, and there to be safely delivered, dry and well
conditioned, for the plaintiff; and in consideration thereof, and of a
certain freight to be paid by plaintiff to defendant, he undertook to
take care of a-nd'safély convey the said goods and merchandizes, with
in the vessel, and under the deck thereof, and deliver the same as afore
said. Breach, that the defendant placed and put the goods upon the
deck of the vessel, and otherwise conducted himself with great negli
Plea non
gence, by reason whereof the goods were greatly damaged.
assumpsit; At the trial before Abbott, C. ]., at the London sittings
after last Trinity term, it appeared that the goods were shipped by
Bayo & Son of Seville, and that they were the parties interested in the
goods. By the bill of lading, the Captain acknowledged to have re
ceived on board the vessel, and under the deck thereof, of Don Pedro
Bayo & Son, the goods therein mentioned; and it then proceeded in the
following words: “I undertake to deliver the same to you, and in
your name, according to custom and usage, to Mr. Sargent or his as
signs, paying freight,” etc. The plaintiff on receiving advice of the
shipment, effected an insurance on account of Bayo, and advanced the
premiums. It was objected, that the action ought to have been brought
The Lord Chief Jus
by Bayo & Son, and not by the present plaintiff.
tice directed the jury to ﬁnd a verdict for the plaintiff, with liberty to
the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. A rule nisi having been ob
‘
tained accordingly.
BAYLEY, I. This is an action on a special contract; and the dec
laration states, that the plaintiff caused to be shipped on board the de
fendant’s vessel, certain goods, to be carried and delivered to the plain
tiff, and that he undertook and promised the plaintiff accordingly.
The declaration therefore describes the plaintiff as the original ship
per, and the original contract as having been made with him. Now I
take the rule to be this: if wan agent acts for me and on my behalf, but
in his own name, then, inasmuch as he‘ is the person with whom the
contract is made, it is no answer to an action in his name, to say, that
he is merely an agent, unless you can also' show, that he is 'prohibited
from carrying on that action by the person on whose behalf the con
In such cases however, you may bring your action.
tract was made.
either in the name of the party by whom the contract was made, or of

\
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the party for whom the contract was made.’
In policies of insurance,
it is a common practice to bring your action, either in the name of the
In this case the contract appears, by the terms of
agent or principal.
the bill of lading, to have been made with the Spanish house.
Then
for whom was it made? why, upon the evidence in the cause, on ac
count of the Spanish house. It is, however, urged, that inasmuch as
Sargent had made certain advances on their account, they were his
goods at the time of the shipment. Now, in the ﬁrst place, there is no
evidence to _show, that, at the tinic of the shipment, he had made any
At that time, the right of action was vested in the
advance whatever.
party to whom the goods belonged. \/Vhat was done subsequently does
not affect this point. As to the advance, I take it to have been made in
the-ordinary way in which an agent makes an advance for his princi
pal, in respect of which he would be entitled to sue his principal, on
If, indeed, the goods had reached
whose credit the advance was made.
his possession, he might have had a lien till he had been repaid; but
no lien can take place till the goods conic into his possession. The
prospect of a lien made in respect of advances subsequent to the ship
ment, never can satisfy the allegation of the plaintiff, that he had
caused the goods to be shipped, and that the defendants contracted
with him to deliver: the contract, in fact, was not with him, but with
Bayo. For these reasons. it seems to me, that the contract is not made
out in evidence, and that the action cannot be suppbrted.'

‘-1-i
1

MILLER
(Supreme

v.

STATE BANK OF DULUTH.‘

Court of Minnesota,

1894.

57

Minn.

319,

59 N. W. 309.)

Suit by Miller for balance of money deposited by him as agent.
The bank claimed the equitable right .to set off ‘against the deposit
notes indorsed by Simon Clark & Co. and held by the bank. Judgment
for plaintiff, new trial denied. and defendant appeals.
GILFILLAN, C. J. Plaintiff was agent for Simon Clark & Co., and.
as such, deposited m0ney‘0f theirs with. defendant to the credit of him
self—“A. J. Miller, Agent.”
Afterwards Simon Clark & Co. made
an assignment in insolvency.
Whether plaintiff could or could not,
while his agency continued, maintain an action in his own name on the
9 In '1‘insle_v v. Dowell. 87 Tex. 23, 26 S. W. 946 (1894). the court lays down
the rule that one who contracts as agent cannot maintain an action in his
own name and right upon the contract.
'I‘o.this general rule there are four
exceptions:
in his own name; (2) where he
(1) Where the agent contracts
does not disclose his principal who is unknown; (3) where. by the usages of
trade. the agent is authorized to act as owner of the property: (4) where the
agent has an interest in the subject-matter oi’ the contract, and in this case
whether he professed to act as agent or not.
3 The opinions of Abbott, C. J., and Best. J.. are omitted.
4Accord: Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389. 2 .\‘. & M. 608. 27 E. G. L. 97 (1833).
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deposit, he certainly could not after his relation to the deposit ceased
by the revocation of his agency with respect to it.
The assignment of his principals,‘Simon Clark & Co., worked such
revocation.
Order reversed.

-__-i
LETERMAN

v.

CHARLOTTESVILLE

(Supreme Court of Appeals

of Virginia,

1910.

LUMBER CO.

110 Va. 769, 67 -S.

E.

281.)

Assumpsit.
Judgment for plaintiff.
BUCHANAN, I.‘ In the view we take of this case, the only question
necessary to be considered is whether or not the trial court erred in
striking out the special plea ﬁled by Leterman (the plaintiff in error),
'
who was defendant in that court.
One objection made to the plea is: “That the plea sets forth the fact
that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was entered into
by the defendant on behalf of a ﬁrm, composed of himself and one
Alfred Wollberg, which matter has been already formally and ﬁnally
adjudicated by submitting that question to a jury at a former term of
this court, as is shown in writing ﬁled by the plaintiff, by counsel, as
\
one of the grounds for excluding said plea.”
The only effect of the verdict of the jury upon the issue raised by
the plea in abatement for the nonjoinder of Alfred Wollberg as a party
defendant was to establish the fact that the contract, for the breach of
which the plaintiff sought to recover damages, was made with L/eter
man personally, and not with the ﬁrm of Leterman & Wollberg, and
that the plaintiff had the right to sue the former for a breach of the
contract. It did not determine that Leterman, in making that contract,
may not have been acting, as averted in his special plea, in behalf of
That question was not involved in
the ﬁrm of Leterman & VVollberg.
An agent may even become liable
the issue on the plea in abatement.
on a contract contrary to his actual intention; but, if he contracts in
such a form or under such circumstances as to make himself person
ally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal was or
was not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself of that re
2 Clark & Skyles on Agency, § S66, and cases cited;
1
sponsibility.
Min. Inst. 235—237; 3 Rob. Pr. (New) 54, and authorities cited.
Another objection made to the plea is that it “attempts to set off the
claim of the partnership of Leterman & VVollberg against the individ
‘
ual demand of the plaintiff against the defendant.”
'\/Vhere a person enters into a simple contract, oral or in writing,
other than a negotiable instrument, in his own name, when he is in
fact acting as the agent of another and for his beneﬁt, without disclos
ing his principal, the other party to the contract may, as a general
6

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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rule, hold either the agent or his principal, when discovered, personally
liable on the contract. But he cannot hold both. 1 Min. Inst. pp. 236,
237, and cases cited; 3 Rob. Pr. (New) 50, andcascs cited; Clark &
A
Skyles on Agency, §§ 457, 568.
It is also equally well settled that upon such a contract either the
agent‘ or the principal may sue; the defendant, where the principal
sues upon
being entitled to be placed in the same situation at the
time of the disclosure of the real principal as
the agent had been the
E.
National Bank v. Nolting, 94 Va. 263, 26
contracting party.
Min. Inst. 239, and
826;
Rob. Pr. (New) 36, and cases cited;
614.
cases cited; Clark
Skyles on Law of Agency,
If the agent of the undisclosed principal be sued by the other party
to the contract, the latter may recover such damages as have resulted
from the breach of
on the agent’s part. On the other hand,
such
agent sues, he may recover such damages as have resulted by reason of
the breach of the contract by the other party—unless his principal in
terferes in the suit; and he
entitled to recover the full measufe of
damages in the same manner as though the action had been brought by
624; Mechem on
the principal.
Sce Clark
Skyles on Agency,
755, 763; Ioseph v. Knox,
Camp. 320—322; Gardner v.
Agency,
Davis,
Car.
Payne, 49; United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29
Md. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 519, 522, 523; Rhoades v. Blackiston, 106
Mass. 334,
Am. Rep. 332, 333, 334; 31 Cyc. 1564; Shelby v. Bur
row, 76 Ark. S58, 89
W. 464, L. R. A. (N. S.) 303,
Ann. Cas.
554, and note.‘
There are exceptions to the general principles of law stated above;
but they do not affect the question now under consideration, and need
not, therefore, be mentioned.
Since either party to the contract set up in the special plea had the
he failed to‘keep and perform
right to sue the other for its breach,
follows that either, when sued by the other for its
pn his part,
breach, had the right to set up as
defense, under section 3299 of the
Code, any matter which, would “entitle him either to recover damages
at law from the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims,
or relief in equity, in whole or in part, against the obligation of the
contract” sued on.
“The plain purpose of that section,” as said by Iudge Moncure in
Huff v. Broyles, 26 Grat. 283, 285, “was to give precisely the same
plea ﬁled under the same as could be obtained
measure of relief on
"
*
in an independent action brought for the same cause.
See
Am. Manganese Co. v. Va. Manganese Co., 9l Va. 272, 282, 21 S.

a

'

'

*

8

B

See also the leading case of Rhoades v. Blackiston, 106 Mass. 334,
Am.
Rep. 332 (1871).
Under the Code provision that "every action must be pros
ecuted in the name of the real party in interest," except that “a trustee of
may sue” in his own name, the agent who has
an express trust
trustee of an express trust.
contracted in his own name is held to be
Con
siderant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 889 (1860).
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Columbia Accident Ass'n v. Rockey, 93 Va. 678, 25 S. E.
1009; Mangus v. McClelland, 93 Va. 786, 22 S. E. 364; Tyson v.
\'\/illiamson, 96 Va. 636, 32 S. E. 42; Kinzie v. Riely, Ex’r, 100 Va.
'
709, 42 S. E. 872.
By section 3303 of the Code it is declared that a defendant who ﬁles
a plea under section 3299 shall be deemed to have brought an act-ion at
the time of ﬁling such plea.
The defendant having the right to set up in a special plea under sec
tion 3299 any damages which resulted from a breach of the contract
which he could have recovered in an independent action, the fact that
his recovery over, if any, was'for the beneﬁt of Leternian & Wollberg,
furnished no ground of objection to the special plea; for it is settled
that, if the agent of an undisclosed principal sues, it is no ground of
defense that the beneﬁcial interest is in another, or that the plaintiff, if
he makes a recovery, will be bound to account to another.
See
Rhoades v. Blackiston, supra; United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve,
supra; Joseph v. Knox, supra; Seaman_ v. Slater (C. C.) 49 Fed. 37;
Clark & Skyles on Agency, § 619; Mechem on Agency, § 755.
The damages claimed in the special plea, as it avers, resulted from
the failure on the part of the plaintitfto do the work, to recover the
price of which he brought his action, in the manner and within the‘
time provided by the contract, and the defendant had the right, under
section 3299 of the Code, to set them up and to get the beneﬁt of them
in this action as fully as if he had instituted an independent action to
recover them. No prejudice can‘result to the plaintiff from compelling
him on his part to answer for not performing the contract to the agent,
* * *
whom he is holding for its breach, instead of the principal.
Reversed.

E. 466;

_-M

\

FISHER

v.

MARSH.

(Court of Queen's Bench; 1865. 6 Best & S. 411,
Q. B. 177, 12 L. T. Rep. [N. s.] cos, 13 W. R.

~

,

11 Jur. N. S. 795, 34
834, 11s E. o. L. 411.)

L. J.

'I

I

it,

Declaration for £27. for the lease of land by plaintiff by auction on
the occasion of the Oxford races.
Plea, never indebted.
BLACKBURN, ]." I am of opinion that the nonsuit should be set
aside, and the rule for a new trial made absolute. I think there was
a case to go to the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain
* * *
the action.
The ground of the nonsuit was that, although there was a letting
the plaintiff was not the proper person t_o
and occupation under
sue; for notwithstanding the defendant had made himself liable to
the plaintiff’s employers, yet unless he was liable to pay the plaintiff
the writ was sued out in the wrong name.
But
think there was evi
Part of the opinion is omitted.
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of a contract with the plaintiff personally.
The plaintiffwas
indeed acting as auctioneer and was known to be such; and this would
be evidence that some other person employed him, and that he had
no interest _in the land beyond that of letting it to the highest bidder.
contract, naming his
The general rule
that when an agent makes
made with the principal and not with the
principal, the contract
contract in writing
But even where the principal
agent.
known
third person in such terms that he
may be made by an agent with
he says, “I for my own
personally bound to the fulﬁlment of it; as
self contract,” in such
case there
personal contract by the agent,
and he may sue or be sued on
although the principal may interfere
as was.decided in Higgins v. Senior,
and claim the beneﬁt of
M.
W. 834, where the cases are collected. In the present case the
plaintiff on putting up this land for hire in effect said, “I let the land;
undertake upon the price being paid to me that the person
and
taking the land shall have the enioyment of it.” Then the defendant
and being the highest bidder, there
clear con
having bid for
tract by the defendant to become tenant. The terms of the contract
were not reduced to writing; but does the fact of the plaintiff being
If not, there was
auctioneer prevent the contract being with him?
evidence to go to the jury. There are reasons in the present case why
the plaintiff should enter into the contract, making himself personally
liable; there are also reasons why he should not: but here was evi
dence on which the jury might say that he had done so, unless the
fact of the plaintiff being auctioneer
conclusive to the contrary.
In Franklyn v. Lamond.
C. B. 637 (E. C. L. R. vol. 56), the plain
tiff had bought railway shares at an auction under circumstances much
like those in the present case. and in an action against the auctioneers.
who had not disclosed their principal at the time of the sale, for not
transferring the shares, the Court held the proper inference to be that
the contract was with the auctioneer personally.
That
distinct
authority that in the present case there was evidence of
contract
with the plaintiff personally.‘
Next, there being such
contract, and the defendant having been
let into possession under it, may the rent be recovereci~in
an action
for use and occupation?
The plaintiff having let the defendant into
possession under the contract, the defendant would be estopped from
were requisite that
should be proved, and the
denying the title
is

a

it

it

if

a

a

is

4

is

a

it,

I

&

8

it,

it,

a

is
a

if

a

is

a

is

is

a

is,

dence

2

&

&

a‘

5

2

3'1'he rule extends to all contracts made in the name of the agent. whether
Wiilson, ("ix-. Pas.
the principal is known or
Edwards v. Ezeil.
unkngvn,
(‘-t. App.
276 (1884): Carter
vb 0. Ry. Co., 111 Ga. 38, 26 S. E. 308, 50 L.
R» A_ 354 (1900). especially it the agent has abeneﬂcial interest in the con
v. Potter, 26 N. C. 257 (1844).
Cf. Evrit v. Bancroft, 22
tract. Whitehead
Ohio St. 172 (1871), in which the interest of the agent was not in the con
tract, but in the commissions he expected to earn it the contract was made.
Neal v. Andrews (Tex. Civ. App.) 60 S. W. 459 (1900).
As to contract signed
by an agent, but madeﬂtor and in behalf of"
principal, see Brandt
Co.
K, B; 784.
Co., [1917]
v. Morris
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In
therefore turns upon the contract for use and occupation.
v. Evans, 3 A. 8: E. 132 (E. C. L. R. vol. 30), the auctioneers
in effect said that they were selling for David jones, whose name ap
Now, prima
peared on the conditions of sale as approving them.
facie, when an agent makes a contract for a person named, the prin
never
cipal and not the agent is considered as making the contract;
theless a case was set up on behalf of the plaintiffs that the auctioneers
were the proper parties to.sue, because the contract was made with
them, and they had an interest in the premises as creditors of their
The Judge had told the jury that the contract was with
principal.
the auctioneers.
The Court thought that direction was not correct
with reference to the conditions of sale, the construction of which
was for them; not that there was no evidence to support an action.
for use and occupation by the plaintiffs. And they granted a new trial
on the question of fact, which was for the jury, viz., “By whose per
mission did the occupation take place, and by whom was the contract
made?”
That appears from the judgments of Patteson and Coleridge,
J]. Here the question is solely whether there was a case to go to the
jury that the plaintiff had made the contract personally, and for the
reasons which I have expressed I think there was.”
case

Evans

SHORT
(Court of King's Bench, 1831.

v.
2

SPACKMAN.
Barn. & Adol.

962, 22

E. C. L.

402.)

Assumpsit
At the trial before Lord Ten
terden, C. ]., at the sittings in London after Trinity term 1831, a ver
dict was found for the plaintiffs "for £600. subject to a reference. The
arbitrator made his award, and annexedito
at the request of the
statement to the following‘ effect:
defendant’s counsel,
The plain
tiffs being brokers, and authorized by one Hudson to buy for him
twenty tuns of Greenland whale oil, employed Bentley, an oil broker,
to make such purchase for them. Bentley applied to the defendant
to sell that quantity to the plaintiffs.
The defendant at ﬁrst refused
to sell to the plaintiffs; bu.t, upon being informed by Bentley that
they were purchasing not for themselves, but as brokers for unnamed
principals, he agreed to sell to them: and bought and sold_notes,
signed by Bentley, were,sent by ‘him to the plaintiffs and defendant,
in which the goods were stated to be “Bought for Messrs. Short,
Brown, and Bowyer” (the plaintiffs), “of Mr. W. F. /Spackman" (the
defendant), on the terms therein speciﬁed to be paid for by the buyers
in ready money. The plaintiffs sent
corresponding bought note to
Hudson, their principal; and they afterwards, under a general au
thority from him, sold the goods for his account, through another
Co.
broker, to Messrs. Buck,
The bought and sold notes in this
9

&

a

a

it,

for not delivering goods.

The opinions of Mellor and

Shee.

JJ..

are omitted.
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transaction mentioned the plaintiffs and Buck & Co., as the buying
and selling parties. On this sale being communicated to Hudson, he
returned the sold note, which had been sent to him, declaring that he
would have nothing to do with the oil as purchaser or seller; and to
this the plaintiffs assented.
The defendant afterwards refused to de
liver the oil in pursuance of his agreement, and the plaintiffs, being
unable to fulﬁll their engagement with Buck 8: Co., were obliged to
pay them a sum of money in satisfaction, the market having risen
since the last-mentioned contract.
It was contended, on behalf of
the defendant, that Hudson's repudiation of the contract, and the ac
quiescence of the plaintiffs therein, put an end to the engagement be
tween the plaintiffs and defendant.
The arbitrator, however, was of
opinion that these facts did not affect either the rights of the defendant
as against Hudson, or the rights and liabilities of the plaintiffs and
He therefore awarded that the defendant should pay the
defendant.
plaintiffs the amount of the loss sustained by them in their settlement
with Buck & Co. A rule nisi was obtained this term for setting aside
the award, on the ground that the action was not maintainable upon
the facts above stated.
I
had at ﬁrst some diﬁiculty in coming to
Loan TENTERDEN, C. J.
the conclusion that the plaintiffs, situated as they were‘ in this case,
could sue upon the contract for their own beneﬁt. But on looking to
The form of
the contract itself, there appears nothing to prevent it.
the bought note is, “Bought for Messrs. Short, Bro\vn, and Bowyer,”
twenty tuns of Greenland oil, at so much per ton, to be paid for by
the buyers in ready money. The sold note is in thelike form.
In
The rest of the facts are
both the plaintiffs appear as the principals.
dehors the present question.
The rule will therefore be discharged.
PARKE, I. There was no fraud upon the defendant in this case.
He was informed that there was an unknown principal, and such was
the fact.
It is found that the plaintiffs were authorized by Hudson
to buy the oil of the defendant, and the contract was binding both
on them, and, if the defendant chose to enforce
on Hudson.
Then
said the contract was put an end to by what
called the repudia
tion on Hudson’s part: that is, by his informing the plaintiffs that
he would have nothing more to do with the purchase or sale, and
But this
such determination.
no more, in
by their acquiescing
effect, than
Hudson had thought proper to sell the beneﬁt of his
contract to any other person, which he might have done Without the
consent of the plaintiffs: and his doing so would have been nothing
to the defendant.“
clearly would not have determined the con
think, therefore, that the arbitrator came to
tract.
right conclu
is

is it,

a

I

It

if

in

is

it

I

sibn."
10 As to the right of every man to elect with what parties he will deal, and
lts effect on the right of the agent or principal to sue, see post, p. 755 ﬂf.
11 The oplnlons of Taunton and Patteson, JJ., are omitted.
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STEVENSON
i

(Court

v.

of King's Bench,

Cowper,

3

'

MORTIMER.
1778.

(Part.

805.)

Action for money had and received, brought by plaintiffs, as own
ers of a boat carrying chalk and lime, against defendant, as -a custom
house officer, for excessive fees collected by defendant from the mas

a

a

is

a

is

a

is

is

if

4

it

it,
it
is

is

If

it

‘it

ter of the boat.
LORD l\'lANSFIELD delivered his opinion as follo\vs.—The ground
of the nonsuit at the trial was, that this action could not be well main
tained by the plaintiffs, who are the owners of thevessel in question:
but it ought to have been brought by the master, who actually paid
the money.
That ground, therefore, makes now the only question
before us: As to which, there is not a particle of doubt. Qui facit
per alium, facit per se. Where a man pays money by his agent, which
ought not to have been paid, either the agent, or principal, may bring
an action to recover
back. The agent may, from the authority of
the principal; and the principal may, as proving
to have been paid
known agent, and an action brought
by his agent.
paid to
money
an answer to such action. that he has paid
against him for
Bur. 1984, ante, p. 608. Here
over to his principal.
Sadler v. Evans,
the statute lays the burthen on the master from necessity; and makes
him personally liable to penalties
he neglects to perform the requisi
tions of- it. But still he
entitled to charge the necessary fees, &c. up
on his doing so, to the account of his owners. And in this case, there
can be no doubt of the relation in which the master stood to the plain
tiffs; for he
the witness, and he swears, that the money was paid
Therefore, they are very well war
by the order of the jzlaintiffs.
ranted to maintain the action.-—If the parties had gone to trial upon
an apprehension that the only question to be tried was, VVhether this
was
case within the act of parliament, consequently, whether any
fee was due; the plaintiff could not have been permitted to surprise
the defendant at the trial, by starting another ground, upon which tn
recover
Norfolk groat. An action for money had and received
allowed to cu
governed by'the most liberal equity. Neither party
trap the other in form. But here, the plaintiff gave notice, that he
meant to insist that too Inuch was taken; and therefore, both’ came
to the trial with equal knowledge of the matter in dispute.
There
new trial must be absolute.—Lord
Mansﬁeld
fore, the rule for
added, that he thought, the plaintiffs ought to let the defendant know
the amount of the excess which they claimed;
that the defendant
might have an opportunity of paying money into court; and the rule
was drawn up accordingly.
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BORNSTEIN .1’

Court of Massachusetts,

1866.

12

Allen,

342.)

Contract to recover back $50, paid b'y plaintiff to defendant in
change for a $50 counterfeit bill. Judgment for plaintiff and defend
ant alleged exceptions.
_
BIGELOW, C.
The facts of this case do not bring it within the
familiar principle relied on by the defendant, that a mere agent or
servant, with whom a contract, either express or implied, is entered
into in behalf of another, and who has no beneﬁcial interest in the
transaction, cannot support an action thereon. The plaintiff had pos
session of money belonging to another, for a special purpose only. His
authority was strictly limited. It was conﬁned to the making of sales
of goods in the store and the payment of the money received "therefor
to a third person.
He had no authority to deal with the money as
his own, or to appropriate it for any purpose whatever.
His duty
was merely to receive it for goods which he might sell in the course
of the day, and to hold it in his possession till the hour for the daily
payment of it over to the sheriff's keeper arrived, when he was bound
to pay it over to him. Any act or dealing with the money beyond
He had no author
this was outside of the scope of hisemployment.
ity to enter into any contract concerning the money in his hands, or
to exchange it for other money with third persons. An authority to
receive the proceeds of sales in a shop did not empower the plaintiff
to exchange the money received in small sums for bills of larger de
nominations with persons who made no purchases of goods. No evi
dence was oifered to show any usage of business, either general ~or
special, which would authorize the inference that the plaintiff's au
thority was extended beyond the precise terms of his employment, so
as to embrace a transaction similar to that which he entered into with
the defendant’s agent.
In this state of the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff exceeded
his authority in exchanging the smaller bills in his possession for one
of the denomination of ﬁfty dollars, and he is liable to his employer
for the loss occasioned by his unauthorized act. It does not appear
For aught that
that the transaction has been ratiﬁed by the principal.
we can know, the plaintiff is still liable for the amount of.the genuine

I.“

Accord: Holt v. Ely, 1 E. & B. 795, 17 Jur. 892, 72 E. G. L. 795 (1853).
the absence of mistake or fraud the agent cannot set up his want of an
thority in an action against the third person. Yetter v. Van Patten. 103 Til.
The third person is not accountable for the agent’s fault.
App. 59 (1902).
Winkley v. Foye, 28 N. H. 513 (1854). Cf. Steiner Bros. V. Clisby. 103 Ala.
181. 15 South. 612 (1893), where the agent had ‘incurred no legal liability to

In

1!

his principal.
_
13 Part of the opinion is omitted,
man, 97 Minn. 157. 105 N. W. 560,
703, and note (1906).

G0nn.Ps.& A.

(211 En.)-—41

The case is followed in Parks v. Foule
A. (N. S.) 363, 114 Am. St. Rep.

4 L. R.
~
_
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ill

It cannot there
bills which he exchanged for the counterfeit one.
fore be said that the plaintiff has no beneﬁcial interest in the cause of
On the contrary, it plainly ap
action on which this suit is brought.
in
is the only mode in which
action
that
his
to
recover
this
pears
right
he can indemnify himself against the rightful claim of his employer
for the loss caused by his abuse of the -authority intrusted to him.
* =l=
Exceptions

overruled.

HOLDEN

v.

RUTLAND R. CO.

(Supreme Court of Vermont, 1901.

73

Vt.

317, 50

Atl.

1096.)

is

it,

a

is

it

is

a

a

Case for negligence in the sale of
mileage book. Plea not guilty.
directed verdict.
Judgment for defendant in
WATSON, ].“ The mileage book in question was purchased of the
defendant’s ticket agent at Burlington by the plaintiff, as the agent of
Dana O. Coles, but the plaintiff did not make known his agency nor
In selling such tickets, the Purchaser’s name
disclose his principal.
required to be signed to the contract printed in the back part of
the book. The plaintiff, being requested by the ticket agent thus to
sign the book in question, signed his own name thereto, instead of
that of his principal.
the duty of the
By force of the contract
selling agent to enter- the purchaser’s name in the front part of the
issued and entitled to trans
book as the person to whom the ticket
In the place for so doing the selling agent en
portation thereon.
tered the name of “A; F. Holden,” instead of “D. F. Holden," the
plaintiff’s name signed in the back part of the book as the purchaser.
The ticket was then used by the plaintiff in going from Burlington to
Rutland and return. Upon his return he gave the book to Coles, and
paid him for the number of miles used. About two months after
wards, the plaiutiff hired the book of Coles, and, with his daughter,
attempted to‘ go from Burlington to Rutland on another journey.
The daughter’s name-had then been inserted in the front part of
member of the purchaser’s family, and a per
the book by Coles as
In making this journey over
son entitled to transportation thereon.
the defendant’s road, the plaintiff offered the book for the transporta-.
tion of himself and daughter, but the conductor refused to accept
and they rode without paying fare to Rutland, where the plaintiff
was arrested at the request of the conductor, and detained for some
The plaintiff claims that his name
little time before being released.
should have been entered in the front part of the book as the person
to whom the ticket was issued, and that ~to enter the name of “A. F.
14

Part of the opinion is omitted.

‘
_

Gonn.Pn.&

A. (20 En.)
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Holden” instead was negligence by the ticket agent; and, further,
that the damages suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the conduc
tor’s refusal to accept the book for transportation were the result
of this negligence, for which the defendant is liable. The court be
low ordered a verdict for the defendant, to which the plaintiff ex
Was this error? is the sole question.
cepted.
The plaintiff purchased the mileage book for Coles, and as his
In these
agent, but he neither disclosed his agency nor his principal.
circumstances it is a well-settled rule
law that an action for a
breach of contract not under seal may be brought
the name of
either the agent or the principal,—in the name of the agent because
he has been treated by the defendant as the other party to the con
tract; in the name of the principal because he
the person really
interested in the contract, for whose beneﬁt
was made, and with
whom
considered in law as made.
Dicey, Parties, 136; Sims v.
Barn.
Bond,
Adol. 393; Lapham v. Green,
Vt. 407. But that
this rule of law shall not be so exercised as to work an injustice to
the other party to the contract, other rules incident thereto are
that,
the action
equally well established. One of these
brought
by the agent in his own name, the defendant may avail himself of
those defenses which are good against the agent who
the plaintiff
on record; also of any defense that would be good against the prin
cipal in whose interest the action
brought.
Dicey, Parties, 142;
Smith, Lead. Cas. 428. '*
\Vhen the plaintiff hired the book to make the journey in question,
he informed Coles that his daughter was going with him, whereupon
her name was inserted in the book, as before stated.
Assuming that
heriname might properly have been there inserted as
member of
the purchaser’s family, thereby entitling her to transportation upon
the ticket, under the provisions of the contract
could be done only
Neither
by the ticket agent at the station where the ticket was sold.
"‘
*
the plaintiff nor Coles had any right so to insert it.
This defense being available in an action brought by the agent in
his own name, the verdict was properly ordered.
Let judgment be
affirmed."
v. Darden. 82 Ga. 219.
S. E. 919. 14 Am. St. Rep. 152
principal and azent agreed to keep the agency secret.
Balto. Coal Tar Co. v, Fletcher, 61 Md. 288 (1884): Saladin v. Mitchell, 45
Ill. 79 (1867), in which part payment was made to the agent before the prin
cipal was disclosed: Brown v. Morris. 83 N. O. 251 (1880). where the third per
7

15 See. also, IRo,sser
(1888), in which the

I

9

8:

5

a

son paid the agent under
misapprehension not induced by the principal, and
then set up this payment by way of counterclaim;
and Girard v. Taggart,
R. 19,
Am. Dee. 327 (1818).
Serg.
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SECTI’ON 2.—IN TORT

-ii-_

PORTER
(Supreme

Court

v.

SCHENDEL."

of New York, Appellate Term.
N. Y. Supp. 602.)

1899.

25 Misc.

Rep. 779, 55
.

We have carefully examined the evidence in this
and have come to the conclusion that there was sufﬁcient, it
credited, to sustain a ﬁnding that the injury to property complained
of was caused by the negligence of the defendant. It was peculiarly
the province of the court below to determine what credit should be
given to the witnesses on the trial, and we see no reason for review
ing his judgment on this question.
the
_ \/Ve are further satisﬁed that, although the plaintiﬁs gweregnot
general owners of the goods which were injured, it was competent
for them to recover the damages so suffered, in an action instituted
by them in their own names.
They were factors, having possession
of the goods in question for sale, and, by special agreement, were
They
guarantors of the purchase money on sales made by them.
were also bound to incur certain expenditures, for which they were
entitled to be reimbursed, and they were also to receive an agreed
commission on such sales.
There was some evidence in the case
tending to show‘ that, at the time of the injury complained of, the
consignors or general owners of the property were indebted to them
on open account with respect to these matters. For the amount so
due the plaintiffs undoubtedly had a lien on the goods in their hands.
They had, therefore, a special property therein,
Story, Ag. § 34.
coupled with the possession of the goods, suﬁicient to support their
right to institute such an action as this; and the recovery of the
judgment here will be a bar to any action which might hereafter be
brought by the general owner, to whom it is the duty of the plaintiffs
1 Am.
to account for the amount realized by them in this action.
& Eng. Enc. Law (Zd Ed.) p. 1166; Faulkner v, Brown, 13 V\"end.
Gorum v. Carey, 1 Abb. Prac. 285; Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank
6_3;
v. Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Nat. Bank, 6O N. Y. 40, 52.
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be aﬁirmed. Iudgment
aﬁirmed, with costs.
PER CURLAM.

case,

16 Accord: Williams v. Miliington, 1_ H.
session of property may maintain trespass
Hayes. 63 Vt. 475. 21 Atl. 610 (1891).
But
v. Stockton, 15 Tex. Clv. App. 145, 38 S. W.

Bl.

81 (1788).
The agent in pos
against a wrongdoer.
Taylor v.
see Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. C0.
647 (1897).
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NATIONAL AMALGAMATED LABOUR
ERS’ UNION.

(King’s Bench Division.

[1903]

2

K. B.

600, 72

L.

J.

K.

.

907.)

Action by plaintiff, a laborer, against defendant union and some of
Plaintiff had been expelled
its officers for damages and injunction.
from the union for failure to pay certain arrears due the union. Other
facts appear in the opinion.
Roman, L. J.“ What are the facts of this case as stated by Walton,
]., and found by the jury? In effect they are that the defendants Wil
liams and Toomey, a.s officers of the defendant union, had, by virtue
of their position, control over the men of the union, and consequently
power to influence employers by calling out or threatening to call out
the men unless_the demands of the defendants Williams and Toomey
were complied with, and accordingly that the defendants combined to
prevent, and did prevent, the plaintiff from getting or retaining em
ployment by calling out or threatening to call out the men, and, further,
that this caused damage to the plaintiff to the extent of £100., and the
jury negatived the suggestion that what the defendants did, first, was
only to warn the employers that the men would leave in consequence of
the men objecting to work with the plaintiff ; and, secondly, was done
in fact in consequence of the men objecting to work with the plain
tiff. Lastly, it is found that the defendants acted as they did in order
to compel the plaintiff to pay the arrears of some moneys due from
him to the union.
The question then is whether, on these facts, the defendant Toomcy
ought not to have been held liable to the plaintiff, as well as the defend
ant \/Villiams, who was also found to have been actuated by a desire
Now, since the de
to punish the plaintiff for not paying the arrears.
cision of the House of Lords in the case of Quinn v. Leathem, [1901]
A. C. 495, I take it to be clear, even if it had not been clear before, that
a combination of two or more persons, without justiﬁcation, to injure
a workman by inducing -employers not to employ him or continue to
But, al
employ him. is. if it results in damage to him, actionable.
though I think there is no difficulty in stating the law, I fully realize
that considerable difficulty may often arise in particular cases in as
within the meaning of my state
certaining what is a “justiﬁcation”
ment.
As to this, I can only say that regard must be had to the cir
cumstances of each case as it arises, and that it is not practically feasi
ble to give an exhaustive deﬁnition of the word to cover all cases; and
I would refer to what I have already said on a similar point in the
judgment I have just delivered in the case of Glamorgan Coal Co. v.
South Wales Miners’ Federation, [1903] 2 K. B. 545. I will only add
that I do not think any excessive practical difficulty would arise in di
17 The statement

of facts is abridged.
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recting a jury on this point in any particular case; and I may refer,
this, to the direction given to the jury by FitzGibbon, L.
]:, in the case of Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. C. at page SOO.
In the case now before us I cannot say that I feel any difficulty in
For, on the facts,
applying the law as regards the defendant Toomey.
more
I have simply to determine whether two or
persons, who by virtue
of their position have special power to carry out their design, are justi
ﬁed in combining to prevent, and in fact preventing, a workman from
obtaining any employment in his trade or calling, to his injury, merely
In my
because they wish to compel him to pay a debt due from him.
opinion they are not justiﬁed; and consequently the defendants Toomey
and Williams are, in my opinion, liable to the plaintiff for the damage
suffered by him through the conduct of the defendants.
I may point out, with reference to some observations made in the
course of the argument, that this is not a case where_the defendants,
knowing of the plaintiff's defalcations, thought it their duty to warn
employers as to the plaintiﬁ"s character, or where the plaintiﬁ"s fel
low workmen, by reason of that character declined to work with him.
The ﬁndings of the jury negative any such case. And, further, I de
sire to add, with reference to an argument addressed to us on behalf
of the defendants, that the intent on the part of the defendants VVil
liams and Toomey to injure the plaintiff appears from the ﬁndings of
the jury. The intent of the defendants was to prevent the plaintiff's
obtaining or retaining employment, in order to compel him to pay a
debt due from him; and from this the intent to injure the plaintiff ap
'
pears to me to follo\v.
But I should be sorry to leave this case without observing that. in
my opinion, it was not essential, in order for the plaintiff to succeed,
that he should establish a combination of two or more persons to do
In my judgment, if a person who, by virtue
the acts complained of.
of his position or inﬂuence, has power to carry out his design, sets
himself to the task of preventing, and succeeds in preventing, a man
from obtaining or holding employment in his calling, to ‘his injury, by
reason of threats to or special inﬂuence upon the man’s employers, or
would-be employers, and the design was to carry out some spite against
the man, or had for its object the compelling him to pay a debt, or any
similar object not justifying the acts against the man, then that person
is liable to the man for the damage consequently suffered.
The con
duct of that person would be, in my opinion, such an unjustiﬁable mo
lestation of the man, such an improper and inexcusable interference
with the man’s ordinary rights of citizenship, as to make that person
liable in an action. And I think this view is borne out by the views
expressed by the members of the House of Lords who decided the case
of Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. C. 495.
The remaining question is as to the liability of the defendant union.
That depends upon whether, if the acts complained of had been done
by the executive committee, the union would have been liable.
have
as illustrating

I
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J.,

come to the conclusion that the union would have been liable on the
principle stated in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex.
259—that the acts were done in the service and for the beneﬁt of the
i
union.
WILLIAMS,
STIRLING,
of
and
VAUGHAN
Opinions
L.
L. J.,
[The

.

_

are omitted.]
Appeal allowed.“

JONES

v.

LESLIE.

(Supreme Court of Washington, 1910.
61 Wash. 107, 112 Pac. 81, 48 L. R. A.
[N. S.] 893, Ann. Cas. 191213, 1158.)

Action for damages.
peals.
DUNBAR,

From judgment for defendants plaintiff ap
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C. R. Jones, by his guardian ad litem, John Jones,
complains of the defendants John C. Leslie, Leslie Power Company,
Winans, and Seattle Cracker
Incorporated, L.
Candy Company,
corporation, and alleges, in substance, that on or about the 12th day
of August, 1909, and long before said time, the plaintiff, C. H. Jones,
teamster,
was employed by the defendant Leslie Power Company as
It
and was driving
wagon and team for said defendant.
seems that the appellant, young Jones, was working for the Seattle
Cracker Company and Steeves Br0s.; that during the summer va
cation he was laid off, so that some relative who was at home during
the vacation could take the job, with the understanding that the appel
lant should have the advantage of the ﬁrst opening.
He then went to
work for the respondent Leslie Power Company, ,and in time he was
notiﬁed that he could have work again with Steeves Bros. or the
cracker company.
One of the employés of the respondent Leslie
Power Company informed Mr. Leslie, the president and manager of
that company, that Jones was going to quit. Mr. Leslie called him in
and he told him that he was going to quit, as
and asked him about
better job at more wages. Leslie wanted to know of him
he had
he was going to leave him in the lurch, and the appellant told him that
he could not give him any more time, that he would commence working
for his new employer on Monday the 15th, whereupon Leslie told ap
he left him in the lurch, he would see that he never got
pellant that,
the job with the cracker company, and he immediately repaired to the
telephone, and sent the following message to the cracker company:
“Q. State what he said over the telephone. A. He told him that he

Accord: Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 73 N. J. Law, 729,
Ann. Cas. 698 (1906),
L. R. A. (N. S.) 254. 118 Am. St. Rep. 727.
Atl. 165,
323 (1915), damages by servant for
Coleman v. Hotel de France. 29 P.
wrongful discharge.
19 Part of the opinion is omitted.
I.
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He said that he was a good customer
thought I didn't do him right.
there, and he said, ‘You know it.’ He said, ‘If you hire him, I will
" Another
certainly not buy any more crackers from you.’
witness
testiﬁed to hearing substantially the same message, and there is some
evidence from the guardian Jones and a man who was with him that
Leslie admitted having tried to injure the appellant for the reason that
“had done him dirt.”
he had tried to injure him, or, as he expressed
The message which Leslie testifies to sending was of a different char
But the determination
acter, and would probably not be actionable.
of the credibility of the witnesses was a matter resting entirely with
the jury.
also appears from the testimony that the appellant was
discharged by Steeves Bros. through the interposition of the cracker
company, for the reason that they did not want to lose "a good cus
tomer.
would
This presents case here which
purely
question of law.
man
fundamental that
be well to remember in the beginning that
This was the doctrine of
has
right to be protected in his property.
the common law,
and always has been, the law in every civilized
nation.
of necessity one of the fundamental principles of gov
ernment, the protection of property being largely one of the objects
of government. For the protection of life, liberty, and property, men
Is,
have yielded up their natural rights and established governments.
then, the right of employment in
That
laboring man property?
The property of the capitalist
we think cannot be questioned.
his gold and silver, his bonds, credit, etc., for in these he deals and
For the same reason, the property of the merchant
makes his living.
his property, be
his goods. And every man’s trade or profession
his means of livelihood, because, through its agency, he main
cause
tains himself and family, and
enabled to add his share towards the
Can
be said with any
expenses of maintaining the government.
man has in his
degree of sense or justice that the property which
labor which
the foundation of all property and which
the only
not prop
capital of so large
majority of the citizens of our country
erty; or, at least, not that character of property which can demand
the boon of protection from the government?
We think not. To de
or exchang
stroyi this property, or to prevent one from contracting
for the necessities of life,
not only an invasion of
ing
private
an injury to the public, for
right, but
tends to produce pauperism
and crime. This relief has been granted to employers in many forms.
Workmen have been enjoined from collecting about the employer's
place of business for the purpose of ridiculing his employés with
view of causing them to stop work; and many other demonstrations
of the same character and purpose have been enjoined, of course, on
the theory that
was an unlawful act. To deny the same relief to the
employé under similar circumstances would be
reproach to the law.
true that in many cases the element of conspiracy existed, but the
the same.
Nor have the courts refused this protection to
principle
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employés} but in a vast majority of cases of the kind it has been held
that a legal right had been invaded, and the law imposed a liability.
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There are a few cases, that might possibly sustain the respondents’
contention. Those which they have cited, however, we think arc clear
ly not in point, or are easily distinguished from the case at bar. Ben
jamin ‘v. Vi/heeler, 8 Gray (Mass.) 409, and Randall v. Hazelton, 12
Allen (-Mass.) 415, do not deal in any way with the principle under dis
In Heywood v. Tillson, -75 Me. 225, 46 Am. Rep. 373,
cussion here.
it was held that an employer had a right to refuse to employ, or to
retain in his service, any person renting certain speciﬁed premises;
and the owner of such premises had no cause of action against him
for the exercise of such right, though such refusal was through malice
or ill will to the owner. An examination of that case shows that there
were conditions which the defendant had a right to take into considera
tion in employing men, and which no one else had a right to question;
that if his employés remained in the house, the rent of which was the
subject of controversy, the renting of the house being the business of
an enemy of the employer, it was liable to affect the character of the
workmen and their attitude towards their employer.
So many other
questions entered into the consideration of that case that it seems to
us it has no bearing on the case at bar. Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt.
219, 35 Atl. 53, 33 L. R. A. 225, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, was another case
of somewhat the same character. There a superintendent of a quafry
refused to permit another to take stone therefrom unless the latter
discharged a certain employé, and it was held that he was not liable for
But, whether the court wisely decided this
causing such discharge.
case on the circumstances controlling
was evident that the court
proceeded upon the theory that there was no lawful right invaded in
that particular case, and that, where the lawful right was invaded, an
action would lie, for in discussing the case
said: “The authorities
cited for the plaintiff clearly establish that
the defendant, without
having any lawful right, or by an act, or threat, aliunde the exercise
of lawful right, had broken up the contract relation existing between
the plaintiff and Libersant, maliciously or unlawfully, although such
relation could be terminated at the pleasure of either, and damage had
thereby been occasioned, the party damaged could have maintained an
action against the defendant therefor."
The English case upon which ‘this doctrine of nonliability rests—and
we have gone outside of the cases cited by the briefs for the purpose
of determining this case as the principle involved seems to us to be of
some im‘portance—is Allen v. Flood, Law Journal, 1898 (Q. B.) p.
the celebrated Boiler Makers’ Case, where the boiler
119.
This
makers in common employment with the respondents, who were ship
Wrights working on wood, objected to work with the latter on the
ground that in
previous employment they had been engaged on iron
work.
The appellant, an official of the Boiler Makers’ Union, in re
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sponse to a telegram from one of the boiler makers, came to the yard
and dissuaded the men from immediately leaving their work, as they
threatened to do, intimating that if they did so, he would do his best
to have them deprived of the beneﬁts of the union, and also fined. The
appellant then saw the managing director, to whom he said that if the
respondents, who were engaged from day to day, were not dismissed,
the boiler makers would leave their work or be called out. The re
spondents were thereupon dismissed, and it was held by a majority
of the judges in the House of Lords that no action would lie. This
opinion by the different Lords is entirely too long to review or to make
But, whatever may be said of
any attempt to review.
tinged
with the idea which prevails in many of the decisions that, where com
the stimulating motive in interfering with employment, such
petition
But, even outside of that
competition
justification for the act.
question, the opinions of the majority of the Lords in this case show
that they are not in harmony with the rule that had theretofore been
established in the English courts, and that has since been almost uni
The Lords them
versally followed in both England and America.
selves were informed of this by the very able dissenting opinion of the
Lord Chancellor, who, after reviewing the cases and the case under
consideration, concluded as follows: “I regret that
am compelled to
differ so widely with some of your Lordships, but my difference
founded on the belief that in denying these plaintiffs
remedy we are
departing from the principles which have hitherto guided our courts
in the preservation of individual liberty to all.
am encouraged, how.
ever, by the consideration that the adverse views appear to me to over
rule the views of most distinguished judges going back now for cer
tainly 200 years, and that up to the period when this case reached your
Lordships’ House there was an unanimous concensus of opinion, and
that of eight judges who have given us the beneﬁt of their opinions
six have concurred in the judgments which your Lordships are now
asked to overrule.”
that of Keeble v. Hickerin
One of the oldest cases on this subject
certain
gill, 11 East, 574. This was an action for interfering with
right to the use of
certain
right of hunting by the plaintiff, and of
wide scope.
The
pond or grounds. The discussion of the case took
opinion was rendered by Chief justice Holt, and, in the course of the
discussion by the eminent judge, he divided these different classes of
‘actions as follows: “Now there are two sorts of acts for doing damage
to
man’s employment, for which an action lies. The one
in respect
in respect of his property.
of the man’s privilege. The other
In
man’s franchise or privilege whereby he hath
that of
fair market,
another shall use the like liberty, though out of his limits,
or ferry,
he shall be liable to an action, though by grant from the King.
But
therein
the difference to be taken between
liberty in which the pub
beneﬁt, and that wherein the public
lic hath
not concerned.
The

_

Ch. 4)

LIABILITY or THIRD

T0 nnrnnsnxmrrvn

PER.8_ONS

651

In

is

if

a

a

(Q. B.)

~

463.

‘

Law

J.

if

a

it
is

*

* a

it

it,

a

it‘

other is where a violent or malicious act is done to a man’s occupation,
There an action lies in all
profession, or way of getting a livelihood.
cases." In Bowen v. Hall, Law Journal, 1881, p. 305, on appeal from
con
the judgment of Queen's Bench,
was held that, where one had
tract for exclusive personal service, the plaintiff could maintain an
action against the defendant for maliciously procuring the other party
to the contract to break
notwithstanding that the strict relation of
was said:
master and servant did not exist between them. There
person to break his contract may not be wrong
“Merely to persuade
* "but
ful in law or fact,
the persuasion be used for the
indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of beneﬁting the defend
in law
ant at the expense of the plaintiff,
malicious act, which
and in fact
wrongful act, and therefore
wrong one, and therefore
an actionable act
injury ensue from it”—citing Lumley v. Gye, 22
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an article in the 54 Central Law Iournal, commencing at page
426, an extended review
made of this subject, and the authorities
cited. There
made from the case of Doremus v. Hen
quotation
nessy, 176111.608, 52 N. E. 924, 54 N. E. 524, 43 L. R. A. 797, 802, 68
Am. St. Rep. 203, where the court said: “The common law seeks to
protect every person against the wrongful acts of others, whether
committed alone or by combination, and an action may be had. for
injuries done which cause another loss in the enjoyment of any right
or privilege or property.
No persons individually or
combination
have the right to directly or indirectly interfere or disturb another in
his lawful business or occupation, or to threaten to do so for the sake
of compelling him to do some act, which in his judgment his interest
does not require.
Losses willfully caused by another from motives
of malice or one who seeks to exercise and enjoy the fruits and ad
vantages of his own experience, industry, skill, and credit will sustain
an action.”
In'that case the action was for the interference with an
It was further said: “Appellant’s counsel concede, and
employment.
we think
the law, that where one maliciously brings about the dis
charge of an employé, where the contract between the latter and his
terminable at will, the injured employé
entitled to re
employé
cover.”
The same author in discussing the natural consequence of
conceded that the man who
competition between laborers, where
underbids his rival may retain the latter’s situation with impunity, says:
“But
an interloper seeks, not employment for himself or for one in
whom he
directly interested, but the mere wanton discharge of an
wanton, unjustiﬁable in law, and actionable
other, such conduct
And the article concludes as follows: “From the
damage result.”
foregoing discussion the rule of law may be deduced that every one has
natural right to conduct his trade, business, profession, or legal re
lationship arising out of contract free from all intentional and wanton
interference on the part of those whose sole object
to damage him
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by refusing his patronage, withdrawing his employés, or interrupting
the valuable relation into which he, by contract, has entered.”
In Purington v. Hinchliff, 219 Ill. 159, 76 N. E. 47, 2 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 824, 109 Am. St. Rep. 322, it was held that any person or combina
tion of persons who unlawfully by direct or indirect means obstruct
or interfere with another in the conduct of his lawful business are
liable in damages for loss willfully caused by such action. In the case
of London Guarantee & Accident Company v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69
N. E. 526, 99 Am. St. Rep. 185, appellee was in the employ of Arnold,
Schwinn & Co. of Chicago, as foreman of the frame department of its
bicycle factory, and on that day, while engaged in his work, was in
jured while attempting to operate a milling machine, from which he
suffered the loss of two ﬁngers on his right hand. At the time of this
injury, Arnold, Schwinn & Co. carried an indemnity policy in the Lon
don Guarantee & Accident Company, indemnifying the ﬁrm from in
The policy provided
juries to its employés, to the extent of $5,000.
that, if any suit should be brought against the assured to enforce a
claim for damages on account of an accident covered by the policy,
immediate notice thereof should be given to the company, and the com
pany would defend, etc., the ordinary provisions in an indemnity policy.
The company oﬁered the appellee a certain amount of money in set
tlement of his claim, and informed him that, unless he accepted that
amount, they would see to it that he was not re~employed by Arnold,
Schwinn 8: Co. The offer was refused, and suit was brought against
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., in which a verdict was subsequently rendered
for $3,500.
The statement is long, but the essence of it is that the
insurance company prevailed upon the employer to discharge the plain
tiff by threatening to cancel the policy which the manufacturing COlTl
pany had in its company, and the suit was brought against the London
Guarantee Company by Horn for damages for loss of employment,
and the court held that he could recover, holding that one whose dis
charge from employment was procured by a third party \had a right
of action against such party. In this case the authorities are reviewed
at great length, and the general doctrine announced as we have in
dicated.
In Chipley v. Atkinson, 23-Fla. Z06, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep.
367, it was held that an action lies in behalf of an employé against a
person who has maliciously procured the employer to discharge such
employé from employment in which he is engaged under a legal con
tract, and that an action will lie where the period for which the employ
ment is to continue is not certain, if damage result from the discharge;
that the fact that no contract or legal right of the employé as against
the employer is violated by the employer, or that no action can be
maintained by the employé against the employer for such discharge,
cannot prevent a recovery against the third person who has maliciously
procured the discharge, and which discharge would not have occurred
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In Thacker Coal Company v. Burke, 59 W.
but for such procurement.
Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1091, it was decided that
one who maliciously entices a servant in actual service of a master to
quit his service is liable to action therefor, and that if one wantonly
and maliciously, whether for his own beneﬁt or not, induces a person
to violate his ‘contract with a third person to the injury of that third
person, it is actionable. In Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.
E. 125, 52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289, which was an action for
maliciously by means of slanderous charges inducing a third person to
discharge the‘ plaintiff from his employ, the action was sustained, the
court saying: “Finally, we see no sound distinction between persuad
ing by malevolent advice and accomplishing the same result by false
hood or putting in fear. In all these cases the employer is controlled
through motives created by the defendant for the unprivileged purpose.
It appears to us not to matter which motive is relied upon. If accom
plishing the end by one of them is a wrong to the plaintiff, accomplish
Sec, also,
ing it by either of the others must be equally a wrong.”
Employing Printers’ Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, SO S. E.
353, 69' L. R. A. 90, 106 Am. St. Rep. 137; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90
Me. 166, 38 Atl. 96, 60 Am. St. Rep. 252 ;' Addison on Torts (8th Ed.)
P.

/.

\

There are hundreds of these cases cited in the cases which we have
quoted from which sustain the doctrine that the person causing the loss
of employment under such circumstances as were the cause of the loss
in this case are liable if damages ensue.
It seems to be almost the
Nor are we able to
universal doctrine of the courts of the country.
ﬁnd any just criticism for such a rule. It is an excellent rule of action‘
to refrain from interference with the affairs of others and especiallv
if the motive actuating such interference is to work injury to others.”
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded, with in
structions to proceed with the trial of the case.
20 As to “malicious
act," ct. Rayerott v. Tayntor, cited in principal case,
supra.
See. also, Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St.
Rep. 367 (1887).
,
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Court of Massachusetts, 1905. 188 Mass. 353,
L. R. A. [N. S.] 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 499, 3 Ann. Cas.

74 N.
738.)

E.

603.
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There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepted. Excep
'
tions overruled.
KNOWLTON, C. ].”1 This is an action of tort, brought to recover
damages sustained by reason of the defendant’s malicious interference
with the plaintiff's contract of employment. The plaintiff was a shoe
maker, employed by the ﬁrm of Hazen B. Goodrich & Co. at Haverhill,
At the time of the in
Mass., under a contract terminable at will.
terference complained of he had been so employed nearly-four years.
The defendant was the representative at Haverhill of a national or
ganization of shoe workers, called the Boot and Shoe Workers’ Union,
of which he was also a member. The evidence showed that he in
duced Goodrich & Co. to discharge the plaintiff, greatly to his damage.
A few days before the plaintiffs discharge a contract was entpred
into between the Boot and Shoe Workers’ Union and the firm of
Goodrich & Co., \vhich was signed by the defendant for the union, the
second clause of which was as follows: “In consideration of the fore
going valuable privileges, the employer agrees to hire, as shoe workers,
only members of the Boot and Shoe Workers’ Union in good standing,
and further agrees not to retain any shoe worker in his employment
after receiving notice from the union that such shoe worker is objec
tionable to the union, either on account of being in arrears for dues,
or disobedience of union rules or laws, or from any other cause.”_
* * * Soon after the execution of this contract the defendant de
manded 'of Goodrich 8: Co. that the plaintiff be discharged, and the
evidence tended to show that the sole ground for the demand was
that the plaintiff was not a member of the union, and that he persistent
ly declined to join it after repeated suggestions that he should do so.
=:=
=r *

The primary right of the plaintiff to have the beneﬁt of his con
tract and to remain undisturbed in the performance of it is universally
recognized. The right to dispose of one’s labor as he will, and to have
the benefit of one’s lawful contracts, is incident to the freedom of the
individual, which lies at the foundation of the government in all coun
Such a right can
tries that maintain the principles of civil liberty.
lawfully be interfered with only by one who is acting in the exercise
of an equal or superior right which comes in conflict with the other.
An intentional interference with such a right without lawful justiﬁ
cation is malicious in law, even if it is from good motives and without
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555-562;
Plant v.
express malice.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492-498, 57 N. E. 1011, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am.
21

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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St. Rep. 330; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1-18; Mogul Steamship
Company v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598-613; Read v. Friendly S0
ciety. of Operative Stone Masons, [1902] 2 K. B. 88-96; Giblan v.
National Amalgamated Union, [1903] 2 K. B. 600-617.
In the
present case the judge submitted to the jury, ﬁrst, the question whether
the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs rights under his contract
with Goodrich & Co.; and, secondly, the question whether, if he did,
the interference was without justiﬁable cause.
The jury were in
structed that, unless the defendant’s interference directly caused the
termination of the plaintiff’s employment, there could be no recovery.
The substance of the defendant’s contention was that if he acted under
the ‘contract between the Boot and Shoe Workers’ Union and the em
ployer in procuring the plaintiffs discharge,C his interference was law

ful.
This contention brings us to an examination of

the contract.
That
part which relates to the persons to be employed contains, ﬁrst, a pro
vision that the employer will hire only members of the union.
This
has no application to the plaintiff's case, for it is an agreement only
for the future, and the plaintiff had been hired a long time before.
The next provision is that the employer will not retain in his employ
ment a worker, after receiving notice that he is objectionable to the
union, “either on account of being in arrears for dues, or disobedience
of union rules or laws, or from any other cause.” The ﬁrst two pos
sible causes for objection could not be applied to persons in the situa
tion of the plaintiff, who were not members of the union or amenable
to its laws. As to such persons the only provision applicable was that
the ﬁrm would not retain a worker who was objectionable to the union
from any cause, however arbitrary the objection or unreasonable the
This provision purported to authorize the union to
cause might be.
interfere and deprive any workman of his employment for no reason
whatever, in the arbitrary exercise of its power. \Vhatever the con
tracting parties may do if no one but themselves is\concerned, it is evi
dent that, as against the workman, a contract of this kind does not
of itself justify interference with his employment by a third person
Curran v. Galen, 152 N.
who made the contract with his employer.
Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297, 37 L. R. A. 802, S7 Am. St. Rep. 496. No one
can legally interfere with the employment of another unless in the ex
ercise of some right of his own, which the law respects. His will so
The judge
to interfere for his own gratiﬁcation is not such ‘a right.
rightly left to the jury the question whether, in view of all the cir
cumstances, the interference was or was not for a justifiable cause.
If the plaintiffs habits or conduct or character had been such as to
render him an unﬁt associate in the shop for ordinary workmen of
good character, that would have been a suﬁicient reason for inter
ference in behalf of his shopmates. We can conceive of other good
reasons. But the evidence tended to show that the only reason for
procuring his discharge was his refusal to join the union. The ques
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tion, therefore, is whether the jury might ﬁnd that such an interference
was unlawful.
The only argument that we have heard in support of interference by
labor unions in cases of this kind is that it is justiﬁable as a kind of
It- is true that fair competition in business brings persons
competition.
into rivalry, and often justiﬁes action for one’s self which interferes
with proper action of another. Such action on both sides is the ex
ercise by competing persons of equal conﬂicting rights. The principle
appealed to would justify a member of the union, who was seeking
employment for himself, in making an offer to serve on such terms
as would result, and as he knew would result, in the discharge of the
plaintiff by his employer, to make a place for the new comer. Such
It would be
an offer, for such a purpose, would be unobjectionable.
merely the exercise of a personal right, equal in importance to the
But an interference by a combination of persons to
plaintiff's right.
obtain the discharge of a workman because he refuses to comply with
their wishes, for their advantage, in some matter in which he has a
In such a case the ac
right to act independently, is not competition.
tion taken by the combination is not in the regular course of their
business as employés, either in the service in which they are engaged
or in an effort to obtain employment in other service. The result which
they seek to obtain‘ cannot come directly from anything that they do
within the regular line of their business as workers competing in the
labor market.
can only come from action outside of the province
of workingmen, intended directly to injure another, for the purpose
of compelling him to submit to their dictation.
difﬁcult to see
how the object to be gained can come within the ﬁeld of fair competi
in reference to the right of employés to com
tion. If we consider
union has no tenden
person to join
pete with one another, inducing
Indeed, the object of organizations
cy to aid them in such competition.
not to make competition of employés with one another
of this kind
rather, by association, to prevent such
more easy or ‘successful.
competition, to bring all to equality and to make them act together in
common interest. Plainly, then, interference with one working under
contract, with
view to compel him to join
union, cannot be justi
ﬁed as
part of the competition of workmen with one another.
VVe understand that the attempted justiﬁcation rests entirely upon
another kind of so—callecl competition, namely, competition between
employers and the employed, in the attempt of each class to obtain as
share as possible of the income from their combined efforts
large
In
in the industrial ﬁeld.
strict sense this
hardly competition.
struggle or contention of interests of different kinds, which are
in opposition, so far as the division of proﬁts
concerned. In
broad
sense, perhaps, the contending forces may be called competitors.
At
all events,. we may assume that, as between themselves, the principle
which warrants competition permits also reasonable efforts, ‘of
direct tendency to beneﬁt one party in his
proper kind, which have
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business at the expense of the other. It is no legal objection to action
whose direct effect is helpful to one of the parties in the struggle that
it is also directly detrimental to the other. But when action is directed
against the other primarily for the purpose of doing him harm, and
thus compelling him to yield to the demand of the actor, and thisaction
does not directly aﬂfect the property or business or status of the actor,
the case is different, even if the actor expects to derive a remote or
indirect beneﬁt from the act. The gain which a labor union may ex
pect to derive from inducing others to join it is not an improvement
to be obtained directly in the conditions under which the men are
working, but only added strength for such contests with employers
as may arise in the future.
An object of this kind is too remote to
be considered a beneﬁt in business, such as to justify the inﬂiction of
intentional injury upon a third person for the purpose of obtaining it.
If such an object were treated as legitimate, and allowed to be pursued
to its complete accomplishment, every employé would be forced into
membership in a union, and the unions, by a combination of those in
different trades and occupations, would have complete and absolute con
trol of all the industries of the country.
Employers would be forced
to yield to all their demands or give up business. The attainment of
such an object in the struggle with employers would not be competi
tion, but monopoly.
A monopoly, controlling anything which the
world must have, is fatal to prosperity and progress. In matters of
this kind the law does not tolerate monopolies.
The attempt to force
all laborers to combine in unions is against the policy of the law, be
cause it aims at monopoly.
It therefore does not justify causing the
discharge, by his employer, of an individual laborer working under
a contract.
It is easy to see that for different reasons an act which
might be done in legitimate competition by one or two or three persons,
each proceeding independently, might take on an entirely different
character, both in its nature and its purpose, if done by hundreds in
combination.
We have no desire to put obstacles in the way of employés who are
seeking bv combination to obtain better conditions for themselves and
their families. VVe have no doubt that laboring men have derived and
We only say
may hereafter derive advantages from organization.
that under correct rules of law, and with a proper regard for the
rights of individuals, labor unions cannot be permitted to drive men
out of employment because they choose to work independently.
If
disagreements between those who furnish the capital and those who
perform the labor employed in industrial enterprises are to be settled
only by industrial wars, it would give a great advantage to combina
tions of employés, if they could be permitted by force to obtain a
monopoly of the labor market. But we are hopeful that this kind of
warfare will soon give way to industrial peace, and that rational meth
ods of settling such controversies will be adopted universally.
Goi>n.Pn.& A.(2n En.)—42
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The fact that the plaintiff's contract was te-rminable at will, instead
of ending at a stated time, does not affect his right to recover. It
only affects the amount that he is to receive as damages. Moran v.
Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485-487, 59 N. E. 125, 52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St.
Rep. 289; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166-176, 38 Atl. 96, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 252; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters Association, 77 Md. 396, 26
Atl. 505, 19 L. R. A. 408, 39 Am. St. Rep. 421; London Guarantee
Company v. Horn, 101 Ill. App. 355; Id., 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526,
99Am. St. Rep. 185.
,
The conclusion which we have reached is well supported by au
thority.
[Omitting the references to the American and English cases.]
* * *
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We hold that the defendant was not justiﬁed by the contract with
Co., or by his relations to the plaintiff, in interfering with
Goodrich
the plaintiff's employment under his contract. How far the principles
which we adopt would apply, under different conceivable forms
con
tract, to an interference with
workman not engaged, but seeking
employment, or to different methods of boycotting, we have no occa
sion in this case to decide.
The defendant contends that the judge erred in his instruction to
the jury in response to the defendant's special request at the close of
the defendant caused
the charge. The judge said, in substance, that
the ﬁrm to discharge the plaintiff by giving the members to understand
that, unless they discharged him, they “would be visited with some
punishment, under the contract or otherwise, then that interference
This instruction, taken literally and alone,
would not be justifiable.”
would be erroneous. Some grounds of interference would be justiﬁa
ble, while others would not. But considering the instruction in con
nection with that which immediately preceded
and with other parts
of the charge,
evident that the judge was directing the attention
of the jury to what would constitute an interference, not to what
would justify an interference.
He had just told them that,
all_the
defendant did was to call the attention of the ﬁrm to the provision of
the contract, and the ﬁrm then, of their own motion, discharged the
He'then pursued the
plaintiﬁ‘, the defendant would not be liable.
subject with some elaboration, and ended as stated above.
Instead of
saying, “then that interference would not be justiﬁable,” he evidently
meant‘ to say, “then that would be interference which would create
was justiﬁable.”
Taking the charge as a whole, we
liability, unless
think the jury \vere not misled by the inaccuracy of this statement.”
Exceptions overruled.

a

&

a.

22 Accord: Conway v. Wade, [1909] A. C. 506.
Cf. Perkins v. Pendleton,
90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. 96, G0 Am. St. Rep. 252 (1897).
As to “competition” as
defense, see London Guarantee
Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 I11. 493, 69 N. E.
526, 99 Am. St. Rep. 185 (1903); Erdman V. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327,
63 L. R. A. 534, 99 Am. St. Rep. 783 (1903), involving
contest between rival
labor unions.
G0nn.Pn.& A. (2n En.)
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OSBORNE.

(Supre me Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1911. 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036,
37 L. R. A. [N. S.] 179, Ann. Cas. 19120, 1299.)
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to enjoin a strike. Decrees in plaintiff's favor reversed.
The material facts which give rise to this controversy
skilled
(as found by the superior court) are that the plaintiff Minas,
laster by trade, had
contract for labor as
laster with the Randall
Adams Company, terminable at the will of either. V)/ith the consent
of his employer, he had
turn employed as helper his father, Ham
partzoon, the other plaintiff, who was not able to do all the work of
laster, and who received no wages from the Randall Adams Company
and had no relation as servant to it. The work was piece work, and
Minas alone received, and was entitled to receive, the compensation
for their joint labor. This method of work was known ‘in the craft
as “contract” or “cross-handed.”
Both of the plaintiffs were, or had been members of the Lasters’
Union, an unincorporated association, of which the defendants are
The defendant Osborne, who
the
representatives and members.
notiﬁed the employer,
business agent of the Lasters’ Union No.
the,Randall Adams Company, that unless the father was discharged
the shop’s crew would be “pulled out.” The father did not work for
day or two, but returned to work after the superintendent of the em
ployer told the sen, Minas, to get him and put him to work again.
The next day all the other lasters went out on an orderly strike, which
consequence, both plaintiffs have lost
was indorsed by the Union. As
their employment. The Lasters’ Union substantially controls the labor
market in the manufacture of shoes, for practically all lasters are
continued, will be
members of the Union. The effect of the strike,
to prevent Randall Adams Company from continuing business unless
discharges Minas or compels him to dispense with the assistance of
his father.
Here
plain and tangible injury to the plaintiffs as the proximate
This gives a cause of action to
result of the acts of the defendants.
sufficient justiﬁcation for
the plaintiffs unless the defendants have
their conduct. If they have acted without good cause or excuse, they
are liable. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353-356, 74 N. E. 603,
L.
R. A. (N. S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 499 Quinn v. Leathem (1901)
A. C., 495-510; South Wales Miners’ Federation v. Glamorgan Coal
As was said in De Minico v.
Co. (1905) A. C., 239-244, 246-251.
Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 598, 94 N. E. 317, 319: “Whether the purpose,
instituted
or
not
for which
strike
legal justiﬁcation for
question of law to be decided by the court.”
The inquiry must be directed to the character of the justiﬁcation
proffered by the defendants in excuse for their conduct. The purpose
of the strike (as found by the superior court) was “to compel the

Ruco, C.
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* * * to cease employing his father to help him
and to induce the employer of Minas either to discharge the father or
to require Minas to cease employing a helper, or failing that, to dis
But it has been found also that
charge Minas from its employment.”
the defendants are not actuated by any ill feeling toward either of the
plaintiffs, and that the strike is wholly disconnected with any question
of membership in the Union. The'basis of the strike is objection to
It follows
the system known as contract labor or cross-hand work.
that the real purpose of the strike is to cause the abolition of that
system of work in this shop.
It is not of much consequence whether the object of the strike is
stated to be the discharge of the father and son without hostility to
ward them, but for the reasonithat they practice a certain system of
shop labor, or the abolition of the system of shop labor, with the in
cidental result that one or both of the plaintiffs may be discharged.
In its practical effects upon the rights of the parties, the question of
law involved is the same whichever way it is put. The question pre
sented for decision is whether the abolition of this particular system of
'
shop work is a legal justiﬁcation for the interference with the rights of
these plaintiffs which arises "from an orderly strike by fellow employés.
“The objection to the system is" (as found by the trial court) “that
where two men work together, as Minas and his father were doing,
they can do more work in a day or week than any single man working
without a helper, and that as a result the men who worked without
helpers would not get their fair share of the work that was to be done,
and would thus be unable to have a chance to earn as much as they
could if there were no helpers employed. The custom in the factory
was that, when a laster had completed his case of shoes or had nearly
completed it so as to be ready for another case, he would put his name
upon a list, and it was understood that cases of shoes would be fur
nished him for his work in the order in which the names stood upon
the list. If there was plenty of work so that any laster could have all
he could do, the fact that two men working together could do more
than he could would not affect the wages he would ordinarily receive;
but in case there was a scarcity of work, or not sufficient work to keeo
all the lasters employed, the laster who had a helper might be able
to do more work and other lasters might not be able to obtain work.
In that aspect of the case their compensation might be affected by the
system of contract labor or cross-hand work.” The controversy as
presented upon this record is not between employer and employé, but
between rival sets of workmen, both of whom were at work in the same
shop upon materials of one manufacturer.
This is not a strike which involves any inquiry as to the plaintiffs’
habits, conduct or character which might render them unﬁt or improper
shopmates. It is not for the establishment of any system of shop work
or rules directed to the curtailment or limitation of production or in
terference with reasonable industrial advancement. It is not aimed to
plaintiff Minas
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prevent the highest efficiency of labor or the use of modern or eco
It was not instituted to promote a closed shop
nomical machinery.
or to compel anybody to join or to leave any union, nor primarily to
cause the discharge or employment of any person or class of persons.
this results in any instance, it is incidental and not essential to the
chief end. It does not go to the extent of interdicting the absolute and
unqualiﬁed right of the individual to work, if he desires, contrary to
the will or rules of a combination.
It is not based upon objections to
shop rules established for the reasonable protection of the rights of
the employer on promotion of the good order or economical and effi
cient service of employés. It is not directed against the education of
apprentices or those who are trying to learn the trade. It does not
appear to be for the establishment or preservation of a monopoly, and
It is not directed
this is not indicated by the framework of the bill.
against piece work as distinguished from day work, nor against any
other method of employment where /superior skill, dexterity or swift
ness secure commensurately higher rewards than inefficiency, careless
It does not directly or immediately affect the
ness or slothfulness.
Its ostensible
general convenience, necessities or safety of the public.
object is not used as a mask for any ulterior design. The direct and
main purpose is to secure a change in a system of work which is claimed
to be unjust in its practical operation.
It is claimed that this system in its ﬁnal analysis resulted in an un
equal distribution of the work of lasting in slack times, and thus af
fected the wages of the strikers, although it did not so operate when
there was work enough to keep all the employés busy all the time.
The ﬁnding of the superior court was in substance to this effect and it
is supported by evidence. There is nothing to indicate that the strike
An honest ef
was not undertaken in good faith against this system.
fort to better conditions of employment by laborers is lawful. The
right of the plaintiffs to work upon such terms as they chose is incident
to the freedom of the individual.
That “right could not be taken
away by the defendants or interfered with by the defendants unless
it came into conﬂict with an equal or superior right of theirs.”
De
Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593 at 598. 94 N. E. 317. The right of
one person to dispose of his labor freely is not superior to the same
rights in others. The right of one to work under unsanitary conditions
does not go to the extent of preventing others from striking in order
to secure a mitigation of these conditions merely because such a strike
may interfere with the desire of the ﬁrst to continue to work under
The same principle applies where a distribution of
those conditions.
work discriminates between men of average capacity and gives an
undue preference to one over another in times when there is a dearth
A system of giving out work which, under existing con
of work.
ditions, operates unjustly, is a condition of employment in which all
workmen affected by it in a particular shop may have a legal interest.
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Nor is injury to -the employer a reason why a strike to remedy such a
condition should be enjoined.
The right of the employer is no more absolute in respect of a con
dition of employment like this than it is as to hours of labor or rate of
wages. It is not a subject as to which he is entitled to special pro
tection against an orderly and otherwise lawful strike.
Pickett v.
Walsh, -192 Mass. 572, 78'N. E. 753, 6_L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am.
St. Rep. 272. The conduct of these defendants, although directly af
fecting to their detriment the labor habits of the plaintiffs, appears to
have suﬂicient justiﬁcation in the fact that it is of a kind and for a
purpose, which has a direct relation to the beneﬁts of a more uniform
distribution of work, and thus of wages among equally skilled or coin
This was the object which the
petent workmen during dull seasons.
defendants were trying to obtain.
While the plaintiffs’ contractual rights to labor, although terminable
at will, were entitled to protection against wanton interference (Citi
zens’ Loan Ass’n v. Boston 8: M‘aine R. R., 196 Mass. 528, 82 N. E.
696, 14 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1025, 124 Am. St. Rep. 584, and cases cited),
they were not so assured or valuable in nature as valid contracts for
continued service for a deﬁnite period. It may well be that ‘a stronger
reason might be needed to justify interference with such contracts
than those here in question. Vi/e do not go beyond what is necessary
to this decision. The decision of this case depends upon a somewhat
narrow interpretation of the ﬁndings of the trial court. Construing
them as we do, this seems to be a clash of equal rights between fellow
laborers, where each could use any lawful means to enforce those
rights.- N0 question is presented as to the unlawfulness of the means
This is not a case in its facts like those presented for
employed.
adjudication in Plant v. VVo0ds, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011, 51 L.
R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330: Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92,
44 N. E. 1077, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443; Walker v.
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Carew v. Rutherford. 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep.
287; Sherry v. Perkins, 14_7 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307, 9 Am. St. Rep.
689; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603, 5 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 499; Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294,
84 N. E. 457, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162; Willcutt v. Driscoll, 200 Mass.
110, 85 N. E. 897, 23 L..R. A. (N. S.) 1236; De Minico v. Craig, 207
Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317; Folsom v. Lewis, 208- Mass. 336, 94 N. E.
316.
But it comes within principles recognized and stated in several
of those cases and applied in Pickett v. \Valsh, 192 Mass. 572 at 579
et sequiter, 78 N. E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep.
In the opinion of a majority of the court the entry in each case
272.
must be
Decree reversed. Bill dismissed."
23 See, also, Tenn. Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 163 Ala. 348. 50 South.
1008 (1909); Huskle v. Grifﬁn, 75 N. H. I.’-45, 74 Atl. 595, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)
966 (1909); 139 Am. St. Rep. 718; National Protective Ass’n of Steam Fitters
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Court of Massachusetts, 1912. 210 Mass.
38 L. R. A. [N. S.] 986.)

487, 97

N. E.

80,
‘

This was an action of tort, in which plaintiff sought to recover
damages from defendant on the ground that defendant served notice on
plaintiff's employer, which notice stated in substance that one Antonio
Lopes had made an assignment of his wages to defendant, and direct
ing the employer not to pay the assignor the wages until further no
tice from defendant.
The employer withheld from plaintiff three
weeks’ wages in December, 1908, and in January, 1909. The plaintiﬁ
was discharged on January 8, 1909, and he was paid all his wages aA
week later. * * *
BRALEY, I.” The jury might have been convinced if no evidence
except his own had been introduced, that there had been an innocent
mistake of identity when the defendant, who held as security an assign
ment of the wages of his debtor, whose name corresponded exactly with
the name of the plaintiff, notiﬁed the plaintiFf’s employer, that thereafter
no wages were to be paid" to the assignor until the amount remaining
due had been satisﬁed.
Rev. Laws, c. 189, §§ 27, 32, 33, 34; St.
But concededly the plaintiff was not the defendant’s
1906, c. 390.
debtor, and if the jury believed his testimony as their verdict fully
indicates, the defendant upon being informed of this mistake instead of
rectifying the error insisted upon his right to retain the money, and
If the defendant had attempted to
refused to withdraw the notice.
collect the debt by garnishment under Rev. Laws, c. 189, this refusal
would have been abundant proof of an abuse of legal process. White
v. Apsley Rubber Co., 194 Mass. 97, 80 N. E. 500, 8 L. R._ A. (N.
S.) 484; Paine v. Kelley, 197 Mass. 22, 83 N. E. 8. The result ac
complished by the notice being indistinguishable, the defendant, who
acted at his peril, is answerable in damages which are measured by
the natural and probable consequences resulting from the attempt to en
force a groundless claim. Burt v. Boston Advertiser Co., 154 Mass.
238. 245, 28 N. E. 1, 13 L. R. A. 97; Markham v. Russell, 12 Allen,
573, 90 Am. Dec. 169.
and Helpers v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315. 63 N. E._369, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88
Am. St. Rep. 648 (1902) in which the members of one union refused to work
Three judges dissented.
The rule in England
with members of another.
was supposed to be greatly altered—“rerolutionized"—by the very long and
much discussed case of Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1 (see 1 Mich. Law Rev. 28),
but as limited in Quinn v. Leathem. [1901] A. C. 495, and English cases since,
Allen v. Flood departs little, if any, from the other cases. And compare the
opinion of Allen, J., with the dissenting opinions of Field, C. J., and Holmes,
J., in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92. 44 N. E. 1077. 35 L. R. A. 722. 57
Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896), and of Hammond, .T., with the dissent of Holmes, C.
.T., in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 4_92, 57 N. E. 1011, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am.
St. Rep. 330 (1900).
_
’ 34
Part of the statement of tacts is omitted.
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It is certain that the plaintiff was deprived of his wages as they ac
crued weekly, and he also could show, and on his evidence of the state
ments of the foreman at the time of dismissal, and which for this
purpose were relevant, the jury could ﬁnd that loss of his regular em
Zinn v. Rice, 161 Mass. 571', 574, 37 N. E.
ployment also followed.
747; Costello v. Crowell, 133 Mass. 352.
The plaintiff's further
evidence, that after his discharge, although using due diligence, he had
been unable to obtain regular work, and was left without his accus
tomed means of subsistence, as well as the statement of his pre
carious earnings from other sources of employment were admissible.
If the contract had been for a stated term at a ﬁxed compensation, the
-measure of damages upon a breach by his employer ordinarily would
have been the difference between what he would have received, and
what in fact he had earned, or by proper exertion might have earned in
the same or some other occupation during the unexpired time.
Cutter
v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N. E. 1010; Bussell Trimmer Co. v. Co
burn, 188 Mass. 254, 74 N. E. 334, 69 L. R. A. 821.
The plaintiff’s employment was terminable at the will of either party,
but this condition does not relieve the defendant whose wrongful act
and not the will of the employer, caused the‘ plaintiff to lose a position,
in which the jury could ﬁnd that so long as his work proved satisfac
tory his employment would have continued, subject, of course, to any
uncertainties of the business, and of his ability to labor.
The de
fendant having procured his discharge and forced him to‘ enter a ﬁeld
of competition where opportunities for obtaining work under similar
conditions of good will with a reasonable prospect of continuity of
service. or indeed remuncrative work of any kind appear to have been
exceedingly limited, and if employment was obtained its continuance
was transitory, was liable in damages for the fair value of the plaintiff’s
contract of service including any loss of time attributable to these
tortious acts.
Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251, 259: Smethurst v.
Barton Square Baptist Church, 148 Mass. 261, 265, 19 N. E. 387. 2
L. R. A. 695, 12 Am. St.- Rep. 550: Pye v. Faxon, 156 Mass. 471, 475,
31 N. E. 640; Stynes v. Boston Elevated Railway, 206 Mass. 75. 91
N. E. 998, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 737; Richards v. Iohnston, 46 Mich.
N. W. 423.
The instructions were sufﬁciently favorable to the defendant, and
the period of examination permitted by the presiding judge in his
297, 9

discretion does not appear to have been so unreasonably extended, that
his decision should be revised. Reynolds v. Ocean Ins. C0,. 22 Pick.
191, 33 Am. Dec. 727; Spoor v. Spooner, 12 Metc. 281, 285; Lane
v. Moore, 151 Mass. 87, 91, 23 N. E. 828, 21 Am. St. Rep. 430.
The
defendant’s persistent and willful interference also subjected the plain
tiff to the injustice and discouragement of having his earnings with
held, and to the perplexity of decision as to what course he must take
not only to vindicate his rights, but to prevent the impending loss
of his situation, and for this mental distress and anxiety reasonable
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Fillebrown v.‘ Hoar, 124 Mass.
compensation could be recovered.
580; Chesley v. Thompson, 137 Mass. 136; Lombard v. Lcnnox, 155
Mass. 70, 28 N. E. 1125, 31 Am. St. Rep. 528; Moran v. Dunphy,
177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125', S2 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289.
But the accidental omission to instruct the jury, that where there is
evidence of a willful wrong, compensatory damages may be enhanced
for injured feelings without being speciﬁcally set forth in the declara
tion, was not called to the attention of the court. Meagher v. Driscoll,
99 Mass. 281, 285, 96 Am. Dec. 759; Wheeler Stenzel Co. v. American
\Vindow Glass Co., 202 Mass. 471,89 N. E. 28.
The defendant, however, even if no error appears in the admission
-of evidence and the denial of his requests, relies upon the refusal to
grant his motion for a new trial as ground for reversal. If we assume
from the'general statement at the close of the exceptions that the
question was saved, the defendant while conceding that the order over
ruling the motion cannot of itself be reviewed, asks ‘to have it set aside
as matter of law because the reasons assigned were erroneous.
The
ﬁrst and third grounds of the motion raised questions which having
been open at the trial are not the subject of exception when presented
in a motion for a new trial.
Garrity v. Higgins, 177 Mass. 414, 58
N. E. 1010. The third ground that the verdict was against the weight
of evidence having been addressed solely to the discretion of the trial
court, only the reasons for not allowing the motion on the fourth
Capron v. Anness, 136 Mass.
ground of excessive damages remain.
271.
It was wholly discretionary whether a new trial should be grant
ed on this ground, and no rulings of law were intended, or were made.
The order denying the motion stated the ﬁnal action of the court of
which the subsequent reasons for the decision formed no part, but
were merely for the information of counsel. Welsh v. Milton Water
Co., 200 Mass. 409, 411, 86 N. E. 779.
Exceptions overruled.
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McAoAM, ]. The defendants conducted a banking house under the
name of Lawrence & Simonds.
They were indebted to the plain
in
and,
the
sum
of
plaintiff
$425,
calling upon them for the money,
tiff
they instructed their cashier to make out a check in favor of the
plaintiff for the amount due. The cashier, according to the custom
of bankers, drew a check upon his principals, signing it “H. M.
Moore, Cashier.”
The defendants failed shortly afterwards, so that
the check was not paid, and the action is against the defendants as
drawers of the check to recover the amount due.
The act of Moore,
according to the plain intention of the parties, was the act of the de
fendants, done in their business, by their direction, for their beneﬁt,
and bound them as effectually as if the check had been signed by
the defendants themselves.‘
Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336; Bank of
the State v. Muskingham Branch Bank, 29 N. Y. 619; Lockwood v.
Coley (C. C.) 22 Fed. 192; Melledge v. Iron Co., 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
158, 51 Am. Dec. 59; Houghton v. Bank, 26 \Vis. 663, 7 Am. Rep.
107.
Whether in the hands of a bona ﬁde third person, having no
knowledge of the facts, the signing by Moore would hold him indi
vidually (the word “cashier” being regarded merely as descriptio
personae) is a question that need not be considered, for the plaintiﬁ,
who had the transaction, sues upon
and he knew that Moore was
a mere agent, performing an act in the line of his duty for his em
ployers, the defendants. for their beneﬁt and on their account; and
in law theirs, not his.
for this reason that the act
The verdict in favor of the plaintiff was properly directed, and the
motion for
new trial must be denied.

I

Webster

v. Clark, 30 N. H. 245 (1855).
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Rep.

724,

LYNCH.

York, Appellate Term,
65 N. Y. Supp. 225.)

31

1900.

From an order dismissing

Misc.

the complaint plain

O’GoRMAN, ]. Although the written contract in question was signed
by George M. Lynch, there is sufﬁcient in plaintiff’s proofs. to jus
tify the ﬁnding that George M. Lynch was at the time acting as the

defendant’s agent, and was so regarded by both parties. It was, there
fore, error to grant the defendanfs motion to dismiss the complaint.
If an agent possessing due authority makes a contract in his own
name, his principal, whether known or unknown, may be sued there
on, unless from the attendant circumstances it is the clear intent of
the parties that exclusive credit is given to the agent, and that no
resort shall in any event be had against the principal.”
Story, Ag.
§ 16021; Coleman v.,Bank, 53 N. Y. 393; Hall v. Lauderdale, 46
N. Y. 70. VVe are aware that a contrary rule was declared in Re
Bateman, 7 Misc. Rep. 633, 28 N. Y. Supp. 36, but the statement of
the law there made is not in harmony with the authorities.
Although
that case was aﬁirmed by the court o'f appeals, the judgment was up
held on other grounds.
'_Iudgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant
to abide the event. All concur.
\

IVIARVIN

v.

WILBER.

(Court of Appeals of New York,

1873.

52 N.

Y.

270.)

Action for the purchase price of hops alleged to have been sold to
The answer set up, among other things, a defect _of par
defendant.
ties defendant in the omission to join George I. VVilber.
Defend
ant moved for a nonsuit for nonjoinder of his partner.
Motion de
nied, verdict for defendant. The case comes up on appeal from judg
ment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in favor of plaintiff.
PECKHAM, I. One Vosburgh was an agent of I/Vilber & Son for
the purchase of hops; he was agent for the ﬁrm only, not for this
Waive any question of the statute of frauds for
defendant severally.
this purpose, and assume that he purchased of the plaintiff as agent
of the defendant the hops in question; that such purchase was made
Renard v. Turner, 42 Ala. 117 (1868); Jones v. Gould, 123 App. Div. 236,
Y. Supp. 31 (1908). It would be anomalous and unconscionable to allow
the principal to contest the right of the third person on a contract made by
the agent. Young v. Stein, 152 Mich. 310, 116 N. W. 195, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
231, 125 Am. St. Rep. 412 (1908); North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill (N. Y.)
2

108 N.

262 (1842).
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defendant, as thus stated by Vosburgh, although
so to purchase, is the defendant severally liable
for such a purchase?
I know of no principle upon which such an action can be main
tained. The whole case is that a person has assumed to act for an
other and incurs an obligation against him without authority, and we
The plain answer
are asked whether such an obligation is valid.
seems to be that the alleged principal never personally made such a
contract, and the assumed agent never had any authority to make
it. Hence, none was made by the defendant.
But it is claimed that this action lies against defendant alone, upon
the ground that a “representation made by a general agent is just as
True, where he is
binding on the defendant as if made by himself.”
acting within the line of his agency; but that assumes that Vosburgh
was the general agent of the defendant, which is not true. _
If he were the general agent of defendant, of course he had the
right to make this contract for him; but he was the general agent of
the ﬁrm, and not of the defendant, individually, at all.
The assumption being wholly unfounded, the whole inference found
ed thereon fails.
Vosburgh had no real authority from the defendant; none is pre
tended; and he was clothed with no apparent authority from him
expressly

the

he had no authority

individually.

An individual and

They
liability are very different things.
creditor as well as to the ﬁrm; one may be
solvent and the other not.
_
The counsel cites many cases to sustain the decision of the trial
judge, but they are cases of dormant partners, who confessedly need
not be sued if the plaintiff did not know of the existence of the dor
mant partner.
Such are the cases in New_York Dry Dock Co. v.
T readwell, 19 Wend. 525; Clarkson v. Carter, 3 Cow. 84; Clark v.
Miller, 4 Wend. 628; North v. Bloss, 30 N. Y. 374; Hurlbut v.
Post, l Bosw. 36:
So if a party purchase for himself, without dis
closing that he had a partner, and the vendoriwas ignorant thereof,
the action may be brought against the party alone who made the con
tract. So an agent can bind himself by not disclosing his agency, but
he cannot bind the party for whom he is not an agent no matter how
He cannot create an agency by representations.
much he assumes.
This action would undoubtedly lie if it could be established that
the agent of a ﬁrm to buy hops was therefore and thereby the agent.
of an individual member of that ﬁrm, authorized to buy for him and
But that position the plain
to make him individually liable therefor.
tiff’s counsel has not attempted to establish. He cites no authority to
He simply argues upon the
that effect and takes no such position.
assumption that Vosburgh was the agent of this defendant, and as
such authorized to bind him as far as he could bind himself.
The
may be diﬁerent

a ﬁrm

to the
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court must have acted upon that -principle in its charge, that if the
plaintiff did not know that Vosburgh was acting for the ﬁrm, but
was informed that he acted for the defendant, that then the defendant
No amount of rep
was liable severally. This cannot be maintained.
resentations cancreate an agency. Any person may bind himself as
he pleases.‘ But to be bound by the act of another, that other must
In this case the as
have real or apparent authority to do the act.

This defendant set up in his answer that
sumed agent had neither.
his son was a necessary party, but the plaintiﬂ‘ refused to amend.
The judgment should be reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the
event. All concur.

FT. WORTH & D. c. R. co.
(Court

of Appeals of Texas,
*

*

1884.

2

v.

JOHNSON

Willson, Civ. Cas.

&

TRICE.

Ct.‘ App.

§§ 232, 234.)

*

In this case Trice & Johnson sued the
VVHITE, P. J.”
railroad company to recover the value of beef furnished to one Bar
ker, claiming that Barker was the agent of the company, and au
thorized to bind it for the beef purchased by him. Barker was road
master for the company, and he also kept a boarding or eating house
in some box cars belonging to the company, which cars were fur
nished him by the company free of charge. He fed and lodged hands
who were in the employ of the company. The beef furnished by Trice
Barker,
& Johnson was for the boarding house kept by Barker.
when he purchased the beef, told Trice that the company was respon
sible for it. There was no evidence, except the declarations of Bar
ker, that he had any authority to bind the company for the beef.
Held, that there was no sufficient proof that Barker was the agent of
the company authorized to bind it by the purchase of the beef.
§ 234. Special agent; principal not bound for acts of, unless, etc.
That a party is agent for another does not render such other liable
for every contract the agentmay make. To be binding upon the
principal, the contract must come within the apparent scope of the
With regard to special agents, the rule is that if
agent’s authority.
the agent exceeds the special and limited authority conferred on him,
his principal is not bound by his acts, but they become mere nullities
so far as he is concerned, unless, indeed, he has held him out as pos
sessing a more enlarged authority.
Story on Agency (9th Ed.) § 126.
The agency conferred upon a roadmaster is special, and does not
confer authority to bind the company for provisions purchased to
supply aboaiding house.‘ * "‘ *
\
Reversed and remanded.
‘

Part of the opinion is omitted.
4'1'he agent cannot increase. or enlarge, his authority by unauthorized
acts
so as to make his principal liable to third persons therefor.
White v. Lee, 97
Miss. 493, 52 South. 206 (1910).
See, also, Spies v. Stein, 70 Neb. 641, 97 N.
8
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whether Paige, the
think the
the case
].
plaintiff below, can call upon the defendants below, after taking
Moulton’s note for the price of the goods sold. Moulton testiﬁed that
he bdught the hay of the plaintiff for the defendants, in 1839 or
1840, and gave his own note for the amount, which he had never paid,
and that he was insolvent.
The plaintiff wanted Moulton’s note, who
declined at ﬁrst to give
saying the hay was for Hyde, for whom
he was purchasing it.
But the plaintiff insisted upon Moulton’s own
The note was payable on demand, and
note, which he ﬁnally gave.
had been given up. Moulton was the only
there was no proof that
witness sworn, and
impossible not to see that the plaintiff relied
entirely upon Moulton to pay for the hay.
Where
vendor sells goods to an agent, and with full knowledge
of the agency, takes the note of the agent, for the purchase money,
Beebee
and relies upon his credit, he can not resort to the principal.
v. Robert, 12 Wend. 417, 27 Am. Dec. 132; Pentz v. Stanton, 10
Wend. 275, 25 Am. Dec. 558; Patterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62;
Taunt. 574. And see
Addison v. Gandasequi,
Emly v. Lye, Id.
Denio, 410.
clearly appears that this was done
Waydell v. Luer,
in this case.
Six or seven years have elapsed, and the agent has
failed in business, and now the vendor attempts to collectthe debt
of the principal. This he can not do.
said this was a question of fact for the justice, and that his
But there
conclusive.
ﬁnding
no conﬂict of evidence. The only
clear, dis
witness in the cause was called by the plaintiff, and he
tinct and unequivocal in his relation of this portion of the transaction.
There being no dispute about what the witness testiﬁed, nor any
ambiguity or doubt as to the meaning of his language, the facts are
undisputed, and the effect of his testimony becomes matter of law.
The judgment of the county court must be affirmed.
HAND,

6

W. 752 (1903); Carter v. ZEtna Loan Co., 61 Mo. App. 218 (1895); Barton
Parker Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 96 Minn. 334, 104 N. W. 968 (1905); Fox v. Fisk,
How. (Miss) 328 (1842).
5Accord: Paige v. Stone, 10 Metc. (Mass) 160, 43 Am. Dec. 420 (1845);
See, also, Silver v. Jordan, 136 Mass.
Ranken v. Deforest, 18 Barb. 148 (1854).
319 (1884), in which the third person charged the goods sold to the agent, who
Men-ell v. Witherby, 120 Ala. 418, 23 South.
purchased them for defendant:
994, 26 South. 974, 74 Am. St. Rep. 39 (1898).
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CRYDER.

of New Jersey,
Atl. 941.)

1893.

55

N.

J‘. Law, 329,

26

E. H. Carmack drew a draft on the defendant for
payable four months after date to his own order, and the
defendant accepted it for Carmac,k’s accommodation.
Thereupon
Carmack indorsed
and delivered
to one Barnett, with authority
to negotiate
for cash at
reasonable discount.
Barnett transferred
to the plaintiff for $2,060 cash and
diamond necklace, which they
valued at $1,100, and then absconded. At the time of the transfer the
plaintiff knew that Barnett was not the owner of the draft, but held
Carmack ‘repudiated
merely as agent of Carmack for negotiation.
the transfer, and the draft went to protest; hence this suit.
At the trial in the Essex circuit the cause was submitted to the jury
on the'question of fact whether the necklace, prior to the transfer,
was the property of the plaintiff or was the property of Barnett, held
by the plaintiff to secure Barnett’s debt to him; and the jury were
instructed that in the former case the plaintiff might recover, but
The cause
could not in the latter.
They found for the defendant.
before us on exceptions to the charge of the judge and to his re
fusals to charge in accordance with the plaintiFf’s requests.
First the plaintiff asked the judge to charge that the plaintiff's
invalidated unless the circumstances
title to the draft could not
proved actual fraud; that mere carelessness
under which he took
would not impair his title. This legal rule
thoroughly established
Law, 187 Copper v. Jersey City, 44
(Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N.
N.
inapplicable to the present case. The defect
Law, 634), but
found in the plaintif’f’s title sprang. not from the law relating to com
universal prin
mercial paper, but from the law of agency.
ciple in the law of agency that the powers of the agent are to be
exercised for the beneﬁt of the principal, and not of the agent or third
Amer. Lead. Cas. (5th Ed.) 687.
Per
Jaques v. Todd,
parties.
sons dealing with one whom they know to be an agent, and to be
exercising his authority for his own beneﬁt, acquire no rights against
Hill, 229; Me
the principal by the transaction.
Stainer v. Tysen,
Law, 230; Safe-Deposit Co. v. Abbott,
cutchen v. Kennady, 27 N.
Law, 257; Bank v. Underhill, 102 N. Y. 336,
N. E. 293.
44 N.
usually, and perhaps properly, spoken of by the
transaction
Such
courts as fraudulent, but, however honest the intention of the parties,
invalid merely because circumstances known to
the agent’s act
be
ultra
vires. In the present case the plaintiff sought
to
both prove
to get rid of the imputation of bad faith, by claiming that Barnett
had told him he had authority to accept the diamonds in exchange for
DIxoN, J.“
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the draft; but it was not pretended that such authority was supposed
to have been given with knowledge that the agent had a personal in
Nothing short of power
terest in the redemption of the diamonds.
expressly granted to the agent to deal with the draft for his own bene
ﬁt would validate such a use of it in favor of one cognizant of the
facts. Consequently, on the fact found by the jury, the plaintiff’s title
was defeated, if not by his actual fraud, by his knowledge of the
of the principal’s property."
This request
agent’s misappropriation
was rightly refused, save as its substance was embodiedin the charge
delivered.
The second request was to charge that, if the agent represented to
the plaintiff that he had authority to exchange the draft for money
and diamonds, and the plaintiff believed him, Carmack was estopped
from denying the authority; and Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. ]. Law,
81, is cited to support this proposition.
For reasons‘ already stated,
this request did not reach the merits of the case, because it was not
claimed that Carmack had any notice of his agent’s interest in the
But, aside from this, the proposition was intrinsically
diamonds.
unsound.
The declarations of-an agent, although accompanying his
acts, constitute no evidence of the extent .of his authority.
Story, Ag.
§ 136; Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray, 139; Baker v. Gerrish, 14 Allen,
201; Gifford v. Landrine, 37 N. J. Eq. 127; Farmers’ Bank v.
Butchers’ Bank, 16 N. Y. 134, 69 Am. Dec. 678.
The decision in
Campbell v. Nichols does not militate with this rule. The representa
tion there upheld as an estoppel against the principal related, not to
the scope of the agent’s power, but to an extrinsic circumstance af
fecting the character of the instrument which the agent was empow
ered to dispose of, and which circumstance would-be within the cog
nizance of the agent or his principal, but not of those dealing with the
The distinction between a representation by an agent as to
agent.
such extrinsic fact_s and his representation as to the scope of his au
thority is clearly drawn in Farmers’ Bank v. Butchers’ Bank, ubi su
pra. * * *
Judgment afﬁrmed.

'lIt

does not matter that the principal received full value in the transac
his agent also acted for the third person. Tyler v. Sanborn, 128 Ill.
136. 21 N. E. 193. 4 L. R. A. 218. 15 Am. St. Rep. 97 (1889).
But see Garrett
‘v. Trabue, 82 Ala. 227, 3 South. 149 (1886), in which it was shown the agent
It the third party has
intended to make secret proﬁts out of the transaction;
acted bona ﬁde he cannot be affected by the nnfaithfulness of the agent, of
which he had no notice or knowledge.
l-lambro v. Bnrnnnd. [1904] 2 K. B.
10. 9 Com. Cas. 251, 73 L. J. K. B. 669, 90 L. '1‘. Rep. N. S. 803. 20 T. L. R.
398, 52 W. R. 583, 1'9Y9l'SlIl£ [1903] 2 K. B. 399. 8 Com. Cas. 252, 72 L. J. K. B.
G62. 89 L. '1‘. Rep. N. S. 180. 19 T. L. R. 284, 51 W. R. (L12. And see Crocker
v. U. S., 240 U. S. 74, 36 Sup. (‘t. 245, 60 L. Ed. 533 (1915), suggesting, though
the contract be void, the third person may rec-over on quantum valebat tor
goods furnished.
tion.
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WALKER, ].° The defendant executed to the plaintiff’s attorneys
of attorney by which they were empowered to confess judg
ment for said defendant on a note which the plaintiff had placed in
the hands of such attorneys for collection.
By virtue of this power
judgment was regularly confessed and entered of record..
a power

To this judgment it is objected:
-1. That the attorney at law for the plaintiff could not act as attor
ney in fact for the defendant, touching the same subject matter on ac
count of his prior retainer by the plaintiff—-the interest and rights of the
plaintiff and de fendant being adverse.
2. That the judgment was not confessed until after the note was
barred by limitation, and that it was the duty of the attorney to have
interposed this defence. * * *
As a general rule it is true that agents cannot act so as to bind their
principals, where they have or represent interests adverse to the prin
This rule is founded upon the consideration that the principal
cipa1’s.°
bargains for the skill and vigilant attention of the agent to the subject
matter entrusted to him: and the policy of the law will not tolerate
the existence of Ian adverse interest in the agent to that of his princi
pal for fear it may inﬂuence his conduct to the prejudice of interests
of the principal.
This well recognized rule is particularly applicable
to buying and selling agents, where the principal contracts for the
services of an agent at a time when he has no interest in the subject
entrusted to him but subsequently by his own act acquires interest in
In the case before us the attorney
it adverse to that of the principal.
in
no
interest
the
matter
of
his
unless it should arise from
agency
had
his claim to compensation as a collector, which may or may not have
been otherwise settled; nor had the plaintiff any interest whatever in
the act to be done of which the principal, at the time he instituted him
agent, was not fully advised; and if such disqualiﬁcation existed he,
by his own act, expressly waived it by conferring upon the agent such
power with a knoivledge of the facts. When it is remembered that the
8

Part of the opinion is omitted.

v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S. E. 397, 40 L. R. A. 234 (1896), with
Especially pernicious are con
full discussion and citation of authorities.
tracts in which it appears the third person paid the agent a commission on
business transacted with his principal. City of Findley v. Pertz, 66 Fed. 427.
13 C. C. A. 559, 29 L. R. A. 188 (1895). attirmed 74 Fed. 681, 20 C. C. A. 662
9 See Ferguson

(1896).

As to whether the contract is void or voidable, see N. Y. C. Ins. C0. v. Nat.
Protection Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85 (1850), reversing 20 Barb. 468 (1854) ; Huggins
Co. v. People's Ins. Co., 41 Mo. App. 530 (1890); Empire State Ins. Co. v.
Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 446, 34 N. E. 200 (1893).
-
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whole ground upon which this rule is based, rests upon the fraudulent
advantage which such an interest may stimulate the agent to take to
the prejudice of his principal’s rights, it will scarcely be contended
that the circumstances of this case bring it within the reason and spirit
of the rule. The principal was informed of the nature and extent of
the interest which the payee in the note h'ad in the act to be performed
The facts disclosed in the instrument itself prove this;
by the agent.
and that it was intended that the act to be performed should enure to
the mutual beneﬁt of both the payor and payee: to the ﬁrst by saving
him the expense incident to a suit in the usual form; to the other by
facilitating and making certain a recovery.
This therefore was not a mere naked power in which the principal
was alone interested, but a power coupled with an interest in a third
person, made upon good and suﬂicient consideration, and in regard to
which the principal was well advised, and so far from an undue ad
vantage having been taken of him in the relationship in which the
agent stood towards him, he only did that which every truthful honest
man should do, and what every prudent, considerate attorney accedes
to.
The act which the attorney undertook to perform was in perfect
harmony with the interest of his client and of the duty and integrity of
defendant. the payor." * * *
’
Judgment aﬁirmed with costs.

-ii-_
TRUSLOVV

v.‘

(Supreme Court

PARKERSBURG BRIDGE

&

R. CO.

of Appeals

of West

Virginia,

57 S.

51.)

E.

1907.

TERMINAL
61

W. Va.

628,

SANDERS, P.“ The Parkersburg Bridge & Terminal Railroad Com
pany employed ]. M. Mitchell to procure for it options on certain
property on the south side of the Little Kanawha river from Park.ers
For this service he was to receive a ﬁxed compensation per
burg.
day. Acting in this capacity, he took from the plaintiffs, Emma I.
and VV. F. Truslow, on the 21st day of November, 1902, an option
on certain property owned by them. the title to which was in the
female plaintiff, for which property the sum of $1,600 was to be paid.
The option was taken in the name of J. A. Shrewsbury, assigned to
1° Two parties, no matter how diverse their interest. may by mutual con
sent make n third their agent to bind them. Fltzsirnmons v. So. Exp. Co..
40 Ga. 330, 2 Am. Rep. 577 (1869): De Steiger v. Hollington. 17 Mo. App.
382 (1885): Adams Min. Co. v. Senter. 26 Mich. 73 (1872).
The rule against
double agency does not apply to cases in which there is no conﬂict in the
‘duties assumed by the agent. Brit. Am. Assur. Co. v. Cooper, 6 Colo. App.
25. 40 Pac. 147 (1895); Colwell v. Keystone Iron Co.. 36 Mich. 51 (1877).
11 Part of the opinion is omitted.
GODn.PB.& A.(2n En.) -

Ch. 5)

LIABILITY or CONSTITUENT T0 THIRD ransom

G}
-10|

Mitchell by Shrewsbury, and by Mitchell assigned to the railroad com
By its terms the option was to be accepted within 90 days,
pany.
and on the 31st day of January, 1903, the company notiﬁed the plain
tiffs in writing that it would accept the option, and upon execution to
it of deed would pay the price agreed to be paid.
In the latter part of February, or the 1st of March, 1903, the com
pany discovered that the agent, Mitchell, had been taking commission
contracts on all the property optioned by him; that is, he agreed with

in
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81
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it,

the landowners that in case a sale was effected by him through the
option taken he was to receive a certain additional sum—-in this par
ticular instance the sum being $75. Upon discovery of this fact, the
relations between Mitchell and the company were severed; the com
pany taking from Mitchell an assignment of all commission contracts
taken by him. Negotiations were entered into with a view of obtain
ing from the plaintiffs a contract more favorable to the company; and,
it refusing to comply with the terms of the option, this suit was on
the 16th day of january, 1904, instituted for the purpose of compelling
a speciﬁc performance of the agreement.
Upon avhearing the court
decreed that the contract, should be speciﬁcally enforced, and, from
* * *
this decree, the railroad company has appealed.
The appellant, after taking the assignment of the commission con
tract, retained the same in its possession, and has never offered to
surrender to the appellees either this option or the commission con
tract, and its action in this respect indicates an intention on its part
to avail itself of the beneﬁts of the contract in case it should deem
it expedient to do so. It ﬁled these papers as exhibits with its an
swer, and relies upon its defense to this suit as a repudiation of the
contract.
The fact that the appellant, with full knowledge of all the facts,
ratiﬁed the contract made by Mitchell, renders immaterial another
and that
that whether or not
question raised by counsel for
immaterial, as the appel
the appellees knew of the double agency
lant had the right to disaﬁirm the contract upon discovering such
double agency, irrespective of whether or not the appellees liad no
tice of such agency, and regardless of whether or not the appellant
This position
was damaged thereby.
sound,
could show that
“VVhen an agent acts for both par
both upon reason and authority.
contract requiring the exercise of discretion, the con
ties in making
voidable in equity upon the application of either party. or the
tract
available as a defense in a.n action at law upon the
circumstance
Am.
contract.”
Eng. Ency. Law (Zd Ed.) lO73j Lloyd v. Col
Bush, 587; Crump v. Ingersoll, 44 Minn. 84, 46 N. \V. 141;
ston,_
Eq. 372; Fish v. Leser, 69 Ill. 394. “A
Young v. Hughes, 32 N.
man cannot be the agent of both the buyer and the seller in the same
transaction, without the intelligent consent of both parties; nor can
an agent act for himself and his principal, nor for two principals on
the same transaction, without like consent. All such
opposite sides
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transactions are voidable, and may be repudiated by the principal with
out proof of injury on his part. Nothing will defeat the right of the
principal except his own conﬁrmation after full knowledge of all the
facts.” Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S. E. 397, 40 L. R. A. 234.
But, while this is true, it is equally as well settledthat a principal
may, upon discovering that his agent has acted in a double capacity,
ratify and conﬁrm his acts, and thus be bound in like manner as if
the agent had not exceeded his authority, but had acted wholly with
in the powers given to him. “Where, with a knowledge of all the
facts, the principal acquiesces in the acts of the agent under such
circumstances as would make it his duty to repudiate such acts if he
would avoid them, such acquiescence
is a conﬁrmation of the acts
of the agent.” Curry v. Hale, 15 W. Va. 867; Dewing v. Hutton,
48 W. Va. 577, 37 S. E. 670; Coulter v. Blatchley, 51 W. Va. 167, 41
S. E. 133; Frazier v. Brewer, 52 W. Va. 306, 43 S. E. 110. “Where
a party originally had a right of defense or of action to defeat or
set aside a transaction on the ground of actual or constructive fraud,
he may lose such remedial right by a subsequent conﬁrmation, by ac
* * * If the party
and even by mere delay or laches.
quiescence,
originally possessing the remedial right has obtained full knowledge
of all the material facts involved in the transaction, has become fully
aware of its imperfection and of his own rights to impeach
or
ought, and might, with reasonable diligence have become so aware,
and all undue inﬂuence
wholly removed so that he can give a per
fectly free consent, and he acts deliberately, and with the intention
of ratifying the voidable transaction, then his conﬁrmation
binding,
and his remedial right, defensive or afﬁrmative,
Pome
destroyed."
964.
roy’s Eq. ]ur.
The right to disafﬁrm was waived by the appellant when, after dis
took an assignment
covery of Mitchell’s agency for both parties.
of the commission contract, and by its subsequent neglect and omis
would not be bound by the con
sion to notify the appellees that
see no error

in the decree

of

the circuit

court, and

is

VVe

it

tract."

af

ﬁrmed.

8:

a

a

12 In the absence of dissent within
reasonable time ratiﬁcation is pre~
reasonable time, see U. S. Rolling Stock Co. v. Atl.
sumed. As to what ls
Gt. West. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450, 32 Am. Rep. 380 (1878).
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PERSON

PRINCIPAL

GANDASEQUI."

1812.

15 East,

62, 13 Rev. Rep. 68.)

Action for goods sold and upon

I

&

It

a

is

a

a

is,

De
the common money counts.
was
a
of
Co.,
&
who
Larrazabal
Spanish
employed
fendant
merchant
London, merchants, to purchase goods'for him for a foreign market
upon a 2 per cent. commission.
Larrazabal 8: Co. applied to Pater
son to send to their counting house an assortment of silk hose with
terms and prices. Defendant was present, inspected the samples, and
selected such as he required.
Larrazabal & Co. gave written orders
for a large supply to ﬁll defendant’s order, but the invoices were made
out in the name of Larrazabal & Co., and they were debited for the
goods on plaintiffs books. Soon after, and before the credit expired,
Larrazabal & Co. became insolvent, and thereupon plaintiffs de
manded payment of defendant; which being refused, the present ac
tion was brought.
At the trial Lord Ellenborough directed a non
suit. On a motion to set aside the nonsuit a rule nisi was granted.
Loan ELLENBOROUGH, C. I. The Court have not the least doubt
that if it distinctly appeared that the defendant was the person for
whose use and whose account the goods were bought, and that the
plaintiffs knew that fact at the time of the sale,’ there would not be
the least pretence for charging the defendant in this action.
But the
doubt is, whether that does sufﬁciently appear by the evidence. It ap
pears that the defendant was present at the counting-house of Lar
razabal, where one of the plaintiffs had come by appointment, and in
-his presence inspected and selected such of the articles as he re
quired: that the goods were afterwards ordered by Larrazabal 81
Co., credit given to them and the invoices made out in their name and
sent to them. The question
whether all this was done with
The law has been
knowledge of the defendant being the principal?
settled by
variety of cases, that an unknown principal, when discov
liablc on the contracts which his agent makes for him: but
ered,
that must be taken with some qualiﬁcation, and
party may preclude
himself from recovering over against the principal, by knowingly
making the agent his debtor.
certainly appeared to me at the trial
that the plaintiffs knew of the defendant being the principal, and had
Co. as their debtors, or
elected to take Larrazabal
should not

9

&

&

4

13 In Addison
Taunt. 574, 11 Rev. Rep. 689 (1812) Lord
v. Gandasequi,
Mansﬁeld on similar facts allowed the jury to say whether the goods were
Co., or to Gandasequi through Larrazabal
Co., as fac
sold to Larrazabal
tors; and refused to set aside their verdict for defendant.
See, also, Silver
v. Jordan, 136 Muss. 319 (1884), in which the contract was made with the
agent alone, but the third person tried to hold the principal, and Beebee v.
Robert, 12 Wend. 413, 27 Am. Dec. 132 (1834), post, p. 759. As to the anomaly
of the undisclosed principal see
Col. Law Rev. 116.
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have nonsuited the plaintiffs:
but as there may perhaps be a doubt
upon the evidence, whether the plaintiffs had a perfect knowledge of
that fact, it may be as well to have it reconsidered.
BAYLEY,' J.
There may be a particular course of dealing with
respect to trade in favour of a1 foreign principal, that he shall not be
liable in cases where a home principal would be liable: that would be
a question for the jury.
I have generally understood that the seller
may look to the principal when he discovers him, unless he has aban
doned his right to resort to him. I agree that where the seller knows
the principal at the time, and yet elects to give credit to the agent, he
must be taken to have abandoned such right, and cannot therefore aft
I think it should be reconsidered in this
erwards charge the principal.
I
case whether the plaintiffs did so.
Rule absolute.“

MEEKER
(Commission

v.

CLAGHORN.

of Appeal of New York,

1871.

44 N.

Y.

349.)

a

a

8:

_T.

B.
W. W. Cornell, to recover
Action by assignee of
balance
for iron-work and cut-stone. The articles were furnished for build
ing of the defendants in Savannah. upon the order of their architect,
Charles Shall.- The defendants claimed that the articles were fur
nished by plaintiffs assignors, upon the credit of said Shall, and that
they had paid him therefor; and the plaintiff claimed that they were
furnished upon the order of said Shall, acting as agent for the de

1

§§

607.
of Grose and Le Blane, .'IJ., are omitted.
Part of the opinion is omitted.

14 The opinions
15

&

9

fendants, and upon their credit.
The assignment to the plaintiff was in writing and absolute in terms,
Two of his assignors testiﬁed in substance, on cross-examination, that
“they expected to receive the amount recovered in the action.”
EARL, Com.“ The principles of law applicable to this case are
If the defendants were known to be the
elementary and undisputed.
principals in the transaction, and Shall only their agent, then they are
alone responsible, unless credit was given exclusively to the agent, in
which event the agent alone was responsible. If however the defend
ants were not known to be the principals, and credit was at the time
given to Shall, who was in fact an undisclosed agent, then the vendors
could hold for payment, at their election, either the agent or the prin
cipals. If Shall was not in fact the agent of the defendants, and fur
nished these articles to them upon his agreement with them, then the
Pentz v. Stanton, 10
defendants are not responsible to the plaintiff.
VVend. 271, 25 Am. Dec. 558; Thomson v. Davenport,
Barn.
Am. Lead. Cases,
Cress. 78; Story, Agency,
267, 446, 447, 423;
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Keeping these principles of law in view, this case involves only ques
tions of fact. The defendants can claim exemption from liability upon
1. That Shall was not their agent, and that
only one of two grounds:
the vendors dealt with him as principal; or, 2. That the vendors knew
the defendants to be the principals, and gave the credit exclusively to
the agent.
As to the ﬁrst ground, there is some evidence tending to show that
* *
Shall was the agent of the defendants, and acted as such.
assume that Shall was in fact the agent of the defendants,
'
and that the vendors knew it.
As to the second ground, the evidence should be quite clear that the
vendors gave exclusive credit to the agent of known principals, before
In all cases, where
we can hold the principals exempt from liability.
the principals seek exemption upon the ground that the credit was ex
clusively given to their agent, this should clearly appear. and they have
the affirmative to show it; the natural presumption being, in all cases,
that credit is given to the principal rather than to the agent.
It is suf
ﬁcient to say upon this branch of the case, that there is no conclusive
evidence that the credit was given by the vendors, exclusively to the
It
agent, and that they intended to look to him solely for their pay.
is true, that upon the ledger and day-book of the vendors, the articles
were charged to Shall, and while this furnishes strong evidence that
they were furnished upon his credit, it does not show it conclusively.
The plaintiff gave some explanation, tending to weaken the effect of
this evidence, and its weight under all the circumstances of the case,
was for the referee.
The most that can be properly said in behalf of the defendants is,
that the plaintiff made a very weak case. But if the circumstances of
the case, and the evidence, and the legitimate inferences to be drawn
from them tend in any degree to uphold the decision of the referee, we
cannot disturb it; and it seems to me that this is such a case.
There is no sufficient evidence that Shall was the agent of the ven
dors, to receive payment for the articles furnished, in such a sense as
’to bind them by the payment the defendants made to him, even if there
\
is any competent evidence of such payment. V
in
that
have
been
made
numerous
decisions
this
court
and
I/Vithin
also in the Supreme Court, the plaintiff, under the absolute assignment
in writing to him, is the legal holder of the claim against the defend
ants, and the real party in interest as plaintiff in this action.
I am therefore of the opinion that the judgment should be aﬁirmed,
with costs. All concur except LEONARD, Com., not sitting.

We must
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HORNE PRODUCE CO.

(Circuit Court of the United States, D. Indiana,

1893.

57 Fed.

463.)

BAKER, District Judge.“
The question of the sufﬁciency of the
complaint is raised by demurrer.
The complaint, so far as material
to the decision of the question involved, is as follows: That hereto
fore, th_e Zlst day of January, 1893, the plaintiffs, at Chicago, Ill.,
sold to the defendant, through its agent and general manager, VVilliam
Harris, a quantity of butter, as mentioned in the contract of sale and
purchase thereof, which contract was and is in writing; that said
contract, although made for and on account of these plaintiffs on the
one hand, and for and on account of the defendant upon the other
hand, was executed only in the names of the said respective agents,
A. A. Kennard & Co., forithese plaintiffs, and in the name of the
said VVilliam Harris, by the style of VVm. Harris, for the defendant,
of said agents thereby intended to bind
but as matter of fact 1_:_a_c_l1
duly
his said principal thereby, and each of said agents was thereunto
‘
* * *
authorized by his said principal.
It is undoubtedly true that parol testimony will not be permitted to
control or contradict a contract in writing; but in the absence of any
recital appearing therein, it in no just sense contradicts the written
contract to show by oral testimony, aliunde the writing, that the names
signed to the contract are those of agents, and that undisclosed prin
cipals are the real parties in interest. Counsel has cited cases touch
It is unnecessary to
ing the rule applicable to sealed instruments.
examine those cases, because the writing here declared on is a simple
contract, not under seal.
A further review of the adjudged cases is unnecessary, as the true
doctrine is found accurately stated in the elementary books.
Story,
Ag. (4th Ed.) § 1600, states the doctrine in these words: “Indeed,
the doctrine maintained in the more recent authorities is of a far more
comprehensive extent. It is that, if the agent possesses due authority
to make a written contract not under seal, and he makes it in his own
name, whether he describes himself to be agent or not, and whether
the principal be known or unknown, he, the agent, will be liable to
be sued, and be entitled to sue thereon, and his principal also will be
liable to be sued and be entitled to sue thereon, in all cases, unless
from the attendant circumstances it is clearly manifested that an ex
clusive credit is given to the agent, and it is intended by both parties
that no resort shall in any event be had by or against the principal
upon it. The doctrine thus asserted has this title to commendation
that it not only furnishes a sound rule for the exposi
and support:
tion of contracts, but that it proceeds upon a principle of reciprocity,
and‘ gives to the other contracting party the same rights and remedies
16

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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Nor
against the agent and principal which they possess against him."
The
contradict
or
the
written
instrument.
doctrine
vary
this
same writer observes:
“It does not deny that it is binding on those
whom on the face of it it purports to bind, but shows that it also binds
another by reason that the act of the agent in signing the agreement
Hig
in pursuance of his authority is in law the act of the principal.”
gins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & W. 834, 845, and other cases cited under
the above section.
V\’hart. Ag. § 298, states the doctrine thus:
“On nonnegotiable in
struments, where the agent is prima facie the contracting party, un
less it should appear that the agent is the person exclusively privileged
or bound, the principal can sue or be sued, and in the latter case the
contracting party can sue either principal or agent."
Mechem, Ag. §§ 695-700, discusses the subject of the liability of
undisclosed principals, and of principals known, but not mentioned
in contracts executed on their account, but signed by the agent alone,
and he shows that in such cases, unless the principal in the mean time
has in good faith paid the agent supposing he was the principal, the
other party may overpass the agent, and sue the principal in the ﬁrst
instance. In section 701 he says: “This rule applies to all simple con
tracts, whether written or unwritten, entered into by an agent in his
own name and within the scope of his authority, although the name
of the principal does not appear in the instrument, and was not dis
closed, and although the party dealing with the agent supposed that
And this rule obtains
the latter was acting for himself.
well in
respect to contracts which are required to be in writing as those to
not essential.
whose validity writing
does not violate the prin
written agreement by parol
ciple which forbids the contradiction of
evidence, nor that which forbids the discharging of
party by parol
from the obligation of his written contract.
The writing
not con
the agent discharged;
tradicted, nor
the result
merely that an
made liable.”
additional party
“Whatever the original merits of the rule,” says the court in Bying
ton v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 45 Am. Rep. 314, “that
party not
mentioned in
simple contract in writing may be charged as
prin
cipal upon oral evidence, even when the writing gives no indication
of an intent to bind any other person than the signer we cannot re
for
as well settled as any part of the law of agency.”
open
These authorities demonstrate that the ﬁrst contention of the de
untenable."
fendant
Demurrer overruled.
a

*

*

*
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it
is

it,
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a
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7

17 See, also, In re Bnteman,
Misc. Rep. 633. 28 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1894);
Lindeke Land Co. v. Levy. 76 Minn. 364, T9 N. W. 314 (1899); Barker v. Gar
vey, 83 Ill. 184 (1876). approved in Heywood Bros. Co. v. Andrews, S9 Ill
App. 195 (1900); Edwards v. Gildemeister, 61 Kan. 141, 59 Pac. 259 (1899);
Bnrbre v. Goodale, 28 Or. 465, 471, 38 Pac. 67, 43 Pac. 378 (1896); ante, p.
466; Wnddill v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1012, 14 S. E. 849, 29 Am. St. Rep. 766 (1892);
Mechanics’ Bank v. Bank of Columbia,
Wheat. 326,
L. Ed. 100 (1820).
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GREENBURG

,

(Supreme Court

v.

of -New Jersey, 1904.

or ran nnnuron
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PALMIERI."
71 N.

J.

Law,

S3, 58

Atl.

297.)

VAN SYCKEL, J. This is a suit instituted in the Second District
court of Newark against the wife for supplies purchased by her hus
band for horses owned by her.
The plaintiff, before this suit was
brought, sued the husband, and recovered a judgment for the same
claim. After judgment against the husband, the plaintiff learned that‘
the husband, in making the purchases, acted as the agent of his wife
in her business, and then this suit was commenced. From the judg
ment recovered against the wife, the case is in this court by appeal.
In Elliott v. Bodine, 59 N. J. Law, 567, 36 Atl. 1038, Judge Nixon,
in delivering the opinion of the court of last resort, says:
“VVhere
credit is given to an agent. the fact of agency being unknown at the
time, the party giving credit may elect which he will hold responsible.
the principal or the agent; and that a husband may act as the agent
of his wife."
In Yates v. Repetto, 65 N. J. Law, 294, 47 Atl. 632, Judge Adams.
in expressing the views of the Court of Errors and Appeals, says:
“The authorities are uniform in maintaining the doctrine that, when
the principal is unknown to the vendor at the time of the sale, he
may, upon discovering the principal, resort to him, or to the agent
with whom he dealt, at his election.”
To make an election binding, the party electing must have infor
mation of the name of the principal, in addition to the fact of the
agency, for in the absence of such knowledge there could not be an
election. In this case the plaintiff had notice neither of the agency
nor of the name'of the principal.
If the plaintiff sues after he is advised of the agency, it is an elec
tion, from which he cannot recede; but where, as in this case, he
recovers a judgment against the agent when he is in ignorance of
the existence of _a principal, an action will lie against the principal.
Story on
unless he discharges the judgment against the agent.
Beymer v. Bon
Agency, § 296; Mechem on Agency, §§ 695-700;
sall, 79 Pa. 298.
The judgment below should be aﬁirmed, with costs
Especially,

see the interesting

H. 561 (1874).
Cf. Kelly v. Thuey,

54 N.

review

of the authorities in Chandler v. Coe,

102 Mo. 522, 15 S. W. 62 (1890), in which the court held
the contract showed both parties intended that no resort should be had by
or against the undisclosed principal, and Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625.
23 N. E. 24 (1889), in which it was shown the third person would not have
dealt with him if he had been disclosed.
18 Accord: Raymond v. Crown Mills, 2 Metc. (Mass) 319 (1841).

-—
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VVILSON.

of Appeals of New York,

1882.

90 N.

Y.

423.)

Plaintiff sold Robin’s island to one McNish, as agent for one Scott.
They assigned to Horne, to whom plaintiff conveyed the property,
subject to certain mortgages, and took payment, part cash and part
by bond and mortgage back. Horne conveyed to Mrs. Moﬁett. The
bond was not paid, and plaintiff foreclosed the mortgage and charged
a deﬁciency of $4,660.62 against Mrs. Moffett.
Execution was issued
and returned unsatisﬁed, and plaintiff now sues Wilson, as being all
the time the real principal and purchaser of Robin’s island.
* * * Besides the plaintiff dealt with Horne and
FINGH, ].1°
his grantee, Mrs. Moffett, as real principals, and actual owners and
purchasers of the island’, and in such utter disregard and repudiation
of any rights of Vt/ilson, after notice of his claim to be owner, as to
The appellant’s idea
estop him now from treating him as principal.
seems to be that Wilson’s alleged contract of purchase somehow sur
vived its subsequent fulﬁllment, and having been made by agents
acting for an undisclosed principal, the seller had a remedy against
both; could sue the agents as he did, and failing to get satisfaction
\»Ve do not see how
have a remedy against the discovered principal.
but if they do,
the facts of the case admit of any such proposition;
if it were possible to say that a right of action for the unpaid pur
chase-money of the land remained to Tuthill, against Horne and
Mrs. Moﬁett as agents who had become personally liable, and also
against Wilson as the undisclosed principal, a fatal diﬁiculty remains.
The vendor could not enforce his claim against both the principal
when discovered and the agents who contracted in his behalf. Grant
ing that each was liable, both were not, for both could not be at one
and the same time, since the contract could not be the personal con
tract of the agents, and yet not their contract but that of the prin
cipal. The vendor had a choice and was put to his election. Meeker
v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 351; Addison v. Gandassequi, 4 Taunt. 574;
Curtis v. Williamson, L. R., 10 Q. B. 57. The rule is well stated in
Leake’s Digest, 503-4, that “if, after discovery of the principal, the
creditor elect to hold the agent liable, and act accordingly in a man;
ner to affect the principal, he will be precluded from afterward charg
He has the right of election as to which of them
ing the principal.
he will hold responsible, but having once made an election he is
In the present case the learned trial judge_found as
bound by it.”
a fact that in ]uly, 1873, the plaintiff had notice that \-Vilson claimed
to be the real owner of Robin’s island. Yet after that, he took from
Mrs. Moffett a further mortgage; knowing the real principal, he be
he asked a personal
gan a foreclosure of the agents’ mortgage;
19 Part

ot the opinion is omitted.
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judgment both against Horne and Mrs. Moffett; he omitted to make
the principal a party; he released Horne from his liability; pursued
Mrs. Moﬁett to judgment and execution; and became repossessed
of Robin’s island by virtue of his judgment.
By these acts he made
his election to treat the agents as principals, as he had the right to
do, and cannot now recall his choice. It was said in Priestly v. Fer
(I
nie, 3 I-I‘. & C. 982, that where the agent, having made a contract
in his own name, has been sued on it to judgment, there can'be no
doubt that no second action would be maintainable against the prin
The plaintiff wholly ignored Wilson in pursuing his remedy,
cipal.”
as he had a right to do.
He treated the agents as principals, and
they were such as to him and on the face of the papers. He cannot
now have a remedy against Wilson." We are unable to discover
any ground upon which a recovery for the deﬁciency on the foreclo
sure can be sustained against Wilson. * * *
judgment for defendant aﬁirmed.
But in Gay v. Kelley,

109 Minn. 101, 123 N. W. 295, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
the court holds that if the agency is disputed the third person may
maintain suit against both principal and agent until it is disclosed who is lia
ble, though he cannot have judgment against both.
Contra, see Furculi v.
Bittner, 69 Misc. Rep. 112, 125 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1910); Weil v. Raymond, 142
As to why the remedies against principal and
Mass. 206, 7 N. E. S60 (1886).
agent are inconsistent, see Eufaula Grocery C0. v. Mo. Nat. Bank, 118 Ala.
408. 24 South. 389 (1898), and especially the leading English cases, Priestly
. Exch. 172, 13 L. T. Rep.
v. Fernie. 3 H. & C. 977. 11 Jur. (N. S.) 813, 34 L.
(N. S.) 208, 13 W. ~~R.1089 (1865), and Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504,
Cf. Curtis
48 L. J. C. P. 705, 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 418, 28 W. R. 97 (1879).
v. Williamson. L. R. 10 Q. B. 57, 44 L. J. Q. B. 37, 31 L. '1‘. Rep. (N. S.) 678,
23 W. R. 236 (1874), in which ﬁling an aﬂidavit of proof against the estate or
an insolvent debtor was held not as matter of law an election.
A delay of
three months is not as matter of law unreasonable “in the absence of any
altering for the worse" of the position of the principal. Berry v. Chase, 179
A delay of nine months is too long, es
Fed. 426, 102 C. C. A. 572 (1910).
pecially it the position of the principal towards his agent has been altered
before the action is brought.
Smethurst v. Mitchell, 1 E. & E. 622, 5 Jur.
A reason
(N. S.) 978. 28 L. J. Q. B. 241, 7 W. R. 226, 102 E. C. L. 622 (1859).
able time to investigate and compare the standings of principal and agent is
always allowed.
Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656, 62 C. C. A. 382 (1904),-and
there seems to be no reason why the principal should complain in any case
if he has not altered his position with the agent. Campbell v. Hicks, 28 L. J.
2°

742 (1909),

J

Exch. 70 (1858).
An action pursued to judgment after knowledge of all the facts is in law
Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178 (1870), approved in Lindquist
an election.
v. Dickson, 98 Minn. 369. 107 N. W. 958, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729. 8 Ann. Cas.
1024 (1906); Murphy v. Hutchinson,
93 Miss. 643, 48 South. 178, 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 785. 17 Ann. Cas. 611 (1909), containing a discriminating discussion of
the cases. But there must have been full power of choosing between principal
and agent. Hoffman v. Anderson, 112 Ky. 893, 67 S. W. 49, 24 Ky. Law Rep.
44 (1902).

It

_

is not necessary that the judgment

i

shall have been satisﬁed. Barrell v.
disapproving on this point Beymer

Newby, 127 Fed. 656, 62 C. C. A. 382 (1904),
'
Y. Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298 (1875).
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DAVENPORT.
8: C. 78, 4

M. & R.

110, 17

E. G. L.
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The plaintiff below declared for goods sold and delivered.
Plea,
Verdict for plaintiff.
general issue.
LORD TENTERDEN, C. ]. I am of opinion that the direction given
by the learned Recorder in this case was right, and that the verdict
was also right.
I take it to be a general rule, that if a person sells
goods (supposing at the time of the contract he is dealing with a
principal). but afterwards discovers that the person with whom he has
been dealing is not the principal in the transaction, but agent for a
third person, though he may in the mean time have debited the agent
with
he may afterwards recover the amount from the real princi
pal; subject, however, to this qualiﬁcation, that the state of the ac
count between the principal and the agent
not altered to the preju
dice of the principal.
On the other hand,
at the time of the sale
the seller knows, not only that the person who
nominally dealing
with him
not principal but agent, and also knows who the principal
all that knowledge, chooses to make
really is, and, notwithstanding
the agent his debtor, dealing with him and him alone, then, according
to the cases of Addison v. Gandassequi, 4'Taunt. 574. and Paterson
v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62, the seller cannot afterwards, on the fail
ure of the agent, turn round and charge the principal, having once
made his election at the time when he had the power of choosing
between the one and the other.) The present
middle case.
At
the time of the dealing for the goods, the plaintiffs were informed
that McKune, who came to them to buy the goods, was dealing for
another, that
that he was an agent, but they were not informed
who the principal was.
They had not, therefore, at that time the
means of making their election.
true that they might, perhaps,
have obtained those means
they had made further inquiry; but
they made no further inquiry.
Not knowing who the principal really
was, they had not the power at that instant of making their election.
That being so,
seems to me that this middle case falls in substance
and effect within the ﬁrst proposition which
have mentioned, the
case of
person not known to be an agent; and not within the sec
ond,_where the buyer
not merely known to be agent, but the name
of his principal
also known.
There may be another case, and that
where
British merchant
buying for
foreigner.
According to
the universal understanding of merchants, and of all persons in trade,
the credit
then considered to be given to the British buver, and not
to the foreigner.
In this case, the buyers lived at Dumfries; and
question might have been raised for the consideration of the jury,
Whether, in consequence of their living at Dumfries,
may not have
been understood among all persons at Liverpool, where there are
great dealings with Scotch houses, that the plaintiffs had given credit
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to McKune only, and not to a person living, though not in a foreign
country, yet, in that part of the king's dominions which rendered him
But, instead of directing
not amenable to any process of our courts?
the attention of the Recorder to any matter of that nature, the point
insisted upon by the learned counsel at the trial was, that it ought to
have been part of the direction to the jury, that if they were satisﬁed
the plaintiffs, at the time of the order being given, knew that McKune
was buying goods for another, even though his principal might not
be made known to them, they, by afterwards debiting McKune, had
elected him for their debtor.
The point made by the defendant’s
counsel, therefore, was that if the plaintiffs knew that McKune was
dealing with them as agent, though they did not know the name of
The Recorder
the principal, they could not turn round on him.
he thought that though they did know that Mc
thought otherwise:
Kune was buying as agent, yet, if they did not know who his principal
really was, so as to be able to write him down as their debtor, the
defendant was liable, and so he left the question to the jury, and I
think he did right in so doing. The judgment of the court below must
'
therefore be aﬁirmed.
BAYLEY, ]. There may be a course of trade by which the seller
will be conﬁned to the agent who is buying. and not be at liberty at all
to look to the principal.
Generally speaking, that is the case where ar
agent here buys for a house abroad. There may also have been evi
dence of a course of trade, applicable to an agent living here acting
for a ﬁrm resident in Scotland. But that does not appear to have
been made a point in this case, and it is not included in the objection
In my opinion,
which is now made to the charge of the Recorder.
the direction of the Recorder was right; and it was, with the limits I
have mentioned, perfectly consistent with the justice of the case.
\Vhere a purchase is made by an agent, the agent does not of neces
sity so contract as to make himself personally liable; but he may do
so. If he does make himself personally liable, it does not follow that
the principal may not be liable also, subject to this qualiﬁcation, that
the principal shall not be prejudiced by being made personally liable,
if the justice of the case is that he should not be personally liable.
If the principal has paid the agent, or if the state of accounts between
the agent here and the principal would make it unjust that the seller
should call on the principal, the fact of payment, or such a state of
accounts, would be an answer to the action brought by the seller
But the
where he had looked to the responsibility-of the agent.“
seller, who knows who the principal is, and instead of debiting that
principal, debits the agent, is considered, according to the authorities
which have been referred to, as consenting to look to the agent only,
But there
and is thereby precluded from looking to the principal.
21 See 18 Mich. Law Rev. 343, note on Southern By. v. W.
178 N. C. 273, 100 S. E. 418, 10 A. L. R. 731 (1919).

—i

A. Simpkins Co.,

LIABILITY or CONSTITUENT 'ro ramp mason

Ch. 5)

687

which establish this position, that although he debits the
who has contracted in such a‘ way as to make himself person
ally liable, yet, unless the seller does something to exonerate the
principal, and to say that he will look to the agent only, he is at lib
In
erty to look to the principal when that principal is discovered.
the present case the seller knew that there was a principal; but there
is no authority to show that mere knowledge that there is a principal,
destroys the right of the seller to look to that principal as soon as he
knows who that principal
provided he did not know who he was
said, that
at the time when the purchase was originally made.
the seller ought to have asked the name of the principal, and charged
him with the price of the goods. By omitting to do so, he might have
lost his right to claim payment from the principal, had the latter paid
the agent, or had the state of the accounts between the principal and
the agent been such as to make
unjust that the former should be
called upon to make the payment. But in
case circumstanced as this
case
where
does not appear but that the man who has had the
the justice of the case?
That
goods has not paid for them, what
he should pay for them to the seller or to the solvent agent, or to
the estate of the insolvent agent, who has made no payment in respect
as
of these goods. The justice of the case
seems to me, all on
one side, namely, that the seller shall be paid, and that the buyer
(the principal) shall be the person to pay him, provided he has not
Now, upon the evidence,
paid anybody else.
appears that_the de
fendant had the goods, and has npt paid for them either to McKune
or to the present plaintiffs, or to anybody else. He will be liable to
pay for them either to the plaintiffs or to McKune’s estate.’ The
seems to me, is,-that he should pay the plain
justice of the case, as
am, therefore,
tiffs, who were the sellers, and not any other person.
of opinion that the direction of the Recorder was right.
LITTLEDALE,
The general principle of law< is, that the seller
shall have his remedy against the principal, rather than against any
other person. Where goods are bought by an agent, who does not at
the time disclose that he
acting as agent, the vendor, although he
has debited the agent, may, upon discovering the principal, resort to
the principal be known to the seller at
him for payment.
But
the time when he makes the contract, and he, with a full knowledge
of the principal, chooses to debit the agent, he thereby makes his
Or
in such
election, and cannot afterwards charge the principal.
case he debits the principal, he cannot afterwards charge the agent.
third case; the seller may, in his invoice and bill of parcels,
There
he may debit A. as
mention both principal and agent:
purchaser
for goods bought through B., his agent. In that case, he thereby makes
his election to charge the principal, and cannot afterwards resort to
The general principle
that the seller shall have his
the agent.
remedy against the principal, although he may by electing to take the
The
agent as his debtor abandon his right against the principal.
are
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present case diﬁers from any of those which I have mentioned. Here
the agent purchased the goods in his own name. The name of the
principal was not then known to the seller, but it afterwards came to
his knowledge.
It seems to me to be more consistent with the gen
eral principle of law, that the seller shall have his remedy against the
principal, rather than against any other person, to hold in this case
that the seller, who knew that there was a principal, but did not know
who that principal was, may resort to him as soon as he is discov
ered. Here the agent did not communicate to the seller sufﬁcient in
The seller
formation to enable him to debit any other individual.
was in the same situation, as if at the time of the contract he had. not
known that there was any principal besides the person with whom
he was dealing, and had afterwards
discovered that the goods had
and, in that case, it is clear
been purchased on account of another;
It is said. that he ought
that he might have charged the principal.
to have ascertained by inquiry of the agent who the principal was, but
I think that he was not bound to make such inquiry, and that by
debiting the agent with the price of the goods, he has not precluded
himself from resorting to the principal, whose name was not disclosed
to him.
It might have been made a question. whether it was not a
defence to this action that the principal resided in Scotland.
But
that was not a point made at the trial, nor noticed in the bill of ex
For
ceptions; we cannot, therefore. take it into our consideration.
the reasons already given, I think the plaintiﬁ is entitled to recover.
Iudgment affirmed.
PARKE,
having been concerned as counsel in the cause, gave no
opinion.

1855.
10 Exch. 739,
24 L.
Exeh. 76,

J.

C. L. R.
W. R. 176.)

612,
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v.

3

HEALD

Jur.

[N. S.] 70,

I

It

a

I

a

It

I

is

Declaration for goods sold and delivered.
Plea, that the goods
were sold to the agent of defendant, to whom alone credit was given,
and who was treated as a principal until after defendant had paid
and settled with the agent.
Demurrer and joinder.
POLLOCK, C. B.
am of opinion that the plea
bad.
comes
shortly to this.—A person employs his agent to purchase goods for
him, with authority to pledge his credit. The agent does so, and thus
debt; and
creates
agree with the remark made by my Brother
Parke, that all the cases in which the principal has been held to be
discharged, are cases in which the seller has enabled the agent to
misrepresent, or where the agent by some conduct adopted by the
seller has placed his principal in
worse situation than that he ought
to be in. This plea contains nothing of that sort.
merely states
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that the plaintiffs treated Taylor as the principal, and that the defend
ant bona ﬁde settled with him.
PARKE, B. I am of the same opinion.
The plea simply states, that,
after the contract was entered into between the plaintiffs and a third
party, the agent of the defendant, under circumstances which ren
dered the defendant liable upon
am
the latter paid the agent.
clear, that,
of opinion that this
no defence to the action.
bound to
person orders an agent to make
purchase for him, he
see that the agent pays the debt; and the giving the agent money for
that purpose does not amount to payment, unless the agent pays
But there are no doubt cases and dicta, which, unless
accordingly.
they be understood with some qualiﬁcation, afford ground for the
First,,there
the
position taken by the counsel for the defendant.
dictum of Bayley, ]., in Thomson v. Davenport, where that learned
Judge lays down the rule, that “if the agent does make himself per
does not follow that the principal may not be liable
sonally liable,
also, subject to this qualiﬁcation, that the principal shall not be preju
diced by being made personally liable,
the justice of the case
that
he should not be personally liable.”
And he then proceeds to say,
“if the principal has paid the agent, or
the state of accounts be
tween the agent here and the principal would make
unjust that the
seller should call on the principal, the fact of payment or such
state
of accounts would be an answer to an action brought by the seller.
where he had looked to the responsibility of the agent.”
The ex
unjust,”
pression, “make
very vague; but
rightly understood,
what the learned judge said
no doubt, true. If the conduct of the
seller would make
unjust for him to call upon the buyer for the
induced by the con
money; as for example, where the principal
duct of the seller to pay his agent the money on the faith that the
settlement on the matter, or
agent and seller have come to
any
made by the seller either by words or
representation tothat effect
conduct, the seller cannot afterwards throw off the mask and sue the
would be unjust for him to do so.
think that
But
principal.
there
no case [of this kind where the plaintiff has been precluded
from recovering. unless he has in some way contributed either to de
ceive the defendant or to induce him to alter his position.” This was

a

5

7

22 In Armstrong v. Stokes, L. R.
Q. B. 598. 41 L. J. Q. B. 253, 26 L. T.
Rep. (N. S.) 872, 21 W. R. 52 (1872). the court preferred the dictum of Thom
son v. Davenport to the rule of Heald v. Kenworthy, but in Irvine v. Watson,
L. R. Q. B. D. 414, 49 L. J. Q. B. 531, 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 810 (1880), the
court, after
of the cases. preferred the rule that
deliberate consideration
the undisclosed principal is discharged, upon payment to the agent, only when
he is misled by some conduct of the third person into the belief that the
agent had settled with the third person, and pays the agent in reliance upon
Such is the English rule.
such belief.
To the same eﬂfeet is New York County Bank v. Stein, 2'4 Md. 447 (1866);
Bonnell v. Briggs, 45 Barb. 470 (1866).
The contrary doctrine is approved in Harder v. Continental Card Co., 64
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ground of the decision in Wyatt v. The Marquis of Hertford,
where the seller took the security of the agent unknown to the prin
cipal and gave the agent a receipt as for the money due from the prin
cipal, in consequence of which the principal dealt differently. with his
agent on the faith of such receipt, and it was properly held that the
seller could not sue the principal.
So in the case put by Lord Ellen
borough, C. ]., in Kymer v. Suwercropp, the observations of that
learned judge are perfectly correct; for the fact of the seller’s allow
ing the time for payment to elapse might afford evidence of deceit
on his part, and of his having thereby induced the principal to pay the
Neither does the case of Smyth v. Anderson, nor the elab
agent.
orate' judgment of my Brother Maule, contain anything at variance
with the principle I have stated.
He adopts the proposition expound
that the seller cannot recover against the principal,
ed by Bayley,
be unfair for him to do so.
In Smyth v. Anderson, which con
tains
good illustration of this principle, the agent purchased goods on
account of his principal who resided abroad; but at the time of the
purchase, although he did not inform the seller who his principal was,
the invoice stated that the goods “were bought on account of B.,"
the principal.
The seller drew certain bills of exchange on the agent,
who became insolvent before the bills arrived at maturity.
The prin
cipal, after having received advice of the purchaser, and of the ac
ceptance of the bills by the agent, made large remittances on account
of the goods to the agent, who
the time of his stoppage was largely
My Brother Maule says, the Court were of
indebted to his principal.
was unfair and unjust to
opinion that under such circumstances
allow the seller to receive the value of the goods from the principal.
think that there
no authority for saying that
payment made to
the agent, as in this case, precludes the seller from recovering from the
principal, unless
appears that he has induced the principal to believe
There
that
settlement has been made with the agent.
no averment
ofthat kind here, and consequently the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
am of the same opinion.
ALDERSON, B.
clear that the de
fendant, who
the principal in the transaction, authorized the agent
to contract the debt on his account; the defendant afterwards paid
his agent money, which, however, he did not pay over to the plain
not excused from seeing that the plain
tiffs.
Now the defendant
tiffs are paid, unless the latter by their acts induced the defendant to
Where the seller trusts the agent
make the payment to their agent.
only, and says that he will consider him as the only party liable, the
it
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is
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89, 117 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (1909)
Knapp V. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284
L. R. A. 749 (1888).

(citing Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun, 144
[1884]); Fradley V. Hylnnd (C. C.)

As to what would be an injustice to the principal, see Smyth v. Anderson.
Jur. 41, 18 L. J. G. P. 109, 62 E. C. L. 21 (1849); Yenni v. Ocean
-

Daly, 421 (1874).
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agent alone is responsible, and the seller cannot proceed against the
But there must be-some act on the part of the creditor
principal.
to warrant us in saying that the payment by the debtor to his agent
is to be treated as a payment to the creditor.
Where a creditor by
his conduct induces the debtor to pay a third party, and thereby alters
his debtor’s position, it would be unjust to call upon the debtor to pay
the amount of the debt to the creditor.
But there is nothing of that
sort in this case, and consequently the defendant is not discharged.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

.i-—
VAN DYKE
(Supreme Court of Georgia.

1905.

v.

VAN DYKE.

123 Ga. 686, 51 S.

E.

582. 3 Ann.

Cas. 978.)

a

it,

Declaration on a note under seal payable to the order of plaintiff,
and signed by E. A. Van Dyke. husband of defendant. The note was
given for money borrowed by the maker, as plaintiff supposed for his
own use.
She afterward learned that it was used for paying an as
sessment on stock-owned
and since sold by defendant.
On motion
the court dismissed the action and plaintiff excepted.
LUMPKIN, J. [After stating the factsz] The general rule with ref
erence to holding an undisclosed principal liable upon the contract of
his agent is thus stated in Civ. Code 1895, § 3024: “If an agent fails
to disclose his principal, yet, when discovered, the person dealing
with the agent may go directly upon the principal, under the contract,
unless the principal shall have previously accounted and settled with
the agent."
This is a codiﬁcation of the law as it stood prior to the
original Code of 1863, and is not an innovation resulting from legis
In Lenney v. Finley, 118 Ga. 718, 45 S. E. S93, it
lative enactment.
was held that: “The rule that an undisclosed principal shall stand lia
ble for the contract of his agent does not apply when the contract is
under seal.
Accordingly. a lease, under seal, executed by an agent
name, and which does not purport to "be
as lessee in his individual
executed on behalf of the principal, is not binding upon the latter.
although it appears from extrinsic evidence that the lessee was the
general agent to conduct a business for his principal, and that the
premises were leased to be used in such business.” \Ve are asked to
review and reverse this decision, but the court declines to change the
ruling then made. An examination of the authorities cited in the opin
In Merchants’ Bank
ion will show that it was not without foundation.
v. Central Bank, 1 Ga. 418, 44 Am. Dec. 665, ante, p. 460, it was said:
“In the execution of instruments under seal by an agent the general rule
is that it must purport upon its face to be the contract of the princi
and signed to it.” See. also,
pal, and his name must be inserted in
Compton v. Cassada, 32 Ga. 428 (compare Tenant v. Blacker, 27 Ga.
418; as to the execution of
power, see Terry v. Rodahan, 79 Ga.
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11 Am. St. Rep. 420) ; Graham v. Campbell, 56 Ga.
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laid down as a common-law doctrine that, when a contract is made
by an instrument under seal, no one but a party to the instrument
is liable to be sued upon
made by an agent or at
and therefore,
must be in the name of the principal, in order that he may
torney,
Some
be
not bound by it.
party, because otherwise he
of the later decisions, however, qualify this doctrine by holding that
in
when
sealed contract has been executed in such form that
la.w the contract of the agent, and not of the principal, but the prin
cipal’s interest in the contract appears upon its face, and he has re
ceived the beneﬁt of the performance by the other party, and has
one which
by acts in pais, and the contract
ratiﬁed and conﬁrmed
would have been valid without
seal, the instrument will be binding
In the note attached to the declaration there
on the principal.”
was executed by Van Dyke as agent, or
nothing to indicate that
that his wife was in any way connected with it.. Indeed, no reference
to her or to any agency
made in the paper.
See Briggs v. Part
701,
ridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617; Mechem on Agency,
702, and note; Clark on Contracts,
275, p. 519; Bishop on Con
tracts,
426, 1070; Evans v. VVells
Spring, 22 Wend. 324—in
which several interesting opinions were ﬁled. Some courts hold that
negotiable instruments do not fall within the general rule, and that
an unnamed principal cannot be sued on them.
See Clark on Con
tracts,
275, p. 519 and notes.
contended that the rule applies only to instruments which
were specialties at common law, as to which
seal was necessary;
seal
and that in cases where the instrument would be valid without
seal would not bring
within the rule. There are
the addition of
some authorities holding or tending to hold this to be the rule.
See
Law,
Stowell v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614; Wagoner v. Watts, 44 N.
126; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69, 75. The distinction drawn in this
line of authorities, however, has not been followed in Georgia.
In
the case of Lenney v. Finley, supra, the instrument under consid
lease for
term less than two years, which, under our
eration was
law, conveyed no interest in land, and could have been executed \vith—
was held that “the sig
out any seal. In Rowe v. Vi/are, 30 Ga. 278,
nature of
sealed instrument by an agent, the principal not being pres
not binding on the principal, unless the authority of the agent
ent,
In the body of the opinion
be under seal.”
said:
“But
was
said that the bond need not have been under seal, though in point of
fact
was so, and therefore the seal might be disregarded.
Not so.
The question was whether Taylor had authority to sign the names
is—sealed as
of Hooks and Herndon to this bond as
is. \/Vhether
seal (to use, for convenience,
short but inaccurate
bond without
phrase) would be valid has nothing to do with the case, for there was
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no such paper in the case." This was reaﬂirmed in Overman v. At
kinson, IOZ Ga. 750, 29 S. E. 758.
It is further contended that a note under seal does not fall within
this rule. At common law a note under seal was unknown.
Such an
instrument more nearly approximated
a “single bond.”
Broom’s
Common Law (9th Ed.) 272, 484; Sivell v. Hogan, 119 Ga. 170, 46
67.
It is unnecessary to discuss the exact status of a sealed note.
S.
In Albertson v. Holloway, 16 Ga.'377, its nature was considered, and
it was held that a plea of failure of consideration could be made to a
suit based on it. In other cases there have been intimations that a pre
sumption of a consideration arose from the presence of a seal, but that
it might be rebuttcd. See Neil v. Bunn, 58 Ga. S83; Sirmns v. Lide,
In \Veaver v. Cosby, 109 Ga. 310, 34 S.
94 Ga. 553, 21 S. E. 220.
E. 680, Mr. Justice Lewis said that an instrument then before the court,
being under seal, “raised a strong presumption of law” that it was
In Sivell v. Hogan, 119 Ga. 167, 169,
founded upon a consideration.
170, 46 S. E. 67, the opinion was strongly expressed, although no di
rect ruling was made, that a seal raises a conclusive presumption of the
existence of a consideration at the time the contract was entered into,
but not that it has not since failed, either wholly or -partially; and, ac
cordingly, that want of consideration cannot be pleaded, but failure of
consideration may be. Whether the presumption thus raised is dis
putable or conclusive, the fact of being under seal gives to the note a
Moreover, the statute
character which it would not have otherwise.
of limitations in regard to a note under seal and one without a scal is
not the same. Civ. Code 1895, §§ 3765, 3767. Section 3634 of the Civ
il Code of 1895 reads as follows: “A specialty is a contract under seal.
and is considered by the law as entered into with more solemnity, and
Un
consequently of higher dignity, than ordinary simple contracts.”
der the strict commercial law prevailing in some jurisdictions, a note
under seal and payable to a named person or order is deemed not nego
tiable, but in this state it is treated as negotiable. Farrar v. Bank of
New York, 90 Ga. 331, 17 S. E. 87; Porter v. McCollum, 15 Ga. 528.
It is apparent that a note under seal occupies a different position in
several respects from one which is not so. Hence it is not to be treat
ed merely as a simple contract, and the seal rejected as surplusage.
\\'e think it does fall within the rule announced in Lenncy v. Finley,
From what has been said it follows the plaintiff could not
supra.
have recovered against the defendant on the note given by the husband

of
'

the

_

I

latter.”

Hamid: Briggs v. Partridge. e4 N. Y. .257. 21 Am. Rep. em (1876):
Furculi v. Bittner, 69 Misc. Rep. 112. 125 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1910). But Lagumis
v. Gerard, 116 Misc. Rep. 471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (1921), holds that New
It
York has abandoned the rule as outworn, arbitrary, and unreasonable.
is to be seen whether the Court of Appeals will support this sensible. but rev
olutionary, breaking away from outworn rules.
Cf. Case v. Case, 203 N. Y.
263, 96 N. E. 440, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 311 (1911).
As to the eﬂect or statutes dispensing with the necessity of seals, see Jones
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that, whether the plaintiff can recover on
of action against the defendant aside
from the'note, under the facts alleged. The case of Farrar v. Lee,
10 App. Div. 130, 41 N. Y. Supp. 672, was very similar to that now
under consideration.
It is there said: “That the liability rested en
tirely upon the bond, in which any preliminary contract was merged;
that, as the bond was signed by Tanner [the agent] in his own name,
and not as agentfor Lee [the principal], it was not competent to
transfer by parol evidence, or in any other way, from Tanner to Lee,
In'the case
the obligation which Tanner had assumed personally.”
of Lenney v. Finley, supra, it was contended that, if the concealed
principal was not liable on the contract of lease by reason of its being
under seal, nevertheless, having occupied the premises and used them
for the purpose of conducting business, she was liable to the plaintiff.
This contention was denied by the court. In the case of Maddox v.
The third
W'ilson, 91 Ga. 39, 16 S. E. 213, no opinion was written.
headnote appears to conﬂict with the ruling here made.
The deci
sion was made by two justices, and not by a full bench, and was dis
approved in Lenney v. Finley, supra.
Under the allegations of the petition the trial court committed no
All the Jus
error in sustaining the demurrer.
Judgment afﬁrmed.
tices concurring, except Snmons, C: ]., absent.
is contended, however,

the note or not, she has a cause

BERRY

et al. v.

of Appeals of the United
(Circuit Court
'
'

CHASE

et al.

States. Sixth Circuit, 1910.

179

Fed.

426, 102 C. G. A. 572.)

KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge.“
The plaintiffs, Iacob Beriy & Co., a
ﬁrm of stock brokers doing business in the city of New York‘, brought
this suit, for the use and beneﬁt of Darwent as assignee of their claim,
to recover the loss alleged to have been sustained by them through their
purchase to cover a short sale of 25 shares of Northern Paciﬁc Rail
way stock, made by the direction of Schloss, Miller & Malone, a Mem
phis, Tenn., brokerage ﬁrm, which ﬁrm is alleged to have acted in the
transaction on behalf of Chase as undisclosed principal.
Upon a for
mer trial verdict was directed for the defendant upon the ground
that the purchase by Berry & Co. was shown to have been made
v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518 (1878). and Sanger v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472, -14 S.
477. 66 Am. St. Rep. 913 (1898), and Streeter v. Janu, 90 Minn. 395, 96 N.
,
1128 (1903).

W.
W.

Some cases hold that though an action does not lie against the principal
upon a bond in the agent's name yet assumpsit lies, and the writing may be
introduced as evidence of the terms of the contract.
Violett v. Powell. 10 B.
Mon. 347. 52 Am. Dec. 548 (1850); Moore v. Granby Min. Co., 80 M0. 86 (1883).
As to liability on a negotiable instrument, see ante, p. 324 if.
#4 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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not upon Chase’s order, but at the sole direction of Schloss, Miller &
Malone; and upon the further ground that the contract of sale was a
Tennessee contract, the laws of which state make a contract for the
sale of stocks or bonds void “when either of the contracting parties have
had no intention or purpose of making actual delivery or receiving the
property in specie.” This court reversed the judgment of the Circuit
Court, holding that there was substantial evidence from which a jury
might ﬁnd that Chase had authorized Schloss, Miller & Malone to make
the purchase in question, as well as evidence tending to show that
the contract was a New York contract, the laws of which state make
such stock transaction void only where both parties join in the inten
tion that there shall be no delivery of the subject of the contract of sale
or purchase. See Berry v. Chase, 146 Fed. 625, 77 C. C. A. 161, where
the material facts appearing upon the former trial are set out.
Therassignment from Berry & Co. to Darwent was of the former’s
“claim and debt owing to them by the ﬁrm of Schloss, Miller & Malone,
of the city of Memphis, Tenn., of $5,762.50, created in the purchase by
said Jacob Berry & Co. for and on behalf of said Schloss, Miller &
Malone, on the 9th day of May, 1901, of 25 shares of the capital common
* * * with the
stock of the Northern Paciﬁc Railway Company
right and authority to said ]ohn P. Darwent to sue for and recov
er same from said Schloss, Miller & Malone, as well as any un
disclosed principal or principals whom they represent in the purchase
of said shares of stock, etc.” It was held by this court, upon the
former review. that Berry & Co., upon discovering Chase's principal
ship, had the right to elect to hold Schloss, Miller & Malone or Chase,
but that they could not hold both liable, and that they must choose
between the two and must abide an election once made.
146 Fed. 626,
77 C. C. A. 161.
Upon a later trial a verdict was again directed for
defendant upon the ground that, at the time of the assignment to Dar
went, Berry & Co. had not elected to sue Chase instead of Schloss,
Miller _& Malone; that they were required to make such election per
sonally, and could not assign the right of election to another. The trial
judge further expressed the opinion that what was really transferred
to Darwent was the account against Schloss, Miller & Malone and not
an account against Chase or any other undisclosed principal, and that
up to the time of the transfer Berry & C0. were looking to Schloss,
Miller & Malone for payment of the claim, and that Darwent thus ac
quired only the right to sue the latter ﬁrm.
Defendant contends that the evidence is undisputed that Berry &
Co. had, previous to the assignment to Darwent, elected to look to
Schloss, Miller & Malone, rather than to Chase. If this contention
is correct, verdict was properly directed for defendant.
The plain
tiff, on the other hand, insists that the record contains undisputed
evidence that Berry & Co. had elected to look to Chase alone. In sup
port of defendant’s contention, principal reliance is had upon the lan
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of the assignment itself, which it is insisted transfers an account
against Schloss, Miller & Malone, and so is inconsistent with a release
of their liability; and in connection therewith, the fact that although
Berry & Co. learned through Schloss, Miller & Malone on ]une 24,
1901, of Chase’s principalship, and were then requested by the former
to release them and to take action against Chase, they not only are not
shown to have released the account against the brokerage ﬁrm, but,
on the contrary, appear to have carried it for more than three months,
and until October 1, 1901, without making any demand upon Chase.
The evidence relied on by plaintiﬁs is that no demand appears to have
been made by the plaintiffs upon Schloss, Miller & Malone, together
with the testimony of one of the defendants, that following a talk by
telephone with one of the plaintiffs a day or two after the communica
tion of June 24th, plaintiffs “took it out of our account and put it to
.
Chase’s account and looked to Chase for it.”
In our opinion the evidence was not sufficient to establish an elec
tion by Berry & Co. to look to either Chase or the brokerage ﬁrm, to
the exclusion of the other.
On the one hand, although the instrument
of assignmentin terms conveys an account against Schloss, Miller &
Malone, any inference from this fact is overcome by an express au
thorization of suit against any undisclosed principal.
On the other
hand, the testimony as to Berry & Co.'s treatment of the account, fol
lowing the conversation by telephone, was manifestly no more than a
conclusion of the witness, and incompetent as evidence. \/Vhile any
decisive act by a party, after knowledge of his rights and of the facts,
determines his election in the case of inconsistent remedies (Robb v.
Vos, 155 U. S. 13, 15 Sup. Ct. 4, 39 L. Ed. 52), yet an act to have the
effect of e1ection' must be decisive. The mere act of charging the agent,
after knowledge of an originally undisclosed principal, does not, as mat
ter of law, amount to an election to look only to the agent. Jones v.
Johnson, 86 Ky. 530, 6 S. W. 582. It has been held, for manifest rea
sons, that the bringing of suit against both the agent and his'originally
undisclosed principal does not constitute an election to hold the principal
and discharge the agent. Mattlage v. Poole, 15 Hun (N. Y.) 556.
Whether or not the mere bringing of suit against the agent, without pro
ceeding to judgment, would amount to an election to look to the agent
(a proposition upon which the authorities are not entirely agreed), there
was here no suit against the agent, nor was there any overt act in our
opinion inconsistent with the right of Berry & Co. to ultimately look
to Chase. It is urged that the delay in electing to sue Chase was un
reasonable. Vt’ e cannot say this is so, in the absence of any altering for
the worseof Chase’s position towards 5chloss, Miller & Malone, or of
any circumstance making the holding of Chase unjust or unreasonable.
The judgment of
trial ordered.
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(Court of King's Bench, 1676.

3 Keble,

714

650.)

excepted in arrest of judgment, in act. upon the case for
bringing horses wild to tame in Little Lincolnﬁelds, being an open pub
lick place where people are all the day passing and repassing, because
its not said to be any high-way, nor said that the defendant knew them
to be wild, nor was there negligence in the coachman, who was thrown
out and hurt; but by Saunders an action upon the case well lay, as by
Smith of Westminster, for not pinning an ox, but setting a dog on him,
whereby he ran into pallas-yard and hurt him; so where a monky
escaped and did hurt, by default of the owner; & per Curiam, Its at
peril of the owner to take strength enough to order them, and the mas
and the action
ter is as lyable as the servant if he gave order for
intended personal, and
generally for bringing them thither, which
judgment for the plaintiff.”
is

is

it,

Simson

JONES

v.

HART."

(Court of King's Bench,

1699.

Holt,

642.)

a

is

if

is

is

a

is

a

a

it

a
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A

servant to
pawn-broker took in goods, and the party came and
tendered the money to the servant, who said he had lost the goods.
Upon this, action of trover was brought against the master; and the
would lie or not?
question was. whether
HOLT, C.
The action well lies in this case. If the servants of A.
pipe of wine, and
with his cart run against another cart, wherein
So
overturn the cart and spoil the wine, an action lieth against A.
where
carter’s servant runs his cart over
boy, action lies against
and so
the master for the damage done by this negligence:
liable.
horse in shoeing, the master
For
smith’s man pricks
answerable for him, and undertakes for
whoever employs another,
his care to all that make use of him.
The act of
servant
the act of his master, where he acts by au
thority of the master.

2

1

4

95 See the interesting
Harv.
view of this case by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Law Rev. 35-i.
=6 Accord:
Ld. Raym. 264 (1698); Barwiek V.
Turberville v. Stampe,
English Joint-Stock Bank, L. R.
Exch. 259 (1857).
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SIR ROBERT WAYLAND’S CASE.
(Court of King's Bench, 1702.

3 Salk. 234-)

He‘ used to give his servant money every Saturday to defray the
charges of the foregoing week, the servant kept the money; yet per
HOLT, Chief Justice, the master is chargeable, for the master at his
peril ought to take care what servant he employs; and it is more rea
sonable, that he should suifer for the cheats of his servant than stran
gers and tradesmen; so if a smith’s man pricks my horse, the master
is liable.

-2-?

Q

HERN

v.

NICHOLS."

(Court of King's Bench at Nisi Prlus,

1708.

1 Salk.

289.)

In an action on the case for a deceit, the plaintiff set forth, that he
silk, whereas\it was another
bought several parcels of silk for
kind of silk; and that the defendant, well knowing this deceit, sold it to
him for
silk. On trial, upon not guilty, it appeared that there
was no actual deceit in the defendant who was the merchant, but that
it was in his factor beyond sea. And the doubt was, If this deceit
could charge the merchant?
And HOLT, C. ]., was of opinion, that
the merchant was answerable for the deceit of his factor, though not
criminaliter, yet civiliter; for seeing somebody must be a loser by this
deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts a trust and
conﬁdence in the deceiver should be a loser, than a. stranger.
And
upon this opinion the plaintiff had a verdict.

M‘MANUS
(Court

This

v.

CRICKETT.

of King’s Bench. 1800.

1 East,

105.)

was very much discussed at the bar, upon a motion to
for the plaintiff and enter a nonsuit, by Gibbs and
\Vood, against the rule, and Garrow and Giles in support of it. The
Court took time to consider of their judgment;
and afterwards en
tered so fully into the cases cited and the arguments urged at the
bar, that it is unnecessary to detail them in the usual form.
LORD KENYON, C. ]., now delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court.
This is an action of trespass. in which the declaration charges that
the defendant with force and arms drove a certain chariot against a
chaise in which the plaintiff was riding in the king’s highway, by
case

set aside a verdict

27 Mr. Justice Holmes, in 5 Harv. Law Rev. 8. considers that, though this
is a case of agency, it was treated as one of master and servant, and as such
it is always cited. Does it ‘matter which it is?
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chaise and greatly hurt.
Brown, a servant of the
defendant, willfully drove the chariot against the plaintiffs chaise, but
that the defendant was not himself present, nor did he in any manner
direct or assent to the act of the servant, and the question is, if for
this willful and designed act of the servant an action of trespass lies
against the defendant his master? As this is a question of very gen
eral extent, and as cases were cited at the b_ar, where verdicts had
been obtained against masters for the misconduct of their servants
under similar circumstances, we were desirous of looking into the au
thorities on the subject before we gave our opinion;
and after an
examination of all that we could ﬁnd as to t-his point, we think that
this action cannot be maintained.
It is a question of very general con
cern, and has been often canvassed; but I hope at last it will be at
It is said in Bro. Abr. tit. Trespass, pl. 435. “If my servant,
rest.
contrary to my will, chase my beasts into the soil of another, I shall
not be punished.”
And in 2 Roll. Abr. 553. “If my servant, without
my notice, put my beasts into another's land, my servant is the tres
passer, and not I; because by the voluntary putting of the beasts there
without my assent, he gains a special property for the time, and so
I have looked into the corre
to this purpose they are his beasts.”
spondent part in Vin. Abr. and as he has not produced any case con
trary to this, I am satisﬁed with the authority of it. And in Noy’s
Maxims. c. 44. “If I command my servant to distrain, and he ride
on the distress, he shall be punished, not I.” And it is laid down by
Holt, C. ]., in Middleton v. Fowler, Salk. 282. as a general position,
“that no, master is chargeable with the acts of his servant but when
Now when a
he acts in the execution of the authority given him.”
servant quits sight of the object for which he is employed, and without
having in view his master's orders pursues that which his own malice
suggests, he no longer acts in pursuance of the authority given him,
and according to the doctrine of Lord Holt his master will not be an
swerable for such act. Such upon the evidence was the present case:
and the technical reason in 2 Roll. Abr. with respect to the sheep applies
here; and it may be said, that the servant by willfully driving the
chariot against the plaintiffs chaise without his master's assent gained
a special property for the time, and so to that purpose the chariot was
‘
the servant's.
This doctrine does not at all militate with the cases in which a mas
ter has been holden liable for the mischief arising from the negli
of his servant who had no purpose but the
gence or unskillfulness
execution of his master’s orders; but the form of those actions proves
for if it can be sup
that this action of trespass cannot be maintained:
ported, it must be upon the ground that in trespass all are principals;
but the form of those actions shews, that where the servant is in point
of law a trespasser, the master is not chargeable as such, though
liable to make a compensation for the damage consequential from his

At

the

the trial, it appeared in evidence that one

nrrntrrs

700

AND

consnounncns or TIIE RELATION

(Part

3

it

a

it

a

6

a

a

it

6

a

8

it

is

a

is

2

is it

if

is

a

it,

employing of an unskillful or negligent servant. The act of the master
is the employment of the servant; but from that no immediate preju
dice arises to those who may suffer from some subsequent act of the
If this were otherwise the plaintiffs in the casesmentioned
servant.
in 1 Lord Raym. 739 (one where the servants of a carman through
negligence ran over a boy in the streets and maimed him: and the
other, where the servants of A. with his cart ran against the cart of
B. and overturned
by which
pipe of wine was spilled); must have
been nonsuited from their mistaking the proper form of action, in
bringing an action upon the case, instead of an action of trespass;
for there
no doubt of the servants in those cases being liable as tres
were
passers, even though they intended no mischief; for which,
necessary, Weaver v. \Vard in Hobart, 134, and Dickinson v. Watson
in Sir Thomas Jones, 205, are authorities.
But
must not be inferred from this, that in all cases where an
action
brought against the servant for improperly conducting his
master’s carriage, by which mischief happens to another, the action
Levinz, 172, where an
must be trespass. Michael v. Allestree in
action on the case was brought against a man and his servant for
breaking a pair of horses in Lincoln’s Inn Fields, where being un
manageable they ran away with the carriage and hurt the plain-tiff’s
wife,
an instance to show that trespass on the case may be the proper
form of action. A-nd upon
distinction between those cases where
the mischief immediately proceeds from something in which the de
fendant
himself active, and where
may arise from the neglect or
other misconduct of the party, but not immediately, and which per
non—feasance, we held in Ogle v. Barnes,
haps may amount only to
Term Rep. 188, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
The case of Savignac and Roome,
Term Rep. 125, which was
much pressed as supporting this action, came before the court on a
motion in arrest of judgment;
and the only question decided by the
court was, that the plaintiff could not have judgment, as
appeared
that he had brought an action on the case for that which in law was
trespass; for the declaration there stated, that the defendantby his
servant willfully drove his coach against the plaintiff’s chaise. Day v.
Edwards,'5 Term Rep. 648, was also mentioned; which was an action
on the case, in whic_h the declaration charged the defendant personally
with furiously and negligently driving his cart, that by and through
the furious, negligent and improper conduct of the defendant the
said cart was driven and struck againstithe plaintiff's carriage:
and
on demurrer the court were of opinion, that the fact complained of was
trespass. And in the last case that was mentioned of Brucker v.
Froment,
Term Rep. 659, the only point agitated was, VVhether evi
dence of the defendant's servant having negligently managed
cart
supported the declaration, which imputed that negligence to the de
did, ‘on the au
and the court with reluctance held that
fendant:
precedent in Lord Raymond’s Reports, 264, of Turberville
thority of
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and Stamp. In none of these cases
cided; and those determinations do
entertain, which is, that the plaintiff
must be' entered.
PER CURIAM. Rule absolute for
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was the point now in question de
not contradict the opinion we now
cannot recover, and that a nonsuit
entering a nonsuit."

CONSUMERS’

v.

PERSON

(Court of Appeals of New York,

1878.

ICE CO.
73 N.

Y.

543.)

a

is

it

is,

Appeal from a nonsuit in an action to recover damages sustained
by the careless driving of defendant’s ice cart against plaintiﬂ"s car
riage.
ALLEN, J. The injury complained of was committed by a servant
of the defendant, and the sole question is, whether there was evi
dence for the jury that the act of the servant was one for which the
master was responsible. The responsibility of the master for the acts
of a servant rests upon the express or implied authorization of the act
by the master who in the employment of another to act for him, as
sumes all the risks of a wrongful execution of his duties. The general
principles by which the liability of the master to respond for the conse
quences of the wrongful acts of his servant are tested, have in their
frequent discussion by the courts of late become quite familiar, and the
to apply them to the different circum
only difficulty has been, and
The rule recognized in all
stances under which the question arises.
the recent cases, and which does not materially conﬂict with any of the
older decisions, although
may qualify some of the intimations and
that for the acts
casual expressions or illustrations of the judges,
of the servant, within the general scope of his employment, while en
view to the furtherance
gaged in his master's business, and done with
of that business and the master’s interest, the master will be
responsible,
in some early cases in the United States: Foster v. President,
Am. Dec. 168 (1821): Ware v. Barataria
of Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479,
Lafourche Canal Co.. 15 La. 169, 35 Am. Dec. 199 (18-10), with extensive
Wright v. Wilcox, 19
note; Cox v. Keahey, 36 Ala. 340. 76 Am. Dec. 325 (1860)
See, contra, Richberger v. Am. Exp. Co..
W'end. 343, 32 Am. Dec. 507 (1838).
73 Miss. 161, 18 South. 922, 31 L. R. A. 390, 55 Am. St. Rep. 522 (1896), and
23 Followed

;

&

9

etc.,

cases cited.

&

&

a

4

9

1

Lim
In England the rule of McManus v. Grlckett has been much
modiﬁed.
'
H. & C. 526 (1862). But compare Ers
pus v, London General Omnibus Co.,
kine, J., in Sleath v. VVilson,
P. 607 (1839), with Cockburn, G. J., in
C.
See, also, Citizens‘ Life Assurance
Storey v. Ashton, L. R.
Q. B. 476 (1869).
Co. v. Brown, [1904] App. Cas. 423, in which the servant published
libel
against a third person.
Many American cases express dissatisfaction with
See Gilliam v. So.
'McManus v. Ci-lckett.
N0. Ala. R. Co., 70 Ala. 268 (1881),
and Holler v. P. Sanford Ross.,6S N. J. Law, 324, 53 Atl. 472, 59 L. R. A. 943,
96 Am, St. Rep. 546 (1902), in which the court held, however, that the exten
sion of the rule should be kept in strict limits.
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In
whether the act be done negligently, wantonly or even willfully.
general terms, if the servant misconducts himself in the course of his
employment, his acts are the acts of the master, who must answer for
them. There are intimations in several cases of authority that for the
willful acts of the servant the master is not responsible. McManus v.
Crickett, l East, 106; Hibbard v. N. Y. 8: E. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 455;
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it,
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VVright v. \Vilcox, 19 VV end. 343, 32 Am. Dec. 507.
But these intimations are subject to the material qualiﬁcation, that
the acts designated “willful,” are not done in the course of the service,
and were not such as the servant intended and believed to be. for the
interest of the master. In such case the master would not be excused
Limpus v. London
from liability by reason of the quality of the act.
Gen’l Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526; Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 H. & N.
359, aﬁirmed 7 H. & N. 355; Shea v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 180,
20 Am. Rep. 480; ]ackson v. Second Ave. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 274, 7
Am. Rep. 448. But if a servant goes outside of his employment, and
without regard to his service, acting maliciously, or in order to effect
some purpose of his own, wantonly commits a trespass, or causes
damage to another, the master is not responsible; so that the inquiry
is whether the wrongful act is in the course of the employment, or out
sideof
and to accomplish
purpose foreign to it. In the latter case
the relation of master and servant does not exist so as to hold the
Ald. 590; \Vright v. VVil
master for the act. Croft v. Alison,
B.
cox, supra; Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnpike Co.,
N. Y. 479, 51
Am. Dec. 315; Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381, 100 Am. Dec. 448; Fraser
v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 566,
Am. Rep. 740; Higgins v. \Vatervliet T.
Co., 46 N. Y. 23,
Am. Rep. 293; Rounds v. D., L.
VV. R. Co., 64
N. Y. 129, 21 Am. Rep. 597; Isaacs v. Third Ave. R. Co., 47 N. Y.
Am. Rep. 418.
122,
The latter case has been questioned, not for the reason that an er
roneous rule of law was adjudged, but upon the ground that the case
was supposed not to be within the operation of the rules which were
there held applicable to the facts of it.
was doubtless a border case,
and may seem to infringe upon some of the other reported cases; but
the true test of liability of masters for the acts of servants was recog
nized and aﬁirmed in that case, and whatever dissent there may be from
the judgment, by reason of
difference of opinion upon the facts, the
case cannot be regarded as seeking to overrule, qualify or in any respect
change the doctrines of any well-considered case. The court there held
the act of the conductor of the cars wholly illegal, and entirely inde
pendent of his employment by the defendant, and outside of
and that
was not committed in the performance of his duty to the defendant.
was decided upon the authority of Vanderbilt v. Richmond T. Co.,
and kindred cases.
That case. and Limpus v. Omnibus Co., supra,
are not unlike in circumstances, but in the one the master was held, and
in the other excused from liability for the consequences of the servant's

\
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acts; but the harmony of the law is in no degree disturbed by a seem
ing inconsistency of the two cases.
At the time of the collision with the plaintiff the driver of the ice
cart was in the actual service and employ of the defendant, and in the
act of driving through the streets of _the city, and at that time and place
was in the course of his employment and the performance of his duties
to his employer.
He was, in passing through Fourth avenue with his
ice cart, within the scope of the express authority conferred upon him
and in the performance of the precise service for which he was em
ployed. The evidence would have authorized the jury to ﬁnd that the
collision with and consequent injury to the plaintiff was the result of
the careless and reckless driving of the defendant’s servant, and was
therefore an act for which the defendant was directly responsible,
unless the fact was proved to the satisfaction of the jury that the
servant willfully and maliciously, and to effect some purpose of his
own outside of his employment, committed the injury; in other words,
that at the time of the injury, and in the act of its commission, the
relation of master and servant did not exist; and to sustain the nonsuit
the evidence must have been so conclusive that the jury could not have
The only evidence other than of the
found a verdict for the plaintiff.
fact that the servant drove the ice cart at an unusual speed through the
street, and negligently against the carriage of the plaintiff, was upon
the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s servant who was by his side
in the carriage, who after stating facts tending to show gross careless
ness on the part of the defendant’s driver, in answer to the question:
“Then he drove into you purposely?” answered: “It seems so; it
looks like it; I could make nothing else of it ;” which was followed by
this other question: “He must have turned right into you then, and
there is no other way unless it is dpne purposely,” to which the answer
was, “'Well, I could not tel1.”
At most, and leaving out of view the answer to the last interrogatory,
it was but the expression of an opinion by the witness that the colli
sion was intentional or willful, which was a fact to be determined by
the jury and not by the witness, and did not, as an opinion, go to the
other material fact, that it was or was not committed in the icourse
of the employment of the driver, and to gratify some personal malice
or to accomplish some purpose of his own. But as the opinion of the
witness its whole effect was destroyed by the answer to the last ques
tion, that he could not tell whether the act was intentional or merely
The whole evidence of the witness only tended to show
negligent.
gross carelessness on the part of the driver of the ice cart, and that
was the most that the witness intended by the answer to either ques
tion. Vi/hen the defense is that the wrongful act was not within the
general scope of the servant’s employment, and so,_not within the ex
press or implied authorization of the master, it is for the court to pass
upon the competency of evidence and for the jury to give effect to it.
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Seymour v. Greenwood, supra; Courtney v. Baker, 60 N. Y. 1 ; ]ack
son v. Second Ave. R. Co., supra; Rounds v. D., L. & W. R. Co., supra.
It was error to take the question from the jury.
Stress is laid upon the original answer of the defendant, put in evi
dence for some unexplained and incomprehensible
purpose by the
plaintiff, and by which it is now urged the plaintiff is estopped. The
admissions of the answer were not necessary to prove the relation be
tween the defendant and the driver of the ice cart, and that the latter
was in the service of the former, as that had been admitted upon the
trial, and the further allegation that the servant “willfully, and not
negligently nor carelessly, drove said ice cart against the carriage of
said plaintiff, and caused some injury thereto,” is the statement relied
upon when used by the plaintiff as estopping him from claiming that
Ordinarily
the act was one for which the defendant was responsible.
a party is not bound by the admission of his adversary, of which he
gives evidence, but is at liberty to use it so far as it makes in his favor,
and to disprove the residue——that is, he is not estopped by it. The
fact that the admission is in a pleading does not change its char-acter or
'
'
create an estoppel.
The answer admitted the injury, and it was for the jury, upon the
evidence, to say whether the true cause was assigned by the answer.
But the answer does not exclude all presumption of liability on the
part of the master, and therefore did not preclude a recovery by the
The act may have been “willful,” and yet committed in the
plaintiff.
course of the employment, and within the authority of the defendant,
and the contrary is not averred as it should have been in order fully
to defend the action and exclude all presumption of liability.
Shea v.
Sixth Ave. R. Co., supra; Seymour v. Greenwood, supra; Limpus v.
London Genl. Omnibus Co., supra; Weed v. Panama R. Co., 17 N.
Y. 362, 72 Am. Dec. 474; Sanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 343,
It is not made to appear by the answer that the
80 Am. Dec. 286.
servant committed the act wholly for a purpose of his own, disregarding
the object for which he was employed, and not intending by the wrong
ful act.to execute it. It is consistent with the answer that the act was
done in the execution of the authorityggiven him, and for the purpose
of performing the directions of the defendant. There was clearly no
estoppel, and there was evidence taken in connection with the answer
upon which the jury might have found that the act was a negligent or
even a reckless act, in the course of the employment of the servant,
and one for which the defendant was responsible. The answer did not
conclude the plaintiff, and the case was one for the jury.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted. All concur,
Judgment reversed.
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DURGIN.”

Court of Massachusetts, 1911.
'801, 33 L. R. A. [N. S.] 79, 20 Ann.

207 Mass.
C218. 1291.)

435,

93 N. E.

Action by Otto Fleischner against Charles E. Durgin. Verdict for
defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.
Rooo, J. The plaintiff while in the exercise of due care and travel
ing on Dartmouth street opposite the Public Library in Boston was
injured by the negligence of one Freeman, who was driving the defend
ant’s motor car. Freeman was not in the general employ of the defend
ant, but on the day in question had been asked by him to drive the car
from the Stevens garage in the town of Brookline to the shop of one
Burlingame, also in Brookline and less than a mile away, for some re
pair. Later in the day Freeman took the car, drove ﬁrst to Coolidge
Corner, a square in Brookline, not on the way to the Burlingame shop,
where he had lunch. Then with a friend he drove the car about six
miles further out of the way from the garage to the Burlingame shop to
a shop in Boston for the purpose of getting a chain for his own uses.
He had started to return to Brookline and was bound for the Burlin
The defendant gave no direc
game shop when the accident occurred.
tions to go to Coolidge Corner or to Boston, and this ride was taken
without his knowledge.
Freeman had worked at the Stevens garage
where the defendant kept his motor car, and once before had driven it
to Boston, but under what circumstances does not appear.
The principles which govern the rights of the parties are settled.
The master is liable for the act of a servant in charge of his vehicle
when the latter is acting in the main with the master’s express or im
plied authority, upon his business and in the course of the employment
for the purpose of doing the work for which he is engaged. The
master is not liable if the servant has abandoned his obligations, and
is doing something not in compliance with the express or implied
authority given, and is not acting in pursuance of the general purpose
of his occupation or in connection with the doing of the master’s work.
Under this rule the employer has been held responsible for. wrongs done
to third persons by his driver during incidental departures from the
scope of the authority conferred by the employment and upon com
paratively insigniﬁcant deviations from direct routes of travel, but
within the general penumbra of the duty for which he is engaged.
Hayes v. Wilkins, 194 Mass. 223, 80 N. E. 449, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033,
120 Am.‘ St. Rep. 549.
2° Compare Hayes v. Wilkins, 194 Mass. 228, 80 N. E, 449, 9 L. R. A. (.\'. S.)
120 Am. St. Rep. 549 (1907), in which the deviation by the servant was
slight; Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476 (1869), per Cockburu, C.
Rich
berger v. Am. Exp. Co., 73 Miss. 161, 18 South. 922, 31 L. R. A. 390, 55 Am.
St. Rep. 522 (1895), overruling earlier Mississippi cases.
1033.

J.;
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A. (20 En.)—45

706

,

EFFECTS AND cousmounncas

or

THE RELATION

(Part 3

The employment of Freeman was limited to a speciﬁc and short trip
within a town. He took the car several miles out of the way, which
was six or seven times as far asihe ‘had a right to go, to a crowded
part of a large city on an errand wholly of his own, and had only
just commenced to return at the time the act occurred for which dam
He was acting in disregard of his in
ages are sought in this action.
structions, and wholly outside his employment, and for a purpose hav
ing no relation even remote to the business of the master. The extent
of the excursion which he undertook on his own account was so dispro
portionate to the length of the route he was authorized to go that it
cannot be minimized to a deviation. It was in fact the chief journey.
There is nothing to indicate that the defendant had any hint or ground
Under such
for suspicion of this unwarranted use of his property.
McCarthy v. Timmins, 178
circumstances he cannot be held liable.
Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 1038, 86 Am. St. Rep. 490; Storey v. Ashton, L.
R. 4 Q. B. 476; Mitcliell v. Crassweller, 13 C.'B. 237.
Exceptions overruled.

ii.

HIGBEE CO.
(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1920.

v.

101 Ohio

JACKSON.
st. 15. 12s N. E. 61, 14 A.

L. R.

131.)

JOHNSON, ].“° Under the circumstances of this case, was the in
The
jured infant entitled to invoke the rule respondeat superior?
answer to this question disposes of the entire case.
The trial court having sustained the motion for a directed verdict
at the close of plaintiffs testimony, it is elementary that every material
fact which plaintiﬁ”s evidence tended to prove must be taken as proven.

The essential facts shown are that the driver of the defendant’s truck,
who was accompanied by a helper, was driving westerly in Euclid
avenue about 7 :30 in the evening. He had made his last delivery, and
in obedience to instructions from the company was then taking the
truck by direct route to the garage, to be stored for the night.
At a
crossing of the avenue, known as “Quarry Track,” plaintiff and a
companion asked permission to ride, which the driver gave them. This
was in violation of the driver’s express instructions.
They got on the
running board; the plaintiff standing near the driver, on the left side,
holding onto the windshield and seat. While in this position the driver
increased the speed of the truck to some 35 miles an hour. He over
took a touring car ahead of him, which had passed him a short time
before, going in the same direction.
Without slacking his speed he
turned his truck onto the wrong side, the south side, of the road, di
rectly in the course of and meeting a horse and wagon, which was be

~i

80 The statement of facts. part of the opinions of Johnson and Jones,
and the concurring opinion of Wanamaker,
., are omitted.

J
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ing driven easterly. The horse and wagon were rightfully and properly
near the curb on the south side.
The truck struck and crushed the
and
the
wagon, caught
jammed
boy, and seriously injured him. The
speed of the truck and its position on the street are conceded to have
been in violation of statute and of an ordinance of the city.
The doctrine of respondeat superior had its origin in considerations
of public policy. Out of the necessities of new social and economic
conditions it has been developed and extended; and its growth and
application have been inﬂuenced and directed by these conditions. The
rule itself, and its development, is an example of the process by which
the judgment of society as to what is necessary to the public welfare
In the early
has from time to time been expressed in juristic forms.
times some authorities expressed doubt as to whether it could be in
voked against corporations, and for a long time its proper application
in cases of willful, malicious, or wanton injury was denied. But in
the presence of the requirements of the countless activities and changed
methods in modern enterprises these limitations are no longer asserted,
i
and have not been for many years.
It is a fundamental principle that, in order to create a liability in a
principal for the acts of an agent, the acts complained of must have
been committed while the servant was acting within the scope of his
It must be shown, ﬁrst, that the agent was at the time
employment.
engaged in serving his principal; second, that the act complained of
was within the scope of the agent’s employment; and, even if this is
shown, it must also appear that the agent, in doing the act complained
of, violated some duty that the defendant owed to the plaintiff at the
time. The law holds the master for what the servant does or omits
in conducting the master's business, because the master has voluntarily
.substituted the management and supervision of the servant for his own.
For the purpose of this hearing plaintiff in error concedes that the
driver of its truck, while taking it to the garage in obedience to instruc
tions, violated the statute and the ordinance of the city in the manner
set forth; that his conduct was willful and wanton, and was the cause
of the collision with the horse and wagon. But plaintiff in error con
tends that when the driver gave permission to the boys to ride on the
truck he stepped outside the scope of his employment, and completely
severed the relationship of principal and agent so far as the plaintiff
is concerned, and that anything he did thereafter, so far as the plaintiff
is concerned, would in no way create a liability upon the principal,
though the acts were negligent or willful.
No defense is made for the conduct of the driver in connection with
But the company contends that in granting permis
the entire matter.
sion to the boys to ride he had no authority to do so. That is conceded.
The grant of permission, so far as the company is concerned, was a
mere nullity.
The violation by the driver of his instructions in this
The
respect affected the right of the plaintiff to be upon the truck.
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most that can be said is that he had no such right, and that when he got
upon the truck he was a trespasser, so far as the defendant company was
concerned. But if it beconceded that he was on the truck as a tres
passer, it must also be conceded that he was entitled to the rights of a
trespasser. . After that situation was created, and while it existed, if the
driver, with full knowledge of
acting in the course ofhis employ
ment and within the scope of his employment, was guilty of willful
and wanton conduct, which was the proximate cause of injury to the
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liable.
plaintiff, the defendant
Now, were the willful and wanton acts of the driver done within
Let us
the course of his employment and within the scope thereof?
The
test
with reference to the owner of the horse and wagon.
driver, taking the truck over the direct route to the garage in obedience
to instructions, runs
in violation of the statute and of the ordinance,
and collides with and injures the horse and wagon, whose driver was
We apprehend there would be no question that the
without fault.
company would be liable to the owner of the horse and wagon. Why?
Because the driver, while in the scope of his employment, violated a
duty which the company owed to the owner of the wagon; that is, the
No one
duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring his property.
would say that the fact that the company had instructed the driver to
exercise ordinary care, and not to operate the truck in violation of law
of liability.
had done so), would relieve
Such
view would
(if
nullify the rule of respondeat superior.
So here, while the plaintiff
upon the truck as
trespasser, with
the rights of
trespasser, the same wanton and willful conduct, the
same violation of the statute and the ordinance,
the proximate cause
of his injury. The difference between the two
that in' the case of the
owner of the wagon the defendant had the afﬁnmative duty to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury to him and his property, while as to the
plaintiff trespasser the defendant had the negative duty not to injure
him by its wanton and willful conduct.
In Cleveland Terminal
Valley Rd. Co. v. Marsh, 63 Ohio St. Z36, at page 245, 58 N. E. 821,
at page 824 (52 L. R. A. 142),
said: “A trespasser who
upon the
company's premises wrongfully, and
mere volunteer, stands upon
substantially the same footing, and are entitled to recover only for such
negligence as occurs after the servants of the company discover their
perilous situation; that is, for willful or intentional injury.”
In B.
O. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Cox, Adm’x, 66 Ohio St. 276, 64 N.
E. 119, 9O Am. St. Rep. 583,
held in the syllabus: “An action to
recover for an injury occasioned by negligence, the element of willful
ness being absent, will not lie, unless there exists between the defendant
and the person injured
relation out of which there arises
duty of
the former to exercise care toward the latter.”
These and other Ohio
cases are merely the statement of a rule everywhere approved.
See
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Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. NV. 257, 51 Am. Rep, 154,
per Judge Cooley.
Quite a number of authorities are cited by the plaintiff in error in
which recovery was denied, but an examination of them discloses that
none of them rested the claim of liability on the willful and wanton
conduct of the defendant.
The plaintitf’s _claim in each case rested
on the failure to exercise ordinary care.
In Driscoll v. Scanlon, 165 Mass. 348, 43 N. E. 100, 52 Am. St. Rep.
523, much relied on, the driver invited the boy on the wagon and al
lowed the boy to drive, while he himself went to sleep.
In managing
the lines the boy lost his balance and fell under the wagon. No act of
the driver brought about the fall of the boy.
In Schulwitz v. Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559, 85 N. W. 1075,
the boy got on the wagon of defendant after it was unloaded and held
onto an unright pole. As the wagon passed over rough places, the pole
was jogged out of its socket, and plaintiff fell from the wagon. Re
covery was sought because of the negligence of the teamster in permit
ting the boy to ride, but no willful or wanton act of the driver brought
about the injury.
In Collins v. City of Chicago et al., 187 Ill. App. 30, plaintiff was
permitted by the driver to ride on the rear step of defendant’s‘ ice
wagon, following which was another horse and ice wagon of the com
Collins was thrown from the wagon because of a jar on one
pany.
of the wheels, and was injured by the second wagon. He based his
action on negligence. The second proposition of the syllabus reads:
“Where a person injured while riding on a wagon is a trespasser, the
owner of the vehicle owes no duty to him, other than to not injure him
wantonly or willfully.”
In.Foster-Herbert Cut Stone C0. v. Pugh, 115 Tenn. 688, 91 S. W.
199, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804, 112 Am. St. Rep. 881, also much relied on,
the plaintiff, with other boys, boarded the stone wagon on the invita
tion of the driver. The court say: “After riding a short distance they
began one after another to dismount, and in undertaking to do likewise
the deceased either fell or jumped to the ground between the wheels.”
The action was one for negligence. It will be noted that no act of the
driver caused the injury. It must be remembered that this is not a
suit for lack of ordinary care, but is based on wanton and willful acts
which caused the injury.
No case has been called to our attention which holds that the mere
giving of unauthorized permission by a driver to an infant relieved the
employer from liability for willful and reckless acts of the employé,
which were done in the course and scope of his employment, and which
were the proximate cause of injury.“ * * *
$1 Compare Dover v. Mayes Mfg. Co., 157 N. O. 324, 72 S. E. 1067. 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 199 (1911). where the injury was due to mere negligence of the serv
ant. See, also, Ploof v. Putnam, 83 Vt. 252, 75 Atl. 277. 26 L, R. A. (N. S.)
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JONES, ]. [Dissentingon the ground that the court rested its judg
ment] upon the theory that, although the invitation extended t0
the boys may have been without the scope of authority, still, the em
ployé having exceeded his authority, the infant could then have been
regarded as a trespasser, to whom the employer owed a duty of not
injuring him by wanton negligence upon the part of the employé.
This feature of the case begs the entire question, and eliminates from
the case one cardinal element which is necessary to impose liability
upon the employer. This elementary principle is that the act of the
If the theory
employé must be within the scope of his employment.
of the Court of Appeals were correct, it could as well be said that a
liability would likewise accrue if Komko had departed from his course
of employment and driven the boys to the city lake front for their own
convenience, and injured them on the way.
The fallacy lies in considering the negligent driving of the employé
solely as the causal act producing the injury. The act of driving was
within the scope of Komko’s employment, it is true. But it was the
unauthorized act—that of giving an invitation to the boys to ride—which
was without the scope of Komko’s employment. The record discloses
and it is not disputed, that this employé had been given explicit instruc
The unauthorized act of
tions not to let any one ride on the truck.
invitation produced the train of events that followed, and the reckless
driving was consequential.
In the case of Driscoll v. Scanlon, supra, the same theory of liability
was argued and presented as in this case. The teamster had invited a
boy to ride with him upon a dump cart. The teamster asked the infant
to take the reins, while he fell asleep.
It was there argued that the
court might look only to the later moment, when the plaintiff was under
138 Am. St. Rep. 1085 (1910); Turner v. American
Dist. Telegraph dz
Messenger Co., 94 Conn. 707, 110 Atl. 540, 10 A. L. R. 1079 (1920); Barrett v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 106 Minn. 51, 117 N. W. 1047, 18 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 416, 130 Am. St. Rep. 585 (1908); Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48, 55
Am. Dec. 304 (1851); Cohen v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. "R. Co., 69 N. Y. 170
251,

(1877).

-

'

The historical development of the rule of respondent superior is traced in
the learned opinion of Jaggard, J’., in Penas v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.. 112
Minn. 203, 127 N. W. 926, 30 L. R, A. (N. S.) 627, 140 Am. St. Rep. 470 (1910).
and in the articles by Professor Wigmore in 7 Harv. Law Rev. 383, and by
Mr. Justice Holmes in 4 Harv. Law Rev. 345, 5 Harv. Law Rev. 1. The
confusion resulting from a failure to recognize that the basis of the rule has
shifted is well illustrated in the leading case of Rounds v. Delaware L. & W.
R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129, 21 Am. Rep. 597 (1876), which in the same paragraph
grounds the rule on two inconsistent theories, as is well pointed out by the
able annotator of 27 L. R. A. 162. Often it is not easy to reconcile decisions
in the same jurisdiction. Compare Ducre v. Sparrow-Kroll Lumber Co., 168
Mich. 49. 133 N. W. 938, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 959 (1911), with Moﬂit v. White
Sewing Machine Co., 214 Mich. 499, 183 N. W. 199 (1921).
The distinctions
are often very ﬁne. Brown v. Boston Ice Co., 178 Mass. 108, 59 N. E. 64-1.
Rep.
469 (1901).
86 Am. St.
In such cases the matter might Well be left to
the jury. Nelson Business College Co. v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N. E. -171,
46 L. R. A. 314. 71 Am. St. Rep. 729 (1899).
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the wheels, and not to the unauthorized act of the teamster in in
viting him to drive; but judge Holmes, of the Massachusetts court,
“The driver's
disposed of that contention by saying in his opinion:
slumber was so intimately connected with»the unauthorized act that
it is impossible to separate the two. The driver would not have been
asleep, and the plaintiff would not have fallen, but for the driver's
unauthorized act, and if the plaintiff had not been driving.”
The following is the syllabus in that case: “If a driver of a cart
invites an infant to drive with him, either for pleasure or to take his
place in driving while he sleeps, and the infant falls from the cart and
is run over by
the act
outside the driver’s authority and his master
*
not liable to the infant.”

v.

ST. PAUL, M.

(Supreme Court ot Minnesota,

Minn.

1884.

3%
.)

MORIER

&

__.__.4
M. RY.

351, 17 N.
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MITCHELL,
All the evidence in this case tends to prove that some
section men, under the charge of
section foreman, were, in the em
ployment of defendant, engaged
repairing its railroad near defend
ant’s farm, on the twenty-ﬁrst of October, 1882.
While engaged in
such work they usually returned to their boarding—house
for dinner,
but on this day, their work being at some distance, they took their
dinner with them. At noon, when they quit work to eat, they built
ﬁre, or rekindled one which some other person had kindled, on de
fendant’s right of way, for the purpose of warming their coffee.
After
eating dinner, they resumed their work, negligently leaving the ﬁre
unextinguished, which spread in the grass and ran on to plaintiff’s
no evidence that the defendant
land and burned his hay. There
was any part of its duty to prepare
was boarding these men, or that
Neither
there anything tending to show that
or cook their meals.
the defendant either knew or authorized the kindling of
ﬁre for any
there any
such purpose, either on this or any other occasion. Nor
was the duty of these section men to exercise any
evidence that
supervision over the right of way, or to extinguish ﬁres that might be
ignited on it. So far as the evidence goes, their employment was
exclusively in repairing the railroad trackf
The doctrine of the liability of the master for the wrongful acts of
predicated upon the maxims, “respondeat superior” and
his servants
In fact,
rests upon the doctrine
“qui facit per alium facit per se.”
Therefore, the universal test of the master’s liability
of agency.
whether there was authority, express or implied, for doing the act;
one done in the course and within the scope of the
was
that
If be done
the course of and within the
servant’s employment?
scope of the employment, the master will be liable for the act, whether

I
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negligent, fraudulent, deceitful, or an act of positive malfeasance.
Smith, Mast. & Serv. 151. But a master is not liable for every wrong
which the servant may commit during the continuance of the employ
ment. The liability can only occur when that which is done is within
the real or apparent scope of the master’s business.
It does not arise
when the servant steps outside of his employment to do an act for
himself not connected with his master’s business. Beyond the scope
of his employment the servant is as much a stranger to his master
as any third person.
The maste'r is only responsible so long as the
servant can be said to be doing the act, in the doing of which he is
A master
guilty of negligence, in the course of\his employment.
is not responsible for any act or omission of his servant which is not
connected with the business in which he serves him, and does not
happen in the course of his employment. And in determining whether
a particular act is done in the course of the servant’s employment, it
is proper ﬁrst to inquire whether the servant was at the time engaged
in serving his master. If the act be done while the servant is at liberty
from the service, and pursuing his own ends exclusively, the master is
not responsible. If the servant was, at the time when the injury was
inflicted, acting for himself, and as his own master, pro tempore, the
master is not liable. If the servant step aside from his master’s busi
ness, for however short a time, to do an act not connected with such
business, the relation of master and servant is for the time suspended.
Such, variously expressed, is the uniform doctrine laid down by all
2 Thomp. Neg. 885, 886; Serg. & R. Neg. §§ 62, 63;
authorities.
Cooley, Torts, S33 et seq.; Little Miami R. Co. v. Wetmore, 20 Ohio
St. 401 ; Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476: Mitchell v. Crassweller,
v. Brock, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 17.
13 Com. B. 236: McClenaghan
It would seem to follow, as an inevitable conclusion, from this, that
on the facts of this case the act of these section men in building a ﬁre
to warm their own dinner was in no sense an act done in the course
of and within the scope of their employment, or in the execution of
defendant’s business. For the time being they had stepped aside from
that business, and in building this ﬁre they were engaged exclusively
in their own business, as much as they were when eating their dinner,
and were for the time being their own masters as much as when they
ate their breakfast that morning or went to bed the night before.
The fact that they did it on defendant’s right of way is wholly im
material, in the absence of ‘any evidence that defendant knew of or
authorized the act. Had they gone upon the plaintiE’s farm ahd built
the ﬁre the case would have been precisely the same.
It can no more
be said that this act was done in the defendant’s business, and within
the scope of their employment than would the act of one of these men
in lighting his pipe, after eating his dinner, and carelessly throwing
the burning match into the grass.
See Williams v. jones, 3 Hurl.
& C. Z56. The fact that the section foreman assisted in or even di
In doing so he was as much
rected the act does not alter the case.
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his own master and doing his own business as were the section men.
Had it appeared that it was part of his duty to look after the premises
generally, and extinguish ﬁres that might be ignited on them, his
omission to put out the ﬁre might possibly, within the case of Chap
man v. N. Y. P. R. Co., 33 N. Y. 369, 88 Am. Dec. 392, be considered
the negligence of the defendant.
But nothing of the kind appears, and
the burden is upon plaintiff to prove aﬁirmatively every fact necessary
to establish defendant’s liability."
Order reversed, and new trial granted.

-1-11
'

CRAKER
(Supreme

r

v.

CHICAGO

Court of Wisconsin,

1875.

& N.
36

Wis.

W. RY. CO.
657,

17 Am.

Rep. 504.)

Action for insulting, violent, and abusive acts alleged to have been
done to plaintiff, a young schoolteacher, by the conductor of one of
defendant’s trains while she was a passenger. For hugging and kiss
ing plaintiff the conductor had been convicted on a criminal charge
of assault and battery and ﬁned $25. Defendant had discharged him
from its employ, and expressed regrets to plaintiff.
Verdict and judg
.
ment for $1,000 damages. Defendant appealed.
RYAN, C. I.” I. We cannot help thinking that there has been some
useless subtlety in the books in the application of the rule respondeat
superior, and some unnecessary confusion in the liability of principals
for willful and malicious acts of agents.- This has probably arisen
from too broad an application of the dictum of Lord Holt, that “no
master is chargeable with the acts of his servant but when he acts
in the execution of the authority given to him, and the act of the serv
SS Accord: Hardemau
v. Williams, 150 Ala. 415, 43 South. 726, 10 L. R. A.
See, also, Zulkee v, Wing, 20 Wis. 408, 91 Am. Dec. 425
7N. S.) 653 (1907).
(1866), holding that respondeat superior does not apply between master and

There is no dispute as to what the rule
servant, but only between strangers.
of respondeat superior is, but much as to when it applies. Compare with the
principal case Lucas v. Mason,
R. 10 Exch. 251 (1875), and Smith v. Keal,
L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 340 (1882). See. also, the opinion of Hoar. J., in Howe v.
Newniarch, 12 Allen (Mass) 49 (1866),
,
In England interesting discussions have developed in a series of cases in
which the owner of a carriage hired job horses and a coachman from a job
man, and was sued for injuries due to the negligence of the coachman.
The
most important discussion is in the celebrated case of Laugher v. Pointer. 5
Bush v. Steinman, 1 Ilos. 8: P. 407 (1799).
B. & O. 547 (1826), disapproving
There was great dispute among the judges, and in the King’s Bench the court
was equally divided.
The opinion oi! Littledale, J., approved itself to later
judgcs, and the rule was settled in Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499 (1840),
and in Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Ad. & El. 737 (1840).
The master’s liability for damage from ﬂre started by a servant has been
considered in a long line of cases, beginning with Tubervilie v. Stampe, 1 Ld.
Raym. 264 (1698).
The principal cases are cited in a note in Ann. Cas. 1914A,
1102, annotating
Seybold v. Eisle, 154 Iowa, 128, 134 N. W. 578, Ann. Cas.
1914A 1097 (1912).
$8 The statement of facts is abridged.
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For
ant is the act of the master.” Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salk. 282.
this would seem to go to excuse the master for the negligence as well
as for the malice of his servant. One employing another in good faith
to do his lawful work would be as little likely to authorize negligence
as malice, and either would then be equally dehors the employment.
Strictly, the act of the servant would not, in either case, be the act of
the master. It is true that so great an authority as Lord Kenyon
denies this in the leading case of McManus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106,
which has been so extensively followed, and again, in Ellis v. Turner,
8 Term, 531, distinguishes between the negligence and the willfulness
of the one act of the agent, holding the principal for the negligence
but not for the willfulness.
It is a singular comment on these subtle
ties that McManus v. Crickett appears to rest on Middleton v. Fowler,
the only adjudged case cited to support
and that Middleton v.
Fowler was not
case of malice, but of negligence; Lord Holt hold
ing the master in that case not liable for the negligence of his servant
in such circumstances as no court could now doubt the master’s lia
In spite of all the learned subtleties of so many cases. the
bility.
true distinction ought to rest,
appears to us, on the condition wheth
er or not the act of the servant be in the course of his employment, as
virtually recognized in Ellis v. Turner.
But we need not pursue the subject. For, however that may be in
in those employments in which the
general, there can be no doubt of
duty of the principal to third persons, as between
agent performs
Because the principal
responsi
such third persons and the principal.
he delegate
to an agent, and the agent fail
ble for the duty, and
immaterial whether the failure be accidental or
to perform
willful, in the negligence or in the malice of the agent; the contract
of the principal
equally broken in the negligent disregard, or in
would be cheap
the malicious violation, of the duty by the agent.
and superﬁcial morality to allow one owing
duty to another to
third, without responsibility
commit the performance of his duty to
for the malicious conduct of the substitute in performance of the duty.
If one owe bread to another and appoint an agent to furnish
and
stone instead, the principal
the agent of malice furnish
responsible
In such cases, malice
for the stone and its consequences.
negligence.
Courts are generally inclining to this view, and this court long since
affirmed it.
In Railroad Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, Dixon, C. ]., says: “It
was insisted by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error that in no case
could
right of action arise against the principal, for the willful and
was previously authorized
malicious misconduct of the agent, unless
or subsequently ratiﬁedby him. On careful examination of this posi
incorrect. The case of Weed v. P. R. R.
tion, we are satisﬁed that
Co., 17 N. Y. 362, 72 Am. Dec. 474, will be found to be
clear and
was there held that
well-reasoned case upon the subject.
was no
railroad corporation, for its failure to
defense to an action against
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transport a passenger with proper dispatch, that the delay was the
willful act of the conductor in charge of the train. The rule estab
lished by that case, as we think with much reason, is that, where the
misconduct of the agent causes a breach of the obligation or contract
of the principal, there the principal will be liable in an action, whether
The
such misconduct be willful or malicious, or merely negligent.
action, though undeniably in tort, is treated virtually as an action
ex contractu, and governed by the same rule of damages, unless the
malice or wantonness of the agent is brought home and directly
In this case the contract between the plain
charged to the principal.
tiff and defendant was that, in consideration of his having paid to
them the fee demanded, they were carefully to transport him in their
It is no defense for their breach
cars from Madison to Edgerton.
of this contract that‘ it was occasioned by the willful act of their
except through
The corporation was incapable of executing
agent.
no matter
the medium of its agents. i If in doing so they violate
from what motive, their acts are the acts of their principals, who hold
them out to the world as capable and faithful in the discharge of
their duties. In no other way could the company be held to
per
This was, perhaps, obiter in that case;
formance of its contracts."
but, with
single qualiﬁcation, presently made and not material in
in this case.
this connection, we fully reaﬁirm
In Bass v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 463, 17 Am. Rep. 495, speaking of
railroad oﬂicers in charge of passenger trains, we said:
“They act
Indeed, as that ﬁcti
on the peril of the corporation and their own.
tious entity, the corporation, can act only through natural persons.
its officers and servants, and as
of necessity, commits its trains
absolutely to the charge of oﬁicers of its own appointment, and pas
sengers of necessity commit to them their safety and comfort in
transitu, under conditions of such peril and subordination, we are
disposed to hold that the whole power and authority of the ‘corpora
tion, pro hac vice,
vested in these ofﬁcers, and that, as to passengers
on board, they are to be considered as the corporation
itself, and
that the consequent authority and responsibility are not generally to
be straitened or impaired by an arrangement between the corpora
tion and the oﬁicers; the corporation being responsible for the acts
of the officers in the conduct and government of the train, to the
as the oﬁicers would be for themselves,
passengers traveling by
they were themselves the owners of the road and train.
We con
sider this rule essential to public convenience and safety, and sanc
tioned by great weight of authority.”
\/Ve have carefully reconsidered
all that was said in Bass v. Railway Co., and realﬁrm the doctrine
of that case. And what
was there said, -in-the passage cited, we
were disposed to hold, we now hold, with
single qualiﬁcation which
we will presently make and need not notice here.
So far as they relate to the duties of railroad companies to their
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passengers, and their responsibility for the officers ot their trains,
Railroad Co. v. Finney and Bass v. Railway Co. are in perfect ac
cord, though the latter case carries’ the principle more into detail;
but both rest on the same principle.
In Bass v. Railway Co. we had occasion also to consider somewhat
the nature of the obligations of railroad companies to their passengers
under the contract of carriage; the “careful transportation” of Rail
road Co. v. Finney.
On the authority of such jurists as Story, ].,
And,
and Shaw, C. ]., we likened them to those of innkeepers.
“To such, the protection
speaking of female passengers, we said:
which is the natural instinct of manhood towards their sex is specially
due by common carriers.”
In Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 72 Am. Dec.
62, the duties of common carriers are said to “include everything
calculated to render the transportation most comfortable and least
annoying to passengers.” In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Clifford, 145, Fed. Cas.
No. 10,262, the court says: “In respect to female passengers, the
contract proceeds yet further, and includes an implied stipulation that
they shall be protected against obscene conduct, lascivious behavior,
and every immodest and libidinous approach."
Long before, Story, _T., had used this comprehensive and beautiful
language, worthy of him as jurist and gentleman, in Chamberlain v.
“It is a stipulation,
Chandler, 3 Mason, 242, Fed. Cas. No. 2,575:
not for toleration merely, but for respectful treatment, for that decen
cy of demeanor which constitutes the charm of social life, for that at
tention which mitigates evils without reluctance, and that promptitude
which administers aid to distress. In respect to females, it proceeds
yet further; it includes an implied stipulation against general ob
scenity, that immodesty of approach which borders on lasciviousness,
and against that viianton disregard of the feelings which aggravates
These things were said, indeed, of passage by water,
every evil.”
but they apply equally to passage by railroad.
Commonwealth
v.
Power, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 596, 41 Am. Dec. 465.
These were among the duties of the appellant to the respondent,
when she went as passenger on its train; duties which concern public
welfare.
These were among the duties which the appellant appointed
the conductor to perform for
to the respondent. If another person,
officer or passenger or stranger, had attempted the indecent assault
which the conductor made upon the respondent,
would have been
the _duty of the appellant, and of the conductor for the appellant,
to protect her. If
person, known by his evil habits and character
as likely to attempt such an assault upon the respondent, had been
would have been the duty of the appellant, and of
upon the train,
the conductor for the appellant, to the respondent, to protect her
Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160; Railroad Co.
against the likelihood.
v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512, 91 Am. Dec. 224; Commonwealth v. Power,
supra; Nieto v. Clark, supra; and other cases cited in Bass v. Rail
way Co.
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We do not understand it to be denied that if such an assault on the
respondent had been attempted by a stranger, and the conductor had
neglected to protect her, the appellant would have been liable.
But
it is denied that the act of the conductor in maliciously doing himself
what it was his duty, for the appellant to the respondent, to prevent
others from doing, makes the appellant liable.
It is contended that,
though the principal would be liable for the negligent failure of the
agent to fulﬁll the principa1’s contract, the principal is not liable for
the malicious breach by the agent, of the contract which he was ap
pointed t'o perform for the principal; as we understand
that
one hire out his dog to guard sheep against wolves, and the dog sleep
while
wolf makes away with
liable; but
sheep, the owner
the dog play wolf and devour the sheep himself, the owner
not liable.
The bare statement of the proposition seems
reductio ad absurdum.
The radical difficulty in the argument
that
limits the contract.
The carrier’s contract
to protect the passenger against all the world;
the appellant’s construction
that
was to protect the respondent
against all the world except the conductor, whom
appointed to
protect her, reserving to the shepherd’s dog
right to worry the
No subtleties in the books could lead us to sanction so vicious
sheep.
an absurdity.
The contract of carriage was very surely the contract of appellant,
not of the agent who sold the ticket.
rested with the appellant to
perform
by agents of its own choice, on its own responsibility.
chose the oﬁ‘icers of the train. with the conductor at their head, to per
form its contract for it. Where was the corporation and by whom
represented, as to this contract and this passenger?
Not surely in
some foreign boardroom,
by directors making regulations and ap
pointing agencies for the corporate business. They could not perform
this contract.
Not surely in some distant office, by
superintendent
or manager issuing the orders of the directors to his subordinates.
He could not perform this contract.
Quoad this contract and this
and to
passenger, the corporation was present on this train to keep
care for her, represented by the ofﬁcers of the train, who possessed,
pro hac vice, the whole power and authority, and were the living em
bodiment of the ideal entity which made the contract, was bound to
and
has no responsibility
appellant here to contend that
keep
for the ﬂagrant violation of the contract, which the respondent paid
to make and to keep, by its sole present representative appointed to
on its behalf.
Like the English crown,
keep
lays its sins upon
its servants, and claims that
can do no wrong.
We cannot bend down
the law to such
convenience.
The appellant tortiously broke this
contract as surely as
made it; committed this tort as surely as
made the contract.
We are unwilling to waste time or patience in discussing the con
ductor’s violation of the appellant’s contract with the respondent.
not
right to assume that
Every woman has
passenger car
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brothel, and that when she travels in
she will meet nothing, see
nothing, hear nothing, to wound her delicacy or insult her woman
hood.
enough to say that the appellant's contract of careful
carriage with the respondent was not kept, was tortiously violated, by
the officer appointed by the appellant to keep it.
And so the appel
lant seems at the time to have regarded it.
very certain that
had
did promptly and most
right to dismiss the conductor, as
properly, rescinding his contract of employment for violation of his
For that person violated his contract with the appellant, by
duty.
He "sinned in
violating the appellant’s contract with the respondent.
the course of his employment against the appellant and the respondent
alike; in one and the same act broke his own contract with the ap
pellant, and the appellant’s with the respondent.
We cannot think that there
question of the respondent's right
to recover against the appellant for
tort which was
breach of the
We might well rest our decision on principle.
contract of carriage.
But we also think that
Rail
abundantly sanctioned by authority.
road Co. v. Finney, Boss v. Railway Co., Weed v. Railroad Co., Nieto
v. Clark, Railroad Co. v. Hinds, and Railroad v. Rogers, 38 Ind.
116, 10 Am. Rep. 103: Railroad Co. _v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 14 L.
Ed. 502; Moore v. Railroad Co., Gray (Mass.) 465, 64 Am. Dec. 83;
Am. Rep. 200: Maroney
Ramsden v. Railroad Co., 104 Mass. 117,
Am. Rep. 305; Coleman v. Rail
v. Railroad Co., 106 Mass. 153,
road Co., 106 Mass. 160; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180,
Am. Rep.
311; Railroad Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. 365, 82 Am. Dec. 520; Rail
road Co. v_ Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md.
277; Railroad Co. v. Young, 21 Ohio St. 518,
Am. Rep. 78; Sherley
Am. Rep. 451; Seymour v. Green
v. Billings,
Bush (Ky.) 147,
Hurl.
N. 359; Bayley v. Railroad Co., L. R.
wood,
C. P. 415.
There are cases, even of recent date, which hold the other way. But
we think that the great weight of authority and the tendency of deci
*
sion sanction our position.
[Omitting the discussion of the measure of damages, which held
but not for exemplary
the master liable in compensatory damages,
damages, unless he shared the malice of the servant
Iudgment afﬁrmed.”f

~

B4 Accord: Bryan v. Adler, 97 Wis. 124, 72 N. W, 368. 41 L. R. A. 658, 65
Am. St. Rep. 99 (1897); Palmerl v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E.
1001, 16 L. R. A. 136. 28 Am. St. Rep. 632 (1892); Barker v, Chicago, P. & St.
L. R. Co., 243 Ill. 482, 90 N. E. 1057. 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, 134 Am. St. Rep.
Compare Bonaparte V. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12, 42 Atl. 918, 44 L. B.
382 (1909).
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482 (1899).
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STATE.

(Supreme Court of Ohio, 1872.

22 Ohio

St. 305.)

Indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor in violation of
the statute. The liquor was sold by a clerk who managed the saloon
for defendant. The evidence was that defendant gave the clerk strict
orders to obey the statute, and that the liquor was sold without the
authority or knowledge of defendant.
\VHiTE, ]."'5 The correctness of the rulings of the court below de
pends on the construction to be given to a provision of the act of
May 1, 1854, providing against the evils resulting from the sale of
S. & C. 1431.
The provision in question de
intoxicating liquors.
clares that it shall be unlawful for any person or persons, by agent or
otherwise, to sell intoxicating liquors in the cases speciﬁed in the act.
To bring a person within the operation of the act, the elements
which constitute the offense must attach to him. He must make the
sale.
It is immaterial whether he does it directly or indirectly. The
object in using the phrase, “by agentior otherwise,” was to show ex
pressly and unequivocally-that the act was intended to embrace every
means that the person charged might employ in effecting the illegal
sale.

.In giving construction to the statute, the court below applied the
rule in civil cases, which holds the principal, as to third persons, liable
for the acts of his agent done within the general scope of his authority,
irrespective of actual instructions that were unknown to the person
dealing with the agent. In such case, as between the principal and a
third person dealing with the agent on the faith of his apparent au
thority, the law conclusively presumes the actual authority of the
agent to be what it openly appears to be; while, as between the prin
cipal and agent, the extent of the actual authority may be shown.
The rule as to the conclusive effect of the prima facie or apparent
authority of an agent ought not to be applied to the enforcement of
a criminal statute where such statute is fairly susceptible of a different
The accused, in such case, has the right to rebut the
construction.
presumption of prima facie agency, which the evidence makes against
him, by showing, if he can, that the criminal act was, in fact, committed
without his authority and against his instructions.
Strictly speaking, the legal relation of principal and agent does not
exist in regard to the commission of criminal offenses. All who par
ticipate in the commission of such offense, are either principals or
But when
accessories. In offenses less than felony all are principals.
it in fact appears that the person accused in no way participated in
the commission of the criminal act, he ought not, by construction, to
be made punishable for it.
85 The

statement of facts is abridged.
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Of course, the directions to the clerk or agent forbidding the sale
must be in good faith to be of any avail. For, however notorious or
formal such directions may be, they can have no effect if they are
merely colorable. The fact of agency is to be determined by the real
understanding between the principal and agent.
_
Our holding in this case is sustained by the decision of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut in Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 399, and by that
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Nichols,
10 Metc. 259, 43 Am. Dec. 432.
judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.“

is
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McCLUNG
(Supreme

DEARBORNE.

Court of Pennsylvania.

1890. ~134 Pa. 396,
204, 19 Am. St. Rep. 708.)

Action on
borne.

v.

the

judgment

19

Atl.

698.

8

L. R. A.

William McClung against George E. Dear
for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

case by

it,

WILLIAMS, J. Dearborne is a dealer in cabinet organs and other
musical instruments.
It is his habit, and it ‘seems to prevail quite
in similar articles, to sell on the installment
dealers
generally among
plan to those who desire
taking an instrument in the nature of a
The several installments of purchase money
lease from the purchaser.
are to be paid as rent. If they are paid, the article becomes the prop
not paid, the vendor reserves the
erty of the so-called “lessee.”
right to seize and retain the article.
Fox was an employé of Dearborne, whose business was to hunt up
instruments on which one or more installments were unpaid, whether
in the hands of the original purchasers or their vendees, in order that
He had sought and
they might be seized or replevied by Dearborne.
obtained admission to the house of McClung by means of falsehood,
and secured the number and description of the cabinet organ in the
His employer allqged that
was an instrument which he
parlor.
had sold or leased to
customer two or three years before, and on
which unpaid installments were due. Fox expressed conﬁdence in his
second time, and bring off the
ability to invade McClung’s home
An expedition was ﬁtted out,
breach of the peace.
organ, without
team, under the direction and control
consisting of two men and
of Fox, for this purpose. Before they set out, they were instructed
by Dearborne not to commit an assault and battery on any person, and
They went to McClung’s house, secured ad
not to break the law.
a

a

a

a

it
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Accord: Seibert v. State, 40 Ala. 60 (1866). principal not liable criminally
in the act or consented to it.
People v. Parks. 49
unless he participated
Mich. 333, 13 N. W. 618 (1982), criminal responsibility must fall on the actual
Strange, 883 (1731); Fogg v. Boston
wrongdoers.
Rex v. Huggins,
L. R.
148 Mass. 513, 20 N. E. 109, 12 Am. St. Rep. 583 (1889), ratiﬁcation of
Corp"
bel.
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mission to the parlor by a false pretense, and began the removal of
the organ. Mrs. McC]ung and her son, who happened to be at home,
tried to resist, but were at once overpowered, and the organ and its
belongings carried off.
The scene is described by one of the witnesses thus: “I came down
and saw Mr. Fox. He was holding my mother up against the parlor
door. I came forward, and my brother came out, and asked what all
this meant. He said:
‘]ust this: if you interfere with my business,
I will shoot you dead,’-—and reached in his back pocket, * * *
He said: ‘I came to take this organ out of here. If you interfere
with my business, I will shoot you.’ Then my brother said: ‘You
do not take this organ out of this house.
Show your authority.
you don’t, you take it over my corpse.’ * * * Then he clinched
* * * Then the two colored men came in, and began
my brother.
I then went ' to the corner and saw a
knocking us about. * * *
He came down, and Fox
policeman, and asked him to come down.
said: ‘Arrest this man (meaning my brother), and I will appear"
They arrested my brother, and he was
against him in the morning.’
taken to the station.” This action was brought by McClung to recover
.
damages for this high-handed and hostile invasion of his home.
On the trial the learned judge of the court below told the jury that
the conduct of Fox “was without mitigation, and deserving of the
severest condemnation,” but that whether Dearborne was responsible
for it or not depended on the instructions he gave him when he started‘
out on the expedition.
The correctness of this instruction is the point
on which this appeal depends. The general doctrine laid down by the
learned judge, that every man is liable for his own trespass only, must
not be taken too literally; for one must be held to do that which he
procures or directs another to do for him, as well as that which he does
in his own person.
“Qui faci per alium, facit per se." Servants
and employés are often without the means to respond in damages for
the injuries they may inﬂict on others by the ignorant, negligent, or
wanton manner in which they conduct the business of their employer.
The loss must be borne in such cases by the innocent sufferer, or by
him whose employment of an ignorant, careless, or wanton servant
has been the occasion of the injury; and, under such circumstances,
it is just that the latter should bear the loss.
But the master is not liable for the independent trespass of his
a coachman, while driving along the street with his mas
servant.
ter’s carriage, sees one against whom he bears ill will at the side of
the street, and leaves the box to seek out and assault him, the master
would not be liable. Such an act would be the willful and independent
It was done while in his master's service, but
act of the coachman.
not in the course of that service. But if the coachman sees his enemy
sitting on the box of another carriage, driving along the same highway,
and he so guides his own team as to bring the carriages into collision,

If

If

Gooo.Pn.& A. (20 En.)—46

722

armors

AND cousmoouncns

or rnn nnnarron

(Part 3

is

is

it

in

a

it

a

a

is

a

it

a

it

it,

whereby injury is done, the master is liable. The coachman was hired
to drive his master's horses. He was doing the work he was employed
to do, and for the manner of his doing it the master is liable. VVood,
Mast. & Serv. § 277.
It would be no defense to the master to prove
that he had given his coachman orders to be careful and not drive
against others. It was his duty not only to give such orders, but to
see that they were obeyed.
It will be seen, therefore, that it is the
character of the employment, and not-the private instructions given
by the master to his servant, that must determine the measure of his
liability in any given case.
An excellent illustration is afforded by the case of Garretzen v.
In his absence
Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104. The defendant was a gunsmith.
from his store a clerk was waiting upon a customer who wanted to
buy a riﬂe. The customer desired to see it loaded, and would not buy
unless this was done.
The orders of the defendant to his clerk were
The customer was so
that he should not load a' riﬂe in the store.
earnest in desiring it that the clerk loaded
and by accident
was
window
discharged, the ball injuring the plaintiff, who was sitting at
on the opposite side of the street. The defendant set up his orders to
defense, but
did not prevail. The court said: “There
his clerk as
no pretense that he [the clerk] was endeavoring to do anything for
He was acting in pursuance of authority, and trying to sell
himself.
bargain for his master; and, in his eagerness to
gun,—-to make
subserve his master’s interests, he acted injudiciously and negligently."
In the case now before us, Dearborne sent Fox and his helpers to
the house of McClung for the purpose of seizing and bringing away
the organ. He says: “I told him totake the men and team'when he
was ready, and to bring the organ in, but to be careful and not to
have any row about it.” Black, who drove the team, testiﬁes:
“Mr.
Dearborne told Fox to go down and get this organ on South Sixteenth
street; to get
as peaceable as possible, and not to have any assault
These directions show that
and battery, or any disturbance whatever.”
Dearborne knew that the errand on which he sent his employés was
one that was likely to result in trouble, and would require to be man
aged with great coolness and care, in order to avoid collision and
breach of the peace.
But, however the rule may be held
regard to the criminal liability
of the master under such circumstances,
very clear that he can
not escape liability civilly by virtue of his instructions to his servant
as to the manner of doing an act which the servant
to undertake
He knew that the invasion of McClung’s house in the
on his behalf.
manner contemplated was likely to excite indignation and resistance
on the part of the inmates, and that what ought to be done might have
to be determined under excitement, and without time for consultation
or reﬂection by his employés. Under such circumstances, he puts them
bound by what they do in the effort to do
in his own stead, and he
Gonn.Pn.& A. (20 En.)
is

~€

-—~~__

Ch. 5)

LIABILITY or CONSTITUENT

TO THIRD

723

PERSON

the thing, which was committed to them.
Sanford v. Railroad Co., 23
N. Y. 343; Railway Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. St. 519, 6 Atl. Rep.
545; Railroad Co. v. Donahue, 70 Pa. St. 119; Hays v. Millar, 77
Pa. St. 238; Garretzen v. Duenckel, supra.
The defendant was bound nof only to give proper instructions to his
servants when sending them on such an errand, but he was bound to
see that his instructions were obeyed.
In the leading English case of
Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 Hurl. & N. 359, (referred to at some length
in \Vood, Mast. & Serv. § 297,) it is said:
“If the act is done within
the scope of the servant’s employment, and is done in the master’s
service, an action lies against the master, and he is liable even though
he has directed the servant to do nothing wrong.”
Here Fox and his
helpers were sent to bring away the organ. The acts complained of
were committed in the course of, and as a means to, the accomplish
ment of that for which they were sent. Let it be conceded that they
were instructed to do no wrong, and that they did what they were
warned not to do. The master is nevertheless liable. \»Vhen he sends
them upon an errand that exposes them to resistance and danger, and
the excitements consequent upon the presence of such a state of things,
he must take the chances of their self-control and ability to obey.
If he ﬁnds the risk inconveniently expensive, he may conclude to
respect the homes of inoffensive citizens, and rely on his legal remedies
for the recovery of any property to which he may claim title hereafter.
The jury should have been told that the defendant was liable for
what the learned judge aptly characterized as an “unjustiﬁable outrage"
by his employés, and they should have been allowed to assess adequate
damages for the breach of the plaintiff's close, if the entry was forcible,
and for all the injury done him by any and all the defendant's serv
ants while engaged in the business of seizing and carrying away the
All the circumstances may be considered in ﬁxing the com
organ.
Judgment reversed, and a
pensation to be awarded to the plaintiff.
.
venire facias de novo awarded.

,_.i__
.

(Supreme Judicial

COMMONWEALTH

v.

STEVENS.

Court of Massachusetts. 1891. 153 Mass.
11 L. R. A. 357, 25 Am. St. Rep. 647.)

421, 26 N.

E.

992,

C. ALLEN, I. The defendant was a druggist, and was authorized
by his license to sell intoxicating liquors for certain purposes, but not
to minors. One of his clerks made a sale to a minor, and the principal
question at the trial was whether the defendant was criminally re
There was evidence that he had instructed all of
sponsible therefor.
his clerks not to make sales to minors, nor indeed to any person under
The learned‘ judge before whom the case was tried
25 years of age.
instructed the jury that, if they were satisﬁed that these instructions
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were given by the defendant, but that the clerks were to determine the
question of minority sim‘ply from the appearance of the customer, and
that the defendant authorized and permitted them to sell without fur
ther inquiry, if they believed such person to be 25 years of age or up
wards, and that the clerk who made the sale in this case applied this
test, and in good faith sold to this customer, then the defendant would
be liable, even if he had no personal knowledge of this sale, because
the servant in such case was carrying on the defendant’s business in the
way he directed, and obeying his instructions, and that under such cir
cumstances the act of the servant would be the act of the master. The
correctness of this instruction is the principal question before us.
The question in this precise form has not before arisen, so far as
we know. In several cases there has been a consideration of the infer
ences of agency, in making a particular sale, which may be drawn from
a general employment to sell liquors in the defendant’s place of busi
ness, and the eﬁect of such employment in overcoming evidence tend
ing to show that the defendant instructed his servant not to sell to
minors, or in leading to the conclusion that such instruction, if given,
was not given in good faith. But in these cases the question is not dis
cussed whether the master would be criminally responsible for a sale
made by a clerk to a minor by mistake, ‘under the su'pposition that the
minor was an adult, both master and servant intending in good faith
that no sale should be made to a minor.
Com. v. Rooks, 150 Mass.
59, 22 N. E. 436; Com. v. Houle, 147 Mass. 380, 17 N. E. 896; Com. v.
Hayes, 145 Mass. 289, 14 N. E. 151.
In the case now before us it was ruled that criminal responsibility
on the part of the master exists in a case where the clerks were ex
pected to determine the question of minority simply from the appear
ance of the customer; but we cannot see that this particular method
of determining the question of minority has any legal signiﬁcance, ex
cept as bearing upon the good faith of the master or the servant.
theclerks had been instructed not to be satisﬁed with the personal ap
pearance of the customer, but in all cases to put a direct inquiry as to his
age, or even to require further evidence, mistakes might nevertheless
be made, although in.such cases the clerks would still be carrying on the
master’s business in the way prescribed by the master.
the clerks
are permitted to be satisﬁed with a slight test, this, indeed, would'be a
proper subject for consideration in determining whether the instructions
not to sell to minors were given and acted upon in good faith.
But in
the present case the instructions to the jury allowed them to convict the
defendant, even though the jury should ﬁnd that he had in good faith
given instructions not to sell to minors, and though the clerk had in
good faith endeavored and intended to follow those instructions, but had
innocently made a mistake in judging of the purchaser’s age from her
appearance.
The question was not submitted to the jury to determine as a matter
of fact whether the permitted mode of determining the age was a rea
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sonable one or not, or, whether it indicated bad faith or negligence on
the part of the defendant in the mode of conducting his business. That
might have been proper for their consideration, but it cannot be aﬁirm
ed as a matter of law that the test was unreasonable, or that it indi
cated bad faith or negligence. The court cannot lay it down as a rule
for the guidance of the jury that the master ought to require further
evidence. In many cases, perhaps in most, a mere inspection of the ‘pur
chaser might be sufﬁcient. Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6.
VVhile a broader rule prevails in respect to a master’s civil responsi
bility for the acts of his servant or agent ordinarily, he is not held re
sponsible criminally, unless he in some way participates in, counte
nances, or approves the criminal act of his servant.
Ordinarily, if a
servant does a criminal act in opposition to the master’s will and against
his orders, though by mistake, the master cannot be held criminally
responsible. This rule is of general application, though subject to some
Com. v. Nichols, 10 Metc. (Mass) 259;
real or apparent exceptions.

Com. v. \Vachendorf, 141 Mass. 270, 4 N. E. 817; Com. v. Briant, 142
Mass. 463, 8 N. E. 338; Com. v. Stevenson, 142 Mass. 466, 8 N. E. 341 ;
Com. v. Hayes, 145 Mass. 289, 295, 14 N. E. 151; State v. Smith, 10
R. I. 258 ; Anderson v. State, 22 Ohio St. 305. This rule has been held
Barnes v. State,
applicable to cases of sales to drunkards and slaves.
19 Conn. 398; State v. Dawson, 2 Bay, 360; Hipp v. State, 5 Blackf.
149.
The case of Com. v. Uhrig, 138 Mass. 492. does not go so far as
to hold that one may be convicted of an illegal sale, for the unauthorized
act of his servant, but only that after such sale by his servant he may be
convicted of keeping a liquor nuisance. This, of course, is because he is
responsible for the character of the place kept by him. But, even in re
spect to this doctrine, it is necessary to bear in mind the limitations indi
cated by-other decisions.
Com. v. Patterson, 138 Mass. 498; Com. v.
Hayes, 150 Mass. 506, 23 N. E. 216; Com. v. Hagan, 152 Mass. 565, 26

N. E.

95.

There are some criminal and some penal cases which ‘perhaps may be
deemed to be exceptions to the general rule.
The usual illustrations are
indictments for libel or nuisance, and informations -and complaints
for the breach of statutory regulations for securing public order; and
it is obvious that in some of these instances criminal responsibility is
imposed for carelessness or negligence on the part of the master. In
Com. v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199, 203, which was an indictment for libel,
this court said: “Criminal responsibility on the part of the principal,
for the act of his servant, or agent in the course of his employment, im
plies some degree of moral guilt or delinquency, manifested either by
direct participation in or assent to the act, or by want of proper care
and oversight, or other negligence in reference to the business which
he has thus intrusted to another.”
See, also, Queen v. Holbrook, 3 Q.
B. Div. 60, 4 Q. B. Div. 42, involving a construction of the English
statute respecting libel.
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Several English cases of informations for penalties are collected in
Smith, Mast. & Serv. 312 et seq., which have the appearance of trench
ing somewhat upon the general rule, unless fairly distinguishable upon
the ground there stated, that they partake more of the nature of civil
For a case of public
proceedings to recover a debt due to the crown.
nuisance, where the master was held criminally responsible for his
Without
servant’s acts, see Queen v. Stephens, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702.
dwelling upon cases like these further than merely to show that they
have not been overlooked, it does not appear to us necessary or rea
sonable to extend criminal responsibility for the act of a servant so far
as to include a case like the present. "T he servant himself is no doubt
responsible because he has made a sale, however innocently, which the
law forbade him to make. But if he reasonably and honestly believed
the purchaser to be of adult age, and that the sale might lawfully be
made, his statutory guilt should not be imputed to the defendant.
Though the defendant would have been responsible for his own mis
take, if the sale to the minor had been made by him, it seems to us to be
carrying the doctrine of criminal responsibility for the act of another
quite too far to convict him by reason of an honest mistake on the part
of his clerk, provided the jury should ﬁnd that the master sincerely
and honestly intended that his instructions should be followed in good
faith, and that he was not negligent or careless in the selection of his
clerks, or in the regulations and precautions which he prescribed for
their guidance. See Mullins v. Collins, L. R. 9 Q. B. 292, per Quain, ].,
and also per Blackburn, ].
The testimony of Palmer as to the number of sales of intoxicating
liquors registered on the defendant’s books was com'petent to be con
sidered, as bearing upon the question of the reasonableness of the pre
cautions taken by the defendant to prevent sales to minors. Exceptions
sustained."
8'1 In People v. Roby, 52 l\I_ich. 577, 18 N. W. 365, 50 Am. Rep. 270 (1884),
Cooley, O. J.. points out that the statute may impose criminal penalties irre
See, also, the leading case of Com. v. Nichols,
spective of intent.
10 Metc.
(Mass) 259, 43 Am. Dec. 432 (1845); Crane v. Bennett. 177 N. Y. 106, 69 N.
E. 274, 101 Am. St. Rep. 722 (1904), a case of libel; Carroll v. State, 63 Md.
551, 3

Atl.

29 (1885).
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FARRIS.
1851.

11 C. B.

457.)

plaintiff and
Lewis, his attorney, to show cause why the writ of summons, and
the copy and service thereof, and all subsequent proceedings, should not
be set aside, and why the plaintiif’s attorney should not pay the costs
of the application. The ground of the motion was, that the writ had
been issued without the seal of the court—that which purported to be
the court seal, being nothing more than an impression taken from the
seal upon another writ.
The matter having been referred to one of the masters to inquire into
the circumstances under which the alleged fraud had been committed,
Mr. Ray now reported to the court, that the semblance of a seal had
been impressed upon the writ in question by placing it in contact with
a seal which had just been- put upon another writ; but that this had
been done by the clerk, without the knowledge of Mr. Lewis, his em
ployer.
]ERv1s, C. I. There are many acts of a servant for which, though
criminal, the master is civilly responsible by action.
The defendant
certainly ought not to bear his own costs; still less should the plaintiff,
who has had conﬁdence in Lewis, suifer from his want of caution in
employing a dishonest clerk. Although, therefore, we acquit Mr. Lewis
of participation in the fraud, which we have reason to suspect to have
been of frequent occurrence, we think he must ‘personally bear the costs.
CREsswELL, J. The writ was served by the direction of Mr. Lewis.
The defendant was obliged to come to the court to -set it aside. Lewis
isthe only person upon whom we can impose the costs; and, however
hard it may be upon him, there is no help for it.
TALFOURD, ]. The service of the writ was an act done in the prose
cution of the attomey’s duty; it was therefore his act.
By making
Mr. Lewis pay the costs of setting aside the proceedings, we are not to
be understood as imputing any blame to him.
But we have no alterna
tive.
Rule absolute accordingly.

Mr.
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SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
(Supreme Court of Georgia,

1903.

v.

118 Ga. 340. 45 S.

(Part 3

JAMES.
E.

303, 63

L. R. A.

257.)

Action by H. James against the Southern Railway Company. Judg
Afﬁrmed.
ment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
It appears from the’ record that Saunders was
SIMMONS, C.
He
the yardmaster, in East Rome, of the Southern Railway Company.
employed Ford as night watchman of the company, to look after the
property and interests of the company in the East Rome yards, and for
the purpose of arresting trespassers who were stealing or attempting to
steal rides on the trains of the company which passed through those
yards. It was also the duty of Ford to attend the switch lights in the
yards. On the night of July 19 or 20, 1899, Ford caught James, the
defendant in error, on the top of a box car, it being the purpose of
Ford ordered him to get down.
James to steal a ride on the train.
He obeyed, and Ford arrested him. James resisted to such an extent
that Ford had to call in assistance. Ford then started with James to the
calaboose of the town, where it had been the custom to conﬁne pris
Ford testiﬁed that he made the arrest for
oners of this character.
the company, and as its employé.
On the way to the calaboose James
broke away from Ford and ran. Ford commanded him to halt, but
The night was dark, and Ford then, according
James kept running.
to his own testimony, ﬁred in about the direction in which James had
run, not to hit him, but to frighten him, and cause him to stop, so that
Ford could “arrest him and lock him up.” The bullet from Ford's
pistol struck James in one of his legs, which had to be amputated above
the knee.
James brought suit against the railroad company for the
injuries thus received, and the jury, on the trial of the case, returned a
verdict in his favor for $500. The company moved for a new trial upon
several grounds. The motion was overruled, and the company excepted.
a * at

J.“

Having shown that Ford wbs authorized to arrest and imprison, the
next question to arise is whether the company is liable for the injury
which James sustained as aconsequence of the shot from Ford's pistol.
The Code section cited above declares that the master is liable for the
torts of the servant within the scope of the master’s business, whether
This seems to be the settled law in
such torts be negligent or willful.
all the jurisdictions in this country in which the common law prevails.
Where a master instructs a servant to do a lawful act, and the servant,
while engaged in the master’s business, and intending to do the act au
thorized, is reckless in the performance of the act, and inﬂicts injury on
another, the master is liable. Webb’s Pollock on Torts, lO3. So, if the
servant, acting in the way of his employment, and on his master’s ac
I
88

*

Part of the opinion is omitted.

7

———

g7

m

a

__

i~

Ch. 5)

.

LIABILITY or CONSTITUENT T0 THIRD

729

PERSON

it

a

is

a

it

a

a

a

if

is

it,

count, willfully and deliberately commit a wrong, the master is liable.
Id. p. 109. See, also, Reinhard on Agency, §§ 485, 486.
The rule is thus well stated by Hoar, ]., in Howe v. Newmarch, 12
Allen, 49, 56: “The master is not responsible as a trespasser unless by
direct or implied authority to the servant he consents to the wrongful
act.
But if the master give an order to a servant, which im'plies the use
of force and violence to others, leaving to the discretion of the serv
ant to decide when the occasion arises to which the order applies, and
the extent and kind of force to be used, he is liable if the servant, in
executing the order, makes use of force in a manner or to a degree
which is unjustiﬁable.
And in an action of tort in the nature of an
action on the case the master is not responsible if the wrong done by
the servant is done without his authority, and not for the purpose of
So that if the servant, wholly
executing his orders or doing his work.
for a purpose of his own, disregarding the object for which he is em
does an injury to
ployed, and not intending by his act to execute
another not within the scope of his employment, the master
not liable.
But
the act be done in the execution of the authority given him by his
master, and for the purpose of performing what the master has direct
ed, the master will be responsible, whether the wrong done be occasioned
wanton or reckless purpose to accomplish the
by negligence, or by
master’s business in an unlawful manner.”
In the case now under consideration, the servant had full authority
from the master to arrest the plaintiff.
If made in proper way, this
arrest would have been entirely lawful. Indeed, the arrest was properly
made, and was
lawful arrest. Acting still within his authority, and
being still within the law, the servant undertook to imprison the person
he had arrested.
To do this
was necessary to take him to the cala
boose, where he was to be conﬁned.
So far the servant was clearly
within his authority, and did nothing which was illegal. In endeavoring,
however, to take the prisoner to the place of conﬁnement, when the
prisoner broke away and ran, the servant negligently, recklessly, and
wantonly ﬁred in the prisoner’s direction in order to frighten him into
The authority to make the arrest and to conﬁne the prisoner
halting.
implied the authority to use spch force or violence as was necessary.
The servant, through
want of judgment and discretion, used an un
justiﬁable amount and character of force and violence. He did so in
an attempt to execute the authority to arrest and im'pris0n, and the mas
liable for the injury thus wrongfully inflicted upon the plaintiff.
ter
Counsel for the plaintiff in error laid much stress on the fact that
the shooting of the plaintiff was
criminal act, and argued that
was,
therefore, an act which could not be authorized.
The arrest and im
prisonment of persons violating the statute against stealing rides on
railroad trains were, however, lawful acts, which could be authorized,
and which were in fact authorized.
The crime committed by the serv
ant was in his injudicious attempt to execute this la_wful authority in
an unlawful manner. It was the means adopted by the servant for the
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purpose of performing the authorized work of the master. The civil
liability of the master is not affected in such a case by the fact that the
servant has rendered himself criminally liable. If the criminal act of
the servant was done within the range of his employment, and for the
purpose of accomplishing the authorized business of the master, the lat
ter is liable. Applying_these rules of law to the present case, there was
evidence from which the jury could ﬁnd that the defendant was liable
for the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff. See 20 Am. & Eng. Enc.
L. (2d Ed.) 169-176; Noblesville, etc., Road v. Gause (Ind.) 40 Am.
Rep. 224, and note; Smith v. L. & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 23 S. W. 652, 22
L. R. A. 72; note to Goodloe v. Railroad Co. (Ala.) 54 Am. St. Rep. 71;
Higgins v. W. T. & R. Co., 4-6 N. Y. 23, 7 Am. Rep. 293; Cooley on
Torts (2d Ed.) 626 et seq.; Addison on Torts (Wood’s Ed.) 46, § 36;
1 jaggard on Torts, 251 et seq.
Judgment aﬁirmed.”
B. Div. 742. See, also, Fields Y.
E. 608, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822, 122
Am. St. Rep. 593 (1907), discussing punitive damages.
As to the master's
liability for a crime beyond the scope of the servant's employment, see Davis
v. Houghtellin, 33 Neb. 582, 50 N. W. 765, 14 L. R. A. 737 (1891); Lynch v.
Florida Cent. & P. R. Co., 113 Ga. 1105, 39 S. E. 411, 54 L. R. A. 810 (1901).
Fam/ilu Purpose Doctrine.—The family automobile has given rise to a line
of cases as to the liability of the head of the family for negligent or criminal
use of the automobile by members of the family. The cases are sharply in
conﬂict.
See the prevailing and dissenting opinions in Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill.
420, 123 N. E. 30, 5 A. L. R. 216 (1919); Steffen v. McNaughton,
142 Wis. 49,
124 N. W. 1016, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 382, 19 Ann. Cas. 1227 (1910); Hays v. Ho
gan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 19180, 715, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1127
Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. Law
(1917), overruling earlier Missouri cases;
754, 71 Atl. 296, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335, 131 Am. St. Rep. 677 (1908).
For the
father’s liability, Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 59 (1913). But compare Doran v. Thomsen, supra, with Missell v.
Hayes, 86 N. J. Law, 348, 91 Atl. 322 (1914), where a distinction is taken be
tween the case where the son uses the family automobile for a pleasure drive
for the family and guests of his father. and the case where the son is driving
the same persons as his guests. It is for the jury to determine which is the
fact in the given case.
Statutes have been upheld which impose liability on
the owner of an automobile for injuries occasioned by its negligent operation
by any person whatever by the express or implied consent or knowledge of
Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N. W.
the owner.
»
520. L. R. A. 1918A, 916 (1917).
Some statutes dispose of the question as involving the relation of bailor and
bailee, instead of master and servant.
Wolf v. Sulik, 93 Conn. 431, 106 Atl.
443, 4 A. L. R. 356 (1919).
3° Accord: Dyer v. Munday,
[1895]
Lancaster Cotton Mills, 77 S. C. 546,

1 Q.
58 S.
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Action of assault and battery; defendant pleads the general issue,
not guilty, and also a special plea in justiﬁcation, that he assisted his
servant, whom the ‘plaintiff was beating.
Contended, that the law will not justify a master interposing on an
assault against his servant, by assaulting the person who beats the
servant, as it does a servant in like case interposing for his master,
because it was the duty ‘of the servant, who was hired to serve and be
assistant to his master’s person, but not so the master to the servant.
On the other hand it was contended to this effect nearly: The duty
of master and servant was reciprocal, and if the servant owed to the
master ﬁdelity and obedience, the master owed to the servant protection
and defense, and might, therefore, well justify by his plea.
LORD MANsF1ELD.“° I cannot tell them a master, interposing when
his servant is assailed, is not justifiable, under the circumstances of the
case, as well as a servant interposing for his master;
it rests on the
relation.“ * * *

BIRKETT

v.

POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.

(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 1905.
107 App. Div. 115, 94 N. Y. Supp. 918, atﬁrmed 186 N. Y. 691, T9 N. E. 1101.)

One Harrington, agent and manager of defendant company at Penn
Yan, had systematically overcharged plaintiff for telegrams and ap
propriated the excess amounts to his own account to the extent of
$2,480.24.
The agent confessed and absconded. Birkett now sues the
company to recover the overcharges.
A
SPRING, J. The rule of law governing this case is elementary.
principal is liable to a third person for the misconduct of his agent
committed in the line of his employment, even though the offense was
in excess of his authority, “and the principal did not authorize, justify,
or know of it.” Nowack v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 166 N. Y. 433-440, 60 N.
E. 32, 54 L. R. A. 592, 82 Am. St. Rep. 691; Iarvis v. Manhattan
Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652-657, 43 N. E. 68, 31 L. R. A. 776, 51 Am.
St. Rep. 727 et seq.
Conceding this rule of law, the appellant contends that Harrington
was not in the line of his employment in making false entries in the
40Part of the opinion is omitted.

41 In Seaman v. Cuppledick,
Owen, 150, 74 Eng. Rep. 966 (1615), a charge
of assault and battery is justiﬁed in defense of a servant, sell. that plaintiﬂ
had assaulted his servant and would have beaten him. But Williams, contra,
Leeward v. Basilu,
though a servant may justify in defense of his master.
1 Ld. Raym. 62 (1696), would leave the master to his action for loss of serv
ice.
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accounts rendered to the plaintiff.
Harrington had general superin
of the defendant’s ofﬁce in Penn Yan. He had the exclusive
handling of its funds at that village. He was charged with the rendi
tion of the accounts to the plaintiff, and with collecting for the tele
grams and cablegrams sent by the plaintiff and upon which there were
He was acting within the scope of his agen
charges for transmission.
If the
cy in receiving the money for the beneﬁt of the defendant.
plaintiff had paid the exact amount due, and Harrington had misap
the plaintiff could not have been compelled to respond
propriated
over again on account of the misconduct of ‘Harrington. Of course.
Harrington was not authorized to collect mohey of the plaintiff for
but
was his duty to collect the sums
telegrams never transmitted;
If he collected more than was
actually due for their transmission.
due, he did that because of his agency. The agent, in his dealings with
the plaintiff, turned out to be dishonest while acting in that capacity.
His delinquency does not exonerate the defendant to the plaintiff, who
relied upon the manifest authority of Harrington. The principal can
not so easily evade liability for the misdeeds of its agent. The general
ﬁxed by the agency, and in whatever an agent
line of employment
does to an innocent third person within that general line, although ul
conductor uses undue vio
tra vires, he represents his principal.“ If
lia
lence in removing
passenger from train, the railroad company
ble.
The company does not authorize the conductor to handle the pas
does empower him in certain cases to eject the
senger harshly; but
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42 The rule applies even though the principal forbade the acts, or disapprov
ed of them, provided they were within the course of his employment.
Phila
delphia
R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 14 L. Ed. 502 (1852); Rhomberg
v. Avenarius, 135 Iowa, 176. 112 N. W. 548 (1907): Dupre v. Childs, 52 App.
Div. 306, 65 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1900).
It applies in case oi! trespass by the
agent, Meir v. Hopkins, 16 Ill. 313, 63 Am. Dec. 312 (1855), to his frauds.
Chetwood v. Berrian, 39 N. J. Eq. 203 (1884); Barwick v. English Joint Stock
Bank, L. R.
Exch. 259, 36 L. J. Exch. 147, 16 L. T. Rep. (N, S.) 161, 15 W. R.
877 (1867), to conversion
of the property of the third person, Rhomberg v.
Avenarius,
supra, to a libel against the third person, Citizens’ Life Assur.
Co. v. Brown, A. C. 423, 73 L. J. P. C. 102. 90 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 739, 20 T. L.
R. 497. 53 W. R. 176 (1904).
As to liability of the principal for slanders
uttered by the agent, see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ala. 574, 43 South.
210,
L. R. A. (N. S.) 929, 124 Am. St. Rep. 90 (1906), as to his neglect, de
ceit, or other wrongful act, Locke v. Stearns,
Metc. (Mass) 560, 35 Am. Dec.
382 (1840), per Shaw, C.
., limiting it however to the civil, and not the crim
inal liability of the principal as do the cases generally.
See Higgins v. Wa
tervliet Turnpike Co., 46 N. Y. 23,
Am. Rep. 293 (1871); Bank of Palo Alto
v. Pac. Postal Tel. Cable Co. (C. C.) 103 Fed. 841 (1900), and even to crimes
in which intent is not an ingredient, such as illegal sale of liquors.
George
v, Gobey, 128 Mass. 289, 35 Am. Rep. 376 (1880).
Where, however, the princi
pal does not participate in the tort, he is not liable in punitive damages. Mai
v. Soc. Concordia,
71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67, 71 Am. St. Rep. 213
.
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Modern cases extend the rule to willful and malicious acts of the agent.
Cf Johnson v Barber, 10 Ill. 425, 50 Am. Dec. 416 (1849) (as to malice), and
Pressley v. Mobile
G. R. Co. (C. C.) 15 Fed. 199,
Woods, 569 (1SS2).
For
an interesting account of the historical development ot the tort liability of
the principal for the acts of the agent, and of the principle upon which
rests, see Kingan
C0. v. Silvers, 13 Ind. App. 80, 37 N. E. 413 (1894).
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passenger, and it must be held civilly responsible for whatever the con
ductor does in carrying out the authority ‘intrusted to him, even though
he oversteps his instructions.
The rule here applicable is founded on
the old maxim that the principal is responsible for his agent, not the
innocent third person.
The plaintiff was furnished with the tariff books of the defendant,
and by examination of each statement with the tariff rates could have
ascertained that he was being cheated.
It is urged that he was negli
gent in failing to make these examinations, and should not, therefore,
be permitted to recover.
The plaintiff was not obliged to act on the
assumption that Harrington was defrauding him. The defendant had
placed its agent in the responsible position of manager of its business.
It vouched for his integrity to its patrons. They had a right to assume
he was honest, and were not called upon to enter into any inspection
of the items of his accounts, for the purpose of discovering either fraud
or mistake. The judgment should be -aﬁirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.

MACKAY

v.

(Privy Council

COMMERCIAL BANK OF NEW BRUNSWICK.
L. R. 5 P. C. 394. 43 L. J. P. G. 31, 30 L. T.
Appeals, 1874.
Rep. [N. S.] 180, 22 W. R. 473.)

Lingley, a timber merchant of New Brunswick, was accustomed to
consign cargoes to Messrs. Mackay of Liverpool, drawing bills on
them which he indorsed to*defendant bank. In August, 1888, he drew
several bills, two of which, by his fraud, were not drawn on any car
On receiving his letter of notiﬁcation, plaintiffs cabled him to
goes.
remit defendant’s guarantee of the bills, or they would refuse all.
VVhen the message arrived. Lingley had made over all his property to
trustees and absconded. The message was taken to Sancton, cashier
and manager of the defendant, who cabled back, “Sent last mail.-—
Lingley." The Mackays being thus deceived, paid the bills, and now
bring deceit against the bank. Verdict directed for plaintiff, new trial
granted by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, from which this
appeal is taken
Sir MONTAGUE E. SMITH“ delivered the judgments of their Lord
* * The Court appear to treat the question whether
*
ships:
or not Sancton was acting within the scope of his authority (there be
ing no conﬂicting evidence as to the general nature of his authority)
as a question of law, and hold that Mr. justice Weldon, instead of di
recting the jury that the sending of the telegram was within the scope
of Sancton’s authority, ought to have directed them that it was not.
The only question of fact which they direct to be submitted to the jury
is, whether or not the sending it was sanctioned by the directors.
48

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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as settled la\v that a principal is answer
where he has received a beneﬁt from the fraud of his agent, act
This doctrine has been laid
ing within the scope of his authority.
down by Lord Holt in Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289, supra, p. 760; by
Lord Ellenborough in Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 355; by Parke,
B., in Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & \V. 373, although, under the peculiar
circumstance of that case, he held the defendant not liable; also by
Parke, B., in Moens v. I-Ieyworth, 10 M. & VV.; by Tindal, C. ]., de
livering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber in Wilson v. Fuller,
in Udell v. Ather
3 Q. B. 77 ; and again by the Court of Exchequer
ton, 7 H. & N. 172, 30 L. I. Ex. 317, where, it is true, the Court was
divided in its judgment, but where Baron Martin, who held that the
plaintiff had not proved his case, stated the question to be, “Was the
agent’s situation such as to bring the representation he made within
the scope of his authority ?”
There are,‘however, some cases to be found apparently at variance
as to the interpretation and the adaptation to circumstances of this
doctrine.
It is seldom possible to prove that the fraudulent act com
plained of was committed by the express authority of the principal, or
that he gave his agent general authority to commit wrongs or frauds.
Indeed it may be generally assumed that, in mercantile transactions,
principals do not authorize their agents to act wrongfully, and conse
quently that frauds are beyond “the scope of the agent’s authority” in
the narrowest sense of which the expression admits.
But so narrow a
sense would have the effect of enabling principals largely to avail them
selves of the frauds of their agents, without suffering losses or incur
ring liabilities on account of them, and would be opposed as much to
A wider construction has been put upon the
justice as to authority.
words.
Principals have been held liable for frauds when it has not
been proved that they authorized the particular fraud complained of
or gave a general authority to commit frauds; at the same time, it is
not easy to deﬁne with precision the extent to which this liability has
been carried.
The best deﬁnition of
their Lordships’ judgment,
to be found in the case of Barwick v. English ]oint Stock Bank, L.
R.
Ex. 259, when the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was de
livered by one of the most learned Judges who ever sat in \'Vestminster
Hall. In that case the plaintiff was induced to continue to supply oats
to
customer of the bank,
contractor with the Government, on a
guarantee from its manager to the effect that the customer’s cheque in
the plaintiff's favour, in payment for the oats supplied, should be paid
on receipt of the Government money, in priority to any other payment
“except to this bank.” The manager fraudulently concealed from the
plaintiff that the customer was indebted to the bank in £12,000.: the
result was that the plaintiff was induced to advance money to the
customer on
guarantee which turned out to be worthless, and which
the manager must have known to have been worthless when he gave
it. The declarations contained, among other counts, one for deceit,
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in which the fraud of the manager was laid as the fraud of the
bank, on which count alone the judgment is based.
Baron Martin hav
ing directed a nonsuit, a venire de novo was ordered by the Exchequer
Chamber, whose judgment was delivered by Mr. justice \/Villes. He
expressed himself as follows :-—“With respect to the question whether
a principal is answerable for the act of his agent in the course of his
master’s business, and for his master’s beneﬁt, no sensible distinction
can be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of any other
The general rule
that the master
answerable for every
wrong.
such wrong of the servant or agent as
committed in the course of
the service and for the master’s beneﬁt, though no express command
or privity of the master be proved. The principle
acted upon every
has been applied also to direct trespass
day in running down cases.
to goods.”
After enumerating other instances of its application, he
was said here, that
proceeds :—“In all these cases
may be said, as
the master had not authorized the act.
true he has not authorized
the particular act, but he has put the agent in his place to do that class
of acts, and he must be answerable for the manner in which that agent
has conducted himself in doing the business which
was the act of
his master to place him in.” ‘“
For these reasons their Lord
ships will humbly recommend Her Majesty that the judgment of the
new trial be
Supreme Court be reversed, and the order directing
discharged.
Whether the tort was for the principal‘s beneﬁt is often the test. Bar
Exch. 259. 36 IJ. J’. Exch. 147. 16 L. T.
v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, L. R.
Rep. N. S. 161. 15 W. R. 877 (1867)
leading case: Moir v. Hopkins. 16 Ill.
44

a

2

wick

313, 63 Am. Dec. 312 (1855); Garretzen v. Duenckel. 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am. Rep.
405 (1872).
The liability is especially clear it the principal enjoys the fruits of
the agent was
the agent’s wrong. Wright v. Calhoun, 19 Tex. 412 (1857). Or
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acting to protect the prlncipal's property or rights.
Palmeri v. Manhattan
By. Co., 133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E. 1001, 16 L. R. A. 136, 28 Am. St. Rep. 632
The agent must he acting for his principal and not for himself.
(1892).
Brit. Mut. Banking Co. v. Charmwood Forest Ry. Co., 18 Q. B. D. 724, 52 J. P.
150, 56 L. J. Q. B. 449, 57 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 833, 35 W. R. 590 (1887).
But see
McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 181. 39 N. W. 315,
L. R. A.
liability
143. 12 Am. St. Rep. 636 (1888), holding that the rule which fastens
upon the master to third persons for the wrongful and unauthorized acts of
his servant is not conﬁned solely to that class of cases where the acts com
plained of are done in the course of the employment in furtherance of the
master's business or interest, though there are many cases which fall within
that rule. Mott v. Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 547; Savings Inst. v. Bank, S0 N. Y. 168,
36 Am. Rep. 595; Potulni v. Saunders, 37 Minn. 517, 35 N. W. Rep. 379.
Accord: Bank of Palo Alto v. Pac. Postal Tel. Cnbic Co. (C. C.) 103 Fed. 841
W. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 12
(1900); Bank of Batavia v. New York. L. E.
P. Ry. Co.,
N. E. 433, 60 Am. Rep. 440 (1887): contra. Friedlander v. Texas
Sup. Ct. 570. 82 L. Ed. 991 (1889).
In the inst two cases an
130 U. S. 416,
third person, issued bills of lading for
agent, in fraudulent collusion with
which he received no goods.
_
Many cases are, or are treated as. cases of master and servant. instead of
principal and agent. The same principle governs each relation.
Such are
R. R. Co. v. Derby. 14 How. 468, 14 L. Ed. 502
the leading cases of P.
(1852) and nearly all the early cases in England.
For extended discussion of the term “course of employment.” see St. Louis,
M.
The lia
S. Ry. Co. v. Grant, 75 Ark. 579, 88 S. W. 580. 1133 (1905).
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FOWLER.

(Court of Kings Bench at Nisi Prius,

1698.

Salk.

1

282.)
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action upon the case upon the custom of the realm was brought
against the defendants being masters of a stage-coach; and the plain
tiff set forth, that he took a place in the coach for such a town, and
that in the journey the defendants by their negligence lost a trunk of
the plaintiff's.
Upon not guilty pleaded, upon the evidence it appeared,
that this trunk was delivered to the person that drove the coach, and
he promised to take care of
and that the trunk was lost out of the
'coachman’s possession; and
the master was chargeable with this
action, was the question. Holt, C.
was of opinion, that this action
did not lie against the master, and that
stage-coachman was not with
in the custom as
carrier
unless such as take
distinct price for
carriage of goods“ as well as persons, as waggons with coaches; and
though money be given to the driver, yet that
gratuity, and cannot
bring the master within the custom; for no master
chargeable with
the acts of his servant, but when he acts in execution of the authority
the act of the
given by his master, and then the act of the servant
master; and the plaintiff was nonsuited. V ide Rep. B. R. Temp. Hard.
85, 194. Comyns 25.

STICKNEY
(Supreme

v.

MONROE.

Judicial Court of Maine.

Case for diverting water from
*
TENNEY, C. ].‘“

1857.

44 Me. 195.)

is

It
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if
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if
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*

mill.
alleged in the writ, that the defend
ant dug up and removed the rocks and earth from the natural bed of
the Schoodic river, to
great depth, and by digging up and removing
the bank and bed of the river as aforesaid, and by using the new and
enlarged water gates as aforesaid, did divert the water of the river
from the usual and natural course, etc., to the great nuisance and dam
age of the plaintiffs.
The jury were instructed upon this part of the case, that
the de
fendant commanded or authorized his tenant, Tinker, to do the blast
ing and digging, which
alleged diverts the water from the plain
tiffs’ shore saw mill, or ratiﬁed and approved of such acts, after they
were done, and they did in fact divert the water, and occasion
dam
age to the plaintiffs’ said mill, he would be liable for such damage; but
he had no knowledge of such acts, and did not command or author
the plaintiff's

bility of the principal extends to CO1‘pOI'at10HS whose agents commit torts
while in the course of their employment.
Scoﬁeld Rolling Mill C0. v. Ga., 54

a

Ga. 635 (1875).
45 The holding of Lord Holt that the carrier assumes no liability
us to
baggage unless he takes
distinct price for it is, of course, not the law to-day.
“Part of the opinion is omitted.
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ize them, nor ratify or adopt them, and had no actual knowledge of
them, he would not be liable for this injury; nor could Lowell's power
of attorney put into the case, nor his general agency in relation to the
defendant’s mill property, if the jury are satisﬁed that such general
agency is proved, authorize Lowell to dig or excavate the bed of the
river, so as to divert the water, nor authorize him to bind the defend
ant, by giving Tinker liberty to do so.
Special inquiries were put to the jury: First, did the defendant
authorize or ratify the digging and blasting and deepening of the chan
nel done by Ferdinand Tinker; and, second, what amount of damage
was done to the shore saw mill of the plaintiffs, by reason of the dig
ging and blasting of the rocks and deepening of the channel by Ferdi
nand Tinker? To the ﬁrst question, the jury answered in the negative;
and to the second, the sum of seven hundred dollars, to the date of

writ.
The parties agreed, that the whole verdict is to

the

be copied as part of
the case, including the special ﬁndings in answer to the questions pro
posed, and if the verdict for the plaintiffs is not set aside, on account
of errors of the judge, or under the motion, judgment is to be|entered
according to the legal rights of the parties. From this we understand
that the whole evidence is submitted to the court, and if from that, it
is satisﬁed that the defendant is answerable for the excavations made
in the bed of the river, the damage found for that cause is to be added
to the verdict returned, and judgment to be rendered thereon.
The acts of a general agent, or One whom a man puts in his place
to transact all his business of a particular kind or of a particular place,
will bind his principal, so long as he keeps within the scope of his au
and
thority, though he may act contrary to his private instructions;
the rule is necessary to prevent fraud, and encourage conﬁdence in
2 Kent’s Com. (5th Ed.) 620; Lobdell v. Bahn, 1 Metc.
dealing.
(Mass.) 202 (1840) ; Story on Agency, § 126, and note (1). ,
“The principal is held liable to third persons, in a civil suit for
frauds. deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences,
and other malfeasances and omissions of duty in his agent, in the
course of his employment, although the principal did not authorize,
justify, or participate in, or indeed know of such misconduct; or even
if he forbade them or disapproved of them.” “In every such case, the
principal holds out his agent as competent and ﬁt to be trusted; and
thereby, in effect, he warrants his ﬁdelity and good conduct in all mat
ters of his agency.”
And as an illustration
Story’s Agency, § 452.
of the principle, a carrier will be liable for the negligence of his agent,
by which the goods committed to his custody are damaged or lost. Ib.
i

§ 453.

But although

principal is thus liable for torts and negligences
yet we areto understand the doctrine, with its just limi
tations, that the tort or negligence occurs in the course of the agency.

of his

the

agent,
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For the principal is not liable for the torts and negligences of his agent
in any matter. beyond the agency, unless he has expressly authorized
them to be done, or he has subsequently adopted them for his own use
and beneﬁt. Ib. § 466, also section 455. The principal is not responsi
ble for injuries done by the person employed by him as an agent, which
he has not ordered and which were not in the course of the duty de
volved upon such person.
In all such cases the proper remedy is
Ib. § 319.
the
immediate
wrong doer, for his own misconduct.
against
By the common law, “he that receiveth a trespasser, and agreeth to
a trespass, after it is done, is no trespasser, unless the trespass was
done to his use, or for his beneﬁt, and then his agreement subsequent
for in that case Omnis ratihabitio re
amounteth to_ a commandment;
Coke, 4 Inst.
trotrahitar et mandato as quissarator” (aequiparatur).
317.

The evidence shows, that in the management of the mill property
at Calais, in the building of one of the mills upon the dam, upon which
the Washington and the Madison are situated, and in the repairs made
upon the defendant’s mills from time to time, and the supervision of
their operations, and the receipt of rents therefor, in connection with
the fact that the defendant had his residence in Boston, and was not
personally at Calais for many years in succession, Lowell was at least
held out to the world as the defendant’s general agent, in the charge
of the property aforesaid.
But it is manifest that the scope of this
agency was limited to the business of keeping the mills in a proper con
dition, leasing the same, and receiving the rents therefor.“ It does not
appear, that previous to the excavations complained of in this action,
he had undertaken to make such an alteration in the bed of the river,
as to cause a diversion of the water of the same from the wheels of
other mills, to the injury of the owners thereof, or that he had done
any unlawful act under his agency, commanded before or ratiﬁed after
it was done, by the defendant.
It is true, that Lowell is shown by the evidence to have authorized
the defendant’s lessee. Tinker, to have made alterations in the chan
nel of the river, provided no injury should be done thereby to any one,
and when informed by the plaintiffs of the excavations made by Tink
er, and when he saw them, he made no objections to the further prose
cution of the work. But at that time the lease to Tinker had four years
and one half to run, and the lessee was entitled, on request, to have
the same extended, and the defendant cannot be affected by these facts.
From a full view of all the evidence in the case, there is nothing
showing that these excavations‘ were made for the use and beneﬁt of
47 Outside the course of his employment. the agent is as much a stranger
to the principal as is any third person. Larson v Fidelity Mut. Life Assui-.,
71 Minn. 101. 73 N. W. 711 (1898): S0. Ry. Co. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404, 55
S. E. 37, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926 (1906); Galveston. H. 8: S. Ry. C0. v. Currie, 100
Tex. 136, 96 S. W. 1073. 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 367 (1906), approved in Grand
Temple, etc., Order v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 173 (1911).
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the defendant, and that they were done by Lowell, or authorized by
him, in the execution of his agency, as he was held out by the defend
ant; and under the special ﬁndings of the jury, and the law applicable
to the facts, the defendant cannot be held liable for this portion of
* * "‘
the injury alleged by the plaintiffs.
'
verdict.
Judgment upon the

ii

SECTION 3.—FOR THE DECLARATIONS, REPRESENTA
TIONS, ANDADMISSIONS OF THE
'
REPRESENTATIVE
STANDARD OIL CO.
(Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1907.

v.
75 N.

LINOL
J.

Law,

CO.
294. 68

Atl.

174.)
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GARRISON, J. This was an action on a book account brought by
“Standard Oil Company,” a corporation of New Jersey.
The defend
ant ﬁled a set-off to sustain which it was essential to show that the
“Standard Oil Company of New York,” a corporation of New York,
had acted as and was, in fact, the agent of the plaintiff in ordering
The main at
the goods for the price of which the set-oﬁ" was ﬁled.
tempt of the defendant toward the establishment of this fact was the
offer to prove the statements or declarations made by the various per
sons with whom it had dealt in the transaction in question. All of
these offers were properly overruled.
Agency cannot be proved by
Until the
the declarations of one assuming to act in that capacity.
declarant is shown to be the agent of a party to the suit, his declara
tions (including his declaration that he is such agent) are inadmissible.
Law, 235, 61 Atl. 378.
N.
Brounﬁeld v. Denton,
After speciﬁc ruling to this effect upon
wit
question put to
ness that was on the stand, the state of the case shows that “the de
fendant thereupon stated that he desired to show facts and circum
stances in the course of the dealings between the alleged plaintiff and
whole
might be inferred that the New
defendant from which as
ark concern was the agent for Standard Oil Company of New York.”
“The court adhered to its former ruling, and refused
admit the
testimony.”
If the statement of desire by the defendant be taken as equivalent
the desire was
to an offer of proof, the“ ruling, in effect, was that,
to bind
party to the suit by declarations of persons assuming to act
was within the ruling already made.
If the defendant
as its agents,
desired to adduce testimony that did not fall within this ruling, an
offer to that eﬁect should have been made in such form that the court
might determine whether the new offer differed in principle from
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those already ruled upon. This might have been done either by putting
to a witness a speciﬁc question calling for such new testimony, or, if
the court permitted an offer to be made,

by making an oﬂ’er to prove
certain deﬁnite facts. From the brief of counsel for the defendant,
rather than from the state of the case, it is to be gathered that what
made by
the defendant wanted to prove was a series of statements
persons not authorized to bind their employer by volunteer declara
tions or narratives touching the master’s affairs.
It cannot be too
often pointed out that the mere fact that one employs others to work
for him does not make him chargeable with what they may say about
him or his affairs while in his employ. If he employs them to talk for
him, a different case may be presented.“
King v. Atlantic Cy. Ga. Co.,
~
N. ]. Law, 679, 58 Atl. 345.
Finding no legal error in the case presented upon this appeal the
judgment of the First District Court of Jersey City is aﬂirmed.

70

MOYLE

v.

CONGREGATIONAL SOC. OF SALT LAKE CITY.

(Supreme Court of Utah,

1897.

16 Utah.

69, 50 Pac.

806.)

Action for work done and materials furnished in the construction
of defendant's church. The contract was made with Barber & Co. and
The church had
later by agreement assigned to plaintiff’s assignor.
paid the full contract price, but plaintiff claimed that at the time of
the assignment of the contract the chairman of the building commit
tee, one Hollister, as agent for defendant,'agreed that the contract price
should be waived, and defendant should pay whatever it cost to do the
work. Hollister had since died. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant
appeals.

MINER,

I.“

*

*

*

The court, over the objection and exception
Mr. ]ames and Mr._Pringle, witnesses for
the plaintiff, to testify that in a conversation with Mr. Hollister some
time after the assignment of the Barber contract, and after Barber
had left town, Mr. Hollister said that he had got rid of Barber, but it
cost him $500 ‘to get him away; that witness james asked Hollister,
out of mere curiosity—as it did not affect witness’ contract with I;Iollis
ter—how he_ got rid of the contractor, and how he settled up with him;
that Hollister replied, “We bought him off for $500, and I would have
given him $1,000 to get rid of him, if I had to.” The objection to the
testimony was that it was incompetent and irrelevant, simply calling
for a recital of past events, and does not bind the defendant.
of

the defendant, permitted

v. De Villeroi, 2 Houst. 311 (1860), Sandtord v. Handy,
The conﬂicting opinions of the judges in Udell v. Ather
Jur. (N. S.) 777, 30 L. J. Exch. 337, 4
T. Rep. (N. S.) 797
(1861). are suggestive.
49 Another portion of this case is found on p. 104,
48 Accord:

Geylin

23 Wend. 260 (1840).
ton, 7 II. & N. 171. 7
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The admission of this testimony was erroneous. The transaction
did not concern the witness, and the declaration was made with refer
ence to a past transaction, and long after the act referred to, and was
no part of the res gestae. Where the act of the agent will bind the
principal, there his representations, declarations,'and
admissions re
specting the subject-matter will also bind him, if made at the same
time, and constituting part of the res gesta. “But an act done by an
agent cannot be varied, qualiﬁed, or explained by his declarations,
which amount to no more than a mere narration of past occurrences,
or by an isolated conversation held, or an isolated act done, at a later
period. The reason isithat the agent to do the act is not authorized to
narrate what he had done, or how he had done
and his declaration
no part of the res gestae.”
Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U.
99,
134.
Sup. Ct. 118, 30 L. Ed. 299; Story, Ag.
Mechem, in his work
on Agency (section 714), states the general rule to be: “The state
ments, representations, or admissions must have been made by the
agent at the time of- the transaction, and either while he was actually
engaged in the performance, or so soon after as to be in reality
part
of the transaction; or, to use the common expression, they must have
been
part of the res gestae. If, on the other hand, they were made
before the performance was underta.ken, or after
was completed, or
while the agent was not engaged
the performance, or after his au
thority had expired, they are not admissible.
In such
case they
amount to no more than a mere narrative
past transaction, and do
not bind the principal.
The reason
that, while the agent was au
thorized to act or speak at the time and within the scope of his authori
not authorized, at
ty, he
subsequent time, to narrate what he had
done, or how he had done it.”
Greenl. Ev.
113; Bank v. Clark,
139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E. 908, 36 Am. St. Rep. 705; Browning v. Hin
kle, 48 Minn. 544, 51 N. \/V. 605, 31 Am. St. Rep. 691; Polleys v. In
surance Co., 14 Me. 141.
Under this general rule,
not required that
perfect coincidence
of time between the declaration and the main facts be shown. It
sufficient
the declaration and the main facts are substantially con
temporaneous. The declaration, however, must be voluntary and spon
taneous, and so proximate in point of time as to grow out of, elucidate,
and explain the character and quality of the main fact, and must
so
as virtually to constitute but one entire trans
clearly connected with
action, and to preclude the idea of design, afterthought, or
mere nar
Mechem, Ag.
715; Railroad Co. v.
rative of
past transaction.
O’Brien, 119 U.
99,
Sup. Ct. 118, 30 L. Ed. Z99. From the gen
eral trend of the testimony,
appears that this conversation did not
occur until several days after the assignment, and the payment of the
Co., and after Barber had left the city.
$500 by the church to Barber
We are of the opinion that the court erred in admitting the testimony.
There are many exceptions taken to the admission and rejection of
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testimony in the case, but, as those already
of the case, we do not consider it necessary
For the errors referred to the
exceptions.
court is reversed and set aside, and the case
to grant, a new trial.“

HOYER

v.

(Supreme Court ot Wisconsin,

THE annarrox

(Part

3

passed upon are decisive
to refer to the remaining

judgment of the district
remanded, with directions

LUDINGTON.“
1898.

100

Wis.

441, 76 N.

W.

348.)

a

*

*
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§
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The complaint alleged that one Meyers was agent of Ludington
to sell his land; that as such agent he organized a corporation to buy
and by false representations induced the plaintiff to buy stock in
such, corporation, which was worthless, etc.
YVherefore he prayed
'
judgment against Ludington and Meyers.
CASSODAY, C. J.“
The action having come on for trial
before the judge and
witness having been upon the
jury, and
stand, the defendant Ludington objected to any evidence under the
complaint as to him, upon the grounds that the complaint did not
state
cause of action as against him.
Thereupon the court sus
tained-the objection of Ludington, and ordered the complaint as to
him to be dismissed.
From the portion of the judgment entered
thereon accordingly, dismissing the action as against Ludington, the
plaintiff brings this appeal.
no doubt of the general proposition that,
an agent
There
employed to effect the sale of lands for his principal, and he does so
by means of false representations in respect to the land conveyed,
even without the authority or knowledge of his principal, the latter
he had known
chargeable with such fraud in the same manner as
or authorized the same.
Law v. Grant, 37 \-Vis. 548; McKinnon v.
Vollmar, 75 \/Vis. 82, 43 N. VV. 800.
L. R. A. 121, 17 Am. St. Rep.
178; Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 ‘Wis. 222, 52 N. W. 88, 33 Am. St. Rep.
32.
And this
especially so where the principal accepts and enjoys
the beneﬁts of the purchase. Fintel v. Cook, 88 VVis. 487, 6O N. VV.
But, even then, “the representation which
788.
to bind the princi
pal must be made in reference to the subject-matter of his agency.
must be made while the agent
acting as such. And the making of
such
representation must be within the apparent scope of his au
Mechem, Ag.
743.
thority."
50 The concurring opinion of Zane, G. J’., is omitted.
51 Accord: Matteson v. Rice, 116 Wis. 328, 92 N. W. 1109

(1903),

in which,

the court found the representations of the agent within the scope
of his authority, tested not by the intention of the principal, but by con
nection with the property and business of the agency. See, also, Latham v.
Cash,
First Nat. Bank, 92 Ark. 315, 122 S. W. 992 (1909); Mussey v. Bucher,
511 (1849)
Olson v. G. N. Ry. Co., 81 Minn. 402, 84 N. W. 219 (1900).
52 Part of the opinion is omitted.
;
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Here the alleged false representations were not made in reference
to the sale of the land which was the subject-matter of the agency,
but wholly in reference to creating and organizing a corporation to
purchase the land.
There is no pretense that Ludington had any
thing to do with the corporation or the procuring of subscriptions to
True, it is alleged that
any of the capital stock of the corporation.
such false and fraudulent representations, and each of them, were
and while acting within
made by Meyers as the agent of Ludington,
the course and scope of his employment.
The demurrer ore tenus
only admitted the issuable facts alleged in the complaint, but did not
admit such mere conclusions of law from the facts alleged. Aron v.
City of Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 N. \/V. 354, 40 L. R. A. 733, and
cases there cited.
The representations of Meyers in respect to the
corporation, and the capital stock thereof, were not within the ap
parent scope of his authority to sell the land.
Besides, it appears
from the complaint that Meyers was only an agent of Ludington for
the purpose of selling the particular lands in question.
He was not
a general, but only a special, agent.
5‘T he scope of the authority of
a- special agent is ordinarily much more restricted than that of
a gen
eral agent.” Mechem, Ag. § 285.
“l/Vhile a general agent may bind
his principal when acting within the scope of his apparent authority,
although he exceeds his speciﬁc instructions, yet that is not the rule
in the case of aspecial agent.”
Bryant v. Bank, 95 Wis. 481. 70
N. VV. 482, and authorities there cited. We are clearly of the opinion
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
The portion' of the judgment of the circuit court appealed from is
aﬁirmed.

-_-ii

WALES
(Supreme

Court of Colorado,

v.

MOWER.

1908.

44

a

Colo.

146,

96

Pac.

971.)

Action by Maggie Mower against L. M. Vl/ales and D. S. Baldwin
to restrain the sale of real estate under a trust deed, upon the ground
that the note secured by the trust deed had been paid. _It appeared
that payment had been made to Baldwin who negotiated the loans, but
his authority to receive it was denied. He testiﬁed that he had author
'
ity. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
*
*
*
MAXWELL, J.”
Objection was made to the introduction
of Baldwin’s testimony as to his instructions from appellant in regard
to loaning and reloaning the money, the reception of the exhibits re
ferred to, and certain cross-interrogatories attached to the deposition,
all of which objections were overruled, and error is assigned upon
these rulings.
53 Part

of the opinion

is omitted.
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The argument in support of these assignments of error is based
upon the rule that “it is well settled that neither the fact of agency nor
the extent of authorify can be proved by the declarations of the alleged
agent.” In support of this contention R. E. Lee S. M. Co. v. Engle—
bach, 18 Colo. 106, 31 Pac. 771, Extension G. M. & M. Co. v. Skin
ner, 28 Colo. 237, 239, 64 Pac. 198, and Burson v. Bogart, 18 Colo.
App. 449, 72 Pac. 605, are cited. In the Englebach Case it was said:
“It is well settled that neither the fact of agency nor the extent of au
thority can be proved by the declarations of the alleged agent.“ And
it is equally as well established that, when an agent makes a contract
or does any act representing his principal, his declarations made at the
time explanatory of the act are admissible in evidence on behalf of
either party. * * * It is true that as a general rule such declara
tions ought not to be received until proof has been made of the agency.
But the order in which evidence may be introduced is almost entirely
within the discretion of the trial court.” In all of the cases cited the
testimony of the alleged agent was not introduced.
Here'the alleged
agent testiﬁed. The rule invoked does not exclude testimony of an al
leged agent as to the fact of agency.
In Fisher v. Denver Nat. Bank, 22 Colo. 373, 382, 45 Pac. 440, it is
held that the alleged agent himself may testify as to the agency.
- In Nyhart v. Pennington, 20 Mont. 158, S0 Pac. 414, ‘objection was
made to the testimony of an alleged agent on the ground here urged.
The court said: “Appellants invoke a generally correct rule of law,
but an inapplicable one. Plaintiffs were not trying to prove agency by
the, declarations of the agent, but by his sworn testimony to thefact.
This they could do. The rule is that the declarations of an agent are
not competent to establish the fact of his agency. But the declarations
of the agent are very different from his testimony to prove the fact of
his agency.”
In O’Leary v. German-American Ins. Co., 100 Iowa, 390, 69 N. W.
686, it was held that the rule that the authority of an agent cannot be
sustained by his own declarations does not render it impossible to
prove the authority of an agent by his own testimony.
In Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan. 494, Mr. _Tustice Valentine,
writing the .opinion of the court, said: “It is competent to prove a
parol agency, and its nature and scope, by the testimony of the person
who claims to be the agent.
It is competent to prove a parol authority
of any person to act for another, and generally to prove any parol au
thority of any kind, by the testimony of the person who claims to pos
But it is not competent to prove the supposed
sess such authority.
54 And evidence of a general reputation as agent, not known and acquiesced
in by the principal, cannot be put in as proof of the existence 01' the agency.
Thompson v. L:-1borlngman‘s Mercantile, etc., Co.. 60 W. Va. 42, 53 S. E,
908, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 311 (1906), ante, p. 106.
Evidence of such a reputation
is irrelevant and should be excluded.' Union Trust C0. v. McKeon, 76 Conn,
508, 57 Atl. 109 (1904).
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authority of an agent, for the purpose of binding his principal, by
proving what the supposed agent has said at some previous time. Nor
is it competent to prove a supposed authority of any kind, as against
the person from whom such authority is claimed to have been received,
by proving the previous statements of the person who, it is claimed,

had attained such authority.”
No authority has been cited contrary to the doctrine above an
nounced. The authorities cited are inapplicable to the case at bar, for
the reason that they apply to declarations made by the agent to an
other, who is introduced as a witness to testify to such declarations,
and not to the direct testimony of the agent himself.
All authorities
hold that the agent is competent to testify to the agency.“
The testi
mony of Baldwin having been properly admitted, the exhibits and an
swers to the cross-interrogatories
were admissible, as tending to cor
roborate the testimony of Baldwin, and as explanatory of the manner
in which the business was transacted by the parties.
No error was
committed by the court in admitting the evidence objected to. * * *

-i

Aﬁirmed.

GARTH
of Common Pleas,

(Court

v.

HOWARD.

1832.

8 Bing.

451, 21

E.

G.

L.

616.)

Plea, general issue.
At the trial before Tin
appeared that Howard had, without authority, pawned,
for £200., certain plate belonging to the plaintiff.
The defendant,
Fleming, was
but the only evidence to show that the
pawnbroker;
plate had ever been in his possession, was a witness, who stated that,
at the house of the plaintii¥’s attorney, he heard Fleming's shopman
was
hard case, for his master had advanced all the money
say that
on the plate at
per cent.
This evidence being objected to, was received,-subject to motion to
verdict having been given for the plaintiif, defend
this Court; and
rule nisi to show cause.
ant obtained
TINDAL, C.
The rule in this case has been obtained upon two
distinct grounds; but
unnecessary to give an opinion upon any
other than this, namely, whether the declaration of the shopman of
the defendant Fleming, that the goods were in the possession of his
master, was admissibler for
clear that, unless Fleming
to be
entitled to the verdict upon the
aﬁected by such declaration, he
it

for plate.

is

is

it
is

it
is
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Detinue
dal, C.

v. Poulter, 111 Ill. App. 330 (1903); Rice v. Croghan,
450, 184 S. W. 376 (1916).
The agent as
witness is under oath, and
subject to CYOSS-6XB,}l1l!1£lt.l0l1. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Grimmon, 28 Nev. 235,
81 Pac. 43 (1905).
But he must state facts and circumstances and not his

“Accord: Phillips
Ky.

a

169

or conclusion, as to his agency. McCormick v. Queen of Sheba Gold
Mill. Co., 23 Utah. 71, 63 Pac. 820 (1895); Blowers v. Southern Ry.
Co., 74 S. C. 221, 54 S. E. 368 (1906). ante, p. 345.
The agent’s testimony 19
oi course not conclusive. Howard v. Brnithwaite, Ves.
B. 202 (1812).
&

1

Mining

8:

opinion,
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general issue, non detinet. If the transaction out of which this suit
arises had been one in the ordinary trade or business of the defend
ant as a pawnbroker, in which trade the shopman was agent or serv
ant to the defendant, a declaration of such agent that his master had
received the goods, might probably have been evidence against the
master, as it might be held within the scope of such agent’s authority
to give an answer to such an inquiry made by any person interested
in the goods deposited with the pawnbroker.
In that case, the rule
laid down by the Master of the Rolls in the case of Fairlie v. Hast
ings, 10 Ves. 128, which may be regarded as the leading case on this
head of evidence, directly applies. But the transaction with Fleming
appears to us, not a transaction in his business as a pawnbroker, but
was a loan by him as by any other lender of money at 5 per cent.
And there is no evidence to show the agency of the shopman in
private transactions unconnected with the business of the shop.
doubted much at the time whether it could be received, and intimated
such doubt by reserving the point; and now, upon consideration with
the Court, am satisﬁed thatit is not admissible.
It is dangerous to
open the door to declarations of agents, beyond what the cases have
already done. The declaration itself is evidence against the principal,
it is madeiin his absence, when he has no op
not given upon oath:
portunity to set it aside, if incorrectly made, by any observation, or
any question put to the agent; and it is brought before the Court
and jury frequently after a long interval of time. It is liable, there
from carelessness
or misapprehension
fore, to suspicion originally,
in the original hearer; and again to further suspicion, from the faith
lessness of memory in the reporter and the facility with which he may
give an untrue account. Evidence, therefore, of such a nature, ought
always to be kept within the strictest limits to which the cases have
conﬁned it; and as that which was admitted in this case appears to us
to exceed those limits, we think there ought to be a new trial.
'
~
Rule absolute.
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SECTION 4.—FOR NOTICE TO AGENT
______
-

MERRY

(High Court of Chancery,

1661.

v.
1

ABNEY.

on. Cas. as.

22 Eng‘.

Reprint, esz.)

Chief justice Foster, the Master of the Rolls:
A. contracts with B. for sale of Lands, but sells them to C., etc.,
sans Notice of the ﬁrst Contract.
Kendal contracted with the Plaintiﬁ to sell him certain Lands in
Afterwards Abney the Father, who lived near the
Leicestershire.
Lands, in behalf of Abney the Son (a Merchant in London) pur
chaseth those Lands of Kendal, and had .a Conveyance from Kendal
to Abney the Son, and his Heirs. The Plaintiﬁ"s Bill was to be re
lieved upon his Contract with Kendal, and against the Conveyance
to Abney, and charged Notice of his Contract to both the Abneys.
Abney the Son pleads himself to be a Purchaser bona ﬁde, without
any Notice of Kendal’s Contract with the Plaintiff, and without any
Trust for his Father.
The Court declared, That Notice to the Father in this Case was
Notice to the Son, and should affect the Son, who_ was the purchas
er.“ So that Notice of a dormant Incumbrance to a Party that pur
And accordingly
chaseth for another, shall affect the very Purchaser.
was this Cause decreed, it appearing at the Hearing, that Abney the
Father had Notice of Merry’s Contract before he purchased for his
'
Son.

ii

_

FIELD

(Supreme Court of Indiana, 1904.

v.

CAMPBELL.

164

Ind.

389, 72 N.

E.

260. 108 Am. St. Rep.

301.)

Action by Campbell, as administrator of the estate of one Noblett,
to recover on a note, and to foreclose a mortgage which defendant
and her husband executed to secure said note.
The note was given
to raise money to pay for the husband a deﬁcit in his accounts as
The evidence showed that, if Noblett
treasurer. of Orange county.
did not know this purpose, his agent Hicks must have known it.
The Indiana statute made any contract of suretyship by a married
woman void. Iudgment for plaintiff.
GILLETT, I.“ * * * 4. In determining the extent that Noblett
had notice of what was to be done with the money received by appel
56Notice to the agent is good notice to the party.
Vern. 574, 2 Freem. 290, 23 Eng. Reprint, 973 (1706).
57 Part of the opinlon is omitted.
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lant, it is important to consider what notice he himself had, and the
notice, if not the actual knowledge, which his agent, Hicks, had, and
the notice based on the record.
Notwithstanding
any, conclusions
indulged in by Hicks in his testimony, it is plain that he was an agent
of Noblett, not only to appraise the land, but to pass upon the title
and conclude the.loan.
All this was within the scope of his agency,
and to the extent that he had notice or knowledge must notice or
It is laid down in Story on
knowledge be imputed to his principal.
Agency, § 140, that “notice of facts to an agent is constructive notice
thereof to the principal himself, where it arises from, or is at the time
connected with, the subject-matter of his agency; for, upon general
principles of public policy, it is presumed that the agent has com
municated such facts to the principal; and, if he has not, still, the
principal having intrusted the agent with the particular business, the
other party has a right to deem his acts and knowledge obligatory
It was said by Lord Broughman in Kennedy v.
upon the principal.”
Green, 3 Myl. & K. 699:
“The doctrine of constructive notice de
First, that certain things existing in
pends upon two considerations:
the relation or conduct of the parties as in the case between them
so strong of actual knowledge that the law
beget a presumption
holds the knowledge to exist because it is highly improbable that it
should not; and, next, that the policy and safety of the public for
bid a person to deny knowledge while he is dealing so as to keep
himself ignorant, or so that he may keep himself ignorant, and yet
all the while let his agent know, and himself perhaps proﬁt by that
knowledge. ' In such a case it would be most iniquitous and most dan
gerous, and give shelter and encouragement to all kinds of fraud, were
the law not to consider the knowledge of one common to both, wheth
er it be so in fact- or not.” A writer on the law of agency states the
doctrine thus:
“The principal is chargeable with notice of all the ma
terial facts which come to the knowledge of his agent in the transac
tions in which the agent is acting for the principal.
If this were not
from possible equities
so, a purchaser would always ‘free himself
arising from the acquisition of knowledge of adverse rights by pur
It is against the policy of the law to place
chasing through an agent.
one who deals through an agent in a better position than one who deals
in person.”
Huffcutt on Agency, § 141.
“My solicitor,” as was
said in an English case, “is my alter ego; he is myself.
Ijstand in
precisely the position he does in the transaction, and therefore his
and it would be a monstrous injustice
knowledge is my knowledge;
that I could take advantage of what he knows without the disadvan
tage." Boursot v. Savage, L. R. 2 Eq. 134.
5. The fact that the mortgage to the bondsmen of the husband was
of record lifts the information which Nohlett admits that he had con
cerning it above the plane of mere rumor, if his answer upon the
stand is to be so construed. “Any instrument affecting the title which
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reversed and
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Iudgment
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is properly recorded is absolute notice to every one subsequently deal
ing with the title, irrespective of whether such person has examined
the records, or even had an opportunity to make an examination.”
\Vade on Notice (2d Ed.) § 97. See, also, Webb _v. John Hancock,
etc., Co., 162 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 1006, 66 L. R. A. 632; McPherson v.
Rollins, 107 N. Y. 316, 14 N. E. 411, 1 Am. St. Rep. 826.
6. Taken as a whole,'the authorities
warrant the assertion that
the notice which the law imputes from notice to an agent, or from
the fact that an instrument in the chain of title is properly of record,
is the equivalent of actual notice.
We are not unmindful that a false
representation might sometimes lead a person who contemplated loan
ing money on real estate,security to omit to examine the record, but
we fail to perceive how the eﬁect of such a representation would be to
prevent an agent from informing his principal of facts which it was
nevertheless the agent’s duty to communicate, or why that should fur
nish any reason for not conclusively presuming, as in other cases, that
the duty of the agent to communicate facts
importance to his prin
And the indulgence of this presumption in the
cipal was discharged.
case before us, thereby infecting Noblett with the notice of Hicks, makes
just, as we think, to hold that the representation of appellant was not
character as to relieve Noblett of the imputation of record
of such
new trial ordered.

58 Accord:
Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391 (1873); Hart v. Sandy. 39 W.
Pringle v. Modern Woodmen of America, 76 Neb.
Va. 644, 20 S. E. 665 (1894).
384, 107 N. W. 756, 113 N. W. 231 (1906).
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YOUNG-McSHEA AMUSEMENT CO.“
of New Jersey, 1906.
82, 118 Am. St. Rep. 747.)

(Court of Errors and Appeals
»

or rm: rmnnxon

70 N.

J.

Eq. 677, 67 Atl.

The Amusement Company owned a building, fronting on the board
walk of Atlantic City, known as Young’s Hotel.
The company is a
corporation with 1,500 shares of stock, of which John L. Young owned
1,440.
He was treasurer of the company, and his son-in-law, Shack
elford, was the secretary. There were two other directors.
Young
controlled the affairs of the company, and had unwritten authority to
lease its property.
Shackelford was its manager.
Clement leased
from Young a space at the entrance of the hotel for a soft drink stand.
Shackelford made out and signed for Young a lease of the same for
ten years, and Clement ﬁtted up the stand at a cost of $6,000.
Shack
elford collected the rent and Young reported to the company. Two
years later, the company brought ejectment, and plaintiffs ﬁled this
bill to enjoin the prosecution of the suit.
Decree for perpetual in
junction, and the company appeals.
DIxoN, J.‘° [After holding that under the New Jersey statute of
frauds such a lease made by~ an agent not having written authority
was in effect a lease at will, and considering the effect of the knowl
edge by Young and Shackelford that complainant was paying the rent
* * * Finally, it is urged that
and had made the improvementsz]
the knowledge of Young and Shackelford should be imputed to the
company. _
Assuming that Young, in executing the lease; was attempting or ap
pearing to act for the company, notwithstanding the form of the in
strument, then, if his knowledge that he was overstepping the bounds
of his authority is to be deemed notice thereof to his principal, no ef
fective limitation can be imposed upon the power of an agent.
By the
very act of transgressing the limits of his authority, the agent would
generally for all practical purposes enlarge them to the full extent of
Nothing short of immediate personal investigation
his transgression.
on the part of the principal would, in most instances, protect his rights.
59 Accord:
Topliﬂ v. Shadwell, 68 Kan. 317, 74 Pac. 1120 (1904); Renton.
Holmes & Co. v. Monnier, 77 Cal. 449, 19 Pac. 820 (1888). “The agent represents
the principal only in the matters pertaining to his agency." Stewart v. Sonne
horn, 49 Ala. 178 (1873).
The notice must be as to a matter which it is the‘
Pennoyer v. Willis, 26 01-, 1,
agent's duty tn communicate to his principal.
36 Pac. 503. 46 Am. St. Rep. 594 (1894); Warren v. Hayes, 74 N. H. 355, 68
Interna
Atl. 193 (1907). This applies with special force to a corporation.
tional Building & Loan Ass‘n v. Watson, 158 Ind. 508. 64 N. E. 23 (1902);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Belcher, 88 TeX. 549, 32 S. W. 518 (1895): Bierce
By the same rule. and within the
v. Red Bluff Hotel Co., 31 Cal. 160 (1866).
same limits, the previously acquired knowledge of the agent is available to
the principal for his beneﬁt. Haines v. Starkey, 82 Minn. 230, 84 N. W. 910
(1901).
00 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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An examination of the cases already cited will show that such
doc
trine has no place in either legal or equitable jurisprudence.
The knowledge of Shackelford cannot be imputed to the company,
because he was never authorized to act as its agent in any matter to
which that knowledge was pertinent.
His testimony
explicit and
uncontradicted that in signing the lease and collecting the rent he acted
solely on behalf of Young, and had no authority’ whatever from the
company. Although he was secretary of the company during the run
director in November, 1903, yet in
ning of the lease, and became
neither capacity did any duty rest upon him concerning the complain
ants’ tenancy. \Vhether the view stated in Sooy v. State, 41 N.
Law, 394, or that stated in \/Villard v. Denise, SO N.
Eq. 482, 26 Atl.
29, 35 Am. St. Rep. 788, be adopted, knowledge possessed by one per
'son cannot be ascribed to another, unless there exists between them a
relation of agency in the exercise of which the knowledge would be
useful.
_
We ﬁnd no ground on which, consistently with established rules, the
decree below can be supported, and
must be reversed, and the bill
dismissed. Decree reversed and bill dismissed.
__.___.

DAY
(Supreme

v.

VVAMSLEY.

Court of Jﬁdicature of Indiana,

1870.

33

Ind.

145.)

It

*

It

01

Part of the opinion ls omitted.
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*
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a

a

a

Complaint by appellee for goods sold and delivered to appellant.
Defense that the goods were sold to defendant’s wife, from whom he
was separated. To show that plain_tiﬁ' had notice of this,
deposition
conversation in which deponent told Atki
was oﬁered, setting forth
son, later
clerk of plaintitf, that Day and wife were separated.
RAY, _I.°1
The deposition discloses that Atkison, at the
date of the purchase of the goods by appe1lant’s wife, was salesman in
appellee’s store and assisted in the sale of part of the goods for the
The conversation spoken of by
value of which the suit was brought.
does
the witness occurred
few months before the date of the sale.
notappear that Atkison was in the employ of the appellee at the date
of the conversation, and therefore notice to him by such conversation
would not be, according to judge Story’s view, constructive notice to
14-O.
There are authori
his subsequent employer. Story on Agency,
408,
Story, Eq. Iurisp.
ties, however, which controvert this rule.
But the conversation was not of such a nature as would nat
note
to his principal,
he were
urally require the agent to communicate
was the mere idle talk of
of
the
in
the
appellee.
employ
actually
parties having no interest in the subject discussed, and not likely to
The notice to the
make any impression on the mind of the agent.

0
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-I OiKO

AND

cossuoonscns or run

(Part 3

nnLA'r1o1~i

agent, to operate as constructive notice to the principal, must be such
reasonably charge the agent, on failure to repeat, with breach
of faith and duty to his employer,“ and therefore the law will, under
such circumstances only, presume he has communicated his knowledge
to his principal.
Story on Agency, § 140,’ and authorities cited. The
rule, indeed,
that the special circumstances of each case must con
trol the admission or rejection of the evidence.
Story, Eq. ]urisp.,
supra.
The court committed no error in excluding the evidence. Judgment
aﬂirmed, with 10 per cent. damages and costs.
is,

as would

___.___
v.

(High Court of Chancery,

EARL OF SCARBOROUGH.
1746.

3

WORSLEY

Atk.

26 Eng.

392,

Reprint,

1025.)

is

a

is

a

is

:

it

if

it

is

It

of

it
is

is

it

if

*

'* Thirdly, No case has gone so
HARDWICKE, Ld. Ch.“ *
where money
would be very inconvenient,
secured
far, and
question depending in this court upon
upon an estate, and there
the right of or about that money, but no question relating to the es
secured, but
collateral matter, that a
wholly
tate, upon which
the estate pending that suit should be affected with notice
purchase-r
by such implication as the law creates by the pendency of a suit.
settled, that notice to an agent or counsel who was
Fourthly,
employed in the thing by another person, 01' in another business, and
no notice to his client, who employs him afterwards
at another time,
was so, for the man of most
and
would be very mischievous
practice and greatest eminence would then be the most dangerous to
employ.“

a

1

"2 As to vague rumor and suspicion
see Stanley v. Schwalby,
162 U. S.
255, 276, 16 Sup. Ct. 754. 4_0 L. Ed. 960 (1896): Shater v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 53
Wis. 361, 10 N.'W. 381 (1881); Satterﬂeld v. Malone (C. C.) 35 Fed. 445,
L.
R. A. 35 (1888). As to information derived through interested parties. and
from
reliable source, Mulliken v. Graham, 72 Pa. 484 (1871). As to notice in
the newspapers, and mere notoriety, Page v. Brast, 18 Ill. 37 (1856).
As tn
notice acquired incidentally, Stennett v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 68 Iowa, 674, 28
N. W. 12 (1886).
68 Part of the opinion is omitted.

3

3

64 Ld. Ch. Hardwicke reached the same conclusion in Warrick v. Warrick,
291. 26 Eng. Rep. 970 (1745), and in the leading case of Le Neve v_ Le
Atk. 646. 26 Eng. Rep. 1172 (1748).
Neve.

Atk.

it

is

&

Many cases in the United‘States have followed this rule. See Pepper
Co. v. George, 51 Ala. 190 (1874), in which the court regards the rule as for
to truth. Houseman
the convenience of lawyers rather than in conformity
v. Girard Mutual Ass‘n. 81 Pa. 256 (1876), in which Justice Sharswood says
the rule is not grounded on the fallibility of the memory of man. but on the
technical ground “that it is only during the agency that the agent represents
and stands in the shoes oi! the principal, that notice to him
then notice to
his principal. Notice to him twenty-four hours before the relation commenced
twenty-four
is no more notice than notice
hours after
had ceased to he.
Wright v. Bruschke, 62 Ill. App. 358 (1896). but cf. Snyder v. Partridge, 138
Ill. 173, 29 N. E. 851, 32 Am. St. Rep. 130 (1891).
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THE DISTILLED SPIRITS.
(Supreme Court or the United States, 1870.

11

Wall.

753

356, 20

L. Ed.

167.)

The United States ﬁled an information for the forfeiture of 278
barrels of distilled spirits for fraudulently
removing them from a
It was found
bonded warehouse without paying the revenue tax.
that Harrington,-who claimed 124 barrels, had bought through one
Boyden as his agent. Boyden knew of the fraud, but did not par
ticipate in it. Harrington knew nothing of it. The jury found against
50 barrels claimed by Harrington and all claimed by Boyden.
* * * The substance of the third instruction
BRADLEY,
prayed for was, that if the spirits were removed from the warehouse
according to the forms of law, and the claimants bought them with
The
out knowledge of the fraud, they were not liable to forfeiture.
in
court charged
accordance with this prayer with this qualiﬁcation,
that if Boyden bought the spirits as agent for hlarrington, and was
cognizant of the fraud. Harrington would be bound by his knowledge.
The claimants insist that this is not law.
The question how far a purchaser is affected with notice of prior
liens, trusts, or frauds. by the knowledge of his agent who effects
the purchase, is one that has been much mooted in England and this
That he is bound and affected by such knowledge or no
country.
tice as his agent obtains in negotiating the particular transaction, is
But Lord Hardwicke thought that the rule
everywhere conceded.
could not be extended so far as to affect the principal by knowledge
of the agent acquired previously in a different transaction.
VVarrick
v. Warrick, 3 Atkyns, 291.
Supposing it to be clear, that the agent
still retained the knowledge so formerly acquired. it was certainly
Lord Eldon did not ap
making a very nice and thin distinction.
prove of it. In Mountford v. Scott, 1 Turner & Russell, 274," he says:
“It may fall to be considered whether one transaction might not fol
low so close upon the other as to render it impossible to give a man
credit for having forgotten it.
should be unwilling to go so far
as to say. that if an attorney has notice of a transaction in the morn
ing, he shall be held in a court of equity to have forgotten it in the
evening: it must in all cases depend upon the circumstances.”
The
distinction taken by Lord Hardwicke has since been entirely overruled
Norwood,
by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in the case of Dresser
v.

J.“

I

85 The statement" 0! facts and part of the opinion are omitted.
66 Approved in Nixon v. Hamilton, 2 Dr. & W. 364, 392 (1838), in which is
an interesting review of the English cases, and in Hargreaves v. Rothwell. 1
See, also, Dresser v. Norwood. 17 C. B, (N. S.) 466, 10
Keen. Ch. 154 (1836).
Jur. (N. S.) 851. 34 L.
G. P. 48, 1'1 L. '1‘. Rep. (N. S.) 111, 12 W. B. 1030, 112
E. C. L. 466 (1864).
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Bench, N. S. 466.
So that in England the doctrine now
to be established, that if the agent, at the time of effecting a
purchase, has knowledge of any prior lien, trust, or fraud, affecting
the property, no matter when he acquired such knowledge, his prin
cipal is affected thereby. If he acquire the knowledge when he effects
the purchase, no question can arise as to his having it at that time; if
he acquired it previous to the purchase, the presumption that he still
retainsit, and has it present to histmind, will depend on the lapse of
time and other circumstances.
Knowledge communicated to the prin
cipal himself he is bound to recollect, but he is not bound by knowledge
communicated to his agent, unless it is present to the agent’s mind at
the time of effecting the purchase. Clear and satisfactory proof that
it was so present seems to be the only restriction required by the Eng
lish rule as now understood.
With the qualiﬁcation that the agent is
at liberty to communicate his knowledge to his principal, it appears to
us to be a sound view of the subject.
The general rule that a principal
is bound by the knowledge of his agent is based onpthe principle of law,
that it is the agent’s duty to communicate to his principal the knowledge
which he has respecting the subject-matter of negotiation, and the pre
sumption that he will perform that duty. When it is not the agent’s
duty to communicate such knowledge, when it would be unlawful for
him to do so, as, for example, when it has been acquired conﬁdential
ly as attorney for a former client in a prior transaction, the reason
of the rule ceases, and in such a case an agent would not be expected
to do that which would involve the betrayal of professional conﬁdence,
and his principal ought not to be_ bound by his agent’s secret and con
ﬁdential information.
This often happened in the case of large es
tates in England, where men of great professional eminence were fre
They thus became possessed, in a conﬁdential
quently consulted.
manner, of secret trusts or other defects of title, which they could not
honorably, if they could legally, communicate to subsequent clients.
This diﬂiculty presented itself to Lord Hardwicke’s mind, and un
doubtedly lay at the bottom of the distinction which he established.
Had he conﬁned it to such cases, it would have been entirely unex
ceptionable.
The general tendency of decisions in this country has been to adopt
the distinction of Lord Hardwicke, but it has several times been held,
in consonance with Lord Eldon’s suggestion, that if the agent acquired
his information so recently as to make it incredible that he should have
his principal will be bound.
This
forgotten
really an abandon
ment of the principle on which the distinction
founded.
Story on
140; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145; Patten v. Insur
Agency,
ance Co., 4O N. H. 375; Hart v. Farmers’
Mechanics’ Bank, 33 Vt.
The case of Hart v. Farmers’
Mechanics’ Bank, 33 Vt. 252,
252.
adopts the rule established by the case of Dresser v. Norwood.
Other
17 Common

&

&

§
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ransom:

of Bank of United States v. Davis, 2 Hill, 452, New York
Central Insurance Co. v. National Protection Co., 20 Barb. 4-68, adhere
to the more rigid view.
[See cases collected in note to American edi
tion of 17 Common Bench, N. S., p. 482, and Mr. justice Cliiford’s
opinion in the Circuit Court in the present case.]
On the whole, however, we think that the rule as finally settled by
the English courts, with the qualiﬁcation above mentioned, is the true
of the reasons on
one, and is deduced from the best consideration
which it is founded.
Applying it to the case in hand, we think that
the charge was substantially correét.
The fair construction of the
that
the jury believed that Boyden, the agent, was cog
charge
nizant of the fraud at the time of the purchase, Harrington, the prin
The precise words were “that
cipal, was bound, by this knowledge.“
Boyden bought the spirits as agent for Harrington, and Boyden
was cognizant of the fraud, Harrington would be bound by his knowl
edge.” The plain and natural sense of these words, and that in which
the jury would understand them, we think,
that they refer to Boy
Thus con
den’s knowledge at the time of making the purchase.
strictly in accordance with the law as above ex
strued the charge
There was no pretence that Boyden acquired his knowledge
plained.
in
ﬁduciary character. * * * judgment affirmed.
_
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is

if
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cases, as that

1

1

a

4

n

7

2

67 Accord: Constant v. Univ. of Rochester, 111 N. Y. 601. 19 N. E. 631.
leading case; Snyder v. Partridge.
Am. St. Rep. 769 (1889).
L. R. A. 734,
138 Ill. 173. 29 N. E. 851._ 32 Am. St. Rep. 130 (1891); Schwind v. Boyce, 91
Co. v. Sheppard, 78
Md. 510. 51 Atl. 45 (1902).
See Equitable Securities
Miss. 217, 28 South. S42 (1900), in which the incident was six years old; Sten
nett v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co.. 68 Iowa, 674, 28 N. W. 12 (1886).
The tendency is to keep this extension of the rule within narrow limits.
Witterbrock v. Parker, 102 Cal. 93, 36 Pac. 374. 24 L. R. A. 197. 41 Am. St.
Rep. 172 (1894); Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 49 N. W. 129, 24 Am. St.
Rep. 225 (1891).
The law does not presume that what is ever known will
Kauffman v. Robey. 60 Tex. 308, 48 Am.
always be present in the memory.
Rep. 264 (1883); Florence v. De Beaumont, 101 Wash. 356, 172 Pac. 340,
A.
L. R. 1565 (1918).
corporation,
As to the knowledge of directors of
see First Nat. Bank
v. Christopher, 40 N. J. Law, 435, 29 Am. Rep. 262 (1878).
While engaged in
the business of the corporation, see City Bank v. Phillips, 22 M0. 85, 64 Am.
N, E,
Dec. 254 (1855); Innerarity v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 139 Mass, 332,
282, 52 Am. Rep. 710 (1885); First Nat. Bank v. Blake (C. C.) 60 .Fed. 78
(1894); Fairﬁeld Savings Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep. 319 (1881).
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PURSLEY

(Supreme Court of Georgia,

v.

(Part 3

STAHLEY.

1905.

122 Ga. 362,

50 S.

E.

139.)

Mrs. Stahley sued Mrs. Pursley on certain notes which she had
signed at the request of Green 8: Preston, attorneys of plaintiff. She
owed them $50, and supposed she was signing them as security for that
debt. She could read, but was ignorant of business matters and did
not know what she was signing. Judgment on the notes.
LAMAR, J.“
[After stating the factsr] The principal is bound by
notice to his agent for the same reason and to the same extent that he
In both cases it must be limited to
is bound by the act of his agent.
Notice as to such matters binds
matters within the scope of the agency.
the principal, according to some authorities, on the theory that the agent
and principal are to be regarded as one; according to others, on the
theory that the agent may and should act for his principal on such in
formation;
and, according to others, because there is a presumption
that such notice would be communicated. See Morris v. Georgia Loan
Co., 109 Ga. 24, 34 S. E. 378, 46 L. R. A. 506; Civ.’Code 1895, §§
3027, 3028.
But when the agent departs from the scope of the agency,
and begins to act for himself, and not for the principal; when his
private interest is allowed to outweigh his duty as a representative;
when to communicate the information would prevent the accomplish
ment of his fraudulent scheme—he becomes an opposite party, not an
The reason for the _rule then ceases. Where, therefore, the
agent.
agent, who is an intermediary, is guilty of an independent fraud for
his own beneﬁt, the law does not impute to the principal notice of such
fraud.
Instead of being communicated, it would be purposely and
fraudulently concealed. Instead of the lender being bound by construc
tive notice, the borrower must be bound by her actual signature to the
note for $500.
2.~ Both parties may be innocent.
T_he defendant, however, put it
in the power of a third person to do the wrong, and she must bear
the loss. She was endeavoring to arrange to borrow money to pay her
own debt.
She allowed the creditor to prepare the paper. He repre
sented the borrower as much as he did the lender. Notice of the fraud
could have been as logically imputed to one as to the other. _ In law,
he was the agent of neither, but drew the note for the excessive amount
for his own personal advantage, and in the commission of an independ
ent fraud.” Merchants’ Bank v. Demere, 92 Ga. 739, 19 S. E. 38;
88 The statement of facts is abridged.
69 Accord: Frenkel v. Hudson, 82 Ala. 158, 2 South. 758, 60 Am.
(1886), in which the rule was applied to knowledge by a corporation

Rep. 736
of facts
known by the president who was acting in his own interest.
Com. Bank v.
Burgwyn, 110 N. C. 267, 14 S. E. 623, 17 L. R. A. 326 (I892):
lnnerarity v.
Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282, 52 Am. Rep. 710 (1885),
a leading case; Gunster v. Scranton Illuminating Heat & Power Co., 181 Pa.

\
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Gunster v. Scranton Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. S50, S9 Am. St. Rep. 650;
Civ. Code 1895, §§ 3028, 3940. On the facts, the case is clear. The
defendant could read. There was no emergency. She signed a deed
Years afterwards she signed six additional notes
and twelve notes.
relating to the same debt, and at a time when it was not alleged that the
agent was present.
The judgment must be aﬁirmed?

'

All

the Justices

concurring.

37 Atl. 550, 59 Am. St. Rep. 650 (1897), containing a valuable review of
the cases, and criticising First Nat. Bank v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 93 (1869).
When the agent abandons the object 01; his agency, and acts for himself,
see Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. 355, 36 L. R. A. 658 (1896),
reversing 77 Hun, 49, 28 N. Y. Supp. 2-12 (189-1), and followed in Biencn
tok v. Ammidown, 155 N. Y. 47, 49 N. E. 321 (1898); Allen v. S0. Boston R.
Co., 150 Mass. 200, 22 N. E. 917, 5 L. R. A. 716, 15 Am. St. Rep. 185 (1889);
Knobelock v. Germania Sav. Bank, 50 S. C. 259, 27 S. E. 962 (1896); De Kay
v. Hackensack Water Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 158 (1884). followed in Camden Safe De
posit & Trust Co. v. Lord, 67 N. J. Eq. 489, 58 Atl. 607 (1904); Bank of Over
ton v. Thompson, 118 Fed. 798, 56 C. C. A. 554 (1902).
As to cases in which
the agent acquired his knowledge in confidential
relations. see Hummel v.
Bank of Monroe, 75 Iowa, 689, 37 N. W. 954 (1888); Hickman v. Green, 123
Mo. 165, 22 S. W. 455, 27 S. W. 440, 29 L. R. A. 39 (1894); Kennedy v.
Green, 3 My. & K. 699, 10 Eng. Ch. 699, 40 Eng. Rep. 266 (183-1); as to cases
in which he was really agent of the opposite party, Etna Indemnity Co. v.
Schroeder, 12 N. D. 110, 95 N. W. 436 (1903); as to cases in which the per
son claiming the beneﬁt of the notice colludes with the agent to_defraud the
principal, Cowan v. Curran, 216 Ill. 598, 617, 75 N. E. 322 (1905).
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SECTION 1.—ON THE CONTRACT MADE BY THE AGENT
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FORD
(Supreme Court of the United

v.

WILLIAMS.

States, 1858.

21

How.

i

287,

16

L. Ed.

36.)

it
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a

\
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is is
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Ford sued NVilliams on a written contract by which the latter agreed
to receive from Bell 2,000 barrels of flour at $9 per barrel.
Mr. Justice GRIER. The single question presented for our decision
writ
in this case
whether the principal can maintain an action on
ten contract made by his agent in his own name, without disclosing
the name of the principal.
contract, under the statute of
not necessary to the validity of
frauds, that the writing disclose the principalf In the brief memoranda
of these contracts usually made by brokers and factors,
seldom
done.
If party informed that the person with whom he dealing
merely the agent for another, and prefers to deal with the agent per
sonally on his own credit, he will not be allowed afterwards to charge
the principal; but when he deals with the agent, without any disclosure
of
fact of his agency, he may elect to treat the after—discovered
the
principal as the person with whom he contracted.
the contract of the principal, and he
hecontract of the agent
may sue or be sued thereon, though not named therein; and notwith
standing the rule of law that an agreement reduced to writing may not
well settled that the principal
be contradicted or varied by parol,
may show that the agent who made the contract in his own name was
acting for him. This proof does not contradict the writing;
only
But the agent, who binds himself, will not
explains the transaction.
be allowed to contradict the writing
proving that he was contract
ing only as agent, while the same evidence will be admitted to charge
the principal.
“Such evidence (says Baron Parke does not deny that
the contract binds those whom on its face
purports to bind; but
shows that
also binds another,
reason that the act of the agent
the act of the principal.”
Meeson and
(See Higgins v. Senior,
W ilsby, 843).
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BEEBEE
(Supreme

'v.

The array of cases and treatises cited by the plaintii¥’s counsel shows
conclusively that this question is settled, not only by the courts of
England and many of the States, but by this court. See New ]ersey
Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 381, l2 L. Ed. 465.
"
I
et cas. ib. cit.)1
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and a venire
i .
de novo awarded.

ROBERT.

Court of Judicature of New York,
27

1834.

12

Wend.

413,

Am. Dec. 132.)

is

a

Assumpsit forlbreach of warranty in the sale of cotton by sample.
The cotton was bought by \Voolley,
broker, in his own name on the
order of plaintiff.
SUTHERLAND, J.’ The suit was properly brought in the name of the
present plaintiﬁs.
Woolley acted as their factor or agent merely, in
the purchase of the cotton;
he had no interest in the transaction
not responsible to the plaintiffs for the
beyond his commissions; he
defect in the quality of the cotton; he has suffered no injury, and no
action could be sustained in his name against the defendant for the
breach of the implied warranty—there
was no express contract or
agreement with him. If Woolley, the factor, had failed to pay for the
have recovered its value from the plaintiffs.
broker or other agent, and he does not
disclose his principal at the time, the principal, when discovered,
liable on the contracts which his agent has made for him.
Livermore
on Agency, 200. Waring v. Faverick,
Campb. 85; Kymer v. Suwer
Taunt. 576, n. a.; Pentz v. Stanton, IO Vi/end. 271,
cropp, Id. 109;
25 Am. Dec. 558.
disclosed at the time of the purchase,
‘Where the principal
then
becomes
question of fact. to be determined from all the circum
stances in the case, whether the vendor relied exclusively upon the
If he did, he cannot afterwards resort to
credit of the agent or not.
201.
15 East, 62.
ZOO,
Taunt. 574.
If the
Liver.
the principal.
plaintiffs might have been made responsible to the defendant for the
would seem to follow that there
purchase money upon this contract,
suﬁiicient privity of contract between them, to enable the plaintiiis
to maintain this action against him for the alleged violation of his
part of the agreement. The general rule is, that the action should be
could

is

it

2

4

a

it

is

4

1

2

is

a

cotton, Robert

When goods are bought by

v. Wade, 109 Ala. 95, 10 South. 500, 55 Am. St. Rep. 915
holding that the burden of proof to show the agency lies on the prin
cipal in such cases; Kingsley v. Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23, 42 Atl. 249, 69 Am. St.
valuable review of the cases, especially as to
Rep. 486 (1898), containing
contracts within the Statute of Frauds.
Part of the opinion is omitted.

1Accord: Powell

B

a

(1895),

I
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brought in the name of the party whose legal interest has been affected,
Ham
1 Chitty’s Pl. 1.
against the party who committed the injury.’
Pull.
&
3
Bos.
1
Pull.
n.
c.
101,
Action,
3.
Bos.
&
mond on Parties to
Gunn v. Cantine, 10
149, and note.
Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R.,330.
Johns. 387. Yates v. Foote, 12 ]ohns. 1. In,Spencer v. Field, 10
Wend. 87, and Sailly v. Cleveland & Hutton, 10 Wend. 156, the ques
tion as to the proper parties to an action was discussed at length, and
to.
Those cases clearly
most of the authorities were there referred
show that this action is properly brought in the names of the present
* * *
plaintiffs.

mi.

New trial denied.
I

HUMPHREY
(Court of Queen’s Bench at Nisi Prius,

v.

LUCAS.

1845.

2 Car. &

K.

152. 61 ‘E. C.

L.

152.)

of a contract by the defendant,
Assumpsit for the non-fulﬁllment
and
to transfer to the plaintiff certain shares in “The Birmingham
Gloucester Railway Company.”
Plea, non assumpsit.
g
The contract was made on the Stock Exchange of Liverpool, by two
The plaintiff’s broker did
brokers who were members of that body.
not disclose the name of his principal at .the time the contract was
entered into. The plaintiff was not a member of the Liverpool Stock
Exchange, but he was cognizant of the rules thereof.
Watson, for the defendant, tendered these rules in evidence, in
order to shew that they controlled the contract; and he contended, that,
as, by the rules of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, the contract in ques
tion was a contract between the two brokers only, the broker not hav
ing disclosed his principal, the latter was not entitled to sue upon such
contract.
CRESSWELL,

4

Co.,v. Chino Tan Cueco,
Russell on Factors, 245,

36

P.

246.

I.

I

Salmon‘
Paciﬁc Commercial
See the authorities collected,
&

3

a

is,

]. They are not admissible as evidence for any such
purpose. I take the law to be clear, that an agent duly authorized may
make a contract in his own name, and that the principal may afterwards
In the present case, the plea is the general issue; and
sue upon it.‘
whether the plaintiff made
the only question on this record therefore
think he did. The rules of the
contract with the defendant or not.
Liverpool Stock Exchange cannot alter the general law of the land.
Verdict for the plaintiff.
556 (1917).
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McGEHEE.

Court of Georgia,

1860.

30

Ga.

158.)

Action for damages for breach of warranty of a horse made to
one Lee, plaintii¥’s agent.
STEPHENS, J. The only reason assigned for the rejection of this
warranty is that itiis made to the agent, the principal not being known
in the transaction.
But the authorities are express that the principal
may claim all his rights, though not at ﬁrst known, just as if he had
been known, with the single limitation that the other party shall not
lose any right which he would have against the agent if the agent were
principal as he had ﬁrst been supposed to be. See Story on Agency, §
418. The reason of the doctrine is, that it is but just that every man
should have what really, though secretly, belongs to him, so far as he
can obtain it without injuring another by appearing in his true char
acter of owner. We think the action is maintainable in the name of the
before unknown principal, and that the evidence ought to have been
admitted.‘
'
Judgment reversed.

WINCHESTER
(Supreme

Judicial

v.

HOWARD.

Court of Massachusetts,
93

Am. Dec. 93.)

1867.

97 Mass.

303,

CHAPMAN, J.‘ The court are of opinion that it should have been
left to the jury in this case to determine whether the minds- of the

and if so, what the contract was.
is true that an agent may sell the property of his principal with
out disclosing the fact that he acts as an agent, or that the property
is not his own; and the principal may maintain an action in his own
name to recover the price. If the purchaser says nothing on the sub
ject, he is liable to the unknown principal.
Huntington v. Knox, 7
Cush. 371. But on the other hand, every man has a right to elect what
parties he will deal with. As was remarked by Lord Denman in Humble
v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 311, “You have a right to the beneﬁt you contem
plate from the character, credit and substance of the person with whom
you contract.” There may be good reasons why one should be unwilling
to buy a pair of oxen that had been owned or used or were claimed by
parties" really met upon any contract;

It

The statement of facts is omitted.
6The undisclosed principal may be a stranger, both to the promise and
the consideration.
Rea v. Barker (C. C.) 135 Fed. 890 (1904).
He must, how
ever, prove tliat he is the real principal. Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & Aid. 389, 27
E. C. L. 97 (1833).
5

I
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a particular person, or why he should be unwilling to have any deal
ings with that person; and as a man’s right to refuse to enter into a
contract is absolute, he is not obliged to submit the validity of his rea
sons to a couht or jury.‘
In this case it appears that Smith, the plaintiffs’ agent, told the de
fendant that he had a pair of oxen for sale, (referring to the oxen in
question,) and that another ‘pair belonging to one Blanchard were in
his possession, which pair he was authorized to sell. A jury might prop
erly ﬁnd that this amounted to a representation that the oxen in ques
tion were his own., The defendant then made inquiries; in answer to
which Smith aﬁirmed that the oxen had never been hurt ; that the plain
tiffs had no mortgage upon them, and that there was no claim upon
them except the claim which Smith had. A jury might properly ﬁnd
that this was, in substance, a representation that the title to the oxen
was exclusively in Smith; and that, as the defendant was unwilling to
deal with the plaintiffs, he made proper inquiries on the subject, and
was led by Smith to believe he was not dealing with the plaintiffs.
The defendant took the cattle home with an agreement that he might
return them “if he did not ﬁnd things as Smith had told him.”
In
the course of the eveninghe was informed that the cattle belonged to
the plaintiffs, and being unwilling to buy oxen of them, he returned
them to Smith the next morning before any‘ bill of sale had been made.
The jury would be authorized to ﬁnd that he returned them within the
terms of the condition upon which he took them, because he did not ﬁnd
things as Smith had told him. It is thus apparent that upon the whole
evidence they would be justiﬁed in ﬁnding a verdict for the defendant.
Exceptions sustained.
\

7Arkansas Valley Smelting C0. v. Belden Co., 127 U. S. 379, 8 Sup. Cf.
1308, 32 L. Ed. 246 (1888), citing Humble v. Hunter. 12 Q. B. 310, 317; Win
chester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 305, 93 Am. Dec. 93; Ice C0. v. Potter, 123
Mass. 28, 25 Am. Rep. 9; King v. Batterson, 13 R. I. 117, 120, 43 Am. Rep.
13; Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. 106. \By statute the anomalous doctrine is
Lim Tim v. Ruiz y Rementeria, 15 P. I. 367
sometimes largely abolished.
(1910); Castle Bros. Wolf 8: Sons v. Go-Juno, 7 P. I. 144 (1906).
The exception is applied to a purely executory contract in Pancoast v. Dins
more, 105 Me. 471, 75 Atl. 43, 134 Am. St. Rep. 582 (1909).
See, also, Cowan
v. Curran, 216 Ill. 598, 75 N. E. 322 (1905).
Contra: Kelly v. Thuey, 143 Mo.
422, 45 S. \V. 300 (1898), with ‘which cf. Id., 102 Mo. 522, 15 S. VV. 62 (1890).

The above exception has no application in cases where it does not appear
that the third person relied on the learning, skill, and knowledge or reliability
of the agent of the undisclosed principal. and where no. personal service is
involved.
Wiehle V. Silfford, 27 Misc. Rep. 562, 58 N. Y. Supp. 298 (1899).
Nor to cases where the principal contracted as agent and now sets up that
he was the real principal, and the agent a mere man of straw.
Bickerton v.

Burrell. 5 Manle & S.
See Moline Malleable
(1897), summarizing

383

(1816).

Iron Co.

v.

\

York Iron

the exceptions to the rule.

_
Co., 83 Fed. 66, 27 C. C.

A.

442
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(Court

of Appeals of New York,

57 How.

v.

T0

CO.\'S'1‘lTL'EN'.l‘
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HENKEL.

75 N. Y. 878, 7 Abb. N. C. 1,
Prac. 97.)

1878.

'

a lease under seal executed by “J. Romaine Brown,
as.lessor, and by defendant as lessee.
MILLER, J.‘ The plaintiﬁs were not parties to the lease upon which
this action was brought. It was not signed by them. Their names did
not appear in
and there was nothing in the lease to show that they
had any thing to do with or any interest in the demised premises or
the execution of the lease, or that
was executed in their behalf.
was made by one Brown, as lessor, who
described therein, and who
as agent; but
not stated in the lease for whom he acted.
signed
The covenants are all between “J. Romaine Brown, agent, the ‘party
of the ﬁrst part,” and the defendant, as party of the second part; and
not made to appear that the defendant had any knowledge or in
timation whatever that Brown was acting on the behalf of the plain
tiﬂs or for their beneﬁt.
For whom Brown was agent was not made
known to the defendant, and
only appears by parol proof upon the
trial that Brown was authorized orally by the plaintiffs to make
demise of the premises described in the lease. The signature of Brown
as agent, and his seal
attached to the instrument, and the same is
also signed and sealed by the defendant.
The plaintiffs, without any
assignment of Brown’s interest under the lease, bring this action‘ to
recover the rent un‘paid, upon the ground that Brown merely acted as
their agent by their authority, and that they are the actual parties in
interest. The question to be determined
whether the actual owners
of the lease, which
in the nature of
deed inter partes, which was
not and does not on its face show that
was executed by them, but
which does show an execution by
third person, claiming to act as
agent without disclosing the name of his principal, and which contains
covenants between the parties actually signing and sealing the same,
for the rent reserved therein, even
can maintain an action upon
though the person who executed the same, describing himself “agent
and party of the ﬁrst part,” had oral authority to enter into the con
tract, and acted as the owner's agent in the transaction.
The rule seems to be quite well established that in general an action
sealed instrument of this description must be brought by and
upon
in the name of
person who
party to such instrument, and that
third ‘person or a stranger to the instrument cannot maintain an action
The question presented has been the subject of fre
upon the same.
think
established in this
quent consideration in the courts, and
state that where
distinctly appears from the instrument executed that
the seal affixed
the seal of the person subscribing, who designates
himself as agent, and not the seal of the principal, that the former only

Action upon

is it

8Part of the opinion is omitted.
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He alone en
is the real party who can maintain an action on the same.
ters into the covenants and is liable for any failure to fulﬁll, and he
He is named in the indenture as
only can prosecute the other party.
on
behalf of or against any person
action
not
lie
will
a party, and an
who is not a party to the instrument, or who does not lawfully repre
It is unnecessary to review all
sent or occupy the place of such party.
the decisions bearing upon the question, as in a very recent case the
principle discussed has been considered by this _c0urt, and the whole
subject, as well as the decisions relating to the same, deliberately and
See Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am.
carefully reviewed.
In the case cited an action was brought to recover pur
Rep. 617.
chase-money unpaid upon a contract for the sale and purchase of lands.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs entered into an agreement
in writing with one Hurlburd, who was acting under the authority of
the defendants, whereby the plaintiffs sold and the defendants through
Hurlburd bought a certain described piece of land, for a price named.
which price the defendants, through their agent, Hurlburd, agreed
to ‘pay, as speciﬁed. The agreement was in writing, but did not show
that Partridge was a principal party, and was signed and sealed by
The name of Partridge did not appear in the
Hurlburd individually.
instrument, but the plaintiffs offered to prove that Hurlburd was act
ing solely for and under the direction of Partridge, who made or
caused the ﬁrst payment to be made as Partridge’s agent or trustee in
the transaction, and that his authority was oral. _Proof was also of
fered to show that Hurlburd was constituted such agent by parol; and
that the plaintiffs did not know that Partridge was the real principal.
The complaint was dismissed, and it was held by this court that a con
tract of this description under seal could not be enforced as the simple
contract of another not mentioned in or a party to the instrument, on
proof that the vendee named had oral authority from such other to en
at least, in
_ter into the contract, and acted as agent in the transaction;
the absence of proof of some act of ratiﬁcation on the part of the un
The opinion of Andrews, ]., in the case cited,
disclosed principal.
fully covers the question now presented; and it appears to be unnec
essary to review or examine the prior cases which have a bearing upon
the subject.
Unless some distinction of a vital character exists be
tween that case and the one now to be determined, the former must be
regarded as decisive of the case at bar.
The claim of the learned counsel for the appellant, that as the con
tract in case of a lease is not required to be under seal, it may be re
garded as a simple contract, upon which the principal may sue or be
sued in his own name, and the seal may be rejected as surplusage, is
also considered in the opinion in the case cited; and without indorsing
the correctness of the cases relied upon, it is remarked that these are
cases which hold this doctrine; “but the principal’s interest in the con
tract appears upon its face, and he has received the beneﬁt of per
formance by the other party, and has ratiﬁed and conﬁrmed it by acts

1
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in pais." It is therefore settled law, that in order to take a case out
of the general rule, where the contract is one which is valid without a
seal, and the seal is therefore of no account, it must appear that the
contract was really made on behalf of the principal, from the instru
ment, and that the party derived beneﬁt from and accepted and con
ﬁrmed it by acts on his part. VVithin this rule, it remains to be con
sidered whether the case at bar differs from that cited. An attempted
distinction is sought to be maintained, for the reason that in the case
cited, Hurlburd, the agent, did not enter into the agreement to sell as
agent, while here Brown signs as agent, which, it is claimed, is notice
of the capacity in which he contracts. This we think is not sufficient;
and to establish any real distinction it should appear for whom he was
The plaintiffs
agent, and that the parties claiming were his principals.
not being named in the lease, and it not appearing that they had any
interest therein, there is no more ground for claiming that Brown was
their agent than that he was the agent of some stranger. The use of
the word “agent” has but little signiﬁcance of itself, and as the prin
cipals are not named, cannot be regarded as applying more to one per
son than to another. It did not take away from Brown’s obligation,
because he is named as agent.
The covenants are between the parties
who are only named in the instrument and no other parties. Any oth
As
er interpretation would be a contravention of its obvious import.
was said in the case cited, “We ﬁnd no authority for the proposition
that a contract under seal may be turned into the simple contract of a
party not in any way appearing on its face to be a party to or inter
on proof dehors the instrument, that the nominal ‘party was
ested in
acting as- the agent of another.” To render the principal liable, where
must be
a contract by deed, made by an attorney or agent,
there
Cush. 374,
Huntington v. Knox,
made in the name of the principal.
would be going
cited and approved in Briggs v. Partridge, supra.
distinction so triﬂing and unimportant would
very far to hold that
authorize
disregard of the decision cited, and thus virtually estab
lish a new and different principle than one which has been settled
and ALLEN,

]].,

dissent.

Judgment

afﬁrmed.

a

3

6

a

3

9

Ohio, 70, 17 Am. Dec. 581 (1827), in which the agent
Cf. Potts v. Rider,
B. Mon.
(1845),
covenant in his name. and Tharp v. Farquar,
sued on
cov
in which the court sustained a demurrer to an action by an agent on
But see revolutionary doctrine of Lagumis v. Gerard. 116 Misc. Rep.
enant.
471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (1921).
Cf. Case V. Case, 203 N. Y. 263, 96 N. E. 440,
,
Ann. Gas. 1913B, 311 (1911).
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PAGE.

Judicial Court or Massachusetts,

1858.

10

Gray,

398.)

7

3

§

it
is

a

is

is,

a

is,

Action by a citizen of New York to recover the price of goods,
sold by his factors in Boston to the defendants. Verdict for plaintiff
and defendant alleged exceptions. * * *
BLGELOW, ].1° * * * 2. As the contract of an agent is in law
the contract of the principal, the latter may come forward and sue
thereon, although at the time the contract was made the agent acted
There is a qualiﬁcation of the
as and appeared to be the principal.
rule, by which it is held that when a contract has been made for an
undisclosed principal, who permits his agent to act as apparent prin
cipal in the transaction, the right of the former to intervene and bring
suit in his own name is not allowed in any way to affect or impair the
right of the other contracting party, but he will in such case be let in
to all the equities, set-oﬁs and other defenses to which he would have
been entitled, if the action had been brought in the name of the agent.
But in the case at bar it does not appear that the defendant has any
defense‘ to the action, which he could have made if it had been brought
The objection is purely technical, and goes only to de
by the agent.
feat the right of action by the principal, irrespective of any meritorious
'
answer to the suit.
It has been sometimes said that when a sale is made by a factor for
a foreign principal, the latter cannot sue for the price.
This supposed
exception has been ‘put on the ground that in such case the presumption
that exclusive credit was given to the agent, and therefore
at law
the principal cannot be treated in any manner whatever as
party
But the later and better opinion
that there
to the contract.
no
principal, whether foreign or
such absolute presumption, and that
domestic, may sue to recover the price of goods sold by his factor, un
made afﬁrmatively to appear that exclusive credit was given
less
to the agent, by proof, other than the mere fact that the ‘principal resid
ed in another state or country.
420.
Story on Agency,
Paley on
Hill,
Taintor v. Prendergast,
Agency (4th Amer. Ed.) 324, note.
72, 38 Am. Dec. 618.
Ilsley v. Merriam, Cush. 242, 54 Am. Dec. 721.
No fact appears in the exceptions to show any exclusive credit by
which to take the present case out of the ordinary rule by which the
principal can maintain an action in his own name.“
Exceptions overruled.

3

2

a

1° The statement of facts is abridged and part of the opinion ls omitted.
11 Accord: Dresser v. Norwood, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 574, 588, 108 E. C. L. 574
(1863), in which the third person was allowed to set oi!
debt due hlm from
the agent; Traub v. Milliken, 57 Me. 63,
Am. Rep. 14 (1869), in which the
third person had paid the agent; Taintor V. Prendergast,
Hill (N. Y.) 72,
38 Am. Dec. 618 (1842); Foster v. Graham, 166 Mass. 202, 44 N. E. 129 (1896),
quoting with approval the principal ease, Sullivan v. Shailer, 70 Conn. 733,

\
I

Ch. 6)

LIABILITY or 'rnmo ransom

COPELAND
(Supreme Court of Alabama,

v.

cro

CONSTITUENT

767'

TOUCHSTONE.

1849.

16

Ala.

333, 50 Am. Dec. 181.)

Error

to the County Court of Mobile.
This suit was commenced in a ]ustice’s Court, and taken by appeal
to the County Court.
The plaintiff having established his demand the
defendant proved as an offset an account for work done by one Rich

ardson, who was a journey-man wheelright in the employment of de
fendant.
The plaintiff in rebuttal proved that the contract for the
work was made with Richardson alone, that plaintiff was not informed
that he was in the employment of the defendant, and that he paid said
Richardson for it as the work was done.
Upon this state of facts, the
cause was submitted to the decision of the court, and judgment was
rendered allowing the defendant’s oifset.
This judgment is now assigned as error.
CHILTON, J. It certainly cannot be assumed, that because the work
was done at the shop of the defendant, he is entitled to recover for it.
Copeland contracted with Richardson, in utter ignorance of the rela
tion which existed between him and his employer, Touchstone.
Con
ceding, then, that as between the latter and Richardson, the relation of
principal and agent obtained, or that Richardson was in the employ
ment of Touchstone, who was entitled to all his earnings, it is too
well settled now to be questioned, that if Copeland was ignorant of this
fact——if he negotiated with Richardson as the principal, su'pposing him
to be so, and paid him for the work before he had notice of any claim
on the part of Touchstone, he will be protected in such payment.
]udge Story, in his work on Agency, p. 439, § 430, says—“The modes
and circumstances under which such payments are made to the agent
If the pay
may have a material bearing on the rights of the principal.
ments are received by the agent according to the ordinary course of
business, or even if they are made out of the ordinary course of busi
ness, if the agent alone is known or is supposed to be the principal,
the latter will be bound thereby. Mr. Pailey lays down the same doc
I!
H
trine. KII f, says he, the agent act for a principal undisclosed, he has
Atl. 1054 (1898), with a valuable review oi! cases; Belﬂeid v. Nat. Supply
Co.. 189 ‘Pa. 189, 42 Atl. 131, 69 Am. St. Rep. 799 (1899).
The principal takes such a contract subject to all rights of the third per
son, just as though the agent were the principal.
Foster v. Smith, 2 Cold.
474, 88 Am. Dec. 60-1 (1865): Rosscr v. Darden, 82 Ga. 219, 7 South. 919. 14
Am. St. Rep. 152 (1888).
But see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kerr, 4 Tex. Civ.
App. 280, 23 S. W. 564 (1893), in which an undisclosed principal sued for
damages for which the agent could have had no action.
If the third person ought to know he is dealing with an agent, he must
be on his guard or he cannot claim a set oﬂ' on a debt due from the agent.
Miller v. Lea, 35 Md. 396. 6 Am. Rep. 417 (1872); Frazier v. Poindexter, 78
Ark. 241. 95 S. W. 464. 115 Am. St. Rep. 33, 8 Ann. Cas. 5512 (1906).
As to distinctions between foreign and domestic principals. see Oelricks
Certainly the various states of
V. Ford, 23 How. 49. 16 L. Ed. 534 (1859).
the United States are not “foreign” so as to aﬂect this rule.
40
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authority to receive payment.” Until the principal appears, the agent
is to be regarded as the propriet0r.—Liv.,on Agency, 226-232; Faveric
v. Bennett, 11 East. 38; Coates v. Lewis, 1 Camp. Rep. 444; Black
burn v. Schoales, 2 Id. 341; Stewart v. Aberdein, 4 -Mees. & Welsb.
211 ; see, also, Governor v. Daily, 14 Ala. 469, 472.
So, in the case before us, the ‘party dealing with the journeyman,
having no notice of the fact that he was working for the defendant
in error, and having made to him a full payment before he was informed
by the defendant that he claimed the price of the work, must be con
sidered as discharged from any obligation to pay the money over again
Mercantile Law, 129."
to the principal.-—Smith’s
It results from what we have said, that the County Court mistook
the law in holding the plaintiﬁ in error liable for the payment he had
'
previously made to Richardson.
The judgment is consequently reversed; and the cause remanded.
\

PITTS

.

(Supreme
’

I

v.

Judicial Court of Maine,

MOWER.
1841.

18 Me. 361. 36 Am.

Dec. T27.)

for the price of a “horse power” sold to defendant by
The agent took in pay
who was the agent of plaintiff.
ment notes running to himself.
The case comes up on exceptions to
'
the ruling and instructions in the trial court.
SHEPLEY, J. It has been decided, that the disclosure of a trustee
and the judgment upon it are to be received in evidence only between
those, who are parties to the suit. \Vise v. Hilton, 4 Greenl. 435.
In this case the plaintiﬁ‘ was not a party to the suit in which the
disclosure was made, and he is not bound by that judgment.
VV hen an agent sells the goods of his principal and takes a promis
sory note payable to himself, the principal may inteﬁpose before pay
ment, and forbid it to be made to his agent; and a payment to the
agent after this will not be good. And the principal may sue in his
own name on the contract of sale, except when, as with us, it is ex
tinguished by taking a negotiable promise.
It is said in argument
for the defendants, that the law will not imply a promise where there
is an express one; and that there being an express one in the note to
Hiram A. Pitts one cannot be implied to the ‘plaintiff. The law re
gards the express contract made with the agent in the purchase as
made with the principal and as remaining unextinguished by the note
not negotiable. These rights of the principal are well established and
were recognized in the cases of Titcomb v. Seaver, 4 Greenl. 542, and
In this case the defendants were
Edmond v. Caldwell, 15 Me. 340.
Assumpsit

H. A. Pitts,

1* So payment is good to a broker who sells as principal.
Townsend v. In
glis, 1 Holt. 278, 3 E. C. L. 101 (1816); Coates v. Lewis, 1 Campb. 444 (1808),
per Ld. Ellenborough.
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notiﬁed before payment or judgment against them as trustees, that the
plaintiff was the owner of the property sold, and that he claimed to have
If they thought proper to disregard that
the payment made to himself.
notice, the rights of the plaintiff cannot thereby be impaired.“
Exceptions sustained and new trial granted.

SECTION 2.—FOR FUNDS OR PROPERTY OF THE
PRINCIPAL
...__....

(

TAYLOR
(Court of King's Bench. 1-‘I15.

3

v.

Maule

PLUMER.

& S. 562, 2 Rose. 457. 16 Rev. Rep. 361.)

It

matters not that the third person has promised to pay the note to the
Farmers’
Mechanics’ Nat. Bunk v. King, 57 Pa. 202, 98 Am. Dec.
8:

13

agent.

it

it,

is

it,

it,

Defendant entrusted to one Walsh, his broker, a draft for £22,200.
with which to buy exchequer bills.
The broker misapplied the most
of the funds from the draft by purchasing American Securities, in
He was arrested before
tending to abscond with them to. America.
escaping the country, and handed over to his principal the American
Securities.
On the day he misapplied the money he had become bank
ru'pt, and his assignees now bring trover for the securities.
LORD ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J. After stating the case, his Lordship
said, The plaintiff in this case is not entitled to recover if the defend
ant has succeeded in maintaining these propositions in point of law,
viz., that the property of a principal entrusted by him to his factor
for any special purpose belongs to the principal, notwithstanding any
change which that property may have undergone in'point of form, so
long as such property is capable of being identiﬁed, and distinguished
And, secondly, that all property thus cir
from all other property.
cumstanccd is equally recoverable from the assignees of the factor, in
the event of his becoming a bankrupt, as it was from the factor him
And, indeed, upon a view of the authorities,
self before his bankruptcy.
and consideration of the arguments, it should seem that if the property
in its original state and form was covered with a trust in favor of the
principal, no change of that state and form can divest it of such trust,
or give the factor, or those who represent him in right, any other more
valid claim in respect to
than they respectively had before such
An abuse of trust can confer no rights on the party abusing
change.
nor on those who claim in privity with him. The argument which
has been advanced in favor of the plaintiffs, that the pro'perty of the
principal continues only so long as the authority of the principal
ceases
and that
pursued in respect to the order and disposition of

215 (1868).

Gonn.PB.& A. (211 E1).)—49

770

_

EFFECTS AND coussonnncns

or

THE RELATION

(Part 3

when the property is tortiously converted into another form for the
of the factor himself, is mischievous in principle, and supported by
no authorities of law. And the position which was held out in argu
ment on the part of the plaintiffs, as being the untenable result of the
arguments on the part of the defendant, is no doubt a result deducible
from those arguments; but unless it be a result at variance with the
The
law, the plaintiffs are not on that account entitled to recover.
contention on the part of the defendant was represented by the plain
tiffs’ counsel as pushed to what he conceived to be an extravagant
length, in the defendant’s counsel being obliged to contend, that “if A.
is trusted by B. with money to purchase a horse for him, and he pur
chases a carriage with that money, that B. is entitled to the carriage.”
And, indeed, if he be not so entitled, the case on the ‘part of the defend
It makes no dif
ant appears to be hardly sustainable in'argument.
ference in reason or law into what other form, different from the
original, the change may have been made, whether it be into that of
promissory notes for the security of the money which was produced
by the sale of the goods of the principal, as in Scott v. Surman, Willes,
400, or into other merchandize, as in V)/'hitecomb v. ]acob, Salk. 160,
for the product of or substitute for the original thing still follows the
nature of the thing itself, as long as it can be ascertained to be such,
and the right only ceases when the means of ascertainment fail, which
is the case when the subject is turned into money, and mixed and con
founded in a general mass of the same description.
The difficulty
which arises in such a case is a difficulty of fact and not of law, and
the dictum that money has no ear-mark must be understood in the same
way; i. e. as predicated only of an undivided and undistinguishable
mass of -current money. But money in a bag, or otherwise kept apart
from other money, guineas, or other coin marked (if the fact were
so) for the purpose of being distinguished, are so far ear-marked as to
fall within the rule on this subject, which applies to every other de
scription of personal property whilst it remains, (as the property in
question did,) in the hands of the factor, or his general legal representa
tives.“ * * . *
use

A

nonsuit must be entered.

14 As to the right of the principal to his property
persons, see, also, ante, p. 425.‘
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DILL.

(Supreme Court of Judicature of Indiana, 1897.

149

Ind.

136,

48 N.

E.

788.)

Plaintiff deposited over $5,000 in her name in the defendant bank,
He
giving her husband authority to check it out for her business.
had dealings with Pearce, who maintained a bucket shop, and to pay
forv“futures” or “options” in wheat and corn, he drew checks for
$4,700 in Pearce’s favor.
These the bank received, and transferred
the amount to the account of Pearce.
Dill and Pearce are both in
solvent, and Mrs. Dill seeks in equity to have the court restore to her
account the moneys wrongfully transferred and still standing in the
From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
account of Pearce.
* * * The insistence of counsel for appcllce is
JORDAN,
that E. S. Dill, the agent of their client, committed a breach of trust,
and wrongfully diverted the money of his principal into the hands of
the appellant Pearce, and that’ she has the right, under the facts and
the law applicable thereto, to trace it into Pearce’s bank account, to
which it had been transferred, and have it restored to her by the court
The authorities generally affirm and support the
as her property.
right of a cestui que trust to pursue and recover trust funds wrong
fully diverted, where their identity has not been lost, and where they
have not passed into the hands of parties for value without notice
of the trust. Whenever any property or fund in its original state has
once been impressed with the character or nature of a trust, no sub
sequent change of its original form or condition can devest it of its
trust character, so long as it is capable of being identiﬁed, and the
regardless of the form
beneﬁciary thereof may pursue and reclaim
into which
has not gone into
may have been changed, provided
bona ﬁde purchaser without notice. All that the
the possession of
law contemplates by requiring the property or fund to be identiﬁed
substantial identiﬁcation, and, in case the fund consists of money,
the cestui que trust may reclaim
although not able to trace the
identical coins or bills, so long as its identity as a fund can be ascer
tained. It
well-settled principle that the abuse of
trust fund
trustee or ﬁduciary confers no right upon him, nor upon those
by
who claim in privity with him. Where the fund has been misapplied,
or converted into other property, or mixed with the funds of the
trustee, or of those claiming through him, and can be traced and
identiﬁed, courts will attribute the ownership to the cestui que trust,
and will not permit the wrongful act of the trustee or ﬁduciary in
third party,
mixing the trust fund with his own funds, or those of
to defeat
recovery, but, in general, in such cases, will separate the
trust fund from the others with which
has been commingled, and
to the beneﬁciary entitled to receive it. Bevis v. Heﬁin, 63
restore
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v. Town of Monticello, 84 Ind. 119; Riehl v. Asso
ciation, 104 Ind. 70, 3 N. E. 633; Orb v. Coapstick, 136 I-nd. 313, 36
N. E. Z78. Shepard v. Bank (No. 17,783) 149 Ind. 532, 48 N. E. 346.
See, also, the many leading authorities collected in a note to the ease
c. 138 Ill. 127,
of Bank v. Goetz, 32 Am. St. Rep. 119, on page 125
(s.

Ind. 129; Bundy

27

N. E. 907).
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trust fund ex
the right to pursue and reclaim
ists, that the true owner thereof, when the fund
traced to the pos
restored to
session of another, and identiﬁed, has the right to have
him, not as
debt due and owing to him, but for the reason that
his property, wrongfully diverted and withheld; and
can make no
difference, in regard to the right of recovery in such
case, whether
the fund has been traced into the possession of
single individual or
ﬁrm. or association composed of many persons, or
into the hands of
into the form of a bank account. In re Hallett’s Estate and Knatch
bull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696; Englar v. Qffutt, 70 Md. 78, 16 Atl.
497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 332; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U.
54, 26 L. Ed. 693.
The evidence, as‘ we have seen, discloses that Dill was the agent of
the appellee, and only authorized to draw checks upon her money in the
bank for her use or in her business. The relation between him and the
appellee was of
ﬁduciary character, and in the use of her money in
trustee; and, in the event that
this respect he occupied the position of
he wrongfully diverted or misapplied such funds, the rules relating
trust fund apply. Riehl v. Associa
to the pursuit and recovery of
tion, supra; Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. 812, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 599.
To summarize, in conclusion, the agent of the appellee
shown
to have abused his trust by wrongfully diverting the money of his
The lat
principal into the hands of Pearce for an illegal consideration.
ter accepted the checks in controversy with knowledge that the funds
upon which they were drawn belonged to appellee, and that Dill, with
whom he dealt, was misappropriating the money.
By the means of
these checks, which, in his hands at least, were tainted with the ille
gality of the transactions in the settlement of which they were drawn,
appellant procured the bank to swell his account with the money be
Under the facts, certainly
must be said that
longing to appellee.
the equities are all with the appellee, and neither of the appellants are
in
position to successfully assail her right to recover."
Some other alleged errors are discussed by appellants’ counsel, but
so manifestly right upon the evidence that, even
the judgment
we should concede that the intervening rulings, of which they complain

If the agent exchanges the pi-lnclpal’s property, the property for which
is exchanged becomes the princlpal’s property, and he may recover it from
in good faith from the agent, and is not com
a third party who has taken
pellet] to set oft a debt of the agent to the third party.
Stevenson v. Kyle, 42
W, Va. 229, 24 S. E. 886, 57 Am. St. Rep. 854 (1896).
16
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were erroneous, they would not result in a reversal. Section 670, Rev.
The judgment is afﬁrmed, at
St. 1894 (section 658, Rev. St. 1881).
the cost of the appellants.

LIME ROCK BANK
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

lilassachégssts,

PLIMPTON.
1835.

17

Pick.

159, 28 Am.

Dec.

a
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a
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VVILDE, J. The plaintiff’s claim is not founded on any privity be
tween the parties, arising from an express contract, but on principles
of equity im'posing an obligation on the defendants, which the law will
imply a promise on their part to fulﬁll. It is contended that the defend
ants have money in their hands belonging to the plaintiffs, which they
cannot in equity and good conscience retain, and that in such case an
action for money had and received will lie.
And this general prin
ciple is undoubtedly well established by the authorities, and is reasonable
and cannot operate injuriously to any one.
The question then is,
whether the defendants have in their hands any money which in equity
and good conscience belongs to the plaintiffs.
It is proved satisfactorily
that the money borrowed~by the defendants of Parkhurst was the
money of the plaintiffs in his hands as their agent; but of this fact
the defendants had no knowledge at the time of the loan. It was there
fore a lawful contract between the defendants and Parkhurst; and if
the case had stopped here, it would be very clear that this action ‘could
For although it is true, that the sale by an agent,
not be maintained.
without authority, of property other than money may be disavowed,
and set aside in the case of a bona ﬁde purchaser, yet in respect to
money the law is otherwise; not only because money has no ear mark
and cannot be easily identiﬁed, but because a different doctrine would
It
therefore, manifest that before
be productive of great mischief.
the defendants were notiﬁed, that the money lent was the money of the
plaintiffs, they were liable only to Parkhurst, or
they had received the
money in payment of their debt against Parkhurst, this action could
not be maintained, even after notice to the defendants, that the money
belonged to the plaintiffs. The only question therefore is, whether after
notice the defendants could lawfully detain the money; and we are of
sum
opinion that they could. As Parkhurst was indebted to them in
exceeding the loan, they had a legal right of set-off as against Park
hurst, of which they could not be deprived by the intervention of the
plaintiffs’ claim; and however disingenuous the defendants’ conduct
may be considered in relation to Parkhurst, they had
legal right thus
to secure their own debt.
Their refusal to repay the loan according
to agreement was
breach of promise; but against this the defendants
could set off a breach of promise by Parkhurst, and this set-off
lowed by law.
The defendants, therefore, had
legal right to ap
the
propriate
money lent, to the payment of their own debt. This dis
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tinguishes the present case from that of Mason v. Waite, where the
money came into the defendant’s hands unlawfully, and he had no legal
or equitable right to retain it; and also from that of Clarke v. Shee,
Comp. ZOO. But the law as laid down by Lord Mansﬁeld, in the latter
case, is decisive against the plaintiffs’ claim. “Where money or notes,”
it is said, “are paid bona ﬁde, and upon a valuable consideration, they
but where they
never shall be brought back by the true owner;
come mala ﬁde into a person’s hands, they are in the nature of speciﬁc
property; and if their identity can be traced and ascertained, the party
has a right to recover.” 1"
Motion to set aside the nonsuit overruled.
17 As to money deposited in a hank in such a way as to show the bank that
does not belong to the depositor personally, see Baker v. N. Y. Nat. Exch.
Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. 452, 53 Am. Rep. 150 (1885), in which the money
See, also, Nat. Bk.
was deposited in the name of “Wilson & Bro., Agents."
v. Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693 (1881), in which the bank knew the
money deposited by the agent belonged to the principal; Union Stock Yards
Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411, 11 Sup. Ct. 118, 34 L. Ed. 724 (1890); and
Central Stock & Grain Exchange v. Bendinger, 109 Fed. 926, 48 C. C. A. 726,
56 L. R. A. 875 (1901), in which defendant accepted the prlncipal's money for

it

an illegal purpose.
Even though the money be deposited in the agent's name, and remain in
his account, the principal is entitled to reclaim it from the bank as against
the general creditors of the agent. Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. _182, 39 N. E.
812, 45 Am. St. Rep. 599 (1895), affirming 68 Hun, 502, 22 N. Y. Supp. 1039
This is so even though some of
(1893); Scott v. Surman, Willcs. 400 (1742).
the agent's money be mingled with the money of the principal. Van Alen v.
Am. Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 1 (1873).
See Nixon v. Brown, 57 N. H. 34 (1876), in
which the agent bought a horse and took a bill of sale in his own name. The
principal allowed him to have the possession ‘of the horse and keep the bill of
Dean v. Plunkett, 136 Mass.
sale. The agent sold the horse to defendant.
195 (1884), applying estoppel.
Cf. Gussner v. Hawks, 13 N. D. 453, 101 N. W.
898 (1904).

Clearly if the third person is charged with knowledge of the source of the
fund paid over by the agent, he cannot dispute the principa1’s right. Riehl v.
Evansville Foundry Ass‘n, 104 Ind. 70, 3 N. E. 633 (1885); Whitley v. F0)". 59
As to negotiable paper, see Winship & Bro.
N. C. 34. 78 Am. Dec. 236 (1860).
v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 42 Ark. 22 (1883).
.
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SECTION 3.—IN TORT

PATTISON

v.

BARNES.

Court or Judicature of Indiana,

1866.

26

Ind.

209.)

Complaint by Pattison against Barnes alleging that he had employed
an agent to pay and compromise debts due to and from a partner
ship, of which plaintiff had been a member; that to deceive and de
fraud plaintiff, defendant falsely represented to the agent that plain
tiff was indebted to him in a large sum, thereby inducing the agent
to compromise the debt by a payment of $250; that defendant well
knew plaintiff did not owe him in any way, either personally or as a
member of any ﬁrm; wherefore he prays judgment.
Defendant de
murred, and the demurrers were sustained.
Plaintiff excepts and
appeals to this court.
* * * No brief has been furnished us by the ap
ELLIOTT,
pellee. The paragraphs were demurred to separately, for the reason
that neither stated factssuﬂicient to constitute a cause of action. We
are not advised of the particular objection which the court below
regarded as fatal to the complaint, but it is said in the brief of the
appellant's counsel, that it was insisted by the counsel for the defend
ant that the suit should have been brought by the’ agent upon whom
the fraud was practiced, and that the plaintiff’s remedy was against
It may be that the plaintiff
his agent, and not against the defendant.
could recoveragainst the agent, as the money was not paid on a
Be that as it may, we think it
claim existing against the plaintiff.
clear that the facts stated in either paragraph of the complaint show
a valid cause of action in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant.
Each paragraph charges the defendant with obtaining the plaintiff’s
money from his agent by fraud and deceit, willfully practiced upon
The fraud thus perpetrated on the agent was
him for that purpose.
a fraud on the principal, as the money obtained by means of the
fraud was the property of the principal, and he is therefore entitled
\Ve see no valid
to his remedy directly against the wrong-doer."

I."

of the opinion is omitted.
the third person deceives the agent, the law will treat the prin
cipal as deceived. Perkins v. Evans. 61 Iowa, 35, 15 N. W. 584 (1883): Cra
mer v. Wright, 15 Ind. 278 (1860); Ward v. Borkenhagen, 50 Wis.‘-159, 7 N.
18 Part

19 When

W. 340 (1880).

The liability will be the clearer where the third person connives with the
agent to defraud the principal. White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Betting, 46 Mo.
App. 417 (1891). And it will not matter that the principal might have recov
Kingman v. Pierce. 17 Mass. 247 (1821); Berthoif v,
ered from his agent.
Quinlan, 68 Ill. 297 (1873). Any proﬁt the third person has made thereby he
Boston v. Sim
holds for the principal, who may recover it in a tort action.
mons, 150 Mass. 461, 23 N. E. 210, 6 L. R. A. 629, 15 Am. St. Rep. 230 (1890);

1
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objection to either paragraph of the complaint, and we think the court
'
'
erred in sustaining the demurrers.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded,
with instructions to the court below to overrule the demurrers to
the second and third paragraphs of the complaint, and for further
proceedings.

BLAKE
(Court of King’s Bench,

v.

1795.

LANYON.
6

T. R.

221, 3 Rev. Rep. 162.)

The ﬁrst count in the declaration stated that the plaintiff, who was a
currier, had hired and retained ‘W. Hobbs to be his servant and journey
man &c, and that the defendant persuaded and enticed Hobbs to leave
his service &c. In, the second count it was alleged that Hobbs, while
he was so hired and employed by the plaintiff in his trade as such serv
ant &c. wilfully and without the leave or license and against the will of
the plaintiff, departed and absented himself from and left the service
of the plaintiff &c, and then and there went to the defendant; yet the
defendant well knowing Hobbs to be the servant of the plaintiff, and
to ‘have been and to be so retained hired and employed by the plain
tiff. &c, but contriving &c, “did then and there receive and harbour
the said VV. Hobbs, and did then and there retain keep and employ
the said Hobbs in his (defendant’s) said service, and wholly refused to
deliver him to the plaintiff his master," although requested &c. and
unlawfully detained, entertained, and kept the said Hobbs, so then
being the servant and journeyman of the plaintiff, in his (the defend
ant’s) service, &c, whereby &c. At the trial at the last Launceston
assizes it appeared that Hobbs, who was retained by the plaintiff to
work by the piece, left the plaintiff’s service on a dispute between them,
the plaintiff having beaten him; that at the time of his departure he
had some work in hand; that he then applied for work to the de
fendant, who was also a currier, and who employed him not knowing
of his engagement with the plaintiff: but that in the course of a few
days afterwards the defendant. having been apprised by the plaintiff
that Hobbs was his servant and had left his work unﬁnished, and
being threatened with -an action in case he continued to employ Hobbs,
requested the servant to return to his former master and ﬁnish his
work: this Hobbs refused, and the defendant continued him in his
service. No evidence being given in support of the ﬁrst count; it was
objected Won behalf of the defendant that the action could not be sup
ported on the second count, because it either imported that the de
fendant had retained Hobbs in his service, knowing him to be the
servant of the plaintiff which was not established in proof, or that he
Mayor of Saltord v. Lever, [1891] 1 Q. B. 168. so L. J. Q. B. 39, as L, T. ass.
R. 85. 55 J. P. 244; Grant v. Gold, etc., Syndicate, [1900] 1 Q. B. 233,
J. Q. B. 150, 82 L. '1‘. 5, 16 T. L. R. 86, 48 W. R. 280.
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merely continued Hobbs in his service after he had notice of Hobbs's
engagement with the plaintiff, for which no action could be maintained,
it appearing that the defendant did not know that Hobbs was the
plaintiffs servant at the time he ﬁrst employed him. But Mr.
Lawrence, before whom the cause was tried, overruled the objection,
the
saying that the plaintiﬁ might recover upon the second count
jury were of opinion that the defendant continued to employ Hobbs
after he knew that Hobbs was the plaintiﬁ"s servant. The jury hav
verdict for the plaintiff,
ing given
non
Gibbs now renewed his objection, and moved either to enter
suit or to arrest the judgment; stating that great inconveniences would
result from
determination against the defendant, for that in such a
case
person engaged in
great manufacture might be deprived of
the beneﬁt of the service of
journeyman, whom he had retained to do
particular piece of work not knowing at the time of hiring that the
journeyman was under any engagement with any other master, before
the servant had ﬁnished his work and at
moment when the materials
then in work might be totally .spoiled
left in an unﬁnished state.
And he cited Adams v. Bafeald,
Leon. 240, where
was held by
Tanﬁeld, ]., and Fenner,
against the opinion of Gawdy, ]., that an
action does not lie for retaining the servant of another, unless he pro
cure the servant to leave his ﬁrst master.
An action will lie for receiving or continuing to
Sed PER CURIAM.
employ the servant of another after notice, without enticing him away.
Here no fault could be imputed to the defendant for taking Hobbs
into his service in the ﬁrst instance, because then he had no notice of
Hobbs’s prior engagement with the plaintiff: but as soon as he had no
tice of that fact, he ought to have discharged him. A person who
the servant of
contracts with another to do certain work for him
ﬁnished, and no other person can employ
that other till the work
such servant to the prejudice of the ﬁrst master; the very act of
giving him employment
affording him the means of keeping out of
his former service.
4 Rule refused.
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Q. B. 463, 1 Eng. Rul.

The ﬁrst count of the declaration stated that plaintiff was lessee and
manager of the Queen’s Theatre, for performing
operas for gain
to him; and that he had contracted and agreed with Johanna V\r'ag
ner to perform in the theatre for a certain time, with a condition,
amongst others, that she should not sing nor use her talents elsewhere
during the term without plaintiffs consent in writing: Yet defendant,
knowing the premises, and maliciously intending to injure plaintiff as
lessee and manager of the theatre, whilst the agreement with VVagner
was in force, and before the expiration of the term, enticed and pro
cured Wagner to refuse to perform: by means of which enticement
and procurement of defendant, \Vagner wrongfully refused to perform,
and did not perform during the term.
Count 2, for enticing and procuring
Johanna Wagner to con
tinue to refuse to perform during the term, after the order of Vice
Chancellor Parker, affirmed by Lord St. Leonards, restraining her
from performing at a theatre of defendant’s.
Count 3. That johanna Vi/agner had been and was hired by plain
tiff to sing and perform at his theatre for a certain time, as the dra
matic artiste of plaintiff, for reward to her, and had become and was
such dramatic artiste of plaintiff at his theatre: Yet defendant, well
knowing, &c., maliciously enticed and procured her, then being such
dramatic artiste, to depart from the said employment.
In each count special damage was alleged.
Demurrer.
joinder.
* * * The effect of the two ﬁrst counts is,
(h{OMPTON,'J.2°
that a person, under a binding contract to perform at a theatre, is in
duced by the malicious act of the defendant to refuse to perform and
entirely to abandon her contract; whereby damage arises to the plain
tiff, the proprietor of the theatre. The third count differs in stating
expressly that the perfomier had agreed to perform as the dramatic
artiste of the plaintiff, and had become and was the dramatic artiste
of the plaintiff for reward to her; and that the defendant maliciously
procured her to depart out of the employment of the plaintiff as such
dramatic artiste; whereby she did depart out of the employment and
service of the plaintiff; whereby damage was suffered by the plain
tiff. It was said, in support of the demurrer, that it did not appear in
the declaration that the relation of master and servant ever subsisted
between the plaintiff and Miss Vi/agner; that Miss VVagner was not
averred, especially in the two ﬁrst counts, to have entered upon the
service of the plaintiff; and that the engagement of a theatrical
20

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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performer, even if the performer has entered upon the duties, is not
of such a nature as to make the performer a servant, within the rule
of law which gives an action to the master for the wrongful enticing
away of his servant. And it was laid down broadly, as a general prop
osition of law, that no action will lie for procuring a person to break a
contract, although such procuring is with a malicious intention and
causes great and immediate injury. And the law as to enticing servants
was said to be contrary to the general rule and principle of law, and to
be anomalous, and probably to have had its origin from the state of
society when serfdom existed, and to be founded upon, or upon the
It was said that it would be dan
equity of, the Statute of Labourers.
gerous to hold that an action was maintainable for persuading a third
party to break a contract, unless some boundary or limits could be
pointed out; and that the remedy for enticing away servants was con
ﬁned to cases where the relation of master and servant, in a strict sense,
subsisted between the parties; and that, in all other cases of con
tract, the only remedy was against the party breaking the contract.
VVhatever may have been the origin or foundation of the law as to
enticing of servants, and whether it be, as contended by the plaintiff, an
instance and branch of a wider rule, or whether it be, as contended
by the defendant, an anomaly and an exception from the general
rule of law on such subjects, it must now be considered clear law
that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same
thing, with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master
and servant by procuring the servant to depart from the master-’s
service, or by harbouring and keeping him as servant after he has
quitted it and during the time stipulated for as the period of service,
whereby the master is injured, commits a wrongful act for which he
I think that the rule applies wherever the
is responsible at law.
wrongful interruption operates to prevent the service during the
time for which the parties have contracted that the service shall con
tinue:
and I think that the relation of master and servant subsists,
sufﬁciently for the purpose of such action, during the time for which
there is in existence a binding contract of hiring and service between
the parties; and I think that it is a fanciful and technical and unjust
distinction to say that the not having actually entered into the'service,
or that the service not actually continuing, can make any difference.
The wrong and injury are surely the same, whether the wrongdoer
entices away the gardener, who has hired himself for a year, the night
before he is to go to his work, or after he has planted the ﬁrst cab
bage on the ﬁrst morning of his service; and I should be sorry to sup
port a distinction so unjust, and so repugnant to common sense, un
less bound to do so by some rule or authority of law plainly showing
The proposition of the defendant, that
that such distinction exists.
there must be a service actually subsisting, seems to be inconsistent
with the authorities that show these actions to be maintainable for

\
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servants after they have left the actual service

of the master.
[Omitting a reference to Blake

_

The objection
antez]
as to the actual employment not having commenced would not apply in
the present case to the third count, which states that Miss-VVagrier
had become the artiste of the plaintiff, and that the defendant had in
duced her to depart from the employment. But it was further said that
the engagement,
employment, orservice, in the present case, was not
of such a nature as to constitute the relation of master and servant, so
as to warrant the application of the usual rule of law giving a remedy
in case of enticing away servants. The nature of the injury and of
the damage being the same, and the supposed right of action being in
strict analogy to the ordinary case of master and servant, I see no
reason for conﬁning the case to services or engagements under con
tracts for services of any particular description;
and I think that the
remedy, in the absence of any legal reason to the contrary, may well
apply to all cases where there is an unlawful and malicious enticing
away of any person employed to give his personal labour or service
for a given time, under the direction of a master or employer,who is
injured by the wrongful act; more especially when the party is bound
to give such personal services exclusively to the master or employer;
though I by no means say that the service need be exclusive.
Two nisi prius decisions were cited by the counsel for the defendant
in support of this part of the argument. One of these cases, Ashley v.
Harrison, 1 Peake’s N. P. C. 194, s. c. 1 Esp. N. P. C. 48, was an ac
tion against the defendant for having published a libel against a per
former, whereby she was deterred from appearing on the stage: and
Lord Kenyon held the action not maintainable. This decision appears,
especially from the report of the case in Espinasse, to have proceeded
on the ground that the damage was too remote to be connected with the
defendant's act. This was pointed out as the real reason of the deci
sion by 1\/lr. Erskine, in the case of Tarleton v. McGawley, 1 Peake‘s
N. P. C. 207, triedat the same sittings as Ashley v. Harrison.
The other case, Taylor v. Neri, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 386, was an action
for an assault on a performer, whereby the plaintiff lost the beneﬁt of
his services; and Lord Chief justice Eyre said that he did not think
that the court had ever gone further than the case of a menial servant;
for that, if a daughter had left the service of her father, no action
He afterwards observed that,
per quod servitium amisit would lie.
if such action would lie, every man whose servant, whether domestic or
not, was kept away a day from his business could maintain an action;
and he said that the record stated that Breda was a servant hired to
sing, and in his judgment he was not a servant at all: and he non
VVhatever may be the law as to the class of ac
suited the plaintiff.
tions referred to. for assaulting or debauching daughters or serv
ants per quod servitium amisit, and which differ from actions of the
v. Lanyon,
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present nature for the wrongful enticing or harbouring with"notice,
as pointed out by Lord Kenyon, in Fores v. \ViIson, l Peake’s N. P.
C. 55, it is clear from Blake v. Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221, and other subse
quent cases, Sykes v. Dixon, 9 A. & E. 693 (E. C. L. R. vol. 36),
Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & VV. 657, and Hartley v. Cummings, 5
Com. B. 247 (E. C. L. R. vol. 57), that the action for maliciously inter
fering with persons in the employment of another is not conﬁned to
menial servants, as suggested in Taylor v. Ne_ri. In Blake v. Lanyon,
a journeyman
who was to work by the piece, and who had left his
work unﬁnished, was held to be a servant for the purposes of such
an action; and I think that it was most properly laid down by the
court in that case, that a person who contracts to do certain work for
another is the servant of that other (of course with reference to such
'
an action) until the work be ﬁnished.
- lt appears to me that Miss Wagner had contracted to do'work
for the plaintiff within the meaning of this rule; and I think that.
where a party has contracted to give his personal services for a cer
tain time to another, the parties are in the relation of employer and
employed, or master and servant, within the meaning of this rule. And
I see no reason for narrowing such a rule; but I should rather, if nec
essary, apply such a remedy to a case “new in its instance, but” “not
new in the reason and principle of it,” that is, to a case where the
wrong and damage are strictly analogous to the wrong and damage
in a well recognised class of cases.
In deciding this case on the nar
rower ground, I wish by no means to be considered as deciding that
the larger ground taken by Mr. Cowling is not tenable, or as saying
that in no case except that of master and servant is an action main
tainable for rnaliciously inducing another to break a contract to the in
jury of the person with whom such contract has been made.
It does
not appear to me to be a sound answer, to say that the act in such
cases is the act of the party who breaks the contract;
for that reason
would apply in the acknowledged case of master and servant.
Nor is it an answer to say that there is a remedy against the con
tractor, and that the party relies on the contract; for, besides that rea
son also applying to the case of master and servant, the action 'on the
contract and the action against the malicious wrongdoer may be for
a different matter; and the damages occasioned by such malicious in
jury might be calculated on a very different principle from the amount
of the debt which might be the only sum recoverable on the contract.
Suppose a trader, witlz a malicious intent to ruin a rival trader, goes
to a banker, or other party who owes money to his rival, and begs
him not to pay the money which he owes him, and by that means ruins
or greatly prejudices the party:
I am by no means prepared to say
that an action could not be maintained, and that damages, beyond the
amount of the debt, if the injury were great, or much less than such
amount if the injury were less serious, might not be recovered. Where

782

EFFECTS AND coxssocnxcns on crnn RELATION

(Part 3

two or more parties were concerned in inflicting su'ch injury, an in
dictment, or a writ of conspiracy at common law, might perhaps
and, where a writ of conspiracy would lie
have been maintainable;
for an injury inﬂicted by two, an action on the case in the nature of
conspiracy will generally lie ; and in such action on the case the plain
tiff is entitled to recover against one defendant without proof of any
conspiracy, the malicious injury and not the conspiracy being the gist
of the action. In this class of cases it must be assumed that it is the
malicious act of the defendant, and that ‘malicious act only, which
causes the servant or contractor not to perform the work or contract
which he would otherwise have done. The servant or contractor may be
utterly unable to pay anything like the amount of the damage sus
and it
tained entirely from the wrongful act of the defendant:
would seem unjust, and contrary to the general principles of law, if
such wrongdoer were not responsible for the damage caused by his
wrongful and malicious act. Several of the cases cited by Mr. Cowling
on this part of the case seem well worthy of attention.
.Without however deciding any such more general question, I think
that we are justiﬁed in applying the principle of the action for enticing
away servants to a case where the defendant maliciously procures a
party, who is under a valid contract to give her exclusive personal
services to the plaintiff for a speciﬁed period, to refuse to give such
services during the period for which she had so contracted, whereby
the plaintiﬁ‘ was injured.
I think, therefore, that our judgment should be for the plaintiff.
ERLE and \/VIC-HTMAN, JJ., rendered concurring opinions.“
21 Coleridge. J., strongly dissented, ﬁrst, because the remedy for breach of
contract is conﬁned to an action between the parties to the contract.
The
malicious act of the third party is not proximately connected with the breach.
Second, because the rule in the case of seducing menial servants from the
employ of their masters is an exception grafted on the general law. It is
traceable to the Statute of Labourers (23 Edw. III), passed because of the great
scarcity of workmen and servants of the lower classes following the Black
Death of 1348-49. and should not be extended to other servants, much less
to an opera singer.
The powerful opinion of Coleridge, J., has received much
attention, both in England and the United States, but the rule of Lumley v.
Gye was ﬁrmly established in England by Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. D.
333, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 717 (1881). an action for wrongfully enticing away and
receiving and harboring a bath and brickmaker from plaintiffs employ. Lum
ley v. Gye has been generally, but not al\va_vs, followed in the United States.
Hitchman Coal 8: Coke Co. v. Mitchell. 245 U. S. 229, 252, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62
L. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 19180, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461 (1917). injunction to re
strain labor unions from coercing piaintiﬁs employees to leave his service;
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871), a case often cited. Wells, J., at page
564, says: "Every one has n right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his
own enterprise, industry, skill and credit.
He has no right to be protected
against competition;
but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton
interference,
disturbance or annoyance.
distui-ba‘nce or loss come as a
result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum
absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is inter
But if it come from the merely wanton or malicious acts of oth
fered with.
ers, without the justification of competition or the service of any interest or
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.
6 Cush. 249.)

1850.

for enticing away the
plaintiff's son and servant from his employment. The action was tried
in the court of common pleas, before Perkins, 1., and came into this
court upon exceptions to the judge's instructions to the jury.
The
case is fully exhibited in the opinion of the court.
The opinion was delivered at the October term, 1851.
METCALF,
The question now'to be decided
whether the in
structions given to the jury, upon the evidence introduced at the trial,
were warranted by the law of the case.
The declaration contains single count, in which
alleged that the
defendants, knowing that the plaintiffs son was in his employment and
case,

it

a

is

is

_]'.

the

is

a

a

a

is

is

if

a

a

a

a

a

service, enticed him into their employment, put him on board
vessel,
and sent him to sea on
whaling voyage. The evidence was that the
son left his father’s house in New Hampshire,
without his father’s
consent, and went to New Bedford; that he there applied to the de
fendants to employ him in
whaling vessel; that they, knowing him
minor, at ﬁrst refused to .employ him, but that, at his urgent
to be
solicitation and upon his representation that he had his father’s con
sent to go on
voyage, they took him into their employment and sent
him to sea. Upon this evidence, the jury were instructed that the de
fendants were liable in this action,
the plaintiff never assented to his
son’s being employed by them, although they honestly believed that he
had given his full consent. And we are of opinion that these instruc
tions were wrong.
A master may maintain an action on the case against one who,
his servant, entices him away from his serv
knowing that another
ice, or retains and employs him, after he has wrongfully left that serv
ice without being enticed away, and also against one who continues
such, though the defend
to employ his servant, after notice that he
ant, at the time of retaining or employing him, did not know him to be
father
servant, and
the master of ‘his minor child, within these
The books of entries contain forms of declarations
rules of law.
plaintiff gener
adapted to these three distinct causes of action. And
ally inserts at least two counts in his declaration—one for enticing, and
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lawful purpose,
then stands upon a different footing, and falls within the
principle of the authorities ﬁrst referred to."
But, contra, see Bourlier Bros. v. Macaulay, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60. 11 L.
R. A. 550, 34 Am. St. Rep. 171 (1891). The development of this common-law
breach of
remedy for procuring
contract of service is traced in Employing
Printers’ Club v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 Q. E. 353, 69 L. R. A. 90, 106
Ann. Cas. 694 (1905).
In England
was for
Am. St. Rep. 137,
time sup
posed that the rule was much restricted in labor union cases by Allen v. Flood,
67 L. J. Q. B. 119, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 285, but this was limited,
[1898] A. C.
B. R. C.
and Lumley v. Gye followed, in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. O. 495,
197.
See. also, South Wales Miners‘ Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905]
A. C. 239, 74 L. J. K. B. 525,
Ann. Cas. 436,
B. R. O.
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that he may succeed on the
another for employing or harboring—so
But in either form
latter, though he may fail to support the former.
of declaring, it is a material and necessary allegation that the defend
ant knew, at the time of enticing, employing, or harboring, that the
party enticed away, employed, or harbored was the servant of the
plaintiff, or that he afterwards had notice thereof, and continued to
employ or harbor the servant after such notice. And such knowledge
See 8
or notice must be proved, in order to support the action.
\Nentw. Pl. 438; 2 Chit. Pl. (6th Am. Ed.) 645, 646; 1 Bl. Com. 429:
Blake v. Lanyon, 6
3 Bl. Com. 142; Fawcet v. Beavres, Z Lev.‘ 63;
T..R. 221; Reeve’s Dom. Rel. 291; Sherwood v. Hall, 3 Sumner,

Cas. No. 12,777; Ferguson v. Tucker, 2 Har. & G. (Md.)
182: Conant v. Raymond, 2 Aikens (Vt.) 243; Fores v. VVilson,
'
Peake’s Cas. 55.
The gist of an action like that now before us is, says Lord Mansﬁeld,
“that the defendant has enticed away a man who stood in the relation
Hart v. Aldridge, Cowp. S4, 56. And the
of servant to the plaintiff.”
3 Stark. Ev. 1310;
Stuart v. Simpson, l
enticing must be proved.
Now what is meant by “enticing away from
VVend. (N. Y.) 376.
the service” of another?
_So far as we know, the word “entice” has
But, in a de'claration like that in this case, it
no technical meaning.
must mean something quite different from a reluctant employment of
another’s servant, under a belief that the master has consented to that
The word is often joined, in the precedents of forms,
employment.
with the words “solicit, seduce, persuade, and procure," and it evi
dently imports an active and wrongful effort to detach a servant from
his master’s service, by offering inducements adapted to that end.
describes enticement
In Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511, Eyre, C.
and its effect as
dissolution of the relation of master and servant
VVe see no evidence of enticement in the present case.
“oﬂ‘iciously.”
The son had wrongfully left his father's service, before he was em
declaration
so that the plaintiff’s
not
ployed by the defendants;
If evidence of the mere employment of am
sustained by the proof.
declara
other’s servant, knowing him to be such, would support
tion for enticing him from his master, there would be no necessity for
count which omits the allegation of enticement, and charges only a
retaining. employing, or harboring.
Besides, if, in the opinion of the jury. the defendants believed that
the plaintiff had fully consented to their employing his son, then
the material averment in the declaration, that they well knew that he
was in plaintiFf’s service, was not proved, but was disproved.
For
impossible that they should know him to be in the service of one
whom they believed to have dispensed with his service.”
New trial ordered.
'
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v. Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457, 85 N. E. 576. 19 L. R. A.
Srntthles v. National Ass'n of Operative Plasterers, [1909]
K. B. 259.

McGurk

S.) 561 (1908);
B. 310, 78 L.

J.
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TRIANGLE FILM CORPORATION v. ART CRAFT
PICTURES CORPORATION.
(Circult Court of Appeals of the United States.'1918.
A. 231, 7 A. L. R. 303.)

250 Fed. 981,

163 C. C.

Suit in equity by the Triangle Film Corporation against the Art
craft Pictures Corporation.
From an order denying a preliminary in
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Aﬁirmed.
junction, complainant appeals.
Appeal from an order denying the plaintiffs motion for an injunc
tion pendente lite. The jurisdiction of the court depended upon di
verse citizenship.
The plaintiﬁ is a Virginia corporation engaged in
manufacturing,
distributing, and exhibiting moving pictures, and on
the 26th day of March, 1917, entered into a contract with one Wil
liam S. Hart, of Los Angeles, Cal.
By this contract the plaintiff en
gaged Hart as an actor, to perform in motion picture productions,
“which are to be manufactured by the employer under the supervision
of Thomas H. Ince."
Hart accepted the employment “under the su
The contract recited that
pervision of the said Thomas H. Ince.”
it was intended to be superseded by one in more elaborate form, and
both parties acknowledged that Hart could not be replaced.
It con
“This contract is made upon the condition and
cluded as follows:
with the understanding that the employé will be supervised in his act
On the day mention
ing and work hereunder by Thomas H. Ince.”
pro
ed Ince was in the employ of the plaintiff as manufacturing
ducer at its studio in Culver City, Cal.. and held an interest in its
stock, but on June 12, 1917, he sold out all this interest and severed his
relations with it. Hart, upon learning these facts, terminated his re
lations with the plaintiff, and both Hart and Ince went into the employ
of the defendant. It may be assumed that the defendant offered to
take Hart in, and, indeed, that it persuaded him to accept.
It may also
be assumed that the defendant knew of the contract between the plain
tiff and Hart. Ince, however, violated no'contract between himself
or terminating
and the plaintiff in selling out his stock interests in
his relations, nor
there undisputed evidence that, having done so, he
attempted to dissuade Hart from continuing in the plaintiff's employ.
LEARNED HAND, District Iudge (after stating the facts as above).
El. & Bl. 216, or upon
This case depends either on Lumley v. Gye,
strangely misconceived extension of that doctrine, Lumley v. Gye,
supra,.a wholesome and widely accepted case we not only accept on
as law upon
principle, but we should in any case be bound to treat
N. R. R. Co., 207 U'. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct.
Bitterman v. L.
authority.
91, 52 L. Ed. 171, 12 Ann. Cas. 693: Angle v. Chic., etc., R. R., 151
And in that aspect the case
14 Sup. Ct. 240, 38 L. Ed. 55.
U.
He so
stands upon the question whether Hart violated his contract.
clearly did not that we hardly feel justiﬁed in any discussion of the
G0on.Pa.&
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He had in substance stipulated that his term should not
question.
last beyond Ince’s connection with the plaintiff, and no one suggests
that Ince had no right to sell out his interest and leave.
Assuming,
then, that the defendant did induce him to leave, it did not run coun
ter to the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, supra.
Realizing the danger of such a conclusion, the plaintiff then stands
upon another leg, which is this: The reasonable expectation of an
employer that his employés will continue with him is a part of his
“good will,” as we say, and any one who hurts him in that “good will”
does him an “injuria,” even though there be no contract broken and
the employé might leave at pleasure.
Lord Bowen put the doctrine as
well as anybody in Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. 598,
613, that intentional damage to one’s property or trade without “just
cause” is actionable. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. l9l6D, 545, Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 283, and Hitchman Coal C0. v. Mitchell (December 10,
1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, has said that in
such cases there may be a right of action, though the person persuaded
does not break a contract in leaving.
Yet it is clear that the real question turns upon what is “just cause”
(“Privilege, Intent and Malice,” Oliver Vl/endell Holmes, ]r., 8 Harv.
Law R. 1), and that in effect it makes slight difference whether one
asks in respect of what “cause of action” the plaintiff suffered his dam
age, or whether the defendant had “just cause” for inﬂicting the dam
age, though it does make a good deal of difference in the development
of the law. Nobody has ever thought, so far as we can ﬁnd. that in
the absence of some monopolistic purpose every one has not the right
to offer better terms to another’s employé, so long as the latter is free
to leave.
The result of the contrary would be intolerable, both to such
employers as could use the employé more effectively and to such em
It would put an end to any kind
ployés as might receive added pay.
of competition.
That such a doctrine should be supposed to follow from Truax v.
Raich, supra, or Hitchman Coal Co-. v. Mitchell, supra, somewhat sur
prises us. In the ﬁrst case the defendant had threatened to use illegal
In the sec
means to induce the employer to discharge the plaintiff.
ond, a labor union had determined to compel a mine to operate as a
It was held that, since the union
closed shop. and that, too, by fraud.
was not seeking to redress wrongs of which any of the plaintiff’s em
ployés complained,‘ but intervened only for the purpose of preventing
any open shops which might compete with closed shops elsewhere, they
had no “just cause” for the ensuing damage.
That purpose—i. e.. to
compel thewhole industry to operate closed shops—was held to be ille
gal, and the illegality depended upon the supposedly meddlesome charac
ter of the intervention.
That nobody in his own business may offer
Gonn.Ps.& A. (20 En.)
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better terms to an employé, himself free to leave, is so extraordinary
doctrine, that we do not feel called upon to consider it at large.
The order is affirmed.

IRON MOLDERS’ UNION NO.
v.

(Circuit Court of Appeals
A.
_

125

a

OF MILWAUKEE, WIS.,

ALLIS—CHALMERS

CO.

01! the United States, 1908.
631, 20 L. R. A. [N. S.] 315.)

166

Fed. 45, 91 C. C.

$3 The statement

of facts and part of the opinion
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Appeal from a ﬁnal decree in a strike injunction suit.
* * * The record shows that the local
BAKER, Circuit judge.”
unions had a conference in regard to conditions in all the foundries in
the city and county of Milwaukee; that they formulated demands
respecting wages, overtime, double time on holidays, piecework, weekly
pay day, limitation of the number of apprentices, and a joint arbitra
tion board; that these demands were made alike upon all the foundry
owners within that territory; and that when the demands were re
jected the union men in all the foundries struck. Nothing in the record
indicates that there was any want of good faith in making these de
mands, or that the strike was undertaken with any other purpose than
to enforce them, or that appellee received or was singled out to receive
different treatment from that dealt‘ out to other foundry owners.
So
the employment of assault and duress in the progress of the strike
should be attributed to a combination to accomplish a lawful end by
unlawful means, rather than the employment of unlawful means should
be taken as proof that the end sought to be accomplished by such means
was itself unlawful. And consequently the parts of the decree which
prohibit the use of persuasion and picketing can be justiﬁed only on
the basis that such means are not lawfully to be applied in a genuine
for surely men
struggle of labor to obtain better terms and conditions;
are not to be denied the right to pursue a legitimate end in a legitimate
way, simply because they may have overstepped the mark and tres
A barrier at the line, with
passed upon the rights of their adversary.
punishment and damages for having crossed, is all that the adversary is
entitled to ask.
So far as persuasion was used to induce apprentices or others (sec
tion l6 of the decree) to break their contracts to serve for deﬁnite times,
the prohibition was right. And the reason, we believe, is- quite plain.
Each party to such a contract has a property interest in it. If either
breaks
he does
wrong, for which the other
entitled to
remedy.
And whoever knowingly makes himself
wrongful and in
party to
jurious act becomes equally liable. But in the present case the gen
erality of the men who took or sought the places left byithe strikers
were employed or were offered employment at will, as the strikers had
are omitted.
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either party, with or without cause, ends an employment at
has no legal ground of complaint.
So if the course of
the new men who quit or who declined employment was the result of
the free play of their intellects and wills, then against them appellee had
no cause of action, and much less against men who merely furnished
information and arguments to aid them in forming their judgments.
Now it must not be forgotten that the suit was to protect appellee’s
property rights.
Regarding employments at will, those rights reached their limit at
this line: For the maintenance of the incorporeal value of a going busi
ness appellee had the right to a free access to the labor market, and
the further right to the continuing services of those who accepted em
ployment at will until such services were terminated by the free act
of one or the other party to the employment. On the other side of this
limiting line, appellants, we think, had the right, for the purpose of
maintaining or increasing the incorporeal value of their capacity to
labor, to an equally freeaccess to the labor market. The right of the
one to persuade (but not coerce) the unemployed to accept certain terms
is limited, and conditioned by the right of the other to dissuade (but
not restrain) them from accepting. For another thing that must not
be forgotten is that a strike is one manifestation of the competition,
the struggle for survival or place, that is inevitable in individualistic
society. Dividends and wages must both come from the joint product
of capital and labor. And in the struggle wherein each is seeking to
hold or enlarge his ground, we believe it is fundamental that one and
the same set of rules should govern the action of both contestants.
For instance, employers may lock out (or threaten to lock out) em
ployees at will, with the idea that idleness will force them to accept
lower wages or more onerous conditions; and em'ployees at will may
strike (or threaten to strike), with the idea that idleness of the capital
involved will force employers to grant better terms. These rights (or
legitimate means of contest) are mutual and are fairly balanced against
each other.
,
molder,
or
locked
out his men, in order
having
Again, an employer
to effectuate the purpose of his lockout, may persuade (but not coerce)
other foundrymen not to employ molders for higher wages or on bet
ter terms than those for which he made his stand, and not to take in his
late employees at all, so that they may be forced back to his foundry at
his own terms ; and molders, having struck, in order to make their strike
effective may persuade (but not coerce) other molders not to work for
less wages or under worse conditions than those for which they struck,
and not to work for their late employer at all, so that he may be forced
to take them back into his foundry at their own terms. Here, also, the
rights are mutual and fairly balanced. On the other hand, an employer,
having locked out h_is men, will not be permitted, though it would reduce
their ﬁghting strength, to coerce their landlords and grocers into cut
.ting off shelter and food; and employees, having struck, will not be
been.

will, the other
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permitted, though it might subdue their late employer, to coerce dealers
and users into starving his business. The restraints, likewise, apply
A
to both combatants and are fairly balanced.
These illustrations, we believe, mark out the line that must be ob
served by both. In contests between capital and labor the only means
of injuring each other that are lawful are those thatoperate directly
and immediately upon the control and supply of work to be done and
of labor to do
and thus directly affect the apportionment of the
common fund, for only at this point exists the competition, the evils of
which organized society will endure rather than suppress the freedom
and initiative of the individual.
But attempts to injure each other
by coercing fnembers of society who are not directly concerned in
the pending controversy to make raids in the rear cannot be tolerated
upon so
by organized society, for the direct, the primary, attack
And for th'e enforcement of these mutual rights and re
ciety itself.
straints organized society offers to both parties, equally, all the instru
mentalities of law and of equity.
Vi/ith respect to picketing as well as persuasion, we think the decree
went beyond the line. The right to persuade new men to quit or de
cline employment
of little worth unless the strikers may ascertain
who’are the men that their late employer has persuaded or
attempt
ing to persuade to accept employment.
Under the name of persua
sion, duress may be used; but
duress, not persuasion, that should
be restrained and punished.
In the guise of picketing, strikers may
obstruct and annoy the new men, and by insult and menacing attitude
intimidate them as effectually as by physical assault.
But from the
evidence
can always be determined whether the efforts of the pickets
are limited to getting into communication with the new men for the
purpose of presenting arguments and appeals to their free judgments.
Prohibitions of persuasion and picketing, as such, should not be includ
ed in the decree.
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated \Vood \Vork
ers' Union, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877,
L. R. A. (N. S.) 788; Ev
erett-Waddy Co. v. Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188, 53 S. E. 273,

L. R. A. (N.

S.) 792.

VVe have not found

anything in the evidence that justiﬁed the de
No attempt was made to touch ap
boycott.”
pellee’s dealings or relations with customers and users of its goods.
Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers’ International Union (C. C.) 72 Fed. 695;
Loewe v. Cal. State Federation of Labor (C. C.) 139 Fed. 71: Loewe
274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, S2 L. Ed. 488.
v. Lawlor, 208 U.
After the
-strike was on, appellee sent patterns, on which the strikers had been
working. to foundries in other cities. The strikers procured the mold
ers in those foundries, who also were members of the Iron Molders’
Union of North America, to refuse to make appellee’s castings. Those
molders notiﬁed their employers that they would have to cancel their
contracts to make castings for appellee, or they would quit work.
as to an “illegal
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Some employers discharged the notiﬁers, others refused to cancel and
the union men struck, and others complied and the union men stayed.
In those instances where the foundrymen fulﬁlled their contracts, ap
pellee was not damaged; in those where foundrymen broke their con
tracts, there is no proof that appellee has not collected or cannot col
lect adequate damages.
That might be taken as a reason why appellee
on this branch of the case is not entitled to the aid of equity.
But there is a more important reason. Appellants were aiming to
prevent, and appellee to secure, the doing of certain work in which
the skill of appellants’ trade was necessary.
Here was the ground
of controversy, and here the test of endurance. If appellee had the
right (and we think the right was perfect) to seek the aid of fellow
foundrymen to the end that the necessary element of labor should en
ter into appellee’s /product, appellant had the reciprocal right of seeking
the aid of fellow molders to prevent that end.
To whatever extent
employers may lawfully combine and co-operate to control the supply
and the conditions of work to be done, to the same extent should be
recognized the right of workmen to combine and co-operate to control
the supply and the conditions of the labor that is necessary to the do
In the fullest recognition of the equality and mutual
ing of the work.
ity of their rights and their restrictions lies the peace of capital and
labor, for so they, like nations with equally well drilled and equipped
armies and navies, will make and keep treaties of peace, in the fear
of the cost and consequences of war.
The decree is modiﬁed by striking out “persuasion” and “persuading”
from the fourth and seventh paragraphs; further modiﬁed by adding
after “picketing” in the ﬁfth paragraph “in a threatening or intimidat
vacated as to the ﬁrst, eighth, ninth, tenth, fourteentlr
ing manner";
afﬁrmed as to the second, third, sixth,
and ﬁfteenth paragraphs;
eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, sixteenth and the modiﬁed fourth, ﬁfth
Costs of this court to be divided equally.
and seventh paragraphs.
'
,
Gaosscur, Circuit judge, concurred.“
I I
above case George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowefs
Eq. 219, T9 Atl. 262, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445 (1910), and Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ius. C0.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 97 Miss. 149, 32 South. 45-1,
29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 869 (1910), which were not contracts for any deﬁnite period
quasi contract, and plaintiﬁ had a
of time, but “there was a service and
right to have this service to continue free of malicious interference.
The suit
is be-cause of a malicious and wanton interference with plaintiffs rights. and is
also,
not for
breach of any contract.”
Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59
See,
Ann. Cas. 885 (1906), and
W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161,
L. B. A. (N. S.) 1091,
cases cited.
24 Ct. with
ASS'!1, 77 N.

S
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WILSON.

Pr-iusé;2T91.
._)

Peake, N. P. Cas. 55. 3 Rev. Rep

Action for assaulting the maidservant of plaintiff and debauching
her, per quod servitium amisit.
Loan KENYON. This is an action in which damages may be given
to recompense the servant for the injury she has received. Undoubt
edly there must exist some relation of master and servant, but this
action materially differs from the common action for seducing a hired
servant to leave her master’s service. In that kind of action the plain
tiff must prove that the defendant knew the servant was in his service,
but no such knowledge is necessary to support this action. And though
a degree of the relation of master and servant must subsist, yet a
very slight relation is sufficient; as it has been determined, that when
daughters of the highest and most opulent families have been seduced,
the parent may maintain an action on the supposed relation of mas
ter and servant, though every one must know that such a child can
not be treated as a menial servant.
Verdict for the plaintiff.

FLUKER

v.

GEORGIA RAILROAD

(Supreme Court Of Georgia,

&

BANKING CO.

81 Ga. 461. 8 S. E. 529, 2 L. R. A. 843, I2
Am. Str Rep. 328.)

1889.

BLECKLEY, C. I. The plaintiff had for some nine years, without
objection on the part of the company, exercised the privilege of coming
upon the right of way, and dealing with passengers by supplying them
with lunches. A part of the time he had even used the platform of
the company for this purpose, and perhaps also had been allowed to
enter the cars.
The privilege, except as to coming upon the right of
way, was revoked some four years previously to October, 1886.
On
the 10th of said October the plaintiff received notice to cease the ex
ercise of the privilege as to the right of way, and was also informed
that the exclusive right of serving lunches to passengers had been
leased by the company‘ to one Hart. About a week after receiving this
notice the plaintiff’s servant was on two or three occasions expelled
from the right of way by a servant of the company, and in one in
stance the company’s servant, in controlling the action of the plaintiff's
servant, did not desist where the right of way stopped, but con
ducted the intruder across the public street, and up to the plaintiff's
The plaintiff, seeing that he could not carry on his business
door.
through the medium of a servant, undertook to conduct it himself, and
he also was expelled;
both Hart and the defendant's servant c0-op
crating in his expulsion, and Hart, but not the servant, continuing

1~:1r1~‘ac'rsAND
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of force beyond the right of way, and into the public street.
The plaintiff, after this, undertook to advertise his business by ringing
a bell in the street in front of his premises, and Hart alone interfered
with that, and committed an assault upon him in the street. For these
The case was
grievances he brought his action against the company.
the use

tried, and the court granted a nonsuit.
[Omitting discussion of defendant’s liability for ejecting plaintiff
’
himself 2]
5. It does appear, however, that the company's servant, although he
did not chase the plaintiff beyond the right of way, pushed the matter
further in dealing with the plaintiff's servant. He not only forced
him off the right of way, but across the street, and to the plaintiff’s
door. This may give a cause of action to the servant, but it furnishes
none to the plaintiff, because there was no loss of service, nor any im
pairment of capacity to render service; and, for a master to have a
right of action for an assault and battery committed upon his servant,
Robert Mary's Case,
one or both of these consequences must ensue.
9 Coke, 113a; \Vood, Mast. & Serv. § 224; Bigelow, Torts, 108, 109;
l Minor, Inst. 224, and authorities cited.”
Judgment affirmed.

-1-A

AMES
(Supreme Judicial

Court of

v.

UNION RY. CO.

1875.
MilSSﬂCh‘\1lé§((;[)tS,

117 Mass.

541, 19 Am.

Rep.

Declaration in tort against a common car1'i_er for negligence whereby
plaintiff's apprentice, a passenger on defendant's car, was injured and
plaintiff thereby lost his services. The Supreme Court sustained de
fendant’s demurrer, and plaintiff appealed.
The relation of master and apprentice, set forth in
VVELLS,
this declaration. is such as will sustain an action in the name of the
master for an injury to the apprentice causing disability, per quod
servitium amisit. l Chit. Pl. (3 Am. Ed.) 47; Reeve’s Dom. Rel. 376:
Bac. Ab. Master & Servant, O; McCarthy v. Guild, 12 Metc. 291;
Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 347, 48 Am. Dec. 671; Rice v. Nickerson, 9
Allen, 478, 85 Am. Dec. 777; Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147. 14
Am. Rep. 584; Martinez v. Gerber, 3 Scott N. R. 386. s. c. 3 Man. &
A. 8: E. 301; Hall v. Hollander, 4
Gr. 88; Hodsoll v. Stallebrass,
B. & C. 660; Woodward v. Vl/ashburn, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 369.
The tort alleged does not consist in the breach of any contract.
Even if the contract arising from the purchase -of a ticket were held
to have been made with the apprentice alone and in his own right, it
would not exclude liability in tort for injuries caused by the negligence

J.”

ll

25

Accord: Woodward

*6 The

v. Was-hburn, 3 Denio, 369 (18-16).
statement of facts i abridged.
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of the defendant; and upon that liability an action may be maintain
The de
ed by any one who has suffered damage by means thereof.
gree of care required of the defendant, and thus the question whether
there was any liability in tort, might be affected by the existence of the
relation of contract between the defendant and the person injured.
But a tort, not consisting merely in a breach of the contract, being
proved, the right to recover for the damages caused must be gov
erned by the general rule of law; and, under that rule, will be deter
mined by the nature of the injury, and of the right or interest injuri
3 Bl. Com. 142; Marshall v. York, Newcastle & Ber
ouslyaffected.
11
C. B. 655, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 519.
The judgment
wick Railway,
for the defendant must therefore be reversed, and the
Demurrer overruled.

PART IV
STATUTES
English Workrnen’s Compensation Act of
(6

If

Edw.

1906 1

7, c. 58.)

[to which this act applies] per
the corrse of the em
shall, subject as here
workman,
a
his
to
is
caused
employer
ployment
inafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation 'in accordance with
the ﬁrst schedule of this act.
(2) Provided that-—(a) The employer shall not be liable under this
act in respect of any injury which does not disable the workman for
a period of at least one [two, in the original act] week from earning
full wages at the work at which he was employed:
(b) VVhen the injury was caused by the personal negligence or willful
act of the employer or of some person for whose actor default the
employer is responsible, nothing in this act shall affect any civil liability
of the employer, but in that case the workman may at his option, either
claim compensation under this act or take proceedings independently
of this act; but the employer shall not be liable to pay compensa
tion for injury to a workman by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment both independently of and also under this
act, and shall not be liable to any proceedings independently of this
act, except in case of such personal negligence or willful act as afore
said:
(c) If it is proved that the injury to a workman is attributable to the
serious and willful misconduct of that workman, any compensation
claimed in respect of that injury shall, unless the injury results in
death or serious~and permanent disablement, be disallowed [the ex
ception as to injuries resulting in death or serious and permanent dis
ablement was not in the original act].
(3) If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to
Sec.

sonal

1.

(1)

in any employment

injury by accident arising out of and in

LIABILITY Acrs.—The English Employers’ Liability Act of
1EMI’L0YERS'
will be found in the Appendix.
In some of the United States the English act of 1880 has been closely copied,
as in Alabama, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Vermont,
but in more of the states it has been substantially incorporated in the more
comprehensive Workn1en’s Compensation Acts, which resulted from the inade
quacy oi the English act of 1880, and which are now in force in Great Britain
and in most of the states. The original English Compensation Act or 1897 was
so ill drawn (see Cooper & Crane v. Wright, [1902] A. O. 302) that it was ex
tensively changed by the act of 1906, and this has been the model or most
American acts.
1880

(794)

I

Part
the

4)

s'r.u'u'rss

liability to pay compensation under this
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act (including

any question

as to whether the person injured is a workman to whom this act ap
plies), or as to the amount or duration of compensation under this act,

the question, if not settled by agreement shall, subject to the provi
sions of the ﬁrst schedule to this act, be settled by arbitration, in ac
cordance with the second schedule to this act.
(4) If, within the time hereinafter in this act limited for taking pro
ceedings, an action is brought to recover damages independently of this
act for injury caused by any accident, and it is determined in such
action that the injury is one for which the employer is not liable in
such action, but that he would have been liable to pay compensation
under the provisions of this act, the action shall be dismissed; but
the court in which the action is tried shall, if the plaintiff so choose,
proceed to assess such compensation, but may deduct from such com
pensation all or part of the costs which, in its judgment, have been
caused by the plaintiff bringing the action instead of proceeding under
In any proceeding under this subsection, when the court as
this act.
sesses the compensation it shall give a certiﬁcate of the compensation
it has awarded and the directions_it has given as to the deduction for
costs, and such certiﬁcate shall have the force and effect of an award
under this act.
(5) Nothing in this act shall affect any proceeding for a ﬁne under
the enactments relating to mines, factories, or workshops, or the ap
plication of any such ﬁne [but if any such ﬁne, or any part thereof,
has been applied for the beneﬁt of the person injured, the amount
so applied shall be taken into account in estimating the compensation
under this act].
Sec. 2. (1) Proceedings for the recovery under this act of compen
sation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice of the
accident has been given as soon as practicable after the happening
thereof and before the workman has voluntarily left the employment
in which he was injured, and unless the claim for compensation with
respect to such accident has been made within six months from the
occurrence of the accident causing the injury, or, in case of death,
within six months from the time of death:
Provided always that
in
defect
or
such
notice shall not be
The
want
of
any
inaccuracy
(a)
a bar to the maintenance of such proceedings if it is found in the pro
ceedings for settling the claim that the employer is not, or would not,
if a notice or an amended notice were then given and the hearing post
poned, be prejudiced in his defense by the want, defect, or inaccuracy,
or that such want, defect, or inaccuracy was occasioned by mistake,
absence from the United Kingdom, or other reasonable cause; and
(b) The failure to make a claim within the period above speciﬁed
shall not be a bar to the maintenance of such proceedings if it is found
that the failure was occasioned by mistake, absence from the United
Kingdom, or other reasonable cause.
(2) Notice in respect of an ‘injury under this act shall give the name
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and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary lan
guage the cause of the injury and the date at which the accident hap
pened, and shall be served on the employer, or, if there is more than
one employer, upon one of such employers.
. (3) The notice may be served by delivering the same at, or sending
it by post in a registered letter addressed to, the residence or place
of business of the person on whom it is to be served.
(4) \Vhere the employer is a body of persons, corporate or unin
corporate, the notice may also be served by delivering the same at, or
by sending it by post in a registered letter addressed to, the employer
at the ofﬁce, or, if there be more than one oﬁice, any one of the of
ﬁces of such body.
The other sections (3—17) are omitted.

\
Michigan Workmen’s Compensation Act
Comp. Laws 1915, § 5423 et seq., amended by Pub. Acts 1917, Nos. 41. 206. 235.
Pub. Acts 1919, No. 64, and Pub. Acts 1921, Nos. 60. 173, 180.

Many of the American acts follow closely the language of the Eng
lish act.
Some apply to employments generally; some only'to extra
hazardous employments.
Such portions of the Michigan act as can
be considered in this work are as follows:
Part I.
Section 1. In an action to recover damages for personal
(§ 5423.)
injury sustained by an employé in the course of his employment, or
for death resulting from personal injuries so sustained, it shall not be
a defense:
(a) That the employé was negligent, unless and except it shall ap
pear that such negligence was willful;
(b) That the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow em

Ployé;

(c) That the employé had assumed the risks inherent in or inci
dental to, or arising out of his employment, or arising from the fail
ure of the employer to provide and maintain safegpremises and suitable
appliances.
Sec. 2. The provisions of section one shall not apply
(§ 5424.)
to actions to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by house
hold domestic servants and farm laborers.
Sec. 3. The provisions of section one shall not apply
(§ 5425.)
to actions to recover damages for the death of, or for personal injuries
sustained by employés of any employer who has elected, with the ap
proval of the Industrial Accident Board hereinafter created, to pay
compensation in the-‘manner and to the extent hereinafter provided.
Sec. 4.
Any employer who has elected, with the ap
(§ 5426.)

I.
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proval of the Industrial Accident Board hereinafter created, to pay
compensation as hereinafter provided, shall not be subject to the pro
visions of section one; nor shall such employer be subject to any
other liability whatsoever, save as herein provided for the death of or
personal injury to any employé, for which death or injury compensa
tion is recoverable under this act, except as to employés who have
elected in the manner hereinafter provided not to become subject to
’
the provisions of this act.
Sec. 5.
The following shall constitute employers sub
(§ 5427.)
ject to the provisions of this act:
1. The state, and each county, city, township, incorporated
village
and school district therein, and each incorporated public board or
public commission in this state authorized by law to hold property and
to sue or be sued generally;
2. Every person, ﬁrm and private corporation, including any public
service corporation, who has any person in service under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, and who, at or prior to the
time of the accident to the employé for which compensation under this
act may be claimed, shall in the manner provided in the next section.
have elected to become subject to the provisions of this act, and who
shall not, prior to such accident, have eﬁected a withdrawal of such
election, in the manner provided in the next section.
6.
on
of
Sec.
Such
election
the
the
employers
part
(§ 5428.)
mentioned in subdivision two of the preceding section, shall be. made
by ﬁling with the Industrial Accident Board hereinafter provided for,
a written statement to the effect that such employer accepts the provi
sions of this act for all his businesses, and to cover and protect all em
ployés employed in any and all of his businesses, including all busi
nesses in which he may engage and all employés he may employ while
he remains under this act; and that he adopts, subject to the approval
of said board, one of the four methods provided for the payment of
the compensation hereinafter speciﬁed. The ﬁling of such statement
and the approval of said board shall operate within the meaning of
the preceding_section, to subject such employer to the provisions of
this act and all acts amendatory thereof for the term of one year from
the date of the ﬁling of such statement, and thereafter, without further
act on his part, for successive terms of one year each, unless such
employer shall ,at least thirty days prior to the expiration of such ﬁrst
or any succeeding year, ﬁle in the ofﬁce of said board a notice in writ
ing to the effect that he desires to withdraw his election to be sub
Provided, however, that such em
ject to the provisions of this act:
ployer so electing to become subject to the provisions of this act shall,
within ten days after the approval by said board of his election ﬁled
as aforesaid, post in a conspicuous place in his plant, shop, mine or
place of work, or if such employer be a transportation company, at its
several stations and docks, notice in the form as prescribed and fur
nished by the Industrial Accident Board to the effect that he accepts
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and will be bound by the provisions of this act. Every employer ﬁling
its approval by the Indus
trial Accident Board, shall be held to have come under this act for
any and all businesses in which he is engaged or in which he may en
gage during the time he remains under the act, and as to all employés
employed by him in any of said businesses, and any employer not se
curing the permission of the Industrial Accident Board to carry his
own risk in the manner provided in part four of this act shall insure
all his liability in all of his businesses in one and the same insurance
company or organization hereinafter provided for in part four of
V
this act.
The term “employé” as used in this act shall
Sec. 7.
(§ 5429.)
be construed to mean:
1. Every person in the service of the state, or of any county, city,
township, incorporated village or school district therein, under any
appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
except any ofﬁcial of the state, or of any county, city, township, incor
Pro
porated village or ‘school district therein, elected at the polls:
vided, that one employed by a contractor who has contracted with a
county, city, township, incorporated village, school district or the state,
through its representatives, shall not be considered an employé of the
state, county, city, township, incorporated village or school district
which made the contract, when such contractor is subject to this act:
Provided, however, that policemen or ﬁremen or employés of the police
or ﬁre departments, or their dependents, in municipalities or villages of
this State having charter provisions prescribing like beneﬁts, may
waive the provisions of this act and accept in lieu thereof such like
beneﬁts as are prescribed in such charter, but shall not be entitled
to like beneﬁts from both:
And provided further, that nothing con
tained in this act shall be construed as limiting, changing or repealing
any of the provisions of any charter of any municipality or village of
this state relating to any beneﬁts, compensation, pensions, or retire
ment, independent of this act, provided for employés as hereinbefore
deﬁned.
2. Every person in the service of another, under any contract of
hire, express or implied, including aliens (including working members
of partnerships, receiving wages irrespective of proﬁts from such),
and also including minors who are legally permitted to work under
the laws of the state, who, for the purpose of this act, shall be consid
ered the same and have the same power to contract as adult employés.
Sec. 8. Any employé as deﬁned in subdivision one of
(§ 5430.)
the preceding section shall be subject to the provisions of this act and
of any act amendatory thereof. Any employé as deﬁned in subdivi
sion two of the preceding section shall be deemed to have accepted
and shall be subject to the provisions of this act and of any act
amendatory thereof, if at the time of the accident upon which liability
'
is claimed:
an acceptance under this act and securing
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1. The employer charged with such liability is subject to the provi
sions of this act, whether the employé has actual notice thereof or not;
and
2. Such employé shall not, at the time of entering into his contract
of hire, express or implied, with such employer, have given to his em
ployer notice in writing that he elects not to be subject to the provi
sions of this act; or, in the event that such contract of hire was
made before such employer became subject to the provisions of this
act, such employé shall have given to his employer notice in writing
that he elects not to be subject to such provisions, or without giving
either of such notices shall have remained in the service of such em
ployer for thirty days after the employer has ﬁled with said board an
election to be subject to the terms of this act. An employé who has
given notice to his employer in writing as aforesaid that he elects not
to be subject to the provisions of this act, may waive such claim by
a notice in writing, which shall take effect ﬁve days after it is deliv
ered to‘ the employer or his agent.

Part

If

II.

Section l.
an employé who has not given notice of
(§ 5431.)
his election not to be subject to the provisions of this act, as provided
in part one, section eight, or who has given such notice and has waived
the same as hereinbefore provided, receives a personal injury arising
out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is at
the time of such injury subject to the provisions of this act, he shall
be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent hereinafter pro
vided, or in case of his death resulting from such injuries such com
pensation shall be paid to his dependents as hereinafter deﬁned.
Sec. 2. If the employé is injured by reason of his in
(§ 25432.)
tentional and willful misconduct, he shall not receive compensation
‘
under the provisions of this act.
No compensation shall be paid under this act
Sec. 3.
(§ 5433.)
for any injury which does not incapacitate the employé for a period
of at least one week from earning full wages, but if incapacity extends
beyond the period of one week, compensation shall begin on the eighth
Provided, however, that if such incapacity con
day after the injury:
tinues for six weeks or longer or if death results from the injury, com
pensation shall be computed from the date of the injury.
During the ﬁrst ninety days after the injury
Sec. 4.
(§ 5434.)
the employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, reasonable med
ical, surgical and hospital services and medicines when they are needed.
If death results from the injury, the employer
Sec. 5.
(§ 5435.)
shall pay, or cause to be paid, subject, however, to the provisions of
section twelve hereof, in one of the methods hereinafter provided, to
the dependents of the employé, wholly dependent upon his earnings
for support at the time of the injury, a weekly payment equal to sixty
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per centum of his average weekly wages, but not more than fourteen
dollars nor less than seven dollars a week for a period of three hun
dred weeks from the date of the injury.
If the employé leave de
pendents only partly dependent upon his earnings for support at the
time of his injury, the weekly compensation to be paid as aforesaid
shall be equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the
beneﬁt of persons wholly dependent as the amount contributed by the
employé to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings of the
deceased at the time of his injury.
VV hen weekly payments have been
made to an injured employé before his death the compensation to de
pendents shall begin from the date of the last of such payments, but
shall not continue more than three hundred weeks from the date of the

Injury.
Sec. 6. The following persons shall be conclusively
(§ 5436.)
presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employé:
(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his
death, or from whom, at the time of his death, the Industrial Accident
Board shall ﬁnd the wife was living apart for justiﬁable cause or be
cause he had deserted her;
(b) A husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her
‘
»
death:
(c) A child or children under the age of sixteen years (or over said
age, if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the
parent with whom he is or they are living at the time of the death of
Provided, that in the event of the death of an employé
such parent:
who has at the time of his or her death, a living child or children by
a former husband or wife, under the age of sixteen years (or over said
age, if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning), said child
or children shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for
support upon such deceased employé, even though not living with the
deceased employé at the time of his or her death; -and in all such cases
the death beneﬁt shall be divided between or among the surviving wife
or husband and all the children of the deceased employé, and all other
persons, if any, who are wholly dependent upon the deceased employé
in equal shares, the surviving wife or husband taking the same share
as a child.
In all cases mentioned in this section the total sum due
the surviving wife or husband and her or his own child or children shall
be paid directly to the surviving wife or husband for her or his own
use, and for the use and beneﬁt of her or his own child or children;
but if during the time compensation payment shall continue, the Indus
trial Accident Board shall ﬁnd, that the surviving wife or husband is
not properly caring for said child or children, it shall be the duty of
said board to order the share or shares of such child or children to be
thereafter paid to their guardian or legal representative for their use
and beneﬁt, instead of to their father or mother; and in all cases the
sums due to the child or children by the former wife or husband of
the deceased employé shall be paid to their guardians or legal repre
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sentatives for the use and beneﬁt of said child or children.
other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be de
termined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time
of the injury.- Where a deceased employé leaves a person or persons
wholly dependent upon him or her for support, said person or persons
shall be entitled to the whole death beneﬁt and persons partly de
pendent, if any, shall receive no part thereof, W.hile said persons wholly
All persons wholly dependent upon a deceased
dependent are living.
employé whether by conclusive presumption or as a matter of fact, shall
be entitled to share equally in the death beneﬁt in accordance with the
provisions of this section. If there is no one wholly dependent or if
the death of all persons wholly dependent shall occur before all com
pensation is paid, and there is but one person partly dependent, such
person shall be entitled to compensation according to the extent of his
dependency; and if there is more than one person partly dependent;
the death beneﬁt shall be divided among them according to the rela
tive extent of their dependency.
No person shall be considered a
dependent, unless he or she is a member of the family of the deceased
employé, or unless such person bears to said deceased employé, the
relation of husband or widow, or lineal descendant, or ancestor, or
brother or sister.
Sec. 7. Questions as to who constitute dependents and
(§ 5437.)
the extent of their dependency shall be determined as of the date of
the accident to the employé, and their right to any death beneﬁt shall
become ﬁxed as of such time, irrespective of any subsequent change
in conditions;
and the death beneﬁt shall be directly recoverable by
and payable to the dependent or dependents entitled thereto, or their
legal guardians or trustees. In case of the death of one such depend
ent his proportion of such compensation shall be payable to the surviv
Upon the -death of all such dependents com
ing dependents pro rata.
pensation shall cease. No person shall be excluded as a dependent who
is a non-resident alien. No dependent of an injured employé shall be
deemed, during the life of such employé, a party in interest to any
proceeding by him for the enforcement of collection of any claim for
compensation, nor as respects the compromise thereof by such employé.
Sec. 8.
If death results from the injury the employer
(§ 5438.)
shall pay, or cause to be paid as hereinafter provided, in addition to
the indemnity paid to dependents,
the reasonable expense of his last
sickness andburying, which shall not exceed two hundred dollars, in
addition to any sum the employer may be required to pay under the
provisions of section four of part two of this act.
Sec. 9.
\Vhile the incapacity for work resulting from
(§ 5439.)
the injury is total, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid as here
inafter provided, to the injured employé, a weekly compensation equal
to sixty per centum of his average weekly wages, but not more than
fourteen dollars nor less than seven dollars a week; and in no case
GODD.PR.& A.(2I> En.)—51
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shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than ﬁve hun
dred weeks from the date of the injury, nor shall the total amount of
all compensation exceed seven thousand dollars.
Section 10 is a schedule of the amount to be paid for various in
For this and sections 11-14 see Appendix. p. 907 ff.
juries.
Sec. 15. No proceedings for compensation for an in
(§ 5445.)
under
this
act shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury
jury
shall have been given to the employer within three months after the
happening thereof, and unless the claim for compensation with respect
to such injury, which claim may be either oral or in writing, shall
have been made within six months after the occurrence of the same;
or, in case of the death of the employé, within six months after said
death; or, in the event of his physical or mental incapacity, within
the ﬁrst six months during which the injured employé is not physically
or mentally incapacitated from making a claim: Provided, however,
that in all cases in which the employer has been given notice of the
injury, or has notice or knowledge of the same within three months
after the happening thereof, but the actual injury, disability or inca
pacity does not develop or make itself apparent within six months after
the happening of the accident, but does develop and make itself ap
parent at some date subsequent to six months after the happening of
the same, claim for compensation may be made within three months
after the actual injury, disability or incapacity develops or makes it
self apparent to the injured employé, but no such claim shall be valid
or effectual for any purpose unless made within two years from the
date the accidental personal injury was sustained:
’And provided fur
ther, that any time during which an injured employé shall be prevented
by reason of his physical or mental incapacity from making a claim,
shall not be construed to be any part of the six months’ limitation men
tioned in this section: And provided further, that in all cases in which
the employer has been given notice of the happening of the accident,
or has notice or knowledge of the happening of said accident, within
three months after the happening of the same, and fails, neglects or
refuses to report said accident to the Industrial Accident Board as
required by the provisions of this act, the statute of limitations shall
not run against the claim of the injured employé or his dependents, or
in favor of either said employer or his insurer, until a report of ‘said
accident shall have been ﬁled with the Industrial Accident Board.
For sections 16-19. see Appendix.
Sec. 20.
No agreement by an employé to waive his
(§ 5450.)
rights to compensation under this act shall be valid except that em
ployés or their dependents as deﬁned in subsection one of section seven,
part one, may, after injury only, elect as provided in subsection one of
section seven, part one.
For remainder of Part II, see Appendix.
Part
providps for an Industrial Accident Board with power to
Gonn.Pa.& A. (20 En.)
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determine all questions arising under the act except as otherwise pro
The intent is to create machinery that would operate under the
act without the uncertainty, delay and expense of litigation by the em
ployee. That this has not been fully secured will appear by the cases
For the text of Part III, see Appendix.
following.

vicied.

Part IV.
Every employer ﬁling his election to be
Section 1.
(§ 5473.)
subject to the provisions of this act, as hereinbefore set forth,
shall have the right to specify at the time of doing so, subject to the
approval of said Industrial Accident Board, which of the following
methods for the payment of such compensation he desires to adopt,
come

to-wit:
First, upon furnishing satisfactory

_

proof to said board of his sol

vency" and ﬁnancial ability to pay the compensation and beneﬁts here
inbefore provided for, to make such payments directly to his employés,
terms and
as they may become entitled to receive the same under
' the
conditions of this act; or
Second, to insure against such liability in any employer's liability
company authorized to take such risks in the state of Michigan; or
Third, to insure against such liability in any employer’s insurance
association organized under the laws of the state of Michigan; or
Fourth, to request the commissioner of insurance of the state of
Michigan to assume the administration of the disbursement of such
compensation and the collection of the premiums and assessments nec
Said board,
essary to pay the same, as provided in part ﬁve hereof.
however, shall have the fight from time to time to review and alter its
decision in approving the election of such employer to adopt any one
of the foregoing methods of payment, if in its judgment such action
is necessary or desirable for any reason.
Every insurance company or organization mentioned in this section
issuing an insurance policy to cover any employer not permitted to
carry his own risk under subdivision “ﬁrst” of this section, shall in
one and the same insurance policy insure, cover and protect all the
businesses, employés, enterprises and activities of such employer, and
each and every policy of insurance covering workmen’s compensation
in this state shall contain the following provisions:
any language elsewhere contained in this contract
“Notwithstanding
or policy of insurance, the insurance company or organization issuing
this policy hereby contracts and agrees with the insured employer:
“(a) That it will pay to the persons that may become entitled there
to all workmen’s compensation for which the insured employer may
become liable under the provisions of act number ten, of the Public
Acts of Michigan of the ﬁrs_t extra session of nineteen hundred twelve,
as amended, or as it may be hereafter amended on account of all ac

~.
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cidents happening to his employés during the life of this contract or

policy;

_

“(b) That it will furnish or cause to be furnished to all employés of
the said employer, all reasonable medical, surgical and hospital services
and medicines when they are needed which the employer may be obli
gated to furnish or cause to be furnished to his employés under the pro
visions of the said Michigan Workmen’s Compensation Law; and that
it will pay to the persons entitled thereto for all said reasonable medical,
surgical and hospital services and medicines when_they are needed on
account of all accidents happening to his employés during the life of
this contract or policy;
“(c) That it will pay or cause to be paid the reasonable expense of
the last sickness and burying of all employés, whose deaths are caused
by accidental injuries happening during the life of this contract or
policy and arising out of and in the course of their employment with
the said employer, which the said employer may be obligated to pay
under the provisions of said \'Vorkmen’s Compensation Law, the
amount in each case, however, not to exceed two hundred dollars;
“(d) That ‘this insurance contract or policy shall for all purposes
be held and deemed to cover all the businesses the said employer is en
gaged in at the time of the issuance of this contract or policy and all
other businesses, if any, said employer may engage in during the life
thereof, and all employés the said employer may employ in any of his
businesses during the period covered by this policy;
“(e) That it hereby assumes all obligations imposed upon the said
employer by his acceptance of the Michigan VVorkmen’s Compensation
Law, as far as the payment of compensation, death beneﬁts, or for
medical, surgical or hospital care or medicines is concerned;
“(f) That it will ﬁle with the Industrial Accident Board, at Lansing,
Michigan, at least ten days before the taking eﬁ"ect of any termination
or cancellation of this contract or policy, a notice giving the date at
which it is proposed to terminate or cancel this contract or policy; and
that any termination of this policy shall not be eﬁective as far as the
employés of the insured covered thereby are concerned until ten days
after such notice of such proposed termination or cancellation is re
ceived by the said Industrial Accident Board;
“(g) That all the provisions of this contract, if any, which are not in
harmony with this paragraph are to be construed as modiﬁed hereby,
and all conditions and limitations in said policy, if any, conflicting here
with are hereby made null and void.”
The said provisions shall be printed upon or attached to the ﬁrst
page of every insurance contract or policy issued by any insurance
company or organization for the purpose of protecting any employer ac
cepting the Michigan Worl<men’s Compensation Law, in type not
smaller than long primer and shall constitute a separate paragraph of
the said policy; and any provision of the policy, if any, inconsistent
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with the said undertakings and agreements of the insurance company or
organization, contained in the said provisions shall be null and void.
The remaining sections of the act will be found in the Appendix.’
ZPart V provides for an “accident fund" to be collected and disbursed
by the state commissioner of insurance (State Adm. Bd. by manager, 1921).
For such as in writing request the state in eﬂ’ect to furnish insurance at c0s1..
Part VI contains miscellaneous provisions.
The statute of Michigan also provides tor incorporation oi? mutual insur
ance companies taking advantage ot the act.
A number of the acts, like the New York statute (Laws 1922, c. 615), apply
to “injuries sustained or death ‘incurred by employees engaged in the follow
forty-seven
ing hazardous employments."
The statute then enumerates
groups of “hazardous employments."
Under this act “an employment cannot
unless the law, fairly construed, declares it to be
be treated as hazardous
Balcom v. Ellintuch, 179 App. Div. 548. 166 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1917).
such."
The purpose of the law is the regulation of industrial occupations involving
special hazards.
Freess v. Kleinan, 190 App. Div. 131, 179 N. Y. Supp. 3-i7
(1919).

In some states the law does not apply to all employers.

In Ohio there must

Compensation Act, 5 1465 et seq. (Gen.
be ﬁve or more workmen. Workmen's
Code, 5 1-i65—37 et seq.).
In some states the actual or imputed negligence of
See
the employer must be the natural and proximate cause of the injury.
New Jersey Workmen’s Compensation Act (Laws 1911, p. 134), § I, 1; in others

the liability for injuries proximately
caused by the employment exists with
out regard to negligence, California W01-kmen’s Compensation. Insurance and
Safety Act (St. 1915, p. 1081) 5 12 (a); though in many there can be no re
covery tor injuries caused by the intoxication or willful misconduct of the
injured employee. California Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety
Act (St. 1915. p. 1081) § 12 (a), subd. (3); or if the injury was intentionally in
ﬂicted by himself or another, Colorado Workmen’s Compensation Act (Laws
1915, c. 179). § 8, subd.
or was caused by some combination of the above,
Indiana W01-kmen’s Compensation Act (Laws 1915. c. 106) Q 8.
Most statutes permit employers and employees to elect whetherthey will
come under the act, penalizing their failure to do so, as in the Michigan act,
supra, hut some make it compulory to come under the act. The Washington
W01-kmen’s Compensation Act (Laws 1911, p. 345) in section 2, enumerates the
employments. and provides that, it there be or arise any
"extrahazardous"
others, they shall come under the,act.
In its ﬁeld the federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§
8657-8665) of course supersedes all state provisions, McLain v. Chicago Gt.
Western R. Co., 140 Minn. 35, 167 N. W. 349, 12 A. L. R. 688 (1918); though
one employed in both intrastate and interstate commerce cannot be com
pelled to elect under which act to proceed until the evidence develops in
which branch of service the injury occurred. Corbett v. Boston & Maine R..
219 Mass. 351. 107 N. E. 60, 12 A. L. R. 683 (1914).
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NEW YORK CENT. R. CO.
(Supreme Court
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of the United States. 1917. 243 U. S. 188. 37 Sup. Ct. 247,
667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. l917D, 629.)

L. Ed.

the opinion of the court.
proceeding was commenced by defendant in error before the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission of the state of New York, es
tablished by the Workmen’s Compensation Law of that state,’ to re
cover compensation from the New York Central & Hudson River Rail
road Company for the death of her husband, Iacob White, who lost
his life September 2, 1914, through an accidental injury arising out
of and in the course of his employment under that company. The
commission awarded compensation in accordance with the terms of
the law; its award was aﬂirmed, without opinion, by the appellate di
vision of the supreme court for the third judicial department, whose
order was aﬁirmed by the court of appeals, without opinion. 169 App.
Div. 903, 152 N. Y. Supp. 1149; 216 N. Y. 653, 110 N. E. 1051. Fed
eral questions having been saved, the present writ of error was sued
out by the New York Central Railroad Company, successor, through
a consolidation of corporations, to the fights and liabilities of the em
ploying company. The writ was directed to the appellate division,
to which the record and proceedings had been remitted by the court
235 U. S. 197, 200, 59 L.
of appeals.
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope,
'
Ed. 193, 196, 35 Sup. Ct. 57.
The errors speciﬁed are based upon these contentions:
(1) That
the liability, if any, of the railroad company for the death of Iacob
Vt/hite, is deﬁned and limited exclusively by the provisions
of the
federal Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65,
Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8657 ; and (2) that to award compensation to de
fendant in error under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensa
tion Law would deprive plaintiff in error of its property without due
process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, in con
travention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The ﬁrst point assumes that the deceased was employed in inter
state commerce at the time he received the fatal injuries.
According
to the record, he was a night watchman, charged with the duty of
guarding tools and materials intended to be used in the construction
of a new station and new tracks upon a line of interstate railroad.
The commission found, upon evidence fully warranting the ﬁnding,
that he was on duty at the time, and at a place not outside of the lim
its prescribed for the performance of his duties; that he was not en
gaged in interstate commerce; and that the injury received by him
and resulting in his death was an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment.

Mr. Justice Prrrzgv delivered

A

~€

3Chapter 816, Laws 1913, as re-enacted and amended by chapter
1914, and amended by chapter 316, Laws 1914.
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The admitted fact that the new station and tracks were designed
for use, when ﬁnished, in interstate commerce, does not bring the case
within the federal act. The test is, “Was the employee at the time
of the injury engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so close
ly related to it as to be practically a part of it ?” Shanks v. Delaware,
L. & VV. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 558,60 L. Ed. 436, 438, L. R. A. 1916C,
797, 36 Sup. Ct. 188.
Decedent’s work bore no direct relation to in
terstate transportation, and had to do solely with construction work,
which is clearly distinguishable, as was pointed out in Pedersen v.
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 152, 57 L. Ed. 1125, 1128,
33 Sup. Ct. 648, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153, 3 N. C. C. A. 779.
And see
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, 180, 60 L. Ed.
941, 942, 36 Sup. Ct. 517, 11 N. C. C. A. 992; Raymond v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. Co. (this day decided) 243 U. S. 43, 61 L. Ed. 583, 37
The ﬁrst point, therefore, is without basis in fact.
Sup. Ct. Rep. 268.
\Ve turn to the constitutional question. The \Vorkmen’s Compen
sation Law of New York establishes forty-two groups of hazardous
employments, deﬁnes “emp_loyee” as a person engaged in one of these
employments upon the premises, or at the plant, or in the course of his
employment away from the plant of his employer, but excluding farm
laborers and domestic servants;
deﬁnes “employment”
as including
employment only in a trade, business, or occupation carried on by
the employer for pecuniary gain, “injury” and “personal injury” as
meaning only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment, and such disease or infection as naturally and unavoid
ably may result therefrom; and requires every employer subject to
its provisions to pay or provide compensation according to a prescribed
schedule for the disability or death of his employee resulting from an
accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of the
employment, without regard to fault as a cause, except where the
injury is occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee
to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another, or where
it results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while
on duty, in which cases neither the injured employee nor any de
pendent shall receive compensation.
By section 11 the prescribed liability is made exclusive, except that,
if an employer fail to secure the payment of compensation as provided
in section 50, an injured employee, or his legal representative, in case
death results from the injury, may, at his option, elect to claim com
pensation under the act, or to maintain an action in the courts for dam
ages, and in such an action it shall not be necessary to plead or prove
freedom from contributory negligence, nor may the defendant plead
as a defense that the injury was caused by -the negligence of a fellow
servant, that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, or
that the injury was due to contributory negligence. Compensation un
der the act is not regulated by the measure of damages applied in neg
ligence suits, but, in addition to providing medical, surgical, or other
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like treatment, it is based solely on loss of earning power, being grad
uated according to the average weekly wages of the injured employee
and the character and duration of the disability, whether partial or
total, temporary or permanent; while in case the injury causes death,
the compensation is known as a death beneﬁt, and includes funeral
expenses, not exceeding $100, payments to the surviving wife (or de
pendent husband) during widowhood (or dependent widowerhood) of
a percentage of the average wages of the deceased, and if there be a
surviving child or children under the age of eighteen years an addi
tional percentage of such wages for each child until that age is reach
There are provisions invalidating agreements
ed.
by employees to
waive the right to compensation, prohibiting any assignment, release,
or commutation of claims for compensation or beneﬁts except as pro
vided by the act, exempting them from the claims of creditors, and
requiring that the compensation and beneﬁts shall be paid only to em
ployees or their dependents.
Provision is made for the establishment of a Workmen’s Compen
sation Commission,‘ with administrative and judicial functions, in
cluding authority to pass upon claims to compensation on notice to
The award or decision of the commission is
the parties interested.
made subject to an appeal, on questions of law only, to the appellate
division of the supreme court for the third department, with an ulti
mate appeal to the court of appeals in cases where such an appeal
would lie in civil actions. A fund is created, known as “the state in
surance fund,” for the purpose of insuring employers against liability
under the law, and assuring to the persons entitled the compensation
The fund is made up primarily of premiums re
thereby provided.
ceived from employers, at rates ﬁxed by the commission in view of
the hazards of the different classes of employment, and the premiums
are to be based upon the total pay roll and number of employees in
each class at the lowest rate consistent with the maintenance of a sol
vent state insurance fund and the creation of a reasonable surplus and
reserve.
Elaborate provisionsare laid down for the administration
of this fund. By section 50, each employer is required to secure com
pensation to his employees in one of the following ways:
(1) By in
suring and keeping insured the payment of such compensation in the
state fund; or (2) through any stock corporation or mutual associa
tion authorized to transact the business of workmen’s compensation
insurance in the state; or (3) "by furnishing satisfactory proof to the
commission of his ﬁnancial ability to pay such compensation for him
self, in_which case the commission may, in its discretion, require the
deposit with the commission of securities of the kind prescribed in
section 13 of the Insurance Law, in an amount to be determined by
the commission, to secure his liability to pay the compensation pro

.~

4 By chapter 67-1, Laws 1915, §§ 2 and 8, this commission was abolished and
its functions were conferred upon the newly created Industrial Commission.
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vided in this chapter.” If an employer fails to comply with this sec
tion, he is made liable to a penalty in an amount equal to the pro rata
premium that would have been payable for insurance in the state fund
during the period of noncompliance: besides which, his injured em
ployees or their dependents are at liberty to maintain an action for
damages in the courts, as prescribed by section 11.
In a previous year, the legislature enacted a compulsory compen
sation law applicable to a limited number of specially hazardous em
ployments, and requiring the employer to pay compensation without
This was held by the court of
regard to fault. Laws 1910, c. 674.
appeals in Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 34 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 162, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156, 1 N. C. C. A. 517,
to be invalid because in conﬂict with the due process of law provisions
of the state Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There
after, and in the year 1913, a constitutional amendment was adopted,
effective January 1, 1914, declaring:
“Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed to
limit\
the power of the legislature to enact laws for the protection of the
lives, health, or safety of employees; or for the payment, either by
employers, or by employers and employees or otherwise, either direct
ly or through a state or other system of insurance or otherwise, of
compensation for injuries to employees or for death of employees re
sulting from such injuries without regard to fault as a cause thereof,
except where the injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of
another, or where the injury results solely from the intoxication of the
injured employee while on duty; or'for the. adjustment, determina
tion and settlement, with or without trial by jury, of issues which may
arise under such legislation; or to provide that the right of such com
pensation, and the remedy therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights
and remedies for injuries to employees or for death resulting from
such injuries; or to provide that the amount of such compensation
for death shall not exceed a 'ﬁxed or determinable sum; provided
that all moneys paid by an employer to his employees or their legal
representatives, by reason of the enactment of any of the laws herein
authorized, shall be held to be a proper charge in the cost of
operatiny
the business of the employer.”
In December, 1913, the legislature enacted the law now under con
sideration (Laws 1913, c. 816), and in 1914 re-enacted it (Laws 1914,
c. 41) to take effect as to payment of compensation on ]uly 1 in that
year. The act was sustained by the court of appeals as not inconsist
ent with the Fourteenth Amendment in ]ensen v. Southern P. Co., 215
N. Y. 514, L. R. A. 1916.-\, 403, 109 N. E. 600, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 276;
and that decision was followed in the case at bar.
The scheme of the act is so wide a departure from common-law
standards respecting the responsibility of employer to- employee that
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doubts naturally have been raised respecting its constitutional validity.
urged or suggested in this case and in
kindred cases submitted at the same time are
(a) That the employ
er’s property is taken without due process of law, because he is sub
jected to a liability for compensation without regard to any neglect or
default on his part or on the part of any other person for whom he
1S responsible, and in spite of the fact that the injury may be solelv at
eiplitribuitable to the fault of the employee; (b) that the employee's rights
v
are interferedwith, in that he is prevented from having compensation
for injuries arising from the employer’s fault commensurate with the
damages actually sustained, and is limited to the measure of compen
sation prescribed by the act; and (c) that both employer and employee
are deprived of their liberty to acquire property by being prevented
from making such agreement as they choose respecting the terms of
\the employment.
In support of the legislation, it is said that the whole common-law
doctrine of employer’s liability for negligence, with its defenses of
contributory negligence, fellow servant’s negligence, and assumption
of risk, is based upon ﬁctions, and is inapplicable to modern conditions
of employment; that in the highly organized and hazardous indus
tries of the present day the causes of accident are often so obscure
and complex that in a material proportion of cases it is impossible by
any method correctly to ascertain the facts necessary to form an ac
curate judgment, and in a still larger proportion the expense and de
lay required for such ascertainment amount in effect to a defeat of
justice, that, under the present system, the injured workman is left
to bear the greater part of industrial accident loss, which, because of
unable to sustain, so that he and those depend
his limited income, he
ent upon him are overcome by poverty and frequently become a bur
den upon public or private charity; and that litigation
unduly costly
and tedious, encouraging corrupt practices and arousing antagonisms
between employers and employees.
In considering the constitutional question,
necessary to view
the matter from the standpoint of the employee as well as from that
an employer, and can
of the employer. For, while plaintiff in error
not succeed without showing that its rights as such are infringed
531, 544, 58 L. Ed.
(Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
713, 719, 34 Sup. Ct. 359; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571,
N. C. C. A. 570), yet, as
576, 59 L. Ed. 364, 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 167,
pointed out by the court of appeals in the jensen Case (215 N. Y.
an essential part of the
526), the exemption from further liability
invalid as against the employee,
scheme, so that the statute,
in
.
valid as against the employer.
The close relation of the rules governing responsibility as between
employer and employee to the fundamental rights of liberty and prop
erty is, of course, recognized. But those rules, as guides of conduct,
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No
are not beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest.
person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to in
sist that it shall remain unchanged for his beneﬁt.
Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113, 134, 24 L. Ed. 77, 87; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S.
516, 532, 28 L. Ed. 232, 237, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292; Martin v. Pitts
burg & L. E. R. Co., 203 U. S. 284, 294, 51 L. Ed. 184, 191, 27 Sup.
Ct. 100, 8 Ann. Cas. 87; Second Employers’ Liability Cases (Mondou
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 50, 56 L. Ed. 327, 346,
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875; Chicago
& A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 76, 59 L. Ed. 1204, 1210,
35 Sup. Ct. 678.
The common law bases the employer's liability for
injuries to the employee upon the ground of negligence; but negli
gence is merely the disregard of some duty imposed by law; and the
nature and extent of the duty may be modiﬁed by legislation, with
corresponding change in the test of negligence. Indeed, liability may
be imposed for the consequences of a failure to comply with a statu
tory duty, irrespective of negligence in the ordinary sense; safety ap
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co.
pliance acts being a familiar instance.
v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 295, 52 L. Ed. 1061, 1068, 28 Sup. Ct. 616,
21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464; Texas & P. R. C0. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33,
39, 43, 60 L. Ed. 874, 877, 878, 36 Sup. Ct. 482.
The fault may be that of the employer'himself, or—most frequently
——that of another for whose conduct he is made responsible according
to the maxim respondeat superior.
In the latter case the employer
may be entirely blameless, may have exercised the utmost human fore
sight to safeguard the employee; yet, if the alter ego, while acting
within the scope of his duties, be negligent—in disobedience, it may
be, of the employer’s positive and speciﬁc cornmand—the employer
is answerable for the consequences. It cannot be that the rule em
bodied in the maxim is unalterable by legislation.
The immunity of the employer from responsibility to an employee
for the negligence of a fellow employee is of comparatively recent
origin, it being the product of the judicial conception that the prob
ability of a fellow workman’s negligence is one of the natural and or
dinary risks of the occupation, assumed by the employee and presuma
bly taken into account in the ﬁxing of his wages. The earliest re
ported cases are Murray v. South Carolina R. Co. (1841) 1 McMul.
385, 398, 36 Am. Dec. 268; Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp. (1842)
4 Met. 49, 57, 38 Am. Dec. 339, 15 Am. Neg. Cas. 407; Hutchinson
v. York, N..& B. R. Co. (1850) L. R. 5 Exch. 343, 351, 19 L. ]. Exch.
N. S. 296, 299, 14 ]ur. 837, 840, 6 Eng. Ry. 8: C. Cas. 580; Wigmore
v. ]ay (1850) L. R. 5 Exch. 354, 19 L. J. Exch. N. S. 300, 14 Jur. 838,
841 ; Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid (1858) 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 266, 284,
295, 4 ]ur. N. S. 767, 6 VVeek. Rep. 664, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 107.
And
see Randall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, 483, 27 L. Ed.
1003, 1005, 3 Sup. Ct. 322; Northern P. R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S.
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L. Ed. 755, 758, 6 Sup. Ct. 590. The doctrine has pre
vailed generally throughout the United States, but with material dif
ferences in different jurisdictions respecting who should be deemed a
fellow servant and who a vice principal or alter ego of the master,
turning sometimes upon reﬁned distinctions as to grades and depart
ments in the employment.
See Knutter v. New York & N. ]. Teleph.
Co., 67 N. J. Law, 646, 650-653, 58 L. R. A. 808, 52 Atl. 565, 12 Am.
Neg. Rep. 109. It needs no argument to show that such a rule is sub
ject to modiﬁcation or abrogation by a state upon proper occasion.
The same may be said with respect to the general doctrine of as
sumption of risk.
By the common law the employee assumes the
risks normally incident to the occupation in which he voluntarily en
gages; other and extraordinary risks and those due to the employer's
negligence he does not assume until made aware of them, or until
they become so obvious that an ordinarily prudent man would observe
and appreciate them; in either of which cases he does assume them,
if he continues in the employment without obtaining from the em
ployer an assurance that the matter will be remedied; but if he re
ceive such an assurance, then, pending performance of the promise,
the employee
does not, in ordinary cases, assume the special risk.
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 504, 58 L. Ed.
1062, 1070, L. R. A. 1915C, 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475,
8 N. C. C. A. 834; Id., 239 U. S. 595, 599, 60 L. Ed. 458, 461, 36 Sup.
Ct. 180. Plainly, these rules, as guides of conduct and tests of liability,
are subject to change in the exercise of the sovereign authority of
642, 647, 29

the state.

‘

So, also, with respect to contributory negligence.
Aside from in
for which the statute under consid
self—inflicted,
eration affords no compensation, it is plain that the rules of law upon
the subject, in their bearing upon the employer’s responsibility, are
subject to legislative change; for contributory negligence, again, in
volves a default in some duty resting on the employee, and his duties
are subject to modiﬁcation.
It may be added, by way of reminder, that the entire matter of lia
bility for death caused by. wrongful act, both within and without the
relation of employer and employee, is a modern statutory innovation,
in which the states diﬁ’er'as to who may sue, for whose beneﬁt, and
the measure of damages.
But it is not necessary to extend the discussion. This court repeat
edly has upheld the authority of the states to establish by legislation
departures from the fellow-servant rule and other common-law rules
affecting the employer’s liability for personal injuries to the employee.
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205. 208, 32 L. Ed. 107, 108,
8 Sup. Ct. 1161; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S.
210, 32 L. Ed. 109, 8 Sup. Ct. 1176: Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline,
199 U. S. 593, 598, 50 L. Ed. 322, 325, 26 Sup. Ct. 159, 19 Am. Neg.
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Rep. 625; Tullis_ v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. Ed.
192, 20 Sup. Ct. 136; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S.
36, 53, 54 L. Ed. 921, 928, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 84, 30 Sup. Ct. 676;
Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 57 L. Ed. 966, 33
Sup. Ct. 581; Wilmington Star Min. Co. v.i Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 73,
51 L. Ed. 708, 715, 27 Sup. Ct. 412;
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Castle,
224 U. S. 541, S44, 56 L. Ed. 875, 878, 32 Sup. Ct. 606.
A corre
sponding power on the part of Congress, when legislating within its
Liability
appropriate sphere, was sustained in Second Employers’
Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L.
Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875.
And see El Paso & N. E. R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 97, 54 L.
Ed. 106, 111, 30 Sup. Ct. 21; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 619, 55 L. Ed. 878, 883, 31
Sup. Ct. 621.
It is true that in the case of the statutes thus sustained there were
Nor is it
reasons rendering the particular departures appropriate.
necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a state
might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of “due process
of law," suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting liability
as between employer and employee, without providing a reasonably
just substitute. Considering the vast industrial organization of tne
state of New York, for instance, with hundreds of thousands of plants
and millions of wage earners, each employer, on the one hand, having
embarked his capital, and each employee, on the other, having taken up
his particular mode of earning a livelihood, in reliance upon the prob
able permanence of an established body of law governing the relation,
it perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of
action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting
No such question is here pre
up something adequate in their stead.
sented, and we intimate no opinion upon it.
The statute under con
sideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish another sys
If the employee is no longer able to recover as much
tem in its place.
as before in case of being injured through the employcr’s negligence,
he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has
a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and expense of es
Instead
tablishing negligence or proving the amount of the damages.
of assuming the entire consequences of all ordinary risks of the occu
in excess of the scheduled com
pation, he assumes the consequences,
pensation, of risks ordinary and extraordinary.
On the other hand, if the employer is left without defense respect
ing the question of fault, he at the same time is assured that the recov
ery is limited, and that it goes directly to the relief of the designated
And just as the employee’s assumption of ordinary risks
beneﬁciary.
at common law presumably was taken into account in ﬁxing the rate
of wages, so the ﬁxed responsibility of the employer, and the modiﬁed
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assumption of risk by the employee under the new system, presumably
be reﬂected in the wage scale.
The act evidentlyiis intended as a.
just settlement of a diﬁicult problem, affecting one of the most im
We
portant of social relations, and it is to be judged in its entirety.
have said enough to demonstrate that, in such an adjustment, the par
ticular, rules of the common law affecting the subject-matter are not
placed by the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the reach of the law
making power of the state; and thus we are brought to the question
whether the method of compensation that is established as a substi
tute transcends the limits of permissible state action.
VVe will consider, ﬁrst, the scheme of compensation, ‘deferring for
the present the question of the manner in which the employer is re
quired to secure payment.
Brieﬂy, the statute imposes liability upon the employer to make com
pensation for disability or death of the employee resulting from acci
dental personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employ
ment, without regard to fault as a cause except where the injury or
death is occasioned by the employee’s willful intention-to produce
or where the injury results solely from his intoxication while on duty;
graduates the compensation for disability according to a prescribed
scale based upon the loss of earning power, having regard to the previ
ous wage and the character and duration of the disability; and meas
ures the death beneﬁts according to the dependency of the surviving
wife, husband, or infant children.
Perhaps we should add that
has no retrospective effect, and applies only to cases arising some
months after its passage.
Of course, we cannot ignore the question whether the new arrange
ment
arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of natural
important to be observed that the act
Respecting this,
justice.
applies only to disabling or fatal personal injuries received in the course
of hazardous employment in gainful occupation. Reduced to its ele
this: Employer and employee,
ments, the situation to be dealt with
common operation intended to be ad
by mutual consent, engage in
to contribute his personal serv
vantageous to both; the employee
to receive wages, and, ordinarily, nothing more;
ices, and for these
to furnish plant, facilities, organization, capital, credit,
the employer
to control and manage the operation, paying the wages and other ex
penses, disposing of the product at such prices as he can obtain, tak
any there be, and, of necessity, bearing the en
ing all the proﬁts,
In the nature of things, there
more or less of
tire losses.
proba
bility that the employee may lose his life through some accidental in
jury arising out of the employment, leaving his widow or children de
prived of their natural support; or that he may sustain an injury not
mortal, but resulting in his total or partial disablement, temporary or
permanent, with corresponding impairment of earning capacity.
The
physical suffering must be borne by the employee alone; the laws of
a
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nature prevent this from being evaded or shifted to another, and the
statute makes no attempt to afford an equivalent in compensation.
But, besides, there is the loss of earning power,—a loss of that which
stands to the employee as his capital in trade. This is a loss arising
out of the business, and, however it may be charged up, is an expense
of the operation, as truly as the cost of repairing broken machinery
or any other expense that ordinarily is paid by the employer. Who is
to bear the charge?
It is plain that, on grounds of natural justice,
it is not unreasonable for the state, while relieving the employer from
responsibility for damages measured by common-law standards and
payable in cases where he or those for whose conduct he is answerable
are found to be at fault, to require him to contribute a reasonable
amount, and according to a reasonable and deﬁnite scale, by way of
compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common
enterprise, irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leav
ing the entire loss to rest where it may chance to fall—that
upon
the injured employee or his dependents.
Nor can
be deemed ar
bitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of the employee’s inter
est, to supplant
system under which he assumed the entire risk of
right to recover an
injury in ordinary cases, and in others had
amount more or less speculative upon proving facts of negligence that
often were diﬁicult to prove, and substitute
system under which,
in all ordinary cases of accidental injury, he
sure of
deﬁnite and
easily ascertained compensation, not being obliged to assume the en
tire loss in any case, but in all cases assuming any loss beyond the pre
scribed scale.
Much emphasis
laid upon the criticism that the act creates lia
sulﬁciently answered by what has been
bility without fault. This
said, but we may add that liability without fault
not a novelty in
the law. The common-law liability of the carrier, of the innkeeper,
or him who employed ﬁre or other dangerous agency or harbored
mischievous animal, was not dependent altogether upon questions of
fault or negligence. Statutes imposing liability without fault have been
F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S.
sustained. St. Louis
22, 41
P. R. Co. v. Zer
L. Ed. 611, 619, 17 Sup. Ct. 243; Chicago, R.
necke, 183 U. S. 582, 586, 46 L. Ed. 339, 340, 22 Sup. Ct. 229.
\Ve have referred to the maxim, respondeat superior.
In
well
known English case, Hall v. Smith,
Bing. 156, 160, 130 Eng. Re
C. P. 113, this maxim was said
B. Moore, 226,
print, 265,
L.
by Best, C. ]., to be “bottomed on this principle, that he who expects
to derive advantage from an act which
done by another for him,
must answer for any injury which
third person may sustain from
it.” And this view has been adopted in New York.
Cardot v. Bar
ney, 63 N. Y. 281, 287, 20 Am. Rep. 533. The provision for compul
sory compensation, in the act under consideration, cannot be deemed
to be an arbitrary and unreasonable application of the principle, so as
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to amount to a deprivation of the employer's property without due
The pecuniary loss resulting from the employee’s
process of law.
death or disablement must fall somewhere.
It results from some
thing done in the course of an operation from which the employer ex
pects to derive a proﬁt. In excluding the question of fault as a cause
of the injury, the act in effect disregards the proximate cause and
looks to one more remote—the primary cause, as it may be deemed—
and that is, the employment itself.
For this, both parties are responsi
ble, since they voluntarily engage in it as coadventurcrs, with personal
injury to the employee as a probable and foreseen result. In ignor
ing any possible negligence of the employee producing or contributing
to the injury, the lawmaker reasonably may have been influenced by
the belief that, in modern industry, the utmost diligence in the em
ployer’s service is in some degree inconsistent with adequate care on
the part of the employee for his own safety; that the more intently
he devotes himself to the work, the less he can take precautions for
his own security.
And it is evident that the consequences of a dis
abling or fatal injury are precisely the same to the parties immediate
ly affected, and to the community, whether the proximate cause be
culpable or innocent.
Viewing the entire matter, it cannot be pro
nounced arbitrary and unreasonable for the state to impose upon the
employer the absolute duty of making a moderate and deﬁnite com
pensation in money to every disabled employee, or, in case of his death,
to those who were entitled to look to him for support, in lieu of the
common-law liability conﬁned to cases of negligence.
This, of course, is not to say that any scale of compensation, how
ever insigniﬁcant, on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be
In this case, no criticism is made on the ground that
supportable.
the compensation prescribed by the statute in question is unreasonable
in amount, either in general or in the particular case. Any question of
that kind may be met when it arises.
But, it is said, the statute strikes at the fundamentals of constitu
tional freedom of contract;
and we are referred to two recent dec
larations by this court. The ﬁrst is this: “Included in the right of
personal liberty and the right of private property—partaking
of the
nature of each~—is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of
Chief among such contracts is that of personal employ
property.
ment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or
If this right be struck down or arbitrarily
other forms of property.
interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty" in the
long-established constitutional sense.”
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S.
l, 14, 59 L. Ed. 441, 446, L. R. A. 1915C, 960, 35 Sup. Ct. 240. And
“It requires no argument to show that the right to
this is the other:
work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure.”
Truax v.
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Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41, 60 L. Ed. 131, 135, L. R. A. 1916D, S45, 36
Sup. Ct. 7.
It is not our purpose to qualify or weaken either of these declara
tions in the least.
And we recognize that the legislation under review
does measurably limit the freedom of employer and employee to agree
respecting the terms of employment, and that it cannot be supported
except on the ground thatrit is a reasonable exercise of the police pow
In our opinion it is fairly supportable upon that
er of the state.
And for this reason: The subject matter in respect of which
ground.
freedom of contract is restricted is the matter of compensation for
human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course of hazard
ous employment, and the public has a direct interest in this as affect
“The whole is no greater than the sum of
ing,the common welfare.
all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and welfare are
Holden v. Hardy, 169
sacriﬁced or neglected, the state must suffer."
U. S. 366. 397, 42 L. Ed. 780, 793, 18 Sup. Ct. 383. It cannot be
doubted that the state may prohibit and punish self-maiming and at
tempts at suicide; it may prohibit a man from bartering away his life
or his personal security; indeed, the right to these is often declared,
in bills of rights, to be “natural and inalienable ;” and the authority
to prohibit contracts made in derogation of a lawfully-established
pol
icy of the state respecting compensation for accidental death or dis
abling personal injury is equally clear. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 571, 55 L. Ed. 328, 340, 31 Sup. Ct. 259;
Second Employers’ Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. &
H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, S2. 56 L. Ed. 327, 347,i 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44,
32 Sup. Ct. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875.
We have not overlooked the criticism that the act imposes no rule
of conduct upon the employer with respect to the conditions of labor
in the various industries embraced within its terms, prescribes no duty
with regard to where the workmen shall work, the character of the
machinery, tools, or appliances, the rules or regulations to be estab
This statute does not
lished, or the safety devices to be maintained.
concern itself with measures of prevention, which presumably are em
braced in other laws.
But the interest of the public is not conﬁned
to these.
One of the grounds of its concern with the continued life
and earning power of the individual is its interest in the prevention
of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and crime. And, in our
opinion, laws regulating the responsibility of employers for the injury
or death of employees, arising out of the employment, bear so close a
relation to the protection of the lives and safety of those concerned
that they properly may be regarded as coming within the category of
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103, 23 L. Ed. 819,
police regulations.
820; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541, 545, 56 L. Ed. 875,
879, 32 Sup. Ct. 606.
Gonn.PB.& A.(2D ED.)—52
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are amply adequate to afford the notice and opportunity to be heard
The denial of a trial by jury is not
required by the 14th Amendment.

inconsistent with “due process.” VValker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90. 23
678; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 340, 59 L. Ed. 960,
985, 35 Sup. Ct. 582.
The objection under the “equal protection” clause is not pressed.
The only apparent basis for it is in the exclusion of farm laborers
But, manifestly, this cannot
and domestic servants from the scheme.
classiﬁcation, since it rea
be judicially declared to be an arbitrary
sonably may be considered that the risks inherent in these occupations
Missouri, K. & T. R.
are exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar.
Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 650, 58 L. Ed. 1135, 1137, 34 Sup. Ct..678,
'
and cases there cited.
\Ve conclude that the prescribed scheme of compulsory compensa
tion is not repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and are brought to consider, next, the manner in which the employer
is required to secure payment of the compensation.
By section 50,
this may be done in one of three ways:
(a) State insurance;
(b) in
surance with an authorized insurance corporation or association;
or
The record shows that the predecessor
(c) by a deposit of securities.
of plaintiff in error chose the third method, and, with the sanction of
the commission, deposited securities to the amount of $300,000, under
section 50, and $30,000 in cash as a deposit to secure prompt and con
venient payment, under section 25, with an agreement to make a fur
This was accompanied with a reservation
ther deposit if required.
of all contentions as to the invalidity of the act, and had not the effect
of preventing plaintiff in error from raising the questions we have
discussed.
The system of compulsory compensation having been found to be
within the power of the state, it is within the limits of permissible reg
ulation, in aid of the system, to require the employer to furnish satis
factory proof of his ﬁnancial ability to pay the compensation, and to
deposit a reasonable amount of securities for that purpose. The third
clause of section 50 has not been, and presumably will not be, construed
so as to give an unbridled discretion to the commission; nor is it to be
presumed that solvent employers will be prevented from becoming
self-insurers on reasonable terms. No question is made but that the
terms imposed upon this railroad company were reasonable in view of
the magnitude of its operations, the number of its employees, and the
amount of its pay roll (about $50,000,000 annually);
hence no crit
icism of the practical effect of the third clause is suggested.
This being so, it is obvious that this case presents no question as to
whether the state might, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment,
compel employers to effect insurance according to either of the plans
There is no such compul
mentioned in the ﬁrst and second clauses.

L. Ed.
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sion, since self-insurance under the third clause presumably is open
to all employers on reasonable terms that it is within the power of the
state to impose. Regarded as optional arrangements, for acceptance or
rejection by employers unwilling to comply with that clause, the plans
of insurance are unexceptionable from the constitutional standpoint.
Manifestly the employee is not injuriously affected in a constitutional
sense by the provisions giving to the employer an option to secure
payment of the compensation in either of the modes prescribed, for
there is no presumption that either will prove inadequate to safe
guard the employee’s interests.“
judgment afﬁrmed.

-1.?

LINDEBAUER
(County

Court

v.

WEINER.

of Niagara County, New York, 1916.
159 N. Y. Supp. 937.)

94 Misc.

Rep. 612,

FISH, ]. Motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to sec
tion 547 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The action is by servant
against master to recover damages received in assisting in the opera
tion of a threshing machine while in the employ of the master. The
complaint alleges that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant
to assist in the operation of a threshing machine; that in October,
1914, while the plaintiff was in such employ, working upon such ma
chine, assisting in the operation and standing upon the steps thereof,
the defendant caused a threshing engine to be backed up against and
upon the plaintiff in such a manner as to crush plaintiff's left leg
against an iron bar, thereby injuring such leg; then follow allegations
as to the extent of such injuries, and that the plaintiff was compelled
to incur expenses for medical aid and treatment; also that the de
5Two of the earliest cases on the constitutionality or Worknien‘s Com
pensation Acts should be compared: Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y.
271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156, referred to in
65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L.
the principal case, and State v. Clausen,
R. A. (N. S.) 466 (1911). They elaborately consider nearly all the arguments
Other important cases on
as to constitutionality that have been advanced.
the constitutionality of liability and compensation acts are Opinion of the
Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308 (1911); Jensen v. South Paciﬁc Co., 215
N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600, L. R. A. 1916A. 403, 409, note, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 276
(1915), upholding the second New York act as not in violation oi the amended
state Constitution, and assuming with little argument that it does not violate
the federal Constitution; Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., 175 Iowa,
245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145. L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, S03
(1915): Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260,
61 L. Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Mackin v. Detroit Timkin Axle 00., 187
Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49 (1915) ;' State v. Creamer, S5 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602,
39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694 (1912); and Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.
S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058, 6 A, L. R. 1537 (1919), upholding the
Liability Law (Civil Code 1913, pars. 3153
extreme Arizona Employers’
Compensation Law (Civil Code 1913, pars. 3163-3179).
3162), and Compulsory
The dissenting views of four Judges are signiﬁcant.
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fendant had not secured compensation as provided in section 50 of
the \/Vorkmen's Compensation Law, and that the plaintiff suffered
damages in the sum of $500, to recover which the action is brought.
There is no allegation of any negligence on the part of the defend
ant.
The answer admits the employment and that the plaintiff was
slightly injured, but denies the extent of the injuries alleged in the
complaint, and denies that the plaintiff was compelled to incur expenses
for medical aid and treatment. The answer in a separate paragraph
alleges that ‘the plaintiff was at the time under the inﬂuence of intoxi
cating liquors, and that his injury was solely the result of his intoxica
tion; also that the injury resulted solely from the plaintiff’s own
The
negligence, and not from any act or omission of the defendant.
plaintiff demurred to the answer on the ground that it is insufﬁcient in
law to constitute a defense.
This action is brought, as stated in the brief of plaintiff’s counsel,
under section 11 of article 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law,
and it is claimed by plaintiff that the operation of a threshing machine
is a hazardous employment within group 41 of section 2 of article 1
of the act, which reads as follows:
“Group 41. The operation, otherwise than on tracks, on streets,
highways, or elsewhere of cars, trucks, wagons or other vehicles, and
rollers and engines, propelled by steam, gas, gasoline, electric, mechan
ical or other power or drawn by horses or mules.”
The sufficiency of a demurrer may in a proper case be tested by a
motion under said section of the Code and an issue of law raised
Delmar v. Kinderhook Knitting Co.,
thereby tried upon the merits.
134 App. Div. 558, 119 N. Y. Supp. 705; Posner v. Rosenberg, 149
App. Div. 272, 133 N. Y. Supp. 704.
This demurrer, however, must be overruled for the following rea
sons:
(1) It is well settled that a demurrer to an answer for insufﬁciency
will not lie, if the plaintiff does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action (Baxter v. McDonnell, 154 N. Y. 436, 48 N. E.
There
816), as “a bad answer is good enough for a bad complaint."
is no allegation in the complaint that the injuries complained of were
At common law the lia
occasioned by any fault of the defendant.
bility of the master for an injury to his servant while engaged in the
master’s work is based on the faultof the master, and without fault
there was no liability (Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 272,
94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156), and I
do not think it was the intention of the Legislature to change the com
mon la\v in this respect as to the alternative remedy by action pro
vided for in said section ll. In the very preceding section, in pre
scribing liability for the compensation, it is provided that every em
ployer shall pay or furnish compensation in accordance with the act
“without regard to fault as a cause of such injury”;
and if it had
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been the intent to create an alternative remedy by action not based
In such an
on the master’s fault the Legislature would have so stated.
action they expressly destroy the defense of contributory negligence,
negligence of a fellow servant, and assumed risk, and make it un
necessary for plaintiff to plead or prove freedom from contributory
In
negligence so far as they change the common law, but no further.
so far as this statute provided for compensation to injured workmen,
it is to be construed with fair liberality to accomplish its beneficent
Matter of Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, 109 N. E. 549. Those
purposes.
purposes appear in the report of the \Vainwright commission to the
Legislature of 1910, and are stated by Iudge W'oodward in Matter of
Rheinwald v. Builders’ Brick & Supply Co., 168 App. Div. 425, 153
N. Y. Supp. 598.
The reason for the act rests upon a fundamental principle of gov
emment ﬁrst advocated by Bismarck in Germany in about the year
1880 and later by Lord Salisbury
in England.
That fundamental
principle is that in a modern industrial state the risk of injury to
workmen while engaged in the employer’s service is a social risk,
chargeable against the business itself, the losses arising from which
are to be added to the productive cost and to be borne ultimately by
the community at large.
This principle has been generally accepted
in Europe for years, and is regarded by sociological writers as a for
It
ward step in the progress and development of a civilized state.
permits an injured workman, or in the event of his death his de
pendents, to demand as a right that which they were often compelled
to ask as a charity, with the ultimate costs in either -event upon the
The purposes of the act are to provide compensation for
community.
injuries sustained or deaths incurred by employés in the hazardous
employments speciﬁed in the statute without regard to fault as a cause
thereof.
The plaintiff, however, does not seek compensation under the
act, but avails himself of the alternative remedy by action, in which
his damages could be assessed by a jury, and it is a well-settled rule
that statutes will not be construed as changing the common law un
less the intention to make such a change clearly appears.
VVood v.

Tunnicliff, 74 N. Y. 43.
(2) The answer denies the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, and thus

raises an issue of. fact to be tried out. It is unnecessary to determine
of a threshing machine is a hazard
ous employment referred to in the VVorkmen’s Compensation Law.
That question would seem to depend upon whether it is a vehicle,
within the meaning of the term “other vehicles,” as such term appears
in said group 41.“
Motion denied, and demurrer overruled, with $10 costs.
at this time whether the operation

“Cf. Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437. 136 Pac. 685, L. R. A. 1916A, 358, Ann.
Cas. 1915D, 154, holding that the Washington statute abolished all causes of
action theretofore existing in such cases.
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LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT BOARD.
Court of Montana.

(Supreme

1916.
52 Mont.
1916D, 628.)

6, 155

Pac.

268,

L. R. A.

Proceedings under the VVorkmen’s Compensation Law by Lewis and
the Industrial Accident Board.
From the judg
ment rendered, the Board appeals.
Afﬁrmed.
HOLLO\VAY, J. ‘This appeal presents the question: Do the provi
sions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (chapter 96, Laws 1915)
The trial court answered
apply to counties and county employés?
the inquiry in the affirmative, and the Industrial Accident Board ap
pealed.
By speciﬁc legislative declarations contained in sections 3 (e), 6 (gg),
and/6(i) co nties and county employés are made subject to the terms
of the act ut it is the contention of counsel for appellant that those
provisiovyﬁie to be disregarded as without force or validity‘, because
the title to the act is not suﬁiciently comprehensive to warrant their
inclusion in the body of the measure.
“No bill, except
Section 23, art. 5, of the Constitution, provides:
general appropriation bills, and bills for the codiﬁcation and general
revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one sub
ject which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject
shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title,
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so

Clark County against

/

d.

I!

Ycpresse
Beginning with Hotchkiss v. Marion,

12 Mont. 218, 29 Pac. 823, and
continuing down to State ex rel. Cotter v. District Court, 49 Mont.
146, 140 Pac. 732, this court has repeatedly considered and deﬁned the
purposes and limitations of this section of the Constitution, and they
96, above, is as follows:
need not berestated here.
The
“An act providing for the protection an safety of workmen in all
places of employment and for the inspection and regulation of places
of employment in all inherently hazardous works and occupations;
providing a schedule of compensation for injury to or death of work
men and methods of paying the same, and prescribing the liability of
employers who do not elect to pay such compensation;
establishing
the industrial accident board, deﬁning its powers and duties;
and
providing for a review of its awards.”
It may be conceded at once that counties and county employés are
not included, eo nomine, in this title; and we agree with counsel that
general legislation is intended primarily for the subjects and not for
the sovereign, and that the rules of statutory construction require that
we enter upon our investigation of the meaning and purpose of a
legislative enactment, indulging the presumption that the lawmakers
intended to legislate upon the rights and affairs of individuals, and 'that
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the state or the public will not be deemed to be within the purview of
such enactment, unless expressly named or included by fair implication.
In their brief, counsel for appellant say: “Theorize as we will, com
pensation and employer’s liability acts are nothing more or less than
substitutes for, and intended to supplant, the recognized unsatisfactory
and ofttimes disappointing and uncertain common-law and statutory
tort remedies which furnished the only legal haven of- refuge for an
injured employé.”
At the time chapter 96 was enacted, a county of this state was not‘
liable for damages to its injured employé, and therefore, if counsel
are correct in their analysis of the purpose of this act, it would seem
to be a justifiable conclusion to be reached by any one entertaining the
same view and considering the title of this act only, that it was never
intended to subject counties or county employés to its provisions,
But that counsel has misconceived the object and purpose of the act
is quite patent when the history of this character of legislation is con
sidered.‘

,

Liability and compensation statutes are not to be grouped together.
They are the antipodes of labor legislation, having their foundation in
essentially different social and economic ideas. The common law of
England and America and the Civil Code of continental Europe fur
nished but a single remedy for a servant’s injury—an action for dam
ages in which it was made to appear that the negligence of the master
was a proximate cause of the injury, The harshness of the rule was
emphasized when there was ingrafted on it the defenses of contribu
tory negligence (Butterﬁeld v. Forrester, 11 East, 60), fellow servant's
negligence (Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Murray v. South Car
olina R. R. Co., 1 McMull. [S. C.] 385, 36 Am. Dec. 268), and assump
tion of risk (Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 4 Metc. [Mass.]
49, 38 Am. Dec. 339; Laning v. New York C. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y.
521, 10 Am. Rep. 417).
\Vith the increased hazards consequent upon the use of high ex
plosives, complicated and dangerous machinery, and the pOWl€l'ft1l
agencies of steam and electricity, the percentage of injured employés
having justiciable claims rapidly increased, until relief was sought in
liability statutes which modiﬁed or eliminated some or all of the com
mon-law defenses. But whether the remedy was sought at common
law or under an employers’ liability statute, the actionable wrong of
the master, or actionable wrong for which the master was liable under
the maxim respondeat superior, was the gist of the claim for damages
and the basis of any right to recover.
Experience demonstrated that
more-than one-half of all industrial injuries resulted from inevitable
accident or from the risks of the business for which no one could be
held responsible; that neither the common law nor employers’ liabil
ity statutes furnished any measure of relief to more than 12 or 15
per cent. of the injured, and that further appreciable improvement from

0
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of existing laws could not be expected so long as the
element of negligence was the foundation of legal liability.
insurance and compensation laws are the products
\Vorkingmen’s
of the development of the social and economic idea that the indus
try which has always borne the burden of depreciation and destruc
tion of the necessary machinery shall also bear the burden of repairing
the efﬁciency of the human machines without which the industry itself
could not exist. The economic loss from vocational disease, industrial
accident, invalidity, old age, and unemployment was a subject of serious
inquiry among the constituent German states before the days of the
empire, but the credit for crystallizing the sentiment into workable
From the enactment of
laws will always remain with Bismarck.
the sick insurance statute in Germany in 1883, and the fundamental
law in 1884, the idea of compensation based only upon the risks of the
business and the impairment of earning efficiency spread to other
The federal
European states, and ﬁnally penetrated to this country.
government, 31 states, Alaska, Hawaii, and the canal zone now have
measures for the relief of injured workmen patterned after the Ger
man insurance or English compensation plan.
Each system seeks
the same ultimate end, but by somewhat different means, and “work
men’s compensation” is a term sufficiently comprehensive for all prac
'
tical purposes to include both.
The fundamental difference between the conception of liability and
compensation is found in the presence in the one, and the absence from
the other, of the element of actionable wrong.
The common-law and
liability statutes furnished an uncertain measure of relief to the lim
ited number of workmen who could trace their injuries proximately
to the master's negligence. Compensation laws proceed upon the the
ory that the injured workingman is entitled to pecuniary relief from
the distress caused by his injury, as a matter of right, unless his own
willful act is the proximate cause, and that it is wholly immaterial
whether the injury can be traced to the negligence of the master, the
negligence of the injured employé or a fellow servant, or whether it
results from an act of God, the public enemy, an unavoidable accident.
or a mere hazard of the business which may or may not be subject
to more exact classiﬁcation;
that his compensation shall be certain,
limited by the impairment of his earning capacity, proportioned to his
wages, and not dependent upon the skill or eloquence of counsel or
the whim or caprice of a jury; that as between workmen of the same
class who suffer like injuries, each shall receive the same compensa
tion, and that, too, without the economic waste incident to protracted
litigation and without reference to the fact that the injury to the one
may have been occasioned by the negligence of the master, and to the
other by reason of his own fault.
Confronted with a legislative history covering more than 30 years
and extending to practically all of Europe, to many of the European
the modiﬁcation
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dependencies, and to more than one-half of the United States, the
members of the Legislative Assembly of 1915 must be credited with
an understanding of compensation measures as they were generally
understood at that time, and with an intention to employ termr. ap
propriate to such measures as they were generally employed under like
circumstances. In drafting this measure and formulating a title for
we must assume that the members of the Legislative _A5Sembly appre
rule of liability_inia
ciated the fact that they were depantinggfrpifthe
vor
rule
the few, to establish
men generally—one which would insure relief without reference to the
questiori of fault and altogether irrespective of whether, under exist
They therefore employed\
ing laws, actions for damages would lie.
in the title to this act, in its generic sense andd
the term “workmen”
intended thereby to include the employés of
county, as well as
servants of individuals or private corporations engaged in the extra
hazardous occupations enumerated in the act.
Since the title selected
“fairly indicates the general subject of the act,
comprehensive enough
in its scope reasonably to cover all the provisions thereof, and
not
calculated to mislead either the Legislature or the public.”
must be
held to be suﬁicient to meet the requirements of the Constitution above.
Evers v. Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 Pac. 462. For the history of in
dustrial insurance and workmen’s compensation legislation, reference
may be had to 24th Annual Report of U. S. -Commissioners of Labor
1909, and to Boyd’s W'orkmen’s Compensation.
We are unable to appreciate much of counsel’s argument in support
of the contention that this statute
open to the objection that
obnoxious class legislation.
In the absence of any restriction
the
Constitution, the Legislature was free to establish
measure of duty
owing to
public employé different from that owing to
citizen who
not in the public service, and
cannot be contended that
classi
ﬁcation of workmen based upon the risks of their employment
either
arbitrary or unreasonable. If the compensation to be payed to an em
ployé injured in the service of the county
to be treated as charity
under an assumed name, then
might be conceded that this measure
conﬂicts with the provisions of section
art. 13, of the Constitution;
but that
not the conception of compensation statutes.
county subject to the provisions of this act will, of necessity, be
compelled to levy taxes to meet the assessments made upon
under
section 40, and this cannot be done unless the purpose to which the
to be devoted
money so raised
art.
public purpose.
Section
l2, of the Constitution, provides: “Taxes shall be levied and collected
by general laws and for public purposes only."\ Whether
particular
purpose
“public,” as that term
not always
employed above,
The power of taxation
easy of solution.
legislative prerogative,
and therefore the determination of the question whether
particular
or
purpose
not one which so intimately concerns the public as to

~4murd.mrlg

thy

ll,

4

is

is

is

a

a

is

is

is

a

a

is

is

it

A

is

l,

it

is

is a

it

is

a

a

a

_in

is

it

is

it

is

is

a

a

pi

STATUTES

826

(Part

4

_I.,

render taxation permissible is for the Legislature in the ﬁrst instance.
37 Cyc. 720; State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 45 N. W. 33, 8 L.
R. A. 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 609; 1 Cooley on Taxation, 182. The
general rule of constitutional law that courts will indulge every rea
sonable presumption in favor of legislation is applicable with peculiar
force to the case of a legislative decision upon the purpose for which
a tax may be laid.
1 Cooley on Taxation, 185.
In sections 3 (e) and
6 (gg) of this act the Legislature has determined that the money to be
contributed by a county-to the fund for the relief of its injured em
ployés is to be devoted to a public purpose—an ordinary and necessary
county expense. In Cunningham v. Northwestern Imp. Co., 44 Mont.
180, 119 Pac. 554, we held that a statute which in effect levied a tax
upon the coal mining industry to provide an insurance fund for injured
miners was a valid exercise of the taxing power, and that the pur
pose sought to be subserved was a public purpose, within the meaning
of section 11 above. It is unnecessary to again review the authorities
which support that conclusion.
We are satisﬁed with its correctness,
and that the determination of the question in that case is decisive of
'
it in this.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Aﬁirmed.
and SANNER, ]., concur.
BRANTLY, C.

_i.

MENKE
(Supreme

Court of Kansas,

v.
1916.

HAUBER.
99

Kan.

171,

_
160

Pac.

1017.)

Action by Henry A. Menke against Frank A. Hauber, doing busi
From a judg
City Secondhand Barrel Company.
Reversed, with directions.
ment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
The plaintiff was injured while in the employ of the
PORTER,
defendant, who was engaged in business as the Kansas City Second
].

ness as the Kansas

is

/

a

hand Barrel Company.
At that time the defendant had in his employ
from 1O to 20 men who were engaged in the work of making and re
pairing barrels. No mechanical power was used in the plant. Each
workman used his own tools, consisting of an adz and driver, or ham
mer and nails. Plaintiff’s injury was caused by a barrel falling upon
him. The barrels were in piles of four, one on top of the other, and
the top one fell over, in some manner, and struck the plaintiff.
The
action was brought to recover compensation under the \Vorkmen’s
Compensation Law. There was
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
the sum of $2,038.
The sole contention of the defendant at the trial was that his-busi
ness was not subject to the provisions of the Compensation La.w,
and the only question raised by the appeal
whether an enterprise such
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as defendant carried on in making and repairing barrels by hand, where
no power or machinery is used, comes within the provisions of the

Law. The title of the act known as the Compensation
“An act to provide compensation for workmen injured i

Compensation

Law is:

2/

certain hazardous industries.”
.
Section l, so far as applicable here, reads:
“If in any employment
to which this act applies, personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment is caused to a workman, his em
ployer shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay com
pensation~to the workman in accordance with this act." Laws-1911,
c. 218.

The title of the act shows that it is not a general law, but was to
Section 1 of the act likewise in
apply to certain hazardous industries.
dicates that the act was intended to apply only to certain employments
deemed to be especially dangerous.
Section 6 (as amended by Laws
1913, c. 216) reads:
“Application of the Act.—This act shall apply only to employment
in the course of the employer's trade or business on, in or about a
railway, factory, mine or quarry, electric, building or engineering work,
laundry, natural gas plant, county and municipal work, and all employ
ments wherein a process requiring the use of any dangerous explosive
or inﬂammable materials is carried on, which is conducted for the
purpose of business, trade or gain; each of which employments is
hereby determined to be especiallydangenous, in which from the nature,
conditions or means of prosecution of the work therein, extraordinary
risk to the life and limb of the workman engaged therein are inherent,
necessary, or substantially unavoidable, and as to each of which em
ployments it is deemed necessary to establish a new system of compen
sation for injuries to workmen.
This act shall not apply in any case
where the accident occurred before this act takes eﬁect, and all rights
which haveaccrued, by reason of any such accident, at the time of the
publication of this act, shall be saved the remedies now existing there
for, and the court shall have the same power as to them as if this act
had not been enacted. Agricultural pursuits and employments inci
dent thereto are hereby declared to be nonhazardous and exempt from
the provisions of this act.”
The act was passed, as every one knows, because there was a demand
for it based upon the conviction that in certain inherently dangerous
employments the common-law remedies aﬁorded an employé for in
juries were inadequate. “In the enactment of the compensation law
the Legislature recognized that the common-law remedies for injuries
sustained in certain hazardous industries were inadequate, unscientiﬁc,
and unjust, and therefore a substitute was provided by which a more
equitable adjustment of such loss could be made under a system which
was intended largely to eliminate controversies and litigation and place
the burden of accidental injuries incident to such employments upon
the industries themselves, or rather upon the consumers of the products
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Zinc Co., 93 Kan. 366,

367, 144 Pac. 247, 248.

It is quite obvious that at the place where the plaintiff was employed
when he received his injury there was no extrahazardous or danger
ous situation which of itself would call for an application of the com
pensation law. The injuries to which he was subject by his employ
ment were those likely to be encountered by a workman employed in
any place where boxes are piled one above another, as in a shoe store,
grocery or dry goods store, storage house, or in a transfer business.
If there were room for doubt about the question, it is settled by sec
tion 9 of the act, in which the Legislature deﬁnes a factory in these
wprds:
“(b) ‘Factory’ means any premises wherein power is used in manu
facturing, making, altering, adapting, ornamenting, ﬁnishing, repairing
or renovating any article or articles for the purpose of trade or gain or
of the business carried on therein, including expressly any brickyard,
meat packing house, foundry, smelter, oil reﬁnery, lime burning plant,
steam heating plant, electric lighting plant, electric power plant and
water power plant, powder plant, blast furnace, paper mill, printing
plant, ﬂour mill, glass factory, cement plant, artiﬁcial gasplant, ma
chine or repair shop, salt plant, and chemical manufacturing
plant.”
\V e think it is clear that by the word “power” the Legislature did
not intend to include hand power, but had reference to mechanical
The plaintiff makes the contention that, before the court can
power.
so determine, it must indulge in legislation.
We do not think so. It
is only necessary to use ordinary common sense in order to arrive at
the intent of the Legislature.
The context of the act shows that the
word “power” must necessarily have reference tojenergy developed
If hand power were intended to be included the Leg
islature would have omitted the use of the word “power” entirely, and
would have merely declared that “factory” means any premises used
in “manufacturing, making, altering," etc. Besides, in this section the
“Any brick
Legislature speciﬁcally includes the following industries:
yard, meat packing house, foundry, smelter, oil reﬁnery, lime burning
plant, steam heating plant, electi'ic lighting plant, electric power plant,
and water power plant, powder plant, blast furnace, paper mill, print
ing plant, ﬂour mill, glass factory, cement plant, artiﬁcial gas plant,
machine or repair shop, salt plant, and chemical manufacturing plant.”
\/Ve all know that every one of these industries uses in some man
ner mechanical power, or there are in operation dangerous machines
such as saws, moving belts, and revolving cylinders, or there are pres
ent other conditions inherently dangerous to the life and limb of the
workman.
The case of De la Gardelle v. Hampton et al., 167 App. Div. 617,
153 N. Y. Supp. 162, cited in the defendant’s brief, is somewhat anal
There a person who was employed as a
ogous to the present case.
butcher at a hotel was fatally injured by the slipping of a knife with

/

b~

?

?

7

7

__

__.___<n

Part 4)

STATUTES

829

which he was boning a leg of mutton. A claim for compensation was
made by the widow under groups 30 and 33 of section 2 of the New
York Compensation Act (Consol. Laws, c. 67), which read:
manufacture or preparation
“Group 30. Packing houses, abattoirs,
i
of meats, or meat products, or glue.”
“Group 33. Canning or preparation of fruit, vegetables, ﬁsh, or
foodstuffs; pickle factories and sugar reﬁneries.”
It was held that the sections of the act enumerating and deﬁning haz
ardous employments could not be regarded as covering the employment
in which the deceased was injured.
In the opinion it was said: “VVith
in the employments determined by the Legislature to be ‘hazardous,’
and consequently designated by it as embraced within the purview of
the statute, the latter should be beneﬁcially construed to effectuate the
legislative purpose; but it is no function of this court to extend by
judicial determination the category of occupations entitled to the pro
tection of the statute.”
This court has always recognized the obligation resting upon it to
give to the Compensation Law a liberal construction in order to carry
into effect the provisions of the Legislature, but we have no right to
extend its construction to cover enterprises and industries not within
the scope and intent of the law. We think it very clear that the enter
prise carried on by the defendant was not a factory within the meaning
of the Compensation Law/ The plaintiff cites the case of Caspar v.
Lewin, 82 Kan. 604, 109 Pac. 657, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) S26, where the
court held that a junkyard wherein railroad iron, old stoves, etc., were
cut up into lengths came within the deﬁnition of a manufacturing es
tablishment as deﬁned by the factory act (Gen. St. 1009, §§ 4676
In that case the junk
4689), imposing a duty to safeguard machinery.
yard was equipped with machinery for operating “aligator” shears,
which were used to cut scrap iron.
Power was transmitted by a belt
It
from a pulley on a line shaft to another pulley on the machine.
was held that the conversion of the raw material was accomplished
by means of machinery especially designed for that purpose, and that
the place came within the deﬁnition of a “manufacturing establishment"
in the factory act. In the Compensation Act the Legislature has deﬁn
ed what it means by a “factory” as “premises wherein power is used
in manufacturing,
The two cases
making, altering, adapting," etc.
are not in any respect the same.‘
The judgment will be reversed, with directions to enter judgment
for the defendant. All the Justices concurring.

/

7Cf. Andrijwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 180 Mich. 298. 148 N. W. 684 (1914),
statute in derogation of common law, hence strictly construed, with Coakley’s
Case, 216 Mass. 71, 102 N. E. 930, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 867 (1913), broad construc
tion of a remedial statute: Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah, 213,
184 PﬁC- 1020. 8 A- L- R- 93011919). liberal construction to eﬂect object; and
State ex rel. Duluth Brewing 8: Malting Co. v. District Court of St. Louis
County, 129 Minn. 176, 151 N. W. 912 (1915).
One reading the great number
of cases growing out ot this attempt by statute to do away with the very un

(Part

STATUTES

S30

CARROLL

v.

(Supreme Court of Colorado,

4

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
1920.

69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097, 19

A. L. R.

107.)

Action by Bessie Carroll and Others against the Industrial Commis
sion of Colorado and others to set aside an order of the Commission
denying compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the
death of joseph Carroll. The order of the Commission was afﬁrmed
Reversed and re
by the district court, and plaintiffs bring error.
manded, with directions.
ALLEN, J.” The plaintiffs in error, as widow and minor children of
Joseph Carroll, ﬁled a claim for compensation with the Industrial Com
mission under the \Vorkmen’s Compensation Act. Laws 1919, c. 210.
Joseph Carroll died while an employé and working as such. The
plaintiffs in error ﬁled their claim as his dependents. After a hearing,
the Commission found, as a conclusion based upon the facts, that the
/{death of joseph Carroll “was not the proximate result of an accident
sustained” by him.
I

satisfactory remedies afforded by common law will readily agree with Vis
count Haldane in Davidson & Co. v. McRobb, [1918] A. C. 304, 316: “My
Lords, the W0rkmen’s Compensation Act. 1906, appeairs on the face of it in
tended to afford a simple and speedy method of claiming compensation in the
cases to which it relates.
These are cases of personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment. But around the principle
which Parliament laid down in this language there is already spreading
itself in courts of justice an atmosphere of legal subtlety which bids fair to
defeat the obvious purpose of the Legislature. Your Lordships have already
made efforts to restrain the growth of obscurity and doubt by resolutely de
clining to interfere with the decisions of arbitrators, unless either on the
face of them they disclose error in law or conclusions of fact have been ar
rived at without any evidence to warrant them. But as the law grows more
and more in the reﬁnements which are being developed in the course of the
numerous judgments about the meaning of the double condition which the stat
ute imposcs, of the accident‘ having to arise both out of and in the course
of the employment, the liability to error in law of the arbitrators tends to
become greater and greater, and their tasks become more difficult and
The courts have, of course, to interpret and apply the language
anxious.
used by the Legislature and nothing besides, and to face any difficulties that
arise in doing so. But I feel that, while in the interpretations we who are
the judges put on the words used we are bound to follow our previous de
cisions when they form really binding precedents. we ought. in applying the
statute to particular facts, to direct our efforts rather to giving effect to broad
principles with freedom in applying them to individual circumstances than to
searching for guidance from mere apparent analogies with the particular facts
of previous cases. analogies which rarely embody the full truth. This task is
not easy to accomplish in practice, and it is a matter of the spirit rather than
But, in speaking for myself, I feel that the effort must be
of the letter.
made if the purpose which is plain on the face of this statute is not to be
stultified.
And I think that the only way to succeed is to regard with dis
favour arguments which lay stress on the kind of analogy which I have en
deavoured to indicate, as distinguished from analogous applications of broad
principle." ' ' ' See, also, Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 1-13, 93
Atl. 245 (1915).
8Part of the opinion is omitted.
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The claimants ﬁled an action in the District Court to set aside the
order denying compensation.
That court affirmed the order of the
Commission, and claimants now bring the cause to this court for re
view.
One of the questions presented by the record is whether the Com
mission’s ﬁnding, which in the instant case is one of law, can be sus
tained. The following facts are not disputed:
]oseph Carroll was employed in an alfalfa meal mill.
On No
vember 1, 1917, he was found dead, his body lying in the hay shed
of the mill, where he had been pitching alfalfa hay. His work was
hard physical labor.
His 'place of employment was in an inclosed
The air therein was dust-laden as the result of handling
building.
The decedent had organic heart
hay, alfalfa meal, and machinery.
trouble.
The evidence shows that the strenuous work of pitching
falfa hay in an inclose‘d building, combined with breathing dust-laden
air, brought on an attack of heart trouble, causing instant death, and
that, if Joseph Carroll had been doing his work in the open air, the
work would not have brought on a ‘heart attack.
The proximate cause of the death of Joseph Carroll was the condi
tion of the air in his place of employment, or the fact that it was dust
laden.
The question to be determined now takes this form: Under
the foregoing facts, must it be held, as a matter of law, that the death
was “accidentally sustained” or resulted from an “injury proximately
caused by accident”?
The dust-laden condition of the air was the “proximate cause” of
the death because had it not been for such condition the death would
not have occurred at the time. Such condition of the air which de
cedent was required to breathe brought on an attack of heart trouble,
resulting in death. The dust-laden condition of the air was the cause,
The result was
and the fatal attack of heart failure was the result.
The term
unexpected and unintended, and therefore an “accident.”
“accident” is often used “to denote any unintended and unexpected
loss or hurt apart from its cause.” 1 C. J. 395.
Our statute uses the expressions “personal injury or death acci-\
dentally sustained” and “injury proximately caused by accident” in pro
viding for what injuries or deaths compensation shall be allowed. By
the term “injury” is meant, not only an injury the means or cause of
which is an accident, but also an injury which is itself an accident.
The expressions above quoted are the equivalent of “injury by
acci-/
dent,” which is frequently used in the decisions. The word “by,” may
mean “through the means, act, or instrumentality of.” 9 C. J. 1109.
Therefore “injury by accident” and “injury caused by accident" are
terms or expressions which can be used interchangeably.
In a dis
cussion of the former it is said in 25 Harvard Law Review, 340:
“Since the case of Fenton v. T horley, nothing more is required than
that the harm that the plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected,
"‘
* * It is enough that the causes, themselves known and usual

all\
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should produce a result which on a particular occasion is neither
designed nor expected. The test as to whether an injury is unexpect
ed, and so, if received on a single occasion, occurs ‘by accident,’ is
that the sufferer did not intend or expect that injury would on that
particular occasion result from what he was doing.”
This is the rule followed in Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California, 177 Cal. 614, 171 Pac. 429, L. R. A. 1918F,
856.
It was there stated that the current of authority is that “unfore
seen, unexpected, and unintended injuries to employés have been
classed as ‘accidents’ and held sufﬁcient to justify awards."
For the reasons above indicated, we are of the opinion that the rec
ord shows that the death of Joseph Carroll resulted from an “injury
proximately caused by accident,” and that therefore his dependents are
* * *
entitled to compensation.

ji

BAGGOT CO.

v.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1919.

290 1u. 530. 125 N.

E.

254, 1 .1.

L. R.

1611.)

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary C.
Cripps, administratrix of the estate of Joseph C. Cripps, deceased,
An award of the Indus
opposed by E. Baggot Company, employer.
trial Commission was aﬁirmed b_v the circuit court, and the employer
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
brings error.
THOMPSON, J. This is a writ of error sued out by the E. Baggot
Company to review a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county
aﬁirming an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of Mary
C. Cripps, administratrix of the estate of Joseph C. Cripps, deceased;
the circuit court having certiﬁed that the cause is one proper to be
reviewed by this court.
Joseph C. Cripps, deceased, was a. plumber employed by plaintiff
in error.
On September 26, 1917, deceased, with Michael Brodie, was
engaged in his regular work upon a building under construction where
A part of the work
plaintiff in error was the plumbing contractor.
consisted of lifting pipe from the ground to the sixth ﬂoor, where these
men were working.
The pipe was lifted by a hand derrick of the usual
type, equipped with an arm over the end of which passed a rope at
tached to a windlass.
At each end of the windlass was a handle, by
means of which the rope was rolled upon the drum, lifting the pipe
attached at the other end of the rope. The windlass was operated by
the two men, deceased turning one handle and Brodie the other.
The
last load of pipe hauled up by these men weighed betwen 250 and 300
pounds. After the pipe was landed on the sixth floor, and while Brodie
was untying the rope, deceased started to walk away from the windlass
and was seen to be spitting blood.
Brodie asked him what was the
matter, but deceased was unable to talk. The latter then proceeded to
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the construction ofﬁce of plaintiff in error, on the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the
building, where he requested the foreman, Edwin Schutz, to get a doc
tor.
While in the oﬁice he had two hemorrhages and coughed up
blood. \/Vhen deceased ﬁrst came into the ofﬁce, the foreman noticed
that he held over his mouth a handkerchief saturated with blood and
was coughing.
Schutz asked deceased if he was hurt, to which de
ceased made no reply in words, but shook his head in the negative.
Nothing unusual happened while the work of lifting this last load
of pipe was in progress. The work was heavy, but it was the same
kind of work that the two men had been doing for a couple of days.
The hemorrhages recurred from time to time until October 8th, when
A post mortem examination disclosed a large longi
deceased died.
tudinal tear and several smaller transverse tears in the walls of the aor
Prior to September 26th, deceased was a strong, healthy man and
ta.
had never suffered from hemorrhages or any trouble with his I heart or
~
lungs.
Plaintiﬁ in error contends that there is no evidence to support the
award of the Industrial Commission, for the reason that there is no
competent evidence to support a ﬁnding that deceased sustained an ac
cidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The word “accident” is not a technical legal term with a clearly de
ﬁned meaning, and no legal deﬁnition has ever been given which has
been found both exact and comprehensive as applied to all circum
stances.
Anything that happens without design is commonly called
an "accident," and, at least in the popular acceptation of the word,
any event which is unforseen and not expected by the person to whom
it happens is included in the term. The words “accident” and “acci
dental injury,” as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Il
linois (Laws 1913, p. 335), were meant to include every injury suf
fered in the course of employment for which there was an existing
right of action at the time the act was passed; also to extend the lia
bility of the-employer to make compensation for injuries for which
_he was not previously liable and to limit such compensation.
If an
injury can be traceable to a deﬁnite time, place, and cause, and the
injury occurs in the course of the employment, the injury is accidental
within the meaning of the act and the obligation to provide and pay
Matthiessen & I-Tegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial
compensation arises.
Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249.
Where a workman died from a
pre—existing disease which was aggravated or accelerated under circum
stances which can be said to have been accidental, his death may be
said to have resulted from accidental injury. Peoria Terminal Co. v.
Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E. 651; Vl/estern Electric Co.
v. Industrial C0m., 285 Ill.'279, 120 N. E. 774.
In Schroetke v. Iackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616, 160 N. \/V. 383,
L. R. A. 1917D, 64, the Supreme Court of Michigan reviews at length
decisions on the question of what constitutes an accident under com
G0r>n.Pa.& A. (20 En.)—53
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pensation acts similar to ours, and it there holds that where an aged
watchman, whose duties were to guard the plant and give alarms of
ﬁre, had been afflicted with heart disease, and on discovering a ﬁre and
giving warning and attempting to extinguish the ﬁre became excited
In Gilliland
and died from heart failure, his death was accidental.
v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 Pac.
793, the Supreme Court of Kansas had under consideration a case
There a, workman’s employment
quite similar to the case at bar.
required him to ‘break rock in a quarry with a 16-pound sledge and
load the rock into a car. At noon he was in apparent good health and
In the afternoon, while at his working place, and shortly
spirits.
after he had been seen beating a large rock with his sledge, he suffered
a pulmonary hemorrhage, from which he died before medical aid
could reach him.
He had been working in the quarry for several
months and before that had worked for three years in the sacking
department of a cement plant. The court, after‘ reviewing the author
ities, held that the evidence warranted a ﬁnding that the physical
structure of the man gave way under the stress of his usual labor,
and that the workman did not know, or in any event was inattentive
to, the limited power of his blood vessels to resist blood pressure ag
'
gravated by vigorous muscular effort. This breaking down of a part
.
of this man’s body was held to be an accident.
In the instant case all the characteristics of an accident were present.
The occurrence was sudden, unexpected, and undesigned by the work
man.
The circumstances were clearly such that the commission was
justiﬁed in ﬁnding that the hemorrhage was due to blood -pressure in
tensiﬁed by vigorous muscular exertion.
Relating the _hemorrhage to
physical exertion, rupture of the aorta by force from within was as
distinctly traumatic as if the canal had been severed by violent appli
There was, no direct evi
cation of a sharp instrument from without.
dence of extraordinary
exertion suddenly displayed.
When last ob
served before the ﬁrst hemorrhage, the deceased was working in the
T he_ fact remains, however, that
manner habitual to his employment.
an extraordinary and unforeseen thing suddenly and unpremeditatedly
occurred, and presence of all the essential attributes of accident can
not be gainsaid. There was ample evidence in the record to justify
the ﬁnding of the Industrial Commission that the deceased came to his
death by accident, and thecircuit court therefore properly conﬁrmed
Peoria Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board, supra; Mat
the award.
thiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, supra;
\Vestern
Electric Co. v. Industrial Com., supra; State v. District Court, 137

Minn.

30, 162

N. W.

678.

j

in error rely upon ]akub v. Industrial Com., 288
Ill. 87, 123 N. E. 263, but that case is clearly distinguishable from the
In that case the evidence showed that
case under consideration.
jakub died from organic heart disease and kidney disease. The court
Counsel forplaintiff

Gonn.Pa.&
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conﬁrmed the ﬁnding of the Industrial Commission that the deceased
did not sustain accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of
his employment.
There was no evidence in the record in that case
that any part of the body was broken, by exertion or otherwise. That
case is further distinguished, so far as a review by this court is con
cerned, in that this court cannot weigh the evidence, but must con
ﬁrm the award of the Industrial Commission if there is evidence to
support it. Swift 8: Co. v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 564, 122 X. E.
796.
It is essentially a different judicial problem to set aside a deci
sion of the Industrial Commission which ﬁnds that a certain state of
facts proves that the death resulted from ‘accidental injuries, than to
conﬁrm a decision of the commission that the death was not by ac
cident.
The circuit court erred in entering a judgment directing the payment,
of the award of the commission and ordering execution thereon. The
only authority which the circuit court had on review by certiorari
was to conﬁrm the ﬁndings and award of the Industrial Commission
or to set aside the same and enter such a decision as is justiﬁed by law
or remand the cause to the commission for further proceedings. Baum
v. Industrial Com., 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625; Otis Elevator Co. v.
Industrial Com., 288 Ill. 396, 123 N. E. 600.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded to the
circuit court of Cook county, with directions to enter an order conﬁrm
ing the decision of the Industrial Commission.
Reversed and remanded I with directions.‘
.
9 See Walsh V. River Spinning Co., 41 R. I. 490, 103 Atl. 1025, 13 A. L. R.
the use of the term “accident” in Compensation Acts
(1918), contrasting
and in accident insurance cases, and citing Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co.,
161 Wis. 370, 154 N. W. 640, L. R. A". 1916A, 273, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 293 (1915).
956

in which death was caused by typhoid fever attributed to bacteria in drinking
water furnished to the employee by the employer.
But cl’. Adams v. Acme 7\ou-nws
White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A, 283,
Ann. Cas. 1916D, 689 (1914), a case of death by lead poisoning.
The Michigan
act, in section 1, speaks of “personal injury sustained by an employee in the
course of his employment," while most acts speak of “personal injury by ae
cldent arising out of and in the course of his employment."
The word “acci
dental” is found in the title to the Michigan act, in section 5 reference is made
board provided for is called the In
to “the accident," an_d the administrative
Section 1 of the Massachusetts act uses the same
dustrial Accident Board.
language as the Michigan act, but the title does not refer to “accident,”
The Massachusetts
though the board is called the Industrial Accident Board.
cases are contra the Adams Case. In re Hurie, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336.
L. R. A. 1916A, 279, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 919 (1914). Both the Massachusetts and
the Michigan statutes omit the word “accident” from part II, section 1. as well
as from part I, section 1. On the reason for the conﬂicting cases, see 19
Though most of the Compensation Acts do not
Mich. Law Rev. 457, 638.
expressly exclude occupational diseases, yet as originally enacted none of
them expressly include diseases, and in most jurisdictions the acts have
See
been so construed as to exclude compensation for occupational diseases.
Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 97 Atl. 3-I5, L. R. A. l916E,
510 (1916).
That no sound policy can be suggested for relieving eases of in
jury by accident. and not those hardly less numerous springing from occupa
tional disease, is admitted in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Brown, 92
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LANE
(Supreme

v.

Court

,

(Part

HORN & HARl)ART BAKING co.»
of Pennsylvania,
1918.
261 Pa.
13 A. L. R. 963.)
_

329,

104

Atl.

4

.
615,

Moscnz1s1;ER,]. Mary Lane claimed compensation, under Act June
(P. L. 736), for the alleged accidental death of her husband,
an employé of defendant.
The claim was allowed by the VVorkmen’s

2, 1915

Compensation‘ Board, and this decision was affirmed by the court below.
Defendant has appealed.
“This case
Upon the facts involved, Commissioner Scott says:
comes before the board on a petition for determination of compensa
tion due the claimant under agreed facts.
The statement of facts
precludes any other cause of death than that of heat exhaustion or
prostration, due to the heated condition of the atmosphere. The claim
ant’s deceased husband was overcome by heat while working at the
defendant’s lunch counter, on a hot August day in 1917, and died
within two hours. There is nothing in the statement to show that [the
temperature of] the place where the employé was working was hot-I
ter than the outside atmosphere, or that he was affected by diﬁerent
heat conditions than prevailed in the community at large.”
On the governing rules of law, the commissioner correctly states:
“The term ‘personal injury’ in our act is conﬁned to injuries of acci
dental origin and _su'ch diseases as naturally result therefrom,
and
must be held to include any form of bodily harm or incapacity [acci
dentally] caused by [either] external violence or physical force. "‘ * *
A stroke by lightning, a stroke from the direct rays of the sun, a heat
stroke, or heat prostration, are untoward, unexpected mishaps, and
accidental injuries, within the meaning of the act.‘ * * * It is im
material whether the heat prostration is produced by artiﬁcial heat,
or by the natural heat of the sun, directly or through the heated at
mosphere, if the exhaustion comes from heat in the course of em
ployment.”
In cases such as the one at bar, the character and cause of the in
jury must be considered, in order to determine whether the results com
plained of are properly attributable to “accident,” within the meaning
of that term as used in the act of Iune 2, 1915 (P. L. 7_36), supra; for,
wherever death is mentioned in the statute, it means death resulting
only from unforeseen violence to the physical structure of the body and
Ohio St. 309. 110 N. E. 744, L. R. A. 1916B. 1277 (1915).
Cf. Industrial Com
mission of Ohio v. Roth. 98 Ohio St. 34. 120 N. E. 172. 6 A. L. 'R. 1463, note
distinguishing
disease due to accident from occupational disease.
The
(1918).
English act of 1906 makes elaborate provisions for disablement from an in
dustrial disease, and in California, by amendment in 1917, injury expressly
includes injury by disease.
10 Accord: Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, [1908] App. Cas. 437, a case
ot heat stroke in the stokehole of a steamer.
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‘
its resultant effects (section 301, P. L. 738), or, in other words, death
from “an accident” happening in the course of the deceased person's
employment, as distinguished from either ordinary or occupational
disease developed during the course of such employment; these latter
This subject is fully dis
not being within contemplation of the act.
cussed in McCauley v. Imperial VVoolen Co.', 104 Atl. 617.
The learned commissioner is not without authority in holding
heat\
prostration, under circumstances such as those at bar, to fall within
the meaning of the word “accident,” as that term is employed in mod
ern compensation legislation, and, we may add, as it is used in the law
of insurance. In Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, Law Rep. A.
C. 1908, 437, 439, Lord Loreburn, speaking for the House of Lords,
said: “This man died frorﬁ an accident. \V hat killed him was a heat
stroke, coming suddenly and unexpectedly upon him while at work.
Such a stroke is an unusual effect of a known cause, often, no doubt,
threatened, but generally averted by precautions, which experience,
in this instance, had not taught.
It was an unlooked-for mishap in
the course of his employment. In common language, it was a case of
accidental death."
See, also, Maskery v. Lancashire Shipping Co., decided by the Court
of Appeals, England, and reported in 7 Butterworth’s Workmen’s
Compensation Cases, 428, 430, where -the engineer on a steamship met
his death from a heat stroke while crossing the Red Sea.
The con
tention of defendants was that they were not liable “because the Red
Sea is always very hot, and there was no special heat on that particular
day more than people in the engine room going through the Red Sea
would ordinarily be exposed to.” In affirming an allowance of com
pensation, the court held that the Ismay Case applied, and the opinion
refers to the heat stroke as “an.JJccurrence
which was in its nature
foitui;Q_us.” Ahdrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society, 90 Law Times
Reports (New Series) 611, 612, involves death from a stroke of light
ning; Pack v. Prudential Casualty Co., 170 Ky. 47, 55, 185 S. W. 496,
L. R. A. 1916E, 952, death from sunstroke; and McGlinchey et al.
v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251, 253, 14 Atl. 13, 6 Am. St. Rep.
190, death from fright—-all held to be accidental; while N. W. Com
mercial Travelers’ Ass’n v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 10
Manitoba Rep. (Queen’s Bench) 537, holds death from frost to be
within the terms “bodily injuries effected through external, violent and
accidental means.” Finally, N. A. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Bur
roughs, 69 Pa. 43, 51, 8 Am. Rep. 212, a case where an assured strained
himself while loading hay, deﬁnes “accident” as “an event that takes
* * * an accident
place without one’s foresight or expectation;
* * * casual
signiﬁes happening by chance or unexpectedly,
[or]
course,
Of
neither
this
last
fortuitous.”
ruling nor" any other of the
insurance cases mentioned can be looked upon as governing the pres
ent compensation claim; but all are illustrative of the liberal views
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entertained by the courts as to the meaning of the .term “accident” in
determining liability for death or personal injury.
Section 422 of the act of 1915, supra (P. L. 753), provides that the
facts on which a claim for compensation depends may be agreed upon,
and, in that event, the “petition shall contain the agreed facts and shall
be signed by all parties in interest.”
Section 425 (P. L. 754) provides
that, on an appeal to the courts, such agreement shall be included in
In the present in
the transcript, or record, sent up for consideration.
stance, the agreement itself has not been physically brought before us,
as it should be, but the commissioner’s ﬁndings are that the statement
of facts contained therein “precludes any other cause of death than
that of heat exhaustion or prostration, due to the heated condition of
the atmosphere”; hence we must take it 190 organic weakness or occu
pational disease can be accounted the proximate cause of the death of
claimant’s husband, but the casualty was attributable solely to the un
expected and violent eﬁ‘ect of the heat upon the physical structure of
deceased’s
body,‘ and this was properly held by the Compensation
Board and the court below to be an accidental death within the mean
ing of the act.
/Appellant’s contention that “the whole intent of this legislation
[compensation law] is based upon the theory that the employment in
which the person is engaged is the proximate cause of the injury," is
without merit.
In this connection it is sufﬁcient to call attention to
Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co., 259 Pa. 578, 581, 103 Atl. 351.
There the deceased, during an intermission in his" work, while wait
ing for material, struck a match for the purpose of lighting a ciga
rette, and, as a result, his clothing ignited and he was fatally burned.
We sustained an award in favor of the widow, and said, inter alia:
“In the compensation acts of some of the states,~compensation is al
lowed only for injuries ‘arising out of and in the course of his em
In
ployment,’ thus attaching two conditions to the right to recover.
the Pennsylvania statute, the words ‘arising out of’ do not appear;
and we are therefore relieved‘ from the necessity of considering the
question whether in this case the accident arose out of, or was due to
the character of, the employment.
Under our statute compensation
is given for personal injury or death of an employé ‘by an accident in
”
the course of his employment.’
In the present case, the court below rightly held that’ claimant’s
husband died from an accident happening in the course of his em
ployment, within the meaning of the act of 1915.
The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment sus
taining the allowance of compensation is affirmed.
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BRINTONS, Limited,
(House

of Lords.

[1905]

839

v.

TURVEY.

App.

Cas. 230.)

The respondent’s husband, while employed with other workmen in
sorting wool in the appellants’ factory, was infected with anthrax on
the 2d of March, 1903, and died thereof on the 7th. In an arbitration
held at Kidderminster,
after hearing medical evidence, the county
court judge awarded compensation to the respondent. * * *
TlhS decision was aﬂirmed by the Court of Appeal (Collins, M. R.,
and Mathew and Cozens-Hardy, L. II.) iupon the authority of Fen
ton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443.
EARL or HALSBURY, L. C." My Lords, I am not able to deny the
cogency of the reasoning of my noble and learned friend Lord Rob
ertson when he contests that this House is concluded by its decision
in Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443.
I do not think the point
which now stands for decision was either argued or upon the facts
open for decision.
Nevertheless I am of opinion that the judgment
now under appeal is right.
My Lords, one proposition which to my mind goes far to solve the
question under debate appears to have been accepted by all the judicial
minds which have been directed to the subject, and that is that the
language of the statute we are called upon to construe must be inter
preted in its ordinary and popular meaning. The use of language pre
'
ceded scientiﬁc investigation.
Probably it is true to say that in the strictest sense and dealing
with the region of physical nature there is no such thing as an acci
dent.
The smallest particle of dust swept by a storm is where it is
by the operation of physical causes, which if you knew beforehand
you could predict with absolute certainty that it would alight where it
did. But when the act now under construction enacted that if in any
employment to which the act applied personal injury “by accident”
arising out of and in the course of his employment is caused to a work
man his employers shall pay compensation, I think it meant that, apart
from negligence of any sort—either employers or employed—the in
dustry itself should be taxed with an obligation to indemnify the suf
ferer for what was “an accident” causing damage. I do not stop to
discuss the provisions which disentitle a sufferer, because they are
not relevant to the question now under debate.
I so far agree with my noble and learned friend that I think, in
popular phraseology from which we are to seek our guidance, it ex
cludes, and was intended to exclude, idiopathic disease; but when
some affection of our physical frame is in any way induced by acci
dent, we must be on our guard that we are not misled by medical
11

Part of the statement of facts andipart of the opinion of Lord Robertson

are omitted.
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phrases to alter the proper application of the phrase “accident caus
ing injury,” because the injury inflicted by accident sets up a condi
tion of things which medical men describe as disease.
Suppose in this case a tack or some poisoned substance had cut the
skin and set up tetanus. Tetanus is a disease; but would anybody
contend that there was not an accident causing damage?_
An injury to the head has been known to set up septic pneumonia,
and many years ago, I remember, when that incident had'in fact
occurred, it was sought to excuse the person who inﬂicted the blow
on the head from the consequences
of his crime because his victim
had died of pneumonia and not, as it was contended, of the blow on
It does not appear to me that by calling the consequences
the head.
of an accidental injury a disease one alters the nature or the conse
quential results of the injury that has been inﬂicted.
Many illustrations of what I am insisting on might be given. A
workman in the course of his employment spills some corrosive acid
on his hands; the injury" caused thereby sets up erysipelas, a deﬁnite
disease; some triﬂing injury by a needle sets up tetanus. Are these
not within the act because the immediate injury is not perceptible un
til it shows itself in some morbid change in the structure of the hu
man body, and which when shown we call a disease? I cannot think so.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the county court judge was quite
right, and I move your Lordships accordingly.
Loan _MAcNAoH'r;eN.
My Lords, on the facts found by the learned
county court judge I am of opinion that the decision-of the Court of
It is plain, I think, that the mischief which be
Appeal was‘ right.
fell the workman in the present case was due to accident, or rather,
should say, to a chapter of accidents.
It was an accident that the noxious thing that settled on the man’s
face happened to be present in the materials which he was engaged in
sorting. It was an accident that this noxious thing escaped the down
draught or suck of the fan which the Board of Trade, as we were told,
requires to be in use while work is going on in such a factory as that
where the man was employed. It was an accident that the thing struck
the man on a delicate and tender-spot in the corner of his eye.
It
must have been through some accident that the poison found entrance
into the man’s system, for the judge ﬁnds that there was no abrasion
about the eye, while the medical evidence seems to be that without some
abrasion infection is hardly possible.
The result was anthrax, and
the end came very speedily.
Speaking for myself, I cannot doubt that the man’s death was at
tributable to personal injury by accident arising out of, and in the
course of, his employment.
The accidental character of the injury
is not, I think, removed or displaced by the fact that, like many other
accidental injuries, it set up a well-known disease, which was imme
diately the cause of death, and would no doubt be certiﬁed as such in
the usual death certiﬁcate.
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I have nothing more to add, because the meaning of the expression
personal injury by accident, as used in the act of 1897, was very fully
considered in the case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443, in this
House. I am content to abide by what I am reported to have said in
It had the express concurrence of my noble and learned
that case.
friends Lord Shand and Lord Davey, and the approval, I think, of
my noble and learned friend Lord Lindley.
agree that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Loan ‘ROBERTSON. My Lords, this man died of anthrax, having
become infected in his eye from the wool at which he was working.
It is clear that the,man’s being attacked by anthrax arose “out of and
in the course of his employment,” and the question is was his catching
anthrax an “accident” in the sense of the act of 1897?
The language in which the county court judge describes the “acci
dent” puts the case in the most favorable way possible for the theory
of the respondent, for he speaks of “the accidental alighting of a
bacillus from the infected wool on" the man's eye.
But while scien
tiﬁcally accurate, this vivid presentment as of a concrete, although
occult, incident must not blind us to the fact that any other case of
disease falling within the wide scope of bacteriology might withiequal
Anthrax
accuracy be traced to the occurrence of a similar “accident.”
is a disease; and unless the contracting of infectious disease (so it
arises out of and in course of the employment) is “accident” in the
sense of the act, I do not see how this judgment can stand. If it does
stand, then in every case in which a man dies of any infectious dis
ease (his taking which arose out of and in course of his employment),
all he has got to do is to get the doctor to prove (what could not be
and the accident
there. (It may be
disputed) that a bacillus did
similar process of illustration and reasoning might
rash to say that
not extend the application to noninfectious disease besides; but
must add that
wish to conﬁne the argument to what
clear.) And
the “illustrations”
(given by one of my noble and learned friends) of
tetanus, pneumonia, or erysipclas ensuing on accident, differ from
the present case in the one point essential to the controversy, for in
the illustrations there
postulated an accident distinct from the dis
in
the
case
before
your Lordships the so-called “accident”
while
ease,
simply the inception of the disease.
Now
necessary steadily to have in mind that the question
whether, in the sense of the act of 1897, this man’s catching anthrax
was accident.
nothing (or little) to the purpose to say that
was an accidental occurrence.
Colloquially, and accurately, we say
that So-and-so accidentally caught cold or any other disease; and yet
no one would think of saying that he had met with an accident.
an accident. Accord
not everything that happens accidentally that
ingly, when the learned county court judge, in what
very well
on the fact that there was here,a “for
expressed judgment, bases
tuitous intrusion of
foreign substance into the eye,” the word “for
a

it

a

is

is

is

It

it

is

It

is

it
is

is

is

I

is

I

a

is

it,

I

842

_

STATUTES

.

(Part

4

tuitous" does not convince me, and the rest is merely, once more, the
'
graphic description of the occult initiation of the disease.
Did the Legislature _then mean, inter alia, the catching of infectious
I cannot
disease when it spoke of “personal injury by accident”?
T he class of mishaps now proposed to be
bring myself to think so.
included is so wide and so heterogeneous to those dangers to life and
limb which admittedly are included, that I do not believe that language
so remote was intended to have this result. * * *
The respondent's main reliance was placed on the recent case of
Now, ﬁrst of all, what were
Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443.
The
the facts of the case? They are of the very simplest possible.
_man ruptured himself, or, in other words, broke a part of his body
No one grasping this fact could possi
by over-exertion in his work.
bly say that this was a disease; and, therefore, the question before
your Lordships was not raised. * * -*

I hold myself free on the present occasion to consider on its merits
the question now raised, and I should think it much to be regretted
if this House were precluded from doing so by observations made
when the question of disease had not been considered.
On the mer
think that these judgments
its, and for the reasons I have stated,
ought to be reversed.
My Lords,
hope that the decision in this case
Loan LIINDLEY.
will not be regarded as involving the doctrine that all diseases caught
by a workman in the course of his employment are to be regarded as
accidents within the meaning of the \¢Vorkmen’s Compensation Act.
That is very far from being my view of the act, and I concur with the
observations made by Cozens-Hardy, L. ]., on this point at the end of
In this case your Lordships have to deal with death
his judgment.
resulting from disease caused by an injury which I am myself unable
to describe more accurately than by calling it purely accidental.
The fact that an accident causes injury in the shape of disease does
not render the cause not an accident. VVhether in any particular case
an injury in the shape of disease is caused by an accident or by some
other cause depends on the circumstances of that case, and on the
The meaning of the
meaning to be attributed to the word “accident.”
word as used in the \Vorkmen’s Compensation Act was settled by
this House in Fenton v. Thorley Co., Limited, [1903] A. C. 443, and
having regard to that authority, and to the facts of this case as stated
by the lmrned county judge, his decision and the decision of the
Court of Appeal were, in my opinion, quite right, and this appeal
ought to be dismissed."
Order of the Court of Appeal afﬁrmed and appeal dismissed with

I

I

costs.
12 The leading English case discussing
"accident" is Fenton v. Thorley &
Co., Limited. [1903] App. Cas. 443.
It has been much cited in the United
trying to tum 3 whe-e]_
States. jlt was a case ot rupture by over-exertion
See, also, Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] App. Cas. 242, contrasting
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McNICOL.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1913. 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697,
L. R. A. 1916A. 306.) ,

Rucc, C. J. This is a proceeding under St. 1911, c. 751. as amended
by St. 1912, c. S71, known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act, by
dependent relatives for compensation for the death of Stuart McNicol.
1. The ﬁrst question is whether the deceased
received an “injury
arising out of mg inghegrse of his employment,” within the mean
ingxof those wordsin part 2, § 1, of the act. In order that there may
be recovery the injury must both arise out of and also be received in
the course of the employment.
Neither alone is enough.
It is not easy nor necessary to the determination of the case at bar
to give a comprehensive deﬁnition of these words which shall accu
rately include all cases embraced within the act and with precision ex
clude-those outside its terms. It is suﬁicient to say that an injury is re
ceived “in the course of” the employment when it comes while the
workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform.
It
arises “out of” the employment, when there is apparent to the rational
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection
between the conditions under which the work is required to be per
formed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be
seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have
been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole sit
uation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the em
ployment, then it arises “out of” the employment. But it excludes an
injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contrib
uting proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the
workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.
The causative danger _rnust be peculiar to the work and not common
It must be incidental to the character of the
to
business and not independent of the relation of master and servant.
It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must
appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment,
and -to have ﬂowed from that source as a rational consequence.
The exact words to be interpreted are found in the English Work
men’s Compensation Act. and doubtless came thence into our act.
Therefore decisions of English courts before the adoption of our act
Ryalls v. Mechanics’ Mills, 150 Mass.'190, '22
are entitled to weight.
N. E. 766, 5 L. R. A. 667. It there had been held that injuries re
ceived from lightning on a high and unusually exposed scaffold (An
drew v. Failsworth Industrial Society, [1904] 2 K. B. 32), from the

tlE;1~od.

“cause” in accident insurance and in compensation cases, and Board of Man
agement or Trim Joint District School v. Kelly. [1914] App. Cas. 667. with vig
orous dissenting opinions, nnd an attempted contrast of injury by “accident."
V
and by "design" or "intent."
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bite of a cat habitually kept in the place of employment (Rowland v.
Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. 963), from a stone thrownby a boy from
the top of a bridge at a locomotive passing underneath (Challis v.
London & Southwestern Ry., [1905] 2 K. B. 154), and from an at
tack upon a cashier traveling with a large sum of money (Nisbet v.
Rayne & Burn, [1910] 2 K. B. 689), all arose in the course and out
of the employment, while the contrary had been held as to injuries re
sultiiig from a piece of iron thrown in anger by a boy in the same
service (Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., [1902] 2 K. B.
178), from fright at the incursion of an insect into the room (Craske
v. Wigan, [1909] 2 K. B. 635), and from a felonious assault of the

employer (Blake v. Head, 106 L. T. Rep. 822).
The deﬁnition formulated above, when referred to the facts of these
cases, reaches results in accord with their conclusions.
Applying it to
the facts of the present case, it seems plain that the injury of the de
The'ﬁnd
ceased arose “out of and in the course of his employment.”
ings of the Industrial Accident Board in substance are that Stuart
McNicol, while in the performance of his duty at the Hoosac Tunnel
DT)El€§E_s a checker in the employ of a ﬁrm of importers, was injured
and died as a result of “blows or kicks administered to tum by * * *
[Timothy] McCarthy," who was in “an intoxicated frenzy of pas
McCarthy was a fellow workman who “was in the habit of
sion.”
drinking to intoxication, and when intoxicated was quarrelsome and
dangerous, and unsafe to be permitted to work with his fellow em
ployés, all of which was known to the superintendent Matthews,” who
knowinglypermitted him in such condition to continue at work during
the day of the fatality—which occurred in the afternoon.
The in
jury came while the deceased was doing the work for which he was
hired. It was due to the act of an obviously intoxicated fellow work
man, whose quarrelsome disposition and inebriate condition were well
A naturaliresult of the em
known _to the foreman of the employer.
ployment of a peaceable workman in company with a choleric drunk
ard might have been found to be an attack by the latter upon his
The case at bar is quite distinguishable from a stabbing
companion.
by a drunken stranger, a felonious attack by a sober fellow work
man, or even rough sport or horseplay by companions who might
have been expected to be at work.
Although it may be that upon the
facts here disclosed a liability on the part of the defendant for negli
gence at common law or un_der the employer’s liability act might have
arisen, this decision does not rest upon that ground, but upon the
causal connection between the injury of the deceased and the condi
A fall from
tions under which the defendant required him to work.
a quay by a sailor while returning from shore leave (Kitchenham
v.
Owners of S. S. Johannesburg, [1911] 1 K. B. 523, § 6, [1911] A. C.
417), a sting from a wasp (Amys v. Barton, [1912] 1 K. B. 40), and
a frost bite (Warner v. Couchman, [1912] A. C. 35), all have been

held

to

be

injuries not “arising

out of” the employment.

But -we
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ﬁnd nothing in any of them in conﬂict with our present conclusion.
Nor is there anything at variance with it in Mitchinson v. Day Br,os.,
[1913] l,K. B. 603, where it was held that injuries resulting from an
assault by a drunken stranger upon an employé engaged at his work
on the highway did not arise out of the employment.
That was a
* * *
quite different situation from the one now before us.
[For error in the decree, in dividing payments between the widow
and a minor child, reversed.]
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v.

(Supreme Court of Vermont,
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Proceedings by Ella M. Brown and others, under the VVorkmen’s
Compensation Act, to obtain compensation for the death of ]oseph
Brown. Opposed by the Bristol Last Block Company, the employer,
and others. There was an award of compensation, and the employer
and others appeal. Award afﬁrmed.
‘
MILES,
This case comes here on appeal from the ﬁnding of facts
No question
and award of the Commissioner of Industries.
made
in the brief_ of the defendants but that Joseph Brown, the husband of
Ella M. Brown, the plaintiff, was employed by the defendant Bristol
Last Block Company at the time of his injury which resulted in his
death, and that his employment included his team of two horses, and
that the injury was the result of an accident.
The statute under which this action
as follows:
“If
brought
workman receives personal injury by accident arising out of‘ and in
the course of such employment, his employer or the insurance carrier
shall pay compensation in the amounts and to the person or persons
hereinafter speciﬁed.” G. L. 5768.
To recover under this statute
was necessary for the plaintiff to
show, not only that the injury was the result of an accident, but that
the accident arose out of and in the course of Brown's employment.
Robinson v. State, 93 Conn. 49, 104 Atl. 491.
The burden
upon
the plaintiff to make out all these conditions.
not enough that the
must also have arisen]
injury arose in the course of the employment.
out of the employment.
not easy to give
deﬁnition of the phrase, “accident arising out
of and in the course of such employment,” that will apply to every case
In re Mc.\licol, 215 Mass.
arising under the employer’s liability act.
497, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 306.
enough now to say
that‘ an injury arises in the course of the employment when
arises
within the period of the employment, at
place where the employé
may reasonably be, and while he
reasonably fulﬁlling the duties of
his employment; and an injury arises out of the employment when
occurs in the course of
and as
proximate result of it. Larke v.
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Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320, L. R. A.
19l6E, 584; In re McNic0l, supra; Jacquemin v.
urner et a1.
(Conn.) 103 Atl. 115; Rees v. Thomas, I. Q. B. 1015; Coronado Beach
Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212, L. R. A. 1916F, 1164;
W'hen an
State v. District Court, 129 Minn. 176, 151 N. W. 912.
injury is a natural and necessary incident or consequence of the em
t
ployn1ent,'though not foreseen or expected, it arises out of it. Larke
A risk is incidental to the
v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra.
Hancock

employment when it belongs to, or is connected with, what a workman
has to do in fulﬁlling his contract of service.
Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.
J. Law, 72, 86 Atl. 458.
No question is raised in the case at bar but that Brown was in the
employ of the Bristol Last Block Company on the day of the accident,
and that the accidentahappened about the noon hour; that Brown had
eaten his dinner;
that for some unknown cause the horses ran away;
that Brown tried to" stop them; and that in trying to do so he was run
over by them and killed. These facts, we thin , bring this case within
the doctrine stated in the cases cited above.
The accident happened
while Brown was‘ doing the duty which he was employed to perform,
and at a place where he had a right to be in the performance of that
duty. The accident, we think, was received in the course ‘of his em
'
ployment. I
_
_
It is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the
circumstances, that there was a causal,connection between the condi
tions under which the work was required to be performed and the
resulting injury. The agency which produced the injury was the instru
mentality with which the workman’s labors were performed and with
He may have been negli
out which he would not have been injured.
G.
gent in the use of that agency; but that does not defeat recovery.
L. 5766. VVe think the facts, about which there is no dispute, clearly
support the ﬁnding of the commissioner that the accident arose out of
Brown’s employment.
The defendant excepted to the ﬁndings of the commissioner that
there were marks upon the body of Brown apparently made by the
hoofs of the horses, and that he was preparing the horses for the after
noon work, when they became frightened and ran away. But wheth
er there was evidence tending to show those facts is of no importance,
and we take no time in searching the transcript in respect to that mat
ter. It is conceded that the horses ran over Brown and killed him.
It is of no importance whether they ran over. him when he was pre
paring them for work or when he was trying to stop them when they
were running away. In either case he was performing a duty which
he owed the master, and which was necessary to perform in order
It is equally of no
to enable him to proceed with the afternoon work.
importance whether marks of the horses’ hoofs were upon Brown's
body; for no one disputed the fact that Brown was killed by the
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horses running over him, and whether it was done by the horses step
ping upon his body or otherwise could not affect the result of this suit.
The most of the evidence was devoted to the inquiry of whether the
accident happened'while Brown was resting at the noon hour, and while
the horses were eating their feed, or just after and before work for
the afternoon was resumed;
the contention of the defendants being
that the employment was suspended during that time. But this conten
tion is not sound. This court has held in Ingram’s Adm’x v. Rutland
R. R. Co., 89 Vt. 278, 95 Atl. 544, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1191, that the
circumstances may be such that the duty may cover the servant’s trip
across the premises to and from his working place, and the circum
stances may be such that a servant may step aside to get a drink of wa
ter, may go into a building to get warm, may withdraw to answer a call
of nature, may stop to talk with a fellow wor-kman, may go to a con
venient place to eat or wash or get fresh air, to hang up his coat, or
even to rest, without forfeiting his right as an employé.
It is said
in that case: “Such digressions and interruptions are to be expected,
and, when reasonably necessary, are held to be within the contempla
tion of the parties when the contract of employment is entered into,
and covered thereby. The relation is not in such cases interrupted,
but continues.”
The defendants further argue that because there was no evidence
tending to show that Brown was not resting or doing something else
wholly unconnected with his employment at the time the horses start
ed to run away that there was no evidence supporting the commis
sioner’s ultimate ﬁnding.
The applicants were not called upon to
prove that negative and the appeal does not raise it. If it were raised,
we could not assume a fact not shown by the record to reverse the
case.
First National Bank of Montpelier v. Bertoli, 88 Vt. 421, 92
In this connection some question is made that tlie, horses
Atl. 970.
were owned by Brown, and therefore what he did in trying to stop
them was an act in his own interest, and not in the interest of his em
ployer. But this position is not tenable to its full extent. The horses
were hired by the employer, and for the time in which the accident
and the employer was ma
happened, their services belonged to
''
terially interested in that service.
The_ act should have-a liberal and reasonable construction.
framed on broad principles for the protection of the workman.
Re
not based on the neglect of the employer or aifectedby
lief under
acts of negligence on the part of the employé.
rests on the economic
and humanitarian principle of compensation to the employé, at the
expense of the business, or to his representatives for earning capacity
destroyed by an accident in the course of, or connected with, his work.
Waters v. William
Taylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, 112 N. E. 727, L.
.
R. A. 1917A, 347.
affirmed, with costs.
The award
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HAGGARD’S CASE."

(Supreme

J udiclal Court of Massachusetts,

Proceeding

1920.

234 Mass. 330, 125 N.

under the Worl<men’s,Compensation

Act (St.

E.

565.)

1911,

c.

751, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571) by James Haggard,

the employé,
Com
opposed by the City of Brockton, the employer and self-insurer.
pensation was denied by the Industrial Accident Board, the denial af
ﬁrmed by the superior court, and from its decree the employé appeals.
Afﬁrmed.
JENNEY, J. James Haggard was in the service of the city of Brock
ton and was engaged in general teaming, using his own horses and
cart. He was paid $6.50 per diem for his own services and the use of
his property.
He not only drove his team, but did other work inci
dental to its use. On the day of his injury, July 11, 1919, he had been
During the noon hour, he sat
hauling coal from a pile near a railroad.
on the railroad track, and leaned against a railroad car while eating
his luncheon. While so sitting, an engine was attached to another car,
and thereby the car against which he was leaning was caused to “kick,”
and Haggard was “rolled under” that car and injured.
While he was
eating, his horses stood at the coal pile near by and were being fed.
It did not appear that Haggard received orders except as to places
of receipt and delivery of his loads.
Even if, as the board found, he was an employé, as to which see
Centrell0’s Case, 232 Mass. 456, 122 N. E. 460, Winslow’s Case, 232
Mass. 458, 122 N. E. 561, Eckert’s Case, 233 Mass. 577, 124 N. E.
421, and Robichaud’s Case, 234 Mass. 60, 124 N. E. 890, the board was
justiﬁed in ﬁnding, if not constrained to ﬁnd, that the accident did not
arise out‘ of his employment.
Haggard was not in a place in which it
was necessary for him to be in the course of his work, or in going to
The act in which he was engaged when injured
or coming therefrom.
had no relation to his employment; indeed, his going upon the rail
road track seems to have been in violation of St. 1906, c. 463, part 2,
§ 232, although the decision of this case is not based on that statute.
Fumiciello's Case, 219 Mass. 488, 107 N. E. 349; Ross v. John Han
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 Mass. 560, 111 N. E. 390; Borin’s Case,
227 Mass. 452, 116 N. E. 817, L. R. A. 1918A‘, 217; Rochf0rd’s Case,
He chose “to go to a dangerous place
234 Mass. 93, 124 N. E. 891.
where he [had] no business to go, incurring a danger of his own
choosing and one altogether outside any reasonable exercise of his em
Brice v. Edward Lloyd, Ltd., [1909] 2 K. B. 804, 810.
ployment.”
The decree for the insurer was properly entered, and must be aﬁinned.
Weis Paper Mill C0.

v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 284, 127 N. E.
where employee was resting on a switch track in the shade, or a
box car. 19 Mich. Law Rev. 232; 22 Col. Law Rev. 589. See also Thomas v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372, 6 A. L. R. 1145 (1919),
Pm'Pl".\'6e at play during noon hour.
13 See
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234 Mass. 93, 124 N.

1919.
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Proceeding under the VVorkmen’s Compensation Act (St. 1911, c.
as amended by St. 1912, c. 571) by Francis Rochford, the em
ployé, opposed by the Woodbury Shoe Company, the employer, and
the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer.
Compensation
was awarded by the Industrial Accident Commission, the award af
ﬁrmed by the superior court, and from its decree the insurer appeals.
Decree reversed, and decree directed in favor of the insurer.
Ruco, C. J. The employé’s place of work was on the second ﬂoor
of the factory of the subscriber. He went home to dinner and return
ed to the factory- about 20 minutes before 1 o'clock.
He went into
the packing room, through which he would have to pass in order to
reach his place’ of work upstairs.
He waited until 1 o’clock in the
packing room, where other of the employés ate their lunch. His con
duct there and the injury received are stated in these words in the
“He was sitting in a chair near some power monogram
agreed facts:
There was a girl about
machines talking with a friend, Whitehead.
17 years of age who was sitting on the employé’s knee and two other
girls about the same age were nearby sitting on a box. * * * just
as the 1 o’clock whistle blew, which was the hour for returning to work,
the girl, who was sitting on the employé’s knee, got up and began to
walk away to go to her work. The employé then arose from the chair
and took hold of the last which was attached to the part of the mono
gram where it would be moved to receive the impression of the stamp,
and took hold of it for the purpose of assisting him to get up out of
the chair.
As the employé was getting up in this way, the stamping
device or die of the monogram was set in motion by the operation
of the machine and came down upon his right hand.”
It is apparent from this recital of facts that there was no causal
It was no part
connection between the employment and the injury.
of the employment to wait for 20 minutes under the circumstances dis
closed in the packing room, although the employé was required to pass
through it in a reasonable and orderly way to reach his labor. VV hat
ever else may be said respecting his manner of spending that period of
time, plainly it was no part of his duty and had no relation to it. The
injury occurred while he was attempting to extricate himself from a
posture and course of behavior utterly foreign to the business of the
The
That risk was not incidental to his employment.
subscriber.
subscriber was in'no wise responsible for it. It was intentionally, in
telligently and voluntarily incurred by the employé on an escapade of
his own.
Conditions may arise where the employé on the way to or
on the return from meals may be injured on the master’s premises
751,
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result of the contract of service although not actually
in the work for which he was hired.
Sun
dine’s Case, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 433, L. R. A/1916A, 318; Hai
lett’s Case, 232 Mass. 49, 121 N. E. 503. The case at bar is not of
that nature; it belongs to the class illustrated by Savage’s Case, 222
Mass. 205, 110 N. E. 283; Mo0re’s Case, 225 Mass. 258, 114 N. E.
204; O’Toole’s Case, 229 Mass. 165, 118 N. E. 303.
\
Decree reversed. Decree to be entered in favor of the insurer.
as

a rational

engaged at the moment
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Y.
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Proceedings by Salvatore Leonbruno under the VVorkmen’s Com
pensation Law to obtain compensation for personal injuries, opposed
by the Champlain Silk Mills, the employer, and the American Mu
tual Life Insurance Company, insurer. There was an award of com
pensation, which was aﬁirmed by the Third Department of the Appel
late Division of the Supreme Court (192 App. Div. 858, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 222), and the employer and insurer appeal. Aﬁirmed.
CARo1>zo, ]. The claimant while engaged in the performance of his
duties in the employer’s factory was struck by an apple which one of
his fellow servants, a boy, was throwing in sport at another, and as a
He did not
consequence lost the better part of the sight of one eye.
participate in the horseplay, and had no knowledge of it till injured.
The question is whether t_he accident was one “arising out of and in
the course of employment,” within the meaning of the statute (VVork
men's Compensation‘ Law, § 3, subd. 7; Consol. Laws, c. 67).
That it arose “in the course of employment” is unquestioned. 'Ilhat
it arose “out of” employment, we now hold. The claimant’s presence
in a factory in association with other workmen involved exposure to
He was
the risk of injury from the careless acts of those about him,
brought by the conditions of his work “within the zone of special dan
ger.” Thom v. Sinclair, [I917], A. C. 127, 142. \/Vhatever men and
at all
boys will do, when gathered together in such surroundings,
events if it is something reasonably to be expected, was one of the
in Hulley v. Moos
perils of his service. We think with Kalisch,
was “but natural to ex
Law, 103, 93 Atl. 79, that
brugger, 87 N.
pect them to deport themselves as young men and boys, replete with
For workmen of that age or even
the activities of life and health.
of maturer years to indulge in a moment’s diversion from work to
fellow workman,
joke with or play
prank upon
matter of
common knowledge to every one who employs labor?’
The claimant
was injured, not merely while he was in
factory, but because he
'
Gonn.Pn.& A. (20 En.)
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was in a factory, in touch with associations and conditions insepara
ble from factory life.
The risks of such associations and conditions
were risks of the employment.
Thom v. Sinclair, supra; Matter of
Redner v. Faber & Son, 223 N. Y. 379, 119 N. E. 842.
We think the precedents in this state, whatever variance of view
there may be in other jurisdictions, sustain our present ruling.
This
case is not within the principle of Matter of De Filippis v. Falkenberg,
219 N. Y. 581, 114 N. E. 1064, and Matter of Stillwagon v. Callan
Brothers, 224 N. Y. 714, 121 N. E. 893, where the claimant, joining
in the horseplay, had stepped
Cf. Mat
aside from the employment.
ter of Di Salvio v. Menihan Co., 225 N. Y. 123, 121 N. E. 766. This
case is rather within the principle of Matter of Verschleiser v. Stern &
Son, 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126, where the claimant, while en
gaged in his work, was assaulted by fellow workmen, who wished to
tease and harrass him. Cf. Markell v. Green Felt Shoe Co., 221 N. Y.
493, 116 N. E. 1060; Matter of Hcitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148,
112 N. E. 750, L. R. A. 1917A, 344.
We do not overlook the cases
in other jurisdictions.
Hullcy "v. Moosbrugger, supra, was reversed
by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in 88 N. ]. Law, 161,
95 Atl. 1007, L. R. A. 1916C, 1203.
It is in accord, however, with a
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Pekin Cooperage Co. v.
Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 128. English cases hostile to
the award (Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 1902, 2 K.
B. 178; Fitzgerald v. Clarke 8: Son‘, 1908, 2 K. B. 796) are inconsist
ent, it would seem. in principle with -later rulings of the House of
Lords (Thom v. Sinclair, supra; Dennis v. \Vhite & Co., 1917, A.
Cf. Matter of Redner v. Faber &_Son, supra, and Matter of
C. 479.
Hanimerle, 222 N. Y. 382, 118 N. E. 805). They are cer
v.
Grieb
tainly inconsistent with the broader conception of employment and its
Matter of Versch
incidents to which this court is now committed.
The risks of injury incurred in the
leiser v. Stern & Son, supra.
crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of fellow workmen
are not measured by the tendency of such acts to serve the master’s
business.
Many things that have no such tendency are done by
workmen every day. The test of liability under the statute is not the
master’s dereliction, whether his own or that of his representatives
The test of liability is the
acting within the scope of their authority.
relation of the service to the injury, of the employment to the risk.“
The order should be aﬁirmed, with costs.
14 The cases involving injury through
“horseplay,"
or “skylarking," can
A large number are gathered in a note in 13 A. L. R.
scarcely be reconciled.
With the principal cnse ct Payne v. Industrial Commission, 295 Ill. 388.
540.
129 N. E. 122. 13 A. L. R. 518 (1920), holding that the Compensation Acts were
intended to apply to industrial accidents, and must therefore be incidental to
“Some courts go much farther than others in extending the
theemployment.
Socha v. Cudahy Packing
scope of the term ‘arising out oi’ the employment.”
In Heitz v. Ruppert,
Co., 105 Neb. 691. 181 N. W. 706, 13 A. L. R. 513 (1921).
218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750, L. R. A. 1917A, 344 (1916), Pound, J., points out
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Proceeding under \Vorkmen’s Compensation Act by Ida Madison
The award ﬁxed by the arbi
against the Rockford Hotel Company.
trator was conﬁrmed by the Industrial Commission, and defendant
brought certiorari to the circuit court, which set aside the-award, and
plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
FARMER, I. Joseph Madison was employed by the Rockford Hotel
On that day, while in
Company on and prior to September 5, 1919.
the discharge of his duties he fell into an ash pit, where hot coals and
He
cinders were thrown when removed by him from the furnace.
was seen by the engineer of defendant in~error, a few minutes before
he was found in the ash pit, in the act of raising the cover from the
pit for the purpose of drawing into it ashes and cinders from the
The witness left the room for 5 or 10 minutes, and when
furnace.
he returned found Madison lying on his back in the pit on the hot cin
ders.
He was unconscious, and before witness could procure help
After“ Madison was removed
and remove him he was badly burned.
he
consciousness
and
was taken to a hospital,
the
pit
regained
,from
He was then removed to his home,
where he remained several days.
where he died December 15, 1919.
The doctor who held a post mortem described the conditions he
found, and expressed it as his opinion that the death was caused by
Deceased left him surviving a widow, but no child or
the burns.
The widow ﬁled an applicatiomfor compensation, which
children.
the arbitrator allowed, and ﬁxed the award at $50 per month for a.
period of 66 months, one month at $47.72," and the further sum of $50,
See 19 Mich. Law Rev. 456, 669.
Cf. Knocks v.
distinctions in the cases.
Metal Pkg. Corporation, 194 App. Div. 65, 185 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1920), employee
provoked assault by a foreman; Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Com
mission, 57 Utah, 589. 196 Pac. 853, 20 A. L. R. 872 (1921), in which the in
jured employee himself engaged in the horseplay.
The English cases at ﬁrst stressed ordinary risks to which the employee
is exposed in common with all on the streets, distinguishing cases of special
risk because the nature of the employment required the employee to be on the
‘street. Pierce v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 997,
and cases discussed in 16 Mich. Law Rev. 179. Cf. Hoenlg v. Industrial Com
mission, 159 Wis. 646, 150 N. W. 996. L. R. A. 1916A, 339 (1915), death by
lightning while working on a dam; State ex rel. Peoplc’s Coal & Ice Co. v
District Court of Ramsey County, 129 Minn. 502, 153 N. W. 119, L. R. A.

1916A, 344, 347, note (1915).
_
15 Accord:
Gonier v. Chase Companies, 97 Conn. 46, 115 Atl. 677, 19 A.
R.
83 (1921), 20 Mich. Law Rev. 687, with discussion of the cases pro and con,
Contra, see Van Gorder v. Packard Motor Car Co., 195 Mich. 588, 162 N. W.
107, L. R. A. 191.715, 522 (1917), and Cox v. Kansas City Reﬁning Co., 10$ Kan,
320. 195 Pac. 863, 19 A. L. R. 90 (1921).
And see 20 Mich. Law Rev. 254,
criticising Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Ill. 463, 131 N. E. 619
(1921). paralysis following an altercation in which there were no actual blows
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being the amount which accrued from ‘December 16, 1919, to January
The award ﬁxed ‘by the arbitrator was conﬁrmed by the
16, 1920.
Industrial Commission on .1 petition for review. Defendant in error
That court set
sued out a writ of certiorari from the circuit court,
This court granted a
aside the award and held there was no liability.
.
writ of error to review that decision.
Liability under the VVorkmen’s Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p.
335) is denied on the ground that Madison’s injury did not arise out
of his employment. The argument in support of that contention is that
the fall into the ash pit was not due to an incident of the employment,
but was caused by Madison being seized with an epileptic ﬁt; that he
was subject to such ﬁts, of which his employer had no knowledge;
that the ﬁt was the direct and only cause of his injury, and the accident
It is generally held by the Eng
did not arise out of the employment.
lish courts and the courts of this country that, where. the death of an
employee results from a prior existing disease, like heart trouble or
other impaired physical condition, while the workman was doing his
ordinary work in the ordinary way, and there was no sudden, unusual,
or violent strain, it will not be considered an accidental death arising
out of the employment, within the meaning of the Workmen’s Com
pensation Act.
It is contended by defendant in error those principles are controlling
in this case, because there was no evidence of any unusual effort or
strain of Madison, which caused or contributed to his fall, or to bring
on a ﬁt, as the result of which he fell into the pit. So far as disclosed
by the testimony, Madison was doing his work in the ordinary way
No one saw him 'fall, but there was proof by medical
when last seen.
and lay witnesses that in the year 1918 he had spasms resembling ep
ileptic ﬁts, and the doctors who testiﬁed on that subject believed him
The widow testiﬁed she had been mar
afflicted with that trouble.
ried to deceased and lived with him a year before the accident, and that
she had never seen or known of his having a ﬁt. It must be admitted
the proof of defendant in error tended to show Madison occasionally
had spasms or ﬁts. Whatever the disease was that caused the spasms
or ﬁts, it was mild in form, and the ﬁts were not many or of frequent
occurrence.
V
It is contended by defendant in error that it is not as probable Mad
ison’s fall into the pit was the result of his being overcome by gases
or fumes or other causes, while removing the hot ashes and cinders
from the furnace, as that the fall was caused by an epileptic ﬁt, in view
of the testimony referred to. The fact that we cannot overlook or
ignore is that Madison, by reason of his falling into the pit wh-ile en
gaged in performing the duties of his employment, was so severely
He did not die from epilepsy
injured that he died from the injuries.
or a pre-existing disease, but from the burns he received from falling
into the pit. Some cases hold that, where an employee is seized with

\
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a ﬁt and falls to his death, the employer is not liable, because the

in

jury ﬂid not arise out of the employment (Van Gorder v. Packard
Motor Car Co., 195 Mich. 588, 162 N. W. 107, L. R. A. 19l7E, 522;
Brooker v. Industrial Com., 176 Cal. 275, 168 Pac. 126, L. R. A. l918F,
878); but a majori-ty of the courts, American and English, hold that;
if the injury was due to the fall, the employer is liable, even though the
fall was _caused by a pre-existing idiopathic condition.
Defendant in error admits the English decisions “apparently sus
tain the position of the applicant in this case,” but endeavors to point
out that those decisions are not all in harmony, and argues the Amer
ican cases holding the contrary are based on sounder reason and prin
ciples. The view of this court on that question was expressed in the
opinion in Peoria Railway Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill.
352, 116 N. E. 651.
In that case the employee was ﬁreman on a
switch engine. While engaged in performing his duties he fell from
the engine, while it was running slowly and smoothly over a prac
tically level roadbed. He died in a short time, without regaining con
sciousness. An autopsy was held, and there was medical testimony
that the fall caused the death, and also that the death was produced by
a pre-existing disease.
The widow testiﬁed she had been the wife
of deceased one year, and during that time he was in good health. The
court held the death resulted from an accident arising out of the em
ployment, and that the employer was liable,_and cited many authorities
That decision we think applicable to this
supporting that conclusion.
case.

'

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
manded to that court, with directions to conﬁrm the award.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.

re
i

DOUGHERTY’S CASE.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1921.
16 A. L. R. 1036.)

238 Mass. 456. 131 N.

E.

167,

under the W'orkmen’s Compensation
Act by Nellie
for
the
death
of
for
compensation
Cornelius
Dougherty
Dougherty,
opposed by the Union Coal & Wood Company, employer, and the
Proceeding

Travelers’
Insurance Company, insurer.
Compensation was denied,
and from the decree entered on the decision of the Industrial Accident
Board, the claimant appeals.
Afﬁrmed.
\
CROSBY, I. The undisputed facts in this case show that the em
ployee was a teamster in the "employ of the Union Coal & Wood Com
pany. On August l, 1917, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after hav
ing delivered a load of coal, he drove into his employer's yard and
complained to one Finn, the treasurer of the company, that he did not
feel well and that he was not perspiring;
he was ordered to put up his
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about half an hour

later it was reported that
he was re
moved to a hospital, and died several hours later, his death being
due to heat prostration.
The day in question was extremely hot;
the temperature registered between 98 and 99 degrees in the afternoon.
It is plain that the sunstroke which resulted in the death of the
employee was suffered while he was doing the work he was employed
to perform; therefore the injury was received in the course of his em

team

and go home;

he was lying in his employer's barn and was unconscious;

ployment.
The question remains whether the injury arose out of the employ
ment within the meaning of the VVorkmen’s Compensation Act (St.
An injury arises out of
1911, c. 751, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571).
the employment when it appears in view of all the circumstances that
there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the
work is required to be performed and the -resulting injury." The
ﬁrst interpretation by this court of the \Vorkmen’s Compensation Act
in this connection is found in McNicol’s Case, 215 Mass. 497, at page
499, 102 N. E. at page 697 (L. R. A. 1916A, 306), where it is said
that, “if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned
by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of’ the employment.
But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employ
ment as a contributing proximate cause and which'comes from a haz
ard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart
from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the
Hewitt’s Case, 225 Mass.
work and not common to the neighborhood."
Donahue's Case, 226 Mass.
1, 113 N. E. 572, L. R. A. 1917B, 249;
595,-116 N. E. 226, L. R. A. 1918A, 215; Warner v. Couchman, 4
B. W. C. C. 32. See McManaman’s Case, 224 Mass. 554, 113 N. E.
287; Mooradjian’s Case, 229 Mass. 521, 118 N. E. 951.
In the case at bar a member of the Industrial Accident Board found
that upon all the evidence the claimant “has not satisﬁed the burden
of proving that the heat prostration which caused the death of her de
cedent was occasioned by or causally related to a personal injury which
This ﬁnding was
arose out of and in the course of his employment.”
aﬂirmed and adopted by the board on review which found that “it has
not been shown that the employee was subjected by reason of his em
ployment to materially greater danger of heat prostration than other
outdoor workers on the days in question."
There was no evidence to show that the employee, while engaged in
delivering coal on the day of his death, was peculiarly exposed to
the danger of sunstroke by reason of the nature of his work ; the haz
ard of injury from that cause would not seem_ to have been different
16 Crosby
1253 (1919),

Thorp-Hawley Co., 206 Mich. 250, 172 N. W. 535, 6 A. L. R.
paralysis from hurrying with heavy grips to catch a train.
v.
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from that to which persons in general in that locality who worked
in the open were exposed. It cannot be said as matter of law that
The
the ﬁndings of the board were without evidence to support them.
case at bar is plainly distinguishable in its facts from McManaman’s
Case, supra, O’Brien’s Case, 228 Mass. 380, 117 N. E. 619, McCar
thy’s Case, 230 Mass. 429, 119 N. E. 697, and McCarthy’s Case, 231
Mass. 259, 120 N. E. 852, where a different result was reached.

CRANNEY’S CASE.
(Supreme Judicial

Proceeding

Court ot Massachusetts,
15 A. L. R.

under the Workmen’s

232 Mass.

1919.

149. 122 N.

E.

266.

584-)

Compensation

Act (St.

1911,

c.

751, amended by St. 1912, c. 571) by Mary E. Cranney, for compensa
tion for the death of Charles VV. Cranney, the employé, opposed by
the employer, and the Employers’
Liability Assur
Compensation was award
Corporation, Limited, the insurer.
ed, the award atﬁrmed by the superior court, and the employer and
insurer appeal. Decree of the superior court affirmed.
BRALEY, ]. The case was heard in the ﬁrst instance by a single
member of the Industrial Accident Board, whose decision for the
claimant was affirmed on review by the full board. VVhile the insurer
concedes that there was some evidence to support most of the ﬁndings
of fact, we are satisﬁed upon reading the evidence, which includes
the statement of Zacharachi who shot and killed the employé, that all
of the ﬁndings were warranted. The ﬁndings are as follows:
“That the employé * * * was shot and killed on August 28, 1916,
that the deceased was head waiter at
by one Stellianos Zacharachi;
and
had
been
such
for 2% years prior to the shoot
the Hotel Essex
ing; that the deceased employé had been employed as a waiter and
as head waiter at the hotel for' about 16 years; that his duties as head
waiter embraced the hiring and discharging of waiters, their control
while on duty and the maintenance of discipline among them; that
Zacharachi, the assailant, had been employed as a waiter at the hotel
for about 20 years; that prior to the claimant’s decedent becoming
head waiter Zacharachi had enjoyed special privileges not enjoyed by
the other waiters, including a special station and shorter hours; that
the deceased in the interest of discipline and to allay dissatisfaction
among the other waiters and promote the interests of his employers
took these privileges away from Zacharachi; that a few weeks before
the shooting Zacharachi had been discharged because he was not a
member of the waiters’ union and that immediately prior to the shoot
re-employed Zacharachi, but had
ing the deceased had voluntarily
not given him his old station; that Zacharachi was of an excitable
temperament, was made ugly by drinking liquor; that Zacharachi was

the

Hotel Essex,

ance

,
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a habitual drinker for a long period of years and that he habitually
carried a pistol; that his drinking habits and the effect of liquor upon
him and‘ the fact that he carried a pistol were generally known at the
hotel; that about a. month before the shooting a pistol belonging to
Zacharachi was taken away from him at the hotel and placed in the
that on on the morning of August 28,
custody of the bookkeeper;
1916, Zacharachi came in to work and did some work; that about 11
a. m. he had some words with the deceased in regard to his. work;
that he refused to obey the orders of the deceased and was told that he
was discharged; that he was very angry and became further inﬂamed
by a couple of drinks which he secured at the hotel bar; that while an
gry and inﬂamed by liquor he sought out the deceased employé, had
some further words with the deceased in regard to his employment,
and then shot and killed him; ‘that the shooting occurred while the
deceased was eating his luncheon shortly after 2 o'clock; that his
luncheon. was furnished to him as a part of his contraét of employ
ment ; that the deceased was free to leave the hotel from 2 o’clock un
til 5:30 in the afternoon, but that he was subject to call while in the
hotel and customarily returned to his place of employment in the din
ing room after eating his luncheon.”
It is unnecessary to discuss the questions whether the employer
knew of Zacharachi’s habits in the use of intoxicating liquors or of
carrying a pistol, or that drinking caused him to be ugly, as the deci
sion is put on the ground that the employé “was shot and killed solely
by reason of his performance of his duties as head waiter, and that
as it turned out his death resulted from a risk of his employment and
flowed from that source as a rational consequence."
The insurer relying on McNicol’s Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E.
697, L. ‘R. A. 1916A, 306, contends that compensation cannot be
awarded, as the casualty could not have been reasonably foreseen by
the employer, and therefore not being a risk of the employment it
does not arise out of it. The shooting occurred in the employer's din
It is manifest that he
ing room while Cranney was at luncheon.
lost his life, not because of any quarrel of his own with the assailant,
but because he faithfully and properly discharged the duty owed to
his employer, and thereby incurred the resentment of Zacharachi.
“The servant must serve in the master's way as he is directed, or in
emergencies as he has reason to believe the master would approve were
he present, or as he a faithful servant owing to his master fealty and
aid in time of peril ought.”
It was plainly in the employer’s interest and for its beneﬁt that
Zacharachi should be discharged, and when Cranney was hired and
reasonable
intrusted with this general authority, which he exercised
was contemplated that whatever befell him when
and suitable way,
the time
acting strictly within the scope of his employment, even
and conditions could not be forecast, was incidental to, and part of
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“The rational mind must be able to trace the re
employment.
sultant personal injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the em
ployment and not by some other agency, or there can be no recovery.”
Madden’s Case, 222 Mass. 487, 495, 111 N. E. 379, 383 (L. R. A.
1916D, 1000).
It moreover is reasonably within the common experience of man
kind that the general nature of what Cranney would have to do in
maintaining discipline if a waiter persisted in disobeying orders, and
the possible anger and desire “to get even,” of a waiter discharged un
der such circumstances could be foreseen in the sense that such inci
dents are not mere ﬁgments of the imagination, but incidents which
might occur in the ordinary course of human affairs.
“That murder resulted instead of a broken bone is of slight, if in
deed it is of any signiﬁcance.
This injury was one to which the em
ployé was exposed by reason of his employment. * * * The causa
tive danger was peculiar to his work.
It was incidental to the charac
ter of the employment and not independent of the relation of master
and servant. Although unforeseen and the consequences of what on
this record appears to have been a crime of the highest magnitude, yet
now, after the event, it appears to have had its origin in a hazard
connected with the employment and to have ﬂowed from that source
as a rational consequence. Tried by the test in McNicol’s Case, 215
Mass. 497, 499 [102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 306], the injury seems
to have arisen in the course of the employment.”
Reithel’s Case, 222
Mass. 163, 165, 109 N. E. 951,'952 (L. R. A. 1916A, 304).
\/V e are of opinion that so long as the employé while in the perform
ance of the employer’s business properly exercises the authority con
ferred upon him by his contract of employment injuries received by
him resulting from such employment, arise out of the employment,
and if death ensues as in the case at bar his dependents are entitled to
McNicol’s Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L.
compensation.
R. A. 1916A, 306; Reithel’s Case, 222 Mass. 163, 109 N. E. 951, L.
R. A. 1916A-, 304; Von Ette’s Case, 223 Mass. 56, 111 N. E. 696,
L. R. A. 1916D, 641; Harbroe’s Case, 223 Mass. 139, 111 N. E. 709."
the

"Accord:

Baum

L. R. 1242
Mich. Law Rev.

6 A.

v.
(1919),
893.

Commission, 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625,
emergency act in interest of employer.
See note, 19
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

(Supreme Court of Illinois, 1920.

202

Ill.

406. 127 N.

E.

49, 15 A. L.

R.

586.)

Proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by Bridget
Gallagher, the widow, for the death of her husband John Gallagher,
opposed by the City of Chicago, the employer.
Compensation was
awarded by the Industrial Commission, the award conﬁrmed by the
circuit court, and the City brings error.
Judgment reversed, and
award set aside.
DUNN, C. J. John Gallagher, a laborer in the employ of the city of
Chicago, was atwork on August 3, 1917, loading sand from a freight
car into wagons near the municipal pier. He got down from the car
and went to a hydrant to get a can of drinking water, with which he
returned to the car. A negro named Ramsey was working on an ad
joining car and asked Gallagher for a drink, but Gallagher told him
to get his own water.
Ramsey called him a name and told him to
climb on the car and he would knock his head. Gallagher said noth
ing, but after standing there for a few minutes climbed upon the car
to go on with his work, and Ramsey called him a name and struck
him on the head with a shovel. Gallagher died as a result of the in
jury, and the Industrial Commission afﬁrmed a decision of an ar
bitrator allowing compensation to his widow.
The circuit court con
ﬁrmed the decision of the Industrial Commission, and upon the peti
tion of the city a writ of error was awarded to review the judgment of
the circuit court.
The only question in the case is whether the accident arose out of the
The rule is that an accident, to be within the
deceased’s employment.
Compensation Act (Hurd’s Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, §§ l26—152i), must
have had its origin in some risk of the employment, but the cases are
so various that it is impossible to establish a ﬁxed rule for determin
ing what is a risk of the employment. We have held that an injury to
an employé in a ﬁght with another employé growing out of a quarrel
about the employer’s work in which they were engaged arises out of
In Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill.
the employment.
31, 120 N. E. 530, we held that there must be some causal relation be
tween the employment and the injury, and though it is not necessary
that the injury be one which ought to have been foreseen or expected,
it must be one which after the event may be seen to have had its
origin in the nature of the employment. The injury for which the
claimant was held in that case to be entitled to compensation was re
ceived in a ﬁght with another employé growing out of a quarrel in
regard to the manner of doing their work, and it was held for this rea
son that it might be inferred that the injury arose out of the employ
ment, because where men are working together at the same work dif
ferences may be expected to arise about the manner of doing the
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work, the use of .tools, interference of the workmen with one an
'
other, or other details.
Swift & Co. v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 564, 122 N. E. 796, was
also a case of an injury received in a ﬁght between two employés.
The decision holding that the dispute arose out of the employment
and that the employer was liable for compensation was based upon
the proposition that the altercation grew out of matters connected
with the employé’s work and was not purely a personal one entirely
These cases were entirely dif
outside the scope of his employment.
ferent from the present case. The felonious assault which was made
upon the deceased was without any excuse. It had no more connec
tion with the work in which he was engaged than if Ramsey had been
a loiterer on the street and had asked for a drink from Gallagher’s
can.
There was no causal relation between the work and the assault.
The affair was purely personal, with no reference to _the employment.
Ramsey and Gallagher happened to be at the same place because of
their employment, but an injury done by one to the other on account
of some purely personal grudge which this proximity gave an oppor
tunity to inflict was not a result of the employment.
There was no
causal connection between the conditions under which the work was
to be done and the injury. The injury was not incidental to the char
acter of the business, but the deceased would have been equally ex
posed to it entirely apart from his employment.
The judgment will be reversed, and the award set aside. Judgment
'
reversed.
p

HOPKINS
(Supreme

v.

Court of Michigan,

MICHIGAN SUGAR CO.
1915.

184

Mich.

1916A, 310.)

87,

150

N. W. 325,

L. R. A.

Claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by _Iane E. Hopkins
against the Michigan Sugar Company and the New England Casualty
From a judgment for claimant, defendant brings certi
Company.
*
orari.
Reversed. ,
STEERE, ]. The proceedings in this case, brought here for review
by certiorari, arose under Act 10, Pub. Acts 1912 (Extra Session),
and involve the validity of an award, by the state industrial accident
board, of compensation to claimant for the death of her husband on
February 13, 1913, against his employer, the Michigan Sugar Company,
defendant.
It appears from the ﬁnding of the board, supported by competent
evidence, that deceased was in the employ of said company as its chief
engineer, supervising the installation of machinery in, and operation of,
six of its plants located at Saginaw, Bay City, Alma, Croswell, Caro,
He resided at Saginaw, had a desk at the oﬁice of
and Sebewaing.
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the company in that city, and did work there from time to time, but
had no regular ofﬁce hours, and was engaged much of his time visit
ing and looking after the different factories, as directed or as circum
stances might require.
He received an annual salary, with his trav
eling expenses paid when going on business of his employer. He some
times started from the ofﬁce and at other times from his home when
On February 4, 1913, he left Saginaw in the
making such trips.
morning for Sebewaing, to visit the company’s plant at that place. A
train arrived at Saginaw from Sebewaing at 5:40 p. m. About 6 :40 he
arrived home with an injury to his head, which was bleeding a little
at the back, and which his wife gared for. He detailed to her, and
N0 one is shown to have
subsequently to others, how it occurred.
seen the accident. He spent most of the following day at the oﬁice, and
the day after attended a funeral in Bay City.
During those two days
he appeared unwell, complained of a severe headache, and in speaking
of it told of the accident to which he attributed it. From that time he
grew worse, suffered a partial paralysis, with other symptoms of brain
pressure, and died on February 13th. Without details, the testimonyof
physicians showed that his death was caused by a hemorrhage re
sulting from a small fracture about one-half inch long extending from
the vertex of the skull toward the right ear.
It is claimed and found by the board that upon arriving at the, sta
tion in Saginaw, upon his return in the evening from Sebewaing, de
ceased found no street car in sight and started to walk along Wash
ington street in the direction of both his home and the company's
office; that after he had walked a number of blocks he saw a street
car coming and started from the sidewalk, intending to take it; that
the ground there was icy and covered with snow, and he slipped and
Material
fell, receiving the injury which eventually resulted fatally.
parts of this ﬁnding are challenged as unsupported by any competent
Much
evidence; no witness being shown to have seen the accident.
clearly incompetent and purely hearsay evidence produced by claimant
some of which showed that deceased ran
was admitted in regard to
to catch the car and did not notice the ice until, in hurrying over
he slipped and fell.
I
Conceding, however, as contended by claimant, that facts and cir
cumstances properly proven, together with the report of accident
made by the defendant company to the industrial accident board, as
required by statute, furnish suﬁicient evidential support for the ﬁnd
ings, and accepting them as true, we are yet impelled, under the au
thorities, to the view that such ﬁndings fail to sustain the conclusion
of law by the board that such accident was naturally or peculiarly in
cidental to and arose out of deceased’s employment.
must be shown that the em
o justify an award under this act,
ployé received “a personal injury arising out of and in the course
adopted in identical words from
of his employment.” This provision
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the English Workmen’s Compensation Act, and presumably with the
meaning previously given it there.
It is well settled that, to justify an award, the accident must have
arisen “out of” as well as “in the course of” the employment, and the
two are separate questions to be determined by different tests, for
An em
cases often arise where both requirements are not satisﬁed.
ployé may suffer an accident while engaged at his work or in the
course of his employment which in no sense is attributable to the na
ture of or risks involved in such employment, and therefore cannot
be said to arise out of it. An accident arising out of an employment
but the converse does
almost necessarily occurs in the course of
p. 398.
Bradbury on \Vorkmen’s Compensation, vol.
not follow.
“Out. of” points to the cause or source of the accident, while “in the
course of” relates to time, place, and circumstance. - Fitzgerald v.
».
Son, [1908]
K. B. 796.
Clarke
found in the Massachu
The same provision, in the same words,
setts Workmen’s
Compensation Act. In McNicol's Case, 215 Mass.
497, 102 N. E. 697, the controlling question was whether fatal inju
ries received by an employé through blows and kicks administered by
a fellow workman, “in an intoxicated and frenzied passion,” arose
out of the employment.
appearing that the assaulting fellow serv
ant, with whom deceased was required to work, was, when in liquor,
known to be quarrelsome and dangerous, and unsafe to be permitted
to work with his fellow employés, the court held that “a natural result
of the employment of peaceable workman in company with choleric
drunkard might have been found to be an attack by the latter upon his
but
the assaulter had not been an employé, though
companion”;
the injury would yet have been received in the course of the employ
ment,
could not have been said to have arisen out of it. Mitchinson
v. Day Bros., VVorkn‘1en’s Compensation Reports (1913) p. 324.
In
that connection, recognizing as controlling authority, and differen
tiating, many cited English cases upon the subject, the court thus
clearly and comprehensively states the rule:
“It
sufficient to say that an injury
received ‘in the course of’
comes while the workman
the employment when
doing the duty
which he
‘arises out of’ the employment
employed to perform.
when there
apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all
the circumstances,
causal connection between the conditions under
which the work
required to be performed and the resulting injury.
Under this test,
the injury can be seen to have followed as
nat
ural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by
reason
able person familiar with the whole situation as
result of the ex
posure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then
arises ‘out
of’ the employment. But
excludes an injury which cannot fairly
be traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause, and
which comes from
hazard to which the workman would have been

Part

4)

V

'

STATUTES

863

a

it,

equally exposed, apart from the employment.
The causative danger
must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood.
It "must be incidental to the character of the business, and not inde
pendent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been
foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had
its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have ﬂowed
from that source as a rational consequence.”
The ‘question of whether deceased was in any sense within the ambit
of his employment at the time and place of the accident is a serious
one; but, conceding that the injury befell him while in the course of
his employment, can it be fairly ‘traced to his employment as a con
tributing, proximate cause, or did it come from a hazard to which he,
in common with others, would have been equally exposed apart from
the employment?
No direct causal relation is claimed in the particu
lar that the nature of the business of manufacturing sugar in itself ex
to unusual risk or danger of accident of this na
poses itsemployés
ture. All that can be claimed is that the accident resulted from the
understood extra hazard to which those who travel are exposed, and,
while traveling in his employer’s business, he was protected against
accidents attributable to that extra danger.
He had a desk
Deceased's home and headquarters were in Saginaw.
in the ofﬁce of the company, where he did some work.
One of the
His traveling consisted
six factories he supervised was in Saginaw.
of journeying to the other ﬁve factories from time to time as occasion
required. On the day in question he had made such a- journey to Sebe
waing and returned to Saginaw in safety. At the time of the accident
he was in his home city, walking along the street, exposed to no more
or diﬁerent hazards of travel than any other citizen, nor than he
would have been had he spent the day at the company's ofﬁce or its
Saginaw plant. How is the legal aspect of the case affected by his
having gone to Sebewaing during that day, when it appears that his
duties of the day were ended and he had returned safely to Saginaw?
At the time of his accident he was passing on foot along a familiar
highway, upon which was ice and snow——a natural condition of that
an increased risk and added danger of
season of the year—involving
falling, common to all and known to all. V\/hen he slipped upon the
snow-covered ice and fell, he was not riding upon nor getting on or
off any conveyance, public or private. No person or thing connected
with transportation or travel touched or threatened him. While it is
indicated by the record that he desired to take a street car and was
walking or running towards one for that purpose, to assert that he
was injured in attempting to take or board a car would be a mislead
He slipped and fell before reaching
apparently
ing overstatement.
as not to attract the attention of those on the car,
distance
away
such
The board found that
as no witnesses to the accident were produced.
“he started from the sidewalk towards the car with the intention of
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boarding the same”; and the employer’s report, which is the legal
basis of such ﬁnding, shows that he fell “about one-third distance be
The car was presumably somewhere
tween sidewalk and car track.”
on the track at the time, but just where is not disclosed.
Slipping upon snow-covered ice and falling while walking, or run
ning, is not even what is known as peculiarly a “street risk”; neither
is it a recognized extra hazard of travel or particularly incidental to
the employment of those who are called upon to make journeys between

I

it,

'
.
towns on business missions.
These distinctions are recognized’ and the rule correctly stated in an
-opinion of the Michigan Industrial Accident Board, ﬁled in VVorden v.
Commonwealth Power _Co., 20 Det. Leg. News No. 39 (December 27,
l913),'as follows: “It must also appear that the injury arose out of
the employment and was a risk reasonably incident to such employment,
To
as distinguished from risks to which the general public is exposed.
* * * On the other hand, it may be fairly said that one
illustrate:
of the most common risks to which the general public is exposed is
This risk is encountered by
that of slipping and. falling upon ice.
* * * ”
people generally irrespective of employment.
The board also referred to the fact that claimant was upon his own
premises, as of some force, but apparently denied an award upon the
ground quoted, which is well supported by former decisions.
In the late case of Sheldon v. Needham, W. C. & Ins. Rep. of 1914,
p. 274, a servant sent to mail a letter slipped in the street," upon a
banana peel or some other slippery object, breaking her leg. Citing as
controlling several cases involving the same principle, the court held
that, although claimant was in performance of the exact thing or
dered done, there could be no award because the accident was not due
to any special or extra risk connected with and incidental to her em
ployment, but was of such a nature as to be equally liable to happen
under like circumstances to any one in any employment, and whether
employed or not. This unfortunate accident resulted,from a risk coin
mon to all, and which arose from no special exposure to dangers of
the road from travel and trafﬁc upon it; it was not a hazard pe
culiarly incidental to or connected with deceased’s employment, and
therefore is not shown to have a causal connection with
or to have
arisen out of it.
For the foregoing reasons, we are impelled to the conclusion that
the order and award of the industrial accident board in the premises
cannot be sustained. Reversed.
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THOMPSON—STARRETT

(Supreme Court of Minnesota.
159

1916.

134

Minn.

113,

158 N.

CO.
W.

913,

N. W. 565.)

Action by Mary Mahowald, as special administratrix, against the
New
Thompson-Starrett
Company and others. Verdict for plaintiff.
Remanded, with directions.
trial granted, and plaintiﬁ appeals.
HOLT, _I.- Action to recover damages for death by wrongful act.
The jury properly found that the negligence of defendant was the
proximate cause of the death of plaintiff’s intestate, Gebhardt Maho
wald, and that the damages sustained amounted to $6,500.
Defendant
moved for a new trial, and plaintiff appeals from the order granting
the same.
In addition to a denial of legal responsibility for the death of Maho
Manufacturing
wald the answer averred that he, the Barnard-Cope
Company (his employer), and defendant were all under and bound
by chapter 467, Laws 1913 (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230), known as
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and that Mahowald’s death was
caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employ
ment; hence plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this action. At the
trial neither party requested the court to submit to the jury any ques
tion of fact relative to the application of the Workmen’s Compensa
tion Act as a defense herein, and no such question was submitted.
The defendant, however, at the conclusion of the testimony, and again
on the motion for a new trial, insisted that, if there was liability, it
was governed by the act. This view was ﬁnally adopted by the court,
but is challenged by this appeal.
The facts are these: Mahowald was, and for more than a year had
been, a teamster for Barnard-Cope
Manufacturing Company, in the
general delivery of furniture in the city of Minneapolis, receiving $60
per month as wages. The team he drove belonged to the company.
Shortly before 3 o’clock in the afternoon of August-' 19, 1914, he left
his employer’s factory on the east side of the river, in Minneapolis,
with a light load of furniture, part of which was to be delivered to the
New England, a store at Fifth street and Marquette avenue, and
The city hall is situated on the
part to the Milwaukee freight depot.
route between the two places where he had to deliver the load, and he
undertook to stop on his way and pay the water tax for his foreman.
He did deliver the part which was to go to the New England, and was
driving on Fifth street towards Second Avenue South, with part of
As he came opposite the First & Securi
the load still on the wagon.
ty National Bank Building, then under construction, a heavy load of
steel beams weighing over 13 tons broke the hoisting apparatus and
fell from the eighteenth story of the building out upon the street where
Mahowald was passing, instantly killing him, the team, and another
person riding in the wagon.
GODD.PB.& A.(2D ED.)—55

866

,

smrnrns

(Part

4

Plaintiff makes the point that defendant did not prove that Maho
wald's employer was under the Compensation Act. It is too technical
and of no merit, being based on the fact that the witnesses as well as
the attorneys at times designated the employer as Barnard & Cope,
Barnard & Cope Company, and Barnard-Cope
Company, instead of
More
the
name
Company.
Manufacturing
true
Barnard-Cope
using
over, the presumption, according to section 8205, G. S. V1913, is that
both Mahowald and his employer had accepted and were bound by
the Compensation Act.
The facts above recited are undisputed. In the court below, as well
as here, both parties took the stand that it is a question of law wheth
er those facts call for an assessment of damages under the Compensa
tion Act, or under section 8175, G. S. 1913. We shall take the same
position in considering the appeal.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act was designed to furnish com
pensation whenever employés suffer injury or death in the course of the
employment from accidents arising out of it. It was intended to let
those employers and employés who so have chosen escape from the
harsh consequences which so often result from the application to their
status of the common—law rule of negligence, contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and the negligence of fellow servant. And every
person who is entitled to avail himself of the compensation law is pre
sumed to have so done when the relation of employer and employé
was assumed. As remedial legislation it should not receive a narrow
construction, but should be applied fairly and broadly with a view to
confer the beneﬁts intended. It may be that in some particular case
remedies afforded by the law outside of this act would be to the
servant’s advantage. But, where both employer and employé have con
cluded to be bound by the Compensation Act, in respect to accidental
injuries suffered in the employment, courts should not be too prone
to exclude an accident when it does occur from the operation of the
compact. It will not do to adopt a rule excluding an accidental in
jury from the Compensation Act if the servant may recover more
under other provisions of law, and including it only when
damages
otherwise no compensation is attainable. Both employer and employé
must be treated with the same fairness.
Had the death of Maho
wald been brought about by some irresponsible party, under circum
stances such as here, would the Barnard-Cope
Manufacturing Com
pany be compelled to pay his dependents compensation?
Clearly it
would not, except under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. But, if
the Barnard-Cope
Manufacturing Company is _liable under the act,
then this defendant, also being thereunder, is liable to the same extent,
but no further.“
International Coal 3: Mining C0. v. Nicholas, 293 I11. 524, 127 N. E. 703,
A. L. R. 1010 (IWO), in which employer tried to relieve itself from lia
G0m>.Pn.& A.(2n En.)
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That the accident befell Mahowald in the course of his employment
admits of no doubt. He was then doing his usual work in a customary
manner, driving along a street at a place where properly he might
be expected to travel in the discharge of the duties in hand.
There
was no departure from the master’s service up to the accident. The
question not so free from doubt is whether the accident arose out of
his employment. We think it should be held to have so arisen. Maho
wald’s duties kept him continuously on the streets of a large city in
In that position certain risks are in
charge of his employer’s team.
herent, such as collision between his team and other vehicles, runa
ways, and the like. The erection of new buildings is constantly going
on.
Hoisting materials for these, as well as hoisting heavy articles
in moving, is often done over or adjacent to the traveled portions of
the street.
These matters and others involve risks to a teamster
whose attention has also to be given to his team and the road. Had
this heavy load of beams crashed to the street just in front of the
team, thereby causing a runaway resulting in his death, could it
have been said that the accident did not arise out of his employment?
We apprehend not. There would seem to be no good reason for draw
ing a distinction between the supposed case and this. “An injury, to
come within the Compensation Act, need not be an anticipated one,
nor, in general, need it be one peculiar to the particular employment in
which he [the employé] is engaged at the time.” State ex rel. People’s
Coal & Ice Co. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 153 N. W. 119, L. R.
A. 1916A, 344.
The accident which befell Mahowald was a street risk. If his em
ployment as a teamster upon the streets of a large city, where he not
only had to look out for his own safety, but also for that of his em
ployer’s team and rig, necessarily accentuated the street risks to him
above those to other occasional travelers, it sufﬁces for the conclusion
Although the risk
that this accident arose out of his employment.
from the accident in question may be said to be external to the em
ployment, yet the employment caused a special degree of exposure to
this risk.
Chartres on judicial Interpretations of Vi/orkmen’s Com
pensation Law, p. 139. The following authorities may be said to sup
Pierce v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co.,
port this conclusion:
4 Butterworth’s W. C. C. 242; McNeice v. Singer Sewing Machine
Co., 4 Butterworth’s WV. C. C. 351; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. Law,
B.
72, 86 Atl. 458; Challis v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., [1905] 2
154; Zabriskie v. Erie R. R., 86 N. I. Law, 266, 92 Atl. 385, L. R. A.
1916A, 315; Anderson v. Adamson, 6 Butterworth’s VV. _C. C. 874.
Instead of granting a new trial with privilege to plaintiff to pro
ceed under the Compensation Act, we think the trial court should have
bility under the Act by lump settlement with employee. The employer cannot
take the beneﬁt of the act in the case of one employed by him in violation of a
statute.
Acklin Stamping Co. v. Kutz, 98 Ohio St. 61, 120 N. E. 229, 14 A.
~
L. R. 812 (1918), injury to a minor of 16 years.

868

STATUTES

(Part

4

reduced the verdict so as to correspond with the amount allowable un
der that act.
There is no need of a new trial.
The liability of de
fendant has been determined.
So has the damage to plaintiff.
It
only remains to ascertain the amount thereof payable under the act.
The cause is remanded, with directions to reduce the verdict to the
full amount allowable in cases of accidental death under the Work
men’s Compensation Act, and enter judgment for such amount against
defendant.

DENNIS

v.

A. J.

(House of Lords.

WHITE

[1917]

&

co.

App. Cas. 479.)

Appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal, affirming an award of
of the Westminster Court under the Workmen’s Compensa
.
tion Act, 1906
[1916] 2 K. B. 1.
The appellant, a boy aged sixteen, was employed as a plumber’s
mate by the respondents, a ﬁrm of builders carrying on business in
In the course of his employment it was his duty to go
V\/estminster.
upon errands to different parts of London, and on such occasions he
was directed to use a bicycle belonging to the ﬁrm.
On August 27, 1915, he was ordered to go on a bicycl_e a distance
of one mile from the ﬁrm’s premises to fetch some plaster, and as he
was crossing Sloane Square he came into collision with a motor car
and was knocked down and his left leg was broken. The appellant had
for the purposes of the ﬁrm used the bicycle about once a day for a pe
riod of eighteen months.
The respondents denied liability to pay compensation on the ground
that the accident did not arise out of the employment.
They called
no evidence and did not dispute the material facts. The county court
judge awarded that the respondents were not liable,to pay compensa
tion.
The Court of Appeal by a majority (Lord Cozens-Hardy, M. R.,
and Phillimore, L. ].; Sargant, ]., dissenting) aﬁirmed this award.
EARL LOREBURN (read by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline). My Lords,
with the greatest respect, I cannot agree with the order appealed from.
When a man runs a risk incidental to his employment and is thereby
This is what
injured, then the injury arises out of his employment.
I can see no other possible conclusion from this evi
happened here.
the judge

dence.

There may be and have been cases in which the risk which resulted
in the injury would not at ﬁrst sight appear to be incidental to the em
ployment but apparently had no relation to the employment and was
common to all who might be at or near the spot at the time. Even
then it may be possible to show that the employment exposed a man
in a special way to that common danger and so to establish that it

Part 4)

STATUTES

869

was incidental to the employment. Such was the lightning case and the
Zeppelin bomb case.
Some of the learned judges seem to be of opinion that a risk is in
cidental to an employment only if it be one that is peculiar to the
I cannot assent
employment or one which other people do not share.
to that view.
It would enormously restrict the language of the act.
Many risks may be incidental to an employment which are common to
almost every one, such, for example, as the dangers of the street, which
last is this very case. It is one thing to say that if an employment pc
‘culiarly exposes a man to a risk that risk is incidental to the employ
ment. It is quite a diﬂerent thing to say that if other people are also
exposed to the risk then the risk is not incidental to the employment.”
should not have thought it possible that the process of perverting
an act of Parliament by divorcing judicial expressions from their con
text and from the subjecta materies could have been carried so far
as it has been in some of the arguments I have heard on this statute.
I believe that a conclusion from evidence is a conclusion of fact.
But, of course the award may be wrong in law, as, for example, be
cause the act has been wrongly interpreted or because there is no evi
dence to support the conclusion of fact.
It is an oldrule that when
there is no evidence reasonably to support a conclusion of fact or a
verdict the court has jurisdiction as on-a matter of law. If there is
conﬂicting evidence, the award under this act is ﬁnal on the conclusion
of fact.
Loan PARKER or WADDINGTON (read by Lord Shaw of Dunferm
It re
line). My Lords, in my humble judgment this is a plain case.
quires no direct evidence to prove that a boy employed to ride a bicycle
through London traﬁic runs the risk of injury by collision with other
vehicles. The risk is inherent in the nature of the employment, or, to
put it in another way, if a collision occurs, a causal relationship be
tween the employment and the collision can be properly inferred, and
in default of further evidence, in my opinion, ought to be inferred by
Most employments have peculiar risks inherent in
a judge of fact.
their nature. A person employed to break stones runs the risk of be
A person employed to climb a lad
ing injured by a ﬂying splinter.
der runs the risk of injury from a fall. In neither case would positive
evidence be necessary to prove that the injury by accident arose out
of the employment.. That it did so arise would be a legitimate infer
ence from the nature of the employment coupled with the occurrence
of the accident causing the injury. There may, of course, be risks so
general that without further evidence no such inference would arise.
Every one is liable to be struck by lightning, to be frostbitten, or to be
In such cases it may
injured by bombs dropped from hostile aircraft.

I

19 See Foley v. Home Rubber Co.. 89 N. J. Law, 474. 99 Atl. 624
(19_17).
Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn.
employee lost lite on Lusitania;
while
at
traveling
salesman
1, 183 N. W. 977, 20 A. L. R. 316 (1921),
killed
tempting to escape from n ﬁre in hotel in which he was stopping.
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implied in the expres
sion “injury by accident arising out of the employment” by positive
evidence, such, for example, as proving that the circumstanocs of the
employment exposed the employee to a greater risk than that run by
person not so employed, or not so employed under the same condi
tions. But these can have, in my opinion, no application to the acci
dent with which this appeal is concerned.
The learned arbitrator gave no reason for his decision, but he ap
pears to have been inﬂuenced by the fact that in riding a bicycle
through the London trafﬁc the boy ran no greater risk of collision than
any one else riding a bicycle through the same trafﬁc. This, though
A person employed to break stones or climb a
true, is nihil ad rem.
ladder runs no greater risk than any other person who breaks stones
or climbs a ladder, but this is no reason for holding that when he is
injured by a ﬂying splinter or a fall the injury by accident does not
arise out of his employment. If it were, the act would in very many
cases be a dead letter. In those cases where it is necessary to consider
whether a particular employment by its circumstances involves spe
cial liability to a risk which is in its nature general the contrast is be
tween persons engaged in the particular employment or under the par
ticular circumstances and persons not so employed or not so employed
under the same circumstances.
It is not between the injured work
man and others doing the same thing under the same circumstances
or the same conditions. VV hen once it is manifest that what the work
man is employed to do involves a particular risk, it almost necessarily
follows that all who do what the workman is employed to‘ do run the
same risk; but this cannot, in my opinion, deprive the workman of his
right to compensation under the act.
In my opinion, therefore, the appeal ought to be allowed. I see no
diﬂiculty in overruling the decision of the arbitrator, ﬁrst, because he
did not draw from the facts proved before him the inference which, in
my opinion, he ought to have drawn, and, secondly, because he was,
I think, under a misconception of law.
My Lords, inasmuch as expressions used by judges in deciding cases
under the act have so often been used in a way their authors never
intended, I desire to add a word of caution. I am dealing only with
risk is involved in the particular thing
cases where the particular
which the workman is employed to do.
I am not dealing with cases
where the particular thing in which the risk is involved is not the par
ticular thing which the workman is employed to do, but is one which,
so far as his duties are concerned, he may or may not do at his own
choice, though it be, in fact, done in furtherance of those duties. If,
for example, a person employed as a lamplighter chose, in order to
save time, to ride a bicycle between the various lamppo_sts on his round,
and in so doing met with injury by collision, I doubt whether it
could be inferred without more that the injury by accident arose out
of his employment. The case for such an inference would, no doubt,

be necessary to establish the causal relationship
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be strengthened by proof that this was the well-known practice of per
sons employed as lamplighters, and ‘must therefore have been contem

plated by both employer and employed as a probable, or at least pos
sible, mode of the employed fulﬁlling his duties, just as it is both pos
sible and probable that factory hands will walk or go by bus, tram, or
bicycle to the scene of their labours, though no one would at present
contemplate their arrival by aeroplane. With such cases your Lord
ships are not now concerned, and I desire to make it clear that nothing
have said has any reference to them.
What I have said relates only
to a risk involved in doing the particular thing which a workman is
I
employed to do.
[Opinions of Loan FINLAY, L. C., and Loan SHAW and Loan
'
PARMOOR omitted.]
Decision of Court of Appeal, [1916] 2 K. B. 1, reversed.

I

-ii

'

GRIEB

v.

HAMMERLE.

(Court of Appeals of New York. 19181 222 N. Y.
1 A. L. R- 1015.)

382, 11s N.

E.

805.

In the matter of the claim of Helen E. Grieb and another against
VVilliam H. Hammerle and another, for compensation under the Work
men’s Compensation Act for the death of an employé. From an order
of the Appellate ‘Division of the Supreme Court (167 N. Y. Supp.
1102), afﬁrming an award of the State Industrial Commission, defend
ants appeal.
Affirmed.
C.-utnozo, J. The award is for death beneﬁts to the widow and
minor child of one Grieb, an employé. Workmen’s Compensation Law
(Cons. Laws, c. 67) § 16. The employé was a cigar packer in the city
of Syracuse. He was a piece worker, receiving $1.25 for packing a
thousand cigars. When not busy packing, his custom was to deliver
cigars to customers if so requested by his employer. He did this fre
quently during working hours.
Sometimes he did it after working
hours, and then his employer gave him car fares and the price of a
i
drink.
On Saturday. September 30, 1916, Grieb left the factory in the aft
ernoon about 4 o’clock. In the evening, he passed by with two friends,
who had been fellow employés. They saw a light in the factory, and
went upstairs. They found the employer tying up two boxes of cigars.
He had called that evening at the Amos Hotel, had been asked by the
proprietor to deliver some cigars, and had gone to the factory to get
them. After some talk about other matters, the employer asked Grieb
to deliver the boxes at the hotel, and to take the bill with him, pre
sumably for collection.
Grieb consented, and received the boxes and
the bill. He left his employer and his two friends in the factory. On
his way downstairs, he fell, and was killed.
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The argument is made that the injury did not arise out of or in the
I think that is too narrow a view.
course of the servant's employment.‘
If Grieb had been injured during working hours, it would make no
If the service was inci
difference that his service was gratuitous.
dental to the employer’s business and was rendered at the employer’s
request, it would be part of the employment within the meaning of
this statute.
Any other ruling would discourage helpful loyalty.
Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539, 97 Atl. 1020. In that
case a shipping clerk, whose duty was to keep the books, lent a hand
of his own motion in the delivery of merchandise. His claim for com
pensation was sustained. VVe do not need to go so far. VVe cannot
doubt that in the case cited the claim would have been valid if custom
or special request had established the approval of the employer. To
It cannot be that
hold otherwise would lead to strange conclusions.
an employer may ask a clerk to assist mechanics in repairing danger
ous machinery, and then be heard to say that because the service was
gratuitous, the employé, if injured, is outside the pale of the employ
ment.
Pro hac vice, by force of custom or request, the employment is
enlarged. ,Lane v. Lusty, [1915] 2 K. B. 230; Mann v. Glastonbury
Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 96 Atl. 368, L. R. A. 1916D, 86. \Ve have
already held that in determining the relation of employer and em
ployé, the payment of wages is not the sole test. De Noyer v. Cava
naugh, 221 N. Y. 273, 116 N. E. 992. We should hold the same thing
now.
It is plain, therefore, that Grieb’s service, if it had been rendered
during working hours, would have been incidental to his employment.
To overturn this award, it is necessary to hold that the service ceased
to be incidental because rendered after hours.
That will never do.
The law does not insist that an employé shall work with his eye upon
the clock. Services rendered in a spirit of helpful loyalty, after clos
ing time has come, have the same protection as the’ services of the
drone or the laggard. Larke v. John Hancock Co., 90 Conn. 303, 308,
97 Atl. 320, L. R. A. 1916E, 584.
But the argument is that because
the employé had left for the day, and had then retumed, his rights are
different.
Why he returned, we do not know. Perhaps it was idle
curiosity.
Perhaps the unexpected light which he saw in the factory
after closing made him feel that investigation was due in the interest
of his employer. At all events, when he reached there, he found busi
ness in progress.
His employer had prepared cigars for delivery, and
was writing out the bill.
What Grieb then undertook to do with his
employer’s approval was just as much a part of the business as if it
had been done in the noonday sun. He_ was not only to deliver the
cigars. He was also to collect the money. That is the plain implica
tion of the request that he should take the bill with him. Moreover,
it is a fair inference that he expected to return, and bring the money
back, for he did not take his companions with him, but left them be
hind. How far he had to go we do not know. There is no evidence
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where the Amos Hotel is situated. There is nothing to show that the
employé would have passed it in going to his home. I do not say that
It is
the case would be different if such things had been proved.
This case is not one where the
enough to say that they are not here.
servant goes out primarily on his own business or for his personal con
venience, and only incidentally and by the way does something for the
master. All the circumstances point to the conclusion that Grieb left
the factory on the fatal errand for the sole purpose of helping the mas
ter in the transaction of the master’s business. It was not mere friend
ship, it was the relation of employer and employé, that led the one to
request the service and the other to render it. If such a service is not
incidental to the employment within the meaning of this statute, loy
alty and helpfulness have earned a poor reward."
I do not think our law commits us to so harsh a holding. A service
does not cease to be part of an employment because it is occasional or
trivial. The Master of the Rolls said in Mc'Donald v. Owners of
Steamship Banana, [1908] 2 K. B. 926, 929: “If I send my domestic
servant in the evening with a letter to a friend, and he is knocked
down by a motor omnibus on his way to or from my friend’s house,"
there will be a liability under the English statute.
The statement, when made, was a dictum, but a recent case in the
House of Lords (Dennis v. White & Co., [1917] A. C. 479), reviewing
all the precedents, and sweeping aside many ﬁnespun distinctions,
makes it clear that the dictumwas sound and just. See, also, Hughes
v. Batt, [1915] S. C. 150, cited in Dennis v. \/Vhite & Co., supra, at
We should interpret and apply our own statute in the same
page 484.
I cannot doubt that, if it is thus read, the claimant's case
large spirit.
will be found within it.
To reach this conclusion, there is no need to attempt a precise or com
One must leave such
prehensive deﬁnition of the term employment.
problems to be worked out by the process of exclusion and inclusion
in particular cases, rather than by “a ﬁxed standard of measurement."
Stewart & Son v. Longhurst, [1917] A. C. 249, 258. It ls enough that
here the employé was in the general service of the employer;
that
the service rendered was incidental to the business; that it was one
which this employé had been accustomed to render upon request; and
that the errand was the cause of his presence on the stairway.
The
inference is legitimate that it was not the comradeship of friends, but
the tacit sanctions of a relation of power and dependence, which
prompted the master’s request and the servant's acquiescence.
The order should be afﬁrmed, with costs.
20 Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 652 (1922),
injury on way to work; Stewart & Son. Limited, v. Longhurst, [1917] App.
Cas. 249, injury on way back to ship; Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. v. Red
ford, [1920] App. Cas. 757. injury on return to work after dinner; Gifford v.
Patterson, 222 N. Y. 4, 117 N. E. 946, 6 A. L. R. 576 (1917), injury from fall
ing asleep in chair.
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ROBICHAUD’S_ CASE."
(Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts,

1919.

234 Mass. 60, 124

N. E.

890.)

Proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by Alectance
Robichaud, opposed by E. Murdock & Co., the employer, and the
Com
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, the insurer.
pensation was awarded, the award aﬁirmed by the superior court, and
from its decree the insurer appeals. Decree reversed, and decree
directed in favor of the insurer.
The claimant made a contract with the insured “to
PER CURIAM.
draw logs for $2.50 a cord,” furnishing and caring for the team. He
assumed no Obligation to draw the logs at any particular time, doing it
at his convenience in connection with other business.
He was injured
in the performance of this contract, which, as construed by the acts
of the parties, included unloading or helping to unload thel logs at
their destination.
,
On these facts, which are not in dispute, it is plain that the claim
ant was an independent contractor.
He was not an employé under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, as amended).
The
case is governed by Centrello’s Case, 232 Mass. 456, 122 N. E. 560,
\Vinslow’s Case, 232 Mass. 458, 122 N. E. 561, and Eckert’s Case, 233
Mass. S77, 124 N. E. 421, all decided since the hearing before the
Industrial Accident Board, which preclude the claimant from re
covering.

A

INDUSTRIAL
(Supreme Court of Colorado,

COMMISSION
1920.

v.

SHADOWEN.

68 Colo. 69. 187 Pac. 926. 13

A. L. R.

952.)

Proceeding by M. E. VV0lfe under the \Vorkmen’s Compensation Act
to obtain compensation for injuries, opposed by L. F. Shadowen, the
An award of compensation, was set aside by the district
employer.
court, and the Industrial Commission and the claimant bring error.
SCOTT, J. 2” This is a proceeding on error to the district court of
Morgan county in review of the ﬁndings and order of the Industrial
Commission.
M. E. Vi/olfe was an employé of the defendant in error, Shadowen,
who was engaged in the business of operating a threshing machine.
He proceeded from place to place, threshing the grain of farmers for
hire.
Mich. 405, 158 N. W. 36. 19 A. L. R.
on independent contractor at page 1168.
But one may be an employee though away from the plant of his employer.
Matter of Dale v. Saunders Bros, 218 N. Y. 59, 112 N. E. 571, Ann. Cas.
1918B, 703 (1916).
As to distinction under Workmen’s Compensation Acts be.
tween "employee" and “independent contractor”
see Rheinwald v. Builders’
Brick & Supply Co.. 153 N. Y. Supp. 598, 168 App. Div. 425, (1915).
22 Part ot the opinion is omitted.
51 See

Gall v. Detroit Journal Co.,
with elaborate annotation

1164 (1916),

191
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Wolfe was employed to operate the steam engine which supplied
the power and, while so engaged, was severely injured.
The Industrial
Commission, upon a hearing, entered an order granting compensation.
An appeal was taken to theidistrict court, where the order of the com
mission was set aside and where it was held that the claimant was
not entitled to an award. This decision is before us for review.
The commission found that both the employer and his employé were
within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law and sub
ject thereto. The court found speciﬁcally:
“(a) That the plaintiff Shadowen was not 3.l'1_€mplOyCl' of more than
three men regularly employed in his occupation of threshing grain.
“(b) That the men employed to pitch grain were casual employés.
“(c) That whatever employés were employed by the plaintiff were
engaged in an agricultural pursuit and were exempt from the opera
tion of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
“(d) That the plaintiff had not elected to come under the VVorkmen’s
Compensation Law, and was not bound thereby.”
The question as to the number of employés in the employ of an em
ployer is a question of fact to be determined by the commission, and,
under the statute, such ﬁnding may not ordinarily be disturbed by the
court.
Shadowen himself testiﬁed that it required at least four men to op
erate the machine, though at times he had only three who wcnt with
the outﬁt and that he sometimes employed and paid additional men
*
* *
furnished by the farmers.
of
the
the
Upon
employer himself, the commission was
testimony
justiﬁed in ﬁnding that he was an employer of at least four men in his
enterprise, and it was error for the court to disturb such ﬁnding.
It was held by the trial court that the employé was engaged in an
agricultural pursuit, and therefore the employment was not within the
statute. The exemption provided by the statute is as follows:
“Provided, that any employer commencing business subsequent to
August 1, 1915, may make his election not to become subject to the
provisions of this act at any time prior to becoming an employer of
four or more employés, in a common employment, exclusive of private
domestic servants and farm and ranch laborers, by giving notice as
above provided.
Such employer may withdraw from the provisions
of said sections of this act at the expiration of one year, * * *
in the manner provided by this act.” Laws 1915, p. 523, § 9.
It will be seen that the language of our statute does not

state the
exemption to relate to those “engaged in agricultural pursuits,” as is
the case of some other statutes, but does exclude from the operation
of the law only “private domestic servants, and farm and ranch la
borers.”
The theory of the law is that domestic service and farm and
ranch labor are not to be classed as hazardous occupations, and for
such reason are exempted from its operation.
The precise question was determined in Re Boyer (Ind. App.) _ll7_
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N. E. 507, under a statute similar to our own in that farm laborers
The court there
were exempted from the operation of the statute.
said:
“In construing or interpreting an act of the Legislature, the courts
may take into consideration the general scope and purpose of the act
Board, etc.,
and the condition that prevailed at the time of its passage.
v. Given, 169 Ind. 468, 483, 80 N. E. 965, 82 N.
918$ Hughes v.
Indiana Union Traction Co., 57 Ind. App. 202, 105 N. E. 537, and
cases cited.
The purpose of the act, as indicated by its title, was to
prevent industrial accidents, and to provide compensation and adequate
medical and surgical care for those injured by accident while engaged
in industrial pursuits.
It is manifest that the purpose of the act was
to include within its beneﬁts employés in all industrial pursuits, ex
cept those expressly mentioned in the exemption proviso, supra.
“While the threshing of wheat may be a part of the work necessary
to be done on the farm, the farmer himself rarely does it. On the
contrary, he has it done by some one who is specially equipped with
Wheat threshing is
the machinery necessary to do this kind of work.
a business or industrial pursuit in and of itself, entirely separate and
We apprehend that it would not be contended
independent of farming.
that the employé of the miller employed in grinding the farn1er’s wheat
into ﬂour, while so engaged, is doing farm or agricultural work. Yet.
as affecting the question of what relation the labor of their employés
sustains to that of the farm, or agriculture in general, we can see little
if any difference between the thresher and the miller. They each have
It is true
to do with getting the farm product ready for consumption.
the miller’s work is a step further removed from the farm, but each is
in a business separate from and independent of the farm,
engaged
which requires machinery, equipment, and labor peculiar to the busi
The
ness, and not ordinarily required on or incident to farm work.
only difference between the occupations which suggests itself to our
minds as one that might be urged as affecting the question whether each
of the occupations are separate and independent of that of the farm,
and whether the labor of their employés, while employed to assist in
the operation of such respective businesses, is farm labor, is the fact
that the thresher goes to the farm to thresh the farmer's wheat, while
the farmer takes his wheat to the miller to get it ground into ﬂour.”
The same reasoning is adhered to in White v. Loades, 178 App. Div.
236, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1023, and reafﬁrrned in Vincent v. Taylor, 180
App. Div. 818, 168 N. Y. Supp. 287.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has given a still broader construction
to the act.
Raney v. Industrial Commission, 85 Or. 199, 166 Pac. 523.
The employer was a farmer and the operation of an ensilage cutter
was but an incidental employment.
It was there said:
“The fact that the operation of an ensilage cutter may have been
merely incidental to farming, the business in which plaintiff’s em
ployer, D. R. Tinnerstet, was generally engaged, did not make the

\
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5 Suther
management of the ‘feed mill’ a less hazardous occupation.
land, Dam. (5 Ed.) § 1376, p. 5185 ; Wendt v. Industrial Ins. Com. of
Washington, 80 Wash. 111, 141 Pac. 311, 5 N. C. C. A. 790; State
v. Business Property Security Co., 87 Wash. 613, 152 Pac. 334-.”
The contrary view is seemingly adopted by the Supreme Court of
Iowa, Sylcord v. Horn, 179 Iowa, 936, 162 N. W. 249. Though the
decision seems to have been largely based upon the language of the
Iowa statute, in the matter of exemption from its operation, “engaged
in agricultural pursuits,” and the fact that the employé was employed
as a farm laborer generally.
I
That case was followed in the case of State ex rel. Bykle v. District
Court, 140 Minn. 398, 168 N. W. 130, L. R. A. 1918F, 198.
\Ve are of the opinion that the New Yerk and Indiana cases are
supported by the sounder reasoning and are more in harmony with
the spirit and ‘purpose of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law. These
cases are likewise supported by the greater weight of authority.
In this case the employé was not employed to labor on his employer's
farm, but to operate the engine of a threshing machine engaged in
traveling about the country threshing grain for those who desired such
service; in other words, his employment was not merely incidental to
general farm labor, and in our opinion the employer and the employé
in such case are clearly within the operation of the statute.
The judgment is reversed, with instructions to the district court to
enter an order affirming the ﬁnding and award of the Industrial Com

mission.”
i

Judgment

reversed.

V 23

'

Cf. Miller & Lux, Inc., v. Industrial Accident Commission, 179 Cal. 764,
A. L. R. 1291 (1919), where the employee of a farmer was to
See, also, State ex rel.
devote his entire time to repairing farm implements.
Foss v. Nelson. 145 Minn. 123, 176 N. W. 164 (1920), in which a carpenter was
employed to build a barn, and Vaughan’s Seed Store v. Slmonini, 275 Ill. 477,
doing a
114 N. E. 163, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 713 (1916), in which a corporation
wholesale‘ and retail seed and ﬂorist business owned a farm on which the
injured employee was employed as a teatnster.
178 Pac. 960, 7
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NICKERSON’S CASE."
(Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts,

1914.

Ann. Cas. 1916A, 790.)

218 Mass. 158, 105 N.

E.

604,

Proceedings by Nora Nickerson, as dependent of Lester Nickerson,
under the VVorkmen’s Compensation Act, against the Bos
ton Woven Hose & Rubber Company, the employer, and the New Eng
land Casualty Company, insurer. From a decree of the superior court,
rendered upon the ﬁndings of the Industrial Accident Board, in accord
ance with the report of the Arbitration Committee, in favor of the
dependent, the insurer appeals.
SHELDON, ]. The insurer contends that this injury happened by
reason of the employé’s “serious and willful misconduct," and so that
no compensation can be awarded therefor.
St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 2, § 2.
He was employed to do general cleaning, painting and whitewashing.
Some of his work had to be done near machinery and shafting, which
when in motion would involve danger; and he had been directed to do
this work during the noon hours, when the machinery was stopped.
At about half past 11 o’clock in the forenoon of the day on which
he was injured, the superintendent, in answer to a question from him
about work on a wall near the moving shafting, said to him, “VVe
will do that during the noon hour when the machinery is stopped,”
and told him also that it was about half past
and that he (the su
perintendent) would ﬁnd out the correct time and report it to him.
The employé went to work at this place about ﬁve minutes later, ex
pecting that the machinery would be stopped at noon, when he would
continue the work with the machinery at rest.
His clothing was
caught by a projection on the collar of the shafting, his body was
drawn around the shafting, and he received injuries which caused his
death.
“Serious and willful misconduct” is a very different thing from
negligence, or even from gross negligence. Burns’ Case, 218 Mass. 8,
105 N. E. 601; ]ohnson v. Marshall, Sons & Co. [1906] A. C. 409.
It resembles closely the wanton or reckless misconduct which will
render one liable to a trespasser or a bare licensee.
See Romana v.
Boston Elevated Railway, 105 N. E. 598, and the cases there cited on
page S98. Its existence under any particular circumstances is usually
a question of fact. Lclshman v. Dixon, 3 B. W. C. C. 560; George v.
Glasgow Coal Co. [1909] A. C. 123; Bist v. London & Southwestern
deceased,

ll

Railway, 96 L. T. 750.
Here the Industrial Accident Boardhas found, in accordance with
the report of the Arbitration Committee, that this was not “serious and
C

Baltimore Car Foundry Co. v. Ruzicka. 132 Md. 491, 104 Atl.
167, 4 A. L. R. 113 (1918), citing the leading English case of Johnson v. Mar
shall. Sons & Co., Limited, [1906] App. Cas. 409, contrasting deliberate with
14 Accord:

thoughtless

conduct.
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willful misconduct”;
that “the shafting and machinery were about
to stop at any moment, in the mind of the employé, when he could con
tinue to work with absolute safety.
His decision to do some white
washing during this very brief interval seems more like a sudden
thought than a willful act. It seems that it should fairly be regarded
as a minor transgression, at_most, from his standpoint, and not as
serious and willful misconduct.”
Unless this ﬁnding is shown to be unwarranted upon the evidence it
now is conclusive.
Donovan’s Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431;
Bentley’s Case, 217 Mass. 79, 104 N. E. 432; Diaz’s Case, 217 Mass.
The
We cannot say that it was unwarranted.
36, 104 N. E. 384.
fact that the injury was occasioned by the employé’s disobedience to
an order is not decisive against him. To have that effect, the disobedi
ence must have been willful, or, as was said by Lord Lorebum, in
Johnson v. Marshall, Sons & Co., Ltd., [1906] A. C. 409, 411, “delib
erate, not merely a thoughtless act on the spur of the moment."
This case comes well within the rule of the decisions which have
been cited. The decree of the superior court must be affirmed.

A-4
RADIL
(Supreme Court of Nebraska;

v.

1919.

MORRIS

8:

CO.

103 Neb. 84, 170 N.

W.

363, 7 A.

L. R.

539.)

Action by Adolph Radil against Morris & Co., a corporation.
On
appeal to the district court from an award by the compensation com
missioner, the award was modiﬁed and aﬁirmed, and plaintiff appeals.
DEAN, ]. Plaintiff recovered an award from the compensation com
missioner on account of an accidental injury sustained while in the
employ of defendant at its packing house, and also $129 for expenses
incurred for medical and surgical treatment by a physician other than
the one regularly furnished by the employer.
On appeal to the dis
trict court by defendant, the award for compensation was affirmed,
but the medical service bill for $129 was disallowed.
From that rul
ing plaintiff appealed to this court.
As a result of the accident a part of the second ﬁnger of plaintiff's
left hand was bruised and fractured, and afterwards amputated at
the ﬁrst joint by theiphysician
whose bill is the subject of inquiry
here. It is conceded that amputation was necessary, and it is agreed
that the only question to be decided is this: Did the court err in dis
allowing the bill for medical and surgical treatment, under section
3661, Rev. St. 1913, as amended by Laws 1917, c. 85, § 6?. For relief
both parties rely on section 3661, as amended, which follows:
“During the ﬁrst twenty-one days after disability begins the employ
er shall be liable for reasonable medical and hospital services and
medicines as and when needed,

not, however, to exceed

two hundred
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dollars in value, 'unless the employé refuses to allow them to be fur
Provided, however, in cases of dismember
nished by-the employer:
ment or injuries involving major surgical 0perations,_the employer
shall be liable for reasonable medical and hospital services and medi
cines as ,and when needed beyond as well as within the twenty-one
day period, not, however, to exceed two "hundred dollars in value:
Provided, further, that where the injured employé refuses or neglects
to avail himself of such medical or surgical treatment, the employer
shall not be liable for any aggravation of such injury due to said neg

orrefusal."
_
Plaintiff argues that,

lect

because an operation became
necessary, he
was therefore at liberty to make his own selection of a physician, and
that defendant under the act became liable for the reasonable expenses
His argument is based in part on the 1917 amendment,
so incurred.
that begins with the word “Provided,” where it ﬁrst occurs in the
section under consideration, and ends with the word “Value.” He con
tends that the amendment is a proviso, and hence operates to except
the clause covered by it from the enacting clause, or- to qualify,it in
some way. We do not think the authorities sustain his argument.
It
does not always follow that an amendment operates as a proviso in a
technical sense, merely because it is preceded by the term “provided.”
Whether it is a proviso in effect, or merely a conjunction, must in part
be determined from t.he context and from all the provisions of the act
With this in mind it seems that
relating to the same subject-matter.
the word “provided,” as used in the act, has the same meaning that
the conjunction “and” or “but” would have, if used in its place.
With this interpretation, section 3661, as amended, seems to be in
harmony with the entire act of which it forms a part. Georgia Rail
road & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. 47, 32 L. Ed.
377; ,3 Words and Phrases (Second Series) 1321.
The employer having been made liable for the services contem
plated by the act, it seems from the language used that it must have
been the legislative intent that he should be permitted to furnish a
physician of his own choice, and if his selection is such as would sat
isfy a reasonable man under like circumstances the employé would
not then be heard to complain.
That is the general rule in manufac
turing centers, where Emﬂoyers’ Liability Acts with provisions simi
lar to ours were in eﬁ'ect before our act was adopted. Pecott’s Case.
223 Mass. 546, 112 N. E. 217; Keigher v. General Electric Co., 173
App. Div. 207, 158 N. Y. Supp. 939; Davidson’s Case, 228 Mass.
257, 117 N. E. 310; In re McCaskey
(Ind. App.) 117 N. E. 268,
15 N. C. C. A. 113, note III, p. 116; City of Milwaukee v. Miller, 154
\Vis. 652, 144 N. W. 188, L. R. A. 1916A, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 847,
The record shows that the physician furnished
4 N. C. C. A. 148.
his assistant, who administered ﬁrst aid, are in
the
and
company,
by
all respects competent physicians and surgeons.
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conduct reasonable in the premises? It appears that
immediately after the accident, at about 5 o’clock in the evening, plain
tiff went with a foreman of defendant to the nearby ofﬁce of the com
pany physician,- where, in his absence, ﬁrst aid was administered by
the assistant in charge, who told plaintiff to return that evening be
tween 7 and 8 o’clock for further treatment by defendant’s physician.
Plaintiff never returned, and denied that he was requested to do so,

Was plaintiff’s

both the foreman and the assistant physician tes
notwithstanding
tiﬁed that the request was made. The next morning at 9 o’clock, on
advice of his mother, he went to their family physician, and he from
Plaintiff attempted to justify his em
that time retained the case.
a
physician by criticizing the ﬁrst aid treatment that he
ploymentof
received,.but on this point he called a physician as a witness, who ap
proved the treatment so received in all essential particulars.
It seems to us that plaintiff’s conduct was in effect and within the
meaning of the act an unjustiﬁable refusal to allow defendant to fur
nish the reasonable services and medicines that the act contemplates,
and that defendant is not therefore liable for the medical expenses
We have examined the case de novo, and our conclu
that he incurred.
sion is the same as that arrived at by the trial court."
The judgment is therefore afﬁrmed.

O’BRlEN

v.

ALBERT A. ALBRECHT CO.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1919. 206 Mich. 101, 172 N. W. 601,
6 A. L. R- I257.)

On December 22, 1914, plaintiff, a carpenter, then in the employ of
Bryant & Detwiler Company, received a severe accidental injury to
Following the accident, the Bryant &
both feet and both ankles.
Detwiler Company and its insurer entered into an agreement with
plaintiff for compensation for total disability at the rate of $9.45 per
This agreement was approved by the board. This payment
week.
was continued for some time. It would appear that plaintiff’s condi
tion improved somewhat, and on january 18, 1916, the Bryant 8:
Detwiler Company and its insurer entered into another agreement with
plaintiff to thereafter pay for partial disability at the rate of $7 per
week. This agreement was likewise approved by the board. The in
surer of the Bryant & Detwiler Company continued payments under
this agreement down to the time of the hearing of this case before
the Industrial Accident Board, and so far as this record discloses are
25 As to compensation tor medical services procured by the employee, see
R. A. 1916A. 1,
City or Milwaukee v. Miller, 154 Wis. 652, 144 N, W. 188,
Ann. Cas. 1915B, 847 (1913); Gage v. Board of Control of Pontiac State Hos
pital, 206 Mich. 25, 172 N. W. 536, 7 A. L. R. 533 (1919).
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still making such payments. On September 27, 1917, plaintiff, while
in the employ of defendant the Albert A. Albrecht Company as a car
penter, and while earning $30 per week, suffered another accidental
injury, resulting in a hernia. The testimony clearly establishes the
tender of an operation for the hernia, that it could be performed with
out administering a general anaesthetic, by application of a local an
aesthetic, that it would not endanger life, and that plaintiff could not be
cured of the hernia without it. The testimony also clearly establishes
plaintiff’s refusal to submit to the operation. At the time of the hear
ing before the committee of arbitration, plaintiff was wearing a truss,
and was earning $18 per week for
getting along fairly well with
The Industrial Accident Board
work other than as a carpenter.
awarded him $10 per week" against defendant here for total disability.
To review this award this writ of certiorari was allowed.
FELLOWS,
Counsel for the de
(after stating the facts as above).
fendants insist that the original accident, which occurred while plain
tiff was in the employ of Bryant
Detwiler Company, was the
proximate cause of the second injury, and that there can be no re
that the recovery should be, against
covery against the defendants;
the Bryant
Detwiler Company under the holdings of this court in
Son, 198 Mich. 129, 164 N. W. 464, Reiss v.
Cook v. Charles Hoerts
Manfg. Co., 201 Mich. 90, 166 N. W. 840, Cramer
Northway Motor
v. West Bay City Sugar Co., 201 Mich. 500, 167 N. W. 843, and
Adams v. W. E. VVood & Co., 203 Mich. 673, 169 N. W. 845.
In
each of these cases the Industrial Accident Board found as
fact
that the original accident was the proximate cause of the subsequent in
There being testimony in each case to sustain such ﬁnding,
jury.
this court afﬁrmed the awards. In the instant case, while there
tes
timony that would have justiﬁed the board in ﬁnding that the original
accident was the proximate cause of the second injury, there
also
was not. There
testimony justifying the ﬁnding that
testimony
in this record from which the board was justiﬁed in ﬁnding, as
did,
that the accident arose out of and in the course of plaintiff's em
ployment with the defendant.
The physician of the company and the one of plaintiffs selection both
advised an operation for the hernia.
Such operation
not attended
with danger to life or health, and
appears to be undisputed that
affords the only reasonable prospect of restoration of plainti&"s ca
carpenter. VVithout
pacity to labor at his trade, that of
he may be
able to labor at such light occupation as the condition of his feet and
ankles will permit, but he cannot do heavy lifting, as his trade of car
penter requires. During all the time he has refused, and still persists
in his refusal, to submit to the operation advised by his own physician
as well as the one in the employ of defendant.
Plaintiﬁ‘
an intelli
due to
defect of moral cour
gent man, and whether such refusal
The board did not ﬁnd that his re
age or, not we are unable to say.
Gooo.Pn.&

A.(2o En.)
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fusal was due to any ignorance or misunderstanding on his part, and
no such ﬁnding would be justiﬁed on this record. Under such circum
stances the case is clearly distinguishable from Iendrus v. Detroit Steel
Products Co., 178 Mich. 265, 144 N. \V. 563, L. R. A. 191_6A, 381,
Ann. Cas. 19l5D, 476, Poniatowski v. Stickley Bros. Co., 194 Mich.
294, 160 N. W. 569, and Riley v. Mason Motor Co., 199 Mich. 233,
'

N. W. 745.
We appreciate the timidity with which the average person contem
plates an operation, minor as well as major.
But we also appreciate
that in thousands of cases operations, many of them of but minor de
gree, have restored incapacitated men to the army of wage-earners,
165

and put them in position to discharge their duty to their dependents,
to themselves, and to society. We are impressed that under the un
disputed evidence in the ease it was the plaintiffs duty to accept the
tendered operation.
His unequivocal refusal to follow the advice and
judgment of both physicians with reference to the operation relieved
defendants from further activities in that direction, and for the time
As was said by this court,
being, at least, absolved them from liability.
Kuhn,
in
Kricinovich
v. Car & Foun
speaking through Mr.']ustice
dry Co., 192 Mich. 687, 159 N. W’. 362: “Before the defendant is to
be charged, in law or morals, with the duty to compensate him, the
claimant should ﬁrst discharge the primary duty owing to himself and
society to make use of every available and reasonable means to make
himself whole._”
In both this case and that of jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co.,
supra, this court quoted with approval the following language of
Lord McLaren in Donnelly v. Baird & Co., Ltd., 1 B. W. C. C. 95:
“That if the operation is not attended with danger to life or health, or
extraordinary suffering, and if according to the best medical or surgi
cal opinion the operation offers a reasonable prospect of restoration or
relief from the incapacity from which the workman is suffering, then
he must either submit to the operation or release his employers from
the obligation to maintain him.”
In the Iendrus Case Mr. justice Stone fully considers this question.
That was a case of a.major operation of a very serious character.
The workman was an ignorant foreigner, who refused for some time
Under all
to consent to the operation, but who ﬁnally did consent.
the circumstances of that case it was held that the refusal to consent
to the operation was not an unreasonable one.
Applying, then, the rule announced by Lord McLaren and adopted
by this court to the facts of the instant case, we are impressed that
plaintiff's refusal was unreasonable. The operation was not as serious
Indeed, the record discloses that it was
a one as in the _Tendrus Case.
not a serious case of hernia. The operation is not attended with dan
ger to life or health, and could be performed by the use of either a
The doctors agree that it is advisable, and
general or local anaesthetic.
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it is not disputed that it is the only thing that can be done to effect a
cure.
Until the plaintiff submits to an operation, which should be
at the expense of defendants, he is not entitled to compensation from
them."
On September 27, 1917, when plaintiff received the injury here in
volved, he was receiving $7 for partial disability from the Bryant &
Detwiler Company. From that date to the hearing of this case he con
tinued to receive this amount per week. Notwithstanding this fact,
the board made an award against these defendants for the payment
of $10 per week for the same period. So far as we are advised, plain
tiff is still drawing $7 per week from the Bryant & Detwiler Com
pany, and has this award for $10 per week against these defendants.
Both injuries occurred while plaintiff was following his trade as a
His disabilities are disabilities to continue in that line of
carpenter.
The maximum of compensation for total disability ﬁxed
employment.
It
by the statute is $10 per week. Section 5439, Comp. Laws 1915.
must be obvious that a man cannot be more than totally disabled.
It
should be equally obvious that he cannot receive compensation for
more than total disability.
Our statute does not provide for concur
rent compensation.
It ﬁxes a maximum for total disability of $10
per week, and it cannot exceed that sum, whether -it is paid by one
employer or by several.
The award will be vacated, and the case remanded for such proceed
ings as may be had not inconsistent with this opinion.

‘iii.
SULLIVAN’S CASE.
(Supreme Judicial

Court

of Massachusetts,

1914.

L. R. A. 1916A, 378.)

218 Mass. 141, 105

N. E.

463,

SHELDON, ].’" This employé sustained an injury which necessitated
the amputation of his right arm, and for which it is admitted that he
But the insurer contends that on May
was entitled to compensation.
31st following the accident he was physically able to go to work and
that for this reason his right to be compensated for an incapacity for
work ceased on that day, regardless of the question whether he was
The facts found by the committee
or was not able to procure work.
of arbitration, and, on review, by the Industrial Accident Board, are
is a very clear discussion of principles in the much-cited case of
William Baird & Co., [1907-08] Sess. Cas. 536. See, also, Strong
Iron & Metal Co., 109 Kan. 117, 198 Pac. 182, 18 A. L. R.
v. Sonken-Galamba
various statutes, and citing many cases.
415 (1921), considering
Contra:
l\IcNally v. Hudson & M. R. Co., 87 N. J. Law, 455, 95 Atl. 122 (1915); Henley
v. Oklahoma Union Ry. Co., 81 Okl. 224. 197 Pac. 488, 18 A. L. R. 427 (1921).
And see discussion of the cases in 18 Mich. Law Rev. 169: also the late case
of Frost v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161, 190 N. W. 208 (1922).
'
1'1 The statement of facts is omitted.
26 There

Donnelly

v.
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that from May 31st to October 25th he did not work, that he diligently
endeavored to secure employment and was unable to obtain work be
cause of the loss of his arm, but that on May 31st he was capable of
doing the work which he ﬁnally procured, or any work which a one
armed man could ordinarily perform.
Upon these facts and as an
inference therefrom it further was found that he was in fact unable
to obtain any work at which he could earn wages during the period
from May 31st to October 25th; and he was awarded compensation
for a total incapacity for work during that time.
Our statute provides for a weekly compensation while “the inca
pacity for work resulting from the injury is total.”
St. 1911, c. 751,
pt. 2, § 9. The expression “incapacity for work” was taken from the
English Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906, in which it was pro
vided that the amount of compensation to be paid “where total or par
tial incapacity for work” resulted from the injury should be certain
weekly payments. Accordingly decisions of the English courts ﬁxing
the meaning there to be given to these words are of weight. McNicol’s
Case, 215’ Mass. 499, 501, 102 N. E. 697.
The same words were used in an earlier English statute; and it was
held by the Court of Appeal in Clark v. Gaslight 8: Coke Co., 21 T.
L. R. 184, that the object of the act was to give compensation for an
inability to earn wages, and that if an injured employé after repeated
efforts could not get an opportunity to earn wages, a ﬁnding that his
earning power was gone and therefore that he was under an “incapac
ity for work” was warranted, although he had a physical capacity to
work and earn money. The same principle has been aﬁirmed in other
English decisions, that an inability to obtain work resulting directly
from a personal injury is an incapacity for work within the meaning
of this act, although a like inability resulting from some other cause,
such as an altered condition of the labor market, would not be so.
The inability to get work is evidence tending to show an incapacity for
work, although it will not always be conclusive. Radcliffe v. Paciﬁc
Steam Navigation Co., [1910] 1 K. B. 685; Cardiﬁ’ v. Hall, 4 B. W.
C. C. 159, [1911] 1 K. B. 1009; Brown v. J. I. Thorneycroft & Co.,
Ltd., 5 B. W. C. C. 386.
This doctrine of the English courts was settled ﬁnally in two deci
sions of the House of Lords. Ball v. William Hunt & Sons, Ltd., 5
B. W. C. C. 459, overruling s. c. in the Court of Appeal, [1911] 1
K. B. 1048, and McDonald v. Wilson’s & Clyde Coal Co., 5 B. \V. C.
C. 478.
- In our opinion these
The ob
decisions are correct in principle.
ject of our statute was to give compensation for a total or partial loss
of the capacity to earn wages. Gillen’s Case, 215 Mass. 96, 99, 102 N.
E. 346. If, as in this case, the injured employé by reason of his in
jury is unable in spite of diligent efforts to obtain employment, it
would be an abuse of language to say that he was still able to earn
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money, that he still had a capacity for work, even though his physical
powers might be such as to enable him to do some kinds of work if
He has
practically the labor market were not thus closed to him.
he has lost his capacity to work for
become unable to earn anything;
wages and to support himself, not by reason of any change in market
conditions, but because of a defect which is personal to himself and
He is
which is the direct result of the injury that he has sustained.
deprived of the beneﬁt which the statute promises to him if he is told
he
not under
that because he could do some work if he could get
an incapacity for work, although by reason of his injury he can ob
tain no opportunity to work.
But we said in Donovan's Case, 217
Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431, that the statute was to be construed broadly
for the purpose of carrying out its manifest purpose.
The Industrial,Accident Board had
right to ﬁnd that the employé
was totally incapacitated for work until October 25th, and to award him
compensation upon that basis. The decree of the superior court must
‘
be afﬁfmed.

(Supreme Court of New Jersey,

1914.

co.
86 N.

PRESSEY.

v.
.

J

DE ZENG STANDARD

j

-ii

Law,

469, 92

Atl.
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Employers’ liability action by Sheridan Pressey against the De Zeng
Standard Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defend
ant brings certiorari.
PARKER,
This case arises under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act of 1911 (P. L. p. 134), and the principal question argued
wheth
er the petitioner should receive an award for the permanent impair
ment of the function of his right arm, when
shown that he has
been earning the same pay as he earned before the accident.
The petitioner as carpenter in the employ of the prosecutor earned
week.
He sustained an accident arising out of and in the course
$20
fracture of the bone of the fore
of his employment which caused
arm known as the “radius” at or near the elbow, and which
ad
mitted to have caused the permanent loss of 30 per cent. of the use of
his arm. After two weeks he went back to work under the same em
time entered the employ of
ployer, at the same wages, and'after
his son at the same wages. Later on when work became slack he
worked independently, receiving the same pay for the time he was ac
tually employed.
In this proceeding the court awarded him 30 per cent. of $10 for the
period of 200 weeks, under the provision of the act: “Where the use
member or any physical function
fulness of
permanently impaired,
the compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the
schedule as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries claim
ed in the schedule.”
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however, was awarded upon the number of weeks
and consequently the award was the sum of $10 per week
for a period of 60 weeks. This is not the method sanctioned in james
A. Banister Co. v. Kriger, 84 N. ]. Law, 30, 85 Atl. 1027, where this
court sustained an award for the full period with relation to the per
centage of the weekly wage on application of the minimum clause.
Applying that rule to the present case, the award would have been
for ZOO weeks at a minimum of $5 per week; but the petitioner does
not question the form of the award, and plainly the prosecutor is not
injured by it.
The prosecutor’s principal claim is that there cannot be a statutory
“disability” when it appears that the earnings of the petitioner had
It may well be that
not been impaired.
VVith this we cannot agree.
for a time an injured employé might be able to earn the same wages
as before the accident; but, as we read the act, the disability intended
thereby is a disability due to loss of a member, or part of a member, or
of a function rather than to mere loss of earning power. Even if this
were not so, it does not follow that the injured employé had not sus
tained a distinct loss of earning power in the near or not remote fu
ture and for which the award is intended to compensate. _If it were
a question of damages at common law, the elements of damage would

The

30 per cent.,

as a base,

consist of present loss of wages, probable future loss of wages, pain
and suffering, and temporary or permanent disability, which loss the
jury would be at liberty to assess quite independently of the fact that
the plaintiff was earning the same wages, except so far as that fact
might be evidential with regard to the extent of the disability.
Next it is argued that, because the petitioner worked for the prose
cutor for 55 weeks at full wages, these 55 weeks should be deducted
from the 60 weeks for which the award was made. The answer is that
the prosecutor was under no obligation to employ the petitioner at $20
a week or any other sum, and that inasmuch as he chose to do so
without any understanding, express or implied, that petitioner was not
worth those wages, or that part of them should be treated as moneys
paid under the compensation act he must be presumed to have paid
the money as wages and because he thought the petitioner was worth
Indeed, it was optional to petitioner to continue work
that amount.
ing for the prosecutor, just as it was optional with the prosecutor to
employ him, and, if the petitioner had chosen to do no work, he would
have been entitled to his compensation under the act just the same.
We see no force whatever in this argument.
The judgment of the Camden common pleas will be affirmed."
28 Accord:

Galley

v. Peet Bros.

Mtg. Co., 98 Kan. 53. 157 Pac. 431 (1916).
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GORRELL
(Supreme Court of Kansas,

I.”

v.
1914.

t

4

BATTELLE.
93

Kan.

370, 144 Pac. 244.)

BURCH,
The action was one for compensation under the work
men’s compensation act (chapter 218 of the Laws of 1911, as amended
Compensation was awarded
by chapter 216 of the Laws of 1913).
the plaintiff for partial incapacity to work, for the maximum period
and in a. lump sum. The defendant appeals. "’ "‘ *
The plaintiff was a carpenter and brick mason by trade. During a
period of dullness in those trades, he took employment with the de
fendant as a car repairer.
While so engaged, a piece of steel struck
his right eye, penetrated the tissues, so that the ﬂuid portions of the or
gan escaped, and total blindness resulted, which can never be remedied.
The iris of the injured eye, which formerly was blue in color, has
turned black, and the left eye has become weakened to such an extent
as to impair clear and sustained vision.
Capacity to use tools is di
minished because oi inability to estimate distances accurately with one
enfeebled eye. The plaintiff is 38 years old, for 18 years has worked in
the trades mentioned, and good eyesight is necessary in order to
hold employment in them. Since his injury, the plaintiﬁ has done a
little work on the streets of the city of Ottawa, where he resides with
his family, and has chopped a little wood, working about a fourth of
a day at a time, but in trying to chop wood, he had diﬁiculty in meas
uring distances in order to strike with precision. He had opportunity
to secure other work, which he would have accepted if he had been
able to see to do it. Before his injury he had good eyesight, was strong
and able-bodied, and was always busy at his trade, except during occa
The court ruled that the
sional temporary business depressions.
plaintiff was entitled to recover compensation at the rate of $6 per
week for 18 weeks and at the rate of $3 per week for the further
period of 7 years and 34 weeks, and rendered judgment in a lump sum
Various objections are interposed to this judgment.
accordingly.
The workmen’s compensation act contains the following provisions
material to the controversy:
*
*
"‘
“Sec. 11. Amount of Compensation.
(c) When partial
incapacity for work results from injury, periodical payments during
such incapacity,rcommencing at the end of the second week, shall not
be less than twenty-ﬁve per cent., nor exceed ﬁfty per cent., based
upon the average weekly earnings computed as provided in section 12,
but in no case less than three dollars per week or more than twelve dol
Provided, however, that if the workman is under
lars per week:
twenty-one years of age at the date of the accident and the average
weekly earnings are less than $10.00 his compensation shall not be
W Part of the opinion is omitted.
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less than seventy-ﬁve per cent. of his average earnings.
No such pay
ment for total or partial disability shall extend over a period exceeding
Section 11, c. 218, Laws 1911, as amended by section
eight years.”
5, c. 216,

Laws

1913.

“Sec. 12. Rule for Compensation.
For the purposes of the provi
* * the following rules shall be observed:
sions of this act *
"‘
* *
(f) In the case of partial incapacity the payments shall be
computed to equal, as closely as possible, ﬁfty per cent. of the difference
between the amount of the ‘average earnings’ of the workman before
the accident, to be computed as herein provided, and the average
amount which he is most probably able to earn in some suitable employ
ment or business after the accident, subject however, to the limitations
hereinbefore provided.”
Section 12, c. 218, Laws 1911.
“Sec. 36. Actions.
A workman’s right to compensation under this
act, may, in default of agreement or arbitration, be determined and en
* * * The
forced by action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
in
the
if
in
of
the
shall
be
action,
favor
for a lump
plaintiff,
judgment
sum equal to the amount of the payments then due and prospectively
due under this act, with interest on the payments overdue, or, in the
discretion of the trial judge, for periodical payments as in an award.”
~
Section 36, c. 218, Laws 1911.
It will be observed that compensation is awarded for incapacity to
work as a result of injury. In an effort to comprehend the true basis
of compensation which the Legislature established, the defendant in
terprets the expression “incapacity to work” to mean actual physical
inability to perform work, and he would exclude physical impairment,
which, although it might prevent the plaintiff from securing work,
would not prevent him from performing work if obtained. The argu
ment is that the disinclination of employers, particularly in the mechan
ical trades, to take crippled, disﬁgured, or otherwise physically defec
tive persons into service, notwithstanding their protestations of com
The question is
petency, cannot be considered as incapacity to work.
not sharply presented by the evidence, but it may as well be consid
ered now, since it is involved in the interpretation to be given the stat

ute.”
Vt/hat the Legislature had in mind was compensation for loss of
earning power asia workman as a result of injury. Whether this loss
manifest itself in inability to perform work which is obtainable or in
Vi/hile personal in
ability to secure work to do is not very material.
jury must occur, the word “incapacity” is not expressly qualiﬁed by
the use of the word “physical” in the statute, and any deprivation of
power to earn wages as a workman asa result of injury is incapacity,
within the meaning of the law.
v. Dodge Bros" 213 Mich. 233. 181 N. W. 976, 17 A. L. R.
injured employee earning larger wages after than before the in

3° See W'oodr-or-k

203 (1921),
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The defendant insists that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
judgment for compensation for the length of time allowed by the court.
Under the terms of the statute, the periodical payments which are
the units of compensation are to be extended “during incapacity,” not
exceeding eight years. The duration of incapacity becomes, therefore,
a subject for the determination of the trial court, and is to be deter
mined in the same way as other questions of fact. The task will fre
quently be diﬂicult to discharge, because of the speculative nature of
the subject and because of the moral factor involved, the character
Very often the solution of the
and ability of the injured workman.
medical question of the curability or incurability of the plaintiff will
not carry the court very far. Probable earning capacity in some suit
able employment or business after injury must be taken into consider
ation in computing the amount of the payments to be awarded, and
facts indicating probable future earning capacity will sometimes have
The trial court's observa
a bearing upon the duration of incapacity.
tion of the plaintiff, in the course of the hearing, is likely to be es
Because of these facts, and some others peculiar
pecially informing.
to the subject, a challenge of the correctness of the conclusion of the
trial court, respecting the duration of incapacity, must necessarily be
considered on appeal in the same way as other challenges of a similar
nature.
In this case the loss of the plaintiff’s eye is an injury necessarily
permanent in its nature. A consequent reduction to a lower economic
status was fully disclosed by the evidence. There was no direct proof
that the plaintiff can ever retrieve his former capacity. The court it
self examined him at some length, and from his appearance, his de
meanor, and the unconscious disclosures, which inevitably accompany
human conduct. was able to form an estimate of his personality which
cannot be brought to this court by appeal, but which was probably as
It is impossible,
important as any fact established by the testimony.
therefore, to declare that the trial court’s ﬁnding that to this plaintiff
the loss of his eye constitutes permanent partial incapacity is not sus
tained.
The defendant insists that compensation must cease when the plain
tiﬁ’s partial incapacity to work as the result of his injury ceases; that
the plaintiff is likely to become able to work with his remaining eye,
and to secure suitable employment, so that incapacity will end long be
fore the expiration of the time for which he is allowed compensation.
Therefore, it is said, an award of periodical payments should have
been made instead of judgment for a lump sum. It mayibe conceded
that compensation should cease when incapacity to work as the result
of injury ceases, but the defendant’s argument ignores the ﬁnding of
the trial court that the plaintiffs incapacity is permanent, so far as
the remedy afforded by the statute is concerned.
The statute confers express power to render judgment in a lump
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sum instead of making an award of periodical payments. In every case
the trial court must exercise its judgment and discretion as to the
best method of making compensation in the light of all the facts, and
the result cannot be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of the
power.
The judgment of the district court is aﬂirmed. All the Justices
concur.

-L-_.

TEMESCAL ROCK CO.

v.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT

COMMISSION.
(Supreme Court of California, 1919.

I. This

'

180 Cal. 637. 182 Pac. 447, 13 A.

L. R.

j

683.)

is a proceeding to review a judgment of the Indus
Commission awarding compensation to Dolores Rodri
guez otherwise known as Dolores Lopez, on account of the death of
one Silviano Lopez.
The death was caused by accidental injuries to
Silviano Lopez occurring on ]uly 23, 1918, while he was in the em
ployment of the Temescal Rock Company, which injuries arose out of
The award was made against Ocean Accident &
said employment.
Guaranty Corporation, the insurance carrier of the rock company.
It was made to Dolores Rodriguez on the ground that at the time of
the accident she was wholly dependent for support upon said Lopez.
'The sole objection thereto is the claim that upon the evidence and the
ﬁndings of the commission she was not dependent upon Lopez for sup
port, within the meaning of section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensa
tion Act of 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 844).
_
It is conceded that she was,_ as a matter of fact, dependent upon him
for support and was being supported by him at the time of the in
jury. The commission found these facts to be true. The claim is that
she cannot be classed as a dependent and is not entitled to compensa
tion for the death of Lopez, because she sustained no legal relation to
him, either of blood or marriage, at the time, but that she and the de
cedent were then living and cohabiting together as husband and wife,
Upon this
notwithstanding the fact that they were never married.
question the commission found, upon suﬂicient evidence, that she and
Lopez were ignorant persons, unacquainted with our laws or with the
legal requirements of marriage; that on June 5, 1918, they had agreed
to intermarry, and in pursuance of such agreement procured from
the county clerk of Riverside county a marriage license authorizing
their marriage; that they in good faith then believed that said license
was sufficient to constitute in itself a lawful marriage; that thereupon
they assumed the relation of husband and wife and cohabited together
in the same dwelling, holding themselves out as husband and wife, the
husband providing for their support until the time of said accident;
and that during all that time Dolores Rodriguez believed herself to be
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lawful wife of Lopez and continued to be in good faith a member
of his household and wholly dependent upon him for her support.
The provisions of section 14, aforesaid, relating to this subject are
as follows:
“(a) The following shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly de
pendent for support upon a deceased employé:
“(l) A wife upon a husband with whom she was living at the time
of his death, or for whose support such husband was legally liable at
the time of his death.
“(2) [This clause speciﬁes the children who are deemed to be de

the

pendent and is not important to the present case.]
“(b) In all other cases, questions of entire or partial dependency and
questions as to who constitute dependents and the extent of their de
pendency shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact
may be at the time of the injury of the employé.
“(c) No person shall be considered a dependent of any deceased
employé unless in good faith a member of the family or household of
such employé, or unless such person bears to such employé the re
lation of husband or wife, child, posthumous child, adopted child or
grand
stepchild, father or mother, father—in-law or mother-in-law,
father or grandmother, brother or sister, uncle or aunt, brother-in-law
or sister-in-law, nephew or niece."
Dolores Rodriguez does not come within the provisions of subdivi
sion 1 of subsection (a). That part of the subsection includes only
Its language
those who stand in the relation of husband and wife.
necessarily implies that the relation must be lawful, and therefore it
excludes persons who, though not lawfully married, live together be
lieving themselves to be husband and wife.
Subsection (b), however, clearly empowers the commission to in
quire into the actual conditions of dependency and to ascertain wheth
er or not the applicant was in fact dependent upon the decedent for
support at the time of the injury, and ﬁnding such dependency com
Stand
plete or partial, thereupon to award compensation accordingly.
ing alone, this clause would authorize compensation to any person, re
But it is expressly quali
gardless of relationship or place of abode.
ﬁed and limited in these particulars by the provisions of subsection (c).
The latter attaches two conditions to the powers given by subsection
(b). The ﬁrst one is that the person claiming to be a dependent must
be “in good faith a member of the family or household of such em
ployé.” The facts found bring Dolores Rodriguez within these condi
tions. Lopez had a dwelling house and a household, consisting of him
self and said Dolores.
She was a member of that household.
Both
the ﬁndings and evidence show that she was living there and was such
member in the utmost good faith, believing that she wa.s the lawful
wife of Lopez. The conditions are fully met by the facts.
The second limitation of subsection (c) applies to dependents of the

Part

STATUTES

4)

893

is

\

a

a

It

a

it

a

al

if

a

a

It

.1,

employé who may not be members of his family, or household, but
who are related to him by blood or marriage or by adoption in some
The two classes of limitations are
one of the degrees there speciﬁed.
stated in the alternative, being connected by the disjunctive particle
“or.” The result is that the law does not require that the person
found to be actually dependent under subsection (b) shall come within
both classes of the limitations speciﬁed in subsection (c), but that such
person may be awarded compensation if he or she comes within either
class.
If the applicant is a member of the family or household of
such employé in good faith, compensation may be awarded although
he or she may not bear any relation by adoption, blood, or marriage
to the employé. But if it appears that the applicant bears either of the
relations speciﬁed in the second part of subsection (c) although not a
member of the family or of the household, compensation may be award
ed according to the degree of dependency.
It is not infrequently the
case that a person bearing someone of such relations to another is
living apart as a member of a different family or household. The sec
ond qualiﬁcation in subsection (c) was intended to cover persons of
this class.
The .petitioners argue that to allow compensation to one whose only
claim to dependency arises from an illegal cohabitation with the em
ployé, ostensibly as his wife, would be a gross violation of morals and
of the express policy of our law, and, furthennore, that one living in
such forbidden and criminal relations with another cannot in law
be deemed to be acting in good faith as a member of his household.
We think there are satisfactory answers to this argument. At com
mon law Dolores Rodriguez, under the facts found, would have been
There was a contract of marriage and as
the lawful wife of Lopez.
sumption of the rights, duties, and obligations of the relation, and an
actual consummation thereof.
Graham v. Bennet, 2 Cal. 506; Sharon
v. Sharon, 75 Cal.
16 Pac. 345.
was not until after the amend
solemnization be
ment of 1895 to section 55 of the Civil Code that
Norman v. Norman, 121
came essential to the validity of
marriage.
Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343, 66 Am. St. Rep. 74. There
was nothing essentially or inherently immoral or vicious in the con
we judge them according to their own under
duct of the parties,
standing and belief. The criminal character of their cohabitation does
not come from the fact that they were cohabiting together believing
themselves to be husband and wife, although not so, but from the fact
that the Legislature, by the statute of 1895, had required an addition
Of this statute they were
legal marriage.
ceremony to constitute
ignorant, and the immorality of their conduct cannot be judged with
case where the validity of the marriage
reference to
except in
was competent for the Legis
the essential thing to be determined.
lature, by
subsequent statute, to make that particular requirement to
valid marriage inapplicable in other cases, such, for-instance, as the
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determination of the question of dependency necessary to authorize
compensation to a person injured by the death of an employé. This it
has done by the provisions of section 14, with respect to one who at the
time of the injury was in good faith a member of the household of
the employé. This statute completely takes away, for that purpose,
the immorality of parties who in good faith were living together as
It also declares a different
Lopez and Dolores Rodriguez were living.
public policy with reference to such cases and completely removes the
objection that it is not sound policy to allow compensation in such a
case.

It is true that if the provision is loosely administered it may
to great abuses.
Persons consciously living in illicit relations
deavor to take advantage of the situation for their own gain.
the proper administration of the law in this respect the state
It will, of course,
upon the Industrial Accident Commission.
the greatest care to require strict proof of entire good faith
There is nothing in the evidence in the present case
cases.
cate that there was any ground for a charge of bad faith in
duct of the parties at and prior to the time of the accident."
The award is afﬁrmed. '
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POWERS

v.

HOTEL BOND CO.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,

1915.

89 Conn. 143, 93

Atl. 245.)

Appeal to the superior court by the Hotel Bond Company from an
award of the Compensation Commissioner under the Workmen’s Com
pensation Act. Judgment dismissing the appeal, and respondent ap
peals.
WHEELER, I. [omitting a discussion of the jurisdiction of the com
missioner and of the court in trial of questions of fact]. We come,
then, to the second question:
Did the court err in overruling the ap
pellant’s claim that upon the ﬁnding and evidence, as matter of law, the
claimant was not a dependent?
The act (section 43) deﬁnes a dependent by specifying the classes
to which the dependent must belong and by conﬁning dependents to
those members of these classes who were wholly or partially depend
ent upon the earnings of the employé at the time of the injury. It con
clusively presumes certain persons standing in a certain relation to a
deceased employé to be totally dependent. “In all other cases questions
of dependency, total or partial, shall be determined in accordance with
the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury.” Section 10.
Questions of dependency are thus by the act made questions of fact.
Casualty C0. v. Pillsbury, 181 Cal. 389, 184 Pac.
wife having decree of separate maintenance, and
Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R. I. 5S, 105 Atl. 363 (1919), 17 Mich. Law
Rev. 521, widow remarried.
31 See, also, Continental
658, 8 A. L. R. 1110 (1919),
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Had the act not deﬁnitely settled this point, we should have inclined to
this view both on reason _and authority.
Herrick’s Case, 217 Mass.
111, 112, 104 N. E. 432; Main Colliery Co. v., Davies, [1901] A. C.
358.
The ultimate question is the application of the proper standard
to the facts found.
The court may review the standard applied; it cannot review the
facts found, except in those instances in which our law permits such
review.
_
In this case there was evidence that the deceased contributed to the
support of his mother, and that she, while not immediately dependent
for sustenance upon such contributions, was, because of advancing
years, condition of mind, lack of regular employment and of property,
liable to become dependent. We cannot hold, as matter of law, that
this evidence did not tend to prove that the mother had been receiving
support from her deceased son and was not partially dependent upon
him. Nor can we hold, as matter of law, that evidence such as this did
not tend to prove a condition of partial dependency.
A dependent under the act is not necessarily one to whom the con
tributions of the injured or deceased workman are necessary to his
or her support of life; the test is (whether the contributions were re
lied upon by the dependent for his or her means of living, judging this
Howells v. Vinan &
by the class and position in life of the dependent.
Sons, 85 L. T. 529; Bradbury's Workmen’s Compensation, vol. l, p.
573.

Partial dependency may exist. though the contributions be at irreg
ular intervals and in irregular amounts, and though the dependent have
other means of support.
Bradbury’s Workmen’s Compensation, vol.
1, p. 574.
Dependency is thus in each case a fact to be determined.
Main Colliery Co., Limited, v. Davies, 16 T. R. 460. The record does
not disclose that the commissioner applied a standard of dependency
other than that required and contemplated by the act.
The court cannot review conclusions of fact made by a commission
er which merely concern the weight of evidence and the credibility of
witnesses. And rulings of this character are the only ones involved
in the decision of the partial dependency of this claimant. If the com
missioner had found facts which might materially have influenced his
decision, without evidence, or the subordinate facts found neither le
gally nor logically supported the ultimate fact, or the commissioner had
refused to consider facts which would have been relevant to his deci
sion, and which the record did not show had not affected the decision,
he would have committed an error of law, and his ruling or decision
been reviewable.
Such is not this case. Gray’s Appeal, 80 Conn. 248,
251, 67 Atl. 891; Brown v. Clark, 80 Conn. 419, 423, 68 Atl. 1001.
The third question upon the appeal is whether the commissioner
erred in making an award of $5 a week in a case in which the depend
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ency did not approximate that sum.” This claim is rested upon the
propositions that the contributions to establish a condition of depend
ency must have been necessary to the sustenance of the dependent
and must have been substantial, which in this sense is said to mean an
approximation to the minimum amount set in the statute. We have
already held that partial dependency may exist, although the alleged
dependent could’ have 'subsisted without the contributions of the de
'

ceased.

be inferred that the
contributions must approximate the minimum amount set by the act.
“The compensation payable on
Section 9 of the act provides that:
account of death resulting from injuries shall in no case be more than
ten dollars or less than ﬁve dollars weekly.”
The General Assembly has thus in explicit terms made the mini
mum weekly payment on account of death from injuries $5. Consid
erations of public policy dictated the adoption of this minimum; its
wisdom is not our concern. A minimum might be adopted which would
plainly violate constitutional rights of property; that objection has
not been and cannot be made to this provision.
There is no error.

There is nothing in the act from which it must

.i_-

ROCK ISLAND IRON WORKS

COMMISSION.

(Supreme

Court of Illinois,

1919.

287

v.

Ill.

INDUSTRIAL
648,

122

N. E. 830.)

DUNN, ]. This writ of error was sued out by the Rock Island Bridge
& Iron Works to reverse a judgment of the circuit court of Rock
Island county quashing a writ of certiorari to review an award made
by the Industrial Commission against the plaintiff in error in favor of
James McQuaid, administrator of the estate of his son, John Mc
Quaid, an employé of the plaintiff in error, who died on August 12,
1917, from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his
The commission found that the deceased's wages were
employment.
$1,400 a year; that his mother, Mary McQuaid, was his sole beneﬁ
ciary and was partially dependent upon him to the extent of 56 per
cent. of total dependency, and was entitled to receive 56 per cent. of
four times his annual wages, being $3,136, and made an award of that
amount.
The only substantial objection made to the award is that there is no
evidence in the record to sustain it. The evidence shows that ]ohn Mc
Quaid was 26 years old, unmarried, and living in his father’s house
with his father, mother, two adult sisters and a 10 year old brother.
32 Ct. Moll v. City Bakery, 199 Mich. 670, 165 N. W. 649 (1917), in which
the amount allowed as the contribution
of a deceased son was found to be
less than the cost to the parents of maintenance of the son in the family.
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63 years old, in bad health, and did not work.
He
property and had an income of about $500 a year. He
gave his wife $40 a month, the deceased gave her $50 a month, and
The daughters worked,
she paid the household expenses of the family.
but contributed nothing to the household expenses and paid no board.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1917 (Laws 1917,
493) pro
vides that the amount of compensation for an injury resulting in
the deceased leaves ‘no widow, child, or totally dependent
death,
partially dependent parent, shall be such pro
parent, but does ‘leave
sum equal to four times the annual earnings of the em
portion of
ployé as such partial dependency bears to total dependency, but not
In law depend
less, in any event, than $1,650 or more than $3,500.
ent
one who
sustained by another, or relies for support upon the
aid of another; who looks to another for support, and relies on an
other for reasonable necessaries consistent with the dependent’s posi
Law, 550, 91 Atl.
tion in life. ]ackson v. Erie Railroad Co., 86 N.
1035; Women’s Catholic Order of Foresters v. Heﬁernan, 283 Ill.

His father was

I.
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1l9‘N. E. 426.
Questions of dependency, and the extent of
with the decision of which by the commission
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are questions of fact,

the courts cannot inter
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there
evidence tending to sustain its ﬁndings.
The evidence
tended to show that the motHer’s only means of support was $90 a
month, which she received from her husband and her son. While her
husband was under
legal duty to support her, the question whether
she actually received all or a part of her support from her son and
looked to him for such support
question of fact, which upon this
record
concluded by the ﬁnding of the commission that she was
however, no evidence which
partially dependent upon him. There
tends to
the ﬁnding that her dependency was 56 per cent. of
sustain
total dependency. The evidence
that she received $90 month, all of
which was expended in paying the expenses of the family of six per
The dependency which justiﬁes an award
sons.
personal depend
ency for support and maintenance—an actual dependency for support
consistent with the dependent’s position in life.
does not include
the maintenance of others whom the dependent
under no legal ob
ligation to maintain or contributions which merely enable the donee to
accumulate money. The $50
month contributed to his mother by
the deceased was not given and was not used for her support and
maintenance alone.
There
no evidence from which
can be as
certained how much or what proportion either of the $50 or of the
$90 was used for the support and maintenance of the mother. The
The
$40 from the husband’s income was at least a partial support.
additional $50 was
no basis
general beneﬁt to the family, but there
was used for
the evidence for determining what proportion of
the support of the mother and what proportion for general family ex
therefore no basis for the ﬁnding that her dependency
There
penses.
GODD.PB.& A. (21) En.)—57

'
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was 56 per cent. of total dependency. The ﬁnding of partial depend
ency, whatever its degree, entitled the claimant to the minimum award

of

$1,650.

The facts found were sufﬁcient to constitute the basis for a proper
decision, and the judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed,
and the cause is remanded, with directions to enter an award for $1,650,
payable in installments, if the claimant shall elect to accept such award;
otherwise, to remand the cause to the Industrial Commission for an
~

other hearing.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
,

.

.

HENRY PRATT CO.
(Supreme Court

v.

ot Illinois,

H.

\

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
1920.

293

Ill.

367,

127 N.

E.

754.).

Tnomrson, ].

This writ of error is prosecuted by leave of court to
the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county conﬁrming an
of the Industrial Commission awarding compensation to Henry
and Ellen Olson, parents of Hugo Olson, an employé of plain
error, who died from an accidental injury arising out of and
course of his employment.
Compensation was ﬁxed at $1,650,
payable in installments, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(c) of section 7 of the Compensation Act (Hurd’s Rev. St. 1917, c
48, § 132).
The only question presented is whether the applicants, or
either of them, were dependent upon the earnings of deceased within
the meaning of the Compensation Act as amended and in force May
1
review
award
Olson
tiff in
in the

1917.

31,

From

the testimony of the applicants, the onl_v witnesses before the
arbitrator, it appears that the family of Henry Olson consisted of him
He was 54 years old, his wife was
self, his wife and seven children.
59 years old, and deceased was 29 years old, at the time of his death.
The two oldest daughters were married, and, while they lived much of
the time with their parents, they were supported by their husbands.
25; Teckla, 24; Lydia, 22; and
The other four children—Emma,
Walter, 19—were single and lived with their parents.
The home
cost $2,500 and was paid for 111 installments of $20 a month.
The last
installment was paid a year or more before the death of Hugo. He
contributed toward the payments on the home, furnished materials for
painting, papering, and repairing the home, and did the work at odd
times. He paid part of the taxes and the coal bills, and paid to his
mother $7 a week for board and room.
He furnished her spending
money and gave her funds with which to buy clothes. It does not ap
pear from the record whether any of the other children paid board or
otherwise contributed toward the support of the home.
The father
was steadily employed at $18 a week. Of this amount he gave his wife
-

Goon.Pa.& A.

(21)

En.)
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which with'the contributions from the children, constituted the
fund from which Mrs. Olson paid all of the household expenses.
Partial dependency may exist, even though the evidence shows the
claimant could have subsisted without the contributions of the deceased
It is not necessary to show that the claimant would have
employé.
been without the necessities
of life, nor is it necessary to show that
the dependent was without other means of support.
Appeal of Hotel
Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Atl. 245; Havey v. Erie Railroad Co.,
87 N. ]. Law, 444, 95 Atl. 124; Kenney v. City of Boston, 222 Mass.
N. E. 47. The test is whether the contributions were relied
401,
on by the dependent for his or her means of living, judging this by
the position in life of the dependent, or whether the dependent is to a
substantial degree supported by the employé at the time of the em
ployé’s death. The problem presented by this test is largely one of fact.
Miller v. Riverside Storage & Cartage Co. (Mich.) 155 N. VV. 462;
Rock Island Bridge & Iron Works v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 648,
122 N. E. 830; Keller v. Industrial Com., Z91 Ill. 314. 126 N. E. 162.
In addition to the $8 retained by him from his weekly wages Henry
Olson claimed his son contributed largely to his support. It- does not
appear what use he made of this money, but, regardless of the use
made of
can be said that this father, who was
we cannot see how
was to support his fam
regularly employed, and whose legal duty
ily was dependent upon his son for support.
On the other hand, Ellen Olson had no income and was necessarily
depepdent on some one for support. VVhile her husband was under
legal duty to support her, the question whether she actually received
all or
part of her support from her son, and looked to him for such
concluded by
support,
question of fact, which upon this record
the ﬁnding of the commission that she was partially dependent upon
him.” Where there'is no voluntary payment on the part of the em
ployer, and the Industrial Commission must determine the compensa
tion,
the further duty of the commission to determine the person
or persons entitled to the compensation. Keller v. Industrial Com.,
supra; Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Com., 286 Ill. 34,
121 N. E. Z31.
This the commission has failed to do, but the record
justiﬁes
ﬁnding that Ellen Olson was the only person entitled to com
pensation.
The judgment
modiﬁed by awarding compensation to Ellen Olson
afﬁrnied.
only, and, as modiﬁed,
$10,
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33 Accord: Miller v. Riverside Storage
stenographer who had
N. W. 462 (1915),
brother; Blnnton v. VVheeler
Ilowes (‘o.,
married daughter
Cas. 1918B, "747 (1916),
tributions from her father.

Cartage Co., 189 Mich. 360, 155
received contributions
from her
91 Conn. 226, 99 Atl. 494. Ann.
who had been in receipt of con
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This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment of the circuit court
of Dane county, entered February 14, 1913, setting aside an award of
The award provided
the Industrial Commission made ]uly 1, 1912.
that plaintiff pay to the defendant Iela Nevadjic the sum of $2,100
on account of the death of her husband by reason of injuries accident
The award
ally sustained by him while in the employ of the plaintiff.
was based on a ﬁnding of the Commission that ]ela Nevadjic was liv
The circuit court ﬁrst
ing with her husband at the time of his death.
decided that, although the ﬁnding of the Commission that Jela Nevad
jic was living with her husband at the time of his death was erroneous,
still the award should be conﬁrmed because there wasevidence to
support the Commission’s ﬁnding of total dependency without re
gard to the statutory presumption.
A motion for rehearing was made in the circuit court based upon
an affidavit of the plaintiff’s attorney setting forth correspondence
with the chairman of the Industrial Commission showing that the Com
mission “determined that the wife was totally dependent simply be
cause of the statutory presumption following its ﬁnding of fact that
Nevadjic was living with his wife at the time of his death.” On re
hearing the circuit court adhered to its decision that _Tela Nevadjic
was not living with her husband at the time of his death, but found
that the Commission’s ﬁnding of total dependency was based solely
upon the statutory presumption, and further found that in making suc'h
ﬁndings and‘the award the Commission acted without or in excess of
its powers, and entered judgment setting aside the award of the Com
The Industrial Commission made the following ﬁndings:
mission.
“That on February 25, 1912, while in the employ of the respondent
(plaintiff here), one Prokopia Nevadjic accidentally sustained personal
injuries by reason of a car of ore being dumped upon him, from the
result of which he died, at Mayville, Wis.; * "' * that the said
deceased, Prokopia Nevadjic, came to this country some three years
and three months prior to his death, leaving in his native country,
Austria-Hungary, in the province of Korenica, a wife and one child;
after coming to this country, the said deceased, Prokopia Nevadjic, did
not return to his wife, but did occasionally send her money, and on
February 8, 1912, shortly before his death, sent her the sum of $21;
that deceased could not write, and the wife of deceased could not write,
but they corresponded with each other through~ the aid of friends;
and we ﬁnd from these facts that the deceased Prokopia Nevadjic and
the above-named jela or jelena Nevadjic,
his wife, were living to
gether at the time of the death of said deceased, and the said jela or
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jelena Nevadjic was solely and wholly dependent for support upon the
deceased, Prokopia Nevadjic.”
It also appears from the evidence that Prokopia Nevadjic came to
Mayville and “was employed by the Northw'estem Iron Company on
the 7th of November, 1911”; that he sent $30 to his wife “when he
ﬁrst came to Mayville"; that he said if “I don’t send money every three
month my wife can’t make a living”; that he sent $21 to‘ his wife
exactly three months from the time of
February 8, 1912, an interval of
'

1

i_n

his previous remittance.
KERWIN, J. (after stating the facts as above). -The judgment of
the court below setting aside the award of the Industrial Commission
rests upon the conclusion of the court that the Industrial Commission
acted without or in excess of its powers in ﬁnding that the appellant
Iela Nevadjic was living with her husband at the time of his death.
The question, therefore, presented on this appeal is whether the Com
mission acted without or in excess of its powers in making such ﬁnd
’
mg.
Subsection 3, § 2394-9, of the Workmen’s Compensation Act pro
vides a death beneﬁt “in case the deceased employé leaves a person or
persons wholly dependent on him for support.”
Subsection 3, § 2394——10, provides:
“3. The following shall be conclusively presumed to be solely and
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employé:
“(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she is living at the time of
1
his death.
“(b) A husband upon a wife with whom he is living at the time of
her death.
“(c) A child or children under the age of eighteen years (or over
said age, but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning), upon
the parent with whom he or they are living at the time of the death
of such parent, there being no surviving dependent parent. In case
there is more than one child thus dependent, the death beneﬁt shall be
divided equally among them.
“In all other cases questions of entire or partial dependency shall
be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the
time of the death of the employé. * "F * T’
The Industrial Commission in its opinion ﬁled in the case with its
“We are of the
ﬁndings deﬁned the phrase “living together” thus:
opinion that the husband and wife are to be considered as living to
gether, even though one or the other may be absent from the home for
a considerable length of time and separated
by great distance; they
are living together when they are not living apart, when there is neither
We have
legal nor actual separation of the bonds of matrimony.”
been cited to no authority directly in point and have found none where
the words “living together” have been construed
a statute similar to
the one now before us.
Authorities are cited by counsel where the
words “living together" and similar phrases have been deﬁned in stand
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ard dictionaries, and in statutes quite different from the one now be
fore us. And it is argued by counsel for respondent that, giving the
words the meaning ascribed to them according to the common and ap
proved usage of the language they impart a dwelling together in the
same place.
In giving construction to such statutes, words are to be taken and
construed in the sense in which they are understood in common lan
guage, taking into consideration the text and subject-matter relative to
which they are employed.
It has been ruled in England that terms used in the Workmen’s
Compensation Acts should be given their practical, popular meaning,
and that a technical construction should not be placed upon them.
Small v. Coles, 2 King's Bench, 821; Rogers v. Cardiff Corporations,
8 W. C. C. 51; Adams v. Shaddock, 2 King’s Bench, 859.
Proof of total dependency is dispensed with under the statute where
the husband and wife are “living together” at the time of the death
of the injured employé., It seems, therefore, quite obvious that the
Legislature intended by the use of the words to include all cases where
there is no legal or actual severance of the marital relation, though
there may be physical separation of the parties by time and distance.
The “living together” contemplated by the statute, we think, was in
tended to cover cases where no break in the marriage relation existed,
and therefore physical dwelling together is not necessary, in order to
There must
bring the parties within the words “living together.”
be a legal separation or an actual separation in the nature of an es
trangement, else there is a “living together” within the meaning of
the statute. This seems to be the reasonable and practical construc
tion of the law, and the one which we think the Legislature intended.
the law should receive the construction that there must be physical
dwelling together in order to satisfy the statute, it is plain that the
purpose of the law would in many cases be defeated, because in many
cases the spouse may be absent from home for long intervals, although
there be no break in the marriage relation, no estrangement, and no
intent to separate or sever the existing relation or change the rela
tions or obligations created by the marriage contract.
The circuit judge below conceded in his opinion in the record that
temporary absence from home or from the place at which the other
spouse resides would not warrant a ﬁnding that the wife was not liv
ing with the husband, if death occurred during such temporary ab
sence, and that there is no ﬁxed rule as to the length of time that will
take the case out of the statutory presumption of dependency.
But
he further held that the limit'as to time had been exceeded in the
In this.conclusion we think the court below erred.
instant case.
There seems to be no solid reason why an absence of a month or a
year or less should require a diiferent construction of the words “liv
ing together” than an absence of three years and three months or more.
The question does not turn on time or distance, but upon the nature
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and character of the absence and the intention of the parties respecting
it. Intent is an important element in determining the nature of ab
sence.
Ex parte Gilmore, 3 Eng. Com. B. 967; \Villia.ms v. Vi/illiams,
122 Wis. 27, 99 N. VV. 431; Thompson v. Thompson, 53 Wis. 153,
10 N. VV. 166; Miller v. Sovereign C. W. of \V., 140 Wis. 505, 122 N.
W. 1126, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 178, 1.33 Am. St. Rep. 1095.
The status of the parties was established by theirrelation as hus
That relation, having once
band and wife in their native country.
existed, is presumed to continue. State ex rel. Coffey v. Chittenden,
112 \Vis. 569, 88 N. \/V. 587. It may well be that long-continued phys
ical separation, unexplained, might raise an inference that the parties
were not living together within the meaning of the statute under con
sideration, but the proof here is ample to rebut such inference. The
intent and purpose of the separation is explained, and the evidence
Time and
shows that the marital relation continued without break.
distance alone cannot sever such relation without intent or purpose
to do so.
The ﬁndings of the Industrial Commission on questions of fact
should not be disturbed if there is a substantial basis for the decision.
State v. W'illiams, 123 Wis. 61, 100 N. VV. 1048; State ex rel. v.
Chittenden, 127 Wis. 46$, 107 N. VV. 500. But it is claimed by coun
sel for respondent that the ﬁnding to the effect that the deceased and
his wife were “living together” is a conclusion of law and not a ﬁnding
of fact, and that to hold otherwise would permit’ the Industrial Com
mission, a quasi judicial body, to determine the -legal signiﬁcance of
any and all parts of the law and conclude the parties from a judicial
construction of the law by the courts.
\Vhether the parties were living together was a question of fact to
be tried and determined by the Commission.
Travelers’ Ins. Co. v.
Hallauer, 131 VVis. 371, 111 N. \-V. 527. \Vhat constitutes “living to
gether” where the facts are undisputed and no conﬂicting inferences
can be drawn from the evidence is a question of law for the court.
In the instant case the Commission made its ﬁndings upon the facts
leading up to the conclusion of ultimate fact which it stated‘, viz., that
the parties were living together.
The facts found formed the basis
for the conclusion that the parties were living together, and the Com
mission had reasonable ground for the decision. Clancy v. Board, etc.,
150 V\/is. 630, 138 N. W. 109.
“Findings of fact,” as recognized by
the decisions of this court, mean ﬁndings of ultimate, rather than evi
Briere v. Taylor, 126 Wis. 347, 105 N. VV. 817;
dentiary, facts.
Chippewa B. Co. v. Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 99 N. VV. 603, 106 Am. St.
Rep. 931; McDougal v. New Richmond R. M. Co., 125 \Vis. 121,
103 N. VV. 244; Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Hallauer, 131 \Vis. 371, 111
N. VV. 527; Cole v. Cole, 27 \Vis. 531. It is only when the facts are
undisputed and no conﬂicting inference respecting the ultimate fact
can be drawn therefrom that the question becomes one of law.
Ennis
v. Hanna D. Co., 148 Wis. 655, 134 N. \V. 1051.
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The question of intent was an important factor in determining
whether the parties were living together. This is ordinarily a question
of fact. Hoff v. Hackett, 148 Wis. 32, 134 N. VV. 132. We think
the inference drawn by the Commission that Jela Nevadjic and her
husband were living together at the time of his death is supported by
the established facts.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit
court, with instructions to affirm the award of the Industrial Commis
sion. No costs will be allowed in this court, except that respondent
pay the clerk's fees.“
,
Omitting concurring opinion of Barnes, J.
Of. Finn v. Detroit, Mt. C. & M. City By., 190 Mich. 112, 155 N. W. 721,
L. R. A. 19160, 1142 (1916), wife absent teaching school; In re Carroll, 65
Ind. App. 146, 116 N. E. 844 (1917), husband’s lntemperate habits drove wife
Roberta v. Whaley, 192
and children to leave home and care for themselves;
Mich. 133, 158 N. W. 209, L. R. A. 1918A. 189 (1916), wire supported by state
in insane asylum and husband left two illegitimate children, who were living
with him at the time of his death; Paciﬁc Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 184 Cal. 462, 194 Pac. 1, 13 A. L. R. 725 (1920), wife
divorced from husband, child awarded to custody of mother, but receiving
,
aid from father.
As to survival of right to compensation see Duftney v. A. F. Morse Lumber
Co., 42 R. I. 260, 107 Atl. 225, 15 A. L. R. 810 (1919); Lahoma Oil Co. v.
Commission of Oklahoma (Okl.) 1'75 Pac. 836, 15 A. L. R. 821,
Stateésiigistrial
note
).
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APPENDIX
ENGLISH EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT OF

1880

MICHIGAN WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT

ENGLISH EMPLOYERS‘ LIABILITY ACT OF
(43 & 44 Vict.

1880

C. 42.)

Section 1. Where, after the commencement of this act personal injury is
caused to a workman:
(1) By reason of any defect in the condition of ways, works, machinery, or
plant connected with or used in the business of the employer; or
(2) By reason of the negligence oi! any person in the service of the em
ployer who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst in the exercise of
'
or
such superintendence;
person
in
of the employer,
negligence
the
the
service
of any
(3). By reason of
to whose orders or directions the workman, at the time of the injury, was
bound to conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his
having so conformed; or
(4) By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the
employer done or made in obedience to the rules or by-laws of the employer,
or in obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with
the authority of the employer in that behalf; or
(5) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service ot the em
ployer who has the charge or control of any signal. points, locomotive engine,
or train upon a rai1way.—the workman, or in case the injury results in death,
the legal personal representatives of the workman, and any persons entitled in
case of death, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against
the employer as it the workman had not been a workman of nor in the serv
ice or the employer, nor engaged in his work.
Sec. 2.
A workman shall not be entitled under this act to any right of
compensation or remedy against the employer in any of the following cases,
that is to say:
_
(1) Under subsection 1 of section 1, unless the detect therein mentioned
arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence or
the employer, or of some person in the service of the employer, and entrusted.
by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant
were in proper condition.
(2) Under subsection 4 of section 1, unless the injury resulted from some
impropriety or defect in the rules, by-laws, or instructions therein mentioned:
Provided that where a rule or by-law has been approved or has been ac.
cepted as a proper rule or by-law by one of Her Majesty's principal Secre
taries of State, or by the Board or Trade, or any other department of the
Gonn.Pn.&
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government, under or by virtue of any act of Parliament, it shall not be
deemed, for the purposes of this act, to be an improper or defective rule or

by-law;
(3) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence which
caused his injury, and failed within a reasonable time to~glve, or cause to be
given, information thereof to the employer or some person superior to him
self in the service of the employer, unless he was aware that the employer or
'
such superior already knew of the said detect or negligence.
Sec. 3.
The amount of compensation recoverable under this act shall not
exceed such sum as may be found to be equivalent to the estimated earnings,
during the three years preceding the injury, of a person in the same grade
employed during those, years in the like employment and in the district in
which the workman is employed at the time of the injury.
.
Sec. 4.
An action for the recovery under this act of compensation for an
injury shall not be maintainable unless notice that injury has been sustained
is given within six weeks, and the action is commenced within six months
from the occurrence" of the accident causing the injury, or, in case of death,
within twelve months from the time of death: Provided always, that in case
of death the want of such notice shall be no bar to the maintenance of such
action it the judge shall be of opinion that there was reasonable excuse for
such want of notice.
There shall be deducted from any compensation awarded to any
Sec. 5.
workman, or representatives of 'a workman, or persons claiming by. under, or
through a workman in respect of any cause of action arising under this act,
any penalty or part of a penalty which may have been paid in pursuance of
any other act of Parliament to such workman, representatives, or persons in
respect or the same cause of action; and where an action has been brought
under this act by any workman, or the representatives of any \vorkman, or
any persons claiming by, under, or through such workman, for compensation
in respect of any cause of action arising under this act, and payment has not
previously been made of any penalty or part of a penalty under any other act
of Parliament in respect of the same cause of action, such workman, represen
tatives, or person shall not be entitled thereafter to receive any penalty or
part of a penalty under any other act of Parliament, in respect of the same
'
cause of action.
\
Every action for recovery of compensation under this act shall
Sec. 6. (1)
be brought in a county court, but may, upon the application of either plaintiﬂ?
or defendant, be removed into a superior court in like manner and upon the
same conditions as an action_ commenced in a county court may by law be
'
removed;
in
Upon
any
such action
the trial of
a county court before the judge
(2)
without a jury one or more assessors may be appointed for the purpose of
ascertaining the amount of compensation;
the conditions and mode of appointment
(3) For the purpose of regulating
and remuneration of such assessors, and all matters of procedure relating to
their duties, and also for the purpose of consolidating any actions under this
act in a county court, and otherwise preventing multiplicity of such actions,
rules and regulations may be made, varied, and repealed from time to time,
in the same manner as rules and regulations for regulating the practice and
procedure in other actions in county courts.
“County Court" shall, with respect to Scotland, mean the “Sheriﬂ's Court,"
and shall, with respect to Ireland, mean the “Civil Bill Court."
In Scotland any action under this act may be removed to thecourt of
Sessions at the instance of either party, in the manner provided by, and
subject to the conditions
prescribed by, section 9 of the Sheriff Courts
(Scotland) Act, 1877.
_
\
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In Scotland the sheriff may conjoin actions arising out oi? the same occur
rence or cause of action, though at‘ the instance of different parties and in
respect of diiferent injuries
Sec. 7. Notice in respect of an injury under this act shall give the name and
address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary language the cause
of the injury and the date at which it was sustained, and shall be served on
the employer, or, it there is more than one employer, upon one of such
-*
employers.
The notice may be served by delivering the same to or at the residence’ or
place of business of the person on whom it is to be served.
The notice may also be served by post by a registered letter addressed to
the person on whom it is to be served at his inst known place of residence or
place of business;
and, it served by post. shall be deemed to have been
served at the time when a letter containing the same would be delivered in
the ordinary course of post; and, in proving the service of such notice, it
shall be suiiicient to prove that _the notice was properly addressed and
registered.
Where the employer is a body of persons corporate or unincorporate,
the
notice shall be served by delivering the same at or by sending it by post in
a registered letter addressed to the ofﬁce, or, if there be more than one otﬁce,
any one ofithe oﬂices of such body.
A notice under this section shall not be deemed invalid by reason of any
defect or inaccuracy therein, unless the judge who tries the action arising
from the injury mentioned in the notice shall be of opinion that the de
fendant in the action is prejudiced in his defense by such defect or inaccuracy,
and that the defect or inaccuracy was tor the purpose of misleading.
Sec. 8. For the purposes of this act, unless the context otherwise rcquires,—<
The expression “person who has superintendence entrusted to him? means a
person whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence, and who is
not ordinarily engaged in manual labour;
The expression “employer” includes a body of persons corporate or unin
corporate;
The expression “workman” means a railway servant and any person to
whom the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875. applies.
Sec. 9.
This act shall not come into operation until the 1st ‘day of Janu
ary, 1881, which date is in this act referred to as the commencement of.
this act.
Liability Act, 1880, and
Sec. 10. This act may be cited as The Employers’
shall continue in force till the 31st day of December, 1887, and to the end of
the then next session of Parliament, and no longer, unless Parliament shall
otherwise determine; and all actions commenced under this act before that
period shall be continued as it the said act had not expired.

MICHIGAN WORKl\IEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT

(Comp. Laws 1915, § 5423 et seq., amended by Pub. Acts 1917, Nos. 41. 206, 235,
Pub. Acts 1919, No. 64, and Pub. Acts 1921. Nos. 60. 173, 180.)
[The portions

printed

ante, p. 796 ﬂf. are omitted here.]

Part

II

While the incapacity for work resulting from the in
Sec. 10.
(§ 5440.)
jury is partial, the employer shall pay. or cause to be paid as hereinafter
provided, to the injured employé a weekly compensation equal to sixty per
centum of the diﬁerence between his average weekly wages before the in

\
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jury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but
not more than fourteen dollars a week; and in no case shall the period cov
ered by such compensation be greater than ﬁve hundred weeks from the date
of the injury. In cases included by the following schedule the disability in
each such case shall be deemed to continue for the period speciﬁed, and the
compensation so paid for such injury shall be as speciﬁed therein, towit:
For the loss of a thumb, sixty per centum of the average weekly wages dur
ing sixty weeks;
For the loss of a ﬁrst ﬁnger, commonly called index ﬁnger, sixty per centum
of average weekly wages during thirty-ﬁve weeks;
For the loss of a second ﬁnger, sixty per centum of average weekly wages
during thirty weeks;
For the loss of a third ﬁnger, sixty per centum of average weekly wages
during twenty weeks;
For the loss of a fourth ﬁnger, commonly called the little ﬁnger, sixty per
centum of average weekly wages during ﬁfteen weeks;
The loss of the ﬁrst phalange of the thumb, or of any ﬁnger, shall be con
sidered to be equal to the loss of one-half of such thumb, or ﬁnger, and com
pensation shall be one-half the amounts above speciﬁed;
The loss of more than one phalange shall be considered as the loss of the
entire ﬁnger or thumb: Provided, however, That in no case shall the amount
in this
received for more than one ﬁnger exceed the amount provided
schedule for the loss of a hand;
For the loss of a great toe, sixty per centum of average weekly wages during
‘
1
thirty weeks;
_
For the loss of one of the toes other than a great toe, sixty per centum of
average weekly wages during ten weeks;
The loss of the ﬁrst phalnnge of any toe shall be considered to be equal to
the loss of one-half of such toe, and compensation shall be one-half of the
amount above speciﬁed;
The loss of more than one phalange shall be considered as the loss of the
entire toe;
For the loss of a hand, sixty per centum of average weekly wages during
s
one hundred and ﬁfty weeks;
For -the loss of an arm, sixty per centum of average weekly wages during
two hundred weeks;
For the loss of a foot. sixty per centum of average weekly wages during one
hundred and twenty-ﬁve weeks;
For the loss of a leg, sixty per centum
of average weekly wages during one
'
hundred and seventy-ﬁve weeks;
For the loss of an eye, sixty per centum of average weekly wages during
one hundred weeks;
The loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, ‘or both legs, or both
eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to
be compensated according to the provisions
of section nine.
The amounts speciﬁed in this clause are all subject to the same limitations
~
as to maximum and minimum as above stated.
Soc. 11.
(a) The term “average annual earnings" as used in this
(Q 5441.)
act is deﬁned to be ﬁfty-two times the average weekly wages of the em.
ployé as arrived at according to the provisions of this section.
(b) The term “average weekly wages" as used in this act is deﬁned to be
six times the daily wage, salary or emolument which the injured employé is
earning at the time he suﬁers the accidental injury.
to ascertain the exact daily wage,
(c) In cases where it is impossible
salary or emolument the injured employé is earning at the time he suffers the
accidental injury, such daily earnings shall be taken and held to be for Q11
the purposes of this act such a sum as having regard to the previous daily

I

'

MICHIGAN wonKi~nrN’s

cou‘I>ENsA'rioN

ACT

909

of the injured employé and of other employés of the same or most
similar class working in the same or most similar employment in the same
or neighboring locality shall most nearly approximate the daily earnings of
the said injured employé at the time he receives the accidental injury, in the
employment in which he was working at such time. After the amount of said
daily wage, salary or emolument shall be determined as in this sub-section pro
vided, said amount shall be multiplied by six, and the product so obtained shall
be for all the purposes of this act taken and held to be the average weekly
wages of such employé.
(<1) The fact that an employé has suffered a previous disability or received
compensation therefor, shall not preclude compensation for the later injury
or for death, but in determining compensation for the later injury or death his
average annual earnings shall be held to be such sum as will reasonably
represent his annual earning capacity -at the time of the later injury in the
employment in which he was working at such time and shall be arrived at
according to and subject to the provisions of this section.
(e) The weekly loss in wages referred to in this act shall consist of such
percentage of the average weekly, earnings of the injured employé computed
according to the provisions of this section as shall fairly represent the pro
portionate extent of tho impairment of his earning capacity in the employ
ment in which he was working at the time of the accident, the same to be
ﬁxed as of the time of the accident, but to be determined in view of the nature
and extent of the injury.
The death of the injured employé prior to the expiration
See. 12.
(§ 5442.)
of the period within which he would receive such weekly payments shall be
deemed to end such disability, and all liability for the remainder of such pay
ments which he would have received in ease he had lived shall be terminated,
but the employer shnll thereupon be liable for the following death beneﬁts in
lieu of any further disability indemnity:
If the injury so received by such employé was the proximate cause of his
earnings

death, and such deceased employé leaves dependents, as hereinbefore speciﬁed,
wholly or partially dependent on him for support, the death beneﬁt shall be a
sum sufficient, when added to the indemnity which shall at the time of death
have been paid or become payable under the provisions of this act to such
deceased employé, to make the total compensation for the injury and death
exclusive of medical, surgical and hospital services and medicines furnished
as provided in section four hereof, equal to the full amount, which such depend
ents would have been entitled to receive under the provisions’ of section five
hereof, in case the accident had resulted in immediate death, and such bene
ﬁts shall be payable in weekly installments in the same manner and subject
to the same terms and conditions in all respects as payments made under
the provisions of said section ﬂve.
No savings or insurance of the injured employé, nor
Sec. 13.
(§ 5443.)
made by him to any beneﬁt fund or protective association
any contribution
independent of this act, shall be taken into consideration in determining the
compensation to be paid hereunder, nor shall beneﬁts derived from any other
source than those paid or caused to be paid by the employer as herein pro
vided, be considered in ﬁxing the compensation under this act.
Sec. 14.
If an injured employé is mentally incompetent or is
(§ 5444.)
a minor at the time when any right or privilege accrues to him under this act,
his guardian or next friend may in his behalf claim and exercise such right or
~
privilege.
[Sec. 15. Ante, p. 802.]
The said notice shall be in writing, and shall state in
Sec. 16.
(§ 5446.)
ordinary language the time, place and cause of the injury; and shall be
signed by the person injured, or by a person in his behalf, or, in the event of
his death, by his dependents or by a person in their behalf.

\
1
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The notice shall be served upon the employer or an
Sec. 17.
(§ 5447.)
Such service may be made by delivering said notice to the
agent thereof.
person on whom it is to be served, or leaving it at his residence or place of
business, or by sending it by registered mail addressed to the person or
corporation on whom it is to be served, at his last known residence or place of
business.
,
Sec. 18.
A notice given under the provisions of this act shall not
(§ 5448.)
be held invalid or insuilicient by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the time.
place or cause of the injury, unless it is shown that it was the intention to
mislead, and the employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, or
the commissioner of insurance, as the case may be, was in fact misled thereby.
Want of such written notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under this act.
if it be shown that the employer had notice or knowledge of the injury.
Sec. 19.
After an employé has given notice of an injury, as pro
(§ 5449.)
vided by this act, and from time to time thereafter during the continuance of
his disability, he shall, if so requested by the employer, or the insurance com
pany carrying sudi risk, or the commissioner of insurance, as the case may be.
by a physician or surgeon authorized to
submit himself to an examination
practice medicine under the laws of the state, furnished and paid for by the
employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, or the commissioner of
insurance, as the case may be. _The employé shall have the right to have a
If
physician provided and paid for by himself present at the examination.
he refuses to submit himself for the examination. or in any way obstructs the
same, his right to compensation shall be suspended, and his compensation dur
Any physician who shall
ing the period oi! suspension may be forfeited.
make or be present at any such examination may be required to testify under
oath as to the results thereof.
[Sec. 20. Ante, p. 802.]
No payment under this act shall be assignable or sub
Sec. 21.
(§ 5451.)
ject to attachment or garnishment, ‘or be held liable in any way for any debts.
In case of insolvency every’liability for compensation under this act shall
constitute a ﬁrst lien upon all the property of the employer liable therefor,
paramount to all other claims or liens except for wages and taxes, and such
liens shall be enforced by order of the court.
Whenever any weekly payment has been continued for
Sec. 22.
(§ 5452.)
not less than six m0nthS,'the liability therefor may be redeemed by’ the pay
ment of a lump sum by agreement of the parties, subject to the approval of
the Industrial Accident Board, and said board may at any time direct in any
case, if special circumstances be found which in its judgment require the
same, that the deferred payments be commuted on the present worth thereof
at ﬁve per cent. per annum to one or more lump sum payments, and that such
payments shall be made by the employer or the insurance company carrying
such risk, or commissioner or insurance, as the case may be.
Sec. 23.
All compensation paid or to be paid under this act by any
(§ 5453.)
employer, being an incorporated public board, or public commission shall be
treated as part of the necessary operating expenses thereof, and all sums
and amounts of money required therefor may be embraced in any requisition
authorized by law to be mnde upon any other public corporation,
body or
oﬂlcer for moneys for the use of such employer in addition to all other sums
authorized by law, or separate requisition therefor may be made in like man
ner; and the same shall be allowed and paid to such employer in the same
manner as other moneys are required to be allowed and paid for the use of
or the same may be embraced in any report or requirement
such employer;
authorized by law to be made to or upon any other public corporation, or oili
cer of sums of money to be levied as taxes for the use of such employer, in
addition to all other sums authorized by law, or separate report or requirement
thereof may be made in like manner; and the some shall be levied, collected

I
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III

Section 1. There is hereby created a board which shall be
consisting oi! three members to be
known as the Industrial Accldent_Board,
appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the senate, one of
to
Appointments
whom shall be designated by the Governor as chairman.
ﬁll vacancies may be made during recesses -or the senate, but shall be sub
ject to conﬁrmation by the senate at the next ensuing session of the legislature.
The term of oﬁice of members of this bound shall be six years, except that
when ﬁrst constituted one member shall be appointed for two years, one tor
four years, and one for six years. Thereafter one member shall be appointed
every second year for the full term of six years. No more than two members
of this board shall belong to the same political party.
Sec. 2.
The salary of each of the members so appointed by the
(§ 5155.)
Governor shall be three thousand ﬁve hundred dollars per year. The board
may appoint a secretary at a salary of not more than two thousand ﬁve hun
dredidollars a year, and may remove him. The board shall be provided with
an ofiice_in the capitol, or in some other suitable building in the city of
Lansing, in which its records shall be kept, and it shall also be provided with
necessary ottice furniture, stationery and other supplies. It shall provide itself
with a seal for the authentication of its orders, awards and proceedings—upon
which shall be inscribed the words “Industrial Accident Board—-Michigan—
Seal." It shall employ such assistants and clerical help as it may deem neces
Provided, That
sary and ﬁx the compensation of all persons so employed:
the average compensation paid to such employés shall not exceed eleven hun
dred dollars per annum for each person employed, and all such clerical as
sistants shall be subject to existing laws regulating the grading and compen
The members of the board and its assistants
sation ot department clerks.
shall be entitled to receive from the state their actual and necessary expenses
while traveling on the business of the board; but such expenses shall be
sworn to by the person who incurred the same, and be approved by the chair
man of the board before payment is made. Said board shall have the power to
maintain an otilce in the city of Detroit. All such salaries and expenses when
audited and allowed by the board ot state auditors, shall be paid by the state
treasurer out of the general fund, upon warrant of the auditor general.
Sec. 3.
The board may make rules not inconsistent with this
(§ 5456.)
act for carrying out the provisions of the act. Process and procedure under
this act shall be as summary as reasonably may be. The board or any mem
ber thereof shall have the power to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses and
to examine such parts of the books and records or the parties to a proceeding
Any witness who refuses to obey 9, sub
as relate to questions in dispute.
poena of a. member or deputy member‘ of the board, or who refuses to be
sworn or testify, or who fails to produce any papers, books or documents
touching any matter under investigation, or any witness, party or attorney who
is guilty or any contempt while in attendance at any hearing held under this
act may be punished as for contempt of court; and for this purpose an ap
plication may be made to any circuit court within whose territorial jurisdic
tion the offense is committed, and for which purpose the court is hereby given
(§ 5454.)

I

jurisdiction.

The board shall cause to

and furnish free of
(5 5457.)
charge to any employer or employé such blank forms a it shall deem requisite
to facilitate or promote the efficient administration of this act; it shall pro
vide a proper record book in which shall be entered and indexed the name ot
any employer who shall ﬁle a statement of election under this act, and the
date of the ﬁling thereof and its approval by such board, and a separate
Sec.

4.

be printed

;
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book in which shall be entered and indexed the name of every employer who
shall ﬁle his notice of withdrawal of said election, and the date of the
ﬁling thereof; and books in which shall be recorded all orders and awards
made by the board; and such other books or records as it shall deem required
by the proper and eilicient administration of this act; all such records to be
kept in the oﬁice of the board.
Upon the ﬁling of a statement of election by
an employer'to become subject to the provisions of this act, the board shall
forthwith cause such notice of the fact to be given by requiring said em
ployer to post such notice as hereinbefore provided; and the board shall
likewise cause notice to be given of the ﬁling of any withdrawal of such
election;
but notwithstanding the failure to give, or the insuﬂlciency of, any
such notice, knowledge of all ﬁled statements of election and notices of with
drawal of election, and of the time of the ﬁling of the same, shall conclusive
ly be imputed to all employés.
If the employer, or the insurance company carrying such
Sec. 5.
(§ 5458.)
risk, or commissioner of insurance, as the case may be, and the injured em
ployé reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this act, a mem
orandum of such agreement shall be ﬁled with the Industrial Accident Board,
and, if approved by it, shall be deemed ﬁnal and binding upon the parties
thereto.
Such agreement shall be approved by said board only when the
'
terms conform to the provisions of this act.
Sec. 6.
If the employer, or insurance company carrying such
(§ 5459.)
risk, or the Commissioner of Insurance, as the case may be. and the employé
fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this act, either
party may notify the Industrial Accident Board, who shall thereupon set the
case for hearing.
The hearing shall be conducted by a member or deputy
member oi.’ the Industrial Accident Board.
Sec. 7.
It shall be the duty of the Industrial Accident Board,
(§ 5460.)
upon notiﬁcation
that the parties have failed to reach an agreement, to
designate one of its members or deputy members to hear the case. The mem
ber or deputy member so designated shall be known as a committee of arbitra
tion wherever the phrase “committee of arbitration” is used in the act.
Sec. 8.
The committee of arbitration shall make such inquiries
(§ 5461.)
and investigations as it shall deem necessary. The hearings of the committee
shall be held at the locality where the injury occurred, and the decision of
the committee shall be ﬁled with the Industrial Accident Board.
Unless a
claim for a review is ﬁled by either party within ten days, the decision shall
stand as the declsion_ of the Industrial Accident Board: Provided, that said
Industrial Accident Board may, for suﬂiclent cause shown, grant further time
in which to claim such review.
The Industrial Accident Board or any member thereof
Sec. 9.
(5 5462.)
may appoint a duly qualiﬁed impartial physician to examine the injured em
The tee for this service shall be ﬁve dollars and traveling
ployé and to report.
expenses, but the board may allow additional reasonable amounts in ex
traordinary cases.
Sec. 10.
The cost of such arbitration, including the cost of tak
(5 5463.)
ing stenographic notes of the testimony presented at such hearing, not ex
ceeding, however, the taxable costs allowed in suits at law in the circuit
courts of this state. shall be ﬁxed by the Board and paid by the state as the
other expenses of the state are paid.
The fees and payment thereof of all
attorneys and physicians for services under this act shall be subject to the
approval of the Industrial Accident Board.
In the event oi’ disagreement
between the parties as to the fees for services of attorneys and physicians,
either party may apply to the Board for a hearing in accordance with the
~
terms of section fourteen, part three, of the act.
Sec.
11.
If a claim for review is ﬁled. as provided in part:
(§-546-1.)
three. section eight, the Industrial Accident Board shall promptly review the
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decision of the committee of arbitration, and such records as may have been
kept of its hearing, and shall also, if desired, hear the parties together with
such additional evidence as the board in its discretion may allow them to
submit, and ﬁle its decision therein with the records of such proceedings.
Such review and hearing may be held in its oiiices at Lansing, or elsewhere,
as the board shall deem advisable.
Sec. 12.
The ﬁndings of fact made by said Industrial Accident
(§ 5465.)
Board acting within its powers, shall, in the absence of fraud. be conclusive,
but the supreme court shall have power to review questions of law involved
in any ﬂnal decision or determination of said Industrial Accident Board:
Provided, that application is made by the aggrieved party within thirty days
after such determination by certiorari, mandamus or by any other method per
missible under the rules and practice of said court or the laws of this state,
and to make such further orders in respect thereto as justice may require.
Sec. 13.
Either party may present a certiﬁed copy of the deci
(5 5466.)
sion of such Industrial Accident Board approving agreements of settlement as
provided in part three, section ﬁve hereof, or of the decision of such commit
tee of arbitration when no claim for review is made as provided in part three,
section eight, or of the decision of such Industrial. Accident Board when a
claim for review is ﬁled as provided in part three, section eleven, providing
for payment of compensation under this act, to the circuit court for the coun
ty in which such accident occurred, whereupon said court shall, without no
tice, reuder a judgment in accordance therewith against said employer and
also against any insurance company carrying such risk under the provisions of
this act; which judgment, until and unless set aside shall have the same
eifect as though duly rendered in an action duly tried and determined by
said court, and shall, with like effect, be entered and docketed.
Any weekly payment under this act may be reviewed by
Sec. 14.
(§ 5467.)
the Industrial Accident Board or by any member or deputy ‘member thereof,
at the request of the employer, or insurance company carrying such risk, or
the Commissioner of Insurance, as‘the case may be, or the employé, and on
such review it may be ended, diminished or increased, subject to the maxi
mum and minimum amounts above provided, if the board or member or deputy
Provided, however, that
member ﬁnds that the facts warrant such action:
when such review is made by a member or deputy member it shall be conduct
ed ln accordance with the procedure covering arbitration hearings, set forth
in sections six, seven and eight of part three, and either party may appeal
from the decision of the member or deputy member to the full board within
ten days from the ﬁling of the decision with the Industrial Accident Board.
The costs of such proceedings, when heard before a member or‘ deputy member,
'
shall be paid in accordance with section ten, part three, hereof.
Where the injury for which compensation is payable
Sec. 15.
(§ 5468.)
under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in
some person other than the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the
employé may at his option proceed either at law against that person to re
cover damages, or against the employer for compensation under this act, but
not against both, and it compensation be paid under this act the employer may
enforce for his beneﬁt or for that of the insurance company carrying such risk,
or the commissioner of insurance, as the case may be, the liability of such
other person.
Sec. 16.
All questions arising under this act, if not settled by
(5 5469.)
agreement by the parties interested therein, shall, except as otherwise herein
provided, be determined by the Industrial Accident Board.
Sec. 17. Every employer shall hereafter keep a record of all in
(§ 5470.)
juries. fatal or otherwise, received by his employés in the course of their em
Goob.Pa.&
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On the eighth day after the occurrence of an accident resulting in
ployment.
personal injury, a report thereof snall be made in writing to the Industrial
Accident Board on blanks to be procured from the board for that purpose, as

follows:

(a) In all cases in which the injured employé is injured so slightly that he
loses no time, or' little time, or returns to work within seven days, the em
ployer ‘shall on the eighth day after the occurrence of the accident make and
send to the Industrial Accident Board a report of said accident in which shall
the name and address of
be stated the name and address of the employer;
the date of the
the employé, including street, house number and postotiice;
accident;
the nature of the injury;
the length of time lost by the injured
employé, if any; the date upon which the injured employé returned to work;
the amount of the medical, surgical and hospital expense. if ﬁlly. incurred up
to the time of the making of the report; the name of the insurance com
and such
pany carrying the employer's risk on the date of the accident;
Said re
other information as the Industrial Accident Board may require.
port shall be dated and signed in ink by the employer, or his duly authorized
agent, and made and mailed to the Industrial Accident Board at Lansing,
Michigan, on the eighth day after the accident occurred. All non-compensable
of this
accidents shall be reported by the employer under this subdivision
section: If any accident reported under this subdivision as a non-compensable
accident shall later prove to be a compensable accident, the employer shall as
soon as he learns the same to be a compensable accident make a report of
the same under subdivision (b) below, and shall state in said report the fact
that said accident was previously erroneously reported as a non-eompensable
I
accident.
(b) In all cases in which the employé is injured to such an extent that he
does not return _to work within seven days after the accident, and in ‘all cases
in which the disability of the injured employé continues for more than seven
days after the accident, and in all cases in which the accident results in the
loss of a member of the employé’s body, and in all cases in which the acci
dent causes the death of the employé, the employer shall report said acci
dent to the Industrial Accident Board, at Lansing, Michigan, on the eighth
day after the accident, in the manner hereinafter stated.
Said report to be
made under this subdivision of this section shall state the name and address
of the employer; the nature of his business; the location of the plant or place
of work where the accident occurred;
the name and address of the injured
employé, including street, house number and postofﬁce;
the occupation
of
the injured employé;
the department or branch of work in which the em-I
ployé was injured; whether the employé was injured in his regular occupa
tion, and if not, what the regular occupation of the injured employé was;
how long the injured employé was employed:
the place of birth, sex and
age of said employé; whether he was single, married, widowed or divorced;
the number of children of the said injured employé under sixteen years of
age; the date and hour of the accident;
the hour the injured employé began
work that day; whether full wage was paid for the day on which the em
ployé was injured; the daily wage, salary or emolumcnt the injured em
ployé was earning at the time of the accidental injury; the average weekly
wage of the injured employé, computed according to the provisions of this
act; the working hours per day of said injured employé; the number of days
the injured employé worked per week; the place of accident in detail; the
cause and manner of the accident stated fully: the nature and extent of the
injury fully and in detail; the name and address of the physician who at
tended the injured employé; the fact as to whether the injured employé was
taken to a hospital and if so, the name and address of the hospital; the
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name of the insurance company carrying the risk of the employer, if any;
and such other information as may be required by the Industrial Accident
Board.
When the accident causes the loss of a member, said report shall state
exactly what member, or portion of the member, was lost. The .1-eport shall
be dated and signed in ink by the employer, or by some person by him duly
authorized, and shall on the eighth day after the accident be made out and
signed by the employer and mailed to the Industrial Accident Board, at Lan
sing, Michigan.
(c) In all cases of compensable accidents reported under subdivision
(b)
of this section, the employer, or his insurer, shall immediately after the mak
ing of the report to the Industrial Accident Board showing said accident to
be a compensable one, prepare and sign an agreement to pay compensation to
said employé under the terms of this act, and present said agreement to the
injured employé for his signature, and when said agreement is signed by said
injured employé, and within the second week after the accident, the said em
ployer or insurer shall forward said agreement so signed to the Industrial
Accident Board. Said agreement shall be prepared, signed and mailed so
that it shall reach the ollice oi the Industrial Accident Board on or prior to
the fourteenth day after the accident.
In all cases in which an accident is
ﬁrst erroneously reported as noncompensable and afterwards ascertained to
be compensable, the employer or insurer shall prepare, sign and submit to the
injured employé for his signature an agreement to pay said injured employé
the compensation to which he is entitled under the terms of this act, within
one week after said employer or insurer learns that said accident is compen
sable, and during the same time shall forward said agreement signed as afore
said to the Industrial Accident Board.
(d) Every employer or insurer obligated to pay workmen’s compensation to
any employé under the terms of this act shall make the ﬁrst weekly payment
of compensation to the injured employé at. the end of one weelvafter the
compensation period begins to run, and shall make like weekly payments of
compensation at the end of each week thereafter as long as compensation is
payable to the injured employé on account of his injury.
(e) In all cases in which an acddental injury suﬂfered by an employé shall
result in his death, the employer of the employé whose death results shall on
the eighth day after the accident, or after the death of the said injured em
ployé, make to the Industrial Accident Board a supplemental report, which
report shall state the name of the employer;
the name of the
his address;
deceased employé; his nationality; the last address of the deceased employé,
including street, house number and postoiﬁce; the date of the accident which
resulted in the death of the deceased employé; the date of the death of the
deceased employé; whether employer furnished all medical aid required dur
ing the ﬁnal illness; the amount of compensation, if any, paid to the deceased
employé before his death;
name and address of person who incurred the
expense of the burial of the deceased; name and address of the person to
whom any expense of ﬁnal illness is due; and the names, ages, and relation
ship to the deceased, and postoﬂice address of all dependents of deceased as
far as said employer is able to ascertain the same, and whether said persons ap
pear to be dependent upon the deceased in whole or in part. Said report shall
be dated and signed in ink by the. employer or by some person by him duly
authorized and shall be within fourteen days after the death of the deceased
employé mailed to the Industrial Accident Board, at Lansing, Michigan.
And in all cases in which the employer shall be liable to pay compensation
or death beneﬁts to the dependents of the deceased employé, said employer or
his insurer shall within said fourteen days prepare and sign an agreement to
thereto, and present said agreement
pay the same to the dependents_entltled
to the dependents of the deceased employé for their signatures;
and when said
agreement is signed by said dependents, and within fourteen days after the
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death of said employé, the said employer or his insurer shall forward said
agreement to the Industrial Accident Board.
_
If any employer shall, after he has notice or knowledge or an accident hap
pening to one of his employés, refuse or neglect to make any of the reports
required by this section, neither he nor his insurer shall have the right to
raise the defense oi the statute of limitations contained in section ﬂtteen of
part two of this act in any proceedings by injured employés, or their de
pendents, to recover compensation, and said employer shall be punished by a
ﬁne of not more than ﬁfty dollars for each offense.
The board may appoint an assistant secretary at a sala
Sec. 18.
(§ 5471.)
ry of not more than two thousand dollars a year to be paid as other state em
ployés are paid.
The Industrial Accident Board shall have jurisdiction over all
Sec. 19.
controversies arising out of injuries suifered without the territorial limits of
this state, in those cases where the injured employé is a resident of this state at
the time of the injury, and the contract of hire was made in this state, and
any such employé or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation or
death beneﬁts provided by this act.
Sec. 20.
The board may, subject to the approval of the State
(5 .5472.)
Administrative Board, appoint suﬂicient deputy members to enable it eﬂiciently
to administer the law, who shall hold oﬁice during its pleasure.
Such deputy
members shall take and subscribe the constitutional
oath of oﬂice, have
power to administer oaths, certify oﬂicial acts, take depositions, issue sub
poenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, ac
counts and papers, and under the direction of the board any such deputy mem
ber may conduct an investigation, inquiry, hearing or arbitration in the same
manner and with like effect as if done by a member of the board. The salary
of each such deputy member shall be ﬁxed by the board, subject to the ap
proval of the State Administrative Board.

Part
[Sec. 1. Ante, p. 803.]
Nothing herein
Sec. 2.
(§ 5474.)

IV

'

shall aifect any existing contract tor em
ployers’ liability insurance or aﬂect the organization of any mutual or other
insurance company, or any arrangement now existing between employers and
employés, providing for the payment to such employés, their families, de
sick, accident or death beneﬁts, in addition to
pendents or representatives,
the compensation provided for by this act. But liability for compensation un
der this act shall not be reduced or affected by any insurance, contribution or
other beneﬁt whatsoever, due to or received by the person entitled to such
compensation, and the person so entitled shall, irrespective of any insurance
or other contract. have the right to recover the same directly from the em
ployer; and in addition thereto, the right to enforce in his own name in the
manner provided in this act the liability of any insurance company or of
any employers’ association organized under the laws of the state of Michigan,
or the commissioner of insurance, who may, in whole or in part, have insured
Provided,
however, that payment in
the liability for such compensation:
whole or in part or such compensation by either the employer, or the insur
ance company carrying such risk, or the commissioner of insurance. as the
case may be, shall, to the extent thereof be a bar to recovery against the
other, of the amount so paid.
Every contract for the insurance of the compensation
Sec. 3.
(§ 5475.)
herein provided tor, or against liability therefor, shall be deemed _to be made
subject to the provisions ot this act, and provisions thereof inconsistent with
this act shall be void. No company shall enter into any such contract for in
surance, unless such company shall have been aproved by the commissioner of
insurance as provided by law.

MICHIGAN wonKMmn’s COMPENSATION

ACT

917

Any employer against whom liability may exist for com
Sec. 4.
(§ 5476.)
pensation under this act may, with the approval of the Industrial Accident
Board, be relieved therefrom by:
1. Depositing the present value oi! the total unpaid compensation for which
such liability exists, assuming interest at three per centum per annum, with
such trust company of this state as shall be designated by the employé, or by
his dependents, in case ot his death, and such liability exists in their favor. or
in default of such designation by him. or them, aften ten days’ notice in writing
from the employer, with such trust company ot this state as shall be desig
nated by the Industrial Accident Board; or
2. By the purchase of an annuity, within the limitations provided by law.
in any insurance company granting annuities and licensed in this state, which
may be designated by the employé, or his dependents, or the Industrial Acci
one of this section.
dent Board as provided in
sub-section
Part V
Section 1. Whenever ﬂve or more employers, who have become
subject to the provisions of this act, and who have on their pay rolls an
aggregate number of _not less than three thousand employés, shall in writing
request the commissioner of insurance so to do, he shall assume charge of
levying and collecting from them such premiums or assessments as may from
time to time be necessary to pay the sums which shall become due their em
ployés, or dependents 0! their employés, as compensation under the pro
visions of this act, and also the expense of conducting the administration oi‘
such funds; and shall disburse the same to the persons entitled to receive
such compensation under the provisions of this act: Provided, however, that
neither the commissioner of insurance nor the state of Michigan shall become
or be liable or responsible for the payment of claims for compensation under
the provisions of this act beyond the extent of the funds so collected and re
ceived by him as hereinatter provided.
The commissioner of insurance 1 shall immediately upon
Sec. 2.
(5 5478.)
assuming the administration of the collection and disbursement of the moneys
referred to in the preceding section, cause to be created in the state treasury
a fimd to be known as “accident fund." Each such employer shall contribute
to this timd to the extent of such premiums or assessments as the commis
sioner shall deem necessary to pay the compensation accruing under this act to
employés of such employers or to their dependents, and also the expense of
the administration of said accident fund, which premiums and assessments
shall be levied in the manner and proportion hereinafter set forth.
There
shall be maintained in said accident fund a sufficient amount or cash to pay
current losses and expenses, and the balance may be invested by the com
missioner of insurance and the state treasurer acting together, in such securi
ties as are speciﬁed in section four of act number seventy-seven of the Public
Acts of eighteen himdred sixty-nine, for deposit by insurance companies with
the state treasurer.
All such securities shall be purchased and may be sold
at such time, in such manner and in accordance with such rules and conditions
as may be prescribed and required by the joint action of said insurance com
missioner and state treasurer:
Provided, however, that no such investment
shall be made nor any securities sold or disposed of except by and with thc
consent and approval in writing of the board of state auditors.
The com
missioner oif insurance shall give a good and suﬂicient bond in the sum of
twenty-ﬁve thousand dollars, executed by some surety company authorized to
(5 5477.)

' Act 180, P. A. 1921, transfers the control or the State Accident Fund from the
State
Insurance Commissioner to the State Administrative
Board.
It became eilective May 17,
1921. See Sec. 14, part V, herein.
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do business in the state of Michigan, covering the collection and disburse
ment of all moneys that may come into his hands under the provisions of
this act. The premium on said bond shall‘be paid out of the general funds of
Said bond must be approved by
the state on an order of the auditor general.
the board of state auditors.
It is the intention that the amounts raised for such
Sec. 3.
(§ 5479.)
fund shall ultimately become neither more nor less than sell?-supporting, and
the premiums or assessments levied for such purpose shall be subject to read
justment from time to time by the commissioner of insurance as [may become
necessary.
Sec. 4.
The commissioner of insurance may classify the establish
(5 5480.)
ments or works of such employers in groups in accordance with the nature of
the business in which they are engaged and the probable risk of injury to
their employés under existing conditions. He shall determine the amount of
the premiums or assessments which such employers shall pay to said accident
and
fund, and may prescribe when and in what manner such premiums
assessments shall be paid, and may change the amount thereof both in respect
to any or all of such employers from time to time, as circumstances may re
quire, and the condition of their respective plants, establishments or places of
work in respect to the safety oi’ their employés may justify, but all such pre
miums or assessments shall be levied on a basis that shall be fair, equitable
I
and just as among such employers.
Sec. 5. All premiums or assessments shall be due and payable
(§ 5481.)
within forty-ﬁve days from the date on which the insurance became eﬁective
and formal demand for the payment of such premium shall be made within
thirty days from said date. If any employer shall make default in the pay
premium or assessment required as aforesaid by
ment of any contribution,
the commissioner of insurance, the insurance of such employer shall become
void and the sum due for the period insured shall be collected by an action
at law in the name of the state as plaintiff and such right of action shall be
in addition to any other right of action or remedy. In case any injury happens
to any of the workmen of such employer after the default in the payment of
any such premium, assessment or contribution, the defaulting employer shall
not, if such default he ﬁfteen days after demand for payment, be entitled to
the beneﬁts of this act, but shall be liable to suit by the injured workman, or
by his dependents in case death results from such accident, as if he had not
elected to become subject to this act.
Every employer requesting insurance under the adminis
Sec. 6.
5482.)
tration of the commissioner of insurance shall upon complying with the rules
and regulations adopted by saidcommlssioner of insurance, be furnished with
a certiﬁcate showing the date on which such insurance becomes effective.
period of one year, and may be renewed
Such insurance shall be in force for
for subsequent periods of one year providing such employer shall have com
plied with
adopted by the commissioner
of the rules and regulation
of
insurance.
In case any controversy shall arise between the commis
Sec. 7.
5483.)
sioner of insurance and any employer subject to the provisions of part ﬁve of
this act, relative to any rule or regulation adopted by said commissioner of
insurance or any decision made by him in respect to the collection, adminis
tration and disbursement of such funds, or in case any controversy shall arise
between any employé claiming compensation under the provisions of this act
and said commissioner of insurance, all such controversies of every kind and.‘
nature shall be subject to review in like manner and with the same force and
effect in all respects as is heretofore provided in respect to diﬁferences arising
through the administration of such funds by the employer, or by
liability in
surance company or by an employers’ mutual insurance association.
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The books, records and pay rolls of each employer sub
of part ﬁve of this act shall always be open to inspec
tion by the commissioner of insurance, or his duly authorized agent or repre
sentative, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the amount of the
pay roll reported, the number of men employed, and such other information
as said commissioner may require in the administration of said funds.
Re
fusal on the part of any such employer to submit said books, records and paY
rolls for such inspection, shall subject the otfending employer to a penalty
of ﬁfty dollars for each oﬂfense, to be collected by civil action in the name 0!
the state and paid into the accident fund, and the individual who shall per
Any such em
sonally give such refusal shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ployer who shall knowingly submit to the commissioner of insurance a false
statement of pay roll for the purpose of securing a lower premium charge,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to a
ﬁne of not less than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than
thirty days in the county jail or both such ﬁne and imprisonment in the dis
.
cretion of the court.
Sec. 9.
The commissioner of insurance shall issue proper re
(55-185.)
ceipts for all moneys so collected and received from employers, as aforesaid,
and shall take receipts for all sums paid to employés for compensation under
the provisions of this act, and shall keep full and complete records of all busi
ness transacted by him in the administration of such funds.
He may employ
such deputies and assistants and clerical help as may be necessary, and as the
advisory board, hereinafter created, may authorize, for the proper administra
(5 5484.)

Sec.

8.

ject to the provisions

tion of said funds, and the performance ot the duties imposed upon him by the
provisions of this act, at such compensation as may be ﬁxed by the advisory
board, and may also remove them. The commissioner of insurance and such
deputies and assistants shall be entitled to receive from the state their actual
and necessary expenses while traveling upon the business of the accident fund.
and all such salaries and expenses as authorized by the provisions of this act
shall, when audited by the board of state auditors, be charged to and paid out
He shall include in his annual report a full and cor
of said accident fund.
rect statement of the administration of such fund, showing its ﬁnancial status,
obligations,
the claims contested and why, and general
and outstanding
statistics in respect to all business transacted by him under the provisions of
this act.
Sec. 10.
All payments on account of injuries to employés from
(§ 5486.)
said accident fund shall be made only upon the certiﬁcate of the commissioner
of insurance, which certiﬁcate shall be in accordance with the agreement for
compensation as approved by the Industrial Accident Board; such certiﬁcate
shall be ﬂied with the auditor general, who shall thereupon draw his war
rant on the state treasurer against said accident fund.
It this act shall be hereafter repealed or (it it shall in
Sec. 11.
(§ 5487.)
the judgment of the commissioner of insurance become necessary to dissolve
the accident fund), all moneys which are in the accident fund at such time
shall be subject to disposition under the ‘direction of the circuit court for the
county of Ingham, with due regard, however, to the obligation incurred and
existing to pay compensation under the provisions of this act.
An annual meeting of the employers contributing to the accident
Sec. 12.
fund, shall be called by the commissioner of insurance, to be held in the city
of Lansing, in the month of September, which may be attended by the mem
Notice of the annualpmeetlng shall be by
bers in person or by an attorney.
ordinary mail, at least ten days prior to the date of meeting. At the annual
meeting so held there shall be nominated by the members present, ﬂve con
tributing members to constitute an advisory board, who, when so nominated
and certified to the Governor, shall receive an appointment as such by the
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Governor, to serve for the term of two years.
In case of vacancy in the ad
visory board, a nomination may be made by the remaining members to the
The advisory board shall
Governor, for the purpose of ﬁlling said vacancy.
elect one of its members chairman, and the board shall meet quarterly on the
call of the chairman, in the city of Lansing.
Sec. 13.
The advisory board shall advise with the commissioner of insur
the affairs of the said ac
ance as to the means and methods of administering
cident fund, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
Sec. 14.
The duties and powers of the Commissioner of Insurance in re
spect of,the administration of the accident fund created in this part are hereby
transferred to and vested in the State Administrative Board, and whenever
reference is made in this part to the Commissioner of Insurance such refer
ence shall hereafter be takan to mean the State Administrative Board. The
securities belonging to such fund, and all investments thereof, shall be under
the control and management of such board; and the provisions in section two
hereof with respect to’ the giving of a bond are hereby repealed.
The State
Administrative Board, subject to the approval of the Advisory Board created
by section twelve, shall appoint and employ a manager for the accident fund,
\ who shall give a bond to the state in the sum of ten thousand dollars, condi
tioned upon the faithful performance of his duties, and the accoimting for all
collections and disbursements made by him.
Such manager shall perform
such duties under this part as the State Administrative Board shall direct.
Part~

VI

Section 1. If the employé, or his dependents, in case of his death.
of any employer subject to the provisions of this act ﬁles any claim with, or
accepts any payment from such employer, or any insurance company carrying
such risks, or from the commissioner of insurance on account of personal in
jury, or makes any agreement, or submits any question to arbitration under
this act, such action shall constitute a release to such employer of all claims
or demands at law, if any, arising from such injury.
Sec. 2.
If the provisions of this act relating to compensation for
(5 5489.)
injuries to or death of workmen shall be repealed or adjudged invalid or un
constitutional,
the period intervening between the occurrence of an injury or
death and such repeal, or the ﬁnal adjudication of invalidity, shall not be com
puted as a part of the time limited by law for the commencement of any ac
tion relating to such injury or death, but the amount of any compensation
which may have been paid for any such injury shall be deducted from any
'
judgment for damages recovered on account of such injury.
Sec. 3.
This act shall not affect any cause of action existing or
(5 5490.)
pending before it went into effect.
Sec. 4. The provisions of this act shall apply to employers and
(5 5491.)
workmen engaged in intrastate commerce, and also to those engaged in inter
state or foreign commerce, for whom a rule of liability or method of com
pensation has been or may be established by the congress of the United
States, only to the extent that their mutual connection with intrastate work
may and shall be clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or for
eign commerce, except that any such employer and any of his workmen work
ing only in this state, may, subject to the approval of the Industrial Accident
Board, and so far as not forbidden by any act of Congress, yoluntarily accept
and become bound by the provisions of this act in like manner and with the
same force and effect in all respects as is hereinbefore provided for other em
ployers and their workmen.
Sec. 5.
All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are
(§ 5492.)
to be deemed replaced by this act, and to that end are hereby repealed,
(5 5488.)

\

I

4

MICHIGAN woaKiusN’s

COMPENSATION

ACT

921

The legislature intends that part ﬁve of this act shall
Sec. 6.
(§ 5493.)
be deemed separate from the other parts thereof, so that if said part ﬁve
should fail or be adjudged invalid or unconstitutional it shall in no way
,
aﬂect any other part of this act.
Sec. 7.
To carry out the provisions of this act there is hereby
(§ 5494.)
appropriated for the expenses of the Industrial Accident Board for the ﬁscal
year ending June thirty, nineteen hundred eighteen, and annually thereafter,
The auditor general shall add to and
the sum of seventy thousand dollars.
incorporate into the state tax, the sum of seventy thousand dollars annually,
which said sum shall be included in the state taxes apportioned by the,auditor
general on all taxable property of the state, to be levied, assessed and collected
as other state taxes, and when so assessed and collected, to be paid into the
general fund to reimburse said fund for the appropriation made by this act.
The provisions Of this act shall take effect and be in
Sec. 8.
(§ 5495.)
force from and after September ﬁrst, nineteen hundred twelve.
EMPLOYEBS'

Lunrnrrr

INSURANCE

The statute of Michigan [Comp. Laws 1922, §§ 9100 (286)——9100 (298)]. au
thorizing the formation of mutual liability insurance companies, is as follows:
Subdivision

One

Section 1. Any number of persons, ﬁrms, partnership associations or cor
porations, not less than ﬁve, who have become subject to the provisions of
the laws of Michigan relating to employers’ liability and workmen’s com
establish
pensation, and who own or operate mills, factories, manufacturing
ments of any and every kind, buildings, stores, hotels and mercantile estab
lishments, or any combination
of manufacturing and mercantile business,
companies, tele
mines, quarries, blast furnaces, railroads and transportation
graph and telephone companies, or who are engaged in the production or
supplying of gas and electricity for lighting, fuel, power, or other purposes;
printing, publishing and bookmaking or in carrying on any other lawful busi
ness in the state of Michigan, may associate together and form an incorporated
company for the purpose of mutual insurance of'its members against liability
for any and all payments which may become due and payable to their em
ployés under the provisions of law for death beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, or
otherwise, as hereinbefore set forth: Provided, however, that the persons,
ﬁrms or corporations so associating themselves together for the organization
of such company shall have on their pay rolls at that time not less than ﬁve
thousand employés.
Sec. 2.
In addition to the requirements of chapter one, part two hereof,
such articles of association shall set forth:
The names of the persons, ﬁrms, partnership associations and corporations
associating in the ﬁrst instance, their respective residences, the nature of the
business in which they are engaged,
and the number of persons employed
'
therein by each of them;
That each and all of such incorporators have elected, with the approval of
the Industrial Accident Board, to become subject to the pr0visl0ns oi! act
number ten, Public Acts of nineteen hundred twelve, ﬁrst extra session, and
are forming this corporation for the purpose of mutually insuring their mem
bers against liability for any and all payments which may become due and
payable to their employés under the provisions of said act.
Sec. 8. The board of directors shall determine the amount of the premiums
or assessments which the members of such company shall pay for such in
surance, in accordance with the nature of the business in which they are en
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gaged, and the probable risk of injury to their employés under existing con
ditions.
The board may also prescribe when and in what manner such pre
miums shall be paid, and may change the amount thereof both in respect to
any or all of its members from time to time, as circumstances may require
and the conditions of their respective plants, establishments or places of work
in respect to the safety of their employés may justify, but all such premiums
or assessments shall be levied on a basis that shall be fair, equitable and
just as among such members; and it shall be the duty of such board oi.’ direc
tors at the bemnning of each ﬁscal year, to call for the required payment of
premiums in such amount as shall, in the judgment of the Commissioner of
Insurance, be suﬂicient to enable such company to pay all sums which may
become due and payable during the following year, to the employés or any oi?
its members, and also the expenses of conducting its business.
Sec. 4.
The company shall in its by-laws and policies ﬂx the contingent
mutual liability of its members for the payment of losses and expenses not
provided for by its cash funds.
Such contingent liability of a member shall
not be less than an amount equal to the liability imposed by this act and of
act number ten, Public Acts of nineteen hundred twelve, ﬁrst extra session.
Sec. 5.
If the company is not possessed of cash funds so that it has un
earned premiums sufficient for the payment of incurred losses and expenses, it
shall make an assessment for the amount needed to pay such losses and ex
penses upon the members liable to assessment therefor in proportion to their
Every member shall pay his proportional part of any as
several liability.
sessment which may be laid by the board of directors, in accordance with the
law and his contract on account of injuries sustained and expenses incurred
while he is a member of such company.
Sec. 6. The board of directors may, from time to time, by vote, ﬁx and de
termine the amount to be paid as a dividend upon policies expiring during each
year after retaining sufficient sums to pay all the compensation which may be
payable on account of injuries sustained and expenses incurred.
All premi
ums, assessments and dividends shall be ﬁxed and determined in accordance
with the experience of said company, but all the funds of the company, and
the contingent liability of all the members thereof, shall be available for the
payment of any claim against the company.
Sec. 7. Any proposed premium or assessment required of, or any dividend
or distribution made to the members, shall be ﬁled with the Commissioner of
Insurance, and shall not take effect until approved by said commissioner after
,
such investigation as he may deem necessary.
Sec. S. The board of directors may make and enforce reasonable rules and
regulations, not in conﬂict with the laws of this state, for the prevention of
injuries on the premises of members, and for this purpose the inspectors of
the company shall have free access to all such premises during regular work
ing hours.
Any member neglecting to provide suitable safety appliances as
provided by law or as required by the board of directors may be expelled
Any member, or employé of any
by a majority vote of all the members.
member, aggrie\'e(1
by any such rule or regulation,
may petition the In
dustrial Accident Board for review, and it may aiiirm, amend or annul the
rule or regulation.
Sec; 9. Any member of said company, who has complied with all its rules,
regulations and demands, may withdraw therefrom at the expiration of the
period of one year for which he has elected to become subject to the provisions
of the workmen’s compensation act, so-called: Provided, however, that he shall
give written notice of such withdrawal to said company at least thirty days
before the expiration of such period:
And provided further, that if at the
time of such wlthdra\val liability may exist against such member and against
said company for compensation to employés who have been theretofore killed
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either relieve himself
provided in part four,
hundred twelve, extra
company against such
by the board of direc

Subdivision Two
Every'employers' liability company and every employers’ insur
ance association insuring employers against the liability provided for by act
number ten of the Public Acts of nineteen hundred twelve, ﬁrst extra session;
as amended, shall ﬁle with the Insurance Commissioner of the state its classi
ﬁcation of risks and normal premiums relating thereto together with any and
all reasonable percentage of allowance made upon such premiums above or
below the said normal premium for increased or diminished hazards in said
classiﬁcations of risks.
The classiﬁcations so ﬁled shall be classiﬁcations upon
which the insurer ﬁling same shall classify its risks and the premiums and
percentages of allowances thereon shall be the premiums which must be
charged by the insurer ﬁling same, on its risks until such classiﬁcation
and
premiums and percentage allowances shall be changed as herein provided.
Sec. 11.
No insurer against liability provided for in this chapter shall ﬁx
any classiﬁcation or allowance or charge any premium against liability under
said act number ten of the Public Acts of nineteen hundred twelve, which is
unreasonable or which discriminates unfairly between risks in the applica
unfairly between
tion of like charges and credits, or which discriminates
risks on essentially the same hazards and having substantially the same de
Sec.

10.

gree ot protection against accident.
Any deviation of any such insurer from the classiﬁcations and
Sec. 12.
schedules of premiums and percentages relating héreto, as ﬁled with the In
surance Gommissioner shall be uniform in its application to all the risks in the
class for which the deviation is made, and no such uniform deviation shall be
made unless notice thereof shall be ﬁled with the Insurance Commissioner of
‘
the state at least ﬁfteen days before such uniform deviation is in eﬁfect.
The State Banking Commissioner, the Attorney General and the
Sec. 13.
Commissioner of Insurance, of this state, shall constitute a commission, and
upon written complaint or upon its own information that discrimination in
classiﬁcation of risks or in the normal premiums relating thereto, or in any
percentage of allowance upon such premiums exists, or that any such classiﬁ
cation of risks or that any premiums or any percentage of allowance upon
such premiums discriminates between risks of essentially the same hazard and
having substantially the same degree of protection against accident, the com
mission may order a hearing for the purpose of determining such questions
of discrimination and the review of such classiﬁcation of risks, such premiums
or such percentage allowance before said commission shall be had only after
due notice to all parties interested. and if upon such hearing the commis
sion shall determine that said classiﬁcation,
such premium or premiums or
such percentage allowance is on are discriminatory, it shall have power to
Any party in interest being dissatisﬁed
order the discrimination removed.
with any order of the commission may within thirty days from the issuance
of such order and notice thereof commence an action in the circuit court in
chancery for the county of Ingham against the commission, as defendant. to
vacate and set aside any such order upon the ground that such order is unlaw
ful or unreasonable; in which suit the commission shall be served with a sub
The commission shall ﬁle its answer and
pmna and a copy of the complaint.
on leave of court any interested party may ﬁle an answer to said complaint.
Upon the ﬁling of the answer of the commission said action shall be at issue

u
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and stand ready for hearing upon ten days’ notice by either party.
The said
circuit court for the county of Ingham in chaneery is hereby given jurisdic
tion of such suits and empowered to aﬂirm, vacate or set aside the order of
the commission in whole or in part, and to make such other order or decree
as the court shall decide to be in accordance with the facts and the law.
During pendeney of such proceedings the order shall be suspended. and in
against any insurer, any overcharge during
the event or ﬁnal determination
the pendency of such proceedings shall be refunded by the insurer to the
persons entitled thereto.
,
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ACCEPTING BENEFITS.
Ratiﬁcation by,

ACCIDENT,

see

,

Ratiﬁcation.

see Workmen’s

Compensation

Acts.

ACCOUNTING,
ee Habillty of Representative
to Constituent.
ACQUIESCENCE,
Ratiﬁcation by, see Ratiﬁcation.
,
ACTIONS, see Damages; Evidence: Trial.
Form of, see cases under Liability (various headings).
In law or in equity, 423.
Case or trover, 400.
Trover, when appropriate, 619 and note; see, also, Conversion
Agent.

_

by

Against agent, 400, 416.
What amounts to conversion, 619 and note.
Trespass by agent against third person, 644.
Third person against agent, 620 and note.
For disobedience by agent, 400.
Assumpsit by principal, 400, 406, 759.
V
By agent, 630, 631, 634, 638.
Quantum meruit for services, 440, 441.

When contract speciﬁes amount, 221, 435 and note. 448.
.
When constituent terminates relation, 461.
Parties to, see Execution of Authority; Factors; Liability (various head
ings).
Proper parties in general, 759, 768.
Principal’s right superior to agent’s, 632 and cases following.
Sealed instruments, 691 and note, 763.
_
Negotiable instruments, 326 and note, and cases following.
_
ADMISSIONS OF AGENT, see Evidence; Liability of Constituent to third
Person.
"
ADOPTION, see Ratiﬁcation.
ADVANCES,
By factor, 406.
ADVERSE INTEREST, see Authority of Agent; Liability of Representative

to Constituent.

AGENCY,

I

of Authority;

Termination of Relation.
see Agent, Delegation
Deﬁned, 2, 4.
Distinguished from sale, 1, 22; see, also, Agent.
Partnership, p. 21 note.
Maxims ot, see Qui Facit per Alium.
Societies;
Creation
Parties to, see Agent; Clubs and Unincorporated
Relation; Execution of Authority;

Principal.

Purpose, see Purposes of Agency.
How created, see Authority of Agent; Creation of Relation.
~ Double agency, see Authority of Agent; Compensation of Representative;
Liability oi! Representative to Constituent.
Agent act for himself and his principal, 239.
After termination of agency, 187.
GODD.PB.& A. (20 ED.)
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,
AGENCY—Continued.
Agent for two principals.

I
~

674.

For

vendor and vendee, 143, 374, 674.
When lawful, 673 and note.
As aﬂfecting right to compensation, see Compensation
ative.

of Represent

AGENT,

Liability of Constituent to
see Compensation
of Representative;
Representative;
Liability of Representative to Constituent; to Third
Person; Liability of Third Person to Representative;
Reimbursement
and Indemnity of Agent.
_
Deﬁned, 2.
Distinguished from servant, 7.
From trustee, 21.
From independent contractor, 10, 11.
.
From lessee, p. 21 note.
Classes 0£,_in general, 29.
General and special, 29, 60; see, also,-General Agent; Liability 01'
Constituent to Third Person; Special Agent.
Universal agent, 8, 29.
Collecting, liability of, 349 and note.
How appointed, see Authority of Agent; Creation of Relation.
For what purposes employed, see Purposes of Agency.
Must act in principal's name, 32, 308; see, also, Execution of Authority.
Who may act as, 39 and cases following.
Infant,

39, 40.

Authority
Cannot act for sell’, 90, 192, 247, 295, 671; see, also. Agency;
of Agent; Compensation of Representative;
Liability of Representative
to Constituent; Termination of Relation.
Ratiﬁcation by, 100 and note.
Right to appoint subagent, see Delegation of Authority.
AMBIGUOUS

AUTHORITY,

APPARENT AUTHORITY,
APPENDIX,

see Construction
see

of Authority.

Authority of Agent; Estoppel.
"

Employe’r’s Liability Act, 905.
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 907.

APPOINTMENT OF AGENT,
ASSOCIATIONS,

see Clubs

see

Authority of Agent; Creation of Relation.

and Unincorporated

ASSUMED RISK, see Master;
ASSUMPSIT, see Actions.
ATTORNEY AT LAW,

W0rkmen's

Societies.

Compensation

Authority of agent to employ, 3112, 471.
As collecting agent, 410; see, also, Delegation
Liability tor mistakes, p. 409 note.
Compensation

of Authority.

of, 440.

ATTORNEY IN FACT,

see Creation

How constituted, 31.
.
Delegation of authority by, 342.

AUCTIONEER,

Acts.

0! Relation.

,

As agent for undisclosed principal, p. 599 note,
Liability for money paid by mistake, 605, 607.
For property sold without title, 609.
Sue on contract in own name, 636.

AUTHORITY OF AGENT,

600.

see Construction
of Authority: Creation 01' Rela
tion; Execution ot Authority; Ratiﬁcation; Termination of Relation,
How conferred, see Creation of Relation.
_

Burden or proof to show, see Evidence.
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OF AGEl\‘T—Continued,

Nature,
Implied, see Creation of Relation.
\\'hen arises, 62, 267.
When not, 64, 136, 231, 262, 280.
Distinguished from apparent, 66; see, also, Estoppel.
As to acts incidental to employment. 281 and note; p. 291 note.
Limited to acts ot like kind, 232, 295.
Express, verbal, 267; see, also, Express Authority.
Implied added to, 278, 281 and note.
Written, under seal. 74; see, also, Seal, Authority under.
When writing required. 31; see, also, Construction of Authority;

Pxpress
ty.

Authority;

Scope of, 279;

Power of Attorney;

see, also, Construction

Oral evidence to enlarge or explain,

\

Written Author

of Authority.

see, also,

EVI

Apparent authority, and actual, 65. 67, 257; see, also, Estoppel.
Of agent of corporation, see Corporations.
Is actual as to third persons, 242 and note, M5 and note,

258,

279, 283;

dence.

260, 261.

Indicia of authority,

Amounts
Lignited
. 11.

257,

258, 261.

to estoppel, 263.
to appearances given by principal,

Instructions of principal as limiting,
Secret, as to third persons, 238,
248, 257, 268, 294, 298.
246,

Known limitations,

$2

.

and note, 263, 265,

236.
242, 243, 245 and note, 246,
.

248; see, also, Liability or Third
Person to Constituent.
Extent of authority, in general. 230 and note.
How limited, 63, 238, p. 245 note, 252, 301.
When written, 234, 235, 280, 283, 298.
Includes what, 278, 282 and note, 295.
Third persons ascertain at peril, 65. 234 and note, 235, 238, 239, 248,
252, 298 and note;
see, also, Liability of Third Person to Constit
uent.
Usage and custom as affecting, 66, 230, 253 and note, 255, 282, 283,
295.

Incidental power, 65, 232, 267, 282, 296.
Scope of authority.
H,olding out of principal. 64. 242, 2-i4.
Acts within scope, 61, 236. 242.
Frauds. etc.. see Liability of Representative
to Third Person.
Outside scope,

234 and note, 239,

to Constituent:

248, 253, 269.

Of general agent to do acts naturally resulting, 238, 242, 295.
Acts for personal beneﬁt of agent, 239 and note, 249, 295; see,
Agent; Liability of Representative to Constit
also, Agency;
uent.

As shown by acts or representations

of agent,

234 and note, 235,

238. 239.

As affecting tort liability of principal, 731 and note, 734 and note.
Of general and special agencies, p. 30 note, 249, 293 and note, 295.
Limitations on authority in, 253, 295, 297.

When unknown, 261 and note.
Scope of apparent authority, 64, 236, 246, 259, 293, 310.
Distinctions as to extent of general and special authority, 267,
282 and note, 293, 297, 298 and note, 742; see, also, General
Agent; Special Agent.
,
Authority to borrow, general rule, p. 290 note.
Power perilous, 288.
When not implied, 136.

\
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AGENT--Continued,
AUTHORITY
OF
"
Of cashier of bank, 238.
To buy, not authority to lend, 114.
Of manager of business, 237, 252.
-

When implied, p. 292 note, 237.

To collect, when implied from possession of securities,

214,

232,

284, 285,

286 and note.

From power to sell, 234.
From authority to collect interest,
What included, 295, 302.

To
To
To
To

_
286 and note.
~

When remit proceeds, 430.
When foreclose mortgage, 232.
When lndorse negotiable paper, p. 289 note.
What receive in payment, 62, 269, 302, 582.
Not before or after maturity, 269.
Compromise debt, 295, 302.
manage business, 282, p. 292 note, 294.
Whether indorse negotiable paper, 291.
lease or rent property, p. 292 note.
settle claims and bring suit, p. 292 note.
make contracts of employment, p. 292 note;

Law; Physician.

see,

-

also,

Attorney at

To make and indorse negotiable paper, 2S9 and note, 291, 301, 582.
To sell personal property, see Liability of Representative to Constituent,
for loyalty.
'
~ Possession

'

as prooﬁ of, 257, 259 and note.

To warrant quality, .p. 255 note.
To sell on credit, 255.
Not to exchange, 100, 255.

When collect, 234, 269, 295.
To ﬁx terms, p. 255 note. 298.
To do usual and necessary things, 298.
Authority ot factor, 406.
To sell real estate,
May be implied, 277.
Not from power to ﬂnd buyer, 273.
Must be clear, 124, 272 and note.
When written power required, 273; see,

also, Express Authority;
Written Authority.
Power to ﬁx terms, 60.
.
To exchange, 284.
To sell on credit, 143, p. 272 note.
To collect the price, 62, 270 and note.
Not after agency terminated, 214, 218.
To convey with warranty, 2'73 and note, 279 and note, 304.
Deed as equitable

contract

to convey, 277;

see,

also, Deed.

BAILEE,
Distinguished

from servant,

14.

BANK, see Cashier; Corporations.
As collecting agent, see Delegation of Authority.
Money deposited in agent's name, 424, p. 425 note,

BANKRUPTCY,

see

426 and note.

Termination of Relation.

BENEFITS,

Acceptance of as ratiﬁcation, see Ratiﬁcation.

BLANKS IN A DEED,
Power to ﬁll,

74, 77.

BORROW,
Authority 0! agent to, 136;

see,

also. Authority of Agent.

1

A

_

_

-

_

_4

ism-:x
[The ﬁgures reler to Pages]

BROKER,
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Authority to sell in own name, 257.
Real estate broker, deﬁned, 273.
Right to act for two parties, 368.
Liability when principal undisclosed,

,
p. 599 note.
Compensation when earned, 207, 220, 273, 459 and note, 464 and note.
From both parties, 375.
When forfeited, 377; see, also, Compensation of Representative.
When to sue or be sued on contract of, 758-760.

BURDEN OF PROOF,
BUY,

see

Evidence.

Agent to, see Authority of Agent;
uent, tor loyalty.

CAPACITY TO ACT,
cipal.

CARE AND SKILL,
CASHIER.

see Agent;
see

Liability

oi! Representative

Clubs and Unincorporated

to Constit

Societies;

,

Liability of Representative

Prin

to Constituent.

Execution of drafts by, 319.
Liability of banks on checks signed by, 333, 666.
As oiﬁce cash keeper, 288.
CHECKS, see Authority of Agent.
CHILD, see Infant.
CLUBS AND UNINCORPORATED SOCIETIES,
Liability on contracts of. 111, 592.and note, 594.
Not partnerships, 111, 592 and note.
Ratiﬁcation by, 111.
COLLECTING AGENT, see Authority of Agent; Delegation

of Authority.

COLLUSION,

Between agent and third person, p. 775 note.

COMMISSION MERCHANT, see Factor.
COMMISSIONS OF AGENT, see Compensation of Representative.
COMPENSATION OF REPRESE.\‘TA'1‘IVE, see Actions; Hen of
Right in general,

Agent.

434 and note, 4-ll.
Amount of pay, 435 and note, 439.
Of attorney at law, p. 434 note, 440.
When agency for illegal purpose, 47, 61 and note.
When principal refuses to carry out contract, 163.
Revokes authority of agent, 1S8, 191, 201.
When agent abandons agency, 447 and note, 465 and note.
Is discharged, 196, 208 and eases following, 451 and note, 454;

see,

also, Reimbursement and Indemnity of Agent; Termination oi‘
Relation.
Constructive service doctrine, 455 and note.
Acts as mere middleman, 375.
When disloyal, 363 and cases following.
Commissions when earned, 205, 220, 273, 442, 459, 461 and note.

COMPROMISE,
Authority of agent to,-see Authority of Agent to collect.
CONDUCT OF PRINCIP.-\I,,
As establishing agency, see Authority of Agent, implied; Creation of
Relation; Estoppel; Ratiﬁcation.
CONFIDENCE, see Agency; Agent; Delegation of Authority; Termination
of Relation.

CONSIDERATION, see Ratiﬁcation.
CON STITUENT, see Preface p. ix;
Gonn.Pa.&

A. (20 Eo.)—59

278.
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CONSTRUCYJIION OF AUTHORITY,
In view of surrounding circumstances,

277, 300;
see, also, Usage and
Custom.
And of the whole contract, 60.
When contract written, 234, 267, 301 and note, 403.
Question tor court, see Trial.
Strict construction of power of attorney, 234. 300 and note, 306, 314.
Includes usual and necessary acts, 304; see, also, Authority of Agent.
Ambiguous power, 303.
Restrained to business of principal, 300, 306 and note.
General words how construed, 306.
Intentions regarded, 305 and note, 330.
Also way intent effected, 314.

CON STRUCTIVE SERVICE,

see Compensation

CONTINGENT FEES, 47, 51 and
CONTINUING EMPLOYMENT,
Presumed

at former wages, 435;

of Representative.

note.
see,

also, Yearly Hiring,

CONTRACT,
Of agency, see Creation of Relation.
Illegal, see Compensation of Representative;
Liability of Representative
to Constituent, for accounting;
Ratiﬁcation.
On what contract agent liable, see Liability oi‘ Representative
to Third
Person.
Executlon of by agent, see Execution of Authority.
Under seal, see Liability of Third _Person to Constituent;
tive; Seal, Authority Under.
Execution of by agent, % Execution of Authority.
1
In presence of principal, 78.
_
equitable
convey,
Deed
as
Deed.
contract
to
see
_

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
pensation Acts.

CONVERSION BY AGENT,
Ot money, 416, 429.
CORPORATIONS,
Who agent of,

see

Master,

defenses;

#

to Representa

.

Workmen’s

Com

see Actions.

61.

Agent how appointed, 61.
Can act only by agent, 119. 432.
Authority of president, 106.
May ratify acts of agents, T1, p. 92 note, 99 and note.
rtatiﬁcation of acts of promoters, 82, 92 and note, 93.
Ratiﬁcation by, how made, 119.
Liability on unauthorized contracts of agent, 584.
Liability of agent, 588.
Notice to directors of, 750, p. 755 note.

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, see Liability of Constituent
tort; Workmen’s Compensation Acts.

to Third Person, in

‘
Trial.
CREATION OF RELATION, 55 and cases following; see, also, Authority oi!
Agent; Power of Attorney; Seal, Authority under; Written Authority.

COURT,

see

Depends on contract, 4, 55.
Contract of service, p. 55 note.
Rests on will of constituent, 55, 57, 58, 188, 190, 230, 252; see generally
Termination of Relation, by revocation.
How created, in general, 31, 59, 60, 267 and note.
Oral authority, 61; see, also, Express Authority.
By writing, see Express Authority; Power oi Attorney; Seal, Authority

under; Written Authority.
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CREATION OF RELATION—Continued,
Implied agency, 59, 60, 61 and note, 64.
of principal, 61, 243; see, also, Authority of Agent,
Acts
impalnddconduct
ie .

By ratiﬁcation, 61, 147, 148; see. also, Ratiﬁcation.
By estoppel, 59, 66 and note; see, also, Estoppel.
By a corporation, 61.
CREDIT, see Authority of Agent, to buy.
CUSTOM, see Authority of Agent; Usage and Custom.
of Representative;
Termination of Relation;
see Compensation
Workmen's Compensation Acts.
For disobedience of agent, 399.
For negligence, see Liability of Representative to Constituent; Master;
Workmen’s Compensation Acts. For wrongful discharge, see Compensation of Representative.
Suit by agent for, 635 and cases following,
I
Measure of, 399.

DAMAGES,

DEATH,
DECEIT,

see
see

‘
Termination of Relation.
Liability of Constituent to Third Person; of Representative

Third Person.
Actions for, 588;

see.

to

also, Actions.

DECLARATIONS OF AGENT,

Third Person.
DEED,
Authority to execute,

see

Evidence;

Liability

of Constituent

to

Blanks
see Authority of Agent, to sell real estate;
in a Deed; Contract, under seal; Execution of Authority.
-As equitable contract to convey, 72, 73, 277; see, also, Seal, Authority
under.
Execution of in principal’s presence, 78.

DEFENSES,

Open to Third Person, see Liability of Third Person to Constituent;
Representative;
Set-Off.
Of master, see Master; Workmen's Compensation Acts.

to

DEFINITION,
Of
Of
Of
Of
Of
Of
Of

“agency,” 2.
"agent," 1.
“estoppel," 83.

"factors,"

1.

“general and special agents," 29, 293, 295.
"master," 14.

"ratiﬁcation,"

80, 81,

85,

149.

DEL CREDERE AGENCY. 22.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY,

Power to delegate, 340, 341 and note.
By joint agents, 312.

Exceptions to general rule,
No conﬁdence or discretion involved, 342, 343 and note.
Usage and custom, 341, 346, 355.
Consent of principal, 346.
Necessities of agency, 344.
Subagent agent of whom, 130, 345, 346, 358.
Liability of agent for acts of subagent, 345-347, 358 and note.
Of collecting agent for acts of correspondent, 347, 350, 359.
Of a bank, 350 and note, 354 and note.
Of an attorney at law, 347 and note.

DEMAND,

Necessity of before suit, 347;
Constituent, for accounting.

see,

also, Liability

of Representative

\

to
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DEPOSITS, see Bank; Liability of Representative to Constituent,
counting;
Trust Fund.
DESCRIPTIO PERSONJE, see Execution of Authority.
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DIRECTOR,

Authority of,

Corporations: Liability of Constituent

see

for ac

to Third Person.
of Representative;

DISCHARGE OF REPRESENTATIVE,

see Compensation

DISCRETION,

of Authority; Liability of Represent

Termination of Relation.

see Agency;
ative to Constituent.

DISOBEDIENCE,

see

DOUBLE AGENCY,

of Representative;
tive to Constituent.

DRUNKENNESS,
DUTY,

see

Delegation

Liability of Representative to Constituent, for obedience.
Agent: Authority of Agent; Compensation
Liability of Constituent to Third Person; of Representa

see Agency;

see

Termination of Relation.

Liability (various headings).

EARMARKS, see Money.
ELECTION, see Liability of
cipal.

_

Constituent

to Third Person,

EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACTS,

p. 79-} note.

EMPLOYMENT,

of Representative;

English Act, Appendix

905 if.

se'e Compensation

Servant.

ENTIRE CONTRACT, see
EQUITY, see Actions.
ESTOPPEL, see Authority

undiciosed prin

Compensation

of Representative;

of Agent, apparent;
Distinguished from ratiﬁcation, S3, 122.
General rule as to agency by, 61.
Elements giving rise to, 67.
Reliance by party claiming, 264.

EVIDENCE,

Creation

Creation

of Relation;

Ratiﬁcation.

of Relation.

see Execution of Authority.
Agency how show , 60, 61, p. 267 note.
-r
By conduct 0? principal. 60; see. also, Authority of Agent; Estoppel;
Liability of Constituent to Third Person.
By ratiﬁcation of previous acts, 2-13.
By parol,
When authority is written, 279,-283, 309; see, also, Authority of
Agent.
To explain, not contradict, 322, 323 and note, 680,-758.
To show value of services, 435, 440.
Acts of agent as proof of agency, 57, 145.
Declarations, representations, etc., of agent, 57, 63, 235, 238, 247,
252, p. 266 note, 672, 739 and note, 745.
To show surrounding circumstances, 145. 743 and note.
As part of res gestse, 235, 579, 741.
Must trace to principal, 57, p. 266 note.
Testimony of agent, 243, 743 and note.
Burden of proof,
On one asserting agency. 59, 63.
On one asserting liability of agent, p. 596 note.
On principal suing on agent’s contract, p. 759 note.
On one setting up ratiﬁcation, 117.
_
On servant to show negligence of master, 565, 567.
Shifting of burden, 568.
No presumption of agency, 252.
Order of proof, 57, 743.
Weight and suﬂiciency, see T1-lal.
a
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EXCHANGE, see Authority of Agent, to sell.
EXCLUSIVE AGENCY, see Termination of Relation.

EXECUTION OF AUTHORITY,
In name of principal, 32, 308,

309, 315, 336.

_

Parol to explain signature, 310, 316, p. 318 note, 329 and note.
To hold principal, not to release agent, 322, 823 and note.

Excessive execution, 310 and note, p. 314 note.
Of sealed instruments, 309, 310, 314, 321, 32-i, 691 and note; see, also,
Contract, under seal.
OI simple contracts, 314, 317, 319 and note.
In agent's name. 316, p. 318 note, 319.
Descriptive words added to signature, 316, 320, 329, p. 337 note, 588.
Look to whole instrument, 317, 3:20.
Of negotiable instruments, 324, 326 and note.
Addition of descriptive words, 316 and note, 329, 330, 333.
Effect of various forms of signature. 337 and notes.
Parol evidence to explain, 326, 330, 333.
Ambiguities on face of instrument, 328 and note, 334.
Agent of corporation, 334 and note.
Of bank, 321, 335.
By a partnership, p. 312 note.
By joint agents, 312 and note.
By joint and several agents, 314.

EXPRESS AUTHORITY,

see

tion oi’ Relation.
By parol, 61.
Written when necessary,

Authority of Agent; Blanks in
31.

When required by statute of frauds, see Written
Sealed, when necessary, see Seal, Authority under.

FACTORS,
Duty to obey instructions,

255,

a Deed;

Crea

Authority.

397.

When disobey to protect selves, 406.
Liability when principal undisclosed. D. 599 note,

Lien, 644.
Right against third persons, 644.
Principal sue on contracts by, 759,
Pursue property in hands oi‘, 769.

766.

FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE, p. 730 note.
SERVANT RULE, see Master.
FEME COVERT, see Married Woman.

Fl~}LI'.OW

FIDELITY,

FIDUCIARY

for ﬁdelity.

see

Liability of Representative to Constituent.
see Liability
ot Representative

RELATIONS,

to Constituent,

FORGERY,

Ratiﬁcation of, 86, 87 and note.
FORMS OF ACTION, see Actions.

FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS,
Person; Liability of Representative

see

Liability

oi’ Constituent

to Third Person,

GENERAL AGENT,

Deﬁned, 29, 61, 293, 295.
Distinguished from special, 249, 267, pp. 293, 297 notes.
‘As to authority of, sec Authority of Agent.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS,
Agency to procure, 51;

see, also, Purposes

GRATUITOUS AGENT,

Liability of, 410, 445.
Whether presumed, 434 and note,

446.

oi! Agency.

to Third
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HOLDING OUT OF AUTHORITY, see Authority of Agent;
bility of Constituent to Third Person; Scope of Authority.

Estoppel;

Lia

to Constituent,

for

HUSBAND, see Married Woman.
As agent of wife, 32.

IDIOTS,

see

Agent;

ILLEGALITY,

Principal.

Ratiﬁcation.
As defense by agent, see Liability
see

‘

accounting.

IMPLIED

AGENCY,

of Relation;

see Creation

to Third

of Constituent

of Representative

Authority of Agent; Liability

Person.

INCIDENTAL POWERS, see Authority of Agent.
INDEMNITY, see Reimbursement and Indemnity of
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR,
Distinguished

from servant,

As fellow servant,

10, 11, 488.

489.

Compensation,

Under Workmen’s

INDORSEMENT,
INFANT,

Agent.

Authority

see

As agent of father,

874 and note.

01 Agent,

to collect.

40.

Capacity as agent, 39.
As principal, 32, 36 and note, 46.

INJUNCTION,

Termination of Relation, by revocation; by abandonment

see

by representative.

INNOCENT PARTY,

see

Authority ot Agent;

Estoppel.

One of two must suffer, 235.

INSANE PERSONS, see Principal.
INSANITY, see Termination of Relation, by operation oi! law.
INSTRUCTIONS, see Authority of Agent.
INTENT, see Agency, distinguished from sale; Construction of Authority.
To bind principal or agent, p. 320 note.
To ratify, 118.
INTEREST, see Liability of Representative

IRREVOCABILITY,
JOB HORSES,

see

p. 713

-

to Constituent,

for accounting.

Ratiﬁcation.

note.

»

JOINT AGENTS, p. 219 note, 312 and note, 314.
JOINT PRINCIPALS, see Clubs and Unincorporated

Societies.

JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, see Damages.
URY. PROVINCE OF, see Trial.
KNOWLEDGE, see Authority of Agent; Liability of

J

Person,

for notice to agent;

LABOR UNIONS,
LAND,

see

Ratiﬁcation;

Usage

\Constituent
and Custom,

to Third

Liability of Third Person to Representative.

Authority of Agent, to sell real estate.
LAW, see Termination of Relation, by operation of.
LEASE, see Authority of Agent.
see

Distinguished

from Agency, p. 21 note.

LEGISLATION,
Contracts

LIABILITY

to procure, 47 and note, 51 and note.

OF CONSTITUENT TO REPRESENTATIVE, see Compensation
Employers’ Liability Acts; Licn of Agent; Master;
of Representative;
Reimbursement and Indemnity of Agent; Workmen’s Compensation Acts.
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LIABILITY OF CONSTITUENT TO THIRD PERSON, V
Of principal for acts of agent, 7, 56, 106, 229, 243, 267.
Scope oi! authority, 61, I17, 131, 2/45, 246, 266, 310; see, also, Authority
of Agent.

Acts known to be unauthorized, 143.
Acts for personal beneﬁt of agent, 295;

see, also, Agency; Agent.
On agent's contracts, 666.
In agent's name, 666, 667 and note.
_
Outside scope of authority, 64, 234, 667, 669 and note.
On sole credit of agent, 670 and note, 678.
Not for beneﬁt of principal, 671 and note.
When agent acted for both parties, 143, p. 673 note, 675; see
Agency;
Compensation of Representative.
When principal undisclosed, see Execution of Authority.
In general, 677 and note, 678, 680, 685, 691.
VVhen principal has settled with agent, 680, 685, 689 and note.
Contracts under seal, 691 and note.
Negotiable instruments, 326 and note, and cases following.
Election to hold principal or agent, 635, 678, 680, 682, 683 and
note, 694.
Exclusive credit to agﬂnt, 679, 680.
In tort, 7, 352, 697, 698 and note, 702, 711 and note, 729, 731 and note,
'
733 and note, 736.
Not in course of employment, 702. 705, 711, 736 and note.
,
Willful and malicious acts, 706. 714, p. 732 note..
Crimes, 719 and note, 721, 723 and note, 727, 729 and note, 731, 733
and note.‘
Frauds, 139, 733 and note, 742.
By ratiﬁcation, 165.
Declarations, representations, admissions, etc., of agent, 229, 672, 740, 741,
'
742 and note, 743, 745.
Notice to agent, 747 and note; see, also, Authority of Agent; Termination
of Relation.
As to subject matter of agency, 747, 751 and note.
As to other matters, 750 and note.
Time of receiving, 752, 753 and note.
Exceptions to rule, 756 and note.

LIABILITY

OF REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSTITUENT,
Fidelity and loyalty, 361, 450.
Personal interest oi’ representative, 362 and note, 364, 368, 372, 671.
Proﬁt of agent, 362, 378 and note, 384, 386, 450; see, also, Compensa
tion of Representative.
Double

agency, 366, 368 and note, 369

and note, 374; see, also, Agen

cy; Agent; Authority of Agent.
When justiﬁed, 368, 375 and note. 377 and note.
Custom as justiﬁcation, p. 378 note.
Dealings with principal, 380, 381 and note, 384.
Rule extends to whom, p. 385 note.

Full

disclosure necessary, 364, 381 and note, 385, 386, 389 and
note.
After termination of agency. 391, 393 and note.
of principal. 361, 363, 368, 372, 378, 380, 381, 384 and note,
Reqmedles
. 86.

When no conﬁdence reposed in agent, 394.
Obedience, 395, 398, 400.
In emergencies, 395, 398.
To protect advances of factor, 406.
Instructions ambiguous, 398 and note.
Ratiﬁcation by principal, 406.
Usage and custom, 398, 428.
Remedy for disobedience, 400.
_ Servant's duty to master, 402.

‘
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LIABILITY OF REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSTl'l.‘UENT—-Continued,
Care and skill, 373, 408.
_
'
Measure of care, 408 and note, 411.

Service gratuitous. 410, 444.
Service abandoned, 225 and note, 444.
'
Misfeasance and nonfeasance, 444.
Accounting,
By agent,,416.
By servant, 412, 415 and note.
Title as between principal and agent,
Agent dispute, 416.
Illegality as defense, 419 and note, 420 and note.
Jus tertii, 423 and note,
Commingling funds or property, 424 and note.
Liability for interest. 429.
Principal follow funds. 425 and note, 769, 771; see. also, Liability
of Third Person to Constituent.
Money deposited in agent's name. 427; see, also, Bank.
Remittance of money. 427-429.
Form of liability, 416.
Necessity of demand, 429 and note.
Of notice by agent, 431, 432.'
To give notice, 364, 431, 432, 754.
Presumption‘ duty performed, 432.

LIABILITY

OF REPRESENTATIVE T0 THIRD PERSON,
Authority; Execution of Authority.

‘

-

see Delegation

of

General rule, 317 and note, 577 and note.
Exclusive credit to agent, 577, 579, 670, 678.
Both principal and agent hound. 322. p. 597 note, 758.
Unauthorized contracts. 159, 581, 589.
Basis of liability, 582, 583 and note, 589 and note.
On what contract, 585. 586 and note.
Fraudulent representations, 581.
Nonexistent principal, 592 and note, 594.
Burden of showing, p. 596 note.
Contracts after death of principal, 580.
Undisclosed principal, 596 and note, 597, 599 and note, 680.
Agent how relieved, 597.
'
Rule as to auctioneer, 600.
Money paid by mistake, etc., 602 and following cases.
When agent has notice, 607.
Has not changed position, 603 and note.
~
Has paid over before notice, 605, 611.
When right to money in dispute, 608 and note.
\\'hen money obtained fraudulently, 609 and note.
Money paid to agent for third person, 612 and note,
In tort, see Actions.
i
For fraud, 615 and note.
For conversion, 619 and note.
For trespasses, 620 and note.
For crimes and misdemeanors, 616 and note, 618.
Servant’s liability to fellow servant, 485, 573.
For nonfeasance, 597, 620. 621.
Nonfeasance distinguished
from misfeasance, 598, 622 and note,
623 and note, 627.

LIABILITY

OF THIRD PERSON TO CONSTITUENT,

On contract of agent, 758, 759 and note.
In agent’s name, 760.
Under seal, 763.
Undisclosed principal, 761, 766.
Right of third person to elect with whom he will deal, 759, 761
and note.
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OF THIRD PERSON T0 CONSTITUENT—Continued,
Defenses of third person, 761, 766 and note.
Right of third person to settle with agent, 767, 768.

769, 771; see, also, Money.
tort, 775 and note, 791. 792.
For collusion with representative, p. 775, note.
For enticing or interfering with representative, 776,
783, 785, 787 and note, 791.

Funds or property of principal,

In

LIABILITY OF THIRD
In

PERSON

778

and note.

TO REPRESENTATIVE.

contract,
In general not liable. 630, 631.
In agent’s name, 632 and note, 634, 636 and note, 642.
Under seal, 691, 763.
After termination of agency, 633.
Defenses to action by agent, 634. 642.
For unknown principal, 635, 639, 643.
Agent recover back money, 640, 641.
In tort, 644; see, also, Actions.
For procuring discharge of representative, 645. 647. 654. 659. 663.
LIEN OF AGENT. 475 and note, 477 ; see, also, Factors.

LIMITATIONS,

see Authority of Agent; Statute of Limitations.
LOAN, see Authority of Agent, to borrow; to buy.
Ratiﬁcation of, 114 and note.
LOBBYING CONTRACTS, 51.
LODGE, see Clubs and Unincorporated Societies.
LOYALTY, see Liability of Representative to Constituent.
LUNATIC, see Agent; Principal.

MALFEASANCE,

see

Liability

Person.

MANAGE BUSINESS,
MARRIAGE.
As termination
Brokerage,

see

of Representative

,

to Constituent: to Third

Authority of Agent, to buy; to manage business.

of relation,

'

180.

51.

MARRIED WOMAN,

see Husbandl
Capacity as principal. 32.
Wife as agent of husband, 32, 71, 83, 130.

MASTER,

see

Employers’

Person; Workmen’s

Deﬁned, 14.
Defenses,
Assumed

Liability

Act;

Compensation

Liability

Act.

risks, 483, 488, 491, 501
547 and note, 550, 553, 811.
Express contract as to. 527.

'

»

01' Constituent

to Third
'

'

and note, 507, 519, 524, 526, 535,

Contrasted with contributory negligence, 553, p. 577 note.
Safe place to work, 511, 567, 570; see, also, Evidence;
Res Ipsa

Loquitur.
Suitable instrumentalities,

'

help and regulations, 487, 516, 518, 530,
535, 537, 547 and note.
Warranty by master, 528 and note, 555, 572.
Proximate cause of injury, 538, 543, 550, 558, 559.
Dangerous instrumentalities.
543 and note.
Willful wrong or neglect of master, 487.
Contributory negligence of servant, 521, 524, 526, 530, 547, 553.
Question for jury, 558, 560.
Fellow Servant Rule, 483, 811; see, also, Independent Contractor.
Who are fellow servants, general rule, 493, 497, 505, 511 and
note, 565.
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MASTER—Continued,

.

Common employment doctrine, 501 and note, 565.
Same department doctrine, 485, 492, 496, 506.

In railway

cases,

509.

rule, 495 and note, 498 and note, 505.
Vice-principal doctrine, 492, 508, 513 and note.
Character of act rule, 513 and note, 515, 550.
Liability, see Liability of Constituent to Third Person.
To stranger for'acts of servant, 7, 17, 165, 482, 486.
To servant for injuries from negligence, 480, 516, 552.
Consociation

MASTER AND SERVANT,

Distinguished from principal and agent, see Agency.
Historical survey, p. 9 note, 165.
When relation exists, 15, 17.
Created by contract, p. 56 note.

MECHANICAL ACTS, see Delegation of Authority.
MIDDLEMAN, see Broker.
MINISTERIAL ACTS, see Delegation of Authority.
MISFEASANCE, see Liability of Representative to Constituent;
Person, in tort.

to Third

MONEY, see Authority of Agent, to collect.
'
Has no earmarks, 141, 769. 773 and note.
Agent recover back, see Liability to Third Person to Representative.
Principal follow, see Liability of Representative to Constituent, for ac
.
counting; Liability of Third Person to Constituent, for funds.
Third Person follow, see Liability of Representative to Third Person.
MORTGAGE, see Authority or Agent, to collect; to borrow; Blanks in a Deed;
Loan.

P

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

Ratiﬁcation by, pp. S6, 99 notes, 119.
MUTUALITY, see Ratiﬁcation, etfect of as to third person;
Relation.

NEGLIGENCE.

see

Liability

Evidence;

Master, defenses.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,

of Representative

Termination of
to Constituent;

Authority of Agent, to make; Construc
of Authority.
NON COMPOS MENTIS, see Agent; Principal.
NONFEASANCE,
see Liability of Representative
to Constituent; to Third
tion of Authority;

Person,

Evidence;

see

Execution

in tort.

NOTICE, see Corporations; Liability to Constituent to Third Person; Liability
of Representative to Constituent; Termination of Relation.

OSTENSIBLE AGENCY,
PARENT,
Child as agent of,

see

see

Authority of Agent, apparent,

Infant.

-

PAROL AUTHORITY, see Authority of Agent; Expre$s Authority.
PAROL EVIDENCE, see Evidence.
PARTNER, see ‘Clubs and Unincorporated Societies.
As agent for partnership,
Agent of partnership

PARTNERSHIP,

68. 72.

as agent of partners, 667.

Agency for how created, 69, 72.
Distinguished from agency, p. 21 note.
Ratiﬁcation by, 126.
Execution of authority by, p. 312 note.
Death as terminating authority, p. 182 note.
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_
PAYMENT, see Authority of Agent. to collect; to sell; Compensation of Rep
resentative; Liability of Representative
to Third Person; of Third Person
to Constituent.

PERSONAL INFLUENCE,
PERSONAL LIABILITY,
Warranty of Authority.

see Purposes
see

Liability

of Agency.
of Representative
'

to Third

Person;

PERSONAL TRUST, see Delegation of Authority.
PHYSICIAN, see Workmen’s Compensation Acts.

Authority to employ, p. 130 note, 142.
see Liability of Third Person to Constituent,
POSSESSION, see Authority of Agent, to sell.

PICKETING,

POST OFFICE,

in tort.

-

Agency to procure location

of, p. 51

note.

POWER COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST, see Termination of Relation.
POWER OF ATTORNEY, see Express Authority; Written Authority.
When necessary, 31.
Recording, 31.
Of insane person or infant, 34.
Construction of, see Construction

of Authority.

I

PRINCIPAL,

See Clubs and Unincorporated
Societies; Liability
ent to Representative;
to Third Person; of Representative
ent; of Third Person to Constituent.
Who may act as. 31 and cases following.
Persons non compos mentis, 32.
Married women, 32. '

Infants, 32, 34, 40.
Lunatics and persons not sui juris,
Insane persons, 34.

32.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS, see Authority of Agent.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, see Purposes of Agency.
PROFITS, see Liability of Representative to Constituent,
PROMOTERS,

of Constitu
to Constitu

for ﬁdelity.

see Corporations.

PROXIMATE CAUSE,

see Master,

defenses.

PUBLIC AGENTS,

Execution of authority by, p. 312 note, 319.
Ratiﬁcation of acts of, pp. 86, 99 notes.
Delegation ot authority by, p. 340 note.
Personal advantage in contracts by, p. 362 note.

PUBLIC OFFICERS,
Contracts

to inﬂuence, see Purposes
pp. 86, 99 notes.

Ratiﬁcation by,

of Agency.

PUBLIC POLICY, see Purposes of Agency.
PURCHASE, see Authority of Agent, to buy.
PURPOSES

OF’ AGENCY,
rule, 7, 42, 43.
Unlawful or immoral purposes, 47, 51.
Contrary to public policy, 47, 51.
What cannot be done by agent, 44.
Employment of personal inﬂuence, 49, 53.
General

QUANTUM MERUIT, see
QUI FACIT PER. ALIUM,
Implication of

‘

Actions.

etc.,
maxim, 4, 6, 42, 640,

.
711, 721.

1
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RATIFICATION,

.
Deﬁned, 81, 83, 85, 150.
Distinguished from adoption, 82.
From estoppel, 83 and note, 108, 123, p. 143 note.
Relations of parties as showing, 127.
Of previous acts as evidence of agency,.61, 12S, 243.
.
What may be ratiﬁed, S5.
Void and voidable acts, 33, 86, 87 and note.
Who may ratify, 86 and note, 91.
A corporation, 99 and note.
An agent, 100 and note.
Essentials of,
Assumption of agency, SO, S1, 84, 94.
Act done for principal ratifying, 94, 96 and note.
Consideration not necessary, 90, 91, 152.
Existence of principal, 92 and note, 94.
Knowledge of facts, 84, 103 and note, 104, 107 and note, 140, 144.
Not of legal effect of facts, p. 109 note.
May assume risk without inquiry, 103, 111 and note.
Ratify all or none, 113, 114 and note, 118, 132 and note.
Not if principal cannot be put in statu quo, 105, 138, 139, 140 and
note.
Intent necessary, 118.
Acceptance of beneﬁts not necessary, 107, 152.
Manner of, 120, _123, 131, 164.
When in writing, 112, 123.
Under seal, 70, 73, 124, 125.
Statutory requirements, 120, 123 and note.

Implied,

118, 127.

When not, 128, 129 and note, 130 and note.
By accepting beneﬁts, 9-1, 99, 119, 125, 132 and note, 135.
\Vhen not a ratiﬁcation, 104, 137, 140.
By acquiescence Or silence, 61, 106, 127.
Acts of stranger or of agent, 127.
Not compelled to ratify, 103, 11S.
When repudiation necessary, 107, 118, 142, 144 and note, 182;
see, also, Estoppel.
By bringing suit or enforcing contract S6, 146, 156.
Limitations, 118, 139 and note, 162.
Proof of, see Evidence; Trial.

Effect

.ogé

1

61,

&,

85, 87, 120, 125, 131, 144, 147, 148, 150, 151, 156, 160, 164,

Of parol ratiﬁcation,

69, 72, 125. 151.

be revoked, 132, 156, 158.
Effect of repudiation, 117, 132.
Of failure to repudiate, see Ratiﬁcation, by acquiescence,
Of ratifying severable part, 104, 115 and note.
Limitations on retroactive effect of, 153.
Effect as to agent, 159.
On compensation, 164.
Cannot

supra.

inaction of principal, 162.
Effect as to principal, 94, 165; see, also, Ratiﬁcation, eifect of, supra.
For agent’s tort, 140, 165.
Effect as to third person, 170 and note.
Intervcning rights of, 153.
REAL ESTATE AGENT, see Authority of Agent, to sell real estate; Broker;
Compensation of Representative.
REIMBURSEMENT AND 1.\'DEM.\‘ITY OF AGENT, see Compensation of
Representative, when discharged; Lien of Agent; Termination of Rela
tion.

467 and note, 469, 471 and note, 473 and note, 474 and
note.
As affected by skill and care of agent, p. 412, note.

Right in general,
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RENT, see Authority of Agent, to lease.
REPRESENTATIONS, see Evidence; Liability of
of Representative

son; Liability

REPRESENTATIVE, see Preface,
REPUDIATION, see Ratiﬁcation.
REPUTATION,
As evidence of agency,

RES GESTZE,

to Third Person.

p.

Constituent

to Third

Per

IX.

252.

see Evidence.

Acts and representations
Declarations

or agent as, 235. »
and admissions of agent as, 741.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR,

As applied to master and servant,
As between fellow servants, 575.

RESPOi\'DI<}A'J.‘
Third Person.

SUPERIOR,

567 and note, 571.

p. 710 note; see, also,

Liability of Constituent

to

RETROACTIVE EFFEG1‘,
REVOCATION,

see

see Ratiﬁcation.
Ratiﬁcation; Termination of Relation.

SAIJE,

Distinguished from agency, 1, 22.
Authority to make, see Authority of Agent, to sell; to collect; Liahiiity of
Constituent to Third Person.
for, see Compensation of Representative.
Compensation
To agent, when binds principal, see Liabiilty of Constituent to Third
Person.

SCOPE OF AUTHORITY, see Authority of Agent; Liability of Constituent to
Third Person; Special Agent; Trial.
Scope ot written authority, 298; see, also, Authority of Agent, extent ot.
How proved, see Evidence.
Burden of proof, 60.
SEAL, AUTHORITY UNDER, see Authority of Agent; Execution of Author
ity; Liability of Constituent to Third Person; of Representative to Third
Person.
When necessary, 69, 74.
Signature by agent in principals presence, 78.
Etfect of act of agent when seal wanting, 70.
Conveyance as equitable contract to convey, see Deed.
When seal unnecessary, 70, 73, 125.
Distinction between sealed and unsealed instrument F -1Fl
Statutes abolishing requirements, 77 and note, 310.

"SEALED INSTRUMENTS, see Execution of Authority; Liability of Constit
uent to Third Person; of Third Person to Constituent; to Representative.

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS. see Authority of Agent.
SERVANT, see Compensation of Representative;
Employers’

Liability Acts;
Liability of Third Person to Representative;
of Representative
to
Constituent; to Third Person; Master; Workmen’s
Compensation
Acts.

Distinctions, see Agency; Bailee; Independent
Liability of master to, see Master.
Deﬁned,

10, 14.

Contractor,

Test of relation of master and servant, 4, 489.
Duty to obey master, 402, 52S.
Discharge for disobedience, 402; see, also, Termination of Relation,
by revocation.

Duty to devote time and skill to service,
To keep trade secrets, 413.

414.
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SET-OFF,

By agent in accounting with principal, p. 435 note,
By third person i.n action by agent, 634.
In action by principal, 766 and note, 773.

T39.

SEVERAL AGENTS, 314.
SIGNATURE, see Deed; Execution

or Authority; Eorgery; Ratiﬁcation; Seal,
authority under.
SILENCE, see Ratiﬁcation.
SIMPLE CONTR.A(7I‘S, see Construction of Authority; Execution of Authori
ty; Liability of Constituent to Third Person; of Representative to Third
Person.

SOCIETY,

see Clubs

and Unincorporated Societies.

SON, see Infant.

SPECIAL AGENT,

Deﬁned, 29, 61, 293 and note.
Distinguished from general, 247, 267, pp. 293, 297 notes.
Scope of authority of, 297, 298 and note, 743; see, also,
Agent; Ratiﬁcation; Scope of Authority.

SPECIAL INSTRUCPIONS,
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,
abandonment.

see
see

Authority

of

Authority of Agent.
Termination of Relation, by revocation;

by

STATE, Ratiﬁcation by, p. 99 note.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. see Written Authority.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
When begins

to run, 430 and note.

STATUTES, see Employers’ Liability Acts; Workmen’s Compensation
SUBAGENT, see Delegation of Authority; Ratiﬁcation.
SUI JURIS, see Principal.
TENDER OF SERVICES, see Compensation of Representative.
TERMINATION OF RELATION,
By accomplishment of purpose, 186.
By eiiiux of time, 188.
By revocation by constituent, 188, 190, 191, 461.
Power to revoke, 174, 188, 192, 205.
“Irrevocable" or “exclusive” agency, 192.
Employment
at will, 196, 198, 206.
For deﬁnite term, 198.
Biutuality of undertaking, 199, 201, 202,
Speciﬁc

enforcement,

Injunction, 213.
Power given for consideration

Acts.

204 and note.

213.

or as security,
and note, 194.
Power coupled with an interest,
What is. 175, 189, 190, 191, 195.
Eifect of, 175, 181, 189, 192.
Death of principal, 175.

174,

Insanity of principal, 181.
Power vs. right to revoke, 191, 196, 206 and note,
Liability of constituent, 190, 206, 212.
When discharge justiﬁed, 208, 210 and note,

181,

208.

189-191,

192

-

212, 403; see, also,
Agency, douhle agency.
‘
Manner of revocation, 173. 215, 217, 218.
Notice of revocation, necessity and effect, 173, 196, 219 and note, 220
and note.
By abandonment by representative,
Gratuitous employment, -145.
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RELATION—Continued,
TERMINATION OF
Employment at will, 222 and note, 224 and note;

see, also, Compensa
tion of Representative.
_
I
Mutuality of undertaking, 199, 201, 202, 204, 225.
Of remedy, p. 226 note.
Speciﬁc performance or injunction vs. representative, 226 and note.
In favor of agent, 213.
By operation of law, 173.
r
By death, 174, 178, 180, 182.
When death unknown to third party, 178 and note, 580.
By insanity or other incapacity of principal, 180.
By marriage of principal, a woman, 180.
Bankruptcy, or _war, pp. 180, 182 notes.
Effect of, 216, 229 and note, 393 and note.

TESTIMONY OF AGENT, see Evidence.
THIRD PERSON, see Authority of Agent; Estoppel; Innocent Party; Liabil

ity ot Constituent to Third Person; Liability of Representative to Third
Person; Liability of Third Person to Constituent; to Representative.
TORT, see Actions; Liability of Constituent to Third Person; of Representa
tive to Third Person; of Third Person to Constituent; to Representative;
Ratiﬁcation.
TRADE SECRETS, 413. Compare case on page 391.

TRESPASS,
TRIAL,

see Actions.

Province of court and jury, 100, 403.
As to contributory negligence of servant,
Written authority for court, 280, 403. 466,
Usually mixed law and fact, 283, 403.
When

Jury

TROVER, see
TRUSTEE,

558, 560.
577.

only one conclusion. 573.
pass on extent of authority, 237.
On negligence of master, 567, 569.
Actions.

from agent, 21 and note
Dealing with trust property, 369, 381.
TRUST FUND,
Right to follow, see Liability of Representative to Constituent, for ac
counting; ot Third Person to Constituent.
UNAUTHORIZED A(,'I‘S OR CONTRACTS, see Authority of Agent; Liability
ot Constituent to Third Person; of Representative to Third Person; Scope
of Authority.
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL, see Liability of Constituent to Third Person; of
Representative
to Third Person; Ratiﬁcation.
Distinguished

UNINCORPORATED SOCIETIES,

see

Clubs

and Unincorporated

Societies.

USAGE AND CUSTOM, see Authority of Agent; Delegation of Authority; Lia
bility of Constituent to Third Person; Ratiﬁcation; Written Authority.
To compensate representative, p. 436 note.
Etfect of on agent's authority. 253 and note.
Knowledge of by principal, 231, pp. 25-1, 255 notes.
Incidents of legality, 253 and notes, 374.
Contrary to instructions, 256 and note, 398.
To reason or good morals, p. 256 note, 354, 375, 397.
To give warranty, see Authority of Agent, to sell.
As to remittance of funds, 426, 428.
WAGES, see Compensation of Representative;
Termination of Relation.
WAR, see Termination of Relation, by operation of law.
WARRANTIES, see Authority of Agent, to sell.

\
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WARRANTY OF AUTHORITY,
also, Liability

WIFE, see
WITNESS,

of Representative
Married Woman.

and cases following,
to Third Person.

p. 591

583

note;

see,

_

see Evidence.

A(7l‘S, p. 805 note.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
English Act of 1906, p. 794 ff.
Federal Act reaches what cases, p. 805 note,
Michigan Act, p. 796 if, p. 805 note, p. 907 if.
Contrasted with liability acts, 823.
V
How construed, 829 and note, $7, 839, 847
Rationale of Act, 810, 814, 821, 823, 827, 866.
Constitutionality of, 807 ff, p. 819 note, 825.
Effect on common law action, 807, 821 and note.
Deﬁnitionsof act, 807, 828, 831.

\Vorkmen, \vho included, 825, 826, 874.
negligence, fellow servant,
Defenses of contributory

assumed

risk,

S07,

810, 821, 846.

Excepted employments, agricultural and domestic, 875.
Hazardous employments, 807, 827, 875 and note.
Independent contractor, 874 and note.
Insurance, S08, S18, p. 921 ft.
.
Compensation provisions,
Accident, S31, 833 and note, 836, 839 and note.
Disease as, 839, 853.
Arising out of employment, 838, 843, 845, 848 and note, 849, 850,
853, 855, 862, S67. 868.

Horseplay, p. 851 note, 858, 859.
Course of employment. 838. 843, S45, 862, 867, 871.
Compensation, S08, 814, 820.
Damages, 807, 885, 886, 888.
Medical services, 879 and note.
Submitting to an operation, S81 and note.
Incapacity for work, 885. 886, SSS.
Serious and willful misconduct, 878.
Dependency for support, 891, 894, 896, S98, 900.

WRITING,

Contracts in, see Execution of Authority; Ratiﬁcation.
When required by statute of frauds, see Written Authority.

WRITTEN AUTHORITY,

see Authority of Agent: Construction
of Authority;
Power of Attorney; Scope of Authority; Trial.
When required by statute of frauds. 71, 72, 73, 112, 123, 148, 273, 437.
Parol evidence as to, see Evidence.
Expanded by implied, 280, 281 and note.

wnouoson DISCHARGE, see Termination
YEARLY mama, p. 199 note, 435.
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